History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization

General Editor D.P. Chattopadhyaya

Volume II Part 6

Pūrvamīmāṁsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View

edited by

K.T. PANDURANGI

PHISPC
Centre for Studies in Civilizations

Pūrvamīmāṁsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View

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HISTORY OF SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE IN INDIAN CIVILIZATION

General Editor & Project Director D.P. Chattopadhyaya

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Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture

CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN CIVILIZATIONS

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Publication of this Volume and much of the research it represents has been made possible by continuing grants with full financial assistance from the Department of Secondary and Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, which has supported multidisciplinary exploration of the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture.

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First published in 2006
by Professor Bhuvan Chandel, Member Secretary, CSC
for the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture
36 Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi 110062

Distributed by
Motilal Banarsidass
Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007

ISBN: 81-87586-25-7

Typeset in Baskerville, 11/14.3 pts.

Views expressed in the PHISPC publications are entirely of the concerned author/authors and do not represent the views of the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture.

Typeset by Digigrafics and
Printed at Pauls Press, New Delhi 110020

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Editors

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA studied, researched Law, Philosophy and History and taught at various Universities in India, Asia, Europe and USA from 1954 to 1994. Founder-Chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (1981-1990) and President-cum-Chairman of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla (1984-1991), Chattopadhyaya is currently the Project Director of the multidisciplinary 96-Vol. Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC) and Chairman of the Centre for Studies in Civilizations (CSC). Among his 34 publications, authored 17 and edited 17, are *Individuals and Societies* (1967), *Individuals and Worlds* (1976), *Sri Aurobindo and Karl Marx* (1988), *Anthropology and Historiography of Science*(1990), *Induction, Probability and Skepticism* (1991), *Sociology, Ideology and Utopia* (1997), *Societies, Cultures and Ideologies* (2000), *Interdisciplinary Studies in Science, Society, Value and Civilizational Dialogue* (2002) and *Philosophy of Science, Phenomenology and Other Essays* (2003). Besides, he has held high public Offices like Union Cabinet Ministership and State Governorship.

KRISHNACHARYA TAMMANACHARYA PANDURANGI belongs to a family of traditional scholars who have made distinct contribution to Dvaita Vedānta of Sri Anandatirtha (Madhvacharya) of Udupi. He taught at Karnataka College, Dharwad and Government College, Bangalore for more than two decades and later retired as the Head of the Post-Graduate Department of Sanskrit in Bangalore University. He was a former Member of Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan and Central Sanskrit Board. He was a Senior Fellow of Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Presently, he is Upakulapathi of Poornaprajna Vidyapeetha and Hon. Director of Dvaita Vedanta Foundation at Bangalore. He received Rashtrapati Award in 1989, Mahamahopadhyaya title in 1997 from Tirupati Sanskrit University and Sir William Jones Memorial Medal in 2005 from The Asiatic Society, Kolkata. His publications include *English Exposition of Prakaraṇapancikā of Śālikanātha* and some literary works such as *Kāvyāñjali, Ravīndra Rupakāni* and *Sanskrit Kavi Kāvya Darśana.* He has translated principal Upaniṣads into English according to Śrī Ānandatīrtha Bhāṣya and also Viṣṇutatvanirṇaya of Śrī Ānandatīrtha. Professor Pandurangi has contributed several articles to this volume which he has edited.

General Introduction

I

It is understandable that man, shaped by Nature, would like to know Nature. The human ways of knowing Nature are evidently diverse, theoretical and practical, scientific and technological, artistic and spiritual. This diversity has, on scrutiny, been found to be neither exhaustive nor exclusive. The complexity of physical nature, life-world and, particularly, human mind is so enormous that it is futile to follow a single method for comprehending all the aspects of the world in which we are situated.

One need not feel bewildered by the variety and complexity of the worldly phenomena. After all, both from traditional wisdom and our daily experience, we know that our own nature is not quite alien to the structure of the world. Positively speaking, the elements and forces that are out there in the world are also present in our body-mind complex, enabling us to adjust ourselves to our environment. Not only the natural conditions but also the social conditions of life have instructive similarities between them. This is not to underrate in any way the difference between the human ways of life all over the world. It is partly due to the variation in climatic conditions and partly due to the distinctness of production-related tradition, history and culture.

Three broad approaches are discernible in the works on historiography of civilization, comprising science and technology, art and architecture, social sciences and institutions. Firstly, some writers are primarily interested in discovering the general laws which govern all civilizations spread over different continents. They tend to underplay what they call the noisy local events of the external world and peculiarities of different languages, literatures and histories. Their accent is on the unity of Nature, the unity of science and the unity of mankind. The second group of writers, unlike the generalist or transcendentalist ones, attach primary importance to the distinctiveness of every culture. To these writers human freedom and creativity are extremely important and basic in character. Social institutions and the cultural articulations of human consciousness, they argue, are bound to be expressive of the concerned people's consciousness. By implication they tend to reject concepts like archetypal consciousness, universal mind and providential history. There is a third group of writers who offer a composite picture of civilizations, drawing elements both from their local and common characteristics. Every culture has its local roots and peculiarities. At the same time, it is pointed out that due to demographic migration and immigration over the centuries an element of compositeness emerges almost in every culture. When, due to a natural calamity or political exigencies people move from one part of the world to another, they carry with them, among other things, their language, cultural inheritance and their ways of living.

In the light of the above facts, it is not at all surprising that comparative anthropologists and philologists are intrigued by the striking similarity between different language families and the rites, rituals and myths of different peoples. Speculative philosophers of history, heavily

relying on the findings of epigraphy, ethnography, archaeology and theology, try to show in very general terms that the particulars and universals of culture are 'essentially' or 'secretly' interrelated. The spiritual aspects of culture like dance and music, beliefs pertaining to life, death and duties, on analysis, are found to be mediated by the material forms of life like weather forecasting, food production, urbanization and invention of script. The transition from the oral culture to the written one was made possible because of the mastery of symbols and rules of measurement. Speech precedes grammar, poetry prosody. All these show how the 'matters' and 'forms' of life are so subtly interwoven.

II

The PHISPC publications on History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, in spite of their unitary look, do recognize the differences between the areas of material civilization and those of ideational culture. It is not a work of a single author. Nor is it being executed by a group of thinkers and writers who are methodologically uniform or ideologically identical in their commitments. In conceiving the Project we have interacted with, and been influenced by, the writings and views of many Indian and non-Indian thinkers.

The attempted unity of this Project lies in its aim and inspiration. We have in India many scholarly works written by Indians on different aspects of our civilization and culture. Right from the pre-Christian era to our own time, India has drawn the attention of various countries of Asia, Europe and Africa. Some of these writings are objective and informative and many others are based on insufficient information and hearsay, and therefore not quite reliable, but they have their own value. Quality and view-points keep on changing not only because of the adequacy and inadequacy of evidence but also, and perhaps more so, because of the bias and prejudice, religious and political conviction, of the writers.

Besides, it is to be remembered that history, like Nature, is not an open book to be read alike by all. The past is mainly enclosed and only partially disclosed. History is, therefore, partly objective or 'real' and largely a matter of construction. This is one of the reasons why some historians themselves think that it is a form of literature or art. However, it does not mean that historical construction is 'anarchic' and arbitrary. Certainly, imagination plays an important role in it.

But its character is basically dependent upon the *questions* which the historian raises and wants to understand or answer in terms of the ideas and actions of human beings in the past ages. In a way, history, somewhat like the natural sciences, is engaged in answering questions and in exploring relationships of cause and effect between events and developments across time. While in the natural sciences, the scientist poses questions about nature in the form of hypotheses, expecting to elicit authoritative answers to such questions, the historian studies the past, partly for the sake of understanding it for its own sake and partly also for the light which the past throws upon the present, and the possibilities which it opens up for moulding the future. But the difference between the two approaches must not be lost sight of. The scientist is primarily interested in discovering laws and framing theories, in terms of which, different events and processes can be connected and anticipated. His interest in the conditions or circumstances attending the concerned events is secondary. Therefore, scientific laws turn out to be basically abstract and easily expressible in terms of mathematical language. In contrast,

the historian's main interest centres round the *specific* events, human ideas and actions, not *general* laws. So, the historian, unlike the scientist, is obliged to pay primary attention to the circumstances of the events he wants to study. Consequently, history, like most other humanistic disciplines, is concrete and particularist. This is not to deny the obvious truth that historical events and processes consisting of human ideas and actions show some trend or other and weave some pattern or other. If these trends and patterns were not there at all in history, the study of history as a branch of knowledge would not have been profitable or instructive. But one must recognize that historical trends and patterns, unlike scientific laws and theories, are not general or purported to be universal in their scope.

III

The aim of this Project is to discover the main aspects of Indian culture and present them in an interrelated way. Since our culture has influenced, and has been influenced by, the neighbouring cultures of West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and South-East Asia, attempts have been made here to trace and study these influences in their mutuality. It is well known that during the last three centuries, European presence in India, both political and cultural, has been very widespread. In many volumes of the Project considerable attention has been paid to Europe and through Europe to other parts of the world. For the purpose of a comprehensive cultural study of India, the existing political boundaries of the South Asia of today are more of a hindrance than help. Cultures, like languages, often transcend the bounds of changing political territories.

If the inconstant political geography is not a reliable help to the understanding of the layered structure and spread of culture, a somewhat comparable problem is encountered in the area of historical periodization. Periodization or segmenting time is a very tricky affair. When exactly one period ends and another begins is not precisely ascertainable. The periods of history designated as ancient, medieval and modern are purely conventional and merely heuristic in character. The varying scopes of history, local, national and continental or universal, somewhat like the periods of history, are unavoidably fuzzy and shifting. Amidst all these difficulties, the volume-wise details have been planned and worked out by the editors in consultation with the Project Director and the General Editor. I believe that the editors of different volumes have also profited from the reactions and suggestions of the contributors of individual chapters in planning the volumes.

Another aspect of Indian history which the volume-editors and contributors of the Project have carefully dealt with is the distinction and relation between civilization and culture. The material conditions which substantially shaped Indian civilization have been discussed in detail. From agriculture and industry to metallurgy and technology, from physics and chemical practices to the life sciences and different systems of medicines—all the branches of knowledge and skill which directly affect human life—form the heart of this Project. Since the periods covered by the PHISPC are extensive—prehistory, proto-history, early history, medieval history and modern history of India—we do not claim to have gone into all the relevant material conditions of human life. We had to be selective. Therefore, one should not be surprised if one finds that only some material aspects of Indian civilization have received our pointed attention, while the rest have been dealt with in principle or only alluded to.

One of the main aims of the Project has been to spell out the first principles of the philosophy of different schools, both pro-Vedic and anti-Vedic. The basic ideas of Buddhism,

Jainism and Islam have been given their due importance. The special position accorded to philosophy is to be understood partly in terms of its proclaimed unifying character and partly to be explained in terms of the fact that different philosophical systems represent alternative world-views, cultural perspectives, their conflict and mutual assimilation.

Most of the volume-editors and at their instance the concerned contributors have followed a middle path between the extremes of narrativism and theoreticism. The underlying idea has been this: if in the process of working out a comprehensive Project like this every contributor attempts to narrate all those interesting things that he has in the back of his mind, the enterprise is likely to prove unmanageable. If, on the other hand, particular details are consciously forced into a fixed mould or pre-supposed theoretical structure, the details lose their particularity and interesting character. Therefore, depending on the nature of the problem of discourse, most of the writers have tried to reconcile in their presentation, the specificity of narrativism and the generality of theoretical orientation. This is a conscious editorial decision. Because, in the absence of a theory, however inarticulate it may be, the factual details tend to fall apart. Spiritual network or theoretical orientation makes historical details not only meaningful but also interesting and enjoyable.

Another editorial decision which deserves spelling out is the necessity or avoidability of duplication of the same theme in different volumes or even in the same volume. Certainly, this Project is not an assortment of several volumes. Nor is any volume intended to be a miscellany. This Project has been designed with a definite end in view and has a structure of its own. The character of the structure has admittedly been influenced by the variety of the themes accommodated within it. Again it must be understood that the complexity of structure is rooted in the aimed integrality of the Project itself.

IV

Long and in-depth editorial discussion has led us to several unanimous conclusions. Firstly, our Project is going to be *unique,* unrivalled and discursive in its attempt to integrate different forms of science, technology, philosophy and culture. Its comprehensive scope, continuous character and accent on culture distinguish it from the works of such Indian authors as P.C. Ray, B.N. Seal, Binoy Kumar Sarkar and S.N. Sen and also from such Euro-American writers as Lynn Thorndike, George Sarton and Joseph Needham. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that it is for the first time that an endeavour of so comprehensive a character, in its exploration of the social, philosophical and cultural characteristics of a distinctive world civilization—that of India—has been attempted in the domain of scholarship.

Secondly, we try to show the linkages between different branches of learning as different modes of experience in an *organic* manner and without resorting to a kind of reductionism, materialistic or spiritualistic. The internal dialectics of organicism without reductionism allows fuzziness, discontinuity and discreteness within limits.

Thirdly, positively speaking, different modes of human experience—scientific, artistic, etc., have their own individuality, not necessarily autonomy. Since all these modes are modification and articulation of *human* experience, these are bound to have between them some finely graded commonness. At the same time, it has been recognized that reflection on different areas of experience and investigation brings to light new insights and findings. Growth

of knowledge requires humans, in general, and scholars, in particular, to identify the distinctness of different branches of learning.

Fourthly, to follow simultaneously the twin principles of: (a) individuality of human experience as a whole, and (b) individuality of diverse disciplines, are not at all an easy task. Overlap of themes and duplication of the terms of discourse become unavoidable at times. For example, in the context of *Dharmaśāstra*, the writer is bound to discuss the concept of value. The same concept also figures in economic discourse and also occurs in a discussion on fine arts. The conscious editorial decision has been that, while duplication should be kept to its minimum, for the sake of intended clarity of the themes under discussion, their reiteration must not be avoided at high intellectual cost.

Fifthly, the scholars working on the Project are drawn from widely different disciplines. They have brought to our notice an important fact that has clear relevance to our work. Many of our contemporary disciplines like economics and sociology did not exist, at least not in their present form, just two centuries ago or so. For example, before the middle of nineteenth century, sociology as a distinct branch of knowledge was unknown. The term is said to have been coined first by the French philosopher Auguste Comte in 1838. Obviously, this does not mean that the issues discussed in sociology were not there. Similarly, Adam Smith's (1723–90) famous work *The Wealth of Nations* is often referred to as the first authoritative statement of the principles of (what we now call) economics. Interestingly enough, the author was equally interested in ethics and jurisprudence. It is clear from history that the nature and scope of different disciplines undergo change, at times very radically, over time. For example, in India '*Arthaśāstra*' does not mean the science of economics as understood today. Besides the principles of economics, the *Arthaśāstra* of ancient India discusses at length those of governance, diplomacy and military science.

Sixthly, this brings us to the next editorial policy followed in the Project. We have tried to remain very conscious of what may be called indeterminacy or inexactness of translation. When a word or expression of one language is translated into another, some loss of meaning or exactitude seems to be unavoidable. This is true not only in the bilingual relations like Sanskrit-English and Sanskrit-Arabic, but also in those of Hindi-Tamil and Hindi-Bengali. In recognition of the importance of language-bound and context-relative character of meaning we have solicited from many learned scholars, contributions, written in vernacular languages. In order to minimize the miseffect of semantic inexactitude we have solicited translational help of that type of bilingual scholars who know both English and the concerned vernacular language, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali or Marathi.

Seventhly and finally, perhaps the place of technology as a branch of knowledge in the composite universe of science and art merits some elucidation. Technology has been conceived in very many ways, e.g., as autonomous, as 'standing reserve', as liberating or enlargemental, and alienative or estrangemental force. The studies undertaken by the Project show that, in spite of its much emphasized mechanical and alienative characteristics, technology embodies a very useful mode of knowledge that is peculiar to man. The Greek root words of technology are *techne* (art) and *logos* (science). This is the basic justification of recognizing technology as closely related to both epistemology, the discipline of valid knowledge, and axiology, the discipline of freedom and values. It is in this context that we are reminded of the definition of man as *homo technikos*. In Sanskrit, the word closest to *techne* is *kalā* which means any practical

art, any mechanical or fine art. In the Indian tradition, in *Śaivatantra*, for example, among the arts (*kalā*) are counted dance, drama, music, architecture, metallurgy, knowledge of dictionary, encyclopaedia and prosody. The closeness of the relation between arts and sciences, technology and other forms of knowledge are evident from these examples and was known to the ancient people. The human quest for knowledge involves the use of both head and hand. Without mind, the body is a corpse and the disembodied mind is a bare abstraction. Even for our appreciation of what is beautiful and the creation of what is valuable, we are required to exercise both our intellectual competence and physical capacity. In a manner of speaking, one might rightly affirm that our psychosomatic structure is a functional connector between what we are and what we could be, between the physical and the beyond. To suppose that there is a clear-cut distinction between the physical world and the psychosomatic one amounts to denial of the possible emergence of higher logico-mathematical, musical and other capacities. The very availability of aesthetic experience and creation proves that the supposed distinction is somehow overcome by what may be called the bodily self or embodied mind.

V

The ways of classification of arts and sciences are neither universal nor permanent. In the Indian tradition, in the *Ṛgveda*, for example, *vidyā* (or sciences) are said to be four in number: (i) *Trayī*, the triple Veda; (ii) *Ānvīkṣikī*, logic and metaphysics; (iii) *Daṇḍanīti*, science of governance; (iv) *Vārtta*, practical arts such as agriculture, commerce, medicine, etc. Manu speaks of a fifth *vidyā* viz., *Ātma-vidyā*, knowledge of self or of spiritual truth. According to many others, *vidyā* has fourteen divisions, viz., the four Vedas, the six *Vedāngas*, the *Purāṇas*, the *Mīmāṁsā*, *Nyaya*, and *Dharma* or law. At times, the four *Upavedas* are also recognized by some as *vidyā*. *Kalās* are said to be 33 or even 64.

In the classical tradition of India, the word *śāstra* has at times been used as a synonym of *vidyā*. *Vidyā* denotes instrument of teaching, manual or compendium of rules, religious or scientific treatise. The word *śāstra* is usually found after the word referring to the subject of the book, e.g., *Dharma-śāstra, Artha-śāstra, Alaṁkara-śāstra* and *Mokṣa-śāstra.* Two other words which have been frequently used to denote different branches of knowledge are *jñāna* and *vijñāna.* While *jñāna* means knowing, knowledge, especially the higher form of it, *vijñāna* stands for the act of distinguishing or discerning, understanding, comprehending and recognizing. It means worldly or profane knowledge as distinguished from *jñāna*, knowledge of the divine.

It must be said here that the division of knowledge is partly conventional and partly administrative or practical. It keeps on changing from culture to culture, from age to age. It is difficult to claim that the distinction between *jñāna* and *vijñāna* or that between science and art is universal. It is true that even before the advent of modern age, both in the East and the West, two basic aspects of science started gaining recognition. One is the *specialized character* of what we call scientific knowledge. The other is the concept of *trained skill* which was brought close to scientific knowledge. In the medieval Europe, the expression 'the seven liberal sciences' has very often been used simultaneously with 'the seven liberal arts', meaning thereby, the group of studies by the *Trivium* (Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric) and *Quadrivium* (Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy).

It may be observed here, as has already been alluded to earlier, that the division between different branches of knowledge, between theory and practice, was not pushed to an extreme extent in the early ages. *Praxis*, for example, was recognized as the prime *techne*. The Greek word, *technologia* stood for systematic treatment, for example, of Grammar. *Praxis* is not the mere application of *theoria*, unified vision or integral outlook, but it also stands for the active impetus and base of knowledge. In India, one often uses the terms *Prayukti-vidyā* and *Prayodyogika-vidyā* to emphasize the practical or applicative character of knowledge. *Prayoga* or application is both the test and base of knowledge. Doing is the best way of knowing and learning.

That one and the same word may mean different 'things' or concepts in different cultures and thus create confusion has already been stated before. Two such words which in the context of this Project under discussion deserve special mention are *dharma* and *itihāsa*. Ordinarily, *dharma* in Sanskrit-rooted languages is taken to be conceptual equivalent of the English word *religion*. But, while the meaning of religion is primarily theological, that of *dharma* seems to be manifold. Literally, *dharma* stands for that which is established or that which holds people steadfastly together. Its other meanings are law, rule, usage, practice, custom, ordinance and statute. Spiritual or moral merit, virtue, righteousness and good works are also denoted by it. Further, *dharma* stands for natural qualities like burning (of fire), liquidity (of water) and fragility (of glass). Thus one finds that meanings of *dharma* are of many types—legal, social, moral, religious or spiritual, and even ontological or physical. All these meanings of *dharma* have received due attention of the writers in the relevant contexts of different volumes.

This Project, being primarily historical as it is, has naturally paid serious attention to the different concepts of history—epic-mythic, artistic-narrative, scientific-causal, theoretical and ideological. Perhaps the point that must be mentioned first about history is that it is not a correct translation of the Sanskrit word *itihāsa*. Etymologically, it means what really happened (*iti-ha-āsa*). But, as we know, in the Indian tradition *purāṇa* (legend, myth, tale, etc.), *gāthā* (ballad), *itivṛtta* (description of past occurrence, event, etc.), *ākhyāyikā* (short narrative) and *vaṁśa-carita* (genealogy) have been consciously accorded a very important place. Things started changing with the passage of time and particularly after the effective presence of Islamic culture in India. Islamic historians, because of their own cultural moorings and the influence of the Semitic and Graeco-Roman cultures on them, were more particular about their facts, figures and dates than their Indian predecessors. Their aim to bring history close to statecraft, social conditions and the lives and teachings of the religious leaders imparted a mundane character to this branch of learning. The Europeans whose political appearance on the Indian scene became quite perceptible only towards the end of the eighteenth century brought in with them their own view of historiography in their cultural baggage. The impact of the Newtonian Revolution in the field of history was very faithfully worked out, among others, by David Hume (1711–76) in *History of Great Britain from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688* (6 Vols., 1754–62) and Edward Gibbon (1737–94) in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (6 Vols., 1776–88). Their emphasis on the principles of causality, datability and continuity/linearity of historical events introduced the spirit of scientific revolution in European historiography. The introduction of English education in India and the exposure of the elites of the country to it largely account for the decline of the traditional concept of *itihāsa* and the rise of the post-Newtonian scientific historiography. Gradually, Indian writers of our own history and cultural heritage started using more and more European concepts and categories. This is not to suggest that the impact of the European

historiography on Indian historians was entirely negative. On the contrary, it imparted an analytical and critical temper which motivated many Indian historians of the nineteenth century to try to discover and represent our heritage in a new way.

VI

The principles which have been followed for organizing the subjects of different volumes under this Project may be stated in this way. We have kept in view the main structures which are discernible in the decomposible composition of the world. The first structure may be described as physical and chemical. The second structure consists, broadly speaking, of biology, psychology and epistemology. The highest and the most abstract structure nests many substructures within it, for example, logic, mathematics and musical notes. It is well known that the substructures within each structure are interactive, i.e., not isolable. The more important point to be noted in this connection is that the basic three structures of the world, viz., (a) physico-chemical, (b) bio-psychological, and (c) logico-mathematical are all simultaneously open to upward and downward causation. In other words, while the physico-chemical structure can causally influence the bio-psychological one and the latter can causally influence the most abstract logico-mathematical, the reverse process of causation is also operative in the world. In spite of its relative abstractness and durability, the logico-mathematical world has its downward causal impact on our bio-psychological and epistemological processes and products. And the latter can also bring about change in the structures of the physical world and its chemical composition. Applied physics and bio-technology make the last point abundantly clear.

Many philosophers, life-scientists, and social scientists highlight the point that nature loves hierarchies. Herbert Simon, the economist and the management scientist, speaks of four steps of partial ordering of our world, namely, (i) chemical substances, (ii) living organisms, tissues and organs, (iii) genes, chromosomes and DNA, and (iv) human beings, the social organizations, programmes and information process. All these views are in accord with the anti-reductionist character of our Project. Many biologists defend this approach by pointing out that certain characteristics of biological phenomena and process like unpredictability, randomness, uniqueness, magnitude of stochastic perturbations, complexity and emergence cannot be reduced without recourse to physical laws.

The main subjects dealt with in different volumes of the Project are connected not only conceptually and synchronically but also historically or diachronically. For pressing practical reasons, however, we did not aim at presenting the prehistorical, proto-historical and historical past of India in a continuous or chronological manner. Besides, it has been shown in the presentation of the PHISPC that the process of history is non-linear. And this process is to be understood in terms of human praxis and an absence of general laws in history. Another point which deserves special mention is that the editorial advisors have taken a conscious decision not to make this historical Project primarily political. We felt that this area of history has always been receiving extensive attention. Therefore, the customary discussion of dynastic rule and succession will not be found in a prominent way in this series. Instead, as said before, most of the available space has been given to social, scientific, philosophical and other cultural aspects of Indian civilization.

Having stated this, it must be admitted that our departure from conventional style of writing Indian history is not total. We have followed an inarticulate framework of time in organizing and presenting the results of our studies. The first volume, together with its parts, deals with the prehistorical period to A.D. 300. The next two volumes, together with their parts, deal with, among other things, the development of social and political institutions and philosophical and scientific ideas from A.D. 300 to the beginning of the eleventh century A.D. The next period with which this Project is concerned spans from the twelfth century to the early part of the eighteenth century. The last three centuries constitute the fourth period covered by this Project. But, as said before, the definition of all these periods by their very nature are inexact and merely indicative.

Two other points must be mentioned before I conclude this General Introduction to the series. The history of some of the subjects like religion, language and literature, philosophy, science and technology cannot for obvious reason be squeezed within the cramped space of the periodic moulds. Attempts to do so result in thematic distortion. Therefore, the reader will often see the overflow of some ideas from one period to another. I have already drawn attention to this tricky and fuzzy and also the misleading aspects of the periodization of history, if pressed beyond a point.

Secondly, strictly speaking, history knows no end. Every age rewrites its history. Every generation, beset with new issues, problems and questions, looks back to its history and reinterprets and renews its past. This shows why history is not only contemporaneous but also futural. Human life actually knows no separative wall between its past, present and future. Its cognitive enterprises, moral endeavours and practical activities are informed of the past, oriented by the present and addressed to the future. This process persists, consciously or unconsciously, wittingly or unwittingly. In the narrative of this Project, we have tried to represent this complex and fascinating story of Indian civilization.

Centre for Studies in Civilizations
New Delhi

D.P. Chattopadhyaya
General Editor

Contributors

SAMIRAN CHANDRA CHAKRABARTI, Professor, School of Vedic Studies, Rabindrabharati University, Kolkata, was earlier Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Professor and Director of the same institution. He is also a Guest Lecturer in German in Calcutta University, an Honorary Visiting Professor in Centre for Indolgical Studies and Research, Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Kolkata and a Fellow of the Asiatic Society, Kolkata. His publications include *The Paribhāṣās in the Śrautasūtras, Some Aspects of Vedic Studies (ed.); Buddhism and World Culture (ed.); Vedic Studies; The Value System as reflected in the Veda; Concept of Puruṣārthas, Brāhmaṇasaṁgraha* and many papers in felicitation volumes and journals of India and abroad. The awards received by him are Griffith Memorial Prize in Humanities, Calcutta University, 1983; Award from M.S. Rashtriya Vedavidya Pratisthana, Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2000; Rising Personalities of India Award, International Penguin Publishing House, Delhi, 2003 and Sanskrit Day Award 2004, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Kolkata.

D PRAHLADA CHAR, former Vice-Chancellor of Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati has also served Sri Chamarajendra Government Sanskrit College Bangalore and the Department, of Sanskrit, Bangalore University for more than 3 decades in various capacities. He was Secretary of Poornaprajna Vidyapeetha and has been associated with various universities and other academic institutions like BHU, JNU, ICPR, ABMM, SLBS, R.S. Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, U.S. Sansthan, New Delhi, Sampoornananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi, Central Sanskrit Board, New Delhi, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi and Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore. He has published more than 75 research-papers and many books, edited several Sanskrit works viz., *Gītā Tātparya, Gītā Bhāṣya,* Bhedojjeevanam, *Tantrasāra Sangraha, Saptopaniṣad Bhasyam, Śeṣa Tātparya Candrikā, Māyāvāda Khandanam* and *Vyāsayogī Caritam.* He has been the recipient of many awards like Tanditaratnam, Madhwa Shastra Nidhi, Pandita Kulabhushanam etc. including the Vedavyas a National Sanskrit award 2002 by the UGC.

SINDHU SADASHIV DANGE was earlier the R.G. Bhandarkar Professor and Head, Department of Sanskrit in University of Mumbai. She has to her credit 126 published research articles and 15 published books - 9 authored, 1 co-authored and 5 edited. She contributed 7 chapters to different Encyclopaedias. She received felicitation from the State Government of Maharashtra (1997) as well as from the Ministry of HRD, Government of India (2000). She was also awarded Shri Guru Gangeshvaranand Veda Vedanga Purashkar by the Sarada Pratisthan, Nasik (2004). Her publications include *The Bhāgavata Purāṇa — Mytho-Social Study; Hindu Domestic Rituals — A Critical Glance; Aspects of Speech in Vedic Ritual* and *Vedic Beliefs and Practices through Arthavāda (ed.)*

K.E. Devanathan, Professor (Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) in R.S. Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, had earlier worked in Sri C.S.N.S. Mahavidyalaya, Kancheepuram and LBS Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, New Delhi. His major publications include *Bhāvana Mukhya Viśeṣyaka Bodha Nirūpaṇam; Kāraka Vibhaktyartha Nirūpaṇam; Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhāntānusareṇam Khyatitattvanirūpaṇam; Avacchedakatā Sāra's Commentary* and *Prāmāṇyavāda Khaṇḍanam.* He has also published 7 major papers in academic journals. He was given the title Nyāya Vibhuṣanam by Sudharmaraksana Parisat, Tenal, Andhra Pradesh and was honoured by several institutions for his scholarship.

Trivikram Narayan Dharmadhikari has worked as a Researcher, Editor, Secretary, Director and Śāstra Cūḍāmanī Scholar during various period in Vaidika Samshodhana Mandala in Pune. He has also worked as guest Lecturer in several institutions. His publications include *Taittirīya Saṁhitā; Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts; Yajñāyudhāni,* a pictorial album of sacrificial utensils, along with full description based on Vedic sources and *Āpali Vaidic Sanskriti* in Marathi. He has written about 100 papers in various academic journals. He was honoured by the Government of Maharashtra and received various academic awards like Veda Vedānga Gangeshbarananda Puraskara, Shri Gangeshvarananda Veda-Rama Puraskara, Rigveda Puraskara, Rashtrapati Puraskara, Vidwat Puraskara, Purushottama Puraskara, Yajñavalkya Puraskara, Kanchi pith-Pithadhirohana Suvarnajayanti Puraskara and Sanskrit Bhasha Puraskara by different institutions.

Ujjwala Jha, Reader, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Pune. She has written many papers in academic journals and participated in large number of seminars. Her publications are *Reconstruction of the Third School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā; Some Issues in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra;* Marathi Translation of the *Śabarabhāṣya: Vol I; A Critical Edition of the Amṛtabindu of Candra, Mīmāṁsā Philosophy of Language* and *A Primer of Navya Nyāya Language and Methodology.*

M. Rama Jois, Senior Advocate in the Supreme Court and honorary Professor in National Law School of India University, Bangalore, was Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court and Governor of State of Jharkhand and Bihar. He was enrolled as an Advocate of Karnataka High Court in 1959 and was appointed judge there in November 1977. He has been the Vice-President of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bangalore and the President, Bharat Vikas Parishad since 1999. He was awarded Naresh Chandra Sen Gupta Gold Medal by Asiatic Society, Calcutta for outstanding contribution to the study of Society and Law, Ancient and Modern, in May 1999. He was also awarded Doctor of Laws (LLD) by Kuvempu University, Karnataka in March, 2004 for his life time contribution in legal and academic fields. His publications include *Services under the State; Legal and Constitutional History of India* and *Need for Amending the Constitution.*

MARKANDEY KATJU, Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, was earlier Chief Justice of High Court of Madras. Initially, he practiced law in the Allahabad High Court specializing in Labour Law, Taxation and Writ Petitions. He has also worked as Standing Counsel, Income Tax Department, served as a Member, International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ) and attended conference in Switzerland in October 2000 and various law related conferences in Delhi and elsewhere. He was elevated to the Bench in 1991, and since then has given several landmark judgments. One of his major judgments delivered in the Madras High Court is on the constitutional question of inter se relationship between the Judiciary and the Executive and the doctrine of judicial restraint (AIR 2005 Madras 1). His publications include *Law in the Scientific Era*; *Interpretation of Taxing Statutes* and *Domestic Enquiry*.

SHASHIPRABHA KUMAR, Chairperson, Special Centre for Sanskrit Studies, JNU, had earlier taught at the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, Department of Sanskrit at Maitreyi College, New Delhi and R.G. Post Graduate College, Meerut. She has published 14 books and contributed more than 60 research paper for academic journals. She has received several prestigious awards including Sri Ramakrishna Sanskrit Award (World Education Foundation, Canada, 2003) and Shankar Puraskar (K.K. Birla Foundation, New Delhi, 1998) for her first book entitled *Vaiśeṣika Darśana mein Padārtha-Nirūpaṇa.*

VEERA NARAYANA N.K. PANDURANGI, Acharya in the Natural Language processing unit, Shastravaridhi, Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati has earlier worked as lecturer in Poornaprajṇa Vidyapeetha Bangalore and as a researcher in the French Institute of Pondicherry where he worked on Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya's Śabdabodhamīmāṁsā. His major publications include *Samavāyavimarśaḥ;* partial translation of *Nyāya Sudhā* and *Muktitattva* etc.

S. REVATHY, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Madras, has participated in over 50 national and international seminars and conferences and published 37 papers including 4 articles for PHISPC Volumes. Her publications include *Three Little Known Advaitins* and *Manamala of Acyutakṛṣṇānandatīrtha* with English Translation and Notes. She has received several awards including Ram Krishna Sanskrit Award for Distinguished and Outstanding Contributions of Sanskrit Research and Teaching in India and Krishna Tadacarya Endowment Award.

R. KRISHNAMURTHI SASTRY, former Principal of Vedanta Sanskrit College, Chennai, has served the institution as Professor for 3 decades. He has attended many academic seminars and published papers in academic journals.

N. VEEZHINATHAN, a specialist in *Nyāya* and Vedānta, was Head, Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras. A recipient of Jawaharlal Nehru Fellowship, he has published many papers and edited important classical philosophical texts in Sanskrit. His publications include: *Saṅksepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman* (ed. with Introduction, English translation, and notes); *Śaṅkara-vijaya of Anantānandagiri; Tarkasaṅgraha-dīpikā-prakāśikā* with commentary, *Bālapriyā* and *In Adoration of the Self.*

Introduction

K.T. Pandurangi

Mīmāṁsā Darśana is one of the six systems of Indian philosophy and is a very ancient one. The terms '*mīmāṁsā*' and '*mīmāṁsante*' occur in Brāhmaṇas and refer to discussions of meaning of Vedic passages dealing with the performance of sacrifices. In due course such discussions developed into a systematic *śāstra* and Jaimini wrote these *Sūtras*. There are two thousand seven hundred *sūtras* arranged in twelve chapters. These chapters normally have four *pādās* but third, sixth and tenth chapters are Śarabhapādās, i.e. have eight *pādās*. There are about a thousand *adhikaraṇas* or topics for discussion.

According to our tradition Jaimini was a disciple of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vedavyāsa and lived at the close of Dvāpara (31,000 B.C.). However, modern scholars assign him to third century B.C.

The purpose served by Pūrvamīmāṁsā is three-fold.

1. Evolving the rules of interpretations or nyāyas for the interpretation of Vedic passages. Therefore, this *śāstra* is called '*Vākyaśāstra*.'

2. Giving authoritative rulings on sacrificial matters such as *adhikāra*, *aṅga*, *atideśa*, *ūha*, *bādha*, *tantra*, etc., and fixing the correct procedure and the nature of sacrifices (*Karmabheda* and *krama*). For this reason it is called *Karma mīmāṁsā*.

3. It is also a *Darśana* or one of the philosophical systems and hence discusses *Pramāṇas* and *prameyas*. In this connection, the contributions made by Pūrvamīmāṁsā for the concepts of *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* and *svataḥprāmāṇya* are very valuable. Its concepts of *ātman*, *mokṣa*, etc., are peculiar and are eclipsed by the great heights achieved in Vedānta on these concepts. Keeping the discussion of these in mind, the system is considered as *Darśana* and is called *Mīmāṁsā Darśana*.

Jaimini refers to certain earlier thinkers in his *sūtras* such as Bādari, Kāṣṇājini, Ātreya, Aitiśayana and Kāmukāyana. The modern scholars surmise that they are likely to have written similar *sūtras* which are lost to us. However, such a surmise does not have sufficient evidence.

Three *vṛttis* or short commentaries seem to have been written on *Jaimini Sūtras* by Baudhāyana, Upavarṣa and Bhavadāsa. These are not available to us. The extract of Upavarṣa's *vṛttis* are incorporated in *Śabara Bhāṣya*. The first two seem to have written their *vṛttis* both on *Jaimini Sūtras* and *Bādarāyana Sūtras*.

Śabara wrote his *Bhāṣya* during A.D. 200. Bhatṛmitra's (A.D. 400) commentary on this was written before Kumārila. It is not available. Kumārila (A.D. 620–703) was a versatile scholar who wrote three commentaries, namely, *Ślokavārtika, Tantravārtika* and *Tup-ṭīka* on different portions of *Śābara Bhāṣya.* The main object of *Ślokavārtika* was to offer a strong criticism of the Buddhist doctrine, and the remaining commentaries were intended for a detailed exposition of *Jaimini Sūtras* and Śabara's *Bhāṣya.* With Kumārila commenced the Bhaṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṁsā. With Prabhākara's (A.D. 650–700) *Bṛhati* or *Vivaraṇa* started the Prābhākara school, Murāri's third school did not develop further. Umveka, Suchāritra Miśra, Pārthasārathi, Bhavadeva, Mādhavācārya, Bhaṭṭa Someśvara and Khaṇḍa Deva are important writers of Bhaṭṭa school while Śālikanātha, Bhāvanātha, Nandīsvara are the important writers on the Prābhākara side.

With a view to make the Mīmāṁsā thoughts available to modern scholars, some important works of Mīmāṁsā have been translated to English. Dr. Ganganath Jha has translated the entire *Śabara Bhāṣya,* and *Śloka Vārtika* and *Tantra Vārtika* of Kumārlia into English. He has also published a study of *Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā.* Dr. Pasupathinatha Sastry has published a study of *Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā.* Dr. Kunhan Raja has edited *Bṛhati* of Prābhākara with *Ṛju Vimala* of Śālikanātha with a detailed introduction in English. K.S. Rama Swamy has edited *Tantra-Rahasya* of Śrī Rāmānuja with a detailed introduction in English. Professor Kuppuswami Sastry has edited *Vibhrama Viveka* and *Bhāvana Viveka* with a detailed introduction in English. Dr. V.A. Ramaswamy Sastry gives a detailed account of Pūrvamīmāṁsā literature in the introduction to *Tattva Bindu.*

Professor Pandurangi has edited *Bhaṭṭa Saṅgraha* of Śrī Rāghavendratīrtha with an exposition in English. He has also prepared an exposition in English on *Prakaraṇa Pañcika* of Śālikanātha. *Artha Saṅgraha* has been translated into English by half a dozen scholars.

Śabara Bhāṣya and a few other mīmāṁsā works are translated into Bengali, Marathi and other modern Indian languages. These provide a good knowledge of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to modern scholars.

In evolving a methodology for ritual organization, Pūrvamīmāṁsā has evolved such well-organized and detailed guidelines that these are useful for any programme organization. To substantiate this observation, I will only mention the plan of *Jaiminī Sūtras* in this respect spread over from Chapters II to XII. First the *Karmasvarūpa* and *Karmabheda,* i.e. identifying the programme and distinguishing different programmes are discussed. Then *Śeṣa* and *Śeṣin* or *Aṅga* and *Pradhāna,* that is to say the guidelines to determine the main programme or items, and subordinate programmes or items are discussed. Next follows the discussion of *Kratvārtha* and *Puruṣārtha,* i.e. the items that are meant for achieving the programme and the items meant for the person undertaking the programme.

Then *Krama* or sequence, and eligibility, i.e. *Adhikāra* are discussed. These chapters are called *Upadeśa* section.

Then *Atideśa* is discussed in a general way and in respect of particular programmes and items. Pūrvamīmāṁsā classifies the ritual programmes into two types, *Prakṛti,* i.e. independently set programmes and *Vikṛti,* derived programmes. It is in the case of derived programmes that *Atideśa* or borrowing certain items from *Prakṛti* is necessary. The provision for such *Atideśa* or borrowing needs two consequential adjustments. These are *ūha* and

Bādha. *Ūha* is substitution. For instance, if the deities in the *Prakṛti* and the *Vikṛti* are different, the name of the deity in the *Prakṛti* has to be substituted by the name of the deity in *Vikṛti* in the hymn. Such *ūha* or substitution will be in respect of *Mantra*, *Sāman* and *Saṁskāra*. *Bādha* is withdrawing or non-performance of certain items of *Prakṛti* in *Vikṛti*. Every item serves certain purpose in the ritual. If the purpose served in *Prakṛti* by an item is not to be served in *Vikṛti*, that item has to be withdrawn. After discussing these consequential items of ritual organization in the case of *Vikṛti*, two important techniques of ritual organization to effect are discussed. These are *Tantra* and *Prasaṅga*. *Tantra* is the technique of single performance with reference to many, while *Prasaṅga* is the technique of one item serving the purpose of another also. These two are intended to avoid repetition and economize the effort.

These guidelines of ritual programme organization are formulated to efficiently organize the rituals and illustrated with ritual items. However, many of these could be applied to any other programme organization.

The contribution of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to linguistics is equally significant. Mīmāṁsā primarily depends upon *Śabdapramāṇa* and therefore, it goes deep into *Śabdapramāṇa*. *Apauruśeyatva* concept of Pūrvamīmāṁsā has made the language autonomous at three important levels of the linguistic communication, viz., (a) the relation between the world and meaning, (b) the formulation of the sentence, (c) determination of the purport of the passage or discourse.

It is well-known that Pūrvamīmāṁsā considers the relation between the world and the meaning as natural and permanent. It is not caused by any human agency or artificial device. A meaningful expression is always associated with its meaning. The relation between the two is autonomous.

Similarly, a Vedic sentence is not formulated by human agency. The words in a sentence are intended to yield a syntactically organized meaning. The action is the centre of semantic organization. Such an organized communication is the very nature and purpose of the words in a sentence. Therefore, no human agency or any other artificial device is necessary to formulate a sentence.

Thus at the level of the formulation of the sentence also language is autonomous.

To ascertain the purport of a passage or a discourse also, Mīmāṁsā has formulated certain guidelines such as *upakrama*, *upasaṁhāra*, etc., that are internal to the language and has made the determination of purport of passage or discourse autonomous. Thus the concept of *Apauruṣeyatva* has far-reaching linguistic implications.

The two theories of sentence meaning, viz., *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* are the most important contributions of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to the linguistics. All other systems of Indian philosophy have adopted one of these two theories with some modifications. The concept of *Bhāvana* and its being the centre of semantic organization is also an important point.

The primary purpose of Pūrvamīmāṁsā is to interpret Vedic statements that describe the sacrifices. For this purpose Mīmāṁsā has evolved certain rules of interpretation. These are designated as Pūrvamīmāṁsā Nyāyas. These are meticulously utilized to determine the nature of sacrifice, its auxilaries and the procedure.

The Vedānta also develops its doctrines by the interpretation of *Śruti*. Hence, Pūrvamīmāṁsā rules of interpretation are utilized for interpreting the *śruti* passages.

Dharmaśāstra texts such as Dharma Sūtras, Smṛtis and later Nibhandhas fully utilize the rules of interpretation of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to determine the exact nature of the religious programmes. In respect of certain statements in connection with the religious programmes there is apparent conflict. To resolve such conflicts and to reconcile the statements Pūrvamīmāṁsā rules of interpretation are used.

In Dharmaśāstra texts, particularly *Manu Smṛti* and *Yājñavalkya Smṛti*, a chapter dealing with Indian Judicial System is included. These describe a very well organized judicial system. In fact, it is the most ancient and a very well organized judicial system. All aspects of judiciary that are found in modern judicial system were already developed in ancient judicial system. To examine the arguments and documents for and against, the mīmāṁsā rules of interpretations are utilized. Commentators after commentators on these two *smṛtis* have utilized the Pūrvamīmāṁsā rules effectively to determine the issue on hand. Some modern scholars like Sri K.L. Sarkar, Sri Gharapure and Sri P.V. Kane, have brought out the importance of Nyāya in this respect. Justice M. Rama Jois has published a volume on the legal and constitutional history of India, Justice Markandeya Katju frequently quotes Mīmāṁsā nyāyas in his Judgements.

Maxwell's rules of interpretations closely resemble the Pūrvamīmāṁsā rules of interpretations. In view of this, the study of Pūrvamīmāṁsā is very relevant even today.

The prominent writers of Pūrvamīmāṁsā, viz., Jaimini, Śabara, Kumārila, Mādhavācārya, Khandadeva flourished with a gap of 500 years. Naturally social changes had taken place during these intervals.

These scholars accommodate these social changes by ingenious interpretations. In the case of Dharmaśāstra, there has been a greater need to accommodate these social changes. The authors of commentaries on *Smṛtis* and later *Nibhandas* accommodate these social changes by appropriate explanations.

Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra have not been static. Rather these have been highly dynamic.

In the present work, a complete picture of mīmāṁsā thought is presented closely following the primary source works in Sanskrit. On philosophical and epistemological issues, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and Vedānta considerably differ. These differences are presented in an inter-disciplinary way.

I take this opportunity to express my thanks to the scholars who have contributed the learned articles for the volume. I express my gratitude to Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya, the General Editor of the project, for giving me the opportunity to edit this volume.

I thank Professor Bhuvan Chandel for her guidance, all along in the course of editing this volume.

I
Pūrvamīmāṁsā before Jaimini

CHAPTER 1

The Perspective and the Scope of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

THE WORLD VIEW OF PŪRVAMĪMĀṀSĀ

Sacrifice is a socio-religious institution in Vedic culture. It represents the world view envisaged by Pūrvamīmāṁsā. According to Pūrvamīmāṁsā,

(i) The world is neither created nor will it be destroyed. It is ever present.

(ii) The language, particularly the Vedic language, has no beginning nor end.

(iii) For sacrificial activity also no beginning can be traced in historical terms.

In the very first hymn of *Ṛg Veda*, Agni is described as *Ṛtvik* and *Hotā*. Prayers were offered to him by sages in the past and will be offered by the sages in future.

Agniḥ pūrvebhiḥ ṛṣibhiḥ īdyaḥ
Nūtanaiḥ uta[1]

In *Puruṣa sūkta*,[2] it is stated that,

yajñena yajñam ayajanta devāḥ tāni
dharmāṇi prathamāni āsan.

The deities performed the sacrifices, these were the earliest sacrifices. The Gītā[3] also informs us,

saha yajñaḥ prajāḥ sṛṣtva
Purovāca prajāpathiḥ[3]

From this it is clear that sacrificial activity was also ever present. These were not ever present in an isolated way. Rather they made an impact on one another.

In the Vedas there is an important concept designated as *Ṛta*.[4] This is the source of the natural law of non-sentient entities and the moral law of the sentinent beings. The first one is designated as *satya*. The second is designated as *dharma*. These are not exclusive to each other. These are the two sides of the same coin. *Dharma* is primarily a sacrificial activity in the context of Pūrvamīmāṁsā. The sacrificial activities, though are physical activities, are elevated as *dharma* on two grounds.

(i) These are enjoined by Vedic injunction.

(ii) These lead to trans-emperical results.

The sarificial activities are conveyed by Vedic language. The Vedic language also describes the nature and the presiding deities of different aspects of nature. The sacrificial offereings are offered to the deities. In fact, *dravya*, the sacrificial offering, and *devatā*, i.e.

deities, form the core part of the sacrifice. The hymns reveal *dravya* and *devatā*. Thus the scope of the sacrificial activities includes the Vedic injunctions and the deities also. For this reason sacrifice is considered as the support or the foundation of the entire world.

Taittarīya Āraṇyaka states that *Dharmo Viśvasya Jagataḥ Pratiṣthā*.[5]

The sacrificial activity leads to the welfare of not only the performers, nor only the sentient beings, but of the entire world. Śatapatha Brahmaṇa[6] states *Śreyo rūpam atya sṛjat dharmam*. (Śata-Bra-14-4-2-26)

Jaimini defines *dharma codmā lakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmaḥ*. Here the word *arthaḥ* states that the *dharma*, i.e. sacrificial activity leads to welfare. As stated above it leads to the welfare of men and also the welfare of all others, including the deities. This is made clear in the Gītā.[7]

(i) *Devān bhāvayatānena te devā bāvayantu vaḥ*
Parasparam bhāvayantaḥ sreyaḥ paramavapsyatha. (Gītā -3-11)
(ii) *Anena prasaviṣyadhvam eṣvo stviṣtakāma dhuk*. (Gītā -3-10)

The Gītā further explains the role of sacrifice in the form of *yajñā cakra*:[8]

Annād bhavanti bhūtāni parjanyādanna sambhavaḥ
yajñāt bhavati parjanyo yajñaḥ karmasamudbhavaḥ. (Gītā 3-14)

Since the sacrificial activity leads to the welfare of all it has to be carried on forever, generation after generation.

Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad advises to undertake the activities all along the life.

Kurvanneveḥ karmāṇi jijīviśet śatam samāḥ.

The Gītā declares that no one can remain without any activity even for a moment.

Na hi kaścit kṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhati akarmakṛt. (Gītā 3-5)

Sacrificial activities constitute the *Śrauta* religion. However, Jaimini has accepted *smṛtis* also as the authorities for *dharma*. *Dharmasūtras*, *Smṛtis* and later *Nibhandha* works constitute the source of *smārta dharmas*. These prescribe *varṇa* and *āśrama* duties as well as the moral duties. These also have to be observed generation after generation forever. Thus the performance of sacrificial activities and other religious activities have to go on. Mīmāṁsakas do not accept the *mokṣa*, i.e. liberation of the type of Vedānta and also do not accept knowledge as a means of it. They do not accept the God who causes *sṛṣti sthiti* and *laya*.

For Mīmāṁsakas the sacrificial and other religious and ethical activities are the means as well as the ends of human welfare. Their world view is quite distinct from that of Vedānta and *Itihāsa purāṇa*.

THE SOURCES OF ŚRAUTA SACRIFICES

Śrauta sacrifices are described in *Taittarīya Saṁhitā* of *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of *Śukla Yajurveda*, *Aitereya Āraṇyaka* of *Ṛg Veda* and in *Taittarīya Brāhmaṇa*. There are two texts of *Taittarīya Śakhā*, viz., *Sāraswata Pāṭha* and *Arśeya Pāṭha*. In *Arśya Pāṭha* there is subject-wise arrangement. In five sections, viz., *Prājāpatya*, *Sowmya*, *Āgneya*, *Vaiṣwadeva* and

Swāyambhuva. This helps us to comprehend *Ṛṣi, Devatā,* hymns and rituals. In these texts of Saṁhitā and Brāhmaṇa, the sacrifices are described. The main sacrifices, the subordinate rituals, the anxilaries, and the hymns are state.

As the performance of the sacrifices was acitively going on, there was no need to describe the whole procedure step by step at that time. This task was done by Śrauta Sūtras. There are ten Śrauta Sūtras related to *Yajurveda.*[10] Among these *Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* is the oldest and gives the detailed description of all major sacrifices. *Āpastambha Śrauta Sūtra* is quite elaborate. *Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra* is a little revolutionary. In many instances, it departs from other *Śrauta Sūtras.*

Only two Śrauta Sūtras namely, *Āśwalāyana* and *Sāṁkhyāyana* are related to *Ṛg Veda.* As many as eighteen Śrauta Sūtras are related to *Sāma Veda.* In addition to these, there are fourteen *Pitrimedha Sūtras* and eight *Pariśiṣṭas.*

Apart from Śrauta Sūtras there are Śulba Sūtras. In these the construction of *yajña manṭap,* the construction of sacrificial altars, *Gārhapathya,* etc., sacred fire places are described. These are a kind of geometrical works, and the foundation of Vedic mathematics and Vedic *vāstu.* The word *Śulba* means a cord. By this the various fire places and altars are measured.

THE NUMBER AND NATURE OF SACRIFICES

The sacrifices are analyzed in three groups, viz., (i) *Pāka yajñas,* (ii) *Havir yajñas,* and (iii) *Soma yajñas.* Among these *Pāka yajñas* are the *Gṛhya* rites.

Havir yajñas and *Soma yajñas* are Śṛauta rites. Seven *Havir yajñas* are enumerated as under:[11]

(i) *Agnyādheya,* (ii) *Agnihotra,* (iii) *Darśapurṇa māsau,* (iv) *Agrāyana,* (v) *Cāturmāsyāni,* (vi) *Dākṣāyaṇa yajña,* (vii) *Kunda-payināṁ ayanam.*

According to *Boudhāyana Sūtra* (B S's 24-4) seven *Soma yajñas* are enumerated as under:

(i) *Agniṣṭoma,* (ii) *Atyagniṣṭoma,* (iii) *Ukthya,* (iv) *Ṣoḍaśī,* (v) *Vājapeya,* (vi) *Aptoryāma,* and (vii) *Atirātra.*

In the above Soma sacrifices, the soma is pressed and its juice is offered to the deities, during only one day of the sacrifice. Hence, these Soma sacrifices are called *Ekāhas,* i.e. having the duration of one day.

The Soma sacrifices in which soma is pressed and its juice is offered for two to twelve days are named *Ahīnas.*

The Soma sacrifices in which Soma is pressed and its juice is offered for twelve days or more are termed as *Sattras.*

However, twelve days Soma sacrifice with some variations has the characteristics of both *Ahīna* and *Sattra.*

A Soma sacrifice extending for one full year, i.e. when the Soma juices offered on all the days of the year is known as *Ayana.*

Nitya, Naimittika and Kāmya Sacrifices

The sacrifices are also classified an *nitya* (obligatory), *naimittika* (occasional) and *Kāmya* (utilitarian). For example, *Agnihotra* and *Darśapūrṇa masa* are *nitya* (obligatory). There is provision to perform these as *Kāmya* also.

The *Agnihotra* is enjoined by the injunctive sentence *Yāvaj jīvam agnihotram juhoti.* One should perform *Agnihotra* all along his life. Here the word *Yāvat,* i.e. all along is the ground to perform it all along the life. This sacrifice is obligatory. *Kārīryā Vṛṣtikamo yajeta* is an instance of *Kāmya karma.* If the house of a sacrificer is burnt, a sacrifice to ward off the ill-effects is prescribed. This is *naimittika.* This classification applies to *Gṛhya rites* and *Varṇāśrama dharmās* also. For example, for a householder *Pañcamahāyajñās*[12] are prescribed. These are (i) *Brahmayajña,* (ii) *Devayajña,* (iii) *Pitṛyajña,* (iv) *Bhūta yajña,* (v) *Atithiyajña.* Studying Vedas is *Brahmayajña.* This is intended to preserve the literary heritage. *Devayajña* is performing sacrifice. This is intended to preserve the tradition of sacrifice. *Pitṛyajña* is for securing the progeny. It is intended to preserve the race. *Bhūta yajña* is offering food to all other living beings. This is intended to preserve all other living beings. *Atithiyajña* is entertaining the guest. It is called *manuṣya yajña* also as it means offering food to fellow living beings. These are obligatory for a householder. This reveals the social consciousness of our ancient people. This social consciousness is not confined to human beings only but extends to other living beings also.

THE PRIEST, SACRED FIRES, UTENSILS OF THE SACRIFICE

The śrauta ritual proceedure requires four types of priests related to four Vedas. (1) *Adhvaryu* belongs to *Yajurveda;* (2) *Brahmā* beongs to *Atharva Veda;* (3) *Hotā* belongs to *Ṛg Veda;* (4) *Udgātā* belongs to *Sāma Veda.* There are three others who assist each of the above main priests. Thus the total number of priests is sixteen. Ten *Camasa adhvaryus* are also employed in the Soma sacrifice.

The Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya class are entitled to perform sacrifices. *Rathakāra* is allowed to perform a special ritual, so also *Niṣhada sthapati.*

A sacrifice consists of four items. (i) *Dravya,* i.e. oblation material, (ii) *devatā,* (iii) *tyāga,* i.e. renouncing the ownership of *dravya* by the sacrificer and investing it with the ownership of the deity, (iv) *prakṣepa,* i.e. putting the *dravya* in the sacrificial fire. It should be noted here that the *tyāga* stated here is *dravya tyāga* but not *phala tyāga* stated in the Gītā.

The sacrificer should set up three fires at *Agṇyādhāna* rite.[13] The three fires are named as (1) *Gārhapatya,* (2) *Āhavanīya,* and (3) *Dakṣina.*

The pit for the *Gārhapatya* fire is circular in shape, situated to the west of the altar. The pit of the *Āhavanīya* fire is square in shape, situated to the east of *Garhapatya.* The pit of *Dakṣiṇāgni* is semicircular in shape. It is constructed to the south of *Gārhapatya.*

For the sacrifice as many as forty-seven utensils are required. Among these (1) *Sphya,* (2) *Kapālāni,* (3) *Agnihotrahavaṇī,* (4) *Śūrpa,* (5) *Krisṇajina,* (6) *Śamyā,* (7) *Ulūkhala,*

(8) *Musala,* (9) *Dṛṣat,* (10) *Upala,* (11) *Sruk,* (12) *Sruva* are important. *Araṇi* and *Yūpa* are major instruments.

For preparing *Araṇi, Yūpa* and other utensils the wood of the following trees is used: Aṣwattha, Udumbara, Khadira, Nyagrodha, Palāśa, Pippala, Vāraṇa, Vaikankata and few other trees are utilized. For a particular item, a particular wood is required.

Puroḍāś (cooked rice), *ājya* (ghee), *soma* plant are primarily used for offering. *Dadhi* (curds), *madhu* (honey), etc., are occasionally used.

The nature of soma plant is described in *Suśruta Saṁhitā*[14] as under.

Soma plant is a mixture of bitterness and sweetness in taste, royal blue in colour, cool. It has fifteen leaves. These grow during bright half of the month and drop out during dark half of the month. On the full moon day, all the fifteen leaves will be present. On new moon day of the month all leaves drop out.

AVESTAN YĀSNA AND VEDIC YAJÑA[15]

Among the surviving old religions, Zoroastrian religion is practised by Parsees in India. *Avesta* is the sacred scripture of this religion. *Avesta* literature is divided into five groups. The first group is *Yāsna-Yajña.* There are broad similarities between Avestan *Yāsna* and Vedic *Yajña.*

1. The Agni has a prominent place in both Vedic and Avestan rituals.

2. The offerings of *dron* and *haom* of Avestan ritual may be compared with the Vedic *Puroḍāṣa* and soma respectively.

3. In Vedic sacrifice, the Soma is offered in three sessions namely, *prātaḥ, madhyandina* and *sāyamsavana.* In *Yasna* ceremony also offereings are made three times.

4. The Avestan rituals are accompanied by *mantras* as in Vedic rituals. The names and functions of some of the priests resemble each other. Eg. Zot = Hotā.

5. Brahma is expected to supervise the entire sacrifice and advise expiations like the *Śraośāverez* in Avesta. *Agnīdhra* as the name itself suggests is one who tends fire is similar to Avestan *Ātarevaxs*' who also tends fire.

AGNYĀDHEYA[16]

As a preliminary for performing subsequent rituals, a sacrificer should set up three sacred fires, viz., *Gārhapatyā, Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣina* fires. According some schools *Sabhya* fire has also to be set up. The *Āvasathya* fire has to be set up at the time of marriage. It is also called *Aupāsanā* or *Vaivāhika.*

The Vedic texts have prescribed certain rituals for setting up these fires which the sacrificer has to perform.

Before the performance of the rituals for setting up the fires, the sacrificer has to prepare the *araṇis,* i.e. churning logs from the *Aśvatha* tree grown in the womb of *Śami* tree. He should also prepare the instruments like *sruk,* i.e. ladles, *sruva,* i.e. spoons, *sphya,* i.e. wooden sword, *camasas,* i.e. square vessels, *antardhānakata,* i.e. small curtain, etc., all from the wood.

He should collect the sticks of following, viz., Aśvatha, Udumbara, Parṇa, Śami, Vikaṅkata, the tree struck by lightening, leaf of lotus, etc. The sacrifier should get the shade prepared with the bamboos, its roof pointing to the east. He should also prepare the altar and fix the places for *Gārhapatyā* fire, *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣina* fire. To the north of *Gārhapatya* fire he should keep a spotted goat.

The sacrificer should shave his hair and beard. He and his wife should trim their nails and take a bath.

The *adhvaryu* should take a portion of the fire from the *Āupāsana* fire and place it on the place fixed for *Gārhapatya*, to prepare *Brahmaudana* rice. He should cook that rice and offer a portion of it to that fire. He should pour the clarified butter on the remaining cooked rice and give it to the four priests. He should then take three sticks of *Aśvatha* and besmear them with *Brahmaudana* rice and offer them in fire. The four priests should consume the *Brahmaudana* rice. The cows should be given to the priests. The priests should keep on offering kindling sticks on that fire throughout the night.

Next morning the *araṇis* should be heated on *Brahmaudanika* fire and the fire be extinguished. The *Adhvaryu* should sprinkle water over the places fixed for the fires and place materials, i.e. *Sambhāras*, over them. He should also place the pieces of gold over the materials. He should churn the fire from the *araṇis*, and place that churned fire in *Gārhapatya*. He should place the enkindling sticks of *Aśvatha* wood on it and let it flame up. He should lift up that burning stick and place it in a pan. He should lift up the pan and make the sacrificer recite the formulae called '*Agni-tanu*' (Apśs 5.10.7) in the ear of the horse kept aside. He should carry the pan towards the east. The horse should also walk towards the east. He should make the horse set up his right foot upon the materials deposited in the *Āhavanīya* firepit and should place the fire from the pan in the pit of *Āhavanīya*. Brahma priest should rotate the chariot-wheel from the *Gārhapatya* to *Āhavanīya* pit. The *Āgnidhra* should place the fire, either churned out or brought from the common fire-place and deposit in the *Anvāhārya* fire (*Dakṣiṇa*) pit. The *Adhvaryu* should offer *Agnihotra* libations without employing any formula.

Thus the fires are set up and the sacrificer has to take care to keep all of them burning, or at least the *Gārhapatya*, continuously.

The dice play takes place near *Sabhya* fire. The sacrificer wins in the dice game. The sacrificial fees are distributed.

The *Adhvaryu* thereafter proceeds to perform the *Pavamānahavīṁṣi*. He offers cakes to Agni Pavamāna, Agni Pāvaka and Agni Śuci baked in eight potsherds. He also offers *Pūrṇāhuti* offering on the *Āhavanīya* fire. This is a model for all sacrifices with suitable changes here and there.

THE ELIGIBILITY TO PERFORM THE SACRIFICE[17]

The eligiblity for performing the sacrifice is briefly stated as *arthī samartho vidwān adhikriyate*, i.e. a person who desires to obtain the result of the sacrifice, who has the necessary resources, and the knowledge is eligible to perform the sacrifice.

In respect of eligibility, the first question that arises is, whether the persons who have defective senses such as blind, deaf or dumb persons are eligible or not. There are certain items in the sacrifice that have to be performed utilizing these senses. For instance, *ājya avekṣaṇa,* i.e. seeing the *ājya, mantroccāraṇa,* i.e. reciting the hymns, *Viṣṇukramana,* i.e. walking, cannot be performed by the blind, dumb, lame persons. It cannot be argued that since such persons cannot perform these times, the injunctions about these items do not apply to these persons. They can be treated as exempted from these acts and they can get the result of the sacrifice without performing these items. This position cannot be accepted. These are *Kṛtvartha* items, that is to say these are the parts and parcels of the sacrifice. If these are not performed, the performance of the sacrifice itself becomes incomplete and does not lead to the result. Hence such persons are not eligible to perform sacrifices. These persons do not satisfy the criterion of *sāmarthya* for the eligibility.

An interesting question is raised in the *Bhāṣya* whether the birds and animals are eligible to perform sacrifice. The birds and animals are also interested in obtaining happiness. They also have the feelings of happiness and sorrow. This is clear from the fact that they move under the shade of the tree when there is heat of the sun and move under the sun when the weather is cold. Further, dogs observe fast on the fourteenth day of the month. The Śyena birds observe fast on the eighth day of the month. It cannot be considered as due to some health problem since such fast is observed regularly. Therefore, it seems these also can be considered to undertake the sacrifice.

However, these acts of animals and birds are not based on their knowledge of these as *dharma.* An act can be decided as *dharma* or not, only by the perusal of Veda. Birds and animals have no access to Veda. Further, these do not have any *dravya* of their own to offer. It is interesting to note that as early as Śabara's time certain areas of forest used to be earmarked for birds and animals. However, the ownership of these is not granted to them. Hence the birds and animals do not satisfy two eligibility conditions, viz., '*sāmarthya*' and '*vidwan*'.

The Eligibility for Deities

The question whether the deities and sages are eligible for undertaking sacrifice is also raised. The statement '*deva vai satram āsata*' gives an impression that deities and sages are also eligible for undertaking the sacrifice. Further, there is a sacrifice that has to be performed for a thousand year. The deities only can perform such long sacrifices. However, the Bhāṣyakāra rejects the eligibility for the deities on the ground that the sacrifices are performed addressing the deities. If deities themselves undertake the sacrifice, then they have to think of another set of deities to address. This is ridiculous. In the case of sages also, they have to envisage another set of sages. Moreover, the deities have no forms. Hence they are not eligible.

The question of eligibility for deities is discussed in *Brahmasūtras* under *devatādhikaraṇa.* Śrī Śaṅkarācārya is not particularly interested in defending the eligibility for the deities for *Karmānuṣṭhāna.* He argues in favour of the eligibility of *Brahmajñāna* and

establishes it. However, certain observations made by him in this context are helpful to support eligibility for *Karmānuṣthāna* also. He says that the deities have form, i.e. *vigraha.* They have the capacities to assume many forms. They can be conveyed by Veda without affecting the eternity of Veda.

Śrī Rāmānuja also supports the eligibility for *Brahmajñāna* for deities on the same line. Śrī Mādhvācārya goes a step ahead and establishes the eligibility for both *Karmānuṣṭāna* and *Brahmajñāna* for the deities. The arguments in favour of eligibility for *Karmānuṣṭāna* are stated as under:

(i) The statement '*devah agnim ādhatte*' states *agnyādhāna* for the deities.
(ii) Indra, Varuṇa, etc., are the effices of the deities. There is someone or the other all along. Hence, the Vedic words can convey them without affecting the eternal relation between the word and meaning.
(iii) The deities have the form and can be simultaneously present in many places. Moreover, it is not necessary that they should be physically present at the sacrifices.

In view of these, the deities have eligibility for both *Karmānuṣṭāna* and *Brahmajñāna.*

Eligility of Women[18]

After disposing of the question of eligibility of deities and sages, the question of the eligibility of women is taken up for discussion. Aitiśayana, an early Mīmāṁsaka, argues that the expression *svargakāmaḥ* is in masculine gender. Therefore, it seems the intention is to convey that men only are eligible to perform the sacrifice.

Another argument to deny the eligibility for women is the lack of resources with them. The sacrifice requires various kinds of grain, ghee, etc. The woman does not own these. In fact, she herself is purchased at the time of the marriage by offering to her father the cows, chariots, etc.

The above arguments are not sufficient grounds to deny eligibility to women. The masculine gender in the expression *svargakāmaḥ* does not exclude women. The desire for the result of the sacrifice is the ground of eligibility. This is stated by the expression *svargakāmaḥ.* The desire is common to both male and female, hence, both are eligible. In this context, we may note that the statement *Brahmano na hantavyah,* i.e. a brāhmiṇ should not be killed does not mean only the male brāhmiṇ be not killed but even female brāhmiṇ be not killed.

Offering some present to the parents of the bride does not amount to the purchase of the bride. It is only a custom.

At the time of the marriage the bridegroom makes a promise that he will not transgress her in respect of *dharma, artha* and *kāma.* This clearly indicates that they enter into a kind of partnership in respect of persuing these ideals of life. One is not the master of the other. The expression *dampati* is explained as *patiśca patnī ca dampati.* The word *dama* means sacrificial fire. *Dampati* means the husband and wife associated with the sacrificial fire. The word *patni* also means the wife associated with the husband in the

programme of sacrifice (*Patyur no yajña samyoge*). Hence, women are as much eligible to undertake the sacrifice as men.

The next question is whether the husband and wife can undertake the sacrifice individually, separately or it is a joint programme. The singular in *yajeta* gives an impression that it has to be undertaken separately. However, there are certain items like *ājya avekṣaṇa* and *anvārambha*, that have to be done by both. This will not be possible if each one of them undertakes the sacrifice separately. Only one of them attending to these items will result in incomplete performance of the sacrifice. It cannot be argued that the items that are to be performed by wife may be performed by the husband in the sacrifice undertaken by him. These items relate to the sacrifice and not to the person. Hence, person-wise allocation will not satisfy the requirement of the programme of the sacrifice. This will result in the absence of *Sarvāngopasamhāra*, i.e. implementing all the detials of the sacrifice. Hence, both have to undertake the sacrifice together. The singular number in the expression '*yajeta*' indicates only the agency of undertaking this act present in the two is one and joint, i.e. *Vyāsajya Vṛtti.* It does not indicate that the agent is only one. It only indicates that the agency is one.

There are certain other acts such as '*yoktrena patnim sannahyati*' '*mekhalyā yajamānam*' which confirm that both of them participate in the programme together. It is also stated that they attain prosperity together. '*Sam patni sukṛten gacchatām*'. All these confirm that the two together have to undertake the sacrifice.

Śūdras do not have Eligibility for Performing Sacrifice[19]

The right of Śūdras for performing the sacrifice is strongly aruged in the *Jaimini sūtras* and *Śabara bhāṣya,* though ultimately it is not granted.

(i) Mere interest in obtaining the result of the sacrifice will not entitle one to undertake it. It is only one of the criteria. The other criteria, particularly, the knowledge of Veda is not found in Śūdras.

(ii) Studying Veda without *upanayana* is a wrong procedure. Such study and recitation of hymns at the sacrifice without proper study will not help to obtain the result of the sacrifice.

The institution of sacrifice is a programme of achieving welfare not only for the individual but for the whole society. It is even more. It is for the welfare of the entire world consisting of all living beings and the nature around. It is also a sacred programme. Therefore, it has to be executed with competent persons with necessary discipline. The persons are meant for the programme. The programmes are not meant for them. In view of this, if any individual or a group of persons are denied participation in the programme, the intention is to accomplish the programme perfectly and faultlessly but not to deny the opportunity to participate to that person or group of persons. The programme is more important than the persons.

The concept of perfection of socio-religious programmes and procedures go on changing, suitable social changes also go on. We have to understand their validity in the

context in which they are practised and preached. In due course, the changes take place whether one likes it or not.

The Eligibility of Rathakāra[20]

Rathakāra is a subcaste. A person born from the mother of Karaṇi caste and the father of Māhiṣyā caste is of Rathakāra caste. A woman born from Śūdra caste mother and a Vaiśya caste father is a Karaṇi. A person born from the mother of Vaiśya caste and the father of Kṣatriya caste is Māhiṣyā.

With reference to a person belonging to Rathakāra subcaste, it is stated that he should perform *Agni adhāna* during the rainy season. The name Rathakāra could be applied to a brāhmaṇa who is engaged in preparing a chariot. However, it would be a forced application when the word refers to a particular caste by usage. Hence, *agni ādhāna* stated here has to be undertaken by a person of Rathakāra caste.

Another exception is that of Niṣāda *sthapati*. Here the word can be taken to mean as a master of Niṣādas or a person belonging to Niṣada clan. It is taken in the latter sense. This is another instance of a person not belonging to the first three *varṇas* being granted eligibility to a particular sacrifice.

The two instances serve more than sacrificial purpose. These are evidences for the intercourse among Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and other castes. Such intercourses do not seem to have been confined to a few individuals. In that case, a new sub-caste would not have emerged. Such persons seem to have adapted different vocations and later indentified with those vocations. The progeny of such intercourse must have acquired a social status by adopting some or the other vocation.

THE CONCEPTS OF APŪRVA AND SVARGA[21]

The sacrifices are enjoined by Vedic injunctions. Certain results to be realized by these are also stated. For instance, the injunction '*darśa pūrṇamasābhyam svarga kāmo yajeta*' enjoins the performance of *darśapurṇamāsa* sacrifice to realize *svarga.* Now this act of the sacrifice comes to an end as soon as all the items of it are completed. However, the result *svarga* does not immediately emerge. The cause should immediately precede the effect. When this does not happen some intermediary to maintain the continuity has to be envisaged. Hence, *apūrva* is envisaged as an intermediary between the sacrifice and the result, i.e. *svarga.*

The concept is envisaged by *arthāpatti pramāṇa.* Whenever there is a conflict between the two facts both of which are supported by apropriate *prāmaṇa,* a third fact has to be envisaged to resolve the conflict. Here, performing sacrifice is enjoined by *śruti.* A result for it is also stated in *śruti.* These statements imply the cause and effect relation between the two. This cannot be worked out unless the two are connected. This difficulty is resolved by envisaging *apūrva* by *arthāpatti.* Since, this *arthāpatti* emerges out of *śruti* statements, it is designated as *śrutārthapatti.*

This *apūrva* arises when the main sacrifice is successfully completed. It is designated as *paramapūrva.* The subsidiary acts generate their own *apūrvas.* These are designated as *avantarāpūrva.* For instance, at *darṣapurṇa māsa* sacrifice *āgneya,* etc., three subordinate acts are performed on *darṣa* and *paurṇamāsā* each. From these three *utpatyapūrvas* arise. Since these two sets of three acts are performed on separate days a *samudaya apūrva* arises from each set of three acts. Ultimately these lead to *paramāpūrva* or *phalāpūrva.* This leads to the final result.

This *apūrva* is a kind of trans-empirical power. It remains with the performer of the sacrifice. Ordinarily the power of an entity remains with that entity only and ceases to exist when that entity ceases. It produces the result for that entity only. However, this is the position in the case of empirical power. *Apūrva* is a trans-empirical power. Hence, its way of functioning is quite different from empirical power. The sacrificial act is empirical. Its continuity until the result arises could not be envisaged. However, as *dharma* it could generate a trans-empirical power and could lead to the result. In Indian philosophical and religious tradition, the concept of non-empirical power, i.e. *adṛṣṭa* is accepted by all in some or the other form at some or the other stage. It remains with the persons concerned. However, it is not cognized by him like his cognition, joy or sorrow.

The Concept of Svarga[22]

There are three kinds of injunctive statements, viz., (i) The injunctive statements that specifically state *svarga* as the result to be realized by performing the sacrifice. (ii) The injunctive statements that mention something other than *svarga* such as *paśu, indriya,* i.e. the strength of senses, etc., as the results. (iii) The injunctive statements that do not state either *svarga* as the result or any other particular result.

In connection with these results two questions arise: (i) what is the nature of *svarga;* (ii) whether these are realized here only or in some other world or some other birth.

The nature of *svarga* is discussed in *svarga kāmadhikaraṇa.* Jaimini and *Śabara* do not seem to be particular in identifying *svarga* with another world. They use the expression *prīti,* i.e. delight, to convey the meaning of the word *svarga.* This is its primary meaning. But in the secondary sense it is also used as means of delight. For instance, the expression '*candanam svargaḥ*', i.e. the sandalwood paste is heaven, *Kauśeyāni svargaḥ,* i.e. the silk garment is heaven and so on. However, Śabara cautions that these are not always delightful nor are these delightful to all. Therefore, the word *svarga* should be taken in the sense of the delight that is not mixed with even an iota of sorrow. Since such a delight is not available here, if people envisage a world on the basis of a reference in Purāṇa and the statements of *Siddhapuruṣas* such a place also has to be taken as a means of delight. Even the *kāmya* sacrifices are undertaken, because, the results obtained from them provide the delight.

In *Viśvajit adhikaraṇa* a more fundamental question is raised. Where is the need to conceive such a result such as *svarga*? Why not say that the sacrifices, at least such sacrifices for which no result is stated have no result at all and need not be performed. Once this argument is conceded, then, this argument could be extended to other sacrifices

also the result of which is not empirically realized and do not lead to any observable result. The only answer to this objection is that these are enjoined by Vedic injuctions. Since the Vedic injunctions have enjoined these, we must envisage appropriate result for these, wherever the result is not mentioned. Otherwise people will not undertake the performance of these sacrifices. The result *svarga* whether stated or not has to be envisaged. From this it is clear that the concept of *svarga* is introduced to induce the undertaking of sacrifice.

The concept of a sacrifice has a larger dimension. It is not meant for the welfare of the individual performer only. It is meant for the welfare of the whole mankind, the whole living being, the whole Nature. In view of this one will derive immense delight by successfully performing this programme. It is believed that it will manifest the trans-empirical power *apūrva* and lead to the welfare of all.

The concept of *svarga* has psychological, ethical and spiritual dimensions. It is a compelx concept. Such complex concepts when put into concrete situations take a concrete form in the context of a particular cultural tradition. In the context of Indian cultural tradition it has acquired the form of another world, i.e. heaven. However, Jaimini and Śabara have not given much importance to this concrete form. This is clear from their remarks in *svargakāmādhikaraṇa.*

The concept of rebirth, and *prārabdha karma* also have played their role in clarifying the situation of the result not following immediately after the *kāmya* sacrifice. *Prārabdha karma* is supposed to have prevented the presence of the result immediately and rebirth has provided the scope for its occurence later. The concept of *apūrva* has provided a link. Sacrificial act is quite distinct from *prārabdha karma.* It does not lead to any chain of *Karma.*

It is interesting to note that Śabara remarks that since the *svarga* in the sense of other world is not observable it has to be envisaged by *arthāpatti.* Since, the delight unmixed with sorrow is stated to be the result of the sacrifice, and since, such delight cannot be realized in this world, the other world, i.e. *svarga* has to be envisaged. However, even then, it will only be a means of *svarga* but not *svarga* in its primary sense, viz., delight. It should be noted that the two important concepts of Pūrvamīmāṁsā, viz., *apūrva* and *svarga* are conveyed by *Arthāpatti.*

APOURUṢEYATVA OF VEDA AND SVATASTVA OF PRĀMĀṆYA[23]

In the very second sūtra of Jaimini it is stated that *codanā,* i.e. Vedic injunction conveys *dharma. Pratyakṣa,* etc., other Pramāṇas are not able to convey *dharma.* On this Śabara raises a small objection by way of *pūrvapakṣa* that the Vedic injunction is of the nature of words. There is no guarantee that the words always provide valid knowledge. For instance the statement: 'There are fruits on the bank of the river.' It may be true or may not be true. Raising this objection Śabara points out that it may be so in the case of the statement of ordinary people. If the speaker is reliable and if he has the correct knowledge, his statement would be true. Otherwise it is not true. However, Vedic statements are not made by any person. These are *apouruṣeya.*

To sustain the *apouruṣeyatva* nature of Vedic statements, Mīmāmsā develops two important concepts, viz. *Apouruṣeyatva* of Veda and *Prāmāṇya svatstva.*[24]

(i) The relation between the word and the meaning is natural. It is not fixed by any human agency. When a word arises its meaning also arises. However, the meaning is comprehended through elders' conversation, generation after generation. Each generation inherits it from the previous generation. It is not fixed by any particular generation. No human agency is involved in working out the relation between the word and the meaning.

(ii) *Varṇas*, the syllables of a word are eternal: these are manifested. A group of syllables form a word. When the syllables of this group are manifested one after the other, these leave a *saṁskāra*—the impression on the mind. The last syllable in cooperation with the impressions of the previous syllables, forms a word. Hence here also, there is no intervention of human agency. The *śabda* is eternal. It is manifested by the efforts of the vocal organs.

(iii) The sentence is also not formulated by human agency. In a sentence, the words are employed to convey the meaning as connected with an action. The word meanings connected with each other form the sentence meaning. These are not arranged by any human agency. Hence at this level also the Vedic statement is impersonal. Since Vedic statements are impersonal, there is no question of these being not true. Veda consists of such impersonal statements. Therefore, it is *apouruṣeya*. The names such as Kāṭhaka and Kalāpaka as given to Vedic *śākhās* are the names of the teachers of these *śākhās*. These persons are not the authors.[25]

The knowledge provided by Vedas is intrinsically valid. In fact, all cognitions that are generated by the appropriate means are intrinsically valid. It is only some or the other drawback that makes this invalid. To generate the valid cognition, apart from its bonafide means, no additional means are necessary. Validitity of a valid cognition, is generated by the same means by which the cognition is generated. This validity is also comprehended by the same means by which the cognition is comprehended. Thus the validity of a cognition is intrinsic both at the level of generation and at the level of comprehension.

However, invalidity of cognition is due to some or the other drawback such as the defective eye-sight, inattentiveness of the mind, the distance, etc. Hence, invalidity of the cognition is not intrinsic at the level of generation.

As a result of the invalidity of the cognition, it fails to lead to the required result. Then the observer tries to verify it and traces the drawback. Hence, comprehension of the invalidy is not intrinsic.

The concepts of the *Vedapouruśeyatva* and *prāmāṇya satastva* are two distinct contributions of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to Indian epistemology.

PŪRVAMĪMĀṀSĀ TECHNIQUE OF PROGRAMME ORGANIZATION

Pūrvamīmāṁsā has evolved a systematic method of programme organization. Though it is developed for the organization of sacrificial programme, it can be applied to any other programme organization. The rules laid down here are a kind of meta-rules designated in Sanskrit as *paribhāṣā*. Pūrvamīmāṁsā has also developed a method of debate on philosophical issues and on programme organization models.

In Indian philosophy two distinct methods of philosophical debate are developed.

(i) *Pañcāvayava*—Five stepped argumentation method developed by Nyāya school.

(ii) *Adhikaraṇa* method developed by Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta.

1. The *Pañcāvayava* method arranges the arguments in five steps, viz. (i) *pratijña*—the statement of the proposition, (ii) *hetu*—the reason, (iii) *udāharaṇa*—example, (iv) *upanaya*—the application of the reason to the present case, (v) *nigamana*—the conclusion.

The *adhikaraṇa* method is also arranged in five stages, viz. (i) *viṣaya*—the subject under discussion, (ii) *saṁśaya*—the doubt or the two sides of the issue, (iii) *pūrvapakṣa*—the prima-facia position of the issue, (iv) *siddhānta*—the final position, (v) *prayojana*—the purpose served by the *siddhānta.*

Pūrvamīmāṁsā follows the *adhikaraṇa* method of presentation. Within *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* there will be *ākṣepa*—some tentative objections and *samādhāna*—a clearing of tentative objections.

In *Jaimini sūtra* it is not clear which *sūtra* is *pūrvapakṣa sūtra* and which *sūtra* is *siddhānta sūtra.* These are not arranged in *pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta* order. In *Śabara bhāṣya* the position is made a little more clear. However, even here it is not very clear where the *ākṣepa* ends and where its clarification begins. Kumārila's *Tantravārtikā* is more a *vāda grantha* than a *vyākhyāna grantha.* It is a large work. It is only *Śāstradīpikā* that gives a clear picture of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta.* Even here the wordings of every *sūtra* are not explained. There is no work that gives word-by-word meanings of all the *sūtras* of Jaimini. However, the themes of all the *adhikaraṇas* are presented well in works like *Śāstradīpikā* in detail and in *Jaiminīya Nyāyamāla Vistāra* briefly. *Bhāṭṭa Saṅgraha* of Śrī Rāghavendra tīrtha is neither as large as *Śāstradīpikā* nor as brief as *Nyāyamāla Vistāra.* The *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* are presented in a compact way. A special feature of this work is that the word-by-word interpretation of *Viṣaya vākyas* of each *adhikaraṇa* is given. The word-by-word interpretation of *pūrvapakṣa sūtra* and *siddhānta sūtra* is also given. The meaning of the technical terms of Pūrvamīmāṁsā is given. Wherever *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* differ, the views of *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* are separately given under the title *Bhāṣyakāravarṇaka* and *Vārtikakāra Varṇika.*

Bhāṭṭadīpikā of Khandadeva differs from *Śāstradīpikā* in many places. He interprets the *Vārtika* statements also differently. *Bhāṭṭarahasya* of Khandadeva is a scholarly exposition of hermeneutics. All these works have richly contributed to the development of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā technique of programme organization.

In connection with the organization of a sacrifice, three questions are raised. *Kim bhāvayet,* what is to be achieved, *kena bhāvayet,* by what means it is to be achieved and *katham bhāvayet,* what are the other aids, i.e. auxiliaries to it? In respect of *darṣapūrnamāsa* these questions are answered as *Svarga* is to be achieved by means of *darṣapūrnamāsa yāga* with the performance of the auxiliaries *prayāja,* etc. In fact, for the organization of any other progamme, these questions and identifying the answers to these questions is essential.

For Vedic sacrifice the answers to these questions are provided by three types of Vedic injunctions, viz.,

(1) *Utpati Vidhi*—the injunction that enjoins the sacrifice.

(2) *Viniyoga Vidhi*—the injunction that enjoins the auxiliaries.

(3) *Adhikāra Vidhi*—the injunction that states the result.

The organizing of the sacrificial programme as per these injunctions is designated as *prayoga vidhi.*

A large number of sacrifices and rituals and their auxiliaries are stated in Brāhmaṇa literature. These are codified in *Śrauta Sūtras.* However, the rationale behind the arrangement of these is not stated in these works. This is worked out by Jaimini in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtras.*

So far as the main sacrifices are concerned these could be identified without any difficulty by their very names and the injunctive statements in respect of them. However, it is difficult to distinguish subordinate rituals. For this purpose six criteria *Śabdāntara, abhyāsa,* etc. are laid down. Similarly, to work out the relation between the principal and auxiliaries also *sruti, liṅga,* etc., six criteria are worked out. Whenever there is conflict between two criteria the ground for preferring one of them is discussed in respect of each of these criteria. Normally among these six criteria the earlier has a preference over the later. However, in a few places, exceptions are made on valid grounds. In connection with the arrangement of the sequence of various items of the sacrifice also, six criteria are laid down. The items are also identified in two ways, viz., *Kṛtvartha*—the items meant for achieving the sacrifice; *Puruṣārtha*—the items meant for the benefit of the person, i.e. the sacrificer.

The sacrifices are grouped as *Prakṛti* and *Vikṛti.* The sacrifices that are self-sufficient in all respects are called *prakṛti* and sacrifices that need the borrowing of certain auxiliaries from the *prakṛti* sacrifices are designated as *vikṛti.*

In this respect two interesting procedural concepts are developed, viz., *Ūha* and *Bādha.*

Ūha[26] means substitution. In the hymn employed at *Prakṛti* the deity Agni is addressed. When this hymn is adopted in *Vikṛti yāga,* the deity addressed has to be Sūrya. Therefore, the name *Agni* is substituted by Sūrya.

Bādha[27] means exclusion. For instance, in the *Prakṛti yāga,* cutting of kuśa grass is prescribed. But in *Vikṛti yāga* it is stated that the kuśa grass that have fallen by themselves have to be used. Therefore, the auxiliary cutting is excluded. Another example for this is, in *Kāmyeṣṭi Khānda* in *Prakṛti yāga caru* is to be prepared by rice. For this prupose, pounding of paddy is prescribed while in *Vikṛti yāga* offering of gold pieces is prescribed. Pounding the gold pieces is not feasible. Therefore, the auxiliary, i.e. pounding is excluded.

In the course of performing the sacrifice, economy of the effort also is kept in mind. For this purpose two interesting concepts, namely, *tantra* and *prasaṅga*[28] are developed. The nature of *tantra* is explained as *Sakṛt kṛtam bahūnām upakārī.* An item once performed helping many. For instance, at *daṣapūrṇamāsa* there are two sets of three *pradhāna yāgas* at *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* respectively. For these, *prayāja,* etc., a number of auxiliaries are prescribed. These need not be performed for each *pradhāna yāga* seperately.

The performance of these at the first *pradhāna yāga* serves the purpose of all. This is the technique of *tantra.*

The process of auxiliaries performed for one serving the other also is *prasaṅga* like a lamp put to light the building also serving to light the road. The sweets prepared for the son-in-law also served to the guest.

From the above guidelines for the organizing of the sacrificial programme, it is clear that the very process of organization is worked out systematically. These guidelines could be applied for all secular programme organization also.

CONTRIBUTION OF PŪRVAMĪMĀṀSĀ TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND SEMANTICS

In addition to *pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabdapramāṇa* and *upamāna*, mīmāṁsā has envisaged a fifth *pramāṇa*, i.e. *Arthāpatti.*[30] This *pramāṇa* is utilized to establish the category of *Śakti* in general and *apūrva* in particular. This *apūrva* is envisaged by *Śrutārthāpatti pramāṇa.* By the injunction *darṣapūrṇa māsābhyām svarga kāmo yajeta* the *yāga* is enjoined as *Karaṇa* and *Svarga* is enjoined as the result. However, as soon as the *yāga* is completed the result *svarga* does not arise.

A cause is required to immediately precede the effect. However, in the case of *yāga* and *svarga,* this is not found. Whenever there is a conflict between the two facts provided by *pramāṇas,* it has to be resolved by envisaging a third fact. In the present instance, *yāga* and *svarga* are stated by *śruti* as the cause and effect. To justify this an intermediary namely, *Apūrva* is envisaged. This process is designated as *Arthāpatti.* This *pramāṇa* is accepted both by Bhaṭṭas and Prābhākara.

The Bhaṭṭas envisage one more *pramāṇa,* viz., *Anupalabdhi*[31]—the absence of cognition. By this *pramāṇa* the absence of the objects is cognized. When an object cognizable by *pratyakṣa,* etc., *pramāṇas,* is not cognized even when these *pramāṇas* are appropriately applied, the absence of that object is cognized by *Anupalabdhi.* It is interesting to note that the absence of the cognition is a means for the cognition of the absence of the object. Here both the cause and the effect are of negative nature. This *pramāṇa* is intended to prevent the denial of *dharma, adharma,* etc., ethical entities, that are not cognizable by *pratyakṣa,* etc. Only such objects that are cognizable by *pratyakṣa,* etc., can be denied when they are not cognized by *pratyakṣa,* etc., *pramāṇas.*

Dharma adharma, etc., are beyond these *pramāṇas.* Hence, these cannot be denied on the ground that these are not cognizable by *pratyakṣa,* etc. *Anupalabdhi pramāṇa* is not acceptable to Prābhākaras, since they do not accept the very category of *Abhāva.*

Another interesting point made by the Bhāṭṭas in the context of epistomology is that the cognition is an activity of the knower's self and it is inferred by the revealing of the object. Every object has a capacity to be revealed. This capacity is activated by the cognition. From this it can be inferred that the cognition of that object has taken place. The capacity mentioned above is designated as *Prākatyā.*[2] Prābhākaras consider the cognition as *Svaprakāśa*—self revealing. Every cognition consists of three elements, viz., the knower, the known and the knowledge. This concept is designated as *Triputīkaraṇa.* The concept of *Prākatya* and *Triputīkaraṇa*[33] are formulated to meet the objections of the Buddhists that

there are no objects outside the cognition. When we say that this is blue, there is no blue object outside this cognition. We have no way out to reach the object without the cognition. This gives scope to deny the object. The presence of the object depends upon the presence of the cognition. However, according to Prākatya theory of the Bhaṭṭas, it is the presence of the object that enables us to infer the presence of its cognition. Hence the presence of the object is not dependent on the presence of the cognition. It is the other way round. Hence there are the objects outside the cognition.

According to a theory of *triputīkaraṇa*, every cognition has the elements of the knower, known and the knowledge. Without the object, no cognition can arise. Neither cognition alone depends on the object nor the object alone depends on cognition. So there is no scope for the denial of the outside objects.

Prābhākara's theory of Akhyāti[34] is another important contribution of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to the Indian epistemology.

Considering the language, autonomous at word and meaning level and sentence level is an important contribution of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to semantics. This is envisaged to sustain, the concept of *Apauruṣeyatva* of Veda. There are a few other linguistic concepts that constitute the contribution of Pūrvamīmāṁsā. These are the concept of (i) *Lakṣaṇā vṛtti*, (ii) *Ākānkṣa*—as a requirement for the semantic organization of a sentence, (iii) the admissibility of foreign words and meaning in certain circumstances.

Besides these linguistic concepts a number of other linguistically important points such as "under what circumstances the attribute of the subject be taken into account, the gender or the number to be taken into account, etc., are discussed. The two theories of meaning of sentence, viz., *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* are the most important contributions of Pūrvamīmāṁsā to the linguistics. All other systems of Indian philosophy have adopted one of these two theories with some modifications.

The import of the injunctive suffix is discussed in detail. The concepts of *Bhāvanā* and *Kārya* are developed by the Bhaṭṭas and the Prābhākaras.

Maxims of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

In Pūrvamīmāṁsā more than a hundred maxims are developed crystallizing the guidelines for the interpretation. We notice only a few of them.

(i) ***Sāmānya-viśeṣanyāya***[35]***:*** As per this maxim a general statement is restricted to a particular. The injunction *Agniṣomiam paśum ālabheta* mentions the animal in a general way. This gives an impression that any animal can be offered at this sacrifice. However, in the hymn stated in this connection *chāga* is mentioned. Therefore, it is concluded that only *chāga* (a goat) is to be sacrified at this sacrifice.

(ii) ***Utsargāpavāda nyāya***[36]***:*** The maxim of the common statement and the exception to it, e.g. *mā himṣyāt sarvābhūtāni.* No living being be killed is a statement commonly applicable to all living beings. For this statement an exception is made by the statement *Agni Ṣomiyam paśum ālabheta.*

An animal be offered at the *Agni Ṣomia* sacrifice. Under this exception an animal is killed at the sacrifice. The difference between *Sāmānya Viśeṣa* maxim and *Utsargśapavāda* maxim is that, under the first a particular is observed, under the second a particular is excluded.

(iii) ***Śruti prābalyādhikarama nyāya*[37]*:*** As per this maxim wherever there is a conflict between Smṛti and Srūti, the Srūti statement be perferred to Smṛti statement. Example: the Srūti states *Audumbarīm spṛṣtvā udgāyet.* The hymn to be recited touching the *audumbari* pole. On the other hand, Smṛti states '*audumbari sarvā veṣtyitāvyam*'—the entire *audumbari* pole should be covered by the cloth. Here there is a conflict between the Śruti statement and the Smṛti statement. If the whole pole is covered then it cannot be touched. Therefore, Smṛti is to be rejected and Śruti statement should be followed.

To give a modern example, Śruti statement is like the constitution and the Smṛti statements are like the laws made. Whenever there is conflict between the consititution and law, the law has to be declared as ultravires. Moreover, the statement that the entire pole be covered smacks of the greed on the part of the priests. This is a malafide intention. For this reason also, the Smṛti statement has to be rejected. In the modern example also if the law smacks of any malafide intention, then it has to be declared ultra vires.

(iv) ***Bāhulyanyāya*[38]*:*** As per this maxim, in a group of rituals, if many auxiliaries are prescribed for many rituals in that group and only one or two auxiliaries are prescribed to the remaining, the auxilaries prescribed to majority of them be applied to others also. Example: In the *Kāmyeṣṭi kāṇḍa,* the offering of curd, honey, ghee, water, to prajāpati is prescribed. Among these curds only is prescribed on *amāvāsya* and honey, curds, ghee and water are prescribed on *pourṇamāsi.* Here the question is raised whether the *amāvāsya* hymns are to be recited or *pourṇamāsi* hymns are to be recited. It is concluded that, as there are many items at *pourṇamāsi, pourṇamāsi* hymns have to be recited.

(v) ***Upakrāmādhikaraṇa nyāya*[39]*:*** As per this maxim when there is a conflict between what is stated at the commencement and what is stated in the end, the statement at the commencement may be preferred, and the statement at the end has to be reconciled with appropriate interpretation.

(vi) ***Yogādṛudheh balīyasi nyāya*[40]*:*** As per this maxim, the meaning of a word by usage, be preferred to that of etymological meaning. Example: A special sacrifice is prescribed for a Rathakāra. Here the question whether the word Rathakāra be taken in the sense of a person of Rathakāra caste, which is its meaning by usage or the etymological sense, one who prepares a chariot. It is concluded that the persons of Rathakāra caste be taken as the sense of this word by usage.

Utilization of Pūrvamīmāṁsānyāyas in Vedānta and Dharmaśāstras

In the three schools of Vedānta, the Pūrvamīmāṁsā Nyāyas are frequently used for the purpose of interpreting *śrutis* and supporting the respective doctrines. The Advaita claims the *Mithyātva* of the world on the basis of certain *śruti* passages. The Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita oppose this and affirm satyatva on the basis of *Pratyakṣa.* Here there is a conflict

between śruti and *Pratyakṣa.* The Pūrvamīmāṁsā maxims are utilized to resolve it and to support their respective contention.

Similarly, there is a conflict between *Saguna Śrutis* and *Nirguṇa Śrutis.*

Advaita prefers *Nirguṇa Śrutis* and explains away the *Saguṇa Śrutis.* On the other hand, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita prefer *Saguṇa Śrutis* and explain away *Nirguṇa Śrutis.* In support of their respective interpretations and doctrines, Pūrvamīmāṁsā maxims are utilized.

In Dharmaśāstra Pūrvamīmāṁsā Nyāyas are utilized to explain the religious programmes. In *Manusmṛti* and *Yāgñavalkya Smṛti,* there are two important sections, viz., *Vyavahāra Kāṇḍa*—i.e. Jurisprudence, *Rājanīti Kāṇḍa*—i.e. the constitutional duties of a king.

A sound judicial system is developed in *Vyavahārakāṇḍa* section. Property rights, inheritance of property, debts and clearance of debts, the remuneration to be paid to labourers in different fields, the code of conduct for persons of different vocations are discussed in detail. In Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* also these topics are discussed under the section *Dharmasthānīya.*

In all the above matters the Mīmāṁsā rules of interpretations are frequently used. Many of these rules closely resemble Maxwell's rules of interpretation of law. We quote a few examples below:

1. The golden rule is that the words of statute must *prima facie* be given their ordinary meanings. (Maxwell)
   Loke eśu artheśu padāni sati sambhave thadarthānyeva. (Mīmāṁsā rule)
2. Exposition of one act in the language of another in the same matter. (Maxwell) The criterion of Samākhyā of Pūrvamīmāṁsā.
3. Usage may determine the meaning of the language.
   yogāt rudhiḥ balīyasi. (Pūrvamīmāṁsā)
4. The title is no part of law. (Maxwell)
   Nāmadheya is not *Karmavidhi.* (Pūrvamīmāṁsā)
5. The general statute is read as silently excluding the cases which are provided by special. (Maxwell)
   Utsargapavādanyāya. (Pūrvamīmāṁsā)
6. Construction has to be made of all parts together. (Maxwell)
   Vākyabhedo doṣaḥ. (Pūrvamīmāṁsā)
7. Personal acts and local customs (Maxwell)
   Rathakāranyāya and *Niṣadasthapattenyāya, Acharaprāmanya.* (Pūrvamīmāṁsā)
8. To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact idea of the object of the act. (Maxwell)
   Phala is the criterion to determine the purport. (Pūrvamīmāṁsā)

ABBREVIATIONS

1.	R.V.	Ṛg Veda Saṁhitā
2.	B.G.	Bhagavadgītā
3.	TAI.A	Taittarīya Āraṇyaka

4.	Sat.Br.	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
5.	I.U.	Īśāvāsya Upaniṣat
6.	Sr.Su.	Survey of Śrouta Sūtra by Kashikar, Published by University of Bombay
7.	J.S.	Jaiminī Sūtras
8.	S.B.	Śabara Bhāṣya
9.	S.D.	Śāstra Dīpika
10.	B.H.S.	Bhātta Saṅgraha with an Exposition in English by Prof. K.T. Pandurangi & Published by Dvaita Vedānta Studies and Reseach Foundation, Bangalore.
11.	Pr. P.	Prakaraṇa Pañchika Banares Hindu University Darshana Series.
12.	Y.T. Pr.	Yāgna Tattva Prakāśikā
13.	N.T.	Nititatvarbhava Ananta Sayana Series, Trivandrum
14.	S.S.	Suśruta Saṁhita
15.	A.Gr.Su.	Ashvalayana Grihyasutra
16.	T.V.	Tantra Vartikam
17.	M.K.	Mīmānsā Kosha

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.	R.V.	I-1-1, I-1-2
2.	do	X 90
3.	B.G.	III-10
4.	R.V.	2-92-14, III-2-13, IV-1-8 V-15-2 X-190-1
5.	Tai.A.	10-63-7
6.	S.B.	14-4-2-26
7.	B.G.	III-10, III-11
8.	B.G.	III-14
9.	I.V.	2
10.	Sr.Su	P.1-V
11.	Y.T. Pr.	P 10, 16, 19, 45
12.	A.Gr. Su.	III-27
13.	Y.T. Pr.	P 5, 6
14.	S.S.	Chikitsa Section, Ch. 29
15.	Aveṣta	Yāsna Section
16.	Y.T. Pr.	
17.	S.B.	VI-1-2
18.	S.B.	VI-1-3, 4
19.	do	VI-1-7
20.	do	VI-1-10
21.	S.B.	II-1-2, S.D. P.104
22.	S.B.	IV-3-7, BHS.IV-3-7
	J.S.	VI-2-23
23.	S.B.	P.20 p.48
24.	J.S.	I-1-5
25.	J.S.	I-2-25
26.	S.B.	BHS IX-3-1
27.	do	X-1-1
28.	do	XI-1-1
29.	do	XII-1-1
30.	S.B.	p.76

31.	S.B.	p.83
32.	S.B.	p.56 IV.T.131
33.	Pr.P.	VI p. 176-173
34.	Pr.P.	III-1-40
35.	BHS	X-8-8
36.	T.V.	1-3-2-3 M.K. P. 1110
37.	S.B.	BHS I-3-2
38.	S.B.	BHS XII-2-7
39.	S.B.	BHS III-3-1
40.	S.B.	BHS VI-1-10

CHAPTER 2

Pūrvamīmāṁsā Thought before Jaimini

Ujjwala Jha

INTRODUCTION

If we look into the earliest occurrences of the term '*Mīmāṁsā*', we find that this word is used as early as in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā, Aitareya Āraṇyaka, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and also in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* etc. Let us see some of the references so that it becomes clear what is the meaning of the word that we gather from them.

(1) *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* 3.3.12

Etaṁ hyeva bahvṛcā mahatyukthe mīmaṁsante, etam agnāvadhvaryavaḥ, etaṁ mahāvrate chandogāḥ. Bahavaḥ ṛcaḥ paṭhitavyāh yeṣaṁ te bahvṛcāḥ ṛgvedinaḥ mahati ukthe śastre bṛhatīsahasrātmake etaṁ paramātmānameva mīmaṁsante vicārayanti etc. Here, the Vedic text itself has paraphrased '*mīmaṁsante*' as '*vicārayanti*'.

(2) The story in *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* runs as follows: Once Prajāpati ran after Agni to stop him but he could not do so as Agni was too swift to get hold of. Prajāpati got tired and started sweating. Then he sat down somewhere and wiped out his sweat from his forehead. That water became *ghee*. By this time the proper time of sacrifice approached and he had to perform the ritual with *ghee* as there was no other material to perform it. Now, Prajāpati had a doubt about that *ghee* as it was produced from his sweat which is not very auspicious. Therefore it is said:

Tad vyacikitsat. Juhavāni mā hauṣamiti.
Tad vicikitsāyai janma. Ya evaṁ vidvān vicikitsati. Vasīya eva cetayate.

Meaning: He had doubt about that *ghee*: whether I should perform the ritual with this *ghee* or I should not, i.e. the doubt was about the auspiciousness of that *ghee*. Thus, here arose the doubt in the mind of Prajāpati.

Whosoever among the wise persons, having some doubt in mind, thinks about it i.e., considers its pros and cons, obtains the highest knowledge i.e., he can decide properly.

From this story (i.e. actually from the usage) we may conclude that the term *vicikitsā* here is used in the sense of *mīmāṁsā* namely coming to a decision after having a doubt.

(3) In the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* (7.5.7) we find the following:

Utsṛjyaṁ notsṛjyam iti mīmāṁsante brahmavādinaḥ. Tadāhuḥ 'utsṛjyam eveti amāvāsyāyāṁ ca paurṇamāsyāṁ cotsṛjyam ityāḥuḥ.'

Here again the context is of some ritual (that of *utsargiṇāmayana* which is the *vikṛti* of *gavāmayana*).

Here, it is being considered that whether some day is to be left out or not. And the decision is: yes, the days of new-moon and full-moon are to be left out.

Thus, here the word *mīmāṁsante* is used in the sense of considering something which is doubtful and coming to a certain conclusion about it.

(4) In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (1.5.21), before considering the special rites of *adhyatma* (pertaining to the sense-organs) and *ādhidaivata* (pertaining to the deities), the proposition is stated '*athāto vratamīmāṁsā.*'

(5) In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (5.11.1) we find the following:

Mahāśrotriyāḥ sametya mīmāṁsāṁcakruḥ ko na ātmā kiṁ brahmati.

This means that the great Vedic priests gathered and considered about the issue as to what is the soul and what is the Ultimate Reality. There are many more references like this from which we understand that the word *mīmāṁsā* means knowing the truth after having considered the pros and cons of the issue about which there is the doubt. (*Saṁśayapūrvakāt vicārāt jāyamāno nirṇayaḥ.*)

The first basic work on *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* (PM), available to us today, is the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* (*MS*) of Jaimini. However, it was not Jaimini who initiated the system of *PM.* This is obvious from the fact that in the MS itself Jaimini has referred to at least nine names of other teachers who preached the principles of PM before him. Sometimes he has disagreed with their positions and hence has referred to their views as the *pūrvapakṣa,* while in other places, he is in full agreement with their views and hence they occur in such cases in the *siddhānta.*

From this, it is clear that Jaimini is not the first teacher of *PM.* He is preceded by many other *mīmāṁsakas* whose views were quite significant. They might have influenced Jaimini in various matters of doubt and therefore he found it necessary to mention them and record their names in his work so that they might not be forgotten by the future generations.

If we go through the *MS* where Jaimini mentions these earlier *mīmāṁsakas* and try to understand their views stated there, we shall have a fair picture of the views on some of the doctrines of *mīmāṁsā* before Jaimini.

In this paper, an attempt is made, primarily, to look into the predecessors of Jaimini mentioned by him and to try to understand the position of *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* before him. It is on account of this that references to the views of (i) Bādarāyaṇa (ii) Kāmukāyana (iii) Lāvukāyana and (iv) Kārṣṇājini etc. on various issues of *PM* are discussed here.

BĀDARĀYAṆA

The first name that Jaimini has mentioned with great respect is that of Bādarāyaṇa. In the very first sub-chapter of the first chapter, the fifth *sūtra* is very important as it puts forth the *mīmāṁsā* doctrine of relationship between word and its meaning. *Mīmāṁsā* holds that the relationship between word and its meaning is natural, i.e., eternal. It is not created by anybody, not even by God.

The first available statement saying this is the fifth *sūtra* of Jaimini mentioned earlier. In this important *sūtra* we find for the first time the mention of Bādarāyaṇa, a predecessor of Jaimini. The *sūtra* runs as follows:

Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ, tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ avyatirekaś cārthe anupalabdhe tatpramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt. MS I.1.5

This means: "The relation of the word with its meaning is innate. Instruction is the means of knowing it (i.e. *Dharma*), which is infallible regarding all that is imperceptible. It is a valid means of knowing as it is independent according to Bādarāyaṇa."

Śabara, while explaining the meaning of the *sūtra,* makes it clear that the mention of Bādarāyaṇa here is only to honour him. This says that Jaimini is in full agreement with Bādarāyaṇa so far as this particular issue is concerned.

In this context, the commentator Śabara has mentioned one Vṛttikāra who interpreted the *sūtra* in this context in a different manner. The Vṛttikāra opined that one need not examine the means of knowing *Dharma.* The means of knowing, like perception etc., are quite well known and among these well-known means of knowing occurs the *śāstra* or verbal testimony and hence one need not examine it either.

Śabara has replied to this view by saying that though the means of knowing, like perception etc., are well known, still it is also well known that in each case, there is a likelihood of error and to avoid error, one has to examine the means of knowing. The implication behind this clarification of Śabara seems to be this: If there is at all any means of knowing what is infallible—beyond all possible doubts—that alone can be the means of knowing *Dharma,* otherwise *Dharma* will remain under the smoke of doubt and nobody would be able to perform it.

This in turn is developed into the logic of *mīmāṁsā* that the Veda is such an infallible means.

It is further interesting to see that Bādarāyaṇa has been mentioned by Jaimini five times. The next mention of Bādarāyaṇa is made in the *MS* V.2.19. The *sūtra* runs as follows:

Ante tu bādarāyaṇasteṣāṁ pradhānaśabdatvāt (*MS* V.2.19)

The context is that of the *nakṣatreṣṭi.* The injunction enjoining the *iṣṭi* is: *Agnaye kṛthikābhyaḥ puroḍāśamaṣṭākapālaṁ nirvapediti.* Thereafter various *homas* are prescribed by sentences like: *So' tra juhoti agnaye svāhā kṛthikābhyaḥ svāhā* etc. Here the doubt is, whether the *nāriṣṭhahoma* occurring in *prakṛti* should be performed first or the *upahomas.*

Here Jaimini is in full agreement with Śabara. He opined that the *nāriṣṭhahomas* are *prākṛta* and hence should be performed first and the *upahomas,* which form the *vaikṛta* part, should follow them. The reason behind this, as per Jaimini, is very simple: That alone can be followed by the end which is already prescribed. In other words, something which has no beginning cannot have an end.

To explain this stand of Jaimini, Śabara gives an example from ordinary world saying : '*yāthā jātasya putrasya krīdanakam*' meaning that, if the son is not born at all, there is no necessity of bringing any toy for him! Bādarāyaṇa, however, has said that the Vedic text itself gives us the order of performing the above mentioned *homas.*

The next mention of Bādarāyaṇa comes in the *MS* VI.1.8. The *sūtra* runs as follows:

Jātiṁ tu bādarāyaṇo'viśesāttasmātstryapi pratīyeta jātyarthasyāviśiṣṭatvāt. MS VI.1.8

The context is as follows: There are prescriptions like, *Darśapūrṇamāsābhyaṁ svargakāmo yajeta* etc. The doubt regarding these sentences is: whether the word *yajeta* is

enjoined only with reference to a 'man' having the desire for heaven or there is no such restriction and it may refer to any man or woman?

While stating the *siddhānta* on it, Jaimini has referred to the view of Bādarāyaṇa who opines that it is not the case that only men have the privilege of performing sacrifices and women are not entitled for the same. The reason is, the case-ending after *'svargakāma'* only indicates a person (i.e. the class of human beings) who is desirous of heaven. No matter, it could be a man or a woman.

Again, Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned in the *MS* X.8.44: '*Vidhiṁ tu bādarāyaṇaḥ.*' The context here is that of *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice. In this, there is a sentence: *Puroḍāśābhyāmevāsomayājinaṁ yājayet yāvetāvāgneyaścaindrāgnaya iti.* (Bhāṣya on *MS* X.8.35) The doubt here concerns the status of this sentence. Is it a *vākyaśeṣa* of the *adhikāravidhi* or a statement of two more acts to be performed with the help of two more *puroḍāśas* or a prescription for the priest who performs the activity to the effect that the sacrificer should make the priest offer these two cakes or a prescription of special time when it is not the time of *somayāga* these two cakes should be offered? Alternatively, is it a *vidhi* for the sacrifice with reference to Indra and Agni and a repetition of the *Āgneya* sacrifice or a repetition for both these sacrifices?

Among these options, the one that Bādarāyaṇa sides is stated by Jaimini in the *sūtra*, *Vidhiṁ tu bādarāyaṇaḥ*, as mentioned above. By the word *Vidhi*, Jaimini has referred to *kālavidhi* explains Śabara. According to Bādarāyaṇa, even before *somayāga* the prescription of *sāṁnāyya* i.e. mixture of curd and butter, is heard and there is another injunction namely, *tadu saṁnayed* for one who has not performed *soma* sacrifice.

So, this *vidhi* as mentioned above, namely, '*Puroḍāśābhyām eva asomayājinaṁ yājayet...*' etc. prescribes the time with reference to both the *Āgneya* and *Aindrāgna* sacrifices.

Jaimini, however, does not agree with this view of Bādarāyaṇa. According to him, it is not prescription of time. But as there are two different sentences enjoining *sāṁnāyya* both for the *somayājin* and the *asomayājin*, this sentence is only a repetition so far as the two *aindrāgna* and *āgneya* sacrifices are concerned.

In the *MS* XI.1.65 we find another view of Bādarāyaṇa mentioned in the context of *tantra*. The *sūtra* runs as follows: "*Vidhivat prakaraṇāvibhāge prayogaṁ bādarāyaṇaḥ.*"

Śabara explains that according to Bādarāyaṇa, when all the main offerings are (offered) together, the process is not separated and hence the performance should be only one.

However, Jaimini does not agree with Bādarāyaṇa in this matter. Śabara says that the mention of Bādarāyaṇa here is just to show respect towards him and not because Jaimini agrees with him.

KĀMUKĀYANA

The view of Kāmukāyana is stated by Jaimini in the *sūtra* XI.1.57. The context is that of the number of *āhutis* in the *Darśa* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. The *sūtra* says:

Tathā cānyārthadarśanaṁ kāmukāyanaḥ. MS XI.1.58

It is said in this *sūtra* that on the full-moon day fourteen *āhutis* are offered while on the new-moon day only thirteen ones. Here, the intention of Kāmukāyana is as follows:

> *Tathā cānyārthadarśanam bhavati, yathā nyāya upadiṣṭa iti kāmukāyana ācāryo manyate sma. Kim punastat.* Caturdaśa *paurṇamāsyām āhutayo hūyante, trayodaśāmāvāsyāyāmiti. Yadyāvṛttiḥ syānna* trayodaśa caturdaśa vā vyavatiṣṭheran.

This shows that the number of *āhutis* to be offered is determined by the text itself. If there had been any repetition (of offering of *āhutis*), this type of fixing of numbers would not have been made. Also, it is observed that these offerings are meant for something else. Kāmukāyana intends to emphasize this maxim of *anyārthadarśana* i.e. being meant for something else—being a help to something else.

Again, in *MS* XI.1.63 Kāmukāyana makes the same point as follows: The performance should be only one because this will avoid the contradiction in the offering of thirteen on one day and fourteen on the other. Perhaps, what he wants to say is this: when there is a doubt whether one should offer thirteen or fourteen offerings and it is difficult to decide, it is better to have only one performance. But Jaimini does not seem to agree with this. The ground he provides for his disagreement is very important. He says, if we accept this opinion, it will amount to disobeying the Vedic Command. Thus, the fault of *Śruti-vyatikrama* will be committed. As such, Kāmukāyana's view is not acceptable at all.

LĀVUKĀYANA

Another name that Jaimini has mentioned is that of Lāvukāyana. It is found in *MS* VI.7.37. The *sūtra* runs as follows:

Vipratiṣedhāttu guṇyantaraḥ syāditi lāvukāyanaḥ. MS VI.7.37

Here, the context is that of a sacrifice which continues for one thousand years.

In this context, by way of solving the problem, one of the mīmāṁsakas, namely, Lāvukāyana, had suggested that as there is discrepancy in accepting the primary meanings of the words used in this context, one should interpret it by taking some of them in a secondary sense.

Here also Śabara's comment is: *Ācāryagrahaṇaṁ pūjārthaṁ nātmīyamata-pratiṣedhārtham.* (vide *Bhāṣya* on *MS* VI.7.37)

KĀRṢṆĀJINI

In the same context, i.e., the ritual which continues for thousand years, we find another *ācārya* mentioned namely: Kārṣṇājini. The *sūtra* runs as follows:

Sa kulakalpaḥ syāditi kārṣṇājinirekasminnasambhavāt. (*MS* VI.7.35)

Kārṣṇājini says: Let us understand that this particular ritual is prescribed for a family and it should be regarded as a family-rite. One person will begin it and it will continue generations after generations for a thousand years, only because, one person cannot live for thousand years. But since the family may live, let it be regarded as a family-rite.

Jaimini, ultimately, has not accepted this alternative. His argument is that a rite has to be completed by the same person who initiated it. We find this very view of Kārṣṇājini mentioned in *Kāt.Śrau.Sū.* I.6.23 which runs as follows:

Kulasatramiti kārṣṇājiniḥ. I.6.23

H.G. Ranade translates the *sūtra* as follows: According to Kārṣṇājini the *satras* of thousand years are meant for the entire lineage of the family: father, son, grandson etc.

Another mention of Kārṣṇājini is found in *MS* IV.3.17:

Kratau phalārthavādam aṅgatvaṁ karṣṇājiniḥ.

There is a sentence: *Pratitiṣthanti ha vā ya etā rātrīrupayanti. Brahmavarca-svino'nnādabhavanti ya etā upayanti, iti.*(vide Bhāṣya on *M* IV.3.17)

Now, the doubt regarding this sentence occurring in the context of *rātrisatra* is: whether this sentence is an *arthavāda* named *phalārthavāda* or it is an injunctive sentence prescribing the result, *phalavidhi*?

Kārṣṇājini tried to remove this doubt by regarding this sentence as an *arthavāda*, that is, a narrative sentence aiming at the praise of the sacrifice. The ground for his saying like this is as follows: There is no injunctive suffix in the sentence to enjoin something, just like any other *arthavāda* sentence such as:

yasya khādiraḥ sruvo bhavati sa chandasām eva rasenāvadyati.

Jaimini, however, has favoured the view of Ātreya who was of the view that this should be treated as *phalacodanā* or *phalavidhi*.

AITIŚĀYANA

The name Aitiśāyana is mentioned thrice in the *MS*. The references are in *MS*. III.2.43; III.4.24 and VI.1.6. Let us look into the last reference here.

The context is: Who is entitled to perform a sacrifice? Whether the sentences, which enjoin different sacrifices like *Darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta* etc, point to the male as an *adhikārin* or to male and female both alike? In other words, is it the case that a man alone is entitled to perform the sacrifices or a woman also can do so? The *sūtra* mentioned above runs as follows:

Liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśat puṁyuktam aitiśāyanaḥ. MS VI.1.6

Aitiśāyana intends that the word '*svargakāmo*' refers to a man (and not to a woman) and hence the rite should be performed by a man alone and not by a woman.

He gives an instance to support his view. He says, there is a belief that when an unknown embryo is killed, the killer of it becomes the killer of the sacrifice, because when he does not know about the foetus, he does not know about its gender and hence there is every possibility in such a case that a male child is killed. Thus, he becomes the killer of the sacrifice by killing a person who is entitled to perform a sacrifice. Had it not been so, even when the foetus is known and killed in all such cases, the person would have incurred the sin of killing a sacrifice. And then the word '*a-vijñāta*' in the sentence '*Avijñātena garbheṇa hatena bhrūṇahā bhavati*', would have been redundant.

Therefore, here one must understand that the masculine gender in '*Svargakāmo*' is very much intended and thus, a woman is not entitled to perform a sacrifice. Another example is given by Aitiśāyana in support of his stand: When the Veda says '*paśumālabheta*' only male animal is killed because the word *paśum* refers to a male animal only. One should interpret the present sentences just in similar manner.

This view of Aitiśāyana is a *pūrvapakṣa*, which is rejected by Jaimini and also by Bādarāyaṇa. Both the views of Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini have already been discussed above while deliberating on the references to Bādarāyaṇa by Jaimini.

BĀDARI

Bādari is the name mentioned both by Jaimini in his *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* and by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahmasūtras*. He is mentioned by Jaimini in the *sūtras* III.1.3; VI.1.7; VIII.3.6 and IX.2.33.

Excepting for the last one, Bādari appears as an opponent in the *sūtras* of Jaimini. From this it is clear that Jaimini has accepted only those views which basically are befitting to his scheme, i.e. those which concur with his point of view. He does not consider as to who has given the opinion but only what is the opinion. This is the real *mīmāṁsā* spirit.

So far as the question of identity of Bādari is concerned, we shall come to it a little later.

The main point to be remembered about Bādari is that he was quite ahead of his time. This becomes evident when we look into his opinions regarding, for instance, the problem as to who is entitled to perform Vedic sacrifices. Bādari, without any hesitation, held that the Vedic sacrifice is meant for one and all. It is not the privilege of any particular class of society.

That his view was not accepted by Jaimini is quite a different matter. In my opinion, Bādari's holding such a view is as important as Jaimini's recording it so honestly and vice versa.

ĀTREYA

Ātreya is mentioned by Jaimini in *MS* IV.3.18; VI.1.26 as also in V.2.18. Let us look into the views of Ātreya as mentioned in these *sūtras* one by one. We have already deliberated on the context of IV.3.18 while discussing the reference to Kārṣṇājini as mentioned in IV.3.17. In this context, Kārṣṇājini has been mentioned by Jaimini as a *pūrvapakṣin* whereas Ātreya is referred to while stating the *siddhānta* position. In other words, Jaimini is in full agreement with Ātreya who thought that the sentence *pratitiṣṭhanti ha vā....* etc. as already mentioned, should be taken as *phalacodanā* or *phalavidhi*, i.e., an injunctive sentence mentioning the result of the action.

Another reference to Ātreya occurs in *sūtra* VI.1.26. The context here is that of the doubt regarding the person entitled to perform the rites enjoined by the Veda. Whether all

the four castes may perform them or it is only the three castes excepting śūdras who are entitled for it? The opponent is of the view that anybody, i.e., a person belonging to any of the four castes, may take up Vedic rites such as *Agnihotra* etc. Here Ātreya opines that this view of the opponent is not acceptable because, only three castes are mentioned by the Veda and not the fourth one. Hence, as per the Veda, only three castes, excepting the śūdras, are entitled to perform Vedic sacrifices. Jaimini also, after a long discussion with Bādari, has taken the same stand. (vide *MS* VI.1.25 to VI.1.38)

In *MS* V.2.18, the context is that of the performance of the *nāriṣṭhahomas*. We have already looked into the matter while discussing Bādarāyaṇa.

Ātreya's opinion in this regard is: Whatever rites are *vaikṛta*, i.e., which belong to the Ectype, should be performed immediately after the main sacrifice, because, in the Vedic text also, we find that it is mentioned in that order. This is why the *nāriṣṭhahomas* should follow the *upahomas*. We have already seen that Jaimini does not agree with this view of Ātreya but sides with one held by Bādarāyaṇa.

If we look into the question of identity of this Ātreya, we may perhaps not be able to come to any definite point. The reason is: the name of this '*ācārya*' is found in *Baudhāyana Gṛhya sūtra* (3.9.6), *Baudhāyana Śrauta sūtra* (21.21), the *Mahābhārata* (13.137.3) as also in the *Brahmasūtra* (3.4.44). Somewhere he is mentioned as a *padakāra* (it is well known that one Ātreya wrote the *pada-pāṭha* of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*), somewhere as a *Vedāntin* while Jaimini has referred to his views in connection with certain *mīmāṁsā* issues. We may come to the question of identification of these *ācāryas* a little later.

ĀŚMARATHYA AND ĀLEKHANA

The names Āśmarathya and Ālekhana are mentioned by Jaimini in *MS* VI.5.16 and VI.5.17 respectively. *MS* VI.5.16 is an opponent's view whereas *MS* VI.5.17 is a *Siddhānta*. In other words, Āśmarathya's view is mentioned as the *pūrvapakṣa* and that of Ālekhana appears as the *siddhānta*. The context is that of the performance of *abhyudayeṣṭi* on the rising of the moon.

Āśmarathya held the view that, if the moon rises before the material has been measured, the *nirvāpa* should be done with reference to the deities who are *prākṛta*, i.e., deities of the original sacrifice. The reason that he provides for holding such an opinion is: the *prākṛta* deities only are said to be displaced after the grains of rice are obtained.

But Ālekhana does not agree with this because, as he argues, actually, the displacement of the deities is caused or prompted by the *a-kāla*, i.e., wrong time of sacrifice (as the moon rises) and so the *nirvāpa* should be done with reference to those deities to whom the oblation is to be offered, and not for the *prākṛta* ones who are to be displaced.

As Jaimini has not commented on it adversely, we may understand that he agrees with Ālekhana's view.

JAIMINI

Interestingly, the name Jaimini occurs in *MS* at not less than five places. From among these references, namely, *MS* III.1.4; VI.3.4; VIII.3.7; IX.2.39 and XII.1.8, excepting the one, i.e., VI.3.4, all remaining ones occur as the *siddhānta* view. One need not give much weightage to these because the *sūtrakāra's* opinion always occurs and should occur in the *siddhānta* position. Here, one may only raise a doubt about the author's reference to himself in the third person. One, well acquained with the Sanskrit literature, will hardly raise such a doubt. It is quite stylistic with Sanskrit authors to refer to themselves in the third person. Even in regard to pronouns, in place of '*aham*', Sanskrit uses '*ayam janaḥ*'. This and similar usages are quite common. As such, the doubt, as mentioned above, can be removed easily. Thus, we may conclude in this context that in all the four instances, stated above, Jaimini has referred to none but to himself and as such, we need not concern ourselves with these references as we are looking into the Pūrvamīmāṁsa thought prior to Jaimini and not into his own contribution to it.

A more interesting case for us, however, is the remaining one, namely, *MS* VI.3.4 where the name Jaimini occurs in the *pūrvapakṣa*. The *sūtra* runs as follows:

Karmābhedaṁ tu, jaiminiḥ prayogavacanaikatvāt
sarveṣām upadeśaḥ syād iti. MS VI.3.4

The context here is whether one performs even the *nitya* rites with all the details or is it alright to perform the *nitya karman* with only as much material as is available. The view that Jaimini held was: there is no difference in the acts prescribed by the Veda and as such, all acts should be performed in minute details. This formula applies to the *nitya-karman,* also as all the acts enjoined by the Veda are of equal status.

The *siddhāntin* concludes: This is not so. There is a difference between a *nitya karman* and a *kāmya karman.* In case of the *kāmya karman* one has to follow every small detail but in the case of the *nitya karman* it is not so. One may perform it even if something is missing, perhaps because it is more important not to miss the regular rite.

Now it is clear that one and the same person cannot hold exactly opposite views at the same time. Hence, there is every possibility that there was one more Jaimini who preceded the author of *MS.* Another small detail is noticed by Umesh Mishra and that is, in this context Śabara simply says, '*Iti jaiminirāhasma,*' 'Jaimini said like this'. Here we do not find his usual way of referring to Jaimini with honour, namely, *ācārya* Jaimini. (vide: *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* in its Sources, Appendix, p.10)

From these two points, it seems viable that there was at least one more Jaimini who had contributed to *Mīmāṁsā* thought before our *sūtrakāra* Jaimini, whose contribution our *sūtrakāra* thought to bring in record.

Over and above these names mentioned by Jaimini, we find references to Āpiśali mīmāṁsā or Kāsakṛtsnī mīmāṁsā in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (vide *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇinī *sūtras* 4.1.3; 4.3.2; 4.1.14; 6.1.92 etc.). From these references, however, it is not possible to understand the developments of *mīmāṁsā* on the level of thought, as we do not get any substantial material there. Thus, to build the '*Pūrvamīmāṁsā* Thought' before Jaimini, Jaimini alone seems to be the prime source of information.

OBSERVATIONS

From the references given above, we do get some idea of *mīmāṁsā* thought before Jaimini, as these are the views held by his predecessors which he has recorded in his monumental work, namely, the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*. From the above discussion, some of the points which emerge are: (i) Jaimini has quite a rich tradition of *mīmāṁsā* thought as his background. (ii) It was an essential topic of discussion in those days of prominence of the ritual culture. (iii) The very nature of *mīmāṁsā* is to discuss over doubtful matters and to arrive at a certain conclusion about the same. Thus, we can see that the eight or nine teachers, referred to above have their own different opinions regarding various issues. (iv) Perhaps, to put an end to all the differences of opinion and settle the doubts about Vedic statements, their applications in the rituals and so on, once for all, Jaimini took up the difficult task of deciding the principles to interpret those statements. He has discussed various views held by the previous teachers of *mīmāṁsā* and has given his own opinion on them, concluding the discussion and deciding the matter some way or the other. (v) Jaimini has become an authentic source of knowledge of the *mīmāṁsā* thought before him. Herein lies his contribution to the system of *mīmāṁsā*. It is an account of him that the ideas of the older *mīmāṁsā* could be available to us. These would have been lost to us but for the pains he took to record them.

One doubt may be raised here: How do we know that the names mentioned by Jaimini belong to the preceding *mīmāṁsakas* only? In other words, can we confidently say that Bādarāyaṇa, Lāvukāyana, Kāmukāyana, Kārṣṇājini etc. were *mīmāṁsā* teachers and not Vedāntins or Śrautins etc.?

This doubt has some solid ground behind it but before trying to tackle it, one would like to consider some more points. One of them is that while Jaimini mentions Bādarāyaṇa, Bādarāyaṇa also mentions Jaimini. (vide *Brahmasūtra*: I.2.28; 31; I.3.31; I.3.31; I.4.18; III.2.40; III.4.2; III.4.18; 40;IV.3.12 and IV.5.11) Even Jaimini himself mentions the name Jaimini in no less than five contexts in his *MS* as we have seen before. (vide *MS* III.1.4; VI.3.4; VIII.3.7; IX.2.39; XII.1.8). As Jaimini mentions Lāvukāyana, Bādari, Kāmukāyana, Ātreya so also Bādarāyaṇa mentions many of these names. (Kārṣṇājini in *Brahmasūtra* III.1.9; Ātreya in III.4.44 etc.)

Another interesting point is: while Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned by Jaimini purely in the contexts of *mīmāṁsā*, Jaimini is mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa in the context of Vedānta.

If we turn to modern times and confine this doubt only to Bādarāyaṇa, we find that there are at least two views among modern scholars regarding the identity of Bādarāyaṇa. They are as follows:

(1) Bādarāyaṇa mentioned by Jaimini cannot be identical with the *Brahmasūtrakāra* (A view held by Nīlakantha Śāstri. Vide: *Indian Antiquary* Vol. L, pp.171-2) and

(2) Bādarāyaṇa mentioned by Jaimini is identical with the *Brahmasūtrakāra*. (A view held by Paśupatinātha Śāstri. Vide: *Introduction to the Pūrvamīmāmsā*, Chaukhambha Orientalia, Varanasi, 1980, pp.28-31)

Both these contradictory views do have some basis to uphold them.

Umesh Mishra favours the latter view by saying: "The study of the *uttara* school necessitates the study of the *pūrva*. It is why the great Mīmāṁsā teacher Kumārila deliberately has asked the enquirer after the nature of self to refer to Vedānta. It seems,

therefore, quite possible that Bādarāyaṇa must have made his contribution to the school of *PM.* Hence, it may be said that the two Bādarāyaṇa were identical... Bādarāyaṇa could equally have had authoritative views on *mīmāṁsā* as well as on Vedānta." (Vide: *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in its Sources* B.H.U., Varanasi, 1964, p.6 of the Appendix)

This line of thinking seems to be more viable.

But I have to contend differently not only in regard to Bādarāyaṇa but also concerning all the other *ācāryas* referred to above.

In view of the facts adduced above, if one tries to answer the doubt, it is not only difficult but seems to be almost impossible to decide the dates and the areas of specialization of these stalwarts, unless and until we obtain some evidence in the form of documents regarding these issues. But this need not disappoint us, as, we are concerned here with the *pūrvamīmāṁsā* thought before Jaimini and not with the *mīmāṁsakas* preceding Jaimini.

Thus, we may not be able to say anything definite about the time of Kārṣṇājini and whether or not he was a hard-core *mīmāṁsaka.* But, we are certainly in a position to say that regarding the ritual which lasts for the period of a thousand years, Kārṣṇājini was of the view that this ritual be regarded as a *Kulasatra*—a family ritual which may continue for a thousand years as the lineage of the family can very well continue so long. Jaimini did not agree with him on the ground that a rite initiated by one has to be completed by the same person and not by someone else. Thus, he decided the matter against the opinion of Kārṣṇājini. Nevertheless, we could know about Kārṣṇājini's opinion because Jaimini has mentioned it and Śabara has explained it. That Kārṣṇājini was of such a view is also corroborated by *Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra,* as we have seen already.

To conclude, it is difficult to say anything about the makers of the statements as they are mortals but one can always have access to the statement of its maker, as once recorded it becomes *a-kṣara.* As the statement itself possesses the power to communicate its meaning, one is always in a position to have access to that meaning as also to the thought conveyed by it. It is the contention of *mīmāṁsā* that as thought is the most important thing, the statement which conveys the thought is equally important. As regards the maker of the statement, since we can understand the meaning of his statement without knowing him, information about his life etc. is insignificant.

This position of *mīmāṁsā* must have influenced the intellegentsia of ancient India which has usually been indifferent in providing biographical details about the authors. Though this may leave many a lacuna in the history of individuals of this country, yet, the tradition of thought remains, mostly, undisturbed.

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CHAPTER 3

Śrautasūtras and the Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtra

Samiran Chandra Chakrabarti

The *Mantras* and the Brāhmaṇas constitute the supreme authority on all matters relating to the Vedic religion which centres upon sacrifices. The Brāhmaṇas in particular are the storehouse of the instructions on different sacrifices. In them, we find that there were doubts and disputes on ritual details, such as the deity, oblation or proper timing or the type of the sacrifice. Though *Mantras* and Brāhmaṇas constitute the authority on the Vedic ritual, the Brāhmaṇas are the chief source of information on the Vedic sacrificial lore. In the Brāhmaṇas, we find *Vidhis*, 'precepts', of sacrifices accompanied by *Arthavādas*, 'supplementary passages', and see how the Brahmanic seers arrive at the conclusion regarding the ritual detail. They tell us why a particular rite should be performed in a particular way, and not otherwise. Great stress has always been laid on the correct ritual procedure, for only when the sacrifice is performed correctly, it leads to the desired result. The complicated nature of Vedic sacrifices often gave rise to disputes as regards the correct procedure.

Mīmāṁsā and derivatives of it would be found in many Vedic texts. The verb *mīmāṁs* is again the desiderative of the root *man* or *mān*. The Bālamanoramā says: *jijñāsāśabdena jijñāsāprayojyo vicāro lakṣyate; māner vicāre ity eva vṛttikṛt.* "By the word *jijñāsā* is meant investigation instigated by the desire for knowing; Vṛttikāra (reads): *māner vicāre* '*mān* in the sense of investigation'." (on Vārttika—*māner jijñāsāyām—Pāṇini* 3.1.6) *Mīmāṁsā*, accordingly, means *jijñāsā* (cf. *dharmajijñāsā* in *PMS* 1.1.1) and the deliberation induced thereby. (cf. *vicikitsā*, KU 1.1.20) The word *mīmāṁsā* means discussion, enquiry, deliberation, and disputation on some point of doubt or ambiguity for reaching at a reasonable solution.

Some sort of *mīmāṁsā* was always concurrent with the Vedic thought. A very early example is found in the *Atharvaveda*: *tāṁ devā amīmāṁsanta vaśeyā3m avaśeti,* "The gods disputed about her: is this a cow or not a cow?" (12.4.42) The ritual literature offered sufficient scope for deliberations on controversial issues. With expansion in the Vedic ritual, interaction of different Vedic schools became a necessity, and difference of opinion was unavoidable. The points of difference varied from trivialities (what appear to us so were not so in the eyes of the seers of the Brāhmaṇas) to major differences (some of the views might have been only *prima facie* views; it is now too difficult to ascertain what the real *pūrvapakṣas* were).

The Brāhmaṇas record such differences of opinion sometimes by referring to the ritual authority by name, sometimes by introducing debates with expressions such as

brahmavādino vadanti (*MS* 1.4.11, 1.5.7; *TS* 1.7.1.4, 1.7.6.2 etc.), *tad āhur brahmavādinaḥ*, or simply: *tad āhuḥ* or *ity āhuḥ* (post-positioned). The Brāhmaṇas sometimes accommodate others' views, sometimes reject them (with such expressions as *tat tan nādṛtyam, tad u tathā na kuryāt,* etc.). There were reasonings and counter-reasonings, and conclusions were arrived at through deliberations. So long as the Vedic ritual was a living and expanding institution, deliberation or *mīmāṁsā* was required for arriving at a decision regarding the right procedure.

For example, *tiṣṭhed yūpā³ḥ anupraharē³t ity āhuḥ/tiṣṭhet paśukāmasya ...anupraharet svargakāmasya tam u ha smaitaṁ pūrve anv eva praharanti ...,* "Should the post stand? Or should he throw it (into the fire)?' they say. It should stand for one desiring cattle ... He should throw (it) after for one who desires heaven; the ancients used to throw it after." (*AB* 6.3, trans. Keith) There was a dispute over whether the Agnihotra oblation is to be offered before or after the sunrise in the morning: *udite hotavyam anudita iti mīmāṁsānte. sa ya udite juhoti pravasata evaitan mahate devāyātithyaṁ karoty atha yo'nudite juhoti sannihitāyaivaitan mahate devāyātithyaṁ karoti tasmād anudite hotavyam,* "Should the offering be made when the sun has risen, or before it is risen?' they debate. He who offers when the sun has risen thus offers hospitality to the great god when gone on a journey. He who offers when the sun has not risen, thus offers hospitality to the great god when close at hand. Therefore, the offering should be made when the sun has not risen." (*Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa* 2.9, trans. Keith) The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa records a dispute over what the sacrificer should eat on the *Upavasatha* day. According to Aṣādha Sāvayasa, the sacrificer should fast; for it is unbecoming for him to take food before offering to the gods who come to his house in view of the sacrifice the next morning. Yājñavalkya, however, said: If the sacrificer does not eat, he becomes a sacrificer to the manes; and if he eats, he eats before the gods have eaten; let him therefore eat what, though eaten, counts as not eaten. The solution of the Brāhamaṇa is: Let him therefore eat only what grows in the forest; because no offerings of them are made to the gods; for, that of which no offering is to be made in the sacrifice, even when eaten, is regarded as not eaten. (1.1.1.7-10)

The seers were determining the correct ritual procedure through deliberation, by means of *mīmāṁsā.* For instance, in connection with the *Utsargiṇām ayana,* we find in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*: *utsṛjyā³ṁ notsṛjyā³m iti, mīmāṁsante brahmavādinaḥ* (7.5.7.1), "The theologians dispute: Should (a day) be omitted or not omitted." Whether the ritual of a particular day of the archetype, the *Gavām ayana,* was to be omitted or not, was debated. (cf. *KS* 33.7, *JB* 2.393) The origin of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* is found in such passages on ritual controversy. Some principles of interpretation evolved in course of time, the culmination of which we find in the *PMS* of Jaimini.

Towards the close of the Vedic age, a new literary genre came into existence. This was the *Sūtra* literature. After the prolix style of the Brāhmaṇa came the austerely brief style of the *Sūtras* which aimed at a systematic, methodical presentation of a subject in a very precise and concise way. The *sūtras* are usually short sentences giving the important information. Any complete work consisting of *sūtras* is also called a *Sūtra.* Both the *Śrautasūtras* and the *PMS* belong to this genre.

The *Sūtra* style of composition starts from the latest Brāhmaṇas. The minor Brāhmaṇas of the *Sāmaveda*, such as the *Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa*, bear the designation Brāhmaṇa, but are composed in the *Sūtra* style. Early Śrautasūtras and late Brāhmaṇas are mostly alike in the matter of style. The word *sūtra* in the sense of a work consisting of *Sūtras* is found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (*Kāṇva* 2.4.10, 4.1.2), while *kalpa* in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (2.10) may mean a *Kalpasūtra*. Kumārila says (in *Tantravārttika* on *PMS* 1.3.11) that the Brāhmaṇa of the *Aruṇaparāśara śākhā* was a *Kalpa*. He draws a significant line of distinction between *Kalpa* and *Sūtra*:

siddharūpaḥ prayogo yaiḥ karmaṇām anugamyate ।
te kalpā lakṣaṇārhāni sūtrāṇīti pracakṣate ॥ (*Tantravārttika* on *PMS* 1.3.11).

"The *kalpas* are those treatises that point out the methods of sacrifices, in the form of well-established regulations, and the *Kalpasūtras* are those that serve to point them out." (trans. G.N. Jha, Vol. 1, p. 224)

According to him, a *kalpa* describes the settled procedure of sacrifices as we find in the earliest brāhamaṇa-like *Śrautasūtras*, whereas a *sūtra* indicates it by means of general rules and their exceptions, as found in the comparatively later Śrautasūtras composed in the *Sūtra* style proper. He mentions the works of Baudhāyana, Vārāha (though it hardly deserves inclusion in this group) and Maśaka as examples of *Kalpa*, and those of Āśvalāyana, Vaijavāpa, Drāhyāyaṇi, Lāṭīya and Kātyāyana as those of *Sūtra*. The *Kalpas* somewhat resembled the Brāhmaṇas. In the age of transition, some works resembled Brāhmaṇa on the one hand and the *Sūtras* on the other.

A Brāhmaṇa belongs to a particular Vedic School following a recension of a particular Veda. Like the Brāhmaṇas, a Śrautasūtra too belongs to a particular Vedic School following a recension of a particular Veda. In a Vedic sacrifice the duties of the *hotṛ* relate to the *Ṛgveda*, those of the *adhvaryu* to the *Yajurveda*, and those of the *udgātṛ* to the *Sāmaveda*. This division of duties is in the main the basis on which the ritual texts were compiled. Accordingly, the Ṛgvedic Śrautasūtras are primarily concerned with the duties of the *hotṛ*, the Yajurvedic Śrautasūtras with those of the *adhvaryu*, and the Sāmavedic Śrautasūtras with the duties of the *udgātṛ* priest, and their acolytes. The Śrautasūtras are generally based on the injunctions of the Brāhmaṇas and the current practices of their time. Difference in practices in different regions and Vedic schools was reflected already in the Brāhmaṇas. This was more so in the age of the Śrautasūtras. Śrautasūtras sometimes differ on points on which the Brāhmaṇas are silent. More incidental and expiation rites are found in the Śrautasūtras.

Towards the end of the Vedic period people found it difficult to understand the correct procedure of complicated Vedic sacrifices from the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas, and handbooks for use of the officiating priests were composed under the name of the Śrautasūtras. This may be known from the observations of the commentators of the Śrautasūtras. For instance, Devatrāta says: *tatra puruṣaśaktiparihāram upalakṣya śaunakādibhir ācāryaiḥ kalpāḥ praṇītāḥ*, on *ĀŚS* 1.1.1; "Kalpas have been written by teachers like Saunaka and others in view of limitations of man's ability"; and *pūrve'pi*(=*hi?*) *pratyakṣadṛśo mantrabrāhmaṇābhyām eva karmāṇi kṛtavantaḥ, tac ca punar yugadaurbalyān na*

śakyate kartuṃ tataḥ śiṣyānugrahārthaṃ granthārambhaṃ cikīrṣur bhagavān āśvalāyanaḥ pratijñātavān "The ancient ones who saw the Reality directly, performed rituals through the help of the mantras and brāhmaṇas alone. Now, because of the weakness of the generation, that cannot be done. Therefore, out of compassion for his students, honourable Āśvalāyana, intending to begin (his) work, has declared": —says Siddhāntin on *ĀŚS* 1.1.1 (For similar remarks, see Sāyaṇa on *BŚS*, Bhavatrāta on *JŚS*, Dhūrtasvāmin on *ĀpŚS*, cited by Chakrabarti, "On the Transition of Vedic Sacrificial Lore", p. 182). The Śrautasūtras were more practical and less discursive than the Brāhmaṇas.

The Brāhmaṇas do not give a complete, connected description of the Vedic rites; they presuppose direct knowledge of the rites on the part of the audience, and mainly try to show justification of the injunctions, and connect the ritual with natural and supernatural forces for showing justification of the ritual and the accompanying Mantras. They often speak of the symbolic character of the rites and various ritual elements. Knowledge of the true character of the rites is frequently praised with the typical expression *ya evaṁ veda*, one who knows thus. In the Śrautasūtras, the significance of the rites was totally ignored. They usually avoided the *Arthavādas* and collected mainly the injunctions. The Brahmanical theory of sacrifices fell into disuse. The *PMS* too relegated the *Arthavāda* passages to a position of secondary importance by saying that their literal meaning is not intended and that their role is to supplement the precepts and the prohibitions.

The *Sūtra* period witnessed the beginning of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. The earliest texts of all the systems are in the *Sūtra* form. The *PMS* is ascribed to Jaimini. This is probably the oldest of the available *Sūtra* works of the six systems of Indian philisophy. Jaimini presupposes a long tradition of *Mīmāṁsā*. At least some of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* principles were already established before Jaimini; in his *PMS* we find their culmination.

The name of Jaimini is traditionally connected with the *Sāmaveda*. The name is not found in the ancient Vedic texts. He is said to have been entrusted with the propagation of the *Sāmaveda* by his preceptor Vyāsa. The name of Jaimini is connected with the Jaiminīya school of the *Sāmaveda*, to which belong the texts of Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka, Śrautasūtra and Gṛhyasūtra etc. The *Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa* (3.9.8) mentions Jaimini, a pupil of Vyāsa Pārāṣarya and the teacher of one Pauṣpiṇḍya. Jaimini is also mentioned in the Gṛhyasūtras of Āśvalāyana and Śāṅkhāyana. These references concern one or several Jaimini(s), connected with the *Sāmaveda*, from whom Jaimini, the author of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā Sūtra*, must be distinguished. In respect of the contents the *PMS* is closest to the *Yajurveda*, though some scholars are inclined to think that the *PMS* originated in the Sāmavedic circle.

Dharmajiñāsā is the central theme of the *PMS*. It is not only the oldest, but also the largest of the philosophical *Sūtra* works available. The contents of this work are divided in twelve chapters dealing with (i) *pramāṇa*, (ii) *bheda*, (iii) *śeṣa*, (iv) *prayoga*, (v) *krama* (vi) *adhikāra*, (vii) *sāmānyātideśa*, (viii) *viśeṣātideśa*, (ix) *ūha*, (x) *bādha*, (xi) *tantra* and (xii) *prasaṅga*. The *PMS* of Jaimini is in many cases too brief to be comprehensible, and is understood by us mostly as interpreted by the great commentators. A Śrautasūtra is affiliated to a particular Vedic School, but the *PMS* is concerned with the Vedas as a whole as the source of *dharma*.

The Śrautasūtras and the *PMS* are direct successors of the Vedic sacrificial lore. The ritual literature developed two trends: one was descriptive and the other interpretative. The Śrautasūtras followed the first and the *PMS* the second. The *PMS* never describes a Vedic sacrifice; this is done by the Śrautasūtras. The Śrautasūtras were concerned with the performance of the ritual and they gave a more or less connected account of the part played by the priests and the sacrificer. The *PMS* on the other hand, dealt with the prinicples of interpretation for ascertaining the correct ritual procedure. Thus their goal was the same: systematisation and correct performance of Vedic ritual. The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* is thus very intimately related to the Vedic ritual and also the Śrautasūtras.

The Śrautasūtras and the *PMS* were both composed in the *Sūtra* style that came into vogue towards the end of the Vedic period. Both of them draw upon the ritual literature existing before them. Though the authors of the Śrautasūtras were chiefly concerned with the descriptive aspect, they were acquainted with the interpretative aspect as well. They enjoined the sacrificial procedure in accordance with the principles of interpretation known to them, and compiled some of them in the form of *Paribhāṣās*. When the *Sūtras* came into existence, most of the Vedic texts were fixed by that time. Now it became the duty of the *Sūtrakāras* to determine the ritual procedure by means of correct interpretation of the Vedic texts. The description of the sacrifices in the Śrautasūtras is a result of such attempts. Baudhāyana says that the ritual practice (*kalpa*) has to be ascertained by five means (*pañcatayena kalpam avekṣeta chandasā brūhmaṇena pratyayena nyāyena saṁsthāvaśena,* 24.1), one of which is *nyāya*. *Nyāya* often means *mīmāṁsā*, compare Bhavatrāta, who too includes *nyāya*, i.e. *mīmāṁsā*, in such five means: *pañcatayam aharjñātram iti ... nyāyo mīmāṁsā etaiḥ pañcabhir dharmair hetubhiḥ kalpam apekṣeta* (read *avekṣeta*) *avagāhyekṣeta* (on the JŚS; p.193). "There is a fivefold means to determine the day ... *nyāya* (is) *mīmāṁsā*, by means of determinants these five, one should get to know the ritual procedure."

An *Adhikarṇa* of the *PMS* is usually based on a particular text (*viṣayavākya*) that admits of doubt and demands a solution. The *Adhikaraṇas* are mostly based on Brāhmaṇa passages. If we can rely on Śabara, some *Adhikaraṇas* are based on some Śrautasūtra passages. It appears that Jaimini's Sūtra *tathā payaḥpratiṣedhaḥ kumārāṇām* (11.1.52) most probably refers to *ĀpŚS* 1.11.2 (*nāsyaitāṁ rātriṁ kumārāścana payaso labhante*). Garge has shown that in some cases the citations are from the Śrautasūtras. It is somewhat strange that the *PMS* which does not accord independent authority to the Śrautasūtras should base its *Adhikaraṇas* on the sayings of the Śrautasūtras. But if we are to believe the great commentators, it does so. It is probable that Jaimini and even Śabara had some other Vedic texts before them, which have now passed into oblivion. For instance, Garge regards *ĀpŚS* 24.5.7 as the source of the passage forming the *viṣaya* of *PMS* 6.1.43 as cited by Śabara (*ārṣeyaṁ vṛṇīte, ekaṁ vṛṇīte, dvau vṛṇīte, trīn vṛṇīte, na caturo vṛṇīte, na pañcātivṛṇīte).* But the *Sūtra* of Āpastamba reads: *athaikeṣām // ekaṁ vṛṇīte / dvau vṛṇīte / na caturo vṛṇīte / na pañcātivṛṇīta iti vijñāyate //.* The expression *iti vijñāyate* indicates that Āpastamba refers to some Brāhmaṇa text. At any rate, the Śrautasūtras themselves leave much to be clarified further. Because of their attention to extreme brevity, the *Sūtras* are at some places obscure. Even the Śrautasūtras contain ambiguities. Especially in the matters relating to the ectypes, one is bound to face controversies in respect of details. The

intricate sacrificial procedure always made controversies on minutiae inevitable. Some principles of interpretation had to be evolved in course of time. Some such principles appear in the Śrautasūtras here and there, but they form the central theme of the *PMS.*

Both the Śrautasūtras and the *PMS* refer to their predecessors sometimes by name and sometimes anonymously. Both presuppose a long tradition and refer to some of their predecessors. All these teachers were not necessarily authors of a complete Śrautasūtra or a Mīmāṁsāsūtra (though some of them actually did so, as we know of the *Āśmaratha Kalpa* from *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini 4.3.105 and of the *Mīmāṁsā* of Kāśakṛtsni from the *Mahābhāṣya*). Their opinions were worth consideration in the eyes of the authors of the Śrautasūtras and the *PMS.* It is quite probable that both the aspects of Vedic ritual, practical and theoretical, were previously studied together. This supposition finds support from the fact that teachers such as Kārṣṇājini, Bādari, Ātreya, Āśmarathya and Ālekhana are mentioned in Śrautasūtras and the *PMS* as well—a fact that signifies the close relation in which the *PMS* once stood with the Śtrautasūtras. Garge observes: "There are not less than one hundred similar topics scattered over all the Śrautasūtras, that have their exact counterparts" in the *PMS* (p.3).

Correct ritual procedure depends on correct interpretation of the Vedas. Hence the *PMS* engages itself mainly with formulating such principles. The *PMS* shows that in a few cases the *Arthavādas* are complementary to the *Vidhis* concerned (cf. *saṁdigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt, PMS* 1.4.24). For instance, when it is enjoined *śarkarā aktā upadadhyāt* (TB 3.12.5.12), the precept is not clear about the substance of besmearing the gravels; the substance is to be known from the following *Arthavāda, tejo ghṛtam.* Jaimini also decides (*PMS* 4.3.17-18) that the result obtained from the Rātrisattras is to be known from the corresponding *Arthavāda.* The result of a sacrifice, if not specified otherwise, is heaven, decides Jaimini in the *viśvajit nyāya: sa svargaḥ syāt sarvān praty aviśiṣṭatvāt,* "That should be the heaven, since it is common to all." (*PMS* 4.3.15) Besides, many cases of doubt that arise in connection with the Vedic ritual have been settled by the *PMS,* which thus acted as complementary to the Śrautasūtras. A few examples may be given here.

The *Pañcaviṁśa Brāmaṇa* says: *paśukāmo yajeta/ yad udbhidā yajeta* etc.,(19.7). The question arises whether *udbhid* is a subsidiary material. It is decided according to *PMS* 1.4.2 that *udbhid* is the name of a sacrifice, for avoiding *matvarthalakṣaṇā* 'possessive implication'.

It is said: *citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ,* "He who has desire for cattle, should perform sacrifice with the *citrā.*" (*TS* 2.4.6) The question arises: whether the work *citrā* i.e. 'variegated' is to be understood as a quality of the sacrificial animal (by accepting the precept as a *guṇavidhi*) with reference to the sacrificial animal for *Agni-Soma. PMS* 1.4.3 decides that *citrā* is to be interpreted as the name of a sacrifice in order to avoid the defect of *vākyabheda* 'syntactical split' (for, otherwise, the one sentence will have to enjoin three factors, namely, the animal, its female sex and its variegated colour). Similarly, we find *śyenenābhicaran yajeta* (*ĀpŚS* 22.4.13, cf. *ṢB* 4.2.1-2); does it prescribe a sacrifice in which the *Śyena* is the sacrificial animal? The PMS interprets it as a name, once again (1.4.3).

The *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* reads: (a) *citpatis tvā punātu,* (b) *vākpatis tvā punātu,* (c) *devas tvā savitā punātu,* (d) *acchidreṇa pavitreṇa vasoḥ sūryasya raśmibhiḥ,* "May the Lord

of consciousness purify you. May the Lord of speech purify you. May god Savitṛ purify you by means of faultless sieve, by means of the rays of the favourable Sūrya." (1.2.1.2). According to the principle of *Anuṣaṅga* 'elliptical extension' (*PMS* 2.1.48) the expression *acchidreṇa ... raśmibhiḥ* has to follow each of (a), (b), and (c), and thus the said text is to be taken as three distinct *Mantras.*

Many questions and disputes arise for ascertaining the relation between a Principal and its subsidiaries. A subsidiary (e.g. an act, *Mantras,* substances and their properties) is that which subserves the purpose of something else. The *PMS* adopts six means of ascertaining which is subsidiary to what; namely, *śruti* 'direct assertion,' *liṅga* 'indicative power,' *vākya* 'syntactical relation,' *prakaraṇa* 'context,' *sthāna* 'position' and *samākhyā* 'name.' These six means of evidence decide the relation between the principal and the corresponding subsidiaries. In case of conflict, each one of these six means prevails over the subsequent ones. (*PMS* 3.3.14)

There is the Vedic text: *uccair ṛcā kriyata uccaiḥ sāmnopāṁśu yajuṣā* "(The rite) is performed audibly with the *Ṛc,* audibly with the *Sāman,* inaudibly with the Yajus." (*MS* 3.6.5, 4.8.7) As regards the real intention of the text there is a doubt whether the work *ṛc* stands for a metrical passage, or the *Ṛgveda.* If the former is correct, even when a metrical passage occurs in the *Yajurveda,* it has to be recited loudly; whereas in the latter case, it is to be pronounced in the *Upāṁśu* voice. It is decided on the basis of syntactical relation etc. that the words *ṛc, yajus* and *sāman* in this context stand for the *Ṛgveda,* the *Yajurveda,* and the *Sāmaveda,* respectively. (*PMS* 3.3.2)

In the context of the *Darśapūrṇamāsas* there is the Vedic text: *syonaṁ te sadanaṁ kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā suśevaṁ kalpayāmi; tasmin sīdāmṛte pratitiṣṭha vrīhīṇāṁ medha sumanasyamānaḥ//* "I make your seat comfortable, by means of the stream of *ghṛta,* I make it dear (to you); sit there and stand firm in this nectar, with kindly spirit, oblation of rice!" (TB 3.7.5.2) According to the evidence of syntactical relation, the whole *mantra* may be used for making a seat (*sadana*) for the *Puroḍāśa* or for placing (*sādana*) the *Puroḍāśa.* According to the evidence of indicative power, however, the first part of the *mantra* may be used in making a place for the *Puroḍāśa* and the second part, for placing it. In this conflict, indicative power prevails over syntactical relation in ascertaining the ritual application of the *mantra.*

Because of the direct assertion: *niveśanaḥ saṁgamano vasūnām,* "He is the resort and meeting ground of prosperities." (MS 2.7.12) *ity aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣthate* with, "With this *mantra* addressed to Indra, he attends on the *Gārhapatya.*" (*MS* 3.2.4), the *mantra* is used in worshipping the *Gārhapatya,* though by virtue of *liṅga,* it could have been used in worshipping Indra.

In the precept *vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate,* "To spring he offers Kapiñjalas" (*VS* 24.20), the word *kapiñjala* occurs in the plural number. How many *Kapiñjalas* are to be understood? Jaimini decides (*PMS* 11.1.38-45) that three is the intended number.

The Mantra *barhir devasadanaṁ dāmi,* "I cut the *kuśa* grass" the seat of gods (*MS* 1.1.2) may be used in lopping the *Kuśa* grass according to *liṅga*; the evidence of context makes its connection with the *Darśapūrṇamāsas* clear.

The *Prayogavidhis* determine the sequence of rites in actual performance of a sacrifice. The *PMS* in the Chapter V lays down six means of evidence for ascertaining sequence, namely, *śruti* 'direct assertion', *artha* 'purpose', *pāṭha* 'textual order', *sthāna* 'position', *mukhya* (order of the) principal (acts)', and *pravṛtti* 'commencement'. Sometimes the order is directly stated in the Veda: *vaṣaṭkartā prathamaḥ sarvabhakṣān bhakṣayati.* "The pronouncer of the word *vaṣaṭ* eats first all foods" (*AB* 13.8), or *teṣāṃ gṛhapatiḥ prathamo dīkṣate* "Of them, the Gṛhapati is initiated first" (*ŚB* 12.1.1.1), sometimes the order is ascertained by purpose, sometimes by the order found in the *Mantras* and Brāhmaṇas. The order may also be determined by the place; and the order of the principal acts decides that of their subsidiaries. When several details are to be performed at one time, the order of commencement becomes the determinant. Each of these means of ascertaining the order of acts prevails over the subsequent ones, in case of conflict. The order as known from the *Mantras* prevails over that known from the Brāhmaṇa.

For example, in the context of the *Darśapūrṇamāsas*, the *Puroḍāśa* for Agni-Soma is enjoined earlier in the Brāhmaṇa portion (in *TS* 2.5.2.3) and the *Puroḍāśa* for Agni thereafter (in *TS* 2.6.3.3). In actual performance, however, the *Puroḍāśa* for Agni is to be offered first, according to the order of the accompanying *mantras.* From these examples it will be clear as to how important the contribution of the *PMS* was in ascertaining the correct form of ritual.

The following Śrautasūtras are available:

Ṛgvedic—Āśvalāyana and Śāṅkhāyana;
Kṛṣṇa-Yajurvedic—Vādhūla, Baudhāyana, Bhāradvāja, Āpastamba, Hiraṇyakeśi, Vaikhānasa, Mānava, Vārāha;
Śukla-Yajurvedic—Kātyāyana;
Sāmavedic—Ārṣeyakalpa, Lāṭyāyana, Drāhyāyaṇa, Jaiminīya;
Atharvavedic—Vaitāna.

The contents of the Śrautasūtras are usually as follows:

Darśapūrṇamāsa, Agnyādhāna, Agnihotra, Nirūḍhapaśubandha, Cāturmāsyas, Agniṣṭoma, other types of *Soma* sacrifices, *Pravargya, Cayana, Vājapeya, Rājasūya, Sautrāmaṇī, Aśvamedha, Puruṣamedha, Sarvamedha, Dvādaśāha, Gavām ayana, Ekāhas, Ahīnas,* and various other ectypal sacrifices.

The earliest of the available Śrautasūtras are those by Vādhūla and Baudhāyana. The Dvaidha section of the *BŚS* records many cases of controversy among the ritual authorities, though some such cases have found place in the main corpus itself. The *Karmānta Praśna* contains some general principles which are akin to the *Paribhāṣās* of the later Śrautasūtras and have some correspondence with the *PMS.* In the next stage we find the beginning of the proper *Sūtra* style that takes recourse to the devices like *anuvṛtti, adhikāra* and *paribhāṣā* for achieving brevity of expression. The *Bhāradvāja Śrautasūtra,* the *Mānava Śrautasūtra,* the *Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra,* the *Laṭyāyana Śrautasūtra,* and the *Drāhyāyaṇa Śrautasūtra* begin with a small number of *paribhāṣās* and some other such *Sūtras* are scattered around these works. Āpastamba was the first author of a Śrautasūtra to compile *paribhāṣās* together in 24.1-4. *Paribhāṣās* occupy the first two sections of the first chapter of the *Śaṅkhāyana*

Śrautasūtra. The *Hiraṇyakeśi Śrautasūtra* and the *Vārāha Śrautasūtra* begin with a larger collection of *paribhāṣās* (1.1). Apart from that, the *Hiraṇyakeśi Śrautasūtra* contains some *paribhāṣās* in 3.1 and 3.8. Mahādeva in his commentary thereon characterizes this work as *nyāyaiś ca yuktam.* The *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* contains in its first chapter a still larger number of *paribhāṣās.*

These *paribhāṣā* portions of the Śrautasūtras in particular deserve comparison with the *PMS* (Garge, pp.52ff, Chakrabarti, *The Paribhāṣās,* Ch. VI), since both deal with the principles of interpretation. Of the Śrautasūtras again, those of Āpastamba and Kātyāyana deserve detailed comparison with the *PMS,* in consideration of their similarity in language and views. Āpastamba uses the ablatives of abstract nouns for indicating reasons (e.g. *prakṛteḥ pūrvoktatvāt,* 24.4.15; *kumbhīśūlavapāśrapaṇīprabhutvāt,* 24.4.16; *paktivaiṣamyāt,* 24.4.17; *prakṛtikālamadhyatvāt,* 24.4.19; *kālasyāśeṣabhūtatvāt,* 24.4.20). This usage is much more frequent in the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra,* and it is the common practice in the *PMS.* Āpastamba's *paribhāṣas* are called *nyayā* by Cauṇḍapācārya in his *Prayogaratnamālā* (*caturviṁśe tataḥ praśne nyāyapravarahautrakam*), and *nyāya* is a term that is often applied also to *Mīmāṁsā.*

Several *Sūtras* are common in the *paribhāṣa* sections of the *ĀpŚS* and the *PMS,* e.g., *ĀpŚS* 24.1.41 = *PMS* 11.4.51; *ĀpŚS* 24.2.36 = *PMS* 4.4.19 (*svakālatvāt* for *svakālavidhānāt*); ĀpŚS 24.2.37 = PMS 4.4.19; ĀpŚS 24.2.38 = PMS 4.4.21; ĀpŚS 24.4.19 = PMS 12.2.20 (*ārambhaṇīyā* for *anvārambhaṇīyā* and *punaḥ* for *hi*); *ĀpŚS* 24.4.20 = *PMS* 12.2.20 (v.l.); *ĀpŚS* 24.4.21 = *PMS* 12.2.21. Some other *Sūtras* of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* that are partially identical with or very strikingly similar to the *paribhāṣās* of the *ĀpŚS* are indicated below: *ĀpŚS* 24.1.21 cf. *PMS* 12.4.43 (44-47 give further reasons); *ĀpŚS* 24.1.35 cf. *PMS* 2.1.34; *ĀpŚS* 24.1.40 cf. *PMS* 11.4.50; *ĀpŚS* 24.1.43 cf. *PMS* 11.4.54; *ĀpŚS* 24.2.1 cf. *PMS* 12.3.25 (adds the reasons); *ĀpŚS* 24.2.6 cf. *PMS* 12.4.3 (adds the reasons); *ĀpŚS* 24.3.47 cf. *PMS* 6.3.38 (adds the reasons); *ĀpŚS* 24.3.48 cf. *PMS* 6.3.39 (adds the reasons); *ĀpŚS* 24.4.16 cf. *PMS* 11.4.30; *ĀpŚS* 24.4.17 cf. *PMS* 11.4.37; *ĀpŚS* 24.4.15 cf. *PMS* 5.2.17 (gives *ĀpŚS* 24.4.15 verbatim and adds the reason); *ĀpŚS* 24.2.29 cf. *PMS* 3.6.34.

The *Hiraṇyakeśi Śrautasūtra,* which closely follows the *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra,* and the *Vārāha Śrautasūtra* also contain some *Paribhāṣā Sūtras* comparable with the PMS. But the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* contains the largest number of *paribhāṣā* comparable with the *PMS* in language, style and contents. For example, *KŚS* 1.1.2-3 cf. *PMS* 6.1.4; *KŚS* 1.1.7 cf. *PMS* 6.1.13; *KŚS* 1.1.9 cf. *PMS* 6.1.44 (adds the reason); *KŚS* 1.2.8-9 cf. *PMS* 12.4.43 (44-47 elucidate the reasons indicated by the *KŚS*); *KŚS* 1.3.2 cf. *PMS* 2.1.46 (modifies); *KŚS* 1.3.5 cf. *PMS* 12.3.25 (adds the reason); *KŚS* 1.4.14 cf. *PMS* 6.3.28; *KŚS* 1.4.16 cf. *PMS* 6.3.39; *KŚS* 1.4.17 cf. *PMS* 6.3.38; *KŚS* 1.5.10 cf. *PMS* 5.2.2; *KŚS* 1.6.6-9 cf. *PMS* 6.3.18-21; *KŚS* 1.6.12 cf. *PMS* 6.3.26; *KŚS* 1.6.13 cf. *PMS* 6.6.18; *KŚS* 1.6.14 cf. *PMS* 6.6.26 (limitation); *KŚS* 1.6.16 cf. *PMS* 6.6.21; *KŚS* 1.6.17 cf. *PMS* 6.7.31; *KŚS* 1.6.18 cf. *PMS* 6.7.32; *KŚS* 1.6.20 cf. *PMS* 6.7.33; *KŚS* 1.6.22 cf. *PMS* 6.7.34; *KŚS* 1.6.23 cf. *PMS* 6.7.35 (adds the reason); *KŚS* 1.6.25 cf. *PMS* 6.7.40; *KŚS* 1.7.7 cf. *PMS* 11.4.27; *KŚS* 1.7.13 cf. *PMS* 11.4.50; *KŚS* 1.8.6 cf. *PMS* 12.3.11 (part); *KŚS* 1.8.20 cf. *PMS* 12.4.9. Even apart from the *paribhāṣās,* the *KŚS* contains *Sūtras* that have strikingly similar counterparts in the *PMS*; e.g. *KŚS* 3.3.24 cf. *PMS* 10.8.53.

The extent of similarity between the Śrautasūtras and the *PMS* has been studied by scholars. The influence of one on the other has also been considered. In view of "the correspondence in language" Garge is "tempted to advance the view that Āpastamba knew the extant P.M.Sūtra of Jaimini or an earlier version of it that contained almost the same expressions." (p.16). He also cites some cases where the *KŚS* appears to compress several *sūtras* of the *PMS* is one *sūtra* (for example, cf. *KŚS* 4.3.8-16 and *PMS* 8.2.10-23; *KŚS* 9.11.14 and *PMS* 3.5.37-39), and believes that such *sūtras* prove beyond doubt that the *KŚS* is later than the *PMS* (pp.53-54). This conclusion is accepted by Parpola (1994, p.303). It is, however, very difficult to ascertain without further evidence whether Jaimini followed Kātyāyana or Kātyāyana followed Jaimini ("Cloony (1990: 85f.), too, leaves the question open," Parpola, p.304, n.59). There are dissimilarities too. The *PMS* investigates into many more issues than any of the extant Śrautasūtras, more systematically and in much more details. What has been laid down in a single *Paribhāṣā* has in some cases been established in a complete section in the *PMS*. The arrangement of subjects in the *PMS* is also much more systematic than in the Śrautasūtras, even in the *KŚS*. For example, the rules on *atideśa* 'extended application' are scattered in different chapters in the *KŚS*, whereas the *PMS* discusses all such principles in chapters 7-8.

The Śrautasūtra in general appear to be anterior to the *PMS* of Jaimini. The *PMS* presupposes the Śrautasūtra inasmuch as it examines the validity of the *Prayogaśāstra* (1.3.11-14), which in all probability meant the Śrautasūtra showing the *prayoga* or actual performance of the Vedic sacrifices; compare: *etad āśvalāyanasūtraṁ nāma prayogaśāstram*, Nārāyaṇa on *ĀŚS* 1.1.1. In respect of style the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā Sūtra* is much more obscure and enigmatic than the Śrautasūtras. The condensation of expressions in some cases makes *Sūtras* totally unintelligible without the assistance of traditional commentaries.

Āpastamba regards the Rathakāra as one belonging to the three higher social classes (*ĀpŚS* 5.3.19). The social order of the time of Āpastamba seems to have changed in that of Jaimini. Jaimini concludes (*PMS* 6.1.50) that Rathakāra means an inferior caste. None of the older Śrautasūtras expressly observes that a Rathakāra is not allowed to perform any sacrifice except the *Ādhāna*; and the Vārāha Śrautasūtra mentions (1.1.1.4) the Rathakāras along with the higher castes as performers of the Vedic sacrifices. Hiraṇyakeśin enjoins (3.1.13) that the *Agnihotra* and the *Darśapūrṇamāsas* are even compulsory for a Rathakāra. Probably it was only in the later age that chariot-making was discontinued by the three higher classes. Jaimini flourished in this period and argued that since chariot-making was not a profession of the higher social classes, the Rathakāra should mean an inferior caste.

Āpastamba's reference to a *nyāyavid* (*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* 2.4.8.13, 2.6.14.13) need not necessarily refer to the *PMS*, it may very well refer to its predecessors. All the technical terms of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* were not invented or coined by Jaimini, they may have been inherited from tradition. The knowledge of the terms used by Jaimini does not necessarily mean the knowledge of his work, because the terms could be ancient; not coined, but only adopted, by Jaimini.

The *PMS* discusses issues such as authority of the Vedas, eternal, self-evident character of the Vedas—not found in the Śrautasūtras. In the Śrautasūtras, there is no

attempt to defend the Vedic ritual, whereas the *PMS* has to defend the authority of the Veda itself and to rebut the view that the Vedas are meaningless. It may have been the trend of the age of Jaimini when the authority of the Vedas was challenged and the PMS as a system of Indian philosophy emerged for defending that authority. *Apūrva* in the sense of transcendental merit that connects the ritual with its result in the future, as accepted by the *Mīmāṁsā*, does not occur in the Śrautasūtras. It may indeed be argued that the contents of the Śrautasūtras did not leave much scope for such topics and we must also remember the weakness of *argumentum ex silentium.*

Garge thinks (pp.67-68) that the *PMS* should be called a Vedāṅga because of its very direct contribution towards correct interpretation of the Vedas and ritual practice. But, then, the question presents itself, why was this status denied to the *PMS*? I think the *PMS* of Jaimini or the *Mīmāṁsā as a separate subject of study* was too late to come into existence, when the number of the Vedāṅgas was already established too firmly to be changed. The number of the Vedāṅgas was already fixed as six towards the end of the age of the Brāhamaṇas (*ṣaḍaṅga* is mentioned in the *Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa* 5.7 and the *Gopatha Brāhamaṇa* 1.1.27). This is not to deny antiquity of the *mīmāṁsā*, which must have been there as a means of deciding the *Kalpa.*

In some cases the *PMS* does not agree with the interpretations or conclusions of the Śrautasūtras, which are not always uniform, either. The *PMS* agrees with the *ĀpŚS* in respect of the independent nature of the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña*, whereas it differs from the *KŚS*, according to which it is a subsidiary. Thus *KŚS* 4.1.28-30 (*Pitṛyajña*—a subsidiary) contra. *PMS* 4.4.19-21 (*Pitṛyajña* - not a subsidiary); *KŚS* 6.10.17 (*Darvihoma*—an ectype) contra. *PMS* 8.4 (*Darvihoma* not an ectype); *KŚS* 1.8.16-18 (*ekaśruti* of *Mantras*) contra. *PMS* 12.3.20 - 22 (*saṁhitā-svara* of *Mantras*).

In respect of the *ārṣeyavaraṇa*, the *PMS* decides; *atryārṣeyasya hānaṁ syāt* (6.1.43), whereas the Śrautasūtras do not say so.

Āpastamba says that one should wish the result of a part of the sacrifice at the beginning of the part (*yajñāṅgādau yajñāṅgakāmam* (*ĀpŚS* 24.4.11, cf. *BŚS* 2.1.1), whereas the *PMS* does not accept a separate result for a subsidiary rite (*aṅgeṣu stutiḥ parārthatvāt*, *PMS* 4.3.19,cf. also *PMS* 4.3.1).

It is said: *santatam āghārayati* (*TS* 2.5.11.7), and *vasordhārāṁ juhoti ... santatāṁ tasya juhuyāt* (*TS* 5.4.8.1-2). Āpastamba takes the word *santata* in the sense of concurrence of a *mantra* and the relevant act, and enjoins that their beginning should synchronize in the *Āghāra* and the *Vasordhārās* (*āghāre dhārāyaṁ cādisaṁyogaḥ*, 24.2.2). But according to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, also in these cases the beginning of the act should synchronize with the end of the relevant *mantra.* Jaimini takes the word *santata* in the sense of continuity of action (*PMS* 12.3.25-28).

In connection with the division of the sacrificial animal among the performers the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (31.1) says that if the Śamitṛ is a non-Brahmin, his share should be given to a Brahmin (thus also *ĀŚS* 12.9, and *ĀpŚS* 7.14.4). The possibility that the Śamitṛ could be a non-Brahmin indicates that he was not one of the *Ṛtvijes*, for none but a Brahmin was entitled to be a *Ṛtvij.* According to the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, however, the Śamitṛ is one of the *Ṛtvijes.* (PMS 3.7.29)

The *Yājñikas* of later period mainly depended on the Śrautasūtras for performance of ritual, as we may know from Kumārila's observation:

> *vedād ṛte'pi kurvanti kalpaiḥ karmāṇi yājñikāḥ* ।
> *na tu kalpair vinā kecin mantrabrāhmaṇamātrakāt* ।। (*Tantravārttika*, p.165)
> "And again, as a matter of fact, we find the persons learned in sacrifices to be performing sacrifices by the help of the *Kalpas*, even without (any knowledge of) the Veda; while with the help of the *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* portions of the Veda, without that of the *Kalpas*, they are never able to perform any." (Trans. G. Jha, p. 229)

The ritualists (*Yājñikas*) sometimes differed from the conclusions of the *PMS*. They preferred to stick to their tradition. For instance, Śabara says: In the context of the *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice, it is said that *āgneyī subrahmaṇyā bhavati.* Accordingly, *indra* is modified as *agni* in the Subrahmaṇyā formula, *indra āgaccha hariva āgaccha medhātither meṣa* etc. Now the question arises whether the words *hariva* etc. too should be modified. PMS 9.1.44 decides that these words are not to be modified. Śabara observes that the ritualists (*yājñika*) do not accept this and modify the other words too, e.g., *agna āgaccha rohitāśva bṛhadbhāno dhūmaketo* etc. Dhūrtasvāmin in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* points out in many cases the difference between *nyāya* and *upadeśa*, the conclusions of *Mīmāṁsā* and the traditional instruction of the ritualists.

Mahādeva in his commentary on the *Hiraṇyakeśi Śrautasūtras* (1.1.1) observes:

> *ucyate sūtrakārādiyājñikānāṁ prasiddhitaḥ* ।
> *taj jaiminimatāpetam iti me dūṣaṇaṁ na hi* ।।
> *yājñikāḥ sūtrakārāṇāṁ mataṁ buddhvā svayaṁ tathā* ।
> *nyāyais tatsūcitair eva draḍhayanty akutobhayāḥ* ।।
> *prasiddhim anugṛhṇantas te mānyāḥ śrautakarmaṇi* ।
> *tanmatasthāpanāyaiva cāpalaṁ me na gaṇyatāṁ* ।। (p. 9)
> "It is said on the basis of the general acceptation of the ritualists. That it is a departure from the view of Jaimini is no fault of mine. The ritualists, having themselves comprehended the views of the sūtrakāras, strengthen them without fear by means of the maxims of interpretation indicated by them. Inasmuch as they uphold the general acceptation, they have to be honoured in (matter of) Vedic ritual. My frivolity for establishing their views may please be left unnoticed."

Though as the basic text of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* system of philosophy, the *PMS* was concerned with the authority of the Veda and interpretation of the Vedic ritual, philosphical topics such as soul, liberation, God, reality, means of valid cognition, etc. were later added by the commentators, Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara. In course of time the Śrautasūtras were succeeded by numerous *Prayoga* or *Paddhati* works dealing with the descriptive part of Vedic ritual and the interpretative aspect developed in the philosophical school called *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* Some *Mīmāṁsakas* also composed *Prayoga* texts. Most of the *Prayoga* or *Paddhati* works are yet to be published and studied properly for estimating the

influence of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* on these works. But the principles of interpretation evolved by the *PMS* had wider scope of application. They have been effectively applied to many branches of learning, especially in Hindu jurisprudence.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AB	*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*
ĀpŚS	*Āpastamba Śrautasūtra*
BŚS	*Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra*
JB	*Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*
JŚS	*Jaiminīya Śrautasūtra*
KS	*Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*
KŚS	*Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*
KU	*Kaṭha Upaniṣad.*
MS	*Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*
PMS	*Pūrvamīmāṁsā Sūtra*
ŚB	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*
ŚB	*Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*
TB	*Taittirīya Brāhamaṇa*
TS	*Taittirīya Saṁhitā*
VS	*Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*

II
Philosophy of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

CHAPTER 4

The Epistemology of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

I

The field of epistemology is very wide and complicated. It is full of controversial issues. However, we will touch only such aspects of epistemology on which *Mīmāṁsā* has something special to say. *Mīmāṁsā* is specially interested in *śabdapramāṇa.* It discusses other *pramāṇas* only to show that these are not of any help to comprehend *Dharma*—the main theme of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* For upholding *śabdapramāṇa,* i.e. Vedas, *Mīmāṁsā* has developed the concept of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* i.e. intrinsic nature of the validity of cognition.[1] When cognition is produced by appropriate means it is produced as valid only. No additional means are required to make it valid—*jñānasāmagrī mātrādeva pramotpattiḥ.* "Knowledge arises out of just collocation of the means of it." In the same way no additional means are required to comprehend its validity. When cognition is comprehended by appropriate means its validity also is comprehended. No additional means are required for it. *Pramātvajñaptirapi jñānajñāpaka sāmagritaḥ eva jāyate.* "Even the validity of knowledge is understood from the means of knowledge. Both in *utpatti* i.e. origination, and *jñapti* i.e. comprehension of the validity of cognition does not require any additional means than the appropriate means to produce and comprehend the cognition. This concept of *svataḥpramāṇya* is a unique contribution of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* to epistemoloy. The concept of *Arthāpatti* and *Anupalabdhi* as two more *pramāṇas* is also a contribution of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* to Indian epistemology. *Arthāpatti* is utilized to prove the concept of *apūrva* which is very vital to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā. Anupalabdhi* is utilized to prevent the rejection of the entities that are beyond sense perception on the ground that these are not perceived. Only such objects that are capable of being perceived but are not perceived in the appropriate situations, could be denied on the ground that these are not perceived. The ethical entities like *dharma, adharma,* etc., cannot be denied on the ground that these are not comprehended by senses. The *anupalabdhi pramāṇa* restricts the scope of the denial to only such entities that are comprehended by the senses. The epistemic purpose and the logical tenebility of these two *pramāṇas* will be discussed later.

The Perspective and the Areas of Epistemology

A presentation on epistemology has to cover the following areas: The nature of cognition, the forms of cognition, the means of cognition and the result of the cognition. *(jñānasvarūpa, jñānaprakāra, jñānasādhana, jñānaphala i.e. pravṛtti).*

In the context of Indian epistemology there is another important item viz. *bhrama* i.e. error. In western epistemology the expression *cognition* stands for valid cognition only. But in Indian epistemology the expression *jñāna*, which is taken as equivalent to cognition, covers both *pramā* i.e. valid cognition, and *bhrama* i.e. false cognition. In the *Prābhākara* system only all cognitions are analysed as *pramā* while the situations of *bhrama* are explained away as *vyavahāra* only. In Buddhist epistemology the *savikalpaka* cognition is considered as *bhrama*. In Advaita vedānta the cognition at *vyāvahārika* and *pratibhāsika* level i.e. empirical level, is considered as *bhrama*. In view of this, the concept of *bhrama* i.e. error, and different theories of *bhrama* have become a part of Indian epistemology.

The epistemology, though a discipline by itself, has intimate connection with metaphysics and ontology on the one hand and it has to satisfy the logical consistency on the other. Each school of Indian philosophy formulates its epistemology keeping its metaphysics and ontology in mind. It is stated that *'mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ'* i.e. the establishment of an entity depends upon the *pramāṇas*. However, it also happens that the *pramāṇas* are formulated to suit the doctrines already envisaged i.e. *meyādhīna manasiddhiḥ*. Such adjustments between the metaphysical and ontological doctrines and epistemological formulations are not necessarily laboured attempts. These are made to maintain consistency and build a logical base to the doctrines conforming to the epistemic and logical norms to the best possible extent. In view of this, the presentation of the epistemology of a school of philosophy has to keep in mind i) the metaphysical and ontological doctrines of that school, (ii) the epistemic norms and the adjustments made in the epistemology of the school concerned, (iii) the extent to which logical norms are satisfied or compromised.

Another important point is the reference made to experience i.e., *pratīti* or *anubhava*, while explaining the epistemological process. In Indian philosophical tradition psychology is not developed as a separate discipline. However, psychological factors are frequently taken into account in explaining the epistemological process, ethical doctrines and religious practices like meditation. While explaining the epistemological process, sometime, experience i.e. *pratīti* is referred to as the final authority and surer ground. It is stated that just as *prayoga*, i.e. common usage, is the final authority for grammarians, *pratīti*, i.e. experience, is the final authority for philosophers: *'Prayoga śaraṇāḥ vaiyākaraṇāḥ'* *'Pratīti śaraṇāḥ darśanikāḥ'*. Therefore, reference to experience is also taken into account in the presentation of epistemology.

There are broadly three approaches to metaphysics viz. (i) Idealism of Buddhists, (ii) Realism of Jaina, Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, (iii) The Advaita approach which cannot be classified strictly either as Idealism or as Realism. In fact, grouping of Indian systems of philosophy in terms of western philosophical classification itself is not quite appropriate. However, to give a broad idea of the approaches of these systems, this grouping is suggested. If these metaphysical approaches are kept in mind, it becomes easy to comprehend the basis of their epistemological formulations. With this background in mind, major epistemological concepts, issues and procedures will be discussed with special reference to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*.

The Ontological Nature of Cognition

The ontological nature of cognition is differently envisaged in different schools of Indian philosophy.[2]

Firstly, whether it is a constituent of the very core of the nature of knowing self or it is an attribute of the self, has to be examined. If it is an attribute, whether it is a quality or activiity, needs to be looked into. It is also considered as a substance by some. As a background to present the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* view in detail, these views are briefly noted here. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider it as a quality of knowing self. The Sāṁkhyas do not classify the categories as *dravya, guṇa* etc. They describe cognition as result of *Satvasāmudreka* of *Buddhitatva,* effulgence of the *satvaguṇa* of the Buddhi.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita cognition is given a special name viz *Dharmabhūta jñāna.* It is considered both as substance and quality. They do not see any contradiction in it. They compare it with *dīpaprabhā, the light of a lamp.* The Jainas consider it as *a modification of the knowing self.* It is stated to be *a natural and special quality of knowing the self.*

In the Advaita vedānta, cognition is considered at two levels, viz., *śuddha caitanya* and *vṛttijñāna,* i.e. pure consciousness and empirical cognition. The first is the foundation of the entire process of cognition. The second one is a conditioned epistemic process. It is only in this state that the knower, known, and the means of cognition get trifurcated. Dvaita vedānta also proposes two types of cognition, normally, *svarupajñāna* and *vṛttijñāna.* The first is the very nature of knowing self. The second is the cognition obtained through the external means such as sense perception, inference etc.

Mīmāṁsā Concept of Cognition

For Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsākas cognition is an activity of the knowing self.

Before we elaborate on this point, we have to take into account the process laid down for establishing the contact between the objects to be known and the knowing self. There are two approaches, viz., (i) modification of the knowing agent, i.e. *buddhi* or *antaḥkaraṇa* by the contact of the object through the external sense; (ii) the contact of the knowing self with the external object through *manas* and the external sense without any modification. The former is the Sāṁkhya model while the latter is the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika model. Though these two processes cannot be equated fully with the two theories of causation, viz., Evolution theory and Creation theory, the influence of these theories on them cannot be ruled out. The process of contact laid down by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas seems to be a mix-up of these two processes.

The Bhāṭṭa theory that the cognition is an activity of the knowing self is established on the following grounds.[3]

The knowing self is an agent while the known is an object. This agent-object relationship is not possible without some activity on the part of the agent. Hence an activity has to be envisaged on the part of the knowing self. The act of knowing itself is this activity. This is a kind of modification i.e. *vikriyā* on the part of the knowing self. The contacts among the knowing self, *manas,* sense and the object bring about this modification in the

knowing self. This modification itself is cognition. It is with this modification that the self becomes the knower. *'Buddhau utpannāyam utpadyate eva jñātṛūpa vikāraḥ.'* "Simultaneous to the arousal of the *buddhi*, is produceed the modification of knowing." (T.T.132) It is a state that is attained by the self. One and same self could be recognized in both the states, viz., before developing the cognition and after developing the cognition. Therefore, this modification does not affect the eternality of the self. *'Na asau vikāraḥ nityatvam vināśayati pratyabhijña pratyayena avasthādvayepi anusandhānāt.'* "That modification does not affect the eternality of the self, since the latter is perceived in both the states by means of recognition." (T.T. P.132) *Vikriyā jñānarūpa asya nityatve na virotsyate.* "On the admittance of its eternality, there would not be any contradiction in its cognitive modification." *(S.V. Pratyakṣa st.53,56)*

This modification designated as cognition, is subtle. It has to be inferred by its result, viz., revelation of the object. A 'phalānumeya tasyāsca phalam syāt artha dṛṣṭatā'. (M.R.S P.280)

To fully grasp its nature and role, the following points have to be noted.

(i) It is *Karaṇa* i.e. means as well as *phala* i.e. result. The fact of its very arising by the contact with *manas*, senses and object makes it the means, and its enabling the object to reveal itself makes it the result.

(ii) It is distinct from other *Karaṇas* in two respects.

(iii) It is not already there to play the role of *Karaṇa*. It arises and plays the role of *Karaṇa.*

(iv) It does not require any intermediary activity i.e. *avāntaravyāpāra* to play its role while other *Karaṇas* do require it.

(v) In a way revelation of object itself may be taken as both *avāntaravyāpāra,* secondary action and *pradhānakriyā,* main action.

From these features it is clar that when Mīmāṁsakas say that the cognition is an activity, they do not mean the usual type of activity. It is a modification of the self into a knowing self investing him with the activity of knowing. Their real interest is to maintain a clear distinction between the subject and the object by pointing out that these two are linked by the cognition.

This concept of cognition as activity is criticized by Jayanta Bhāṭṭa on three grounds[4]: (i) The cognition by itself is not an activity. It is a result of sense contact, etc. activity. (ii) An activity that is present in a perceivable object cannot be imperceptible. *Ātman* is perceptible according to the *Bhāṭṭas.* Therefore, the cognition which is claimed to be its modification has got to be perceptible. If it is accepted as perceptible, then, the Bhāṭṭa theory that the cognition is inferred will collapse. (iii) There cannot be any activity that is subtle and that is not of the nature of motion. Hence, the activity of the nature of cognition which is claimed to be subtle and not of the nature of motion, cannot link the *ātman, manas,* senses and the object. (iv) The cognition as an activity is claimed to be both *Karaṇa* and *phala.* However, one and the same cannot be both *Karaṇa* and *phala.* (N.M. P.16-17 *Kāśi* Sanskrit series No.106, 1936)

All these objections are based on the assumption that the Bhāṭṭas hold that cognition is an activity of usual type. However, Bhāṭṭas have conceived it as a *vikriyā* i.e. modification of *ātman* that operates through the *manas* and sense, and enables the object to reveal itself.

It is better to describe it as a state of the self rather than an activity or quality. It may be noted that in the Vedānta cognition is described as a state of *antaḥkaraṇa* in the case of *vṛtti jñāna*. Later *Mīmāṁsā* writers have called it a *guṇa*. Kumārila uses the expression *dharma* i.e. an attribute. Some commentators have stated it to be a *Śakti* of the self. In any case it is not a *guṇa* or an action of motion type in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika sense.

The Comprehension of Cognition

The next issue is the comprehension of cognition itself.[5] The cognition enables us to comprehend the objects. But what are the means to comprehend the cognition itself? In this respect three views are held, viz., (i) cognition is self-revealing, i.e. *svaprakāśa*; (ii) it is comprehended by *Manas*; (iii) it is inferred on the basis that the object is revealed. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas go by the third view and the Prābhākaras by the first view.

According to the Bhāṭṭas all objects are invested with a quality called *prākaṭya*, i.e. a special capacity to reveal itself.[6] It is also called as *jñātatā* or *dṛṣṭatā*–the capacity to be known or perceived. This is clear from the experiences like 'jar is revealed' 'jar is known', etc. This quality is found in all substances. It is also found in *jāti, guṇa* etc that are connected with the substance by *tādātmya* relation. It is this quality that enables to infer the cognition of the object. Knowledge itself cannot be equated with *prākaṭya* since the cognition is in *ātman* and *prākaṭya* is in the object. It is only on the basis of *prākaṭya* of an object that the cognition of that object is inferred. (M.M. P. 256-260)

Thus according to the Bhāṭṭas knowledge is neither self-revealing nor comprehended by *manas*. It is inferred by the fact that the object is revealed.

This concept of *prākaṭya* is criticised by raising the following objections: (i) *Prākaṭya* is stated to be a quality. At the same time it is also stated that it is found in the qualities like colour etc. A quality cannot be a quality of another quality. (ii) *Prākaṭya* should either be revealed by another factor or be self revealing. If it is revealed by another factor, then, the *prākaṭya* in that has to be revealed by yet another factor and so on. This leads to infinite regress. On the other hand, if it is self revealing why not consider cognition of the object itself as self revealing? (iii) Since the awareness of objects could be explained by the cognition of the object, there is no justification to accept an intermediary entity like *prākaṭya*.

The first objection can be answered by pointing out that a quality like number is found in other qualities. Therefore, there is no bar for a quality to be in another the quality. The second objection also may be cleared on the anology of a eye. Eye reveals the other objects without itself being revealed by anything else. As regards the third point, it is true that the cognition enables the object to be revealed but the question is as to how cognition itself is comprehended. The Bhāṭṭas answer is that it is inferred by the fact of the revelation of the object. (MM 262-63)

The Prābhākaras do not go by this theory. They accept cognition as *svaprakāśa*. According to them in all cognitions, the knower, the known and the cognition are presented. The knower and the cognition are directly cognized in all cognitions. Their cognition is of

the nature of perception. The status of the cognition of object as perception, inference etc. depends upon the means by which the cognition is produced. However, all kinds of cognitions are self revaling in the ultimate analysis. The cognition is termed as *saṁvit* in the Prābhākara system.

Majority of the schools of Indian philosophy accept that cognition is *Saviṣaya* i.e. it is about an object.

Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka

In a perceptual cognition the object is cognized in two stages, viz., *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka.* While describing the nature of these two stages the systems of Indian philosophy considerably differ. We may briefly note their views[7]:

(i) Buddhists hold the view that *nirvikalpaka* alone is valid cognition. At *nirvikalpaka* stage, the *svalakṣaṇa,* i.e. the thing in itself which is momentary is presented. The expression *svalakṣaṇa* means different from all others. It is a state in which there are no attributes. *Savikalpaka* is a mental projection. At this stage the attributes are projected.

(ii) The Grammarians say that there is no *nirvikalpaka* stage. There can be no cognition of an object without a reference by words. The words always refer to the attributes. Therefore, there is no such stage such as *nirvikalpaka.*

(iii) The Advaita holds the view that the cognition of *sat,* i.e. Brahman, is *nirvikalpaka.* The difference between the Buddhist approach to *nirvikalpaka* and that of Advaita is that while the object of *nirvikalpaka* is momentary according to the former, it is permanent according to Advaita. However, the object of *nirvikalpaka* cognition is attributeless according to both.

(iv) It is in Nyaya-vaiśeṣika system that these two stages are systematically worked out. At the *nirvikalpaka* stage the entity, its attributes, and the relation between the two are presented in the cognition but these are not identified as qualified and qualifying. It is only at the *savikalpaka* stage that these are presented as a combination of qualified and qualifiying. It is *viśiṣṭaviṣayaka jñāna* i.e. cognition of a combination of an entity and its attributes duly related. A *viśiṣṭapratyaya* presupposes *viśeṣaṇa pratyaya.* This is the ground to envisage *nirvikalpaka* as an earlier stage of *savikalpaka.* At the stage of *nirvikalpaka* there is only *viṣayatā* of the entity and the attributes with reference to the cognition while at the *savikalpaka* stage there is *prakāratā* of the attributes, *viśeṣyatā* of the entity and *saṁsargatā* of the relation with reference to the cognition.

In the definition of perception given in *Gautamasūtra* the expressions '*avyapadeśya*' and *vyavasāyātmaka* occur. These are interpreted by Vācaspati Miśra as referring to *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* respectively. *Avyapadeśya* means that which is not referred by words. The *nirvikalpaka* stage is not referred to by words. *Vyavasāyātmaka* means determinate. The *savikalpaka* stage is a determinate stage.

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, at the *nirvikalpaka* stage the entity and its attributes such as universal etc. are cognized without realizing their *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya*

nature. This cognition is like a cognition of a child or a dumb person. Kumārila describes it as *ālocanātmaka*, i.e. mere sensation. Later at the *savikalpaka* stage, the fact that the attribute, i.e. universal, continues in other individual entities of the same class and the entity itself as specific, is realized. This process is called *anuvṛtti*, i.e. continuing nature, *vyāvṛtti*, i.e. specific nature. In view of this realization the entity is now cognized with its general and special aspects and referred to by the word.

asti hi ālocana jñānam prathamaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ
bālamūkādivijñāna sadṛśam śuddhavastjaṁ
na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anbhūyate
tayoḥ ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktiḥ eva avaśiṣyate. (S.V.Pr. 112-113)

"Perception, initially, is shorn of modification born, as it is, directly out of the object of perception, like the awareness of the child or the dumb, etc. At that stage, there is no experience at all either of the general or of the particular. Only the individual remains there as the ground of both of them."

Pārthasārathi explains the term *sāmānya* as *anuvṛtti* and *viśeṣa* as *vyāvṛtti* and remarks that *anuvṛtti vyāvṛttī na nirvikalpake prakāśēte tayoḥ ādhārabhutam anuvṛttam vyavṛttam yat jātivyaktyādi anekākāram vastu tattadākārasaṁyuktaṁ sammugdham sarvam avasīyate.* "The general and the particular do not appear in the state of *nirvikalpaka* perception since the factors of generality and particularity, which are to serve as their basis, remain indiscriminately silent at that stage."

It is this cognition of *śuddhavastu* that reminds the word at *savikalpaka* stage. '*tadabhāve nirnimittam śabdasmaraṇam iti na syāt.*'

The Prābhākaras also explain the nature of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* in the same way. Śālkanātha explains the process of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* as follows:

On seeing an entity the cognizer gets the cognition of that entity and its attributes, viz., universal, quality, etc. However, he does not realize which of them is common with other entities of the same class and which is special. When he reflects on other entities he sorts out the common and the special.

(i) *prathamam svarūpamātra grahaṇam dravyajāti guṇeṣu upapadyate.* "At the initial stage barely the object, as it is, is perceived in lieu of the stuff it is made of, the class it belongs to and the qualities it has inherent in it.

(ii) *sāmānyaviśeṣau dve vastuni pratipadyamānam pratyakṣam prathamaṁ utpadyate kintu vastvantara anusandhāna sūnyatayā sāmānya viśeṣatayā na pratīyate anugatam sāmānyam ụcyate vyāvṛttiśca viśeṣaḥ.* (Pr.p 163)

The stage at which the entity and its attributes are cognized without the realization of their continuing nature and special nature is *nirvikalpaka* stage while the next stage at which this is realized is *savikalpaka* stage. The entity and its attributes are cognized at both the stages but at the first stage their common and special nature is not realized while at the second stage this is realized.

This distinguishes the Prābhākara concept of *nirvikalpaka* from that of the Buddhists and the Advaita. According to the Buddhists *svalakṣaṇa* alone is cognized but not its attributes. According to Advaita '*sat*' alone is cognized. At the *savikalpaka* stage, according

to the Buddhists, the attributes are projected while according to *Mīmāṁsā* and Nyāya these are real.

In respect of *Savikalpaka,* Śālikanātha clarifies two points.

(i) It is stated that to have *savikalpaka* stage of cognition reflecting on another entity is necessary. Such a reflection is not caused by the contact of sense with that entity. Therefore, the involvement of such a procedure will come in the way of treating *savikalpaka* stage as perception. Śalikanātha states this difficulty and clarifies that the reflection of another entity is only a *sahakārin,* i.e. an aid, to the *savikalpaka* cognition. Its chief means is the contact between the sense and the object. Therefore, its status as perception is not affected.

(ii) It is stated that the content of both *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* is the same. The entity and its attributes are cognized at both the stages. This appears to affect the very validity of *savikalpaka* since there is no new element in *savikalpaka.* Therefore, it is clarified that identifying the common and special nature of the entity and its attributes is a new element at the *savikalpaka* stage. Therefore, the validity of *savikalpaka* is not affected.

The Definition of Pramāṇa

In Indian epistemology cognition is bifurcated as valid and invalid. The valid cognition is designated as *pramā* and invalid cognition as *bhrama.* In *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* texts these are called *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa.* The expression *pramāṇa* could be interpreted as means of valid cognition and also as valid cognition following appropriate etymological explanation, viz., (i) *pramīyate anena,* i.e. that by which cognition is obtained; (ii) *pramīyate yat,* i.e. the cognition obtained. Its particular meaning has to be identified by the context.

Jaiminī sūtra does not explicitly state any definition of *pramāṇa.* However, Śāstradīpikā evolves a definition of *pramāṇa* by utilizing certain expressions in the *autpattika sūtra* of Jaimini. The definition evolved reads as *'Kāraṇa doṣabādhaka jñānarahitaṁ agṛhīta—grāhijñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ.'*[8] The cognition which is not produced by defective cause, which is not contradicted and which cognizes an object that is already not cognized, is *pramāṇa,* i.e. valid cognition. The first two clauses exclude invalid cognition from the scope of this definition and the third clause excludes *anuvāda,* i.e. restatement, from the scope of this definition. The third clause excludes *smṛti,* i.e., memory also. The first two clauses are suggested by the word *avyatireka* in the *sūtra* and the third clause is suggested by *anupalabdha.* The *sūtra* is framed to explain the nature of *śabdapramāṇa* and establish that it is the only *pramāṇa* in respect of *dharma.* However, it has to have the basic requirements of a *pramāṇa.* These requirements are stated in the *sūtra.* Śāstradīpikā utilized these clauses and has evolved the above definition.

The definition given by Kumārila adds one more clause, viz., *dṛḍham* i.e. firm. This excludes doubt from the scope of the definition of *pramāṇa.*

Dhārāvāhika jñāna i.e. the cognitions of the same object occurring in a series are considered as valid both by the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. However, the justifications

given by them are different. According to the Bhāṭṭas the condition 'not already known' is not violated in the case of *dhārāvāhika jñāna* though the same object is cognized again and again. For the given time the element that is grasped is different in each cognition. But, the Prābhākaras do not introduce time element. Instead they hold that each succeeding cognition in the series is produced by the sense contact separately. Therefore, all the cognitions in the series are equally valid.[9]

The Prābhākaras define *pramāṇa* as '*anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam*', i.e. primary experience is *pramāṇa*. By using the expression *anubhūti*, i.e. primary experience, they exclude memory from the scope of the definition of valid cognition. They declare that '*yathārtham sarvavijñānaṁ*', i.e. all cognitions are true. The instances of doubt and wrong cognition are also explained in such a way that these cognitions also convey the objects as they are. They do not accept *anyathākhyāti*, i.e. a cognition that cognizes an object as another. The Prābhākaras' explanation for the instances of *bhrama*, will be fully explained while discussing the *akhyṭi* theory of the Prābhākaras.

Nyāya defines *pramā* as *yathārthānubhava*, i.e. the primary experience that cognizes an object as it is. Nyāya and the Prābhākara concepts of valid cognition imply correspondence theory of cognition.

The Theory of the Validity of Cognition

In the context of the concept of valid cognition the question whether the validity of cognition is intrinsic, i.e. *svataḥ* or it is brought about by some additional factors, viz., *parataḥ* is raised. The same question is also raised in respect of *aprāmāṇya*. In this respect the following views are generally discussed.

(i) Sāṁkhyā—Both *prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya* are intrinsic, i.e. *svataḥ*.

(ii) Nyāya—Both are *parataḥ*, i.e. extrinsic.

(iii) Bauddha—(a) *prāmāṇya* is *parataḥ*, i.e. extrinsic.

(b) *aprāmāṇya* is *svataḥ*, i.e. intrinsic.

Mīmāṁsaka—*pramāṇya* is *svataḥ* and *apramāṇya* is *parataḥ*.

The nature of this problem can be understood by examining the views of Nyāya and *Mīmāṁsā*.

Mīmāṁsakas have a vested interest in considering *Prāmāṇya* as intrinsic. The concepts of *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda and *prāmāṇya svatastva have intimate connection.* Veda is the unquestionable authority for *dharma*. If it is considered as *pauruṣeya* its unquestionable authority status cannot be maintained. Therefore, they have to establish its intrinsic validity. With a view to achieve it they took the larger question of the validity of cognition itself and formulated their theory of the intrinsic validity of cognition. On the other hand, the Nyāya accepted the *pauruṣeyatva* of Vedas. They hold Īśvara as the author of Vedas. Therefore, it was not necessary for them to accept the theory of the intrinsic validity of cognition.

The Nyāya Theory of the Validity of Cognition

Let us first examine the Nyāya view.[10] According to it, cognition is a quality of *ātman*, i.e. self. The *ātman* is its *samavāyikāraṇa*, i.e., material cause. The contact between the sense and the object is *nimittakāraṇa* i.e. efficient cause. This contact between the sense and the object is found both in the case of *pramā* and *bhrama*. However, in the case of *pramā* the contact is between the sense and the object as qualified by its characteristic. It is a cognition of the object as characterized by its own characteristic. This characteristic is *viśeṣaṇa* of the object and it is called *prakāra* in the cognition of the object. When the characteristic of the object, viz *viśeṣaṇa*, plays the role of *prakāra* in the cognition of the object, it is a valid cognition. '*Tadvati tatprakārakaḥ anubhavaḥ*' is valid cognition. But if the object is cognized as characterized by a characteristic, i.e. *prakāra* which is not actually found in the object cognized, then, it is not valid cognition. There is a gap between the characteristic actually found in the object and the characteristic that is reflected in the cognition. It is '*tadabhāvavati tatprakārakaḥ anubhavaḥ*'. The crucial point here is that in the first case the sense not only has the contact with the object as object but as associated with its own characteristic while in the latter case the sense has contact with the object without extending to the association with its own characteristic. Consequently, some other characteristic is reflected in the cognition.

Though both these cognitions have arisen by the contact between the sense and the object, there are additional factors that have made them valid or invalid. These additional factors are called *guṇa* and *doṣa* respectively. In the first case, the very fact of cognizing the object as characterized by its own characteristic is an additional factor, since mere contact with the object is found in the case of *apramā* also. In the case of the second, certain drawbacks like distance, dim light, etc., are additional factors. The additional factor in the first case is called *guṇa*, i.e. merit, as it is more efficient application of sense with the object, and in the second case, it is called *doṣa* as it hinders the proper application of the sense and leads to distortion of the cognition.

> *doṣo apramāyāh janakaḥ pramāyāstu guṇo bhavet*
> *pittaduratvādirūpo doṣo nānāvidho mataḥ*
> *pratyakṣe tu viśesyeṇa viśeṣaṇavatā samaṁ*
> *sannikarṣo guṇaḥ.*
>
> "Faultiness of the means is the cause of invalid knowledge while efficiency of it is the source of valid knowledge. Faultiness of the means are of various kinds, such as distance, weakening of the eyesight by *pitta*. In perception, contact with the qualified in the same measure as with the quality brings efficiency in the act of preceiving."

In view of the role of these additional factors the Nyāya considers the validity or invalidity as extrinsic, i.e. *parataḥ*. This is the extrinsic nature of the validity or invalidity at the stage of its very generation, i.e. *utpattau paratastvam.*

The cognition of the validity is also not intrinsic. If it were intrinsic no doubt would have arisen in certain instances. Therefore, the validity of a cognition has to be ascertained

on the basis of successful result, i.e. *saphala pravṛtti.* For instance, when one observes water in a lake he proceeds to fetch it. He drinks the water and his thirst is quenched. This confirms the validity of his cognition of water. On the other hand, when one observes a mirage and takes it as water and proceeds he will not get water. This enables him to realize that his cognition of water was not valid. From this it is clear that both validity and invalidity are not intrinsic to cognition. These are ascertained by inference on the basis of the success or failure of the result.

This approach has certain unsurmountable difficulty. The inference by the successful result is also of the nature of a cognition. Therefore, its validity also needs to be verified. If it is further checked by another inference, then, that also has to be checked again. This leads to infinite regress, i.e. *anavasthā.* The *Nyāya* has no logical answer for it. *Udayana* simply states that validity need not be known to undertake activity in all cases. Mere doubt does not prevent activity.

'prāmāṇyasya avaśyajñeyatva anabhyupagamāt
tadagrahepi artha sandehādapi sarvasya upapatteḥ.' (N.K. P.81)

This is defeating the very purpose of the whole debate. *Nyāya* tries to show *anavasthā* in the case of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* also. We will note this later. However, this cannot be an excuse for their failure to find out a satisfactory solution.

In this context we have to note two important points:

(i) Nyāya defines *padārtha* as *prameya,* i.e. an entity which is an object of cognition. Therefore, they have no way to identify the existence of an object other than its cognition. If they had accepted the validity of cognition as intrinsic, there would have been no difficulty in establishing the existence of the object. Since, they have opted for *parataḥ prāmāṇya* they have landed themselves in the difficulty of verifying the validity of one cognition by another and that of the second by the third one and so on. In any case they cannot reach the object without the medium of cognition. This gives scope to deny the very outside object. This is a greater problem than infinite regress. By saying that the cognition of validity is not necessary in all cases and doubt does not prevent activity they have virtually accepted *svataḥ prāmāṇya.*

(ii) The examples given in case of verificatory cognitions are the cognitions of such objects which are ontologically related with the object of the verified cognition. For instance, *'idam pṛthivītva prakārakam jñānam, pramā, gandhavatī pṛthivītva prakārakatvāt.'* "The cognition characterized by *pṛthivītva* is a valid cognition as it relates to an object that has odour." The cognition of the object characterized by *pṛthivitva* is a valid cognition as this object has odour. Here, the odour is a distinct characteristic of *pṛthivi.* This ensures that the object concerned is *pṛthivī.* Hence, it can be made out that the *pṛthivītva* which is *prakāra* is actually found in the object cognized. Here, the objects of the verified cognition and the verificatory cognition are ontologically related. Thus the verification is not merely at the cognition level, but it is at ontological level also. Probably Nyāya feels that in such cases no further verification by another cognition is necessary. The Nyāya definition of *pramā* involving a reference to the characteristic of object at object level and the cognition level and linking the object with its characteristic at these levels is intended to ensure the existence of the object outside the cognition and its true reflection in the cognition.

Mīmāṁsā Theory of the Validity of Cognition

Mīmāṁsakas consider the validity of cognition as intrinsic, i.e. *svataḥ*, both at the level of its generation and cognition. At the generation level the causes that generate the cognition also generate its validity. No additional factors are necessary as contended by the Nyāya. At the cognition level also the causes of the comprehension of the cognition also enable to comprehend its validity. However, in the case of *aprāmāṇya*, i.e. invalidity, some or the other defect of the cause leads to the invalidity of the cognition. The comprehension of the invalidity also is produced by the contradiction of this invalid cognition by another cognition or by tracing the defect of the causes. Thus, the invalidity is *parataḥ*, i.e. extrinsic, both at its generation level and its comprehension level.

The cognition of validity which is intrinsic, is explained in different ways by the three schools of *Mīmāṁsā*. (i) According to the Prābhākaras, the cognition is self-revealing, therefore, its validity also is self revealed. (ii) According to the Bhāṭṭas, the cognition is inferred by *jñātatā*. Consequently, its validity is also inferred by the same. (iii) According to Murāri Miśhra, it is comprehended by *mānasa pratyakṣa*.

The procedure of the cognition of validity of a valid cognition is as under:

(i) *Vyavasāya* of the object as characterized by its own characteristic.

(ii) The cognition of this first cognition by one of the above three ways.

(iii) The cognition of the validity of the cognition concerned along with it.

The procedure of the cognition of invalidity of an invalid cognition is explained as under:

(i) *Vyavasāya* of the object as characterized by a characteristic which is not its own characteristic.

This is due to some or the other defect of the causes. At this stage the absence of this superimposed characteristic in the object cognized and the presence of the object's genuine characteristic are not realized.

(ii) The cognition of this first cognition as it is.

(iii) Undertaking a verification on a point of doubt or defect psychologically or epistemologically.

(iv) Realization of the error by contradiction of this cognition by another cognition or by identifying the defect.

(v) Comprehension of the invalidity.

In this process, since the invalidity is comprehended by means of some other cause, viz., realization of the defect or the contradiction, the invalidity is not intrinsic to the cognition. It is *parataḥ*, i.e. extrinsic.

In this context two difficulties have to be noted and solved.

(i) Why not consider *aprāmāṇya* also as *svataḥ* since *anuvyavasāya* conveys the *vyavasāya* level cognition as it is?

This may be answered by pointing out that the grounds of invalidity, viz., absence of the characteristic superimposed on the object cognized and the presence of its own characteristic in the object are not reflected in this cognition either at *vyavasāya* level or at *anuvyavasāya* level. Therefore, the invalidity is not self-evident here.

(ii) If the invalidity is not *svataḥ* and if the ascertainment of the invalidity should await the verification, what is its status until it is verified and identified as invalid?

This difficulty may be solved by pointing out that the validity of a cognition and its self revealing nature is general, i.e. *utsarga*. Hence, the observer takes it as *pramā* though it is *bhrama*. In other words, he makes *pramātvāropa* on it. However, its real status is that it is *apramā*, even though it is not yet realized as such. This will be discovered after verification. It is the sublating cognition '*na idam rajatam*' that exposes the grounds of its invalidity, viz., the absence of *rajatatva* and the presence of *śūktitva*. That is why the comprehension of invalidity is considered as *parataḥ*, i.e. extrinsic.

The often repeated objection against the intrinsic nature of validity that if the validity is *svataḥ*, the doubt would not have arisen in certain instances, particularly, when the observer has not frequently observed the object is answered by pointing out that the doubt arises only when some defects in the cause are suspected. On verification if the defects are identified, then, the cognition is not taken as valid. If it is found that there are no defects, then, the doubt is eliminated. There is no need to confirm the validity. It is self-evident. The absence of defects is not the cause of validity. Its presence only distorts the cognition. In the case of *aprāmāṇya* the *doṣas* are its cause. The verification confirms the invalidity of the cognition. This distinguishes it from the valid cognition.

The Khyāti Theories in Indian Philosophy

In Indian epistemology the theories of perceptual error have played an important role. There are five dimensions of these theories: (i) optical, (ii) psychological, (iii) epistemological, (iv) logical and (v) metaphysical.

The process of error starts at optical level. The psychological level adds to it. It takes epistemological shape. These three aspects have to be taken into account while analysing the nature of error. The analysis has to satisfy the logical requirements. Different schools of Indian philosophy have different metaphysical views. They have worked out their theory of perceptual error within the framework of their metaphysical systems. Consequently every school has its own theory of error. These theories are known as *khyāti* theories. These could be broadly grouped into two: (i) Idealistic and (ii) Realistic. *Ātmakhyāti* and *Asatkhyāti* theories of *Vijñānavādin* and *Mādhyamika* come under the first group. Within the second group of Realists, there are two groups, viz., *Anyathā khyāti* and *Yathārtha khyāti*. The *Anyathākhyāti* of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, *Viparītakhyāti* of Bhāṭṭas and *Abhinava anyathā khyāti* of Dvaita Vedānta come under *Anyathā khyāti* group. The *Akhyāti* theory of the Prābhākaras, *Yathārthakhyāti* of Rāmānuja and *Satkhyāti* of Sāṁkhyas come under *Yathārthakhyāti* group.

The *Anirvahanīya khyāti* of Advaita is a class by itself. It is based on the *Sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa* concept of Advaita metaphysics and epistemology. The theories of *Ātmakhyṭi* and *Asatkhyāti* were utilized by the Buddhists to explain their metaphysical view. Advaita utilized *Anirvacanīyakhyāti* to support its *Sad-asadvilakṣaṇa* view.

Almost all schools of Indian philosophy discuss the *khyāti* theories in the major works and defend their respective theories. Maṇḍana Mishra has written a separate treatise, viz., *vibhramaviveka* and has discussed five *khyāti* theories.

He particularly criticizes the *Akhyāti* theory of the Prābhākaras and supports *Viparītakhyāti* theory of the Bhāṭṭas. He does not mention *Anirvacanīya khyāti.*

Sri Jayatīrtha discusses five prominent *khyāti* theories in *Nyāyasudhā* and establishes *Abhinava anyathākhyāti* theory of Dvaita Vedānta. Recently, Vepattur Subrahmanya Shastry has written a special treatise on this topic, viz., *khyāti parīkṣā.* Presenting *Vyākaraṇa* view is a special point of this work. He reviews *Dvaita* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* views.

His criticism of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* view is answered by Sri Rāmānuja Tātāchārya in his work *Yathārthakhyāti bhūṣaṇa.* Some modern works on this topic have also appeared in English. Among these *The theory of error in Indian Philosophy* by Dr. Bijayananda Kar, *Perceptual Error—the Indian Theories* by Dr. Srinivasa Rao, *The Critique of the Theories of Viparyāya* by Nāni Lal Sen deserve special mention. These modern works are not affiliated to any particular school.

In spite of a large number of works on this subject and continued debate among philosophers, this problem still remains a vexed problem. Professor Kuppuswamy Shastriji has given a good analysis of the five theories of error in his introduction to *Vibhrama viveka.* He has made an interesting remark: "All the theories of *Khyāti* involve a negative element." In *Asatkhyāti* the negative element is obvious. In *Ātmakhyāti* the external object is absent. In *Anyathākhyāti* the negetive element is found in respect of *saṁsarga* or in presenting one object as another which is not present. Kuppuswamy Shastri says, "even in *Akhyāti* of Prabhākara the *viveka āgraha* is a negative element." It is difficult to agree with this remark since the *viveka āgraha* is not a content of the two cognitions. He also remarks that in the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* no negative element is involved. It is difficult to agree with this remark also since the *Prātibhāsika sattāka rajata* is supperimposed on *vyāvahārika sattāka śūkti* and for the sake of *Pravṛtti* it is taken as *Vyāvahārika.* It is something like a *tādātmyāropa* of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas and does involve negative element. Something that is absent is presented in a cognition as present. Therefore, a plain definition of *khyāti* can be given as *astaḥ sattvena pratītiḥ* which underlies all the theories. But one has to take care that this *asat* is *sādhiṣṭhāna.* Without *adhiṣṭhāna* and *sadṛśa* no error is possible. This distinguishes this theory from Buddhists' theory of *asat khyāti* which is *niradhiṣṭhāna.* This theory is designated as *abhinava anyathākhyāti* in Dvaita Vedānta.

Professor Kuppuswamy Shastriji's analysis is very brief. This problem needs full investigation. It also needs a comparative study with modern scientific view and western philosopher's view. Error is a distorted cognition. To determine the nature of error one has to investigate as to at what level the distortion has taken place.

(i) Is it a distortion at ontological level.

(ii) Is it a distortion at psychological level.

(iii) Is it a distortion at epistemological level.

(iv) Do these levels separately cause distortion or more than one level is involved in the distortion of the cognition.

These are the questions that have to be thoroughly examined.

(a) Broadly speaking, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas go by the distortion at ontological level, that is to say one entity is taken as another. However, *Saṁskāra* or *Jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti* are of psychological nature. These assist the distortion.

(b) The Prābhākaras go by the distortion at epistemological level, that is, the difference between the two cognitions is not realized.

(c) *Vijñānavādins* go by the distortion purely at psychological level. These approaches have to be sorted out to determine the nature of error.

Anyathākhyāti Theory of Nyāya School

Among the *Khyāti* theories the *anyathākhyāti* of Nyāya has a central position. It is discussed by all the schools while presenting their respective theories. According to this theory, in the stock example for error of shell-silver the shell is cognized as silver. The shell is present before the observer. His eye is in contact with it. However, he does not cognize its special characteristic *śuktitva* but cognizes it in a general way as a shining object. He also cognizes the features that are similar to shell and silver. As he had cognized the silver earlier elsewhere, his mind brings in the silver by way of *jñāna lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti,* that is to say, his previous cognition of silver itself serves as a contact to bring in the silver into the fold of his cognition. Both shell and silver are true objects. But the characteristic silverness is not found in the shell. However, this characteristic is presented as characterizing *Idam,* i.e. *śukti,* in the cognition while the genuine characteristic of *śukti* i.e. *śuktitva* is not presented. Consequently, he cognizes shell as silver. This is *anyathākhyāti.*[11] Cognizing an entity as another. Cognitions of both shell and silver are of the nature of perception according to Nyāya.

These are not two cognitions as in the Prābhākara's theory. But the two objects are provided in the cognition by two different relations. The *Idam,* i.e. shell is provided by the *laukika sannikarṣa,* i.e. normal contact of the eye with the shell as *idam* and the other, i.e. *rajata* or *rajatatva* by *alaukika sannikarṣa,* i.e. extraodinary contact known as *jñanalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti.* These two, viz., *idam* and *rajatatva* that are really not associated with each other are presented as associated with each other. This makes the cognition erroneous. The important point to be noted here is that the two objects of the cognition are really existent outside the cognition and are cognized by the cognition. These have *viṣayatā* with reference to this cognition. But they miss *viśeṣyatā* and *viśeṣanatā* relation between the two. *Rajatatva* is presented in the cognition but really it is not a *viśesyatā* of the object referred by '*Idam.*' The *vaiśiṣṭya* between the two which is not actually there is presented in the cognition.

The *viparīta khyāti* of the Bhāṭṭas is also explained in the same way with one important difference, viz., *rajata* is provided in the cognition by memory instead of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti.* Further, the Nyāya theory transfers the characteristic of one to the other. *Rajatatva* which is a characteristic of *rajata* is transferd to *Idam* in the cognition.

In the *viparīta khyāti* of Bhāṭṭas it is a case of wrong identity between *Idam,* i.e. *śukti* and *rajata.* It is conceiving *tādatmya,* i.e. identity between the two which really does not exist. The Prābhākaras differ from both these and have formulated a new theory known as *akhyāti* theory.

Akhyāti Theory of the Prābhākaras

The *Akhyāti* theory of Prābhākaras is a distinct contribution to the theories of error in Indian epistemology. Almost all schools of Indian philosophy quote the Prābhākara's theory and criticize it. The main features of *Akhyāti* theory are well known. However, the points raised against it have to be carefully examined to appreciate the Prābhākara's view point. Therefore, the main features of this theory are briefly stated here and the objections are examined in detail.

The Prābhākaras take the firm stand that all cognitions are true, *yathārtham sarvavijñānam.* The content of the cognition and the object referred to always agree. That which is presented in the cognition is called *bhāsamāna* and the object referred to by it is called *Vedya.* These two always agree.

The Prābhākaras point out that even if in one instance this rule is broken, then, there can be no confidence in any cognition conveying its objects validly.

The well-known example of error, viz., *śukti rajata,* is analysed in such a way that this does not violate the rule of agreement.

According to the Prābhākaras the statement, '*Idam rajatam*' represents two cognitions, viz., perception and memory. One who perceives the *śukti* present before him, perceives it as '*Idam*', i.e. 'this' in a general way without the comprehension of its special features that distinguish it from '*rajata*', i.e. silver. Due to the similarity of *śukti* and *rajata* he remembers *rajata.* The perception of *śukti* and the memory of *rajata* occur in such quick sequence that he does not realize the difference between the two cognitions or the objects conveyed by these two cognitions.

The contents of these two cognitions agree with the facts conveyed by them. '*Idam*' refers to *śukti* that is present before and '*rajatam*' refers to '*rajata*' that is remembered. Therefore, there is no disagreement between the contents of these two cognitions and the objects referred to by these.

Though these two cognitions are true and distinct, an erroneous statement is made as '*Idam rajatam*' due to the non-realization of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects. For the non-realization of the difference the following factors are responsible.

(i) The absence of the comprehension of the distinct features of *śukti* and its comprehension merely as '*Idam*' in a general way.

(ii) Remembering *rajata* on account of the similarity between *śukti* and *rajata.*

(iii) Absence of reference to the past time in the memory of *rajata.* This is called *tattāpramoṣa.*

(iv) Occurrence of the perception of *śukti* and the memory of *rajata* in quick succession.

Objections Against the Akhyāti Theory and the Answers

(i) The so-called memory of *rajata* cannot be treated as memory as it lacks the main feature of memory, viz., reference to the past time.

Answer: *Rajata* cognition is caused by the revival of the impressions of the previous cognition of it. Being produced by the impressions is the main feature of the memory. Reference to the past-time is incidental. The impressions are roused by the similarity between *śukti* and *rajata.*

(ii) *Idam* and *rajatam* are stated with *sāmānādhikaraṇya.* Therefore, the two refer to one and the same. '*Idam*' refers to something that is present before. Therefore, *rajatam* should also refer to the same. Hence, it cannot be remembered as *rajata.*

Answer: The idea of *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* is based on the assumption that '*Idam*' and '*rajatam*' constitute a single cognition. Since these are two distinct cognitions, the question of *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* does not arise.

(iii) It has to be taken as one cognition and *sāmānādhikaraṇya* has to be worked out since the comprehension of *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* and *Viśiṣṭapratyaya* are essential for *Pravṛtti.*

Answer: This objection can be answered by pointing out another factor in the circumstance of the occurrence of the two cognitions. Not only the difference between these two cognitions and their objects is not realized but the difference between the cognition of the *rajata* in the normal circumstances and these two cognitions is also not realized. These two cognitions are taken at par with the cognition of *rajata* in the normal circumstance. It is this *samānarūpatā* that motivates the *pravṛtti.* The difference between the normal cognition of *rajata* and these two cognitions is not realized for two reasons: (i) one of these cognitions is perceptual; (ii) the same object, i.e. *rajata* is presented in the other cognition, i.e. memory.

(iv) If the cognitions '*Idam*' and '*rajata*' are true there will be no scope for *bādha,* i.e. repudiation.

Answer: This objection also does not stand. By the realization of the difference between the objects of the two cognitions, viz., *śukti* and *rajata* the observer gets the correct cognition of *śukti.* This enables him to discover that the statement, i.e. *vyavahāra* '*Idam rajatam*' was not bona fide. It is more a discovery of *śukti* than the rejection of any earlier cognition. It is a case of *vyavahāra bādha* but not that of *jñānabādha.*

The above four objections are stated and answered by Śālikanātha as stated above. Later critics have raised some more objections. We will note some of them.

(v) According to the Prābhākaras the difference is an integral attribute of the entity concerned. That is to say it is *Dharmisvarūpa.* When an entity is cognized its attribute is also cognized. In the present case, when the cognition '*Idam*' is obtained, the cognition of its difference from all other cognitions is also obtained. Same is the case with '*rajatam*'. Therefore, Prābhākaras cannot talk of the non-realization of the difference between the two cognitions '*Idam*' and '*rajatam*'.

Answer: Though the difference is an integral attribute of the entity and cognized along with its cognition, it is cognized in a general way as this entity is distinct from all other entities in the first instance. To comprehend the difference from a specific other entity the presentation of that object as a *pratiyogin* is necessary. In the present case the cognitions '*idam*' '*rajatam*' are not presented as *pratiyogin* for each other since these have occurred in quick succession. Hence, their difference is not realized.

(vi) The non-realization of difference is of the nature of *abhāva*. The Prābhākaras do not accept *abhāva*. Therefore, they cannot make it as a ground to explain the error.

Answer: Though the Prābhākaras do not accept *abhāva* as a separate category, they have their own explanation for the *abhāva* situations. When the ground and the jar are cognized together it is *saṁsṛṣṭa–viṣayabuddhi*. When the jar is removed it is *ekaviṣaya buddhi* or *tanmātra buddhi*. The latter is the position in so called *abhāva* situations. There is no need to envisage a separate category as *abhāva*.

In the present case, each of the cognition, viz., '*Idam*' and '*rajatam*' are of the nature of *eka viṣaya buddhi* separately. However, in view of their quick succession, this is not realized. This is exactly the *vivekāgraha* or *bhedāgraha*.

II

PRATYAKṢA, i.e. PERCEPTION

The definition of Pratyakṣa

Pūrvamīmāṁsā is primarily interested in *śabdapramāṇa*, i.e. Veda only. It is not interested in other *pramāṇas*. However, to show that the other *pramāṇas* are not of any help to comprehend *dharma*, the nature and scope of other *pramāṇas* are explained. The *pratyakṣa sūtra* (1-1-4) of Jaimini explains the nature and scope of *pratyakṣa* to show that it does not help to comprehend *dharma*. Keeping this in mind, the *sūtra* mentions two important features of *pratyakṣa*, viz., (i) *Pratyakṣa* is generated by the senses, (ii) *pratyakṣa* cognizes the object that is present.

Indriya samprayoga janma and *Vidyamānopalambhana*, Śabara points out, since these two requirements of *pratyakṣa* are not found in *dharma*, it cannot be comprehended by *pratyakṣa*. Śabara makes two important remarks in this context, viz., *Sūtrakāra* is not interested in elaborating on the nature of the contact of senses, the nature of cognition and its result at this stage. *Indriyādeḥ, Indriyārtha saṁyogādeḥ, tattadartha viṣayaka buddheḥ, tajjanya hānādi buddheḥ pramāphala bhāve anādaram darśayati.*[12]

He is only interested in informing that if the object is present and is in contact with the sense then only it is comprehended by *pratyakṣa* and if it is not so it is not comprehended by *pratyakṣa*. *Sati indriyārtha samprayoge na asati ityetāvad avadhāryate.* By the mention of *pratyakṣa's* inability to comprehend the *dharma*, it follows that *anumāna*, etc., also cannot help to comprehend *dharma*.

He mentions four other *pramāṇas*, viz., *anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti* and *abhāva*. In view of this the commentators have explained that the purpose of this *sūtra* is not to give a definition of *pratyakṣa* but only to state that *pratyakṣa* is not the means to comprehend *dharma*. For this purpose the fact that *pratyakṣa* conveys the present object only is stated here.

Though Śabara himself is not interested in evolving any definition of *pratyakṣa* out of this *Sūtra*, he quotes *Vṛttikāra* who develops a definition of *pratyakṣa* by explaining the

clauses of the *Sūtra*. The *sūtra* reads as '*satsamprayoge puruṣasya indriyānām buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam.*' *Vṛttikāra* interchanges *sat* and *tat* in the *sūtra*. As a result of this interchange the *sūtra* means that the cognition, which arises by the contact of the senses with that very object which is conveyed by the cognition, is a valid perception.'

Vṛttikāra distinguishes true perception from wrong perception on the following grounds.[13]

(i) In the case of wrong perception its means viz. senses, *manas* or contact suffer from some or other drawback. Therefore, these generate wrong perception.

(ii) The wrongness of the wrong perception is detected by sublation of the wrong cognition.

(iii) In wrong perception the object that is in contact with the sense is different from the object conveyed by the cognition.

Vṛttikāra's explanation of the *sūtra* leads to the development of two important epistemological concepts viz (i) The concept of error i.e. wrong perception (ii) The concept of *Viparīta khyāti*. These two concepts are fully developed later by Kumārila and his commentators.

The Prābhākara's Definition of Pratyakṣa

The Prābhākaras do not agree with this interpretation of the *Sūtra* and the inter-changing of '*tat*' and '*sat*.' They point out that this interpretation confines the scope of *pratyakṣa* only to such perception that is generated by the sense-object contact. However, the entities like the knower's self, and the cognition itself are directly cognized and this cognition also is of the nature of perception.

The mention of the contact between the sense and the object is to exclude the *śukti-rajata* from the scope of *pratyakṣa*, since, this *rajata* is not in contact with the sense. It is only remembered but not actually present. The view that *śukti rajata* cognition is also perception is rejected by the clause- '*Indriyānām samprayoge*' on the ground that there is no sense-contact with *śukti-rajata*. By rejecting *Vṛttikāra's* interpretation, the Prābhākaras have cut the very roots of wrong perception i.e., *bhrama*, and *Viparīta khyāti*.

The Prābhākaras define *pratyakṣa* as '*sākṣāt pratīti*', i.e. direct cognition.[14] The expression *sākṣāt* is intended to exclude inference, etc., other forms of cognition. The term *sākṣāt* implies two conditions: (i) cognizing of an object by its very nature but not as related with something else. *(svena rūpeṇa vastu bhānam)* In inference the object is cognized by its relation with some other object. For instance, fire is cognized as related with smoke by *vyāpti* relation.

(ii) Cognizing an object which is present at the time when the cognition arises. *Svakāle vidyamāna vastu sattāvabodha svabhāvam.*

It may be noted here that the clause, viz., contact between the sense and object is not introduced in this definition. According to the Prābhākaras the scope of the perception is not confined to the cognition generated by sense-object contact only. Sense-object contact is required only in the case of the perception of external objects. However, the knower and

the cognition also are directly cognized. The cognition of these two is *pratyakṣa*. The Prābhākaras have formulated the theory of *tripuṭī pratyakṣa* to explain the perception of the knower, the known, and the cognition. All cognitions involve reference to three factors, viz., the knower, the known and the cognition. In all cognitions whether it is perception, inference or any other, the knower and cognition are directly cognized while the cognition of the object is provided by the sense contact, inference, *saṁskāra*, etc., and by other means. In any case these three factors are referred to in all cognitions. This is *tripuṭīkaraṇa* formula. Among these the knower and the cognition are directly cognized.

The Prābhākaras do not accept the concept of *anuvyavasāya* proposed by Nyāya. According to Nyāya, the cognition of the object is called *vyavasāya* while the cognition of the cognition is called *anuvyavasāya*. The Prābhākaras reject this concept of cognition depending upon another cognition for its cognition. This will lead to infinite regress, since, the second cognition may require one more cognition for its cognition. The Prābhākaras consider cognition as *svaprakāśa*, i.e. self-revealing. If cognition is not considered as self-revealing, the justification of its very existence becomes difficult. Knowledge has no existence apart from its very cognition.[15] The cognition conveys the knower as its location, the jar, etc., entities as its object and reveals itself to enable the initiative of *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*.

The *svaprakāśatva* concept is accepted by the Advaitin and the Vijñānavādin also. However, their concept of *svaprakāśatva* is quite different from that of the Prābhākaras. According to Advaita, it is only *caitanya svarūpabhūta jñāna* that is *svaprakāśa*. Advaita calls the cognition at empirical level as *vṛttijñāna*. This is not *svaprakāśa*. The Prābhākaras consider the empirical cognition itself as *svaprakāśa*.

Tripuṭīkaraṇa Formula

The *tripuṭīkaraṇa* formula is evolved to rule out the Buddhist contention that there are no objects outside the cognition. According to this formula if there was no object, then, the cognition itself would not have arisen. It is not the cognition that is to be utilized to ascertain the existence of the object, but it is the object that gives rise to its cognition. One cannot think of the existence of cognition without the existence of the object to be known and the knower. No cognition can take its shape without these two. Once it takes its shape nothing else is required to reveal it.[16]

According to the formula of *tripuṭīkaraṇa*, the ascertainment of the existence of the object and the cognition does not depend upon either cognition alone or the object alone, but the two help to ascertain the presence of both jointly. This prevents Buddhist's attempt to rule out objects outside the cognition.

To achieve the same objective, Bhāṭṭas have thought of the concept of *prākaṭya*. According to *prākaṭya* formula, cognition has to be inferred by the fact of the revelation of the object.

The objects are invested with a special attribute called *prākaṭya*, i.e., capacity to be revealed by the cognition. It is by this revelation of the object that the presence of the

cognition has to be ascertained. Thus the ascertainment of the cognition is made dependent upon the object.

The purpose of both the *tripuṭīkaraṇa* formula and the *prākaṭyānumāna* formula is the same. The purpose is not to make the ascertainment of object exclusively dependent upon the cognition. Such dependence may give scope for the total rejection of the object outside the cognition. According to *prākaṭyānumāna* formula, the ascertainment of cognition is made dependent upon the object. According to *tripuṭīkaraṇa* formula the ascertainment of the object is made an integral part of the ascertainment of the cognition. In both the formulas, the exclusive dependence of the ascertainment of the object on the cognition is avoided.

In respect of *svaprakāśatva,* an objection is raised that the cognition cannot be both the action and the object; that is to say, it cannot be both revealing and revealed. *Svaprakāśatva* concept assigns both to the cognition. Therefore, it is argued that this concept cannot be accepted. But this objection is not valid. For, *kartṛtva* and *karmatva* status cannot be assigned to one and the same only in the case of *kāraka* type of activity and not in the *jñāpaka* type of activity.

The nature of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* stages of perception is already discussed.

The Relation for the Contact of Sense and Object

In the case of the perception of outside objects, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas have worked out six relations. However, both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras work out only three relations. According to the Bhāṭṭas (i) *Saṁyoga,* (ii) *Saṁyukta tādātmya* and (iii) *saṁyukta tādātmya-tādātmya* are the relations between the sense and substance, its quality and universal, i.e. *jāti* and the attributes of the attributes, respectively. According to Prābhākaras (i) *Saṁyoga,* (ii) *Saṁyukta Samavāya,* (iii) *Saṁyukta samaveta samavāya* are the three relations respectively in respect of (i) substance, (ii) qualities and universals, (iii) the attributes of attributes.

In respect of these relations two important points have to be noted. (i) It is only first relation, viz., *Saṁyoga,* i.e. conjunction, which is actually brought about. (ii) The other steps of relation state the ontological relation between the substance and the qualities and their attributes. Naturally these differ from system to system, since, the ontological relations are differently envisaged in different systems. In the present case Bhāṭṭas talk of *tādātmya* relation at the two stages since they do not accept *samavāya* relation. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Prābhākaras talk of *samavāya* relation. These two consider the substance and qualities as quite different and relate them by *samavāya.* The Bhāṭṭas on the other hand do not consider these as radically different and consider *tādātmya* as the relation.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, (*ākāśa, kāla* and *dik*) are perceived. *Vāyu* and *tamas* are also perceived. *Karma,* i.e. movement is perceived. *Abhāva* is not perceived. It is comprehended by *anupalabdhi pramāṇa.*

According to the Prābhākaras, *karma* is not perceived. It is inferred.

III

INFERENCE—ANUMĀNA

The Definition of Inference

Śabara bhāṣya explains the nature of Inference as '*Anumānam jñātasambandhasya ekadeśa-darśanāt ekadeśāntare asannikṛṣṭe arthe buddiḥ.*'[17]

The cognition of *sādhya* which is presently not in contact with the sense by the perception of *hetu* that is known as related with the *sādhya,* is called *anumāna.*

From the explanation and the examples given by Śabara it is clear that the expression '*ekadeśa*' refers to *hetu* and '*ekadeśāntara*' refers to *sādhya.* The full implication of the terms *ekadeśa* and *ekadeśāntara* is explained by Kumārila and Śālikanātha. It will be made clear later.

Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras develop their definition of *anumāna* on the basis of this statement of Śabara.

Pārthasārathi Miśra quotes the above statement of *Śabara bhāṣya* as the definition of *anumāna* and explains that an entity that is found regularly associated with another entity with a certain relation, such as conjunction, inherence, co-existence, cause and effect, etc., in certain instances, enables the observer to infer the latter by the perception of the former. (S.D. 60-61)

In this explanation, the most important point is the mention of the relation as a regular relation without restricting it to any particular relation. This distinguishes Bhāṭṭa concept of the basis of *vyāpti* from that of others, particularly Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas. The Buddhists make *tadutpatti,* i.e. causality, or *tādātmya* identity relation as the ground for inference. The Vaiśeṣikas make relations such as conjunction, inherence, etc., as the ground for the inference. Such specification fails to cover certain instances such as the inference of the rise of Rohiṇī star by the rise of the Kṛttikā star, the inference of the presence of colour in an object by the presence of taste etc. The Bhāṭṭas hold that the particular relation is not important but its regularity is important. Such regular relation is *vyāpti.*

Later writers of Bhāṭṭa school concisely put the definition of *anumāna* as '*vyāpyadarśanāt asannikṛṣṭārtha jñānam*' i.e. the cognition of *vyāpaka* which is not in contact with the sense of the observer, by the perception of *vyāpya.* The expression *vyāpya* in the definition indicates that the two must have *vyāpti* relation. *Vyāpti* is defined as '*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*' i.e. natural relation. The naturalness of the relation consists in its being free from *upādhi.*

The Prābhākara Definition of Anumāna

Śālikanātha also gives the very statement of Śabara as the definition of *Anumāna* adding two significant expressions, viz., *niyama,* i.e. regular, and *abādhita,* i.e. not contradicted.[18]

With the addition of the word *niyama* in the clause '*jñātasambandha niyama*' it is clear that the relation between the *ekadeśa*, i.e. *hetu* and *ekadeśāntara*, i.e. *sādhya* must be regular. It should never fail. The addition of the word '*abādhita*' makes it clear that the *ekadeśāntara*, i.e. *sādhya* should not be contradicted by any other *pramāṇa*. In other words, the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* should be regular, and the *sādhya* should not be contradicted by any other *pramāṇa*. While explaining the definition clause by clause, Śālikanātha explains the implication of these additional words with suitable examples.

From this definition it is clear that the perception of *vyāpya* leads to the inferencial cognition of *vyāpaka*. This necessitates the investigation into the nature of *vyāpti* and *pramāṇa* by which it is comprehended.

It is already stated above that the Bhāṭṭas consider the natural relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* as *vyāpti* and its naturalness consists in its being free from *upādhi*. The nature and role of *upādhi* will be clear if we examine a *hetu* that is affected by *upādhi*.

Examples of Upādhi

In the syllogism 'killing of an animal in the sacrifice, is sinful, since killing leads to sin' the *hetu*, i.e., killing, has a condition '*niṣiddhatva*', i.e. prohibitedness which actually is the ground for the sin. Mere killing is not the ground for the sin. Only such of the acts that are prohibited lead to sin. Killing of an animal in the sacrifice is not prohibited. Therefore, it does not lead to sin. Since, the *hetu* is affected by a condition it suffers from *upādhi*. This takes away the naturalness of the relation between the sinfulness and killing, and hence the *vyāpti* breaks down.

The stock example for *upādhi* is the syllogism 'The hill has smoke since it has fire.' Here also the mere presence of fire is not sufficient for the presence of smoke. An additional factor, viz., contact with wet fuel is required. This is *upādhi*. Therefore, fire has no *vyāpti* relation with smoke.

On closer examination of these instances it will be found that if the *upādhi* is added to the *hetu*, it becomes a complete *hetu*. For instance, prohibited killing is the ground of sinfulness but not mere killing. Similarly, the fire in contact with wet fuel is sufficient ground for smoke but not mere fire. From this it is clear that a required element is eliminated and the *hetu* is rendered incomplete. The eliminated element is technically called *upādhi*. If it is added to the present *hetu*, it makes it valid *hetu*. If it is deleted it makes the *hetu* fallacious by breaking the *vyāpti*.

Ascertainment of Vyāpti i.e. Inductive Relation

The question of the *pramāṇa* for the comprehension of *Vyāpti* has been a vexed question. Before we present the *Mīmāṁsā* view, it will be useful to briefly notice the views of other schools. The Buddhist concept of *vyāpti* is based on the relation of causality and identity. The comprehension of these relations in particular instances, enables the observer to comprehend the *vyāpti*. However, the very concept of causality depends upon a regular

relation between the cause and effect which is nothing but *vyāpti*. Therefore, this cannot be made the ground for *vyāpti* which is also of the nature of regular relation. This is technically known as *ātmāśraya*.

Some thinkers hold the view that *vyāpti* relation is comprehended by *mānasa pratyakṣa*, i.e. mental perception. They explain that with the aid of the frequent observation of the co-presence of *hetu* and *sādhya* the *manas* comprehends the inductive relation. This theory cannot be accepted. *Manas* can perceive only the internal qualities like happiness, sorrow, etc. It cannot perceive the external objects. Moreover, *vyāpti* is not an object. It is only a relation. *Manas* is of atomic size. Even if it is taken as *vibhu*, i.e. all pervasive, it can function within the body only.

The Nyāya view envisages the comprehension of *vyāpti* by a special type of *pratyakṣa* known as *alaukika pratyakṣa*, i.e. extra sensory perception. When the observer perceives smoke and fire in the kitchen, he also perceives the universals of these particulars. He goes on observing the co-presence of smoke and fire in a number of instances and the absence of smoke wherein fire is absent. He does not come across any instance in which the smoke alone is found without fire. By this process he comprehends *vyāpti* between smoke and fire. Though he observes this only in a limited number of instances, he can envisage *vyāpti* relation between smoke and fire through the observation of the universals of smoke and fire. This medium is known as *sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*, since, the observer's eye has not been in touch with non-observed instances and these were reached only through the medium of the universal. This perception is designated as *alaukika pratyakṣa*, i.e. extra-sensory or extended sense perception. In this process *anvaya*, i.e. positive verification, *vyatireka*, i.e. negative verification, *vyabhicāra-āgraha*, absence of the cognition of contradiction are the three important steps. *Tarka*, i.e. *Reductio ad absurdum* type of argument is also utilized to remove the doubt if any. This process overcomes the difficulty pointed by the *Cārvākas* by means of the stock argument, viz., if the *vyāpti* is between particulars, its scope is restricted to the observed pairs only. If it is between universals, the conclusion is already known and there is no need of inference. The Nyāya reply is that it is, no doubt, between particulars, however, it is universalized through the medium of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*.

The Nyāya theory of the cognition of *vyāpti* is primarily dependent on the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*. However, this approach takes it for granted that there will be no instance of violation of the co-presence of smoke and fire. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti* will be operative only if the object concerned is present. That has to be granted by some other *pramāṇa*.

Among the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, Sucarita Miśra and Umbeka hold views different from that of Pārthasārathi. According to Sucarita Miśra, by observing the co-presence of smoke and fire in a large number of instances, as also by observing the absence of smoke in such instances wherein there is the absence of fires, the invariability of their relation is comprehended. This is cognized by perception alone.

The smoke and its relation with the fire are the objects of this perception. The time and place are not a part of this relation. Only the regular nature of this relation is perceived. This is constant in all instances of the co-presence of two terms i.e. *hetu* and *sādhya* middle term and major term.

The weak point of this theory is that it extends the scope of the perception of *vyāpti* relation to the instances remote in time and place without appropriate epistemic or logical ground. The Nyāya concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* has at least a semblence of epistemic ground to extend the scope of sense perception as extended perception. No such device is thought of here.

Umbeka holds the view that *Vyāpti* is comprehended by *arthāpatti.* He argues that the co-presence of smoke and fire is observed in a large number of instances. Similarly, the absence of smoke in the absence of fire is also observed. This can be accounted for only by envisaging an invariable relation between the two. This way of presuming something unknown to explain the gap between the known and the unknown is presumption *arthāpatti.*

However, it is difficult to accept it as an instance of *arthāpatti.* The two positions stated here are accountable on their own without envisaging a third factor. Presence of fire in the instances where smoke is present, is quite normal and the absence of smoke where there is no fire, is also quite normal. There is neither any conflict between the two nor envisaging a third factor to account for these positions is necessary.

Pārthāsarathi adopts a more practical and empirical method to ascertain *vyāpti.*[19] He says *vyāpti* is comprehended by frequently observing the instances of co-presence of smoke and fire in sufficient numbers and the instances of the absence of smoke where there is the absence of fire. Frequent observation of the co-presence is the means and the observation of the absence is only an aid. It is not necessary to check all instances, since, it is impossible to verify all. The *vyāpti* has to be formulated as "all observed instances of the presence of smoke have the presence of fire." This is sufficient to infer the fire on observing the smoke in a new place. The cognition of *vyāpti* need not be restricted to perception only. Depending upon the nature of the *hetu* and *sādhya,* other *pramāṇas* also help to cognize the *vyāpti.* Frequent observation also need not be specified by certain numbers. It depends upon the ability of the observer to comprehend *vyāpti.* In this way, he restricts the scope of *vyāpti* to the observed cases only. He also notes that the belief sometimes entertained by us as 'all the cases of the presence of smoke are the cases of the presence of fire' is merely an inference from the comprehension of *vyāpti* in observed instances. He insists that the *hetu* should have been observed in the new instances exactly in the same way in which it was observed in the example. If it is inadequate, it fails to help the inference. In the instances where *hetu* is affected by *upādhi,* the *hetu* is inadequate.

The Prābhākara View

The Prābhākara's have an interesting solution for the problem of comprehension of *vyāpti* which they have designated as *sambandhaniyama.* For explaining the comprehension of *sambandhaniyama,* Śālikanātha analyses the very process of comprehension.

(i) Perception of the conjunction of smoke and fire in the kitchen.

(ii) Comprehension of the fact that the conjunction of these two is an adjective of these two which are substantives.

(iii) Time and place are also adjectives of smoke and fire presently seen by the observer but not that of the conjunction. So far as the conjunction is concerned,

it is cognized without any reference to time and place merely as an adjective of smoke and fire. The conjunction is an adjective. Therefore, it cannot have time and place as its adjectives. Substantives only permit adjectives.

(iv) As the observer goes on observing more places, he finds that fire has no conjunction with smoke in certain instances like red hot iron-ball. By this he realizes that the relation of conjunction of fire with smoke is contingent but not permanent. It is due to contact with the wet fuel.

(v) On further observation, he finds that the conjunction of smoke with fire is always found and this relation is invariable. It is not contingent as is the case of the conjunction of fire with smoke. This is made out by *bhūyo darśana*, i.e. repeated observation.

In this way, he comprehends *sambandhaniyama* i.e. regular nature of the relation between smoke and fire. In view of this, as soon as he cognizes the presence of smoke in a place, he infers fire.

This explanation of the Prābhākaras is not convincing. It is difficult to accept the contention that the conjunction is comprehended without reference to time and place. Even the attributes have a reference to time through the substances which they belong to. It is absurd to say that substances have a reference to time but their attributes are timeless.

Kinds of Inference

Śabara bhāṣya mentions two types of inference, viz., (i) *Pratyakṣato dṛṣṭasambandha*, (ii) *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭasambandha*. These are illustrated by the examples: (i) The inference of fire by the cognition of smoke; (ii) The inference of the movement of the sun on his reaching another place by the cognition of Devadatta reaching another place by the movement.

Kumārila does not agree with these designations. He designates the divisions as *Viśeṣato dṛṣṭa* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. He thinks both the examples given by Śabara come under *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* only, since, in both the *vyāpti* is comprehended in a generalized form. For *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*, inferring the rise of Rohiṇī from the rise of kṛttikā star is the example.

Śālikanātha classifies the inference in a different way, viz., (i) *dṛṣṭa-svalakṣaṇa*, (ii) *adṛṣṭa-svalakṣaṇa*. This classification is based on the nature of the object to be inferred. If the object is capable of being perceived it comes under first group. For instance, the inference of fire comes under this category. If the object of inference is not capable of being perceived it comes under the second category. For example, the inference of *śakti*, i.e. potency, comes under this category.

Early writers of Nyāya and Sāṁkhya include inference under three groups, viz., (i) *Pūrvavat*, i.e. inference of effect from the cause, e.g. the inference of rain in near future from the gathering of clouds; (ii) *Śeṣavat*, i.e. inference of cause from effect, e.g. the inference of rain from the increase in the water level of the river. (iii) *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*, i.e. inference in a generalized manner, e.g. movement of the moon on reaching another place by the example of Chaitra.

These divisions are not made in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* either by the Bhāṭṭas or the Prābhākaras. The first two are based on *kāryakāraṇa-bhāva* relation. *Nyāya* has made this

relation as one of the grounds for *vyāpti*. Hence, they are justified in grouping the inferences on this basis. *Mīmāṁsā* does not make any specific relation as the basis of *vyāpti*. It only insist that the relation between the *hetu* and *sādhya* must be regular if it is to be the basis of *vyāpti*. Hence, it has not adopted the above classification which restricts the basis of *vyāpti* to *kāryakāraṇa-bhāva* relation only. The third one is included in its two divisions.

The division as *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* is most popular. The *Nyāyasūtras* and *Vātsyāyana bhāṣya* do not explicitly state it. However, the *sūtra* mentions the five members of the *parārthānumāna* and Vātsyāyana uses the expression '*nyāyaprayoga*.' *Praśastapāda* uses the term *svaniṣcitārtham anumānam* for *svārthānumāna*. The Buddhist scholar Diṅnāga explicitly mentions these two divisions.

Śabara does not mention these divisions. Kumārila also does not mention them. Sucarita Miśra and Umbeka are opposed to this division. This division is stated in a later work *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa. *Svārthānumāna* is inferring for oneself and *parārthānumāna* is enabling others to infer by stating the process of inference in appropriate steps. In either case, it is a logical presentation of the process of inferencial thought. *Parārthānumāna* is not formalization of inference, as in western logic, though it is couched in language. It only helps the listener to think along the necessary steps. The verbal form of syllogism is not inference. The subject matter of logic is a thought but not the verbal form in which it is expressed.

Parārthānumāna consists of five statements arranged as per the process of logical thinking. These are stated as under with a typical example.

(i) *Pratijñā*, i.e. the statement of the thesis proposed to be inferred. "There is fire on the hill."

(ii) *Hetu*, i.e. the statement conveying the reason—"because, it has smoke."

(iii) *Udāharaṇa*, i.e. the statement conveying the *vyāpti* with an illustration. (The example is stated along with the demonstration of *Vyāpti*)—"wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the instance of the kitchen."

(iv) *Upanaya*, i.e. the statement synthesising the two requirements, viz., *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* with reference to the present *hetu*—"the smoke that has the relation of *vyāpti* with fire, is present on the hill."

(v) *Nigamana*, i.e. conclusion—"therefore there is fire on the hill."

The Nyāya school has worked out these steps on the basis of the process of logical thinking. However, the Bhāṭṭas consider that either the first three or the last three are sufficient. These three provide the two necessary requirements of inference, viz., the knowledge of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*. Therefore, the other two which repeat the same points are superfluous. The *Nyāya* approach may be justified on the ground that the first step introduces the proposition to be inferred while the last one affirms it. The last one also removes the doubt about a possible *satpratipakṣa*. The second one simply states the *hetu* and awaits the reference for having *vyāpti*. In the first three, *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* are not synthesized while in the last three the very theme is not introduced. An intelligent listener may envisage these gaps on the basis of the information provided in the first three or the last three. But that is only a psychological supplementing and not a logical presentation.

Kevalānvāyi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki

The *liṅga* or *hetu* is classified in three types in Nyāya on the basis of the nature of *vyāpti* with which it is associated. There are three kinds of *vyāpti*: (i) *anvaya*, i.e. positive-co-presence, i.e. the presence of *sādhya* wherever there is the presence of *hetu*, (ii) *vyatireka*, i.e. negative-co-absence, the absence of *hetu* wherever there is absence of *sādhya*, (iii) both ways. The first is called *kevalānvayi*, e.g. jar is nameable, because it is knowable. Since all objects have these two characteristics, viz., nameability and knowability, there is no counter example to verify the absence of these two in any case. The second is *kevala vyatireki*, e.g. the cognition is self-revealing, because it is a cognition. In this instance, since no other self-revealing object is found, the *vyāpti* cannot be verified positively. It can be checked only negatively as whichever is not cognition, that is not self-revealing. The third is *anvayavyatireki*, e.g. the smoke in the inference—'the hill has fire as it has smoke.' The *vyāpti* between these can be verified both positively and negatively. Hence the *hetu* smoke is called *anvaya-vyatireki*.

The Mīmāṁsakas do not accept *vyatireki vyāpti*. The main feature of the inference is inferring something in one place which is known in another place. Self-revealing nature is not known in any other place. Therefore, the Mīmāṁsakas contend that it cannot be inferred in the cognition.

Fallacies of Inference

Kumārila classifies the fallacies of inference in a way different from that of the Nyāya. They are classified as (i) *pratijñābhāsa* or *pakṣābhāsa*, i.e. defective statements of conclusion; (ii) *hetvābhāsa*, i.e. defective formulations of *hetu*; (iii) *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*, i.e. defective example. The *hetvābhāsas* formulated by Nyāya are brought under these only.

The *pratijñābhāsa* is of three kinds, viz., (i) stating someting as *sādhya* which is already known; (ii) stating as *sādhya* that is contradicted by other *pramāṇas*. Under this category, examples are worked out as contradicted by *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, āgama* and *arthāpatti*; (iii) stating a *sādhya* that is not known.

The *hetvābhāsas* are of four kinds, viz., (i) *asiddha*, i.e. non-existence of the very *hetu svarūpa* or absence of *vyāpti* or stating something unknown as the *hetu*; (ii) *viruddha*, i.e. a *hetu* that supports the opposite of the *sādhya* either fully or partially; (iii) *anaikāntika*, i.e. a *hetu* that is found in a counter instance also. This is also called *sādhāraṇa*; (iv) *asādhāraṇa*, i.e. a *hetu* that is found in *pakṣa* only.

Among the five *hetvābhāsas* enumerated by Nyāya, three, viz., *asiddha, viruddha* and *anaikāntika* are already covered above. *Satpratipakṣa* is the same as *bādhita*, since, one of the propositions has to be taken as rejected by the *pramāṇa* of the other. *Kālātyayāpādiṣta* is also covered by *bādhita* of *pratijñābhāsa*.

Dṛṣṭāntābhāsas are of two types: (i) *sādharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*, (ii) *vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*. The former is of four types: (i) the example in which *sādhya* is not present, (ii) *hetu* is not present, (iii) both are not present, (iv) the very example is non-existent, e.g.

horn of a hare. These divisions are similarly worked out in the case of *vaidharmya dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* also.

Here, a question is raised whether it is reasonable to classify the fallacies as *pratijñābhāsa*, etc. since, ultimately it is the *hetu* that fails to achieve the inference. This is answered by pointing out that the realization of the drawback of *pratijñā* does not wait until the *hetu* is noted. The very non-existence of *sādhya* or its being contradicted by another *pramāṇa* is noticed as soon as *pratijñāvākya* is heard. Therefore, it is more reasonable to attribute the defect to that aspect of the inference in which the defect occurs.

Śālikanātha's presentation of the fallacies of inference is quite interesting. He points out that the various clauses of the definition of inference rule out the fallacious instances of inference from the scope of the valid inference. In this connection, we may note the following observations.[20]

(i) The expression '*jñāta sambandha niyama*' rules out the instances of the fallacy of *asādhāraṇa* from the scope of valid inference. In these instances, *sambandhaniyama* cannot be ascertained outside the *pakṣa*. Therefore, the requirement of its knowledge is missing.

(ii) The term '*sambandha*' rules out the instances that have *bādhaka*, i.e. *viruddha* fallacy, since the *hetu* has *sambandha niyama* with the opposite of the *sādhya*. For example, in the instance '*śabda* is eternal, because, it is produced', the *hetu kṛtakatva* has *sambandha niyama* with the opposite of the *sādhya*, i.e., *anityatva*.

(iii) The term '*niyama*' rules out the instances of *sādhāraṇa*. For, in such instances, the relation is not with the *sādhya* only. In the instance, e.g. '*śabda* is *nitya*, because it is a *prameya*', *prameyatva* is related with *anityatva* also.

(iv) The term *darśana* excludes the instances of *svarūpāsiddha*, since, it cannot be cognized.

(v) The term '*abādhita*' excludes the instances that are contradicted by other *pramāṇas*.

This is how, Śālikanātha explains the fallacies of inference. He neither explicitly supports Nyāya method of bringing all fallacies under *hetvābhāsa* nor classifies them as *pratijñābhāsa*, etc., into three groups.

IV

ŚASTRAPRAMAṆA i.e. SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY

The definition of Śāstrapramāṇa

(1) *Sabdtramana* is designated as *śāstrapramāṇa* by Śabara. Śālikanātha also calls it in the same way. Kumārila prefers the name *sabdtramana*. The Prābhākaras include non-vedic speech under inference. Therefore, *Śāstra* i.e. Vedic speech only constitutes *śabda pramāṇa* for them.

Kumārila explains that Śabara has designated *śabda pramāṇa* as *śāstrapramāṇa*, since he is primarily interested in presenting this *pramāṇa* as a means for the comprehension of

Dharma which is conveyed by *śāstra* i.e., vedic injunction. In fact, in the very second *sūtra* '*codanālakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmaḥ*' it is stated that scriptural injunction is the means to comprehend Dharma.

Śabara explains the nature of *śāstrapramāṇa* as '*Śāstram śabda vijñānāt asannikṛṣṭe arthe vijñānam.*' "Śāstra is the source of knowledge of what is outside the range of understanding by other sources, by mean of words."[21] The expression *śabda* refers to Vedic injunction, *artha* refers to *dharma* and *assannikṛṣṭa* means, 'not known by any other *pramāṇa*'. The whole statement conveys that the cognition of Vedic injunction is the means for the cognition of *Dharma*. Pārthasārathi quotes this statement of Śabara and expands the scope of *śabda* to non-Vedic speech also. He also adds that the cognition of *śabda* leads to the cognition of *artha* through *abhidhāna*, i.e., the power to convey the meaning. In this respect, there are two views among the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. Pārthasārathi holds the view that the word has the power to convey the meaning. Therefore, it has to be taken as conveyed i.e., *abhihita*. Cidananda holds the view that the word reminds *artha*.

Śālikanātha also quotes Śabara's statement about *śāstrapramāṇa* and explains the meaning of *artha* as *kārya*. He expands the scope of the meaning to *viṣaya, niyojya*, etc., also as he takes the whole statement as one unit and formulates the import on the basis of *Anvitābhidhāna* theory of meaning of the sentence.

Classification of Śabda

Pārthasārathi classifies *śabda* as (i) Vedic and (ii) non-Vedic. The Vedic speech always leads one to valid cognition while the non-Vedic leads to valid cognition when the speaker is not an unreliable person. Unreliability of the speaker is the ground for invalidity. In the case of Vedic speech, as there is no speaker, there is no question of any unreliability.

Śabda is further divided into two types: (i) *siddha*, i.e. statement of fact, (ii) *vidhāyaka* injunctive. The injunctive is of two types: (i) *upadeśa*, i.e., this should be done, e.g. by performing *darśapūrṇamāsa*, obtain *svarga*, (ii) *atideśa*, i.e., this should be done as that, e.g. perform *śaurya* sacrifice on the line of *Āgneya*. To impliment *upadeśa* a number of guidelines are laid down for the following purposes: (i) to distinguish different rituals, (ii) to relate the main and the subordinate, (iii) to monitor the sequence. Most of these are linguistic in nature and will be discussed in the article on semantics of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*.

In the *Mīmāṁsā* tradition, *śabda* is also grouped as *vidhi*, i.e., injunctive statement, *mantra*, i.e. hymns recited at the sacrifice, *nāmadheya*, i.e. names of the sacrifices, *niṣedha*, i.e. prohibition and *arthavāda*, i.e. eulogy. Among these, *vidhi*, i.e. injunctive statements occupy the central position in enjoining a sacrifice while others cooperate with it. A detailed classification of injunction is made in *Mīmāṁsā* texts. These will be noted separately. The *arthavādas* quoted in the context of different sacrifices are also significant; these also will be noted separately.

The expression *asannikṛṣṭa* is interpreted to convey two important points also, viz., (i) it excludes *anuvāda*, i.e., statement of what is already known by another *pramāṇa* from

the scope of *śabdapramāṇa*; (ii) it excludes such statements that are contradicted by another *pramāṇa.*

Sabdapramāṇa cannot be Included in Anumāna

Before we proceed to present the other details of *śabdapramāṇa* the basic question whether it is an independent means of cognition or it could be included in inference, has to be examined.

Kumārila strongly argues that *śabdapramāṇa* cannot be included in *Anumāna.* Before he presents his arguments, he examines the arguments advanced by Sāṁkhya to distinguish *śabdapramāṇa* from *Anumāna.* He points out that these arguments do not help to refute the arguments advanced by those who include *śabdapramāṇa* in *Anumāna.* He lists the arguments of *abheda-vādins* as under:[22]

(i) *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* criteria that are utilized for *anumāna* are utilized for *śabdapramāṇa* also as 'whenever *śabda* is present the *artha* is also present' whenever *śabda* is not present *artha* is also not present as in the case of fire and smoke.

(ii) By the cognition of one the cognition of the other is obtained both in *anumāna* and *śabda.* By the cognition of *śabda* the cognition of *artha* is obtained as in the case of the cognition of fire by the cognition of smoke.

(iii) The comprehension of the relation between the two is the basis of the cognition of one from the other both in *anumāna* and *śabda.* The cognition of invariable association between *śabda* and *artha* is the basis for the cognition of *artha* by the cognition of *śabda* as in the case of the comprehension of the invariable relation between smoke and fire.

(iv) Both *anumāna* and *śabda* lead to the cognition of an object that is not perceived. *Śabda* leads to the cognition of *artha* that is not necessarily perceived at the present as is the case with the cognition of smoke leading to the cognition of fire which is presently not perceived.

(v) The cognition produced by both *anumāna* and *śabda* is not confined to the present only.

On these grounds it is claimed that the *śabdapramāṇa* is not different from *anumāna.*

Quoting these arguments Kumārila states that superficial similarities do not prove the identity of *śabdapramāṇa* and *anumāna. Anumāna* has three distinct features, viz., (i) *pakṣasatva,* i.e. presence in the *pakṣa;* (ii) *sapakṣānvaya,* i.e. presence in *sapakṣa;* (iii) *vipakṣa-vyātireka,* i.e., absence in *vipakṣa.* These cannot be worked out in the case of *śabda* leading to *artha.*

He states that the Sāṁkhyas have failed to pin-point this important point, and have advanced arguments which distinguish *śabdapramāṇa* and *anumāna* that cannot stand scrutiny. Some of their arguments and their drawbacks are as follows.

(i) In the case of *śabdapramāṇa,* there are many factors such as words, sentences, intention of the speaker, etc., that contribute to produce the verbal cognition while in the case of *anumāna* there is a definite ground, viz., *hetu* that leads to inferencial cognition:

This is not a sound argument to distinguish *śabda* from *anumāna.* Even in the case of inference there are many factors.

(ii) The relation between *śabda* and *artha* is fixed by persons while in *anumāna* the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not fixed by them.

This is also not a proper argument. In the case of Vedic words, the relation is eternal and natural. It is not fixed by anyone. Moreover, even in the case of *anumāna,* the grounds of relation differ in different cases. For instance, in the case of smoke and fire, the relation is spatial while in the instance of rise of moon and spate in the sea it is temporal.

(iii) The cognition of *hetu* produces the cognition of *sādhya* when there is the comprehension of the invariable relation between them while *śabda* in the instances like *apūrva, svarga,* etc., produces the cognition of these without the comprehension of the relation between these words and their meaning.

This is also not a valid argument. Even in the case of *apūrva,* etc., these are established by *arthāpatti* and the relation between the words *apūrva,* etc., and their meaning is comprehended. A word cannot produce the cognition of its meaning unless the relation between the two is comprehended.

Kumārila has rejected all these arguments as stated above and has given his own arguments, viz., the lack of three main features of *anumāna* in *śabda* is the real ground to reject the inclusion of *śabdapramāṇa* under *anumāna.*

With a view to reject the theory that *śabda* leads to the inference of *artha,* Kumārila raises the question whether it is *pada,* i.e., word or *vākya,* i.e., sentence, that leads to the inference of *artha.* He examines the claim that *pada* leads to the inference of *artha* and rejects it.

(i) The word which is claimed to be *hetu* conveys *ākṛti,* i.e., universal while *sādhya* in an inference is a qualified object. This clearly shows that the object conveyed by the word is quite different in nature from the object conveyed by *anumāna.*

(ii) The word which is claimed to be *hetu* has to have the characteristic of *pakṣadharmatva.* In the case of the inference of fire by smoke, the mountain *parvata* is available as *pakṣa* and smoke can be its *dharma.* In the case of *śabda,* no such *dharmin* is available. *Artha* itself cannot be treated as *dharmin.* For it cannot be both *pakṣa* and *sādhya. Sapakṣānvaya* also cannot be worked out in the *śabda.*

(iii) There is no *anvaya,* i.e. co-existence, between word and meaning. For, in the case of ignorant persons, the word is heard but the meaning is not comprehended. There is no *vyatireka,* i.e. co-absence also. For, the words *Yudhiṣṭhira,* etc., are used even when there is no *Yudhiṣṭhira.*

(v) It cannot be argued that the cognition of the word does lead to the cognition of meaning for those who know the relation between the word and its meaning. In this case, it is the comprehension of the natural relation between the word and meaning that has led to the cognition of meaning. This means there is no need of any inference. *Anvaya* and *vyatireka* help only to comprehend the natural relation. Their role need not be stretched to draw the inference.

(vi) A word is employed in four contexts, viz., to convey an object (i) that is known and now perceived, (ii) not known and perceived, (iii) not perceived but known, (iv) not perceived and also not known. In the first case, it is merely *anuvāda,* i.e. conveying what is already known. Therefore, it is not *pramāṇa.* In the second case, either it does not convey

the object or the object is introduced for the first time. In either case, the object is known by *pratyakṣa.* In the third case, the word reminds the object seen in the past, therefore, it is *smṛti,* and in the last case, the word does not produce any cognition. In all these cases, the word does not lead to the inference of *artha.* Therefore, the word by itself cannot constitute *śabdapramāṇa.*

The view of a section of early Mīmāṁsakas who consider only Veda as śabdapramāṇa and exclude pauruṣeya statements from its scope

In the course of the discussion whether *śabdapramāṇa* is a separate *pramāṇa* or it could be included under *anumāna,* Kumārila refers to a section of Mīmāṁsakas who distinguish *śabdapramāṇa* from *anumāna* on the ground that it conveys *dharma* which is not conveyed by *pratyakṣa, anumāna,* etc., other *pramāṇas.*[23] However, this applies to Vedic *śabda* only. They do not mind to include *pauruṣeya śabda* under *anumāna.* They state that the statements made by men enable the listener to infer the knowledge of the speaker about the objects mentioned in his statement and the statement is taken to convey the same. Kumārila rejects this view. He points out that unless the statement conveys its meaning the speaker's knowledge of the objects mentioned in his statement cannot be made out. There is no other means other than the statement to enable the hearer to ascertain the knowledge of the speaker. Therefore, the statement has to be taken to convey the objects as *śabdapramāṇa* only. Kumārila warns that if *pauruṣeya* statements are included under *anumāna,* there is a danger of Vedic statements becoming *apramāṇa.* The validity of *pauruṣeya* statement can be ascertained on the grounds of *āptavākyatva* and *avisamvāda.* But in the case of Veda both these criteria are not available.

This view of a section of Mīmāṁsakas criticized here is very similar to Prābhākara's view. The Prābhākaras include *pauruṣeya* statements under *anumāna.* They consider Vedic statements only as *śabdapramāṇa.* Some *Mīmāṁsā* theories later developed by Prābhākaras were held by some early Mīmāṁsakas. The view criticized here seems to be the view of such early Mīmāṁsakas.

Prābhākara View

The Prābhākaras do not consider *pauruṣeya* statements as *śabdapramāṇa.* These only help to infer the knowledge of the speaker about the objects mentioned in the statement. Śalikanātha explains the process of the inference as under:

When a *pauruṣeya* statement is heard the facts referred to by the words in the statement are brought to the mind of the listener. Then, he sorts out as to how these could be meaningfully organized. Taking into account the position of the words in the statement he arrives at an organized sense. This process is called *vimarśa.* From this he infers the speaker's knowledge of these facts and comprehends them. This crystallized position is finally taken as communicated by the statement. The statement plays the dual role of serving as a means to infer the speaker's knowledge and to communicate it to the listener.

In the first role it is a *hetu* to infer the speaker's knowledge and in the second role it is verbal communication of *anuvāda* type. *Vimarśa* stage is only a *sahakārin* or *itikartavyatā.*

This process normally leads to the correct inference of the speaker's knowledge and the correct position of the facts. However, there are certain statements that are defective and consequently do not lead to correct inference of the speaker's knowledge and correct position of the facts mentioned in the statement. The statements that do not agree with the facts are made for the following reasons:

(i) The speaker's knowledge itself is erroneous.
(ii) He has no intention to speak truly
(iii) He is (out of mind)
(iv) He formulates the statement defectively, consequently something different from what he intends to convey is presented in the statement.

In all these cases the statement becomes a defective *hetu* leading to a defective inference. This results in the disagreement between the statement and the facts.

The Grounds of Difference between Kumārila and Prābhākara

To comprehend the ground for the difference between Kumārila and Śālikanātha it is necessory to look into the context in which this question is discussed by these two.

At the commencement of *śabdapramāṇa* section Kumārila raises the question whether the scope of *śabdapramāṇa* is to be confined to *Śāstra,* i.e., Vedic speech, particularly, Vedic injunction only or the *laukika* speech also constitutes *śabdapramāṇa.* The designation *śāstra* given in the *bhāṣya* pinches him. He takes for granted that Bhāṣyakāra considers both Vedic and non-Vedic as *śabdapramāṇa* but his immediate interest is in *śāstra* that conveys *dharma.* He states that this is the reason for Bhāṣyakāra, designating *śabdapramāṇa* as *śāstrapramāṇa.* Then he takes up the question whether *śabdapramāṇa* could be included under *anumāna* or not. Arguments for and against this question quoted by him relate to *laukika śabda* only. He quotes the view of a section of the Mīmāṁsaka which tries to exclude the Vedic speech from the scope of *anumāna* on the ground that its subject matter, viz., *dharma* is quite distinct from the subject matter of inference. He insists that the claim to include *śabdapramāṇa* under *anumāna* be countered on a common ground for both Vedic and non-Vedic speech. This has resulted in Kumārila not examining the cases of Vedic-speech and non-Vedic speech separately and considering the possibility of including non-Vedic speech alone under *anumāna.*

Śālikanātha discusses this question in the larger context, viz., whether the verbal statements are capable of producing valid cognition at all. The statements that are linguistically faultless do communicate the facts mentioned in them. But there is no guarantee that these facts are really present. Therefore, the verbal statements are not capable of producing valid cognition. Śālikanātha answers this objection by pointing out that the verbal statements do not communicate anything independently. These enable the listener to infer the speaker's knowledge of the facts mentioned in the statement.

If the speaker correctly presents facts known to him in his statement, it helps the listener to infer the speaker's knowledge of facts correctly. Otherwise, the statement fails

to help the listener to correctly infer the speaker's knowledge. The circumstances under which the statement does not lead to valid cognition are already stated above. If *pauruṣeya śabda* is treated separately in this way, the *apauruṣeya śabda* will be free from such objection. Since persons are not involved in Vedic speech.

Kumārila feels that the inclusion of non-Vedic speech under *anumāna* will make room for the claim to include Vedic speech also under *anumāna,* because, both are of verbal form and there is no reason to distinguish their status as *pramāṇa.* Both have to be treated as same kind of *pramāṇa.*

But Śālikanātha seems to be right when he says that the Vedic speech is impersonal and there is no question of the inference of the speaker's knowledge. This distinguishes the two and provides room for considering one as *śabdapramāṇa* and the other as *anumāna.*

The Issue Under Śabdapramāṇa

In the course of the exposition of *śabdapramāṇa* Mīmāṁsakas discuss a number of related details such as the nature of word, the nature of meaning, the relation between the word and meaning, the process of the formation of sentence and the sentence meaning. All these are worked out in such a way that the *apauruṣeyatva* and *svataḥ prāmāṇya* of Vedas are sustained. The Vedas are not composed by any person. The validity of the cognition provided by the Vedas is intrinsic. These two concepts are the corner stone of the entire *Mīmāṁsā* thought.

We will first take up the question of the nature of a word. In Indian tradition there are two views in respect of the nature of a word, viz., (i) a word is a combination of syllables that yields a unit of meaning; (ii) apart from the syllables there is a separate manifestation designated as *sphota.* This is manifested as a word. In the first view also there are two approaches, viz., (i) syllables of a word are produced and therefore the word is perishable; it is non-eternal; (ii) syllables are eternal; These are manifested. Mīmāṁsakas hold the view that the syllables are eternal and manifested. Mīmāṁsakas consider the relation between the word and meaning as natural and permanent. If the words are considered as perishable, then, the relation between the word and meaning also will have to be considered as perishable. This will affect their central concept, viz., the eternity of the Veda.

The Doctrine of Eternity of Śabda

The doctrine of the eternity of *śabda* is discussed in *Jaimini sūtra* (I-1-6 to 23) in detail and commented by Śabara. Some important points are noted here. The arguments advanced by those who hold that the syllables are not eternal are given with appropriate answers for the same.[24]

(i) The syllables are produced with effort and disappear soon after these are produced. This indicates that these are not eternal.

Answer: By the effort the syllables are manifested but not produced. It is the manifested state that disappears but not the syllable itself.

(ii) The statements 'utter the *śabda*', 'do not utter the *śabda*', indicate that the *śabdas* are produced.

Answer: These statements convey 'employ the *śabda*' *and* 'do not employ the *śabda*'. These do not convey 'produce' and 'do not produce'.

(iii) The *śabda* is simultaneously heard in many places. One eternal *śabda* cannot be heard in many places.

Answer: Just as one sun is seen, as present in many places, one *śabda* can be heard in many places.

(iv) In the conjuncted expression like '*dadhyatra*' the vowel '*i*' is modifed as '*y*'. This will not be possible if the *śabda* is eternal.

Answer: Substitution of one syllable by another is not a *vikāra*, i.e., modification. Such substitution does not remove their eternity.

(vi) When many persons utter a *śabda* its volume is increased. This cannot happen if *śabda* is eternal.

Answer: Increase of the volume is not that of *śabda,* but it is that of *nāda.* Continuous manifestation of a *śabda* by many gives an impression of volume.

Answering the objections against the eternity of *śabda,* Jaimini gives his arguments in support of eternity of *śabda* as under.

(i) The utterance of *śabda* is intended to convey the meaning. If *śabda* perishes as soon as it is uttered, it will not be able to convey the meaning.

(ii) When the word cow is uttered the whole class of cow is conveyed. This means that the word cow conveys the class characteristic *gotva.*

Gotva is comprehended if one and the same word is used with reference to many cows. This means that the word has to be constant. If the word cow is separate in the case of each cow, then, it will convey only that cow. It cannot convey the class characteristic *gotva.* Therefore, *śabda* has to be considered as eternal.

(ii) When the word *gau* is uttered eight times, it is not stated as eight '*gau*' words are uttered. It is only stated that the word '*gau*' is uttered eight times.

(iii) When something is considered as perishable, the reason for its perishability has to be identified. No such reason is found in the case of *śabda.*

(iv) It cannot be said that *śabda* is produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the air and it perishes when the same ceases. Air is not the cause of the *śabda.* If air were the cause then, quality of touch would have been present in *śabda.*

Finally, Jaimini and Śabara point out that the *śruti—'vācā virūpa nityayā*—supports the eternity of *śabda.*

The Process of the Manifestation of Śabda

The process of the manifestation of the syllables of a word is explained by Śālikanātha as given below.

The air within the body is moved by the effort of the inner self. It starts from the navel, moves through eight places such as chest, etc., and reaches *śrotrendriya* and provides

necessary *saṁskāra* for the manifestation of *śabda.* The very contact between the air and *śrotrendriya* is the ground for the manifestation of *śabda.* It is not produced by the effort but the *śabda* that is already there is manifested. It is clear from the recognition as it is same '*gakāra.*'

Sometimes variation found in the audibility of the syllables and the word, is due to the variation in the efforts to manifest it. *Śabda* as such is constant and permanent.

Śrotrendriya is conceived to be *ākāśa.* The *ākāśa* is one and everywhere but still when a word is manifested to a person by his effort of moving the air from navel etc., it is not heard by all others, since, each one has a separate ear cavity. The air moved by the effort of a person can reach his ear and the ears of the nearby persons. These persons will have *saṁskāra* for their ear for the manifestation of the word to them. People in distant places will not have such *saṁskāra.*

When different persons speak, the *śabda* is not different. These are different manifestations of the *śabda* that is constant and permanent.

Śabda is heard in the ear cavity only. It is manifested there only. However, sometimes it is mistaken as emanating from the mouth. Mouth is also one of the manifester along with other vocal organs. The *śabda* is not manifested in the mouth. It is manifested in the ear cavity only. With these explanations to meet the various objections Śālikanātha maintains that the *śabda* is eternal.

Explanation of the Nature of Word, Meaning and Sentence

A group of syllables that conveys a unit of meaning constitutes a word.

When a word consisting of a group of syllables is pronounced it is found that the syllables disappear one after the other. However, the cognition of each syllable leaves an impression. The last syllable supported by these impressions conveys a unit of meaning. This impression is not the same as the impression that causes memory. It is a different kind of impression. If it were the same it would have led to the memory of isolated syllables only. With the support of this impression the last syllable conveys a unit of meaning in association with the earlier syllables. A group of syllables is called a word on this basis. Those who hold the view that the syllables are produced also explain the process of the formulation of the word in the same way. The two differ only on the issue whether syllables are manifested or produced.

As stated earlier, after discussing the nature of word, the nature of meaning, the relation between the word and meaning, the process of the formation of the sentence, the procedure of learning language, the centre of semantic organization in a sentence, the problem of *kārya vyutpatti* or *siddha vyutpatti,* and the import of *vidhi,* i.e. injunction, constitute important items to be covered under *śabdapramāṇa.* These points are covered under a separate article. Therefore, the *mīmāṁsā* position on these issues is briefly mentioned here.

(i) The meaning of a word is *ākṛti* or *jāti,* i.e., universal, present in the object concerned.

(ii) *Pratyāya Pratyāyoka bhāva* is the relation between the word and meaning. This relation is natural and permanent.

(iii) A group of words that satisfies the requirements of *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi* constitute a sentence.

(iv) A language is learnt through the conversation of the elders by observing the activity that follows.

(v) *Bhavanā* is the centre of semantic organization in a sentence according to the Bhāṭṭas.

Kārya is the centre of semantic organization according to the Prābhākaras.

(vi) In respect of the process of communication by a sentence, the theory of *abhihitānvaya* is adopted by the Bhāṭṭas and the theory of *anvitābhidhāna* by Prābhākaras.

(vii) Mīmāṁsakas accept *Karye vyutpatti* theory.

These points are stated in respect of a sentence as a grammatical unit. However, Mīmāṁsakas' concept of the basis of verbal communication goes beyond the unit of a grammatical sentence. The *ākāṅkṣā* among different words in a sentence is satisfied by the syntactical arrangement of the sentence. However, to implement *bhāvanā* or *kārya* conveyed by the injunction there are three *ākāṅkṣās*, viz., *phala-ākāṅkṣā, karaṇa ākāṅkṣā* and *iti-kartavyatā ākāṅkṣā.* These are stated as '*kim bhāvayet*' '*kena bhāvayet*' and *kathaṁ bhāvayet.* The statement that covers the items that satisfy these three *ākāṅkṣās* constitutes a unit of communication in the sacrificial context according to the Bhāṭṭas and the *ākāṅkṣās* of *viṣaya* and *niyojya* have to be satisfied according to the Prābhākaras. Such an organized statement is termed as *prayogavidhi in Mīmāṁsā.* To fully implement the *prayoga* of a sacrifice, the organization of the principal and subordinate items, following proper procedure, sanctifying the performer and the items to be used have to be carried out. These are stated in different contexts of prescribing sacrifices in Brāhmaṇa literature. These statements have to be interpreted. This is a unique kind of verbal communication. For this purpose the language and the sacrificial activity are closely syncretized. All these form the subject of *śabdapramāṇa* in Pūrvamīmāṁsā. With a view to do full justice to this *vākyaśāstra* aspect of *pūrvamīmāṁsā,* a separate article is planned on the semantics of *pūrvamīmāṁsā.* The doctrine of *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* is also discussed separately.

V

UPAMĀNA–COMPARISON

Definition of Upamāna

Śābara bhāṣya explains the nature of *upamāna* as 'the perception of similarity in an object produces the cognition of similarity in its correlate that is not in contact with the sense of the observers', e.g. perception of similarity in the forest cow, i.e. (*gavaya*) produces the cognition of similarity in the village cow seen earlier and now remembered.

The process of this cognition is explained as under: a person goes to the forest and happens to see a forest cow, i.e. (*gavaya*) which is similar to the village cow. He remembers the village cow and cognizes the fact that the village cow is similar to forest cow. In this process the perception of similarity of village cow in the forest cow is the means and the cognition of similarity of forest cow in the village cow is the result. It is a case of the perception of similarity in one correlate, i.e. *pratiyogin*, producing the cognition of similarity in the other correlate, i.e. *pratiyogyantara.*

The cognition of similarity in the forest cow is of the nature of perception, since, the forest cow is actually perceived. However, the cognition of the similarty in the village cow cannot be considered as perception since the cow is presently not in contact with the observer's eye. The cow is remembered. But its similarity with the forest cow cannot also be considered as remembered since it was not experienced earlier. The observer of the cow was not aware of its similarity with forest cow as he had not yet seen the latter. Therefore, the cognition of this similarity is not a case of memory. It can also not be considered as inferred.

Those who try to include *upamāna* under inference formulate the syllogism as 'The village cow has similarity with the forest cow, because, the latter has similarity with it. This is a maxim or a general rule but not *vyāpti* relation between the two similarities or similar objects. Similarity is dual. The similarities found in the two correlates are not found in one together. Therefore, one cannot be the *hetu* to infer the other.

Since this cognition of similarity cannot be classed as perception, memory or inference, a new *pramāṇa* is conceived. As this new *pramāṇa* is based on similarity it is designated as *upamāna.*

The Nyāya View

The Nyāya explains the nature and purpose of *upamāna* differently. A forest dweller informs a villager that the forest cow is similar to village cow and it is called *gavaya.* The villager when he visits the forest happens to see the forest cow that is similar to a village cow and understands that this forest cow is called *gavaya.* The knowledge of the import of the statement of forest dweller is the means and the comprehension that the forest cow is called *gavaya* is the result.

The earlier Naiyāyikas consider the knowledge of the statement is the means as stated above and later Naiyāyikas consider perception of similarity in the forest cow is the means. In either case similarity is the basis for the comprehension of the relation between the name *gavaya* and the forest cow. Therefore, this cognition is called *upamāna.* In the Nyāya tradition, the means is called *upamāna* and the result is called *upamiti.*

On a careful analysis of the the above procedure it will be found that it does not make any room for a new *pramāṇa.* The statement that a forest animal is similar to village cow gives only the meaning of the word *gavaya* indicating its special nature. The listener has to await the actual observation of such an animal to comprehend the meaning of this word. When he actually perceives the animal he comprehends the meaning of the word *gavaya.*

On seeing *gavaya* he remembers the statement and comprehends that the object perceived by him is conveyed by the word *gavaya.* Thus the relation between the word *gavaya* and the object *gavaya* is comprehended from the statement, i.e. *śabdapramāṇa* aided by the perception of object. Hence, there is no need of envisaging any new *pramāṇa* for this purpose.

It is already stated above that the *Mīmānsā* concept of *upamāna* cannot be included under *anumāna* or *pratyakṣa.*

Mānameyodaya raises an objection that if on the basis of similarity a new *pramāṇa* is envisaged why not think of a new *pramāṇa* on the basis of dissimilarity. It answers that dissimilarity is negative and it can be cognized by *anupalabdhi pramāṇa.*

A later Naiyāyika expands the scope of *upamāna* and says that the relation between the word and the meaning can be comprehended on the basis of dissimilarity also.

For a Mīmāṁsakā, the *upamānapramāṇa* serves a practical purpose in organizing the sacrifice in two respects: (i) the details of the *Āgneya* sacrifice are borrowed to *Śaurya* sacrifice on the ground that these have common deity and are similar in this respect. (ii) when *vrīhi* grains are not available for preparing *puroḍāśa nīvāra* grains may be used for this purpose since these are similar in nature.

The Prābhākaras also explain the nature and role of *upamāna* in the same way. However, they consider similarity as separate category while the Bhāṭṭas consider it as an assemblage of common attributes in the two that correlate.

VI

ARTHĀPATTI—PRESUMPTION

The Definition of Arthāpatti

The concept of *arthāpatti* is a special contribution of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* It is primarily formulated to establish the concept of *apūrva* which is very vital to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā. Śakti* is also established by *arthāpatti.*

Śabara bhāṣya explains the nature of *arthāpatti* as '*Arthāpattirapi dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā arthaḥ anyathā na upapādyate iti artha kalpanā.*'

Postulating another fact when a fact that is seen or heard is found incompatible in the absence of such a postulation is *Arthāpatti.* For instance, on finding that Devadatta who is known to be alive is not found in his residence, it has to be postulated that he is outside. This is *arthāpatti.*

Before we proceed to discuss the full implication of this observation of *bhāṣya* we have to note three important points:

(i) The expressions *dṛṣtaḥ śruto vā* in the *bhāṣya* gives an impression that Śabara has two types of *arthāpatti* in mind. Kumārila takes it in this way only. However, Prābhākara includes the examples of *śruta* also under *dṛṣṭa* only. (ii) *Śabara* has given one example only which is of *dṛṣṭa* type. (iii) The example given by *Śabara* is not *pratyakṣadṛṣṭa* type, but *abhāvapramāṇa-pramita* according to Kumārila. Prābhākara does not accept *abhāvapramāṇa.*

Six Types of Arthāpatti

Kumārila expands the scope of the import of the expression *dṛṣṭa* as *pramāṇa pramita* and gives interesting examples in respect of each *pramāṇa* leading to *arthāpatti.* He brings the *arthāpatti* brought about by *śabdapramāṇa* under *śrutārthāpatti* and all others under *dṛṣṭāthāpatti.* He quotes *go-balivardanyāya* to explain this arrangement.

(i) Burning power in the fire is to be postulated by the perception of the burning of fire. This is *arthāpatti* by *pratyakṣa.*

(ii) The power to move on the part of the Sun has to be postulated by the inference that whoever moves from one point of space to another has the moving power. This is *arthpatti* by *anumāna.*

(iii) On hearing the statement 'Devadatta who is quite strong but does not eat during the day' the statement that he eats during the night has to be postulated. This is *arthāpatti* by *Śabdapramāṇa.*

(iv) The power to reveal its similarity with forest cow has to be postulated on the part of village cow, since, on seeing the forest cow such a similarity is cognized. This is *arthāpatti* by *upamāna.*

(v) The power to convey the meaning on the part of the words has to be postulated by *arthāpatti* and to sustain this the natural relation between the word and the meaning has to be postulated. This is *arthāpatti* by *arthāpatti.*

(vi) On seeing the absence of Devadatta at his residence, his presence outside the residence has to be postulated. This is *arthāpatti* by *abhāva pramāṇa.*

It may be noted that the establishment of power, i.e. *śakti* is the outcome of *arthāpatti* in majority of these instances. Only in the cases of *śabdapramāṇa pramita arthāpatti* and *abhāvapramāṇa pramita arthāpatti, śakti* is not brought in.

The *arthāpattipramāṇa* has two important aspects, viz., identifying incompatibility, i.e. *anupapatti,* between two known facts and postulating a third fact, i.e. *upapādaka kalpanā* to resolve the incompatibility. In the stock example the facts of Devadatta being alive but not finding him in his residence are incompatible. This incompatibility is resolved by postulating his presence outside. When two facts are not compatible with each other one of them is to be rejected as not true or a third possibility has to be worked out. In the instances of *arthāpatti,* since both are supported by appropriate *pramāṇas,* none of them can be rejected as not true. In the stock example the fact of Devadatta being alive is vouchsafed by his horoscope and his absence in the residence is cognized by *abhāvapramāṇa.* Therefore, instead of rejecting one of these two facts, a third possibility, viz., his presence outside is postulated and the incompatibility is resolved. It is a case of *pramāṇadvaya virodhaparihāra,* removal of the contradiction between two sources of valid knowledge.

The Prābhākara's Explanation of Arthāpatti

Prābhākaras explain the basis of *arthāpatti* differently. Śālikanātha offers two explanations:

(i) An observed fact leads to the postulation of an unobserved fact to avoid incompatibility with a known fact.

(ii) Postulation of something without which a known fact becomes doubtful.

The common point of both these explanations is that a known fact would be incompatible or doubtful.

To resolve this incompatibility or doubt the process of postulating the required fact is initiated by the observed fact in the first explanation, and by otherwise known fact in the second explanation. In both the cases it is the otherwise known fact that becomes incompatible or doubtful. The postualted fact resolves this incompatibility or doubt.

In the stock example, as per the first explanation when one observes the absence of Devadatta at his residence, he finds that it is incompatible with the very existence of Devadatta unless his existence outside is postulated. The fact of Devadatta being alive is known from his horoscope, etc., and his absence at his residence is observed. The existence and non-existence of one and the same person is incompatible unless existence of Devadatta in a different place is envisaged. By postulating Devadatta's presence outside this incompatibility is resolved.

As per the second explanation, when one observes the absence of Devadatta at his residence, he will have a doubt about the very existence of Devadatta. This doubt will be resolved by postulating his presence outside. Such doubt will not arise if it is already known that he is dead. Hence, the removal of the doubt by postulating his presence outside is quite in order.

Parthasārathi is not happy with the second alternative as the ground of *arthāpatti* proposed by Śālikanatha. He argues that when the very living of Devadatta is in doubt, there is no scope to envisage his presence outside. He states that a doubt is removed either by the removal of its cause or by affirming one of the alternatives of the doubt. In the present case, the cause of the doubt is the absence of Devadatta in his residence. This is not removed by envisaging his presence outside. His absence in the residence continues. The two alternates of the doubt are whether Devadatta is alive or not. His presence outside is not anyone of the alternatives of the doubt. Therefore, its affirmation is not the affirmation of one of the alternatives of the doubt. Hence, no purpose is served by envisaging the presence outside on the basis of the doubt.

However, this criticism of Parthasārathi is not convincing. We may examine his arguments one by one. (i) The doubt about the very living of Devadatta does not prevent the effort to find out a solution to remove the doubt. It is only a firm knowledge of one side that prevents the effort to remove the doubt. But when his presence outside is envisaged it ceases to be the cause of the doubt.

The absence at a particular place alone is not the cause of the doubt but the possibility of absence in other places also suggested by the absence at a particular place where he was normally present is the cause. By envisaging the presence outside the absence in the

usual place ceases to be the cause of the doubt. The continuation of the absence in the particular place is no longer the ground of the doubt.

(iii) It is true that the form of the doubt is whether Devadatta is alive or not. The first alternative, i.e. being alive implies a place of his existence. When his presence outside is envisaged his existence in that place is also envisaged. This means that one of the alternatives of the doubt viz., he is alive is affirmed by the affirmation of his presence outside.

In view of the above, Parthasārathi's criticism of Śālikanātha's view seems to be laboured and not convincing.

Arthāpatti cannot be Included under Anumāna

The Nyāya does not accept *arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa*. It is included under *anumāna.* The stock example is put in the form of a syllogism as under:

Devadatta is outside his residence, because, he is alive but not found in his residence.

However, on closer examination it will be found that this syllogism does not serve any purpose. The *hetu* given here has two clauses viz Devadatta is alive and he is not found at his residence. The first one clearly implies that Devadatta must be in some place since he is alive. This place is naturally other than his residence. Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn by the inference, is already known at the *hetu* stage only. The two clauses of the *hetu* will remain incompatible if the presence of Devadatta outside the residence is not envisaged. Both the clauses are supported by *pramāṇa.* The clause, 'Devadatta is alive' is supported by *sādhāraṇa pramāṇa* i.e. his horoscope, etc and the second clause that he is not found at his residence is supported by a specific *pramāṇa.* However, these are conflicting with each other. Unless this conflict is resolved by envisaging the presence outside, these conflicting clauses cannot be taken as one unit of *hetu.* Therefore, at the very stage of the formation of *hetu* the proposed conclusion of the so called inference is already drawn. In fact, the formation of the *hetu* itself is achieved by *arthāpatti.*

Śālikanātha who makes the doubtfulness of the very existence of Devadatta as one of the grounds for *arthāpatti,* states that the clause, 'Devadatta is alive' cannot be a constituent of the *hetu,* as it is doubtful. A doubtful element cannot be the constituent of *hetu.*

Both Kumārila and Prābhākara point out some important differences between *anumāna* and *arthāpatti.*[25]

(i) *Anumāna* needs the knowledge of *vyāpti* while *arthāpatti* does not depend upon it.

(ii) In *anumāna* the *hetu* is definite while in *arthāpatti* one of the grounds is doubtful.

(iii) In the case of *anumāna* the *hetu* is not confronted with any incompatibility or doubt in leading to *sādhya* while in *arthāpatti* the incompatibility or the doubt is the basis.

In view of this, *arthāpatti* cannot be included under *anumāna.*

Srutarthāpatti

While explaining the nature of *arthāpatti Śābara bhāṣya* has used two expressions *dṛṣṭaḥ* and *śrutaḥ*. Kumārila has explained *dṛṣṭaḥ* as referring to *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *Śrutaḥ* to *Śrutārthāpatti*. He has further explained that the *arthāpatti* arising out of *Śabdapramāṇa* comes under *Śrutārthāpatti* and arising out of the other five *pramāṇas* comes under *dṛṣṭarthāpatti*. There is no dispute between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras on the point that *Śabdapramāṇa* gives rise to *arthāpatti*. They differ only on the manner in which the conclusion of *arthāpatti* is provided by it. In the stock example '*pino devadatto divā na bhuṅkte*', "Devadatta is stout but does not eat during the day", the conclusion arrived at by *arthāpatti* is that he eats at night. Now, the question is whether this conclusion is arrived at by providing a statement 'he eats at night' or by providing the fact that 'he eats at night' without necessarily arrived at by a verbal statement. The Bhāṭṭas hold that the conclusion of *arthāpatti* is necessarily provided by a verbal statement in such cases. They base their stand on two grounds:

(i) '*Pīno Devadatto divā na bhuṅkte*' is a statement made by someone. It is *Śabdapramāṇa*. Any addition or supplementing to be made to a *Śabdapramāṇa* has to be in the form of a *Śabda* only. A fact conveyed by a statement, has to be supplemented only by another word or statement. A fact conveyed by any other *pramāṇa* cannot be a part of the verbal communication. Therefore, the conclusion of *arthāpatti* in the present case has to be arrived at by verbal statement only.

(ii) The knowledge conveyed by the conclusion of *arthāpatti* is *savikalpaka* type. A *savikalpaka* cognition is always accompanied by words.

Prābhākaras do not agree with this contention. They argue as follows:

(i) By *arthāpatti* something is envisaged to resolve the incompatibility between two known things. Therefore, something that is envisaged should be capable of resolving the said conflict. The conflict between the facts of Devadatta being stout and not eating during the day is not resolved by the mere statement that he eats during the night. The fact of his eating during the night has to be provided by the conclusion of *arthāpatti*. Just as in other instances of *dṛṣṭarthāpatti* words have no role, in *Śabdapramāṇapūrvaka arthāpatti* also the fact of its conclusion can be provided directly.

(ii) The words play a role in *savikalpaka* cognitions by way of reminding the fact only. *Smṛti* is not a *pramāṇa*. Therefore, even if the words—'he eats at night' are brought to the mind, these cannot be considered as *pramāṇa*.

From the above discussion two points are clear—

(i) *Śrutārthāpatti* in the sense that it arises from *Śabdapramāṇa* is acceptable to both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras.

(ii) However, the form of this *arthāpatti* is not of the nature of a verbal statement according to the Prābhākaras and it is of the form of a verbal statement is the view of the Bhāṭṭas.

This difference has a wider implication in the context of the *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* theories of sentence meaning, the association of *aṅgas* with *angin,* and the concepts of *bhāvanā* and *niyoga*.

VII

ANUPALABDHI—NON-COGNITION

The Definition of Anupalabdhi

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas accept a sixth *pramāṇa*, viz., *Anupalabdhi* for the cognition of negation, i.e. absence. This is called *Abhāva pramāṇa* in *Śabara bhāṣya.* Its nature is explained as '*Abhāvopi pramāṇābhāvaḥ nāsti iti arthasya asannikṛṣṭasya.*' The non-cognition by the five *pramāṇas* is the means of cognition of negation that is represented as 'is not.'

The cognition that there is no jar on the ground is the cognition of the negation of jar. The entity represented by 'no' is negation. The ground is its location. However, it is different from the ground. The jar is the counter entity of this negation. The counter entity, that is, the jar which is capable of being cognized is not cognized on the ground. This very non-cognition of jar is the means of the cognition of its absence. Here both the means and the result are of negative type. The non-cognition of a positive entity is the means for the cognition of its negation. In this connection two points have to be noted: (i) The relevant means of cognition, viz., *pratyakṣa, anumāna,* etc., should be be properly employed before arriving at the conclusion that the object concerned is not cognized. (ii) The object concerned should be capable of being cognized by the relevant means *pratyakṣa,* etc. When these two requirements are fulfilled but still the object concerned is not cognized, this very non-cognition is the means for the cognition of the absence of that object.

The negation, i.e. absence of an object, cannot be cognized by *pratyakṣa,* since there can be no contact of sense with a negative entity. It cannot be comprehended by inference, since there is no *hetu* or *vyāpti* to infer it. Hence, a new *pramāṇa,* viz., *anupalabdhi,* i.e. non-cognition is envisaged.

The Nyāya View

However, the Nyāya argues that negation can be cognized by *pratyakṣa.* Though there is no usual contact between the sense and the negation, there is the contact between the locus of the negation and the sense. The eye is in contact with the ground. The absence of jar is an attribute of the ground. It has the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā.* This is sufficient to establish the contact between the two. But this argument is not sound. To be an attribute some positive relation is necessary. Negation is negative in its nature and therefore, it cannot have any positive relation. Hence, it cannot be considered as an attribute in the strict sense of the term. Though the Nyāya holds that the negation is *pratyakṣa,* it also consider the non-cognition of the *pratiyogin,* i.e. counter entity, the jar, as an aid, i.e. *Sahakārin.* The non-cognition of jar is an aid to the perception of its absence according to Nyāya. The Naiyāyikas do not want to give it the status of separate *pramāṇa.* However, no *sahakārin* is of any help if the *kāraṇa,* i.e. the chief means, viz., the contact between the sense and the negation, cannot be worked out. Therefore, it is better to consider *anupalabdhi* itself as the

means of the cognition of negation. *Yogyatā*, i.e. the capacity of the counter entity to be cognized, is *sahakārin* i.e. aid to *anupalabdhi* to cognize the absence. This *yogyatā* includes all the requirements that are necessary to cognize the counter entity, i.e. jar, such as properly employing the eye, the required amount of light, concentration of mind, etc. The counter entity itself and the contact of sense with it, of course, will be absent. This *yogyatā* enables the non-cognition to lead to the cognition of the negation. We may contrast the Nyāya position and the Bhāṭṭa *Mīmāṁsā* position as under:

(a) Nyāya position—*Pratyakṣa* is the means and *anupalabdhi*, i.e. non cognition of the counter entity, is an aid to cognize its negation.

(b) The Bhāṭṭa position—*Anupalabdhi*, i.e. non-cognition of the counter entity, i.e. jar, is the means and *yogyatā*; i.e. the capacity of the counter entity to be cognized, if it were present, is an aid to cognize its negation.

The requirements for the cognition of negation are same both in the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa *Mīmāṁsā*. The dispute is only about the status of *anupalabdhi*; whether it is an independent means for the cognition of negation or merely an aid. As stated earlier an aid requires a *kāraṇa*. The contact between the sense and the negation which is supposed to be *kāraṇa* cannot be worked out. Therefore, *Mīmāṁsā* position seems to be more reasonable than that of Nyāya.

Udayana insists that the cognition of negotion be treated as *pratyakṣa* on two grounds: (i) This cognition is direct. (ii) The senses negotiate for it. Both these arguments are based on the misunderstanding of the circumstances. The direct cognition is that of a locus of the negation i.e. the ground but not that of the negation. The sense negotiates only with the locus but not with the negation.

Further, the cognition of negation is *savikalpaka* as it requires a reference to its counter entity. However, it has no *nirvikalpaka* stage. Hence, it cannot be treated as *pratyakṣa* as per Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa*.

Anupalambha, i.e. non-cognition, is of two types: non-cognition by *pratyakṣa* and non-cognition by *smaraṇa*. The usual example of non-cognition of jar on the ground is by *pratyakṣa* and the non-cognition that, 'Caitra was not present in the morning at this place' is by *smaraṇa*. The fact that caitra was not present in the morning cannot be ascertained by his non-perception in the evening. It can be ascertained only by the absence of memory. If he were present in the morning, the memory of his presence would have been activated now. Since, there is the absence of the memory of his presence in the morning, his absence in the morning is now comprehended. This second type is introduced in *śāstradīpikā* to meet certain objections by later writers of Nyāya.

Negation is usually classified in four groups, viz., (i) *prāgabhāva*, i.e. the absence before the origination of a product; (ii) *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, i.e. absence after the destruction of a product; (iii) *anyonyābhāva*, i.e. reciprocal negation, e.g. cow is not horse; (iv) *atyantābhāva*, i.e. the absence of the very entity. Kumārila argues that if these negations are not accepted, then, there would be the contingency of the cognition of (i) the curd in the milk, (ii) milk in the curd, (iii) cloth as jar and horns in the hare.

The Prābhākara's Explanation of Abhāva Situations

The Prābhākaras do not accept the category of *abhāva*. Consequently, they do not accept the *abhāvapramāṇa* also.[26] To understand the Prābhākara's stand that the *abhāva* is not a separate category, their concepts of *saṁsṛṣṭaviṣayabuddhi* and *ekaviṣayabuddhi* have to be understood. When two positive entities are cognized together, it is *saṁsṛṣṭaviṣayabuddhi*, while cognizing only one of them is *ekaviṣayabuddhi*. The latter serves the purpose of *abhāva*. The object which is present in *saṁsṛṣṭaviṣayabuddhi* is not present in *ekaviṣayabuddhi*. For instance, when one cognizes a jar on the ground it is *saṁsṛṣṭaviṣayabuddhi*, since, two objects, viz., ground and jar, are cognized. When the jar is removed, he cognizes the ground only. This is *ekaviṣayabuddhi*. The absence of jar is not a separate object. The jar that is removed is designated as *dṛśya pratiyogin*. It is *pratitiyogya*, i.e. observable if it were there. Such observable *pratiyogins* characterise the absence conveyed by *ekaviṣayabuddhi* that serves the purpose of conveying the absence of the *pratiyogin*. There is no separate object as *abhāva*. Hence, there is no need of a separate *pramāṇa* to cognize it. In the instance wherein the jar is destroyed, there is *ekaviṣayabuddhi*, since the jar has ceased to be present. However, if the broken pieces are taken into account there is *saṁsṛṣṭaviṣayabuddhi* of the ground and pieces. Therefore, there is no such thing as *pradhvaṁsābhāva*.

Śālikanātha criticizes *anupalabdhi pramāṇa* by raising the question whether it conveys its *prameya*, i.e. the negation, by its presence only or by being comprehended. In the case of perception, it is well-known that the mere presence of eye is sufficient to lead to the perception. The knowledge of the eye is not necessary. In the case of the inference, mere presence of *liṅga* is not sufficient. It has to be comprehended to produce the inference. In the present case of *anupalabdhi*, its comprehension is necessary. This is clear from the recollection of *anupalabdhi* in a place where it was observed earlier. Mere presence of *anupalabdhi* will not produce such a recollection. Now, *anupalabdhi* itself is of the nature of negation. Therefore, it requires another *anupalabdhi* for its comprehension. This leads to infinite regress.

The Bhāṭṭas overcome this difficulty by pointing out that *anupalabdhi* leads to the cognition of negation by its mere presence. It need not be known. Just as *saṁskāras* produce the memory without being known, the non-cognition of jar produces the cognition of the absence of jar without itself being known. *Śāstradīpikā* further explains that there are two requirements for the cognition of absence, viz., *yogyatā* and *anupalabdhi*. The first requirement has to be known and the mere presence of the second is sufficient. Since, the knowledge of *anupalabdhi* aspect is not necessary, there is no room for infinite regress. The knowledge of *yogyatā* and the prsence of *anupalabdhi*, i.e. non-cognition, are sufficient to produce the cognition of the negation.

The purpose of the acceptance of *anupalabdhi pramāṇa* by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas seems to be not so much to find out a *pramāṇa* for the cognition of negation but to prevent the negation of the entities like *dharma*, *apūrva*, etc., that are not cognized by the five *pramāṇas* on the ground that these are not cognized. Only such entities as could be cognized by these five *pramāṇas*, could be denied if these are not cognized by the appropriate *pramāṇas*.

Dharma, adharma, etc., are beyond these *pramāṇas.* Therefore, these cannot be denied on the ground that these are not cognized by these *pramāṇas.*

ABBREVIATIONS

1. PMS—*Pūrvamīmāṁsā Sūtra*—Pune: Anandasrama
2. S.B.—*Śabara bhāṣya*—Pune: Anandasrama
3. S.V.—*Śloka vārttika*—Ratna bhārati series-3, Varanasi
4. S.V. Pr.—*Śloka vārttika* (Pratyakṣa chapter)—Ratna bhārati series-3, Varanasi
5. S.D.—*Śāstradīpikā*—Varanasi: Krishna dasa Academy, (Reprint of Nirāya Sagara edition.)
6. NRM—*Nyāyaratnamālā*—Baroda: Oriental Institute
7. M.M.—*Mānameyodaya*—The Adyar Library Series
8. M.R.S.—*Mānameya ślokavārttika rahasya*—Mysore: Govt. Press, 1925
9. Pr.P.—*Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*—Banaras Hindu University, Darśana Series-4
10. N.M.—*Nyāyamañjarī*—Mysore Oriental Library Series No.116
11. S.M.—*Siddhānta Muktāvalī*—Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press
12. ST—*Ślokavārttika tātparyaṭīkā*—Madras University Sanskrit Series, 13, 1940
13. St.—Stanza

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. NRM p.48
2. MRS p.185
3. S.V. Pr. St.53-56 S.T. p.132 MRS p.280
4. N.M. p.16-17
5. Pr.P. p.170 ibid 187 S.M. p.446-47
6. M.M. p.256-260 Ibid 62-63
7. M.M. p.18 S.D. p.38-40 S.V. (Pr.) St.112-113 Pr.P. 163
8. S.B. 1-1-5, S.D. p.44-45 Pr.P. p.104 S.M. (St.135)
9. Pr.P. p.126
10. S.D. p.20 MRS p.287
11. S.M. 448-452 S.B. 36-37 Pr.P. p.43-47

Perception

12. PMS 1-1-4
13. S.B. p.37 Pr.P. p.149
14. Pr.P. p.146-47
15. Pr.P. p.190
16. Pr.P. p.167

Inference

17. S.B. p.36 S.V. p.246 S.D. p.60
18. Pr.P. p.105
19. NRM p.325 Pr.P. p.204 S.V. p.248
20. Pr.P. p.207-210

Śāstrapramāṇa

21. S.B. p.37 Pr.P. p.229
22. Pr.P. p.37 S.D. p.24, S.V. p.291,294, St.18 St.35-37
23. S.V. P.295 St.38.40 Pr.P. p.33
24. PMS I-1-6 to 23 S.B. PP 72-91

Arthāpatti

25. Pr.P. p.273

Abhāvapramāṇa

26. S.B. p.39 S.V. p.335 St.1-8 Pr.P. p.106 p.286

CHAPTER 5

Metaphysics and Ontology of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

I

THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICAL ENQUIRY FOR PŪRVAMĪMĀṀSĀ

Every school of philosophy develops its own theory of metaphysics and ontology. However, it is not clear whether *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* developed its own concepts of metaphysics and ontology in its early stages. Its main theme is *dharma*. Its concept of *dharma* is the performance of sacrifices. These are described in Brāhmaṇa literature. This description has to be correctly comprehended and the sacrifices have to be performed accurately. This requires correct interpretation of Brāhmaṇa literature. Therefore, *Mīmāṁsā* concentrated more on the science of interpretation than on metaphysics. It was developed as a *vākya śāstra*. However, this sacrificial programme envisages certain results that have to be realized beyond one's lifetime and beyond this world. This necessitates the concept of an enduring self. It also necessitates an enduring world. The sacrifices that are of perishable nature have also to be given a religious and mystical stature so as to lead to the enduring results. All this required the construction of a theory of metaphysics and ontology. Moreover, Buddhists questioned the very concepts of a permanent self and a permanent world. If this challange is not countered the entire culture based on sacrificial programme would collapse. This made the *Mīmāṁsā* enter into the area of metaphysics and ontology. Their strategy in this field is twofold: (i) to refute the Buddhist theory of *Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* and connected ontological, epistemological and linguistic theories; (ii) to develop their own theory of metaphysics and ontology. The works of Kumārila and Śālikanātha devote themselves more to the first task than to the second. Among the Indian philosophers, Kumārila's contribution to the refutation of Buddhism is the highest both in quantity and quality. In the second task of constructing their own metaphysics and ontology, Mīmāṁsakas do not have much originality. They mostly borrow from Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas with some modifications here and there. Their presentation of own concepts is lost in the midst of frequent refutation of Buddhist's position at each step. Even later writers, like Pārthasārathi, concentrate more on the criticism of Buddhist's position on each item than in explaining his own position. He is equally vehement in criticizing the Prābhākara position on each item. Therefore, it is very difficult to gather a clear picture of the Bhāṭṭas' position on many metaphysical and ontological concepts. However, a later writer Nārāyaṇa

gives a brief account of *mīmāṁsā* categories in the *prameya* section of *Mānameyodaya*. In the case of the Prābhākaras, it seems Śālikanātha had a section on *Prameyapārāyaṇa* in *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*. However, that is lost. In the commentary, viz., *Nyāyaśuddhi* some details of the *prameyas* are given. The presentation of *Mīmāṁsā* theory of metaphysics and ontology is based on these two sources. Another source is the criticism of *Mīmāṁsā* views in the standard works of other systems. Major writers of Nyāya like Jayantabhaṭṭa, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa review *Mīmāṁsā* views, particularly, the Prābhākara views. This helps us to counter-check the *Mīmāṁsā* views.

The Area of Metaphysics

The area of metaphysics is an inquiry into the nature of Being or Existence. In Indian tradition, it is called *padārthavicāra* or *tattvavicāra*. These terms represent the whole reality. This reality is classified into certain categories. While structural definitions may be given to the categories in terms of their properties and functions, it is difficult to give the same to the whole reality. It can be only introduced as the object of cognition or conveyed by language. Keeping these two features in mind Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas have defined *padārtha* as '*prameyatvam padārthasāmānya lakṣaṇam*'. "To be accessible to the means of valid knowledge is the characteristic feature of the *padārtha* in general" and '*abhidheyatvam padārthasāmānya lakṣaṇam*'. "To be liable to designation is the characteristic feature of *padārtha* in general." The very term *padārtha* conveys the latter definition. These definitions are accepted by all realist schools and *pūrvamīmāṁsā* is a realist school. This reality consists of matter and mind according to realists.

Two Approaches of Indian Philosophy

In respect of matter there are two approaches: (i) *Prakṛti* theory, (ii) *Paramāṇu* theory. The Sāṁkhyas accept *Prakṛti*, i.e. primordial matter, as the source of all material objects and Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider the *paramāṇus* as the source of the four material elements, viz., earth, water, light and air. These and *manas* are called *mūrta-dravyas*. The Mīmāṁsakās go by the *paramāṇu* theory. However, the Bhāṭṭa concept of *paramāṇu* is slightly different from the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. The Bhāṭṭas consider *tryaṇuka* or *tryasareṇu* level as the final level while Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas go to two more steps, viz., *dvyaṇuka* and *paramāṇu*. It is only at *tryaṇuka* level that it has six sides and can be observed. The other two steps seem to be theoretical abstractions. Therefore, Pūrvamīmāṁsakās do not accept them. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas work out a process of creation and destruction of material aspect of the reality. Sāṁkhyas also work out the evolution of *Prakṛti*. However, Mīmāṁsakas do not accept these two processes. The world is ever present. There is no creation or destruction.

Mīmāṁsakas argue that there is no creator. Īśvara cannot be accepted as creator either on the authority of the Veda or that of inference. According to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas the Vedas are composed by Īśvara. Until Īśvara is established, the Vedas cannot be considered as composed by him and until the authority of the Vedas is established. Īśvara cannot be accepted as the composer. Thus, it leads to reciprocal dependency.

He cannot also be established by inference. The stock syllogism proposed in this connection is as follows. All products have an agent to produce them, the earth, the trees and plants, etc., on the earth are products. Therefore, these also have an agent. This agent is Īśvara. This line of argument is not acceptable to Mīmāṁsakas. An agent is required to have a body. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas Īśvara has no body. Therefore, he cannot be the agent.

Then, the question arises as to how these products come into being. A material cause and an efficient cause are required for a product to arise. In the absence of an efficient cause how can a product arise. The Mīmāṁsakas solve this problem by holding that three types of causes, viz., *samavāyi, asamavāyi* and *nimitta* are not necessary to bring about a product. In certain cases, *nimittakāraṇa,* i.e. efficient cause is not necessary. In this case, a further question arises as to 'how the various *avayavas* of an *avayavin* are brought together in the absence of an agent. This is answered by pointing out that the *adṛṣta* of the persons who have to enjoy these objects brings these *avayavas* together.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya also have to answer the question as to how the processes of creation or evolution is initiated. *Paramāṇus* and *Prakṛti* are non-sentient. These cannot take initiative on their own. For this purpose they also bring in *adṛṣta,* i.e. *dharma* and *adharma* of the persons who are destined to enjoy the benefit of the created world. This amounts to bringing in an extraneous element to solve the difficulty of explaining the causation.

The Categories

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas accept five categories, viz., substance, quality, action, universal and negation, i.e. *dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya* and *abhāva.* Two more categories accepted by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, viz., *Samavāya,* i.e. inherence, *viśeṣa,* i.e. particularity are dropped. In the place of *samavāya, tādātmya* relation is accepted. However, the Prābhākaras accept *Samavāya.*[1]

The Prābhākaras accept eight categories. In addition to the first four accepted by the Bhāṭṭas they accept four more, viz., *Śakti, Sādṛśya, Samavāya* and *Saṁkhyā.*

Dravya, i.e. Substance

Dravya, i.e. substance, is the locus of qualities, action, attributes, etc. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas define substance as that which is the locus of qualities. They also define substance as *samavāyikāraṇa,* i.e. inherent cause. Both these definitions are not acceptable to Bhāṭṭas. They argue that *Saṁkhyā,* i.e. number, is a quality and it is found in other qualities. Therefore, the definition '*guṇāśrayatva*' is not an exclusive characteristic of substance. Further, *samavāya* is not acceptable. Hence, the definition *samavāyikāraṇatva* is also not acceptable. The Bhāṭṭas define substance as '*parimāṇa guṇaśraya*', i.e. that which has dimension the quality.

The Bhāṭṭas do not agree with the contention of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas that the substance will remain without any quality during the first moment when it is produced. They hold the view that the substance and its qualities are produced simultaneously. This does not come in the way of *Kāryakāraṇa bhāva* of substance and quality in view of the *tādātmya* relation between the two. The entities that are simultaneously present can be *kārya* and *kāraṇa* both.

In respect of the nature of substance different views are held in Indian philosophy. *Mānameyārahasya Ślokavārtika* summarizes these views in an interesting way. In some cases the name of the school that holds a certain view is mentioned while in other cases we have to trace the sources. Since this summary widens the scope of the perspective of the concept of substance in Indian philosophy, it is briefly stated below:[2]

(i) There is a view that there is no entity such as *dravya*, i.e. substance, apart from attributes.

(ii) *Brahman, Śabda, Kāla* and *Sat* are considered as *dravya* by different schools.

(iii) The Jainas consider the constant aspect of an entity as *dravya* and the changing aspect as *paryāya.*

(iv) Sāṁkhyas consider the entire *prakṛti* as *dravya.*

(v) Some hold the view that *dravya* is constant and others say that it undergoes modification.

(vi) Some hold the view 'that which has *śakti,* i.e. potency' is *dravya.*

(vii) There is also a view that *dravya* undergoes *avasthās,* i.e. different states. These *avasthās* are contingent but still not separable from *dravya.* In respect of the relation between *dravya* and its *avasthās,* some say it is *bheda-abheda,* i.e. identity and difference. It is also stated that *dravya* is permanent and *avasthās* are temporary.

These views reveal that considerable thought was bestowed on the nature of substance in Indian philosophy. Different metaphysical and ontological views were formulated on the basis of the concept of substance by the respective schools.

The concept of substance of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras is the same as that of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. However, in the case of *ātman,* which is considered as a substance, the Bhāṭṭas accept *pariṇāma* or *avasthāntara* in the process of cognition.

The Bhāṭṭas also accept the nine substances admitted by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, space, time, *ātman* and *manas.* They add two more substances, viz., *tamas,* i.e. darkness, and *śabda,* i.e. *varṇa* syllables. The Prābhākaras do not accept *tamas* as a separate category. They consider *śabda* as a quality of *ākāśa.*

The first four substances are defined in the same way as the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas define them. However, air is considered as perceptible. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas take the position that it is not perceptible as it has no colour. But the Bhāṭṭas argue that through touch it can be perceived. Moreover, the Bhāṭṭas consider ether, time and space, that have no colour, as perceptible. Colours are not the ground for perception.

Time and Space

The Bhāṭṭas do not agree with the contention that ether, time, and space are inferred. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas say that *Śabda* is a quality. It must belong to some substance. This substance is ether. This is not acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas. They do not consider *śabda* as a quality. It is a substance. Therefore, the question of inferring a locus for *śabda* does not arise. Even if it is considered as a quality, it may be taken as a quality of the space.

Time and space are also not to be inferred. These are perceived. The cognitions 'this is earlier, that is later, these two are simultaneous', etc., are stated to be the grounds for the inference of time. However, the expressions earlier, later, etc., are not distinct from the time. These refer to time itself but not to the ground of time. Unless one cognizes time, one cannot talk of earlier and later. These very expressions reveal that time is perceived. The time is perceived by all senses. All experiences have necessarily a reference to time.

Similarly *dik*, i.e. space, also is perceived, according to the Bhāṭṭas. The statements 'This is here, that is after it, and the other is before it' clearly indicate that space is also cognized along with the object. If the perception of space could be denied, then, the perception of the very objects in those places may also be denied. On these grounds the Bhāṭṭas consider ether, time and space as perceptible. The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, say that these are to be inferred.

In respect of these three, different views are held in Indian philosophy.[3]

(i) Buddhists do not consider time as a separate element. It is not different from motion. Counting of time with reference to the movement of the sun, the moon, stars, etc., is only a mental process. There is no corresponding separate entity.

(ii) The Sāṁkhyas consider space and time as aspects of *Prakṛti.*

(iii) The Pātañjalas do not accept an all-pervasive time. They say it is a series of moments. Jainas also consider it as a series of moments.

(iv) There are three levels of Time, viz., (i) *mahākāla,* (ii) *khaṇḍakāla,* (iii) *ubhayakāla.*

(i) Ether is merely *avakāśa,* i.e. a vacuum. It is *āvaraṇābhāva,* i.e. absence of covering.

(ii) Time, space and ether are not distinct from Īśvara.

(iii) Two levels of *ākāśa,* viz., *avyākṛta,* i.e. undemarcated and *vyākṛta,* i.e. demarcated, are also accepted. The latter is *bhūtākāśa* which is counted among elements.

(iv) The Jainas also accept two levels of *ākāśa,* viz., *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa.*

The nature of these are discussed in detail by respective schools. The nature of *ātman* and *manas* will be explained in separate sections, since, these involve epistemological and psychological aspects also.

The Concept of Tamas i.e. Darkness

The concept of *tamas,* i.e. darkness, as a substance, is a peculiar view of the Bhāṭṭas. They argue that *tamas,* i.e. darkness, has two attributes, viz., a quality, i.e. blue colour, and motion which are required for an entity to be a substance. As it cannot be brought under any other substance it has to be considered as a separate substance.[4]

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas do not agree with this view. They consider it as the absence of light. It has no dark colour. In the absence of light the eye is not able to see the objects around. This creates an impression that something blue-black is seen. Strictly speaking, there is no positive entity. There is an absence. Therefore, there is no question of our seeing blue-black colour as belonging to some entity. Same is the case with motion. As the light moves, its absence is observed. The movement is that of light but not that of darkness. Moreover, darkness has no touch. All coloured objects have touch also. Hence, it cannot be a substance.

The last point is countered by the Bhāṭṭas by pointing out that air has no colour, it has only touch and even then it is considered as a substance. Similarly, darkness, that has colour but no touch, may also be considered as a substance. It is not necessary that a substance must have both colour and touch. The presence of one of them is sufficient.

The Prābhākaras do not consider darkness as a separate substance. They cannot also consider it as the absence of light, since, they do not accept the category of *abhāva*, i.e. absence. Therefore, they explain the nature of darkness as under: when the light is withdrawn the observer is reminded of blue-black colour. He does not realize the difference between his cognition and the memory of the blue-black colour. He takes it as a content of his cognition. Darkness, as such, is not a separate entity.

There are a few other views in respect of darkness.[5]

(i) Śrīdhara in *Nyāyakandalī* states that in a place where there is no light, the blue-black colour is superimposed. This is called darkness.

(ii) The Jainas hold the view that the *paramāṇus* have all capacities. These spread as light and darkness like the spreading of the cloud.

(iii) Maṇḍana Mishra states in *Vidhiviveka* that darkness is the shadow of the earth.

These views reveal that they did not reject it easily as the absence of light.

The Concept of Śabda, i.e. Varṇa

The Bhāṭṭas consider *śabda*, i.e. *varṇa* also as a substance on two grounds, viz., (i) It is not located in anything else; (ii) It is directly cognized by the sense, i.e. ear. *Śabda* is all-pervasive. For instance, one and the same syllable *'ga'* is found everywhere. It is not correct to say that there are different *'ga'* syllables pronounced by different persons at different times, since, it is recognized as the same *'ga'* syllable even when pronounced by different persons at different times. It is not produced by the vocal organs. It is only manifested by these. Though the *śabda* is all-pervasive, it is heard only in such places where it is manifested. The variation in the manifestation of *śabda* as strong, soft, etc., is due to the variation in the process of manifestation.

A group of *varṇas*, i.e. syllables, that convey a meaning, is a word. A group of words, that conveys a unitary meaning, is a sentence. Mīmāṁsakas do not accept the concept of *sphoṭa* for this purpose.

The Prābhākaras consider *śabda* as a quality of *ākāśa*.

The Qualities

The Bhāṭṭas define quality as that which is not *upādānakāraṇa,* i.e. the material cause, and which is distinct from motion. The first clause is intended to distinguish it from substance. They list colour, taste, etc. as twenty-four qualities.

Twenty-one of these are common with the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas list. Three qualities, viz., *śabda, dharma* and *adharma,* are dropped and three, viz., *śakti, prākaṭya* and *dhvani* are added. The nature of twenty-one qualities common with the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas are described more or less in the same way. However, there are few differences.

(i) *Citrarūpa,* i.e. varigated colour is not accepted as a separate colour. Darkness is stated to have blue black-colour.

(ii) *Pṛthaktva,* i.e. distinctness, is present not only at *paramāṇu* level but at the *kāryadravya* level also. The Prābhākaras accept it only at the *paramāṇu* level.

(iii) *Saṁyoga,* i.e. conjunction, between two all-pervasive substances, like *ākāśa* and *kāla,* is accepted. This is stated to be permanent conjuction.

(iv) Among the qualities of *ātman,* joy, sorrow, desire, hatred and initiative are cognized by *manas. Buddhi,* i.e. cognition, is inferred through *prākaṭya,* i.e. revelation of objects. It is not considered as self-revealing by the Bhāṭṭas while the Prābhākaras consider it as self-revealing. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider cognition as comprehended by *manas.*

(v) *Saṁskāra* is of two types: (i) *Laukika,* (ii) *Vaidika.* The former is explained in the same way as in Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. The latter is of the nature of treatment of sacrificial items such as grinding the paddy for preparing *puroḍāśa,* sprinkling it with water, cutting the *yūpa,* etc. This latter *Saṁskāra* is considered as *śakti* by some as it invests the items concerned with a religious status.[8]

The concept of *prākaṭya* is a special concept of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. It is a quality invested on objects when the objects are cognized. It reveals the object. Though it is a quality of substances it also reveals the qualities, universal, etc., present in the object. It reveals the past and future objects, and *abhāva* also. The experiences such as 'jar is revealed' is the ground to accept *prākaṭya.* The cognition itself cannot be taken as a ground for such experience as it is only in the *ātman* but not in the object. *Prākaṭya* is also called as *dṛṣṭatā* and *jñātatā.* In the instances where the objects are perceived it is called *dṛṣṭatā,* in the instances where in the objects are revealed by inference, etc., it is called *jñātatā. Prākaṭya* is a common name. This concept will be discussed in detail later. It is considered as separate category by some Mīmāṁsakas. The Prābhākaras do not accept this concept.

Śakti i.e. Potency

Śakti is conceived as a quality present in substances, qualities and action. Bhāṭṭas do not accept the contention that a quality is present in substance only. They point out that *Saṁkhyā,* i.e. number, which is a quality, is present in qualities also. *Śakti* is of two types: (i) *Laukika,* (ii) *Vaidika.* The former is established by *arthāpatti.* For instance, the fire normally burns,

but the same fire when *mantra* or *auṣadhi* is employed in it, does not burn. This means that there is some additional factor that is the ground for burning. This factor is not actually seen. Therefore, it has to be envisaged by *arthāpatti*. The *śakti* of sacrifice, that leads to *svarga*, is of the second type. This is to be known through Vedic injunction. *Śakti* is also classified as: (i) *sahajā* and (ii) *ādheyā*. The potency of the fire is *sahajā*, i.e. natural while the potency found in the sacrificial context is *ādheyā*, i.e. brought about by the implimentation of the Vedic injunction. *Śakti* is found in substance, quality and action. The *Śakti* present in the fire is an example of the potency in substance. The killing, leading to the sin, is an example of potency in action and when an object of a certain quality is prescribed for the sacrifice to produce the result, the potency is that of a quality. Thus, potency is to be found in substance, quality and action. The Prābhākaras consider *Śakti* as a separate category. They establish it by inference. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas do not accept *Śakti*.[9]

Karma, i.e. Action

It is of the nature of movement. It causes conjunction and disjunction, it operates in the case of non-all-pervasive entities only and it is perceptible.

The Prābhākaras consider it as inferred. What is observed by the eye, is only conjunction and separation. The action itself is not perceived. It is inferred from the conjunction and separation that are perceived. This view of the Prābhākaras is not acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas.[10]

Sāmānya

The nature of *Sāmānya*, i.e. universal, is discussed in a separate section, since, it is an important concept and it is utilized to reject the Buddhist view of *kṣaṇikatva*, momentariness.

Sādṛśya i.e. similarity

Sādṛśya, i.e. similarity, is considered as a separate category by the Prābhākaras. It is comprehended by *upamāna pramāṇa*. The nature and the process of *upamānapramāṇa* is explained in the same way both by the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. Both of them differ from the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika explanation. However, in respect of the ontological status of *sādṛśya*, the two differ.

The Prābhākaras consider it as a separate category on the following grounds.

(i) *Sādṛśya* cannot be considered as a substance, since it is found in qualities and actions also.

(ii) It cannot be considered as a quality or action for the same reason.

(iii) It cannot be included under *sāmānya*, as it has no continuity.

(iv) It cannot be included under *samavāya*, as it is not a relation.

Therefore, it has to be treated as a separate category.

The Bhāṭṭas do not consider it as a separate category. They say that the commonness of the qualities, parts and universal of the village cow and the forest cow, is the ground for similarity. They give the following reasons against considering it as a separate category:

(i) We talk of more similar and less similar. This cannot be explained if *sādṛśya* is a separate category.

(ii) It cannot be stated that these statements are based on the quantity of similarity, since, only substance has quantity and not other categories.

These objections will not arise if the commonness of quality, parts, etc., is made the ground for *sādṛśya.*

The qualities, etc., will be less in some objects and more in others. This will explain the above statements.

The Prābhākaras argue that if *sādṛśya* is reduced to the objects with common features, then it will have to be stated as '*tat*', i.e. this, but not as '*tadvat*', i.e. it is like this. The latter statement clearly shows that *sādṛśya* is different from substance, quality, etc., and is present in them.

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* utilizes the concept of *sādṛśya* in the context of sacrifices. For instance, *śaurya* and *āgneya* have same deity and *dravya.* Therefore, these lead to the same result. A section of the Navyanaiyāyikas also accept *sadṛśya* as a separate category.[11]

Saṁkhyā, i.e. Number

The Prābhākaras consider *saṁkhyā,* i.e. number also as a separate category as it is found in all objects. It cannot be considered as a substance, since, it is found in qualities, action, etc., also. It cannot be considered as a quality, since, it is found in many. It cannot be taken as action, since, it is observed to be quite different from that. It cannot also be taken as a universal as it is not eternal. Hence, it has to be considered as a separate category.

The Bhāṭṭas and Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider it as a quality. They point out that since the number is found in numbers also, it will lead to infinite regress if number is considered as a separate category.[12]

Samavāya, i.e. Inherence

The Prābhākaras accept *samavāya* as a separate category like the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. However, there is an important difference. They do not consider it as eternal in all cases. If the two relata are eternal, then it is eternal. For instance, the *samavāya* between *ākāśa* and its *mahat parimāṇa* is eternal. If one of the relata or both the relata are not eternal, then, *samavāya* also is not eternal. For instance, when a member of a class perishes, the *samavāya* between that individual and the class, i.e. the universal, ceases to exist. For instance, when a particular cow perishes the *samavāya* between that cow and the universal, i.e. cowness ceases. This explains the position that the universal is eternal and it does not perish when a member of the class perishes. It was linked by *samavāya* with that member

and when *samavāya* ceases to exist, the universal is delinked from it. It is not destroyed.

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider *samavāya* as perceptible while the Prābhākaras consider it as inferred. The Bhāṭṭas do not accept *samavāya*. They replace it by *tādātmya*. They refute *samavāya* by the stock argument that it will lead to infinite regress. *Samavāya* is expected to relate the two relata. However, *samavāya* itself needs a relation to be connected with the relata. That relation needs another relation. Thus, it leads to infinite regress. However, it may be pointed out that since *samavāya* is conceived to relate the two relata, it relates them without needing any further relation. It is conceived as a separate category to serve a specific purpose. It is its very nature to relate the substance-quality, substance-action, etc. *Tādātmya* works on the basis that the substance and quality have *bheda-abheda* relation while *samavāya* works on the basis of difference between substance and quality, etc. Therefore, the difference of opinion in respect of *samavāya* is not merely a difference in respect of working out a relation but the very metaphysical view based on *bheda* and *bheda-abheda*.[13]

The category *viśeṣa* accepted by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas is rejected by both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. Its purpose is served by the quality called *pṛthaktva*, distinctness.

The Category of Abhāva, i.e. Absence

The Bhāṭṭas accept the category of *abhāva*. The cognition '*asti*', i.e. is, conveys *bhāva*, i.e. a positive entity, and the cognition '*nāsti*', i.e. absent, conveys *abāva* i.e. the absence of an entity. This absence itself is considered as a separate category. The absence is of four types, viz., (i) *prāgabhāva*, i.e. previous absence, i.e. the absence before the object is produced, e.g., the absence of the curd in the milk before it is produced from the milk; (ii) *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, i.e. absence after the destruction, e.g., the absence of milk when it is made into curd; (iii) *atyantābhāva*, i.e. the absence all along, e.g., the absence of colour in the air; (iv) *anyonyābhāva*, i.e. reciprocal absence, e.g., the jar is not the cloth. This fourth type is also called *tādātmyābhāva*. According to Bhāṭṭas, absence is cognized by *anupalabdhi pramāṇa*, i.e. absence of cognition. It is the absence of the cognition of jar even when appropriate means are employed to cognize it that leads to the cognition of its absence. Such an object should be capable of being cognized by these means, if it were present.

The Prābhākaras do not accept the *abhāva* category. They state that the cognitions are of two types: (i) *saṁsṛṣṭa viṣaya buddhi*, i.e. cognition of two objects together; (ii) *tadekaviṣaya buddhi*, i.e. cognition of one only. The statement 'there is a jar on the ground', represents the first type. When the jar is removed, the statement is made as 'there is ground' and in addition to the ground there is no such thing as 'absence of jar' as an entity. Keeping the jar present elswhere in mind, we talk of absence of jar. Strictly speaking, there is no such entity as the absence of jar that is present on the ground. The Prābhākara position is fully discussed under *abhāva pramāṇa* in the epistemology section.

The category *abhāva* is not mentioned in the statement of categories in *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*. However, it is implied in other places.

The Sāṁkhyas also do not accept *abhāva.* They state that it is *kaivalya* form of *pariṇāma* of *bhūtala,* that is to say the state of *bhūtala* alone being present without jar. This explanation is very close to the explanation of the Prābhākaras.

Anyonyābhāva is the difference between two objects. In respect of the nature of difference, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras differ. In this connection a discussion is raised while describing the role of the quality *pṛthaktva,* i.e. distinctness. The Bhāṭṭas state that *pṛthaktva* is a quality that is the ground of difference. It is found in all substances. The Prābhākaras say that *pṛithaktva* is a quality of permanent substances only. It is not necessary for produced substances. The difference of these is perceptible, since, the difference is an integral part of the very essential nature of the object. Hence, no separate quality such as *pṛthaktva* is required to present the difference.

Concept of Svarūpabheda

The concept of *svarūpabheda* is challanged by Bhāṭṭas on the following grounds:[15]

(i) If the jar and its difference from other objects are one, then, these two words jar and difference should become synonyms. The statement would have been as 'jar is difference'. This is against our experience.

(ii) The statements such as 'difference of jar' and 'jar is different from cloth' indicate that the difference is related to jar and is an adjective of jar. These statements clearly show that the jar and the difference are different.

(iii) If the difference is not different from jar, then, one should be able to comprehend the difference of jar from the cloth, etc., automatically on seeing the jar alone.

The Prābhākāras answer these objections as follows:

(i) The difference is an integral part of the very essential nature of an object. When an object is comprehended, its distinction from other objects is also comprehended. However, to understand its distinction from a particular object and make a statement about it, a reference to that object is necessary. This is technically called as *pratiyogī sāpekṣatva,* i.e. requiring a reference to its correlate.

(ii) The expressions jar and difference will not be synonymous even though the difference is an integral part of the jar. The jar aspect does not require any reference to pratiyogin, i.e. counter correlate, while the difference aspect does require it. This may be explained by an example. Devadatta is an individual and he is also a son of Yajñadatta. To know him as a son of Yajñadatta, a reference to Yajñadatta is necessary. But to know him as an individual, no such reference is necessary. However, Devadatta, the individual, and Devadatta, the son, are one and the same. Similarly, to know the jar as jar, no reference to other objects is necessary, but to know it as different from cloth, a reference to cloth is necessary. This does not mean that the jar and the difference of it from others are different.

(iii) The statements such as 'the difference of jar' and 'the jar is different from cloth' are made keeping in mind a reference to the counter correlate and do not affect the basic identity between the jar and the difference.

It may be added that when an object is comprehended it has to be understood as distinct from all others. To comprehend A as A, it is necessary to understand it as not B not C, etc., in a general way and only when the difference from another particular entity is to be comprehended, a reference to that entity has to be made. In either case, the difference is an integral part of the object differentiated.

Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras refer to Advaita Vedānta view, viz., the difference is *mithyā* and reject it.

II

THE CONCEPTS OF ĀTMAN, i.e. SELF, MANAS, i.e. MIND, BODY AND SENSES

To understand the world view of a philosophical system, it is necessary to identify its concepts on both the subjective and objective sides. Whether the two sides are considered as radically distinct or one covers the other? What is the nature and what are the components of these two sides? How these two make an impact on each other, are the questions that have to be examined.

In Indian philosophical tradition, the concept of *ātman* is the core concept on subjective side and the concept of matter represented by *prakṛti* or *paramāṇu* is the core concept on the objective side. Time, space, universals, relations, and such other concepts are developed to explain the functions and the purposes of the above two fundamental concepts of the metaphysics of Indian philosophy.

The Concept of Ātman

The expression *ātman* is as old as the Vedic hymns. It is difficult to fix its import in its Vedic usage independent of its later development in the Upaniṣads and the philosophical schools. The concept of *ātman* is the central concept in the Upaniṣads. The entire Upaniṣadic philosophy is an exposition of this concept. Its nature, its functions and its purpose are discussed, debated, and described in the Upaniṣads. The Vedānta schools have further developed this concept. The core nature of this concept is kept intact by all the schools of Vedānta. It is kept as a central concept. However, in relating it with matter, different metaphysical views are formulated. Consequently, its nature and the mode of its comprehension is differently described. The theistic schools have added a theistic dimension also.

Ātman is the centre of the subjective side. The main features of the subjective side are: (i) to know, (ii) to desire, (iii) to take initiative for activity, (iv) to undergo the experiences of joy and sorrow, that is to say, *jñāna, icchā, kṛti* and *sukha-dukhānubhāva.*

An agent to perform these roles has to be accepted by all philosophers. This agent is termed as *ātman* i.e. self, in Indian philosophy. The question whether it is physical, psychological or spiritual in nature is raised.[16]

Cārvāka View

The Cārvākas consider it as physical. They argue that there is no self apart from the body. The body itself develops consciousness from its physical sources and plays the role of knower, enjoyer, etc., that are stated to be the functions of the self. Consciousness arises along with the body and perishes when the body perishes. Cārvākas do not believe in an enduring separate self distinct from the body. Consequently, they do not believe in rebirth, *karma, svarga,* etc., that are closely connected with the concept of a permanent self.

The main arguments against the Cārvāka theory are: (i) Since, the non-sentient elements that develop into a body do not have consciousness, their product, i.e. the body also cannot have consciousness. (ii) Vital air, cognition, joy, sorrow etc., cannot be attributes of the body, since, after death, even though the body continues, these are not found. (iii) The attributes of the body, that are perceived by the person concerned, are also perceived by others. However, cognition, joy, sorrow, etc., are perceived by the person concerned but not by others. Hence, these are the attributes of some entity other than the body. This entity is *ātman.*

Sāṁkhya View

The Sāṁkhyas do not use the term *ātman.* The *Puruṣa* conceived by the Sāṁkhyas does not perform the functions normally assigned to *ātman,* as in other systems. Buddhi, i.e. *anthakaraṇa* performs these functions. According to Sāṁkhya the apparatus of both subjective side and objective side arise from *prakṛti,* i.e., the primal matter only. At the stage of *ahaṅkāra-tattva,* the apparatuses of the subjective and objective sides get bifurcated. Buddhi, together with eleven senses, constitutes the apparatus of the subjective side while *tanmātras* and *bhūtas* i.e. elements, constitute the objective side. Though buddhi performs the functions of subject, it needs the presence and the impact of *puruṣa. Puruṣa* is sentient while *buddhi* is non-sentient. Therefore, the two cannot have any physical contact. The mere presence of *puruṣa* makes an impact on *buddhi.* The *buddhi* plays the role of the agent, enjoyer, etc. *Puruṣa* wrongly appropriates these as his own. Therefore, *buddhi* alone cannot be designated as the knowing self nor *puruṣa* alone can be designated so. According to Sāṁkhya, it is the complex of *puruṣa* and *buddhi* that forms the subjective side. In this complex, *puruṣa* is permanent and enduring. The association with *antaḥkaraṇa* continues until *puruṣa* realizes the distinction between himself and *prakṛti.*

Since the Sāṁkhya does not ascribe the role of cognizing, and experiencing joy and sorrow directly to *puruṣa,* their arguments to establish a permanent *puruṣa* and to consider him as distinct from *prakṛti,* i.e. matter, are quite different from that of other systems. Their main arguments are: (i) *Prakṛti* is constituted of three *guṇas.* An entity that is constituted of *guṇas* must be for some one else. This someone else is *puruṣa.* (ii) Since, *prakṛti* is constituted of three *guṇas,* there must be something else also which is quite different from it. (iii) An entity that is constituted, needs someone to supervise it. (iv) Joy and sorrow, etc., are meant for someone who is the enjoyer. (v) Wise men are found to undertake efforts to get released.

The driving point of these arguments seems to be the concept of the duality of the universe. The universe is not constituted of mere matter nor of mere sentient being. These two are opposite to each other but cooperate with each other. Therefore, both have to be accepted. Sometimes it is suggested that the Sāṁkhya metaphysics can be intelligibly explained without *puruṣa*. The Sāṁkhyas probably added the *puruṣa* under the pressure of the Upaniṣadic thought. However, this suggestion does not seem to be valid. If Sāṁkhya had managed the subjective side and the objective side within the framework of the evolutes of *prakṛti*, then, there would have been no difference between the Cārvāka and the Sāṁkhya approaches. The Cārvāka envisaged consciousness at gross physical level and the Sāṁkhya envisaged it at subtle physical level i.e. *ahaṁkāra* level. Sāṁkhya's intention in accepting separate sentient being seems to be due to its belief in duality. Sāṁkhya's argument *triguṇādi viparyaya* clearly suggests that he believed in the duality of matter and mind. A sentient being and a non-sentient being cannot be physically connected. They can only make impact on each other without involving any physical relation. However, the presence of a sentient being is necessary to explain the cognative process of the subjective side. Consciousness functions only through a physical structure. The physical structure needs the presence of conciousness to account for the cognitive process. Psychological processes need physical apparatus to function and physical apparatus needs psychological process to play the cognitive role. Therefore, the presence of a sentient being i.e. *puruṣa* is necessary to enable *buddhi* to perform the cognitive function.[17]

Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas View

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas concept of *ātman* is quite different from the Sāṁkhya. They accept a permanent self. They argue that senses and *manas* cannot produce the cognition. These are the instruments. The instruments cannot produce anything on their own unless these are handled by an agent. Therefore, an agent has to be envisaged. Such an agent is *ātman*, i.e. self. According to Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas *ātman* is perceived. This is clear from the experiences such as I am happy, I know, etc. However, they prove it by inference also. So far as the *ātman* of others is concerned, it has to be inferred by their activities.

The *ātman* is permanent and it is all-pervasive. Cognition is not its essential nature but only its quality. The *ātman* is sentient in the sense that it has cognition as its quality. What distinguishes the non-sentients from *ātman* is that it is *samavāyikāraṇa* of cognition and the locus of cognition. *Manas* cannot be considered as a sentient entity and the agent of cognition, since, it is atomic in size and is invisible. If cognition is considered as its attribute, that will also be invisible. The senses also cannot be assigned the role of *ātman*. Even after one or more of senses are mutilated, cognition through other senses arises and the memory of earlier cognitions continues. Therefore, an agent to perform the cognitive activities is required and *ātman*, i.e. self, has to be conceived as the agent. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas accept Īśvara and work out two categories of *ātman*, viz., *jīvātman* and *paramātman*. The latter does not have body and senses. He cognizes all objects at all time. The *jīvātmans* are many. These are all-pervasive. However, these function through their respective bodies.

They reject the Advaita Vedāntin's idea of one *ātman*. Apart from the cognition, joy, etc., *ātman* is the locus of *dharma* and *adharma*. These continue in the next birth also. This gives a moral personality to *ātman*.[18]

Pūrvamīmāṁsā View

The Pūrvamīmāṁsā concept of *ātman* is broadly similar to that of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. Their arguments to distinguish it from the body, *manas* and senses are also same. However, there is an important difference between the Bhāṭṭa concept of *ātman* and the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas concept of it. While cognition is an attribute of *ātman* according to Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, it is a modification or a state of *ātman* according to Bhāṭṭas.

The very purpose for which *ātman* is accepted and the context in which the need of this concept is discussed is quite interesting and peculiar to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*.[19]

While discussing the validity of the Veda, an objection is raised that certain inconsistent statements are found in the Veda, therefore, it cannot be taken as an authority. For instance, in the passage '*sa eṣaḥ yajñāyudhī yajamānaḥ añjasā svargam lokam yāti*' it is stated that the sacrificer goes to heaven holding the sacrificial instruments. This gives an impression that he bodily moves to heaven which is impossible. Such statements make room for the objection that the Vedas are not valid.

This objection is answered by pointing out that there is *ātman*, i.e. self, distinct from the body and it is this *ātman* that is referred to in the above passage as going to heaven. It is not the body of the sacrificer that goes to heaven but it is his self, i.e. *ātman*.

There is a detailed discussion on the question of the existence of a separate self distinct from the body in this context. The following arguments are stated to establish a distinct *ātman*.

(1) Activities like breathing, winking, etc., do not belong to the body. These are not found after the death even though the body is found. Therefore, these are the attributes of some other entity that is distinct from the body. This is *ātman*.

(2) Joy, sorrow, etc., are cognized by oneself and not by others. The bodily attributes are perceived by others, but these are not perceived by others. Hence, these belong to *ātman*.

(3) By the desire also *ātman* can be inferred. A person desires something that is already known to him. Therefore, the knower and desirer should be one and the same. This means that there is a permanent *ātman*. This argument is intended to refute the view that the *vijñāna*, that is momentory, can serve the purpose of the cognizer. The cognizer has to be enduring.

(4) By memory and recognition also a permanent *ātman* can be inferred. These arise only in the case of the objects that are already known and to the same agent who knew. This proves an enduring agent.

(5) The experience as *aham*, i.e. 'I' establishes the *ātman*. The *ātman* is capable of knowing itself, i.e. *svasaṁvedya*.

(6) The initiative to continue the work that was done half way in an earlier day on the next day also indicates an enduring self.

It is interesting to note that Śabara quotes a number of Upaniṣadic passages to explain the nature of *ātman*. We will notice a few:

(i) The *ātman* is imperishable:

(a) *Sa vā ayam ātmā aśiryo nahi śiryate.*

"The *ātman* is, to be sure, imperishable, since decidedly he does not perish."

(b) *avināśī vā are ayam ātmā anucchitti dharmā.*

"Lo, the *ātman* is imperishable, possess, as he does, the quality of imperishability."

(ii) The *ātman* knows itself. It is not perceived by others:

(a) *Kim jyotirayam puruṣaḥ? ātmajyotiḥ.*

"What does serve as the light for the *ātman*? That is the light of himself."

(b) *atra ayam puruṣah svayam jyotiḥ bhavati.*

"Here this *puruṣa* serves by himself as his light."

(c) *agṛhyo na hi gṛhyate.*

"Since is not grasped, he is incapable of being grasped."

(iii) *Ātman* is distinct from body, vital air, senses, etc.

(a) *sa eṣaḥ neti neti ātmā.*

"This atman is not this, not this."

From these quotations, it is clear that Śabara was quite familiar with Upaniṣadic texts and took them as authority for understanding the nature of *ātman*. The arguments given by him before quoting Upaniṣad passages are meant to refute the Cārvākas and Buddhists. The question of *ātman* is discussed in *apūrvādhikaraṇa* also. *Apūrva* is a link between the sacrifice and its result. It is produced by the sacrifice but remains on *ātman* until the result is produced. To explain this point *ātman* is referred to in *apūrvādhikaraṇa*.

Kumārila discusses the nature and the functions of *ātman* under *Ātmavāda* in *Ślokavārttika* and in *apūrvādhikaraṇa* in *Tantravārttika*.

He describes *ātman* as eternal, all-pervasive, that which takes different bodies in different births, and serves as the agent and enjoyer. (S.V. 73)

When it is said that he is an agent, it is not meant that he himself actually performs the actions. Whatever activities are performed by his body and senses, he initiates them. The body and senses cannot perform any activity on their own. The self has to initiate them. Therefore, he is an agent. The body and senses are acquired by him by his past deeds. Therefore, their activities are his activities.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika's arguments are mostly aimed at refuting Cārvākas, while Śabara's arguments are aimed at refuting *vijñāna-ātmavāda* also. We may particularly note the points: (i) Memory and recognition need an enduring *ātman*. (ii) A person desires something which he already knows. This needs an enduring *ātman*. (iii) An initiative taken on one day is continued on the next day. This also needs an enduring *ātman*. *Vijñāna*, which is momentary, cannot carry out these functions and therefore, it cannot play the role of *ātman*.

The Prābhākara's concept of *ātman* is briefly explained by Śālikanātha as: (i) It is distinct from the body, *manas* and senses. (ii) It is permanent and all-pervasive. (iii) The *ātmans* are many. (iv) It is cognized as the agent along with the object of cognition.

The Prābhākaras differ from Bhāṭṭas in two important respects, viz., (i) They do not admit any change or modification of *ātman* when cognition arises. (ii) The *ātman* is not

cognized as an object of cognition '*aham*', i.e. 'I'. The *ātman* always reflects as an agent in the cognition but never as an object. One and the same cannot be both the subject and the object. All cognitions consist of a knower, an object and the knowledge. The cognition of these three together is called *Saṁvit* in the Prābhākara tradition. This *saṁvit* is self-revealing while *ātman* and the object are not self-revealing. They argue that if *ātman* is considered as self-revealing, then, one will have to have the cognition of *ātman* even during deep sleep. This does not happen. The Prābhākaras reject the Bhāṭṭa theory of the inference of cognition.

Śālikanātha rejects the views of Cārvākas and Buddhists in detail. For this purpose all orthodox schools put forward more or less the same arguments.

Buddhist's contention is that there is no cognizer apart from the cognition. Cognition itself plays the role of both the cognizer and the cognition. The cognitions are momentary. There is an endless series of momentory cognitions. The previous cognition gives rise to the next cognition and so on. Each cognition leaves an impression on the next cognition. This accounts for the continuity of personality and also accounts for the memory, recognition, desire, etc., on the basis of previous experience, effort to complete the act that was not completed and so on.

The orthodox systems argue that cognition, desire, etc., are the attributes. Therefore, there must be some substance of which these are attributes. Momentary cognitions cannot provide memory, recognition, etc., as stated above, since, these occur at a later moment, when the earlier moments have already ceased to exist. Momentary cognitions do not have the capacity to link the two or more momentary cognitions. The series of the momentary cognitions cannot be considered as either the same as the momentary cognitions or different. If it is considered as different, it amounts to the acceptance of an enduring entity and if it is the same as the momentory cognitions, then, the objections, already raised, stand.

Further, if cognition itself is considered as the cognizer, then 'A' cognition does something as cognizer and 'B' cognition gets its results. It also becomes difficult to work out personal identity of persons and also the difference among different experiences. Therefore, an enduring *ātman* has to be accepted to account for the above experiences.

The above arguments and counter arguments are based on different metaphysical views and they work out the subjective side and the objective side on the basis of their respective metaphysical views. The epistemological and psychological processes are worked out within the framework of the respective metaphysics. Therefore, these cross-roads can never meet. They talk about the same theme in two different metaphysical terminology. Each one is logical and consistent within the framework of his metaphysical view. However, they have to differ to agree on a common point of view.

Manas

Manas is considered as the tenth substance by the Bhāṭṭas. It is an instrument to provide joy, sorrow, etc., to *ātman*. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider it as atomic in size, while the Bhāṭṭas consider it all-pervasive. As it is pervasive, it need not move to be in contact with *ātman* or

senses. It functions within the body, as is the case with the *ātman*. It is considered as pervasive on two grounds: (i) It has no touch; (ii) It is not produced by any other. The first ground indicates that it has no limit while the second one indicates that it is eternal. It is pervasive like space and time but functions within the body only. It provides cognition about external objects in co-operation with external senses. That is why the pain in the foot is cognized as pain in that place only, though *manas* is everywhere in the body and has contact with *ātman* everywhere.

The Bhāṭṭas do accept conjunction between two pervasive objects. For instance, there is contact between *dik*, i.e. space, and *ākāśa*. The expression 'the *ākāśa* in the east and *ākāśa* in the west' indicate such a contact. This conjunction is eternal while conjunction between two limited objects is caused by motion in one of them.

Manas cannot be equated with other pervasive objects, since, it is an instrument for the cognition of these.

Śarīra and Indriyas, i.e. Body and Senses

Body and senses are not considered as separate categories. These are the products of elements as *Pṛthivī*, etc. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas work out four types of body arising from earth, water, light and air. The first one is the body of living beings on the earth while the bodies made of water, light and air are in respective other worlds. *Mānameyodaya*, a primer of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, mentions the body of living beings on the earth only. The question of the body in the other world is linked with the question whether deities have body or not. This question is discussed by Kumārila in *Tantravārttika* in detail.

Mānameyodaya mentions four types of earthly bodies, viz., (i) produced from womb, (ii) produced from egg, (iii) produced from sweat, (iv) produced from seed of trees and plants. The last one is not accepted by the Prābhākaras. Bhāṭṭas accept it on two grounds: (i) When water, fertilizer, etc., are properly provided, trees, plants, etc., grow, and when the same is not properly provided, these decay, (ii) By cutting and burning, etc., these are mutilated. Therefore, these have life. Consequently, these procreate through seeds.[20]

Both the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas and *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* have not developed the concept of subtle body as in Sāṁkhya and Vedānta.

Indriyas, i.e. Senses

Five external senses eye, ear, etc., are accepted by Mīmāṁsakas. These are the instruments for the cognition of external objects. We have the cognitions of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound. These require instruments to cognize. Eye, ear, etc., are envisaged as such instruments. An instrument that assists the cognition of a certain object, must be suitable to assist the cognition of that object. It is found that light assists the cognition of colour. Therefore, the eye, which assists in the cognition of colour, is envisaged as of the nature of *tejas*, i.e. light. It is located at the pupil of the eye. Water assists the cognition of taste. Therefore, the sense of taste is envisaged as related to water. It is located at the tip of the tongue. Sandal paste, which is an earthly object, assists the cognition of odour.

Therefore, the sense of odour is envisaged as related to earth. It is located at the nose. The breeze from a fan assists the cognition of touch. Therefore, the sense of touch is envisaged as related to air. It is located all over the body. These four senses are derived from the four elements, viz., light, water, earth and air on the basis of their function. However, in the case of *śabda, ākāśa* itself is considered as a sense to cognize the *śabda. Ākāśa* within the ear cavity is considered as *śrotrendriya.* It is not derived from *ākāśa* but it is *ākāśa* itself demarcated by the cavity of the ear. Since the other four senses are derived from elements, the sense for *śabda* also is assigned to an element. They could have assigned it to air, but this would have resulted in assigning two sense organs to one element. *Mānameyodaya* assigns the sense for *śabda* to *ākāśa.* However, earlier tradition assigns it to *dik,* i.e. space. It may be noted that *śabda* is not considered as a quality of *ākāśa* by the Bhāṭṭas. Therefore, this has resulted in assigning the sense for *śabda* which is a *dravya* to another *dravya.*

Manas is also considered as an *Indriya.* It is an internal sense organ. It assists the cognition of joy, sorrow, etc., the qualities of *ātman,* directly. It assists the cognition of external objects through the external sense organs.

These senses do not have manifest colour. Therefore, these are not perceptible. These have to be ascertained by *arthāpatti.*

These senses produce cognitions of objects concerned by actual contact with them. This point needs to be explained in the case of eye, as there are some difficulties in establishing direct contact of the eye with objects.[21]

(i) How can the eye with its limited rays, contact such large objects as mountain.

(ii) If the eye-rays can directly reach a distant object, the distance should not be felt and the gap between the eye and the distant object should not be cognized.

(iii) The eye-rays have to move and contact the objects. The movement has its own timing. Therefore, objects that are nearer and far cannot be cognized simultaneously. However, we do cognize them simultaneously. This has to be explained.

These difficulties are solved by explaining the procedure of contact between the eye and the object. The eye-rays proceed from the eye and get mixed with the external light. Though the external light is vast, the eye moderates it and utilizes only that much out of it which is required to perceive the object concerned.

For the purpose of contact between the senses and the objects and their attributes etc., Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas have elaborately worked out six types of relations. However, both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras have managed by three types only, viz., (i) *saṁyoga, tādātmya* and *samyukta tādātmya* are three steps according to the Bhāṭṭas (ii) *Saṁyoga, saṁyukta-samavāya, saṁyukta samaveta samavāya* according to the Prābhākaras.

III

UNIVERSALS i.e. *JĀTI,* PARTS AND WHOLE i.e. AVAYAVA AND *AVAYAVIN,* AND RELATIONS, i.e., *SAMBANDHA*

Mīmāṁsakas are realists and pluralists. They demarcate the subjective side and the objective side and explain the nature of the entities belonging to these two sides. On the

subjective side, the *ātman* is conceived as a centre of cognitive activities. To achieve the psychological unity and stability of cognitive activities the concept of a permanent *ātman*, i.e. self is developed. This ensures the unity and continuity not only during one life-time but even during the next birth. *Manas,* senses and body are provided as aids to the *ātman.*

On the objective side many substances, qualities and activities are worked out. These are many but are related to each other, are cooperative with each other, and fulfil the needs of the subjective side. To relate these and to ensure their cooperation to serve their purpose, certain other categories are formulated. Universal is one such important category. It brings together a class of entities to serve the epistemological and ontological purposes. The concept of parts and whole, though not a separate category, brings internal unity in an object. The relation, as such, is not considered as a category. However, a particular relation, viz., *Samavāya,* i.e. inherence, is considered as a category by Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākaras. There are many other relations of ontological, epistemological and linguistic nature. These serve the purpose of bringing unity and coordination among different entities. While formulating the concepts of these relations, the realists take care that these also have objective reality. These are not mere ideas or mental creations. Pluralists accept many categories and many entities under each category. They achieve the unity and coordination by means of universals, parts and whole position and the relations. Let us first study the nature and functions of universals.

Universals

Universals are called *jāti,* and *sāmānya* in Sanskrit. This expression is contrasted with the expression *vyakti,* i.e. particular. *Jāti* is conveyed by a common name and *vyakti* is conveyed by a proper name. For instance, the word 'Cow' conveys the whole class of cows while the words white cow or black cow convey the sense of a particular cow. The first conveys *jāti* and the second *vyakti.* Strictly speaking, the first conveys cowness, i.e. *gotva* while the second one a particular cow, i.e. *go vyakti.* The first is universal and the second is individual.

This cowness is found in all cows. It is perceived along with the cow. It enables to know the meaning of the word cow with reference to all cows. It enables even to infer certain features of cow in all cows, including the unseen cows. To comprehend the full implications of all these features of a universal, we have to examine the objections raised against the very concept of universal. The following are the main objections:[22]

Objections Against the Concept of the Universal

(1) (a) Is the universal identical with the particulars or different?

(b) (i) If it is identical, it has no existence of its own. This amounts to its negation.

(ii) If it is different, being different in case of each particular, it cannot be a common characteristic.

(2) Is the universal all-pervasive or present only in particulars?

(i) If it is all-pervasive, it will have to be found in all places beyond its particulars also.

(ii) If it is present only in particulars, it will have to be explained as to how and when it is introduced in a newly born cow. It cannot move from already existing particulars to new particulars as it has no capacity to move. It cannot also be said that it partly moves from one into another as it has no parts.

(3) While a particular perishes, the question is whether the universal perishes or not?

(i) If it does not perish, it will have to be found in that place even after the perishing of the particular.

(ii) It cannot be said that it perishes. In that case it must not be found in other particulars also. Further, it is supposed to be permanent.

The answers given to these objections by the Bhāṭṭas makes the Bhāṭṭa concept of universal clear.

(1) The Bhāṭṭas answer the first objection, viz., whether the universal is different from the particular or identical, by saying that it is both different and identical. When particulars are taken into account as particulars, it is different and when these are taken into account as belonging to a class, the universal is identical with them. The difference and identity between the same does not result in any contradiction, if the points of view are different.

(2) The answer to the second objection, viz., whether the universal is all-pervasive or present in particulars only, is that it is both all-pervasive and present in particulars.

Though it is all-pervasive it is observed only through particulars. Just as the *ātman*, though all-pervasive, undergoes experiences only in the body, even so the universal manifests only through particulars.

(3) The third objection, viz., whether when a particular perishes, the universal perishes or not, is answered by saying that only its manifestation through the particular ceases, since, the medium of its manifestation has ceased.

These answers not only remove the objections but also give an idea of the Bhāṭṭa's concept of the universal. According to the Bhāṭṭas the universal is in all particulars, has *tādātmya* relation with the respective particulars, is permanent in the sense, it does not cease to exist when one or more particulars perish and it is perceived.

The expression *ākṛti* also conveys the universal according to the Bhāṭṭas. The earlier Nyāya works used to distinguish between *ākṛti* and *jāti*. But later writers dropped the term *ākṛti* and use *jāti* only. When many particulars are comprehended as a group or class, the concept of *sāmānya* arises. All objects are comprehended in two ways: (i) as individuals and as distinct from other individuals; (ii) a group with a continuing common characteristic. Both the aspects are true. There is no common characteristic without particulars and there are no particulars without a common characteristic, unless they are single entities.

The relation between the universal and particular is a natural relation. It is *tādātmya* relation, i.e. the relation of identity and difference. Universal has no parts and it is pervasive. Therefore, it is not limited to one particular or each particular. These observations make the nature of universal clearer.

Kumārila rejects the view that *avayava saṁsthāna*, i.e., arrangements of constituent parts in a certain way, is universal. Such an arrangement is different in different particulars and therefore, it cannot be considered as universal. He also rejects the view that the similarity is universal. *Avayava saṁsthāna* and *sādṛśya* help to cognize the universal. These are only *upalakṣaṇas* i.e., indicators. These are not universals.

Prābhākara's Concept of Universal

The Prābhākaras consider the universal as distinct from the particulars. It is found in them but it is not identical with them. The relation between the universal and particular is *samavāya*, i.e. inherence, but not *tādātmya*. When the first member of a class is observed, the universal is cognized. But its continuing nature is realized only when the second or more particulars of the class are cognized. Continuity is an attribute of the universal. An object may be cognized without its attribute when that attribute needs a *sahakārin* to be cognized. *Pūrvākāra parāmarśa*, i.e., recapitulation of earlier the form acts as a *sahakārin* to cognize the continuity. This is available only in the cognition of the second member onwards.

Some of the objections that were raised while discussing the Bhāṭṭa's concept of universal are also raised by Śālikanātha and answered differently on the basis of *samavāya* relation between universal and particular instead of the *tādātmya*. The Bhāṭṭa's answers were based on *tādātmya* relation. We may note the following objections:

(1) Whether the universal is eternal or produced?

If it is eternal, the questions where it was before the production of the particular and how it came to be the particular, have to be explained. It cannot remain in *ākāśa*, since, the particulars only are its locus. Nor can it move into the newly produced particular, since, it has no capacity to move.

(2) Whether the universal is identical with particulars or distinct?

It cannot be considered as identical, because, in that case, it has to arise and perish along with the particular. This will destroy its very nature of being one and eternal.

If it is different, it should have been possible to cognize the universal without cognizing the particular. If the two were to be cognized together, then, the relation of *ādhāra adheyābhāva* should have been comprehended. However, on seeing a cow, nobody will say he is comprehending cowness in cow.

(3) Further, If the universal is located in particulars, the question again arises whether it is located in all particulars in a pervasive manner, i.e., *vyāsajyavṛtti* or it is located in each particular separately. It cannot be stated that it is located in a pervasive manner as it cannot occupy the past and future particulars. It cannot also be stated that it is located in each particular separately. In this case, when it is present in one particular., it cannot be present in another, unless many universals of the same type are envisaged to occupy each particular separately.

Śāikanātha answers these objections as follows:

(1) Universal is eternal and all-pervasive. It is connected with the particular by the *samavāya* relation. *Samavāya* is not eternal. Out of the very *samavāyikāraṇa* from which the

particular arises the *samavya* of universal with it also arises. When the particular perishes, the *samavāya* of universal with it is withdrawn. It is not the case of the universal moving in and moving out of the particular but a case of the *samavāya* relation taking place between the universal and the particular. The movement of the both parties is required to relate in the case of *saṁyoga*, i.e., conjunction but not in the case of *samavāya*.

(2) The universal is distinct from the particular. However, it is always cognized along with the particular. Universal is an attribute. An attribute cannot be cognized without the cognition of the entity of which it is an attribute. Both the universal and the particular are cognized simultaneously. The cognition of the universal is included in the cognition of the particular. Hence, the contingency of cognition of cowness as present in a cow involving the notion 'here it is', i.e., '*iha pratyaya*', does not arise.

(3) The universal is all-pervasive. Questions whether it is in all particulars in a pervasive manner or in each particular in its entirety, are not relevant. It is present where and when it is connected with *samavāya* and it is cognized where and when it is present.

These answers make the Prābhākara's concept of universal clear. An important difference between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras is that the Bhāṭṭas consider it as both different and non-different and as connected with particulars by *tādātmya* relation while the Prābhākaras consider it as distinct and connect it with particulars by *samavāya* relation. However, both of them consider that it has an objective reality. It is not merely conceptual or nominal.

The universal also plays the role of relation for comprehending the *vyāpti* relation and the relation between the word and the meaning. The former role is explicitly stated by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas by accepting *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*.

Avayava and Avayavin, i.e., Constituent Parts and the whole

The concept of constituent parts and the whole is as much important to the realists as the universal and particular. In fact, if a whole as distinct from the parts is not established, there will be no need of the universal. Therefore, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsakas discuss this problem. This problem has arisen because the Buddhists deny the existence of a whole apart from a series of momentary *svalakṣaṇas* that are in a continuous flux. The arguments against an enduring whole, i.e., *avayavin*, are summarized by Śālikanātha in *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā* and replied. We may notice some important arguments:[23]

(1) *Paramāṇus* are stated as basic units of a concrete substance and are supposed to lead to the formation of gross objects by the process of formation of *dvyaṇuka, tryaṇuka*, etc.

However, each *paramāṇu* by itself cannot give rise to a gross object. More than one *paramāṇu* have to join by the relation of conjunction so as to lead to the formation of a gross object. This is not possible for two reasons:

(i) *Paramāṇus* have no sides to join.

(ii) The conjunction by which two or more *paramāṇus* are expected to be conjuncted, if inheres in each *paramāṇu* separately, cannot lead to the formation of a whole. The conjunction cannot be stated as inhering in more than one, since each one is a unit by itself and the very idea of another or more is not valid.

Therefore, no conjunction is possible. Consequently, the formation of *dvyaṇuka, tryaṇuka,* etc., leading to the formation of a gross whole is not possible.

Further, even if the formation of a whole, i.e. *avayavin,* is granted, the problem as to how this whole which is constituted of many constituents is located in them, has to be solved. It cannot be stated either as located in each constituent separately or in all constituents in a pervasive manner i.e. *vyāsajyavṛtti.*

(a) If it is stated as located in each constituent separately, the following difficulties will arise.

   (i) If the whole is located in each constituent separately, it would be observed separately in each constituent resulting in the observation of as many wholes as there are constituents.

   (ii) When motion takes place in one constituent, the whole also should be observed as moving. When a colour is given to one constituent, the whole should be observed with that colour.

At the same time, since the other constituents have neither motion nor colour, the whole would be observed as motionless and colourless. This means that one and the same will have motion and the absence of motion, colour and the absence of colour. This is an absurd position.

(b) If it is stated that the whole is located in its constituents in a pervasive manner, the following difficulties will arise.

   (i) To pervade all its constituent parts, the whole will have to have another set of parts apart from its constituent parts, so that each part can occupy a constituent part. No such parts, in addition to the constituent parts, can be envisaged.

(c) The problem whether the whole is different from the constituent parts or identical with them has also to be faced.

   (i) If the whole and the parts are different from each other, one should be observed without the other, at least some time. The objects that are different are not always comprehended together. The whole is never comprehended without comprehending the parts. Therefore, the two cannot be considered as different.

   (ii) If the two are considered as identical, it amounts to eliminate one of them. Naturally, since, the parts are observed, the idea of the whole has to be abandoned.

Pointing to the difficulties in the acceptance of a separate whole apart from parts, as stated above, the Buddhist presents his view to account for the common notion of a whole, i.e. the gross object.

The *paramāṇus,* i.e. *svalakṣaṇas* are in continuous flux. These are observed in continuity. This projects a mental image of a gross object. This may be compared to the idea of a forest on seeing a large group of trees.

Śālikanātha answers the Buddhists objection as follows:

(i) The constituent parts do lead to the formation of the whole joined by the relation of conjuction. The constituent parts are *samavāyikāraṇa* and the conjunction is

asamavāyikāraṇa. Assisted by the *asamavāyikāraṇa samavāyikāraṇas* do produce the effect, i.e. *avayavin*, i.e. the whole.

(ii) The conjunction, though one, is located in many. It is the very nature of the conjunction to be in more than one. Though each *paramāṇu* is single and a unit by itself, it can be the locus of conjunction along with another *paramāṇu* and lead to the formation of *dvyaṇuka*, etc.

(iii) As regards the location of the *avayavin*, the position is that it is spread over all *avayavas*. It need not have another set of *avayavas* to ocupy its *avayavas*. The very *avayavas* that produce the *avayavin* with the aid of conjunction also serve the purpose of locus. The *avayavas* are *samavāyikāraṇa*. These produce the *avayavin* and also serve as the locus of it.

(iv) A question is raised whether the *avayavin* is cognized only when all *avayavas* are cognized or even when one *avayava* is cognized. This is answered by stating that it is cognized when sufficient number of *avayavas* are cognized. Neither the cognition of only one *avayava* is sufficient nor that of all *avayavas* is necesary. What constitutes sufficient number for this purpose, has to be ascertained by experience. Though the *avayavas* and *avayavin* are different, these are comprehended together, since, these have the relation of cause and effect.

The Bhāṭṭa view in respect of parts and whole is briefly stated by Pārthasārathi Miśra while discussing the concept of *jāti*. The Bhāṭṭas accept *bheda-abheda*, i.e. difference in identity between *avayava* and *avayavin*. The relation is *tādātmya*. It is not *samavāya*, as contended by the Vaiśeṣikas and Prābhākaras. The whole is a certain set up of parts. It is not a separate substance. As *avayavas*, these are distinct and many, and as *avayavin* these are one. The qualities of these two are not different. The qualities of *avayavas* will be the qualities of the *avayavin* when it is formed. The *avayavin* inheres in the *avayavas* in a pervasive manner.

Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras are equally interested in establishing the *avayavin*, i.e., the whole. However, one envisages *bheda-abheda* between parts and whole while the other *bheda*, Thus, they present their cases differently.

The Relation

In Indian philosophy, relation, as such, is not considered as a separate category. However, one of the relations, viz., *samavāya* is considered as a separate category by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas and Prābhākaras. Another relation, viz., *saṁyoga*, i.e., conjunction, is considered as a quality by them. The Sāṁkhyas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas consider *tādātmya* as a relation in the place of *samavāya*. This relation is considered as *vastusvarūpa*. There are many other relations that are described and utilized to explain the ontological, epistemological, and linguistic functions. All these relations are broadly brought into two groups. viz., (i) *vṛtti niyāmaka*, i.e. relations that lead to the physical contact of the two relata, (ii) *vṛttyaniyāmaka*, i.e. relations that do not lead to the physical contact. The three relations stated above, viz., *saṁyoga, samavāya* and *tādātmya* are *vṛttiniyāmaka* relations.

Buddhists do not accept *saṁyoga,* i.e. conjunction, since, each *kṣaṇa,* i.e., *svalakṣaṇa,* is a unit by itself and is not related with any other *kṣaṇa.* Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas define it as that which joins the two that were not joined earlier: *aprāpti pūrvikā prāptih samyogaḥ.* This is brought about in two ways: (i) By the motion in one or both the relata; (ii) By the conjunction of the *avayava* with the *avayavin.* The latter is called *saṁyogaja-saṁyoga,* i.e. a conjunction leading to another conjunction. For instance, by the conjunction between the hand and the book arises the conjunction between the body and the book. This is due to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas idea of difference between the *avayava* and the *avayavin.* The conjunction is always between two substances. However, there is no conjunction between two *vibhus,* i.e. all-pervasive substances. For instance, there is no *saṁyoga* between *ātman* and *ākāśa.* Another special feature of *saṁyoga* is that it is *avyāpya vṛtti,* i.e. it does not occupy the whole of the substance in which it is found. For instance, the contact between the monkey and the tree is only upon the tree and not at its root. This means that the tree has both the conjunction with the monkey and its absence.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold the view that there is *saṁyoga* between two *vibhus* also. It is *nitya-saṁyoga,* i.e., permanent conjunction. Therefore, the definition given by Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas holds good only in the case of *anitya saṁyoga.* Some hold the view that the restriction that *saṁyoga* is only between substances is not necessary. Some hold that the *saṁyogas* found in *pratiyogin* and *anuyogin* are distinct. (M.R.S. p.254)

The relation of *saṁyoga* serves many purposes, viz., (i) By the conjuction of *paramāṇus, dyaṇuka, tryaṇuka,* etc., are formed and the whole *avayavi dravya* is formed, by the conjunction of water and seeds, etc., the sprout develops. In this way *saṁyoga* plays a big role in the process of creation. (ii) By the conjuntion between senses and objects the cognition is produced. This is the epistemological role of conjuction. (iii) The theological concept of purity is also sustained by the absence of conjunction with impure objects and the conjunction with pure objects.[24]

Samavāya relation is an ontological relation. This relation is found between the entities that are distinguishable but not separable. For instance, the universal and particular are distinguishable but not separable. The substance and qualities are distinguishable but not separable until one of them is destroyed. Same is the case with an object and the motion, the constituent parts and the whole. Such pairs are designated as *ayuta siddha.*

In Indian philosophy, two theories of causation, viz., *pariṇāmavāda* and *ārambhavāda* are prevalent. The Sāṁkhyas go by *pariṇāmavāda* and the Vaiśeṣikas by *ārambhavāda.* The former have conceived the *tādātmya* as the relation between the cause and effect while the latter have conceived *samavāya* as the relation. The term used for the cause by the former is *upādāna kāraṇa* while latter uses the term *samavāyikāraṇa.*

As per the *pariṇāma* theory of causation, the cause and the effect are not different. Therefore, *tādātmya* is conceived as their relation. The same holds good between the universal and particular, substance and qualities. This *tādātmya* relation involves both difference and identity, i.e. *bheda-abheda* from different points of view. As per the *ārambha* theory, the cause and effect are different. Hence, a different relation has to be conceived to relate them. *Samavāya,* i.e., inherence, is conceived as such a relation. The effect is inherent in the cause. Therefore, the cause is designated as *samavāyikāraṇa.* Similarly,

substance and qualities etc., that are *ayutasiddhas* are also distinct from each other. Hence, these also require a relation. Therefore, the scope of *samavāya* is extended to these also. This *samavāya* is considered as permanent. It is eternal. Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas give utmost importance to brevity. Therefore, instead of conceiving a *samavāya* separately in each case and as generated on each occasion, they have conceived only one *samavāya* and that too as eternal.

Those, who oppose the concept of *samavāya*, raise the question whether *samavāya* is related with the two relata or not? If it is not related, then, it cannot serve its purpose of relating the two relata viz, *kāraṇa-kārya, avayava-avayavin* etc. If it is related, what is the relation by which it is related. If that is another *samavāya*, that requires one more *samavāya* to relate it. This leads to infinite regress.

This criticism is not justified. The very purpose, for which *samavāya* is conceived, is to relate *avayava-avayavin*, that is, the *ayutasiddha* pairs. Therefore, it does not require another relation to relate it with its relata. Its capacity to relate the two relata may be stated as *dharmigrāhaka māna siddha*, i.e., it is established by the very *pramāṇa* by which *samavāya* is established. That is why it is conceived as a separate category. In the case of *saṁyoga*, as it is a quality, it requires a relation to relate it with its relata. It is related by *samavāya*.

The Prābhākaras conceive *samavāya* as *anitya* and many. In other respects, they agree with the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas.

The relation *samavāya* serves the ontological purpose of producing the effect from the cause and also holding the two together. It also brings the unity between the substance and qualities, universal and particular, etc.

It also serves the epistemological purpose of working as a contact between the senses and the qualities through the object to which these qualities belong. In the case of *saṁyoga* it has to be developed between the senses and the object. However, in the case of *samavāya*, it is a part of the very structure of the object. It is an ontological relation that is utilized for epistemological purpose. Those who do not accept *samavāya*, manage these functions by *tādātmya* relation. The Bhāṭṭa school of *Mīmāṁsā* goes by *tādātmya* while the Prābhākaras go by *samavāya*.

Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta has conceived the relation of *apṛthaksiddhi* as a substitute for *samavāya*. The expression *pṛthaksiddhi* refers to separate functioning in respect of *utpatti*, i.e. origination, *sthiti* i.e. existence and *jñāpti* i.e. cognition. An entity which does not function separately from another entity in these three respects has *apṛthaksiddhi* relation with that entity. This relation is basically conceived to explain the relation between the *śarīrin*, i.e. *brahman* and *śarīra*, i.e. the *jīva* and *jagat*. It is utilized in other areas also. It is an ontological relation. It is utilized to serve the purpose of *samavāya* and *tādātmya*.

Besides these ontological relations which come under the category *vṛttiniyāmaka*, a number of other relations also are worked out in Indian philosophy. Some of these are in the area of cognition, some are linguistic and some are correlative. These relations are minutely worked out in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system. The others broadly follow the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika model with certain changes to suit their respective metaphysical views. The gap between the idealist view and the realist view is maintained all along.

Viṣayatā is a relation in the area of cognition. It has three dimensions: (i) *viśeṣyatā,* (ii) *viśeṣaṇatā/prakāratā,* (iii) *saṁsargatā.*

Pratiyogitā and *anuyogitā* relations indicate the correlative nature of the relata. These can be worked out in any area where the relata are correlatives. E.g. the two relata of *sādṛśya,* i.e. similarity, and *bheda,* i.e. difference *kāryakāraṇa bhāva,* i.e. *kāraṇatā* and *kāryatā, ādhāra-ādheyabhāva,* i.e. *ādhāratā-ādheyatā,* and so on. These are more of the nature of the description of the status and the role of the relata than the actual relation. To attain this status, these will have to have an ontological or epistemological relation as their basis.

Nirūpya-nirūpakata also indicates the role. *Avacchedakatā* specifies the characteristic.

The nature of *kāraṇatā* and *kāryatā* depends upon the the theory of causation of the respective schools, viz., *satkāryavāda, asatkāryavāda, sad-asat kāryavāda, pratītya samutpāda vāda, adhyāsa vāda* and so on.

Though relation is not given the status of a separate category in Indian philosophy, different types of relations are worked out in detail in the areas of ontology, epistemology and linguistics to bring a unity and cooperation among different categories and the objects under these categories. It is interesting to note that the two schools of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* adopt two different relations, viz., *tādātmya* and *samavāya* in the area of ontology. *Tādātmya* is more suitable for the *pariṇāma* theory of causation and *samavāya* for the *ārambhavāda.* Mīmāṁsakas are not interested in any particular theory of causation as they hold the view that there is no creation or destruction of the world.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. S.B.—*Śabara bhāṣya*—Pune: Ānandāśrama
2. M.M.—*Mānameyodaya*—Adyar Library Series.
3. MRS—*Mānameya śloka vārttika rahasya*—Mysore: Govt. Press, 1925.
4. Pr.P.—*Prakaraṇa pañcikā*—Banaras Hindu University Darśana series.
5. NS—*Nyāyasiddhi*—Commentary on Prakaraṇa pañcikā.
6. S.M.—Siddhantā Muktavlī—Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press.

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6. S.B. 1-1-6 to 23 Pr.P. 353 M.M. P.222 MRS.194
7. M.M. P.244
8. M.M. P.258
9. M.M. P.263, P.266
10. M.M. P.282
11. MRS P.87
12. MRS P.175
13. M.M. P.293 Pr.P. P.90
14. M.M. P.289 P.299

15. M.M. P.247
16. S.B. P.41, PP. 60-71 Pr.P. P.316
17. MRS P.125
18. S.M. P.205
19. M.M. P.195 MRS P.132, P.142
20. M.M. P.154
21. Pr.P. P.129
22. Pr.P. P.64 M.M. P.233 MRS P.236
23. Pr.P. P.67, 77
24. MRS. P.254

CHAPTER 6

Semantics of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

There is a general impression that grammar aided with etymology and lexican is concerned with the language. However, it is concerned only with the structure of the language. It deals primarily with morphology and syntax. It deals with semantics in a limited way. The area of semantics is deeply probed by philosophy, psychology, anthropology and other human sciences that deal with the mind. It is the behaviour of the mind that is reflected in the behaviour of language. Mīmāṁsā philosophy that gives utmost importance to *Śabdapramāṇa* is vitaly concerned with language. It studies all aspects concerning the import of language. Its studies belong to a period of our intellectual history when human sciences like psychology, sociology were not bifurcated from philosophy. Therefore, its handling of the problems of language involves the approach of these disciplines also unconsciously. Mīmāṁsā reveals remarkable insight on these aspects.

In respect of the study of language Mīmāṁsā raises some interesting questions:

(i) Whether the language of the day-to-day discourse be taken as standard for the purpose of study or the scholastic language.

(ii) What is the status of the vocabulary that is assimilated from the tribal languages into the sophisticated language.

(iii) What is the status of corrupt forms vis-á-vis standard forms.

Mīmāṁsā has a very practical and liberal view on these questions:

(i) The language of the day-to-day discourse be taken as standard for the study of the nature and behaviour of language but not the scholastic language.

(ii) The vocabulary assimilated from tribal and other sub-culture languages be taken in the same sense in which these were used by them.

(iii) The corrupt forms do not form the genuine part of language.

The study of language has to cover the issues:

(i) What is the nature of the word?

(ii) What is the nature of the relation between the word and meaning?

(iii) What constitutes a sentence?

(iv) How to determine the purport of a passage or discourse? What is the import of scriptural injuction?

(v) What are the types of injunctions?

(vi) What is the import of negetive statements?

These are main issues, though there are good many related issues. Mīmāṁsā has distinct views on all these issues and these are discussed thoroughly in it. Nyāya and

Vyākaraṇa also discuss these issues. The modern semantics also is considerably developed. There is full scope for interdisciplinary approach in this area.

Pūrvamīmāṁsā considers language as autonomous at three levels. These are: (i) the relation between the word and the meaning, (ii) meaning of sentence, (iii) the purport of a passage or discourse.

The relation between word and meaning is natural. It is not fixed by any human agency or God. When a meaningful expression is expressed, its meaning is also expressed. It is comprehended through elders' conversation from generation to generation. No generation fixes it.

I

THE PROCESS OF LEARNING THE LANGUAGE

The language is learnt by children by observing the elder's conversation. When a person asks a younger one, "Chaitra bring the cow", the latter, Chaitra, brings it. The boy standing nearby listens to the statement, observes the action of bringing the cow, and comprehends that this statement conveys this activity. He is yet to learn as to which word conveyed which item of the activity. The same boy listens to another statement, "Chaitra bring the horse", and observes the activity of bringing the horse. From this statement he comprehends that the animal brought is horse. and the animal stated in the earlier statement is cow. Then on another occasion he listens to the statement, "take away the cow" and he comprehends that the verb 'take away' conveys the action of taking away; he also comprehends that the verb 'bring' in the earlier statement conveyed the action of bringing.

In these ways the boy goes on comprehending the sentence meanings and word meanings one after the other and makes progress in learning the language.

This process of learning the language has been going on through generations. The earliest or first generation cannot be identified. Probably it is as old as the very evolution of the human race and making of the habit of speech on the part of man. No individual or no particular generation fixed the meaning of a given word or a given sentence. Each individual and each generation inherited it from the previous generation. Articulation of words, conveying of meaning by words and the use of the same in sentences must have developed over several generations. It is difficult to fix any stage of this development as the starting point. Therefore, the trio of word, meaning, and their relation is stated to be *nitya* in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*. The expression *nitya* has two implications, viz., (i) *anādi*, i.e. the beginning of these cannot be traced, (ii) *sahaja*, i.e. emerging together. To indicate this *nityatva*, Jaimini uses an interesting expression, viz., *autpattika*. This expression conveys that the word and its meaning arise together. It is not brought about or fixed by any outside agency.

It is not fixed by any human agency later by way of fixing a *saṅketa* or in any other manner. It is natural.[1]

The process of the evolution of language can be ascertained by a study of the acquiring of language skill by children. The child has a natural capacity to speak. However, it starts

with inarticulated sounds and gesticulation. It slowly starts articulating the sounds into clearer and clearer words and syllables on the model of the pronounciation of the parents and other inmates at home. It learns the language through the elder's conversation as described above. We can envisage similar process for the evolution of the language. At early stages, probably, each individual had his own language. Through interaction with the members of the family he must have evolved a common language at family level. In due course, when the social interaction would have developed, the language must have developed at the social level. On development the social level also must have had regional and social variations. At all these levels, language is primarly developed through conversation generation after generation. This validates the *Mīmāṁsā* theory of learning the language through elder's conversation and the theory of natural relation among word, meaning and their relation. Words convey their meaning in a natural way. However, one has to get acquainted with it through elder's conversation. *Vācaka. śakti,* i.e. denotative power of the words is natural but *śakti graha,* i.e. comprehension of this denotative power of the words is provided by elders' conversations. The sweetness of a sweet object is natural but the comprehension of it is provided by the tongue.

The theory of learning the language by elder's conversation is very vital to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*. It lays the foundation for the *Mīmāṁsā* doctrine of the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda. It also supports the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of Prābhākaras, since the language is learnt initially through sentences and then only word meanings are comprehended by *avāpa* and *udvāpa,* i.e. dropping a word and substituting another word. It makes the language autonomous at the level of word and sentence both. It gives more importance to day-to-day conversational language than to the scholastic language. In fact, it puts the Vedic language at par with the day-to-day language so far as the comprehension of the language is concerned.

The very opening remark of *Śābara bhāṣya, 'loke yeṣu artheṣu prasiddhāni padāni sati sambhave tadarthāni eva sūtreṣu iti avagantavyam'*, which means that the words employed in the *sūtras* be taken in the same sense in which these are used in the day-to-day language. This remark not only applies to *sūtras* but also to the words employed in the Veda. The *sūtras* are meant to interpret the Veda. Therefore, this remark applies to the words of the Veda also.[2] Śabara makes it clearer in another place by his remark, '*śabdānām arthajñāne laukikaḥ prayogaḥ abhyupāyaḥ*', which means that the meaning of the words is comprehended from the day-to-day usage.[3] Under the *sūtra, 'prayoga codanābhāvāt arthaikatvam avibhāgāt'*[4], Jaimini himself makes it clear that the Vedic words are the same as the *laukika* words and they have the same sense. Otherwise, the comprehension of the very Vedic injunction becomes difficult. The elder's conversation helps to comprehend the meaning of the *laukika* words. If Vedic words are the same as these, their meaning is easily comprehended. This enables one to implement the injunction. There is no other way to comprehend the meaning of Vedic words. In this way, the theory that the elders' conversation is the means for comprehending the language, forms the foundation to comprehend the meaning of the Veda and implement Vedic injunctions. Keeping this in mind, Jaimini affirms this position again under the *sūtra 'śabdārthaścāpi lokavat'*[5], "The meaning of words also is to be determined as per their usage among people."

II

THE FORMATION AND THE NATURE OF THE WORD

Vedic injunctions are in the form of sentences. The sentence consists of words. The word meanings appropriately associated form the sentence meaning. Therefore, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* discusses the nature of the word and the word meaning. The nature of the word is explained as 'a group of syllables arranged in a certain order and yielding a meaning'. Here, two questions arise. According to Mīmāṁsakas, if the syllables are eternal and all-pervasive, how can these be arranged in an order? This is answered by pointing out that these eternal syllables get manifested in the cavity of the ear. The order is the order of their manifestation. The next question is, since, the presence of the manifsted syllables is momentary, how can a group of these be formed and the unit of syllables designated as word be cognized. This question is answered by pointing out that each syllable when manifested, leaves a *saṁskāra,* i.e. impression, in the mind of the listener and the last syllable together with the impressions of the earlier ones gives the cognition of the word.

To avoid these difficulties, *vyākaraṇa* envisaged the concept of *sphoṭa.* Mīmāṁsa does not accept this concept. According to Nyāya, the syllables are not eternal. These are produced by the efforts of the vocal organs and are not manifested. In other respects, their explanation of the nature of words is the same as that of Mīmāṁsā.

III

THE NATURE OF WORD MEANING

The nature of the meaning of the word is differently explained by Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya.

Nyāya holds the view that *vyakti,* i.e. the object referred to by the word, is its meaning while the Mīmāṁsā holds the view that *ākṛti* or *jāti,* i.e. the universal, i.e. the common characteristic the object shares with the other objects of the same group, is the meaning of the word.

For instance, the word 'cow' conveys the sense of the object cow according to Nyāya, while its characteristic 'cowness' is conveyed by the word 'cow' according to Mīmāṁsā.

Jaimini raises this question whether *ākṛti* is the meaning of the word or *vyakti* in *ākṛtyādhikaraṇa.*[6] Ordinarily the word *ākṛti* is understood in the sense of *avayava saṁsthāna,* i.e. a particular arrangement of the parts of an object but it is used here in the sense of universal, i.e. common characteristic. Śabara makes it clear by explaining it as *'dravyaguṇa karmaṇām sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ',* i.e. the common characteristic found in substances, qualities and actions.

Pūrvapakṣin argues that *vyakti* has to be taken as the meaning of the word. He puts forward the following arguments:

(i) Vedic injunction enjoins offering of a *paśu*, acts like sprinkling water on rice. These cannot be performed on the *ākṛti*, i.e. the universal *paśutva*, *vrīhitva*, etc. These can be acted upon only on the *vyakti* (the object). Therefore, *vyakti* has to be taken as the meaning.

(ii) There are certain injunctions such as 'six cows be given', 'twelve cows be given', 'twenty-four cows be given'. These numbers cannot be of *ākṛti*, nor can so many *ākṛti* of cows be given. *Ākṛti* is one in all.

(iii) It is stated that if a *paśu* duly taken for the sacrifice escapes, another has to be taken. Now, if *ākṛti* is the meaning, there is no other *akṛti* to replace the first.

These arguments are based on the assumption that when *ākṛti* is taken as the meaning, *vyakti* is not conveyed in any way. However, *ākṛti* and *vyakti* are invariably associated. When two items are invariably associated with each other, the cognition of one provides the cognition of the other.

It is our experience that when a word is heard, the *vyakti* is also comprehended. Now, the question that is to be settled is, whether the *vyakti* is comprehended from the word or through the *ākṛti* conveyed by the word. This can be settled by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, i.e. positive and negetive verifications. A person who cognizes *ākṛti* even without words, cognizes *vyakti* also. On the other hand, a person who hears the word but is unable to recall the *ākṛti* conveyed by it, will not be able cognize the *vyakti*. This clearly reveals that the word does not convey the *vyakti* but it is *ākṛti* conveyed by the word which helps to cognize the *vyakti* as per the maxim 'when an item related with another is cognized, it provides the cognition of the other also'. It cannot be suggested to take *vyakti viśiṣṭa ākṛti* as the meaning. This will prevent one from using the same word with reference to another *vyakti*, since that is not conveyed by this word. The driving point of this discussion is that *ākṛti* is the meaning of the word and *vyakti* is conveyed because of its association with *ākṛti* but not as the meaning of the word. Since *vyakti* is also conveyed, the objections raised by *pūrvapakṣin* do not hold the ground. Taking *ākṛti* as the meaning of the word does not come in the way of implementing the Vedic injunctions such as '*paśum ālabheta*', '*vrīhīn prokṣati*', etc., since *vyakti* is also conveyed as associated with these.

The Nyāya holds the view that the word conveys *vyakti* qualified by *jāti*. They argue that the *vyakti* has to be conveyed by the word by the power of denotation only. It should not be considered as conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* or *ākṣepa*. The *lakṣaṇā* has to be resorted only when there is some ground for it. When *vyakti* can be included in the scope of the meaning of the word in a natural way, there is no reason to exclude it. The only objection for the inclusion of *vyakti* in the scope of the meaning of the word is that the word which conveys a particular *vyakti*, cannot be used with reference to other *vyaktis*. A separate word has to be thought of for each *vyakti*. There are innumerable other *vyaktis* of the same class. Hence, innumerable words have to be envisaged. These objections are technically designated as *vyabhicāra* and *ānantya*. These are answered by Nyāya by pointing out that a word is capable of conveying the sense of all the members of the class on the basis that these belong to that class. That is why the meaning is stated as that of *vyakti* qualified by the *jāti*.[7]

It should be noted here that according to Nyāya, *jāti* and *vyakti* are distinct, while according to Mimāṁsā, these have *tādātmya* relation. Therefore, Nyāya has to envisage the

denotation of both *vyakti* and *jāti* while for Mimāṁsā it is sufficient if one of them is denotated. The other is also cognized because of *tādātmya* between the two.

Vyākaraṇa considers both *vyakti* and *jāti* as the meaning. Śabara quotes the view of *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya* in this respect. It is stated in *Mahābhāṣya* that *ākṛti* may be conveyed as an adjective and *vyakti* as a substantive. *Jāti* is not conveyed without *vyakti* and *vyakti* is not conveyed without *jāti*. Therefore, both have to be taken as conveyed by the word. One of them may be taken as the main and the other as the subordinate depending upon the context of the use. Quoting this view, Śabara remarks that there is no need to include the *vyakti* in the scope of the meaning of a word since it is cognized as invariably associated with the *jāti* not, however, as the meaning of the word.

Here, Mīmāṁsakas have to face a problem. If *vyakti* is not conveyed as the meaning, syntactical connection between the *prātipādika* and *pratyaya* becomes difficult to establish This is overcome by accepting *nirūḍhalakṣaṇā*.

From the above discussion emerge the following points:

(i) Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya agree that *jāti*, i.e. universal, is conveyed by the word as its meaning.

(ii) Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya hold that the *vyakti* also should be included in the scope of the meaning while Mīmāṁsā thinks that it need not be included in the scope of meaning as it is otherwise comprehended. They go by the maxim *ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*, i.e. the points comprehended by some other *pramāṇa* are not to be included in the scope of the meaning of the word.

Modern Theories of Meaning

In respect of the meaning of a word, there are some modern theories, namely, (i) Referential theory, (ii) Ideational theory, (iii) Behavioural theory.

When we use the words like 'book', 'courage', 'run', 'Mr.X', we are referring to an object, a quality, an action, and the name of a person. The respective words stand for the respective items. This is known as referential theory. Nobody knows who has fixed these relations. It is handed over from generation to generation.

All speech groups have not fixed the same word (sound unit) for the same item. However, within a speech group, this relation is faithfully followed.

This referential theory has some difficulty. Whether the word 'book' conveys a particular book or a class of books. If a particular book is referred to, we need another word for another book, a third word for a third book and so on. On the other hand, if a class of books is conveyed by the word book, the statement 'bring the book' cannot be implemented since the class of books cannot be brought. These difficulties are the same as raised against the *vyakti śakti* theory and *jāti śakti* theory discussed in Indian traditions.

To avoid this difficulty, modern scholars have introduced the ideational theory. According to this theory, the word 'book' conveys the idea of the book. Through this idea one can grasp the particular book as well as a class of books. The ideational theory also has its own difficulty. Can we separate the idea and the word so as to treat one as the

meaning of the other? If the idea is a mental image of a particular book or a class of books, the difficulties pointed out in the referential theory will arise here again.

The *Mīmāṁsā* theory of meaning is closer to the referential theory of meaning. But, to solve the difficulties raised against it, the Ideational theory is not resorted to. This is because, the concept of 'idea' is not found in Indian philosophy.

Mīmāṁsā holds the view that the word 'book' conveys the sense of the class of books, but in actual practice it boils down to a particular book. The class characteristic is invariably associated with the particular objects of the class. As such, conveying the class results in conveying the particular object also. Thus, there is no difficulty in implementing the statement 'bring the book.'

It is interesting to find out that the theories recently formulated by modern scholars were formulated and discussed in Indian tradition long back.

The behavioural theory of meaning is a recent formulation after the advent of psychology. According to this theory, the stimuli or the response the word evokes is the meaning of the word. This theory seems to have been adopted by Mīmāṁsā in respect of the meaning of the injunctive suffix. The injunctive suffix stimulates the person addressed by it to underake the activity. The import of an injunctive suffix is stated to be *preraṇā*, i.e., prompting one to undertake an activity and to generate initiative. Probably such a concept underlies the behavioural theory.

IV

5. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE WORD AND THE MEANING

While explaining the process of learning the language, it was stated that the relation between the word and meaning is *nitya*. It is not brought about by any human or divine agency. Śabara elaborates this point and brings out the *apauruṣeyatva* nature of this relation.

The relation between the word and the meaning is stated to be *pratyāyak* and *pratyāyya*, i.e. that which makes it known and that which is made known. If such a relation is natural, one should be able to cognize the meaning at the very first use of the word. This does not happen. Even in the course of elders' conversation, the boy is able to comprehend the meaning only when the words are employed in different sentences.

This difficulty is answered by pointing out that we have never said that the meaning is to be comprehended in the very first use. This aspect has to be settled on the basis of experience. Observing the use of the words as many times as required to comprehend the meaning is necessary on the basis of experience. It is an aid to comprehend the meaning. The eye is not able to see the objects without the light. This does not mean that the eye has no natural capacity to see the object. Just as the light is an aid to the eye to play its role, even so the elders' conversation is an aid to comprehend the word meaning.

Answering the above objection śabara gives the arguments in support of the *apauruṣeyatva* of the relation between the word and meaning.

(i) The relation between the word and the meaning is not caused by any human agency. In case it was caused by any one person the people would have remembered him.

It cannot be argued that the people are not interested in remembering the person who fixed the relation between the word and meaning. The meaning of a word remains in circulation only when there is a rapport between the person who fixes the relation and who uses the words. For instance, a person will not comprehend the meaning of the word '*vṛddhi*' as '*ād aic*' without being in rapport with *Pāṇini*. In the absence of such rapport in the case of Vedic words, it is better to say no one fixed the relation instead of saying "some one fixed it but people did not care to remember him." Moreover, even if we grant the possibility of forgetting, we cannot think of a person fixing the relation without *pramāṇa*. Not remembering is a negative evidence. This does not prove the existence of a person who fixed the relation. To prove the existence a positive evidence is necessary.

(ii) The *arthāpatti* in the form "The words are not found conveying meaning without fixing the relation between the word and meaning. If they could convey the meaning without fixing the relation, then, they would have conveyed on the first hearing only. Hence, we must presume a person who has fixed the relation, is not of any help." *Arthāpatti* helps only when there is no other way out. It is already stated that the elders' conversation generation after generation reveals the natural relation between the word and meaning.

(iii) At no time the words remained without the relation to their meaning. Therefore, the question of some one fixing the relation sometime does not arise.

(iv) The person who is supposed to have fixed the relation must have fixed it by using some word. The meaning of that word should have been fixed by some other person. That person again must have fixed it by using another word the meaning of which must have been fixed by still another person. This results in infinite regress. Therefore, it is better to consider that the beginning of this relation cannot be traced. It is *anādi*. It is comprehended through the elders' conversation.[8]

Vyākaraṇa considers the relation between the word and meaning as *tādātmya*, i.e. identity. This identity is not absolute identity type. The two are distinguishable but not separable. Further, this identity is not physical identity but it is an identity of these two when these are objects of cognition. It is technically stated *bauddha tādātmya*. It is also held by Vyākaraṇa that the words have *anādi yogyatā* or *anādi śakti*, i.e. an inherent capacity to convey the meaning. The Vyākaraṇa view is very close to the Mīmāṁsā view.

Nyāya takes altogether a different view. According to Nyāya the relation between the word and meaning is established by men by some kind of convention. We find that such convention is laid down in case of new words conveying new objects. There is no reason to think that a different procedure is followed in the case of the words that mankind has inherited from the past.

However, the problem remains as to who are these persons. Can we trace the first generation of persons who established this convention. Even if these are traced, did these persons fix the convention by using the words or by other means. If by other means, then, that stage cannot be stated to be the stage of the use of language. Further, the other means can be considered as an aid to reveal the inherent capacity of the words to convey the meaning that is natural to them, like the elder's conversation at a later stage. Thus the concept of natural relation between the word and meaning cannot be avoided.

V

THE AIDS FOR COMPREHENDING THE MEANING

It is explained above that the relation between the word and meaning is natural and the meaning of the words is comprehended through the elders' conversation. It is also stated that *ākṛti* is the meaning and *vyakti* is also conveyed as it is invariably associated with *ākṛti*. Now, the elders' conversation provides the meaning of the words of day-to-day use only. Therefore, to enrich the vocabulary of one's speech and writing, other sources are also required. These sources are listed as *vyākaraṇa, kośa, upamāna, āptavākya, vākyaśeṣa* and the commentary. These are accepted as the sources by all including Mīmāṁsā. However, Mīmāṁsā adds its own sources. Before Mīmāṁsā proceeds to explain the sources a very useful general observation is made by Mīmāṁsā, viz., '*yasya āgame yadupajāyate sa tasya arthaḥ iti gamyate*', i.e. the meaning that occurs when a word is heard is its meaning, that is to say, it is its primary meaning. This primary meaning is conveyed by the primary denotative power designated as *abhidhā* or *vācaka śakti*. The primary meaning is designated as *mukhyārtha* in Sanskrit.[9] Ordinarily all words convey the primary meaning.

The usage of *abhiyuktas* or *śāstrajñas*, i.e. learned persons is an important source of comprehending the primary meaning.

The learned men are well acquainted with the Veda and the continued tradition of the performance of sacrifice. Their memory is quite strong. Therefore, whenever a word is used in more than one sense, the usage of the learned is more authoritative than that of the ordinary people. For instance, the words *yava, varāha* and *vaitasa* are used by the learned persons in the sense of *dīrgaśuka, sūkara,* and *vañjula* cane. The ordinary persons use these words in the sense of *priyaṅgu, kṛṣṇa śakuni* and *jambū* cane. As the articles conveyed by these words are to be used in sacrifices, the meaning of these words should be taken according to the usage of the learned. Śabara quotes the relevant Vedic passages to substantiate the meaning adopted by the learned.

This guideline is formulated keeping the Mīmāṁsā requirement for the performance. The other meanings are also permitted as secondary meanings. Mīmāṁsā has high regard for the usage of the people. However, this special guideline is laid down in the context of the requirement of the sacrifice. It is a choice between *vidvad rūḍhi* and *rūḍhi*.[10] The concept of *vidvad rūḍhi* is fully developed in Dvaita Vedānta.

Tribal people and foreigners are the source to comprehend the meaning of the words adopted from their usage. For instance, the words *pika, nema, tāmarasa,* etc., are used by the tribal people. They know the meanings of these words better. Hence, these words should be taken in the same sense. The meaning of these should not be twisted by laboured etymological explanation.[11]

Technical works like Nigama, Nirukta, Vyākaraṇa are another source to comprehend the meaning of words. Without this, it is difficult to comprehend the meaning of these words. For instance, the words *jarbharī, turbharī,* etc., are the names of the deities *Aśvins.* These words appear to be unintelligible. However, by appropriate etymological explanation these yield meaning: *jarbharī* means yawning, and *turbharī* means aggressive.[12]

VI

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MEANINGS

Two kinds of denotative powers are envisaged for conveying the meaning by the word. These are designated as (i) *abhidhā,* i.e. direct communication, (ii) *lakṣaṇā,* i.e. figurative or extended communication. The meaning conveyed by *abhidhā* is *mukhyārtha,* i.e., primary meaning and the meaning conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* is secondary meaning. The primary meaning is of two types, (i) *rūḍha,* i.e. the meaning developed by usage, (ii) *yaugika,* i.e. the meaning developed by etymological explanation. For instance, the meaning of the word *kamala* as lotus is *rūḍha* and the meaning of the word *paṅkaja* as lotus is *yaugika.* The latter meaning is obtained by the etymological explanation *paṅke jātaḥ,* i.e. born in the mud. Both these are primary meanings. Large number of words have *rūḍha* meaning only. A few have *yaugika* meaning only. However, some words that have a *rūḍha* meaning could also be given a different meaning by etymological explanation. For instance, the word *rathakāra* has the *rūḍha* meaning as a person of *rathakāra* caste. This meaning is by usage. But this word can be explained by etymology as conveying the sense of the builder of chariot who may or may not be a person of the *rathakāra* caste. In such cases, *rūḍha* meaning has to be preferred to the *yaugika* meaning.

Lakṣaṇā, i.e. the denotative power to convey the secondary meaning is utilized only when the primary meaning is not suitable. *Lakṣaṇā* is resorted on three grounds: (i) unsuitability of the primary meaning, i.e., *mukhyārtha bādha,* (ii) *tātparyānupapatti,* i.e. inability to arrive at the purport, (iii) to serve some or other purpose that is not served by mere primary meaning.

In the stock example of *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ,* i.e. there is a fisherman's village on the river Gaṅgā, the primary meaning of the word Gaṅgā, i.e. river, does not suit. There cannot be a village on the river. The secondary meaning, i.e. the bank of the river or *Gaṅgā-tīra* is developed. This *lakṣaṇā* is based on the ground of *mukhyārtha bādha.*

According to Bhāṭṭas, the word meanings lead to sentence meaning by *lakṣaṇā.* This is based on the ground of *tātparyānupapatti,* inability to arrive at the purport. The words are employed in a sentence to get associated with the injunctive suffix that enjoins action. This

purpose cannot be achieved unless the word meanings develop into a sentence meaning. Therefore, these develop sentence meaning by *lakṣaṇā.*

An important point to be noted in connection with *lakṣaṇā,* is that the *lakṣyārtha,* i.e. the secondary meaning, must be related with the primary meaning. Any other unrelated meaning cannot be adopted as the *lakṣyārtha.*

Ānarthkya parihāra, i.e. avoiding a word or words in the sentence becoming *anarthaka,* i.e. unsuitable to convey the required meaning, is the main purpose of resorting to *lakṣaṇā.* The contingency of *ānarthkya* arises because of *arthabādha,* i.e. contradictory nature of the primary meaning of one or more words in the sentence. Such *ānarthkya* is found mostly in *arthavāda* passages. Mīmāṁsakas have a responsibility to establish the validity of *arthavāda* passages as that of injunctive statement. For this purpose, Mīmāṁsakas have developed this unique concept of *lakṣaṇā.* It is the Mīmāṁsā contribution to Indian hermeneutics.

Mīmāṁsā employs more often the expressions *gauṇī* and *gauṇārtha* for *lakṣaṇā* and *lakṣyārtha.* Kumārila explains that when *sadṛśya,* similarity, is the relation between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning, it is designated as *gauṇa* and when these are related with other relations it is designated as *lakṣaṇā.* Though Mīmāṁsā has developed the concept of *lakṣaṇā,* it cautions that the same should not be adopted when there is the possibility of the primary meaning.

The relative position of primary and secondary meanings is discussed by Jaimini and Śabara under the *sūtra arthābhidhāna saṁyogāt.*[13] In the statement *agniḥ māṇavakaḥ,* i.e. the boy is fire, the primary meaning of the word *agni* is fire and the meaning *agnisadṛśaḥ,* the boy is similar to fire is the secondary meaning. The primary meaning is directly conveyed by the word *agni* while the same word is applied to the boy on the basis of the similarity between the fire and boy. The primary meaning is designated as *mukhyārtha* and the secondary meaning is designated as *gauṇa* or *lakṣyārtha.* Here, the question arises, since both these meanings arise from the word *agni,* why not to treat them on equal basis. This question is answered by pointing out that the second meaning depends upon the first meaning. Unless and until the first meaning of the word *agni,* viz., fire, is comprehended the second meaning, viz., the boy is similar to fire, does not arise. While the first meaning can be comprehended without comprehending the second meaning, the second meaning cannot be comprehended without the comprehension of the first meaning. Hence, the two cannot be treated on equal basis.

VII

THE PRIMARY MEANING IS SUPERIOR TO THE SECONDARY MEANING

(i) In the hymn of '*barhiḥ devasadanam dāmi*' the word *barhi* conveys *barhi,* a kind of grass as the primary meaning and similar other grass as its secondary meaning. In view of this, the hymn has to be recited with reference to *barhi,* kind of grass only. It is that kind of grass that is prescribed in connection with the sacrifice. Therefore, that only has to be used and the hymn has to be recited with reference to *barhi* only. If the secondary meaning is taken,

the hymn will cease to be an auxiliary of *barhi.* Consequently, it will cease to contribute to the performance of *yāga* and acquisition of the *apūrva.*

This ruling, viz., the word *barhi* be taken in its primary sense, is designated as *barhinyāya.* This is an instance of the primary meaning being superior to the secondary meaning.

There are instances in which the word concerned seems to have two primary meanings. Both cannot be taken as primary meanings in the same context, nor can one of them be taken as the secondary meaning. In such contexts, the meaning that is most suitable to the context should be taken as its meaning and any other meaning should not be taken into account. For instance, the word *parva* used in the context of *darśapūrṇamāsa* has the meaning 'time' as also 'a group'. Between these two the meaning 'a group' suits the context. Therefore, the other meaning is not to be taken into account.

(ii) In the statement *'sauryam carum nirvapet'*, "an oblation of cooked rice should be offered to the sun", the word *caru* occurs. It has the meaning 'cooked rice' and also the 'the pot in which the rice is cooked'. Between these two meanings the meaning 'cooked rice' has to be taken. It is cooked rice that is connected with the sacrifice as an offering. It cannot be argued that the meaning 'pot' may be taken as the primary meaning and the meaning 'cooked rice' as a secondary meaning since the rice is cooked in the pot. When the primary meaning serves the purpose, it is not justified to take a secondary meaning as the other meaning. A word conveys only one meaning.[14]

There are instances in which two words are phonetically same but they have different meanings. For instance, the word *mātā* means mother and it also means 'a measurer'. In the sentence '*māta daivatam*' it means 'mother' but in '*mātā samaḥ kṣipraḥ*' i.e. 'he measures evenly and quickly' the word *mātā* means a measurer.

It is actually a case of two different words that are phonetically similar but actually different as these are derived from different roots. Hence, the particular word should be identified to ascertain its meaning.[15]

There is an interesting example in which a word of a general meaning is taken in the sense of a special meaning. At *jyotiṣṭoma* it is stated '*agniṣomīyam paśum ālabheta*' a *paśu* be offered at *agniṣomiya.* Here, the question arises whether a particular *paśu,* say *chāga,* i.e. goat, or any *paśu* be offered. There is a *mantravarṇa* in this context, viz., '*chāgasya vapāyāḥ medaso anubrihi*'. This helps us to decide that *chāga* be offered. However, the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that the word *paśu* occurs in the very injunctive statement while the word *chāga* is in *mantravarṇa.* A word occurring in *mantravarṇa* cannot regulate the meaning of a word that occurs in the injunctive statement. He suggests that to reconcile the *mantravarṇa* reference to a particular animal, i.e. *chāga,* and the injunctive statement's, reference to *paśu* in general, the word *chāga* can be taken in its etymological sense as *chinna gamana,* i.e. an animal that moves quickly. This suggestion of the *pūrvapakṣin* cannot be accepted. When a meaning is available for the whole word, it is not correct to go to its etymological parts and build a meaning. The etymological meaning, i.e. *avayavaśakti,* force of a part cannot set aside the *samudāya śakti,* integral force. The *avayavaśakti* is designated as *yoga* and *samudāya śakti* is designated as *rūḍhi.* The *rūḍhi* is superior to *yoga.* In the case of *rūḍhi,* the

meaning is directly and readily available while in the case of *yoga* one has to arrive at the meaning of the whole word after ascertaining the meaning of the parts.

Further, if the word *paśu* is taken in the sense of *chāga* the *mantravarṇa* in which the word *chāga* occurs becomes an auxiliary to the act. On the other hand, if it is taken in the general sense of *paśu*, the *mantravarṇa* will go without any referent and will not be an auxiliary to the act.

In this example, the primary meaning is fixed utilizing *sāmānya viśeṣa nyāya*, i.e. the maxium of a general word being taken in the special sense.[16]

(i) The well-known example of *rūḍhi* prevailing over *yoga* is the word '*rathakāra*'. The statement '*varṣāsu rathakārah ādadhita*', "in the rainy days, the *rathakāra* should initiate the fire", prescribes *agny ādhāna* to *rathakāra*. Here, the question is raised whether the word *rathakāra* be taken in the etymological sense, viz., a person who builds the chariot or in the sense of a person of *rathakāra* caste.

Taking the word *rathakāra* in the etymological sense as a builder of a chariot to rule out a person of the *rathakāra* caste from undertaking *agny ādhāna* and restricting it to first three *varṇas* only is not possible. Since, the first three *varṇas* are prohibited from undertaking the vocation of building chariots, etc. The *śilpopajīvana* is prohibited to them. Moreover, the rainy season is prescribed as a time for the *rathakāra* to perform *agny ādhāna* while for *brāhmaṇa*, etc., other times are prescribed. Therefore, the word *rathakāra* should be taken in the sense of a person of a *rathakāra* caste. This sense is *rūḍha* while taking it in the sense of a builder of a chariot is *yoga*. Here, *rūḍha* has to prevail over the yoga.[17]

(ii) There are a few interesting examples which were originally *yoga* words but in due course became *rūḍha*. For instance, the word *kuśala* originally meant a person skilled in cutting the *kuśa* grass but later it developed the meaning 'a skilled person in general'. Similarly, the word *pravīṇa* originally meant a person skilled in playing on *vīṇā* but later developed the meaning 'a skilled person in general'. These are the instances of the words that were originally *yoga* type but later developed into the *rūḍha*. In these cases the original *yoga* sense is completely ignored.

VIII

THE SECONDARY MEANING, i.e. LAKṢAṆĀ BASED ON TATSIDDHI, JĀTI SĀRŪPYA, ETC.

We have seen that the Mīmāṁsakas attach utmost importance to the primary meaning and have laid down the necessary guidelines to ascertain that meaning. However, there are certain instances in which the primary meaning is not acceptable. For instance, there are Vedic statements such as '*yajamānaḥ prastāraḥ*', '*yajamānaḥ ekakapālaḥ*'. These cannot be taken in their primary sense. *Prastāra* means a handful of grass placed by the side of the *yajamāna*. This itself cannot be taken as *yajamāna*. Same is the case with *kapāla*. Therefore, the word *yajamāna* should be taken as *yajamāna kāryakārin*. In the absence of *yajamāna*, *prastāra* is addressed as if it is *yajamāna*. Ordinarily a person himself discharges all his

activities. However, when someone else discharges his activities, the latter is called by the name or the designation of the former. For instance, when a village headman discharges the duties of a king, he is called the king. He is called the king only in the secondary sense. The process of obtaining the secondary sense is called *lakṣaṇā* and the secondary sense is called *lakṣyārtha.* The ground for *lakṣaṇā* in the above two instances is, one performing the activities of the other. This ground is designated as *tatsiddhi.*

Here, it should be noted that the primary meaning is the basis for the secondary meaning. It is a case of an extension of meaning. No secondary meaning can be developed without the basis of the primary meaning. However, mere primary meaning does not suit here. It becomes *anarthaka,* i.e., irrelevant.

There is a Vedic statement *'agni, vai brāhmaṇaḥ'*. In this statement the word *agni* cannot be taken in its primary sense. Hence, it has to be taken in the sense *agnisamānajātīyajanmā,* i.e. born in the same manner as *agni.* Both *agni* and *brāhmaṇa* are stated to have been born from the mouth of *Prajāpati.* Therefore, *brāhmaṇa* is called *agni* in the secondary sense. The common source for birth is the ground here. This ground is called *jāti.*

There is a Vedic statement '*āditya yūpaḥ*'. Here the word *āditya* cannot be taken in the primary sense. Therefore, it has to be taken in the secondary sense, viz., brilliant. *Yūpa* is praised here as brilliant. *Sārūpya,* i.e. the two being alike, is the ground here.

There is a Vedic statement '*apaśavo vā anye gavāsvebhyaḥ*', i.e. the animals other than cow and horse are not animals. Here the word '*apaśavaḥ*' cannot be taken in the primary sense that the other animals are not animals at all. Therefore, the word *apaśavaḥ* conveys the secondary meaning that these are inferior animals while cow and horse are superior. *Praśaṁsā,* i.e. praise is the ground to develop the secondary meaning here.

In the statement '*sṛṣṭiḥ upadadhāti*' placing of *iṣṭakas* by reciting *sṛṣṭi* hymns is prescribed. Here, the question is raised as to whether only those hymns that have a reference to *sṛṣṭi* be recited or other hymns also stated in the context be recited. It is ruled that the word *sṛṣṭiḥ* is used simply because the hymns that have reference to *sṛṣṭi* are in large number. However, all hymns stated in the context are connected with the sacrifice. Therefore, the word *sṛṣṭi* is to be taken to convey both the hymns that make a reference to *sṛṣṭi* and other hymns stated in the context. The ground for the secondary sense here is *bhūmā* the mention of majority.[18]

Liṅga Samavāya, i.e. the presence of a prominent indication is another ground. The well-known example for this is '*chatriṇo yānti*', the umbrella holders are moving. Here, the word conveys both the persons who hold umbrella and those who do not hold it. Holding umbrella is prominently observed. Therefore, that alone is mentioned here. But both umbrella holders and all others moving on the road happen to be indicated through the secondary meaning. This example is given by Śabara himself under the *sūtra, liṅga samavāyaḥ.* However, it can be brought under *bhūmā,* i.e. majority also, if majority of persons were holding the umbrella and only a few were moving without it.

In the above examples, *lakṣaṇā* in *yajamanaḥ prastaraḥ*' is intended to avoid *nāmadheyatva* or *guṇavidhitva* of the word *yajamāna,* in '*agniḥ brāhmaṇaḥ*' it is intended to avoid *guṇavidhitva* of *agni,* in '*āditya yūpaḥ*' it is intended to avoid *nāmadheyatva* or

guṇavidhitva in the word *āditya*, in '*apaśavo vā anye*' it is intended to avoid *guṇavidhitva* of the word *apaśavaḥ*, while in *sṛṣṭirūpadadhāti* it is intended to avoid *guṇavidhitva* of the word *sṛṣṭi*.

From this it is clear that the purpose of *lakṣaṇā* is not merely to avoid the unsuitability of *mukhyārtha* of these words but to avoid *nāmadheyatva* and *guṇavidhitva* of these words. These are all treated as *arthavādas*, 'words of praise', by resorting to *lakṣaṇā*. The *arthavādas* are also *pramāṇa*. By treating these as *arthavādas* the contingency of these statements being *apramāṇa* is avoided. Since, the *laksyārtha* is based on the *mukhyārtha*, the status of natural relation between the word and meaning is not affected. Ordinarily Mīmāṁsā does not like to resort to *lakṣaṇā*. However, if it is required to protect the authenticity of the Vedic language, *lakṣaṇā* is permitted. In the majority of cases, the *arthavādas* do need *lakṣaṇā*. In fact, *arthavāda* conveys *prāśastya* by *lakṣaṇā*.

IX

LAKṢAṆĀ OF PLACE, TIME, ATTRIBUTES AND ACTS

We will notice a few more instances of *lakṣaṇā* which relate to the *lakṣaṇā* of place, time, attributes, act, cause and effect.

Place. *Agnau tiṣṭhati* i.e. stands on fire. Here the word fire conveys the secondary meaning viz., the place near the fire. In the stock example '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*', i.e. fisherman's village on the *Gaṅgā*, the word *Gaṅgā* conveys the secondary meaning, viz., the place near the *Gaṅgā*, i.e. bank of *Gaṅgā*. This stock example is quoted by Śabara (7-1-4). It has also another reading *gaṅgāyām gāvaḥ*, 'cows in the *Gaṅgā*'. In the same *sūtra*, Śabara remarks that *ākṛti* conveys *vyakti* also as these are found always together.

Time. In the statement *Śaṅkhavelāyām āgantavyam*, i.e. 'come at the time when conch blows', the particular time is conveyed. One has to go by that time whether conch blows or not. The blow of conch is only an indication. *Goraja muhūrta*, 'the time when the dust is raised by the returning cows', is another example of *kāla lakṣaṇā*. Even in modern times we say 'when ten bells are given', though the bells are no longer in use. The time indicated by the word bell is the secondary meaning of the word bell.[19]

The attributes. '*Agniḥ māṇavakaḥ*' and '*siṁhaḥ devadattaḥ*' are the examples of attributes of fire and lion being conveyed by the words concerned. The statements '*stenam manaḥ*', i.e. the mind is a thief '*anṛta vādinī vāk*', i.e. the tongue is a lier, also are the examples of *lakṣaṇā* of attributes.

Act. Acts are also sometimes conveyed as the secondary meaning. For instance, the words *darśa* and *paurṇamāsi* have the respective time as their primary meaning. However, these convey the sacrifical acts performed on these days as their secondary meaning. In the instance of *kāla lakṣaṇā*, an event indicates time while in *karmalakṣaṇā* the time indicates act.[20]

The word for cause secondarily conveys the effect and vice-versa.

There is an interesting example in which the contingency of *lakṣaṇā* arises both in *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*. However, the *Siddhāntin* ingenuously avoids *lakṣaṇā* and affirms *siddhānta*.

In the context of *vājapeya*, sacrifice it is stated that *'saptadaśa āratniḥ vājapeyasya yūpo bhavati'* the *yūpa* of the *vājapeya* will be seventeen forearms length. However, *vājapeya* is a *somayāga* and there is no *yūpa* used in it. Therefore, the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that the word *yūpa* should be taken in the secondary sense as a long sacrificial vessel and applied to *ṣoḍaśipātra*. However, the *siddhāntin* points out that there is *paśuyāga* which is subordinate to the *vājapeya*. The *paśuyāga* has *yūpa* used in it. Therefore, the length prescribed for the *yūpa* may be taken in its primary sense as an auxiliary of this *yāga* and thus *lakṣaṇā* be avoided. The *pūrvapakṣin* further argues that though you have avoided *lakṣaṇā* for the word *yūpa* you have taken the word *vājapeya* in the sense of *paśuyāga*. This is the *lakṣaṇā* of the word *vājapeya* as a *paśuyāga*. But the *Siddhāntin* contends that we have not taken the word *vājapeya* in the sense of *paśuyāga*. We have only pointed out that the *yūpa* of *paśuyāga* can be talked of as that of the *vājapeya* as the former is subordinate to the latter. Śabara gives an interesting example to bring home this point. When we say he is the grandson of Devadatta, the grandson is related to the grandfather in the primary sense of the word *sambandha*. Similarly, the *yūpa* of the *paśuyāga* can be taken to belong to the *vājapeya*. This will satisfy the expression *vājapeyasya*. There is no need of *lakṣaṇā*.[21]

The above example indicates that the concept of *lakṣaṇā* is widely utilized to determine the nature of sacrificial acts. Some of the instances given above occur in the *pūrvapakṣa* also. However, the nature of *lakṣaṇā* of these words is not denied in the *siddhānta* but 'whether these support the *pūrvapakṣa* or not' is discussed. So far as the instances given in the *siddhānta* are concerned, the support of these is utilized.

In connection with *lakṣaṇā* the following points have to be noted:

(i) The primary meaning is superior to the secondary meaning. Therefore, so far as possible, the primary meaning only is to be taken. Jaimini and Śabara stress this point repeatedly.

(ii) The unsuitability of the primary meaning is the main ground to resort to *lakṣaṇā*.

(iii) The primary meaning is the basis for the secondary meaning. The latter should be related to the former.

(iv) Adopting the secondary meaning should serve some purpose.

(v) Avoiding *ānarthakya* is the main purpose of resorting to *lakṣaṇā*.

X

THE SENTENCE

Jaimini discusses the nature of sentence in the context of fixing the unit of *Yajurveda*. The unit of *Ṛk* can be easily identified since it is in metrical form. The unit of *Sāman* also can be easily identified as a musical note added to a *Ṛk*. However, the unit of *Yajus* cannot be easily identified as it is in a series of isolated words. It is difficult to easily locate the word

with which a *Yajus* begins and one with which it ends. Therefore, a concrete basis has to be fixed to work out the unit of *Yajus.* The expression *Yajus* is explained as "*yajyate iti yajus*" that which assists the *yāga* is *Yajus.* Such an assistance is provided by the *Yajus* through the account of the deity, *dravya* and some other items connected with the *yāga.* Therefore, a group of words that serve this purpose is a *Yajus. Yāvatā padasamūhena ijyate tāvad padasamūhaḥ ekaṁ yajuḥ.* This unit of *Yajus* is designated as *vākya* as it speaks of the assistance provided to *yāga.* '*Yāvatā kriyāyāḥ upakāraḥ prakāśyate tāvad vaktavyatavād vākyam iti ucyate*'. This is stated in the *sūtra* '*arthaikatvāt ekam vākyam*'. A group of words that serve a common purpose constitute a sentence.[22]

Now, the question arises as to how to ascertain whether a particular word in a group of words serves the purpose or not? To meet this question, a condition is laid down in the *sūtra,* viz., *sākāṅkṣaṁ cet vibhāge syāt,* i.e. if that word is taken out the rest will not be able to serve the purpose. Those words will be in need of the left out word. The expression *ākāṅkṣā* means 'in need of' or 'in expectation of'. Hence, that word has to be taken as a part and parcel of the sentence.

The above definition of *vākya* is illustrated by the passage '*devasya tvā savituḥ*', etc. This passage makes a reference to *nirvāpa,* 'offering'. Its purpose is *nirvāpaprakāśana,* 'expression of the idea of offering'. All words in this passage serve the common purpose of *nirvāpaprakāśana.* Therefore these constitute one *Yajus,* i.e., one *vākya.* Here, *nirvapāmi* is the central word. All other words get connected with it and describe *nirvāpa.* The procedure of other words getting connected with the central word, that conveys action, is explained in the *sūtra* '*tadbhūtānāṁ kriyarthena samāmnāyaḥ*'.[23]

The two conditions laid down here, viz., (i) *arthaikatva,* i.e. 'serving a common purpose', (ii) *sākāṅkṣatva,* i.e. 'being in need of each other' are very essential to treat a group of words as a *vākya.* This is explained by the following illustrations.

(i) In the passage '*bhāgo vām vibhajatu, aryamā vām vibhjatu*', etc., the purpose served by these statements, viz., *vibhāga prakāśana* is common. Hence, these fulfill *ekārthatva,* 'condition of oneness in the sense'. However, each one of these statements is not in need of the other. Each one has no *ākāṅkṣā* of the other. Therefore, these statements cannot be considered as one *vākya.*

(ii) In the passage '*syonām te sadanam kṛṇomi yasmin sīda*', "I am making a pleasant seat on which please seat yourself", there is *ākāṅkṣā* between *sadana,* i.e. 'place to sit', and *sīda,* i.e. 'be seated'. However, the purpose of the first part is *sadana prakāśana,* i.e. 'describing the seat', and the purpose of the second part is to 'describe the sitting'. Hence, the condition of *ekārthatva* is not fulfilled. Hence, these two statements do not form a *vākya.*

In the expression '*ekārtha*' the word *artha* does not mean the 'sense' or 'meaning'. It means 'purpose'. This is clear from the objection raised and the answer given in the *bhāṣya* in respect of the implication of the meaning of *ekārtha.* The word '*ekārtha*' cannot be understood in the sense of a single or a common meaning. Since each word has its own meaning and the words in the group have many meanings, the group of words, as a whole, has no separate meaning. The association of these meanings also cannot be considered as a *vākya,* since the associations of each word with the rest are also different. This objection

is raised and it is answered by pointing out that the expression *ekārtha* is not used here in the sense of a single meaning but it is used in the sense of a common purpose. *'ekaprayojanatvād upapannam'*.

However, to achieve the purpose of a group of words serving a common end, one of the words in the group has to play the central role while the others have to get connected with it. This central word is technically called *mukhya viśeṣya,* i.e. 'the chief substantive word for which the other words are adjectives'. This fact of a central word associated with the other words conveying the meaning of the whole group of words is *ekārthatva.* In this explanation the word *artha* in the expression *ekārtha* means the sense or meaning. Keeping this fact in mind the Bhāṣya remarks *'ekārtha pada samūhaḥ vākyam'* can be understood in the sense that a group of words that convey the sense of a central word associated with the sense of other words is a *vākya,* i.e. sentence. This explanation is also supported by the remark of the Bhāṣya: *'ekārtham anekapadam vākyam'* 'sentence is a group of such words which combinedly convey one meaning' under III-3-14.[24]

This explanation of *arthaikyatva* is expressly given in *Bhāṭṭakaustubha* by Khaṇḍadeva. The core part of his explanation is, *mukhya viśeṣya pratipādaka śabdaikatva,* i.e. in a sentence, there should be only one *mukhyaviśeṣya,* i.e., central substantive word. This word associated with other words conveying the sense is *arthaikya.*

This explanation holds good so far as the ordinary sentences are concerned.

However, in the case of some Vedic sentences it creates problems.

(i) For Mīmāṁsakas *mukhya viśeṣya* is *bhāvanā.* At *darśapūrṇamāsa, Agneya* etc., are stated by different statements and have different *bhāvanā.* However, these serve the common purpose of accomplishing *darśapūrṇa māsa* and have to be treated as *ekārtha.*

(ii) *Vrīhi* and *yava* are stated by different statements. These serve the same purpose. However, these two statements cannot be taken as one *vākya.*

To avoid the above difficulties Khaṇḍadeva expands the scope of the explanation of *ekārtha* and puts the basis of *ekārthatva* negatively. He puts the revised explanation as *bhinnapratīti viṣayāneka mukhya viśeṣya rāhityam,* i.e. there should not be more than one central substantive word, i.e. *mukhyaviśeṣya,* each being an object of a separate cognition.

(i) In the case of *āgneya,* etc., at *darśapūrṇa māsa* though there are more than 'one central substantive', these are the objects of a single cognition. Hence, *ekārthatva* is not violated.

(ii) In the case of *vrīhi* and *yava,* though the cognition of these is separate as these are stated by two statements, the *mukhya viśeṣya,* viz., *yaga,* is one. Therefore, *ekarthatva* condition is not violated. But still these two statements are not to be considered as one *vākya,* since these two statements are not *sākāṅkṣā* with each other.

Khaṇḍadeva has accommodated both the explanations of the expression *arthaikya,* viz., (i) serving a single or common purpose, (ii) conveying a unitary sense, in a very ingenious way. The first explanation holds good for the Vedic *vākya* and the second explanation for both the Vedic and the *laukika vākya.* In the context of determining a unit of *Yajus* as a *vākya,* it is to be noted that a particular *Yajus* is not always a single grammatical sentence while a *laukika* sentence is always so. The scope of a *vākya* in

Mīmāṁsā is much wider than a grammatical sentence. Consequently, its nature also is quite distinct from that of a grammatical sentence. (Bh.K. p.120)

XI

ĀKĀṄKṢĀ, SANNIDHI AND YOGYATĀ

The clause '*sākāṅkṣam cet vibhāge syāt*' states an important requirement of a *vākya*. Different words employed in a sentence must be in need of each other. These must have reciprocal need for each other. For instance, in the sentence 'bring the cow' the verb 'bring' is in need of the object 'cow' and the object cow is in need of the action 'bring'. This kind of mutual need or expectancy is technically called *ākāṅkṣā*. The absence of one of these makes the sentence incomplete. The nature of *ākāṅkṣā* is explained as *pratiyoginī jijñāsā*, i.e. seeking the counterpart. It is also explained as *pratiyoginī jijñāsā* seeking of the counterpart by the person who has to comprehend the meaning of the sentence. Seeking something is primarily an attribute of a person. Therefore, *ākāṅkṣā* has to arise in the seeker's mind only. However, since he seeks the *padārthas* and the *padārthas* are conveyed by the words, the words and the meanings are also stated to be *sākāṅkṣa*. This *ākāṅkṣā* at the word level may be explained as a capacity of the words to convey the meaning that is needed by its counterpart, *jijñāsitārtha pratipādana yogyatā*.[26] Thus, "*yogyāta* is the capacity of conveying the sense of the desired object."

Ākāṅkṣā is also explained as *abhidhāna aparyavasāna*, i.e. incompleteness of the statement. When a required word is not included in the statement, the word already stated is in need of it. For instance, if the word *dvāram* is stated without the word close or open, there is *abhidhāna aparyavasāna*, i.e. incompleteness of the statement. By providing the word *pidhehi*, i.e. close, it gets complete and the *ākāṅkṣā* is satisfied.

It is also of the nature of *abhidheya aparyavasāna*, i.e. incompleteness of the items to be conveyed. To satisfy this type of *ākāṅkṣā*, appropriate items have to be brought in by the relevant words and statements. For instance, the statement '*viśvajitā yajeta*' conveys *kārya*, i.e. the task to be accomplished. The *kārya* cannot be accomplished unless there is a *niyojya*, i.e. a person who undertakes it . Such persons only undertake it who have a desire for its result. Thus, there is the *ākāṅkṣā* for the result, a person who desires it and undertakes this act of *viśvajit yāga*. All these items have to be brought in to satisfy the *ākāṅkṣā* arising out of the incomplete statement '*viśvajitā yajeta*'. It is incomplete in respect of the items required to implement the statement.

Another example of *abhidheya aparyavasāna* is, '*sauryam carum nirvapet brahmavarcasakāmaḥ*'. Here, the result, and *niyojya* and *adhikārin*, i.e. 'the person who desires it', are stated. But the *kāraṇa* and *kāraṇopakāraka padārthas* are not stated. Hence, there is *abhidheya aparyavasāna* to that extent. These have to be brought in to make the statement '*sauryam carum nirvapet*' complete. This is the explanation of *ākāṅkṣā* according to Prābhākaras.

The *ākāṅkṣā* operates in an orderly way. Conveying *kārya* is the central purpose of a sentence. This *kārya*, i.e., 'the task to be accomplished', needs an object, *viṣaya*. This is *yāga*. Therefore, the *ākāṅkṣā* arises for *yāga*. Then, there arises *ākāṅkṣā* about *niyojya* (performer) then, about the 'auxiliaries'. In this way all the requirements to accomplish *kārya* are elicited by *ākāṅkṣā*. This procedure of the operating of *ākāṅkṣā* is laid down by Prabhākaras in keeping with the *anvitābhidhana* theory of meaning of the sentence.

Sannidhi or *āsatti* 'proximity', *yogyatā* 'compatibility', are two more criteria that assist a group of words to develop into a sentence. Even when two words in a group of words have *ākāṅkṣā* for each other but are not pronounced with reasonable proximity, then their association is incomprehensible to the listener. In such cases, the group of words cease to be a sentence for him. Hence, proximity of words that have *ākāṅkṣā* is laid down as one of the requirements for the formation of the sentence and the comprehension of the meaning of it.

This requirement is not directly laid down in *Jaimini sūtra*. However, in the context of his discussion of *anuṣaṅga*, i.e. 'sifting a part of the sentence to other related sentence', the concept of *sannidhi* 'proximity', is discussed.

The question of *anuṣaṅga* is raised in connection with the passage '*yā te agne ayāśayā tanūḥ varṣiṣṭhā*' '*yā te agne rajāśayā*' '*yā te agne harāśayā*' to be recited at *jyotiṣṭoma*. Here, the question is raised whether the part of the sentence '*tanūḥ varṣiṣṭhā*' occurring in the first sentence needs to be shifted to other two related sentences '*yā te agne rajāsayā*' and '*yā te agne harāśaya*'. It is ruled that as there is *ākāṅkṣā* of this part of the first sentence with the other two sentences, this part of the first sentence needs to be shifted and recited while reciting the other two sentences. Such shifting of a part of the sentence is called *anuṣaṅga*.

Here the question arises whether a part of a sentence could be shifted to another sentence when it is intervened by another sentence merely on the ground that it has *ākāṅkṣā* with the former or should it not be immediately after the first sentence. In the present instance, '*yā te agne harāśayā*' does not occur immediately after '*yā te agne ayāśayā tanuḥ varṣiṣṭhā*', etc., but is intervened by '*yā te agne rajāśayā*'. Raising this question Śabara answers that the intervention by a related expression will not hurt the proximity. The ground for the necessity of proximity is to have the *saṁskāra* of the previous expression alive to connect it with the following one. This will not be hurt if the two expressions are intervened by a related expression. *Sambandhi pada vyavāye hi sambandhādeva pūrva saṁskāra na apaiti.* From this reply of Śabara it is clear that the proximity between two *sākāṅkṣa* words or passages is necessary for the formulation of the sentence, and the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence.[27]

In explaining the nature of *sannidhi,* i.e. proximity, the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras differ. According to Bhāṭṭas, there are two requirements of *sannidhi*:

(i) The words that convey the meanings should be pronounced with proximity.
(ii) The objects concerned should be represented only by words and not by any other means. For instance, if the words 'cow' and 'bring' are pronounced with a long gap of time, the requirement of proximity is violated. Similarly, a horse standing

nearby has no proximity with the action of bringing conveyed by the word 'bring' as it is not presented by the word.

Prābhākaras explain the nature of *sannidhi* differently.

When a word is heard and its meaning is comprehended, the meaning of a related word that has *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā* with it is presented to the mind. Such presentation is *sannidhi*, i.e. proximity. It is not necessary that the word itself should be present.

The *sannidhi* also takes place in an orderly way.

The third requirement of a *vākya*, viz., *yogyatā* is also not specifically mentioned by Jaimini or Śabara. However, it is implied by their observations in many places. In the *sūtra* IV-3-11 Jaimini remarks that the words, the meanings of which are not compatible, do not get connected even if they have proximity–*'asamarthānām ānantaryepi asambandhaḥ'.* Under the *sūtra* III-1-12 Śabara remarks *'na hi vacana śatenāpi anārabhyo arthaḥ śakyo vidhātum'* '*nāpi brūyād udakena dagdhavyam agninā kleditavyam*'. "No statement can be made with words of incompatible meanings. Nobody will say burn with water and make wet with fire." From these observations it is clear that *yogyatā*, i.e. compatibility is taken for granted as a requirement for the formulation of the sentence and the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence.

Prābhākaras define *yogyatā* as *sambandhārhatā*, i.e. 'suitability to get connected with the relevant word'. In the statement *agninā siñcati* meaning 'sprinkles with fire', sprinkling is not suitable to be connected with fire. Such a course is *pramāṇa viruddha*, i.e. oppossed to our experience. Keeping this in mind, it is also explained as *arthābādha*, i.e. 'non-contradiction of the sense proposed to be conveyed.' It is also negatively explained as the absence of unsuitability.

This requirement of *yogyatā* in the sense of suitability to be connected, creates a problem for Prābhākaras. According to them, all word meanings in an injunctive sentence have to get connected with *kārya*, i.e. *apūrva*, conveyed by the injunctive suffix. This *apūrva* is not cognized by any *pramāṇa* other than the Vedic injunction. To know the suitability of this *apūrva* to be connected with the meanings of all other words in the injunctive sentence, its knowledge is necessary. However, it cannot be known before the connection. This difficulty is solved by Prābhākaras by pointing out that on the basis of experience of the suitability of all word meanings in a sentence being connected with the action in the ordinary sentences, the connection of all word meanings with *kārya* or *apūrva* can be envisaged in a general way and the comprehension of connection with a particular *apūrva* will take shape when the relevant word meanings are actually connected.

In the application of *ākāṅkṣā*, *sannidhi* and *yogyatā* criteria and connecting words syntactically in a sentence, propriety also has to be taken into account. For instance, in the sentence *ayam eti putraḥ rājñaḥ puruṣo apanīyatām*, i.e. the son of the king is arriving, push aside the person. Here, though the word king has proximity and *ākāṅkṣā* with both the words 'son' and 'person', it gets connected with the word 'son' but not the 'person' to be pushed aside. Once the word king gets connected with the word 'son', its *ākāṅkṣā* is satisfied and need not be connected with the word 'person'.

XII

MEANING OF SENTENCE

In respect of sentence meaning there are four prominent views held by Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā.

1. Vyākaraṇa considers *sphoṭa* as the import of a sentence. The expression *sphoṭa* is explained as *sphutati asmāt arthaḥ iti sphotaḥ*, '*sphoṭa* is that from which the meaning springs out.'
2. According to Nyāya, words convey the meaning of the sentence through their meanings. The words are the means to convey the meaning of the sentence, and the word meanings are a kind of *vyāpāra*, i.e. process. The words are assisted by
   (i) *Ākāṅkṣā*, i.e. expectancy on the part of each word in the sentence to seek the syntactical connection with the relevant other word.
   (ii) *Sannidhi*, i.e. the proximity with the word with which it is to be connected.
   (iii) *Yogyatā*, i.e. compatibility or suitability to be connected.
3. According to Prābhākaras, words convey their meanings as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word.

The concept of *sphoṭa* is unique and the process of its conveying sentence meaning is quite different. Therefore, we will consider it separately. So far as the other three views are concerned, there is a common point, viz., word meanings constitute the sentence meaning. It looks simple. However, it raises the following questions:

(i) Whether each word separately gives rise to the sentence meaning.
(ii) Whether the group of the words in the sentence gives rise to the sentence meaning.
(iii) Whether the word meanings give rise to the sentence meaning.

For instance, whether the meaning of the sentence *'agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ'* arises from each word separately, or from the group of these words or from the meanings of these three words.

The first alternative is against our experience. The second alternative is also not possible since the group is not a separate unit. The three words convey their respective meanings only. There is nothing more to convey the notion of a group. The third alternative, viz., that word meanings convey the sentence meaning is also not possible since there is no relation between the word meanings and the sentence meaning. If the word meanings convey the sentence meaning without any relation between the two, then, any word meanings should be able to convey any sentence meaning, since no particular sentence meaning is related with any particular word meaning.

The driving point of these arguments is that since the word meanings do not help in arriving at the sentence meaning, a separate denotative power has to be envisaged for the sentence itself so as to make it yield the sentence meaning. This means that a *saṅketa* 'convention', has to be fixed for the sentence to convey its meaning. This has to be done by a human agency. This means *apauruṣeyatva* of Veda will break down at the level of the sentence. As a result, in spite of the permanent nature of *śabda* and *artha* and their natural relation, the permanent nature of the sentence and the sentence meaning has to be given

up. This means that Vedic injunctions are not absolutely authoritative. This is stated by Jaimini by way of *pūrvapakṣa* in the *sūtra*: *Utpattau vā avacanāḥ syuḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt* i.e., in spite of the permanent nature of *śabda*, *artha* and their relation, the Vedic injunctions will not be authoritative, i.e. *avacanāḥ*, since the sentence meaning arises from the sentence only which has to be fixed by a human agency.[28]

Stating the position of the *pūrvapakṣa*, as stated above, Jaimini declares, "Words are employed in a sentence to convey their meanings associated with the action conveyed by the verb. The word meanings constitute the sentence meaning." '*tadbhūtā-nāṁ kriyārthatvena samāmnāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt*'.

Words do not convey the sentence meaning individually and separately. Nor is there a group of words as a separate entity. It is the association of the meanings of the words or the associated meanings of the words that is sentence meaning. '*vākyārthaḥ padārthānāṁ saṁsargaḥ, padārthānām anvitāvasthā vā*.'[29]

In this explanation of the nature of the sentence meaning, the only point that needs to be explained concerns the means through which the sense of the association is conveyed. The task of the words is over as soon as their meanings are conveyed. This is answered by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas that it is conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, i.e. the secondary denotative power of words to extend the meaning. By these processes the very meanings of words convey their association with other words which constitutes the sentence meaning:

> *Padāni svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, atha idānīṁ padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham avagamayanti.*[30]

The method of *lakṣaṇā* here is quite distinct from the *lakṣaṇā* in the stock example of *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*, i.e. there is a fishermen's village on the bank of the river Gaṅgā. The primary meaning of the word *Gaṅgā* is *gaṅgāpravāha*, i.e. the flowing water of the river Gaṅgā. The secondary meaning is the bank of the river Gaṅgā. In this stock example, the primary meaning, i.e. the flowing water, is incongruent with the presence of a fishermen's village on it. Therefore, the secondary meaning, viz., 'the bank' is resorted to. The primary meaning is set aside.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas explain the basis of *lakṣaṇā* here differently. The words are not employed in a sentence merely to know the word meanings. The word meanings are already known. Therefore, the purpose of employing them is to enable us to know that is yet to be known. This is the association of word meanings, or associated words meanings. This requires the extension of word meanings to their association to the relevant other word meanings in the sentence. This has to be done by way of *lakṣaṇā*. This ground for *lakṣaṇā* is designated as *tātparya anupapatti*.

XIII

MUKHYA VIŚEṢYA—THE CENTRE OF SEMANTIC ORGANIZATION

The question of the centre of semantic organization in a sentence is debated by Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṁsā. Whether the verb is more important in a sentence or the noun is an old dispute. When a person says 'the clock fell on the ground', is it the clock that is

the centre of semantic organization or is it the act of falling that is the centre of semantic organization. Normally we think that it depends upon the context. On hearing a loud noise, if one is asked as to what fell down, then the clock will be the centre of semantic organization. On the other hand, if one is asked what happened to the clock, then, the centre of semantic organization will be the action of falling. But this is a subjective arrangement. However, Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṁsā think of fixing a uniform centre of semantic organization for all sentences. Nyāya holds that the agent is the centre of semantic organization. Vyākaraṇa holds that action, i.e. *dhātvartha* is the centre of semantic organization.

Mīmāṁsā holds that the *ākhyātārtha*, i.e. *bhāvanā*, motivation to action is the centre of semantic organization. These theories are designated as:

(i) *Prathamānta mukhya viśeṣyaka* theory
(ii) *Dhātvartha mukhya viśeṣyaka* theory
(iii) *Bhāvanā mukhya viśeṣyaka* theory

The Nyāya insisting on agent and Vyākaraṇa insisting on action have no special significance. But Mīmāṁsā insisting on *bhāvanā*, i.e. motivation to action, to be the centre of semantic organization has a significance for their whole programme of organizing the sacrifice, ethics, and epistemology.

According to Mīmāṁsakas, the central word meaning with which the other word meanings are to be associated is *ākhyātārtha*, i.e., meaning of the verbal termination. This is indicated by the phrase *kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ* in the *sūtra*. In this respect there are three different views.

(i) Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā holds that *ākhyātārtha*, i.e., the meaning of the verbal termination is the central meaning or *mukhya viśeṣya* in the sentence. This central meaning is *bhāvanā* according to Bhāṭṭas and *kārya* or *niyoga* according to Prābhākaras.
(ii) Vaiyākaraṇas hold the view that *dhātvartha*, the meaning of the verbal root is the central meaning. The other word meanings appropriately associated with it constitute the sentence meaning.
(iii) The Nyāya holds the view that in those sentences wherein there is a word in nominative case, meaning of that word is the central meaning. In a few cases verbal root meaning is the central meaning. In some cases the meaning of the verbal termination is the central meaning. In other cases, *nipātārtha* is the central meaning. Nyāya takes a pragmatic view and does not insist that only one of these is the central meaning. It depends upon the importance given to some or the other item in the actual use of the language.

Mīmāṁsā takes its stand on the statement in Nirukta of Yāska, viz., '*bhāva pradhānam ākhyātam*', i.e. the *bhāvanā* conveyed by the verbal termination is the central meaning. The words with the case suffixes accusative, instrumental, etc., are in need of a verb to convey their meaning as connected with the action. This indicates that the verb provides the central meaning. The verb consists of the root and the termination. Between these, the termination is more important. The meaning of the termination is *bhāvanā* or *preraṇā* which is impelling to undertake activity. This is the central meaning, i.e. *mukhya viśeṣya*. The

verbal termination conveys the time, number and the agency, i.e. *kartṛtva* also. However, these get connected with *bhāvanā* only. The meaning of the words get connected with *bhāvanā.*

The other words also consist of stem, i.e. *prātipadika,* and nominal suffixes. Between these two also suffix is more important than the stem. The meaning of the stem is associated with the meaning of the suffix. This unit gets connected with *bhāvanā.*

This works out in case of *kāraka* words, the words that are in accusative, instrumental. However, in the case of the words that are in nominative case, the question arises whether or not there is any need of a verb. In the statements like '*chaitraḥ paṇḍitaḥ*' '*aham paṇḍitaḥ*' that are descriptive, there seems to be no need of any verb. However, on the authority of Kātyayana's statement '*astiḥ bhavanti paraḥ aprayujyamanopi asti*' the verb 'is' or similar required verb has to be envisaged in all such cases.

In the case of the words in the nominative case, a special point to be noted is that the meaning of the nominative suffix is *kartṛtva.* Though the *kartṛtva* is conveyed by the verbal termination, it is conveyed by it in a general way. The nominative case suffix in the words *chaitra* particularly conveys it. The stem conveys the person *chaitra* and the nominative case suffix conveys him as the agent. This agency of *chaitra,* connected with *chaitra* by the relation of *ādheyatā,* gets connected with *bhāvanā* as conveyed by the verb.

Mīmāṁsā considers *kartṛtva* as *akhaṇḍa dharma* but not *anukūlakṛtyāśrayatva.* When one or more explanations of a characteristic do not suit all the instances, it is designated as *akhaṇḍa dharma.* Instead of considering different kinds of characteristics as *kartṛtva* to suit each context, it should be considered as one characteristic taking into account its basic function. *Kartṛtva* is considered as such an *akhaṇḍa dharma* since the nature of the agency differs in different instances. This also helps to consider the *kartṛtva* of the *yajamāna* and his wife as joint, i.e. *vyāsajyavṛtti.*

Prābhākaras also consider *ākhyatārtha,* i.e. the meaning of the verbal termination, as the central meaning. However, this meaning is not *bhāvanā.* It is *kārya* or *niyoga.* It is also designated as *apūrva* in the sense that it is not conveyed by any *pramāṇa* other than the Vedic injunction. All other words convey connected meanings only. Mere association is not the sentence meaning, but the associated or connected meaning is the sentence meaning. The connection or association is not obtained by *lakṣaṇā* but it is an essential part of the word meaning. Words convey their meaning as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word. The scope of the meaning of a word includes its connection with the relevant other meaning also. Prābhākaras interpret the *Jaimini sūtra* '*tadbhutānām*', etc., and Śabara's remark on it accordingly.[31]

In this context we may briefly note the views of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya.

Vyākaraṇa interprets the Nirukta's statement '*bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam*' in the sense that the verbal root meaning is the central meaning. The expression *bhāva* is interpreted as *dhātvartha,* i.e. root meaning. The statement in *Mahābhāṣya,* viz., '*kriyāpradhānam ākhyātam*' holds the root meaning as more important. A sentence consists of nouns and a verb. The nouns are subordinate while the verb is principal. Within the verb, the root is principal and its termination is subordinate. The statement that the suffix is more important than the stem applies only to nouns. So far as the verbs are concerned the root

meaning is more important than the meaning of the verbal suffix. Therefore, it is the root meaning, viz., action, that is the central meaning but not *bhāvanā*, i.e. the meaning of the verbal termination, as contended by Mīmāṁsakas.

Under the Nyāya sūtra, *'te vibhaktyantāḥ'* (II-2-57) the author of *Nyāyavārtika* remarks that *kriyāpradhānam ākhyātam*. This indicates that the old Naiyāyikas agreed with grammarian in considering the root meaning as central in the sentence.[32]

If one goes by the later Nyāya theory that the meaning of the word in the nominative case is central in a sentence, there will be difficulty in the following instances.

(i) The statement '*pacati bhavati*' in the sense 'the action of cooking takes place' given in *Mahābhāṣya* has no noun but still it is considered as a sentence.

(ii) The statement *'paśya mṛgo dhāvati'* will have to be treated as two sentences (i) *mṛgo dhāvati*, (ii) *tvam paśya*, meaning 'the *mṛga* has *'dhāvanānu kula kṛti'* and *'darśanāśrayaḥ tvam'* if noun is taken as the central word.

In case the verb is taken as the central word, the meaning of the above sentence may be paraphrased as *'mṛgakartṛka dhāvana karmaka darśana'*, i.e. the act of seeing the running of the deer.

In this explanation, the running of the deer is conveyed by the statement *mṛgo dhāvati* and the seeing of the running is conveyed as an object of the act of seeing.[33] These two form the contents of one sentence.

The Nyāya holds the view that the meaning of noun in the nominative case is the central meaning in the sentence. Naiyāyikas quote a number of sentences where in there is no verb at all. We may notice a few from a fine poem.

(i) *Śaśī divasa dhuṣaraḥ*, i.e. the moon dull during the day.

(ii) *Saraḥ vigatavārijam*, i.e. the lake without lotus.

(iii) *Prabhuḥ dhana parāyanaḥ*, i.e. an employer interested only in profit.

(iv) *Satata durgata sajjanaḥ*, i.e. a virtuous person always in difficulty.

(v) *Nṛpāngaṇagataḥ khalaḥ*, i.e. a cunning person close to the king.

None of these sentences has a verb. In these sentences the meaning of a noun in nominative case suffix is the central meaning.[34]

The statement of Kātyāyana that in such sentences the verb *'asti'* should be understood even if it is not expressly stated is not binding.

The Vaiyākaraṇins also have accepted the sentence *nīlam idam na raktam*, "This blue not red", without the verb *'asti'*.

The sentence *devadattaḥ paktā*, i.e. Devadatta a cook is accepted as a valid sentence without the verb.

[These are the examples of without verb in Sanskrit. Here in its English translation also the verb 'is' is removed.]

The statement *sup-tiṅantā cayo vākyam* is interpreted as *subanta caya* and *tiṅanta caya* by Manjūṣā in order to consider the sentences without verb as valid.

In view of this, the meaning of the noun in the nominative case suffix has to be accepted as the central meaning. This does not affect *ekavākyatā* of *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*, 'See, the dear is running.'

The sentence *'mṛgo dhāvati'* is *avāntara vākya*, i.e. a sentence within a sentence. *Dhāvana viśiṣṭa mṛga* is conveyed by this sentence. This can be the object of the act of seeing, i.e. *paśya*. The sentence meaning can be the object of another action. There are a number of instances of this type:

(i) *Jānami sītā janaka prasūtā*, i.e. I know that Sītā is the daughter of Janaka.

(ii) *Deva ākarṇaya saṅgrāme āsāditaḥ śarah*, i.e. O, king listen! the arrows are kept ready at the war.

(iii) *Śrutvā ca etanmāhātmyam tathā ca utpattayaḥ śubhāh*, i.e. Hearing this glory and the sacred incarnations.

In these instances, the sentence meaning is used as an object of another verb. The explanation of *kartṛtva* as *kṛtimatva* is also sustainable. In the case of *yajamāna* and his wife also it can be explained as *yāgakriyakṛtyāśraye* as applicable to both.[35]

XIV

THE ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDA AND ANVITABHIDHĀNAVĀDA THEORIES OF SENTENCE MEANING

When a person hears the sentence 'the clock fell on the ground' does he go on grasping the meaning of the words 'clock' 'fell' 'down' 'on' 'ground' separately and then semantically organizes them into one unit of thought or is the thought 'the clock fell on the ground' is grasped as a whole? In the latter case also, the words contribute to the formulation of the whole thought which is the meaning of the sentence. However, the meaning of the individual words is not separately communicated in isolation. The first view is known as *Abhihitānvaya* theory held by Bhāṭṭa school of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*. The second view, known as *Anvitābhidhāna* theory, is held by Prābhākara school of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*.

According to *abhihitānvaya vāda* words convey their meanings and these meanings duly associated constitute the sentence meaning. According to *Anvitābhidhāna vāda*, the words do not merely convey the objects referred to by them but also their association with the relevant objects conveyed by the other words in the sentence. These connected word meanings constitute the sentence meaning.

The expression *'abhihita'* refers to the word meaning expressed. The word *'anvita'* refers to the connected word meaning. *Anvaya*, i.e. the association of word meaning is necessary for constituting the sentence meaning in both the theories. However, they differ on the point whether the association is included in the scope of the meaning of the word itself or it is developed by the word meaning by way of *lakṣaṇā*, i.e. extended meaning. The *Abhihitānvaya* theory is adopted by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta while the *Anvitānabhidhāna* theory is adopted by Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and Dvaita Vedānta. The arguments advanced for and against these views give deeper insight into the Indian theory of language.

Generally it is said that the *Abhihitānvaya* theory considers the word as a unit of verbal communication and *Anvitābhidhāna* theory considers the sentence as the unit of verbal communication. However, on closer examination we find that both consider the sentence as a unit of verbal communication. They differ only in respect of the formulation of the sentence meaning. It is also generally said the *Jaimini sūtra 'tadbhūtanām kriyārthena'*, etc., particularly as explained by Śabara, support *Abhihitānvaya* theory. However, on closer

examination it will be found that these can as well support *anvitābhidhāna*. Therefore, the matter has to be settled by closely checking the *sūtras* and the *bhāṣya* remarks in all other relevant places. We will elaborate these points after summarising the arguments for and against these two theories.

Anvitābhidhānavādins raise the following objections against *abhihitānvaya vāda*.

(i) The contention of the *abhihitānvayavādin* that the words convey their meanings and these meanings convey the sentence meaning, i.e. connected word meanings, involves the envisaging of a three tiered denotative power: (a) a denotative power for the words to convey the word meaning, (b) a denotative power for the word meanings to convey the sentence meaning, (c) another power to the words to invest the word meanings with the power to convey the sentence meaning. But, if we go by *Anvitābhidhāna* theory, a single denotative power to denote the connected word meanings which is the sentence meaning is sufficient.

(ii) At the time of learning language by the youngsters the import of the sentence is comprehended for the sentence as a whole by observing the activity following the statement. Individual word meanings are comprehended only later. For instance, an old person asks the younger person to bring the cow. The latter person brings her. The boy, who observes this, comprehends the import of the whole sentence as the act of bringing the cow. He does not understand the meaning of the words 'cow' and 'bring' separately. Later, when he listens to another sentence 'bring the horse' he sorts out that the word *aśva* conveys the meaning of horse, and the word *ānaya* conveys the sense of the act of bringing. In this way, he goes on comprehending the import of the sentence consisting of unfamiliar words and sorts out the meanings of the individual words as and when these occur in different sentences. This clearly shows that connected word meanings are the basis of sentence meaning not mere word meanings. Therefore, primary denotative power conveys the connected word meaning. That is to say the *anvaya*, i.e. syntactical connection, has to be included in the scope of the word meaning.

The word meanings refer to the objects concerned. The association of these objects cannot constitute a sentence and a comprehension of this cannot be considered as the sentence meaning. In this connection, the example given by the Bhāṭṭa to establish that the word meanings can constitute the sentence meaning, is analysed and the idea is rejected.

A person sees some object that is white. He hears *hreṣā*, i.e. the neighing sound. He also hears the sound of the footsteps. Then he states *'sveto aśvo dhāvati'*, a white horse is running. Here, he has comprehended the *padārthas*, i.e. the objects only, connected them appropriately and comprehended the sentence meaning, namely, a white horse is running. By this example the Bhāṭṭas try to prove that the *padārthas* develop the association and lead to the sentence meaning. However, on closer examination we find that this is a cognition not produced by words at all but obtained by other means. There are two ways of understanding it.

(i) The *hreṣā* (neighing), and the sound of footsteps are found in some white object. Since these are the special features of a horse, this white object is a horse that is running. This knowledge is obtained by inference.

(ii) The white object, the *hreṣā,* and the sound of footstep are cognized without any common locus. But there must be some common locus. That is a running horse. This is *arthāpatti.*

Therefore, this cognition is either inferential or *arthāpatti.* It is not a verbal cognition at all. Hence, it cannot be an instance of word meaning constituting the sentence meaning.

If the word meanings are the means of sentence meaning, the latter will cease to be a verbal communication. The cognition that arises from the words only is verbal communication. The word meanings refer to objects. Therefore, a cognition that may arise by envisaging a relation among them is not verbal cognition. (T.B. p.110)

The Bhāṭṭas claim that the words employed in a sentence remind the respective objects referred to by them. These objects presented in the memory aided by *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi,* enable one to comprehend the sentence meaning.

This claim is rejected by pointing out that the objects presented in the memory by words will not necessarily lead to coherent sentence meaning. For instance, a person who remembers the palace in a city without remembering the particular city will not be able to associate this with that city. Remembering merely the objects conveyed by words will not help to comprehend the sentence meaning unless their association is also conveyed by the words.[36]

A number of objections are raised against *Anvitābhidhāna* theory also. We quote below some of these with the answers given in Prakaraṇa, Pañcikā, Tarkatāṇḍava and other texts that support *Anvitābhidhāna* theory.

(i) **Objection:** According to *Anvitābhidhāna* theory, in the sentence 'bring the cow' the word cow conveys the sense of cow connected with the action 'bring', and the word bring conveys the sense of the action 'bring' connected with the object cow. This amounts to conveying the sense of the same thing by these two words. Therefore, these words may have to be treated as synonyms. This is absurd.

Answer: Though the contents are same, there is a difference in the manner in which these are stated. The first states the object connected with the action and the second states the action connected with the object. These cannot be treated as synonyms. A person is a father from his son's point of view and a son from his father's point of view. Therefore, both the words son and father are used with reference to him. However, these words father and son cannot be considered as synonyms.[37]

(ii) **Objection:** A word is used in a number of sentences. It has to have different connections with different words in all these sentences. This means it will have to have a number of denotative powers to convey these connections. This leads to *ānantya,* i.e. infinite denotative powers for each word.

Answer: The words employed in a sentence convey the connection of their meaning with the aid of *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi.* The connection is conveyed with the other relevant word which satisfies these criteria. Therefore, there is no need of a different denotative power to convey the connection with different other words in different sentences. Just as one and the same eye gives the cognition of different objects as and when these are presented to the eye, one and the same

denotative power of a word conveys the connection of its meaning with the meaning of the relevant other words as and when these are employed in a sentence with it.[38]

(iii) **Objection:** A word is expected to convey its meaning as connected with the meaning of the other word. This means that the meaning of the other word has to be known earlier. The other word also has to convey its meaning as connected with the meaning of this word. This means that the meaning of that word has to be known earlier. Thus, these are dependent upon each other. Hence, both will not be able to play their role. This drawback is techically known as *anyonyāśraya*, interdependence.

Answer: The words employed in a sentence remind the object referred to by them in the first instance. Then only these proceed to convey the connection of their meaning with the meaning of the other relevant word. The object referred to by the other word is also already reminded. Hence, there is no question of interdependence. (Pr.P. 40,67)

XV

INTERPRETATION OF THE SŪTRA TADBHŪTĀNAṀ KṚIYĀRTHENA SAMĀMNĀYAḤ ARTHASYA TANNIMITTATATVAT

It is interesting to note that both abhihitānvayavādins and anvitābhidhānavādins claim that their viewpoint is stated in *Jaimini sūtra* and *Śabara bhāṣya.* We state below their interpretations.

Abhihitānvayavādin's interpretation of the *sūtra*: *Tadbhūtānāṁ kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt.*[39]

The words employed in a sentence convey their meanings to accomplish the action. The word meanings constitute the sentence meaning.

Remarks of the Śabara bhāṣya:

(i) *na anapekṣya padārthān pṛthagarthyena vākyam arthāntara prasiddham*
Apart from word meanings, there is no distinct sentence meaning.

(ii) *Padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, atha idānīṁ padārthāḥ avagatāḥ santaḥ vākyārtham gamayanti.*

The role of words ends with the communication of their own separate meanings. After that, having been understood, the word meanings lead to the understanding of the meaning of the sentence.

The word *kriyā* is explained as *sādhya sādhanetikartavyatā viśiṣṭa bhāvanā*, i.e. the *bhāvanā* qualified by *sādhya* meaning *bhāvya*, i.e. the result, *sādhana*, i.e. *kāraṇa*, the means, *iti kartavyatā*, i.e. the auxiliaries.

Anvitābhidhāna-vādin's interpretation of the *sūtra*: *Tadbhūtānām teṣu padārtheṣu anviteṣu vartamanānām kriyārthena samamnāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt.*

The words employed in a sentence convey the connected meaning to accomplish the action. The connected word meanings constitute the sentence meaning.

Bṛhatī and Pañcikā interpretation of the *sūtra*:[40]

Tadbhūtānāṁ teṣu padārtheṣu anviteṣu vartamānānāṁ kriyārthena samamnāyaḥ arthasya padārthasya anvitasya tannimittatvāt anvaya nimittatvāt.

(i) The word *kriyā* primarily means *kārya* or *niyoga*. It also means ordinary activity in non-Vedic sentences.

(ii) The word *anvaya* means *vākyārtha* (Bṛhatī p.391-392)

Interpretation of Śabara's remarks by anvitābhidhānavādins:

(i) *Padāni anvitam abhidhāya nivṛtta vyapārāṇi na anvayaṁ pṛthak abhidadhati.*
The words convey connected meanings. Since their purpose is over, they do not convey the connection separately.

(ii) *Atha idānim anvitāḥ pratītāḥ anvayamapi pratītaṁ sampādayanti.*
As these are comprehended as interconnected, the interconnection is also comprehended.

(iii) *Bhāṣyakāraḥ vākyārtha śabdena anvayamāha.*
The Bhāṣyakāra has used the expression *vākyārtha* in the sense of *anvaya.*

(iv) *Vede tu apūrvātmā anvitaḥ vākyārthaḥ.*
Vedic injunctions convey *apūrva* i.e., *kārya* connected with *kāraṇa, niyojya* etc.[41]

When one goes through these two interpretations of the same *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya* remarks on it, one feels that the Prābhākara interpetation is a little laboured while the Bhāṭṭa interpretation is closer to the wordings of the *bhāṣya.* However, the theory of learning the language through the elders' conversation, which is repeatedly utilized in the *bhāṣya,* supports the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory. Even Bhāṭṭas concede that in the early stage of learning language the meaning of a sentence as a whole is comprehended. Later only isolated word meanings are comprehended. This amounts to accepting *Anvitābhidhāna* theory as a primary theory of verbal communication.

XVI

THE IMPORT OF THE INJUNCTION

In *Pūrvamīmāṁsā,* semantic injunction, i.e., *vidhi,* occupies the central position. The central theme of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā,* namely, *dharma,* is enjoined by Vedic injunctions. The injunction *yajeta* in the statement *svargakāmo yajeta* enjoins the performance of the sacrifice for a person who desires the *svarga.* The verb *yajeta* contains optative suffix. This suffix is designated as *Liṅ* in Sanskrit. It is also called *vidhi pratyaya,* i.e. the suffix that conveys injunction. Its meaning is called *vidhyartha,* i.e. the meaning of an optative suffix. It is briefly called *vidhi,* i.e. injunction.

The chief role of an injunction is to prompt to undertake an action. This is designated as *cikīrṣā* in Sanskrit. As soon as one hears the statement *'svargakāmo yajeta'* he is prompted to undertake the sacrifice to obtain *svarga.* The act of prompting by the optative suffix is designated as *pravartanā preraṇā.* The desire to undertake *yāga* produced by this *preraṇā* is *cikīrṣā.* Now, this prompting to act will not automatically produce the desire to act merely by its cognition. It should also convey that the action enjoined leads to a desired object. It is *iṣṭasādhana,* i.e. a means to get a desired object. Therefore, the injunctive suffix has to convey this also and this has to be included in the scope of the meaning of an injunctive suffix.

Further, the action enjoined to be undertaken should be within the capacity of the person to whom the injunction is addressed. If a person is asked to go and fetch the moon, he will not act as if it is beyond his capacity. Therefore, *kṛtisādhyatva,* i.e. the undertaking of the act being within the capacity of the person concerned has also to be conveyed by the injunctive suffix and this also should be included in the scope of the meaning of that suffix.

Even after knowing that the enjoined act leads to the desired object and is within his capacity, if the person concerned comes to know that it leads to some strong adverse effect, he will not undertake such an act. Therefore, the injunctive suffix should also inform him in a general way that the act enjoined does not lead to any strong adverse effect. For instance, the statement 'consume the poison' will not be acted upon since it is harmful. In view of this another requirement, viz., *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva,* i.e. not affected by any strong adverse effect, has to be included in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix.

From the above discussion it emerges that an injunctive suffix has to convey (i) *iṣṭasādhanatva,* i.e. the act lead to the desired object, (ii) *kṛti sādhyatva,* i.e. the act is within the capacity of the person concerned, (iii) *balavadaniṣṭānanu bandhitva,* i.e. the act does not lead to any strong adverse effect. Therefore, these three are to be included in the scope of the meaning of an injunctive suffix. This is the import of a *vidhi,* i.e. injunction. To convey these three, the injunctive suffix need not have three denotative powers. Since the purpose of these three is one *pravartanā,* i.e. prompting to undertake the act, these can be conveyed by a single denotative power. This view is held by Nyāya.[42]

However, on closer examination it will be found that the second and the third need not be included in the scope of the meaning of an injunctive suffix. (i) *Kṛtisādhyatva,* i.e. the act's accomplishment being within the capacity of the person concerned, is laid down to prevent the contingency of enjoining to bring the moon. However, when the person concerned does not act, he does so because he realizes that he will not get the desired result. Hence, there is the breakdown of *iṣṭasādhanatva* that is required to undertake the act. In the example 'bring the moon', the realization of the fact that the person concerned will not get the desired object, i.e. moon, prevents him from undertaking the act. Therefore, there is no need to include *kṛtisādhyatva* in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix. (TT. p.339)

Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva, i.e. not leading to any strong adverse effect also need not be a meaning of the injunctive suffix. The knowledge that the act to be undertaken leads to an adverse effect may prevent the undertaking of the act but the knowledge of the absence of any such adverse effect is not necessary to undertake the act. Therefore, this also need not be included in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix. For example, the statement 'Eat the poison' is not acted upon because it leads to strong adverse effect. But the statement, 'bring the cow' has not to wait to get cleared that it does not lead to any adverse effect. Hence, only *iṣṭasādhanatva* remains as an import of an injunctive suffix.[44]

Vyākaraṇa and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā accept *iṣṭasādhanatva* as the import of injunctive suffix. The import of an injunctive suffix is explained in the Pāṇini's *sūtra* as '*vidhi-nimantraṇa āmantraṇa ādhīṣtha sampraśna prārthaneṣu liṅ.*' In this *sūtra* six meanings are assigned to an injunctive suffix.

(i) *Vidhi,* i.e. prompting a person who is not equal or superior, to act.
(ii) *Nimantraṇa,* i.e. prompting a person to act pointing out the adverse effect if he does not act. For instance, asking the daughter's son to be a *brāhmaṇa* at the ceremony of his maternal grandfather. If he does not agree, he will incur *pratyavāya.*
(iii) *Āmantraṇa,* i.e. prompting to undertake the act or not to undertake as per the option.
(iv) *Adhīṣṭham,* i.e. prompting a superior person to undertake the act with respect.
(v) *Sampraśna,* i.e. asking whether one likes to undertake the act.
(vi) *Prārthanā,* i.e. appeal to undertake the act.

Among these six meanings, the first four are of the type of *pravartanā,* i.e. prompting to undertake the act. Therefore, making margin for these shades of meaning, *pravartanā* can be taken as a common import of the injunctive suffix in all these cases. Vākyapadīya makes this position clear by the remark '*asti pravartanārūpam anusyūtam caturṣu api.*' This *pravartanā* is of the nature *iṣṭasādhanatā.* The injunctive suffix conveys *iṣṭasādhanatva* and prompts the undertaking of the act. Therefore, it is called *pravartanā.* This approach is endorsed by Maṇḍana Miśra, *Puṁsāṁ na iṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyāsu anyaḥ pravartakaḥ.*

"There is nothing which prompts persons to undertake action apart from to serve as a means to achieve what is desired."

Pārthasārathi Miśra also holds the same view.[45]

Khaṇḍadeva does not consider *iṣṭasādhanatva* as the meaning of the injunctive suffix. He considers it rather as the *pravṛtti prayojaka vyāpāra,* i.e. a function that prompts one just to undertake the action. This is designated as *pravartanā.* It is not the same as *iṣṭasādhanatā.* The *iṣṭasādhanatā* has to be inferred from it.

As soon as one hears an injunctive statement, he is prompted to undertake the act. Such prompting is a *vyāpāra,* that is a function of the injunctive suffix. Such a function is observed both in Vedic and *laukika* injunctions. As it arises from the word, it is designated as *śābdibhāvanā.* The *pravṛtti,* i.e. the initiative to undertake activity generated by it is designated as *ārthī bhāvanā.* These two are conveyed by the injunctive suffix.[46]

XVII

PRĀBHĀKARA'S CONCEPT OF KĀRYA AS THE IMPORT OF INJUNCTION

The Prābhākaras differ from Bhāṭṭas. They do not consider *iṣta sādhanatā* as the import of the injunctive suffix. They have developed a unique and new concept *kārya,* i.e. the task to be accomplished. The injunctive suffix conveys *kārya.* As soon as an injunctive statement is heard, the person concerned comprehends that he has to accomplish a *kārya,* i.e. *'mam idam kāryam.'* The particular subject of this *kārya* is provided by *yāga.* The objective, i.e. *svarga,* gives the clue of the person who has to accomplish this *kārya.* He is called *niyojya,* i.e. the respondent.

The person interested in attaining *svarga* is *adhikārin,* i.e. eligible person. He is *niyojya.* The *niyoga* enjoins the *niyojya* person to accomplish the *kārya* by performing *yāga.* The performer is called *adhikārin* as he is interested in obtaining the result, i.e., *svarga.* He is called *niyojya,* since he responds to *niyoga.* Ordinarily the performer is both *adhikārin* and *niyojya.* In fact to be a *niyojya,* it is necessary to be an *adhikārin.* However, there are one or two exceptions in which the performer is only an *adhikārin.* In the example, '*darśapūrṇa māsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta*', "One desirous of attaining heaven, should perform the *darsa* and *pūrṇamasa* sacrifice", *svargakāma* is *adhikārin* and *niyojya* while *darśapūrṇamāsa* is the subject as well as the means to accomplish the *kārya.* The import of the injunctive suffix is *kārya,* i.e. the task to be accomplished by performing the *yāga.* In view of this, the *kārya* is described as *vākyārtha.* In fact, it is the entire *Vedārtha* since the central theme of the Veda, namely, *dharma,* is of the nature of accomplishment of the *kārya* by performing the sacrifice described in the Veda.[47]

The chief role of the import of an injunctive suffix is to prompt the *niyojya* to undertake the activity. Excepting Prābhākaras, all others broadly agree that it is *iṣtasādhanatājñāna,* i.e. the knowledge that the act to be undertaken leads to the desired result. But the Prābhākaras argue that it is *kāryatā,* i.e. the realization on his part that it is a task or duty to be accomplished by him that prompts the person to undertake the act.

Now we have to examine the relative claim of *iṣtasādhanatā* and *kāryatā* as the ground to prompt one to undertake the act. Ordinarily it appears that one proceeds to act on having comprehended that the act concerned leads to the desired result. However, it is only an incentive but not the final ground. Even when one knows that something is *iṣtasādhana,* he will not proceed to act unless he thinks that this is a task that he has to accomplish. The knowledge of *iṣtasādhanatā* is a stepping stone to develop the interest in considering the task as one needing to be accomplished. Since both *iṣtasādhana* and *kāryatā* are present in the majority of cases, people are not able to distinguish the role of the two.

In course of discussion on the concept of *pravartanā* of Bhāṭṭa's we have already noticed that Khaṇḍadeva does not consider *iṣtasādhanatā* as the import of the injunctive suffix. He has said that it is only inferred. Maṇḍana Miśra identifies *iṣtasādhanatā* with *pravartanā.* In Dvaita Vedānta tradition, *kāryatā* is identified with *iṣtasādhanatā.* When we

say that *pravartanā* is prompting to undertake the act, the prompting has to generate a sense in the mind of the respondent that it is a task to be undertaken by him. This means that the element of *kāryatā* has to be there. Therefore, the only question that has to be settled is as to which of these two is to be considered as the import of the injunctive suffix and which supports it. This issue has a bearing on another important issue, *kārye vyutpatti* and *siddhe vyutpatti*, i.e. whether the of meaning the sentence is an action or an object.

XVIII

THE IMPORT OF PROHIBITION

The purpose of prohibitive statements is to prompt a person to withdraw from undertaking the prohibited act. In the prohibitive statements, the negative particle '*na*' is added to the verb to convey this sense. The particle '*na*' is syntactically connected with the *liṅ* aspect of the injunctive suffix and conveys *nivartanā*, i.e. withdrawal. It is the nature of the negative particle '*na*' to convey the opposite. Since the *liṅ* conveys *pravartanā* in the normal course, the opposite position of the *nivartanā* is conveyed when the negative particle is added to it. For instance, the statement '*na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet*' conveys the sense of withdrawal from eating uncooked meat. According to those who hold that the *liṅ* conveys *iṣṭasādhanatva*, with the addition of the negative particle it conveys *aniṣṭa sādhanatva*.

In certain cases such as *abrāhmaṇa* and *adharma*, the negative particle conveys the meaning '*tadanya*', i.e. other than that. The expression *abrāhmaṇa* means 'other than *brāhmaṇa*' and the expression *adharma* means other than *dharma*. When a negative particle is added to a substantive word, i.e. *nāma* or a verbal root, it conveys the sense 'other than that.' It conveys withdrawal only when it is added to an injunctive suffix. The scope of the negative particle is neatly stated as '*tadanya-tadviruddha tadabhāveṣu na*', i.e., the negative particle conveys the meanings 'other than that', 'opposite of that' and the 'absence of that.'[48]

XIX

THE CONCEPT OF PARYUDĀSA

The implication of the use of a negative particle is explained in another interesting way. There is a Vedic statement '*na anuyājeṣu ye yajāmaham' karoti'*, i.e. *ye yajāmaha* is not recited in *anuyājas*.

This is a negative statement. A negation can be made of only such items that have a positive scope. For instance, the presence of a person can be denied only if such a person exists. In the present case, the statement '*yajatiṣu ye yajāmaham karoti'* provides the positive side. Now, since both the negative and positive statements are Vedic, none of them could be discarded. Hence arises the contingency of considering them as *vikalpa*, i.e. alternates

like *vrīhi* and *yava*. Considering any two items as alternates is a drawback. It results in the *aprāmāṇya* of each one of them when the other item is adopted. Therefore, an interesting new technique of interpreting such negative statements is evolved. This is designated as *paryudāsa*. In *paryudāsa* the negative particle '*na*' gets syntactically connected with a noun or verbal root.

According to this technique, negative particle '*na*' has to be taken with *anuyāja* and assigned the meaning *anuyāja vyatirikta,* i.e., other than *anuyāja*. Now, the whole sentence means, '*ye yajāmaḥ*' be recited in other than *anuyāja*. This is exclusion but not direct negation. There is no conflict between '*yajatiṣu ye yajāmaham karoti*' and *anuyāja vyatirikteṣu ye yajāmaham karoti.*' Hence, there is no need of *vikalpa*. In this example, a negative statement is converted into a positive statement making provision for the negation within the statement by exclusion. This process is designated as *paryudāsa.*

'*Na īkṣeta udyantam ādityam*', i.e. 'a *brahmacārin* should not look at the rising sun', is another example of *paryudāsa*. This statement occurs along with other items of the code of conduct to be followed by a *brahmacārin*. The statement of the code of conduct commences with the remark *tad-vratam,* i.e. the following must be acted upon. The expression '*na īkṣeta*' cannot be taken in the sense of the absence of looking. The absence cannot be acted upon. Therefore, something that is opposite of *īkṣaṇa* which can be enjoined has to be taken as the meaning of the expression '*na īkṣeta.*' This something is envisaged as *anīkṣaṇa saṅkalpa,* i.e. a determination not to look at the sun. This is a positive act. It can be enjoined. Here also a negative statement is converted into a positive one making provision for the exclusion of the item that has to be denied by the negative particle. Here, it is not for avoiding *vikalpa* but to bring unity with the positive statement at the commencement.

In the instance '*atirātre ṣoḍaśinām gṛhṇāti*' '*na atirātre ṣoḍaśim gṛnhāti*' 'on the occasion of *atirātra,* he accepts sixteen *grahas*'. On the occasion of *atirātra,* he does not accept, sixteen *grahas*', these is direct opposion. Hence, *paryudāsa* cannot be managed and *vikalpa* has to be accepted. However, since both are Vedic statements, there will not be any adverse effect if *ṣoḍaśigrahaṇa* is not done. The negation only indicates that the sacrifice concerned will lead to the expected result even without *ṣoḍaśigrahaṇa*. On the other hand, if *ṣoḍaśigrahaṇa* is made taking into the account the positive statement, the performer will get better results.[49]

In the instance '*vapāyām hutāyām dīkṣitasya annam aśnīyāt*'. "After the offering of the *vapā* in the fire, one should take the food offered by the *dīkṣita*"—there is no need of conveying *iṣṭa sādhanatva* since, eating food is a natural act. However, in another statement '*na dīkṣitasya annam aśnīyāt*' taking food offered by *dīkṣita* is prohibited. Therefore, the statement permitting to take food at a particular time offered by *dīkṣita* conveys that the *aniṣṭa sādhanatva* conveyed by the earlier statement is not applicable to taking food according to this statement.

From the above discussion it is clear that the injunctive suffix normally conveys *iṣṭasādhanatva*. However, in certain instances it conveys *aniṣṭa sādhanatvābhāva*. *Pravartanā* and *Nivartanā* are the primary meanings of injunction and prohibition.

The Prābhākaras do not accept any result for *nitya, naimittika* and *niṣedha*. In all these cases, the injunctive suffix conveys *kāryatā*. Even in the case of *kāmya karmas* also

the injunctive suffix conveys *kāryatā* only. The mention of the result in *kāmya karma* is intended to provide for the *adhikārin.* In the case of *nitya* and *naimittika adhikārin* and *niyojya* these are available on other grounds. Therefore, there is no need to envisage the result in any form for these. Prābhākaras do not accept *iṣṭasādhanatva* as the import of an injunctive suffix.

XX

THE STATUS OF ŚYENA YĀGA

There is an interesting discussion about *śyena yāga.* This discussion deals with three questions:

(i) Whether *iṣṭasādhanatva,* 'the state of serving as a means to obtain the desired object' is conveyed by the injunctive suffix in the statement *'śyenena yajeta'*.

(ii) Whether *śyena yāga* is *dharma* or *adharma.*

(iii) What is the difference between the *paśu hiṁsā* at *agniṣomīya* sacrifice and the *hiṁsā* of the enemy by *śyena yāga*?

The answer to the first question is that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is conveyed by the injunctive suffix as in the case of all other injunctive suffixes. However, it is *aniṣṭasādhana* also. Its *aniṣṭasādhanatva* is not conveyed by the injunctive suffix but by the very nature of the act of *hiṁsā* which is prohibited by the Vedic statement '*mā hiṁsyāt sarvabhūtāni*', 'do not cause injury to any of the creatures'.

The answer to the second question is that *śyena yāga* is *adharma.* The definition *dharma 'codanā lakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmaḥ'* has two clauses, viz., *codanā lakṣaṇa,* i.e. enjoined by Vedic injunction, and *artha* i.e. that leads to welfare. In the case of *śyena yāga* the second clause is violated. Therefore, it is not *dharma.* On the contrary it is *adharma,* since, *hiṁsā* is prohibited by a Vedic injunction.

Third question is a little ticklish. From the ordinary point of view, both *agniṣomīya paśuhiṁsā* and killing of enemy by *śyena yāga* are *hiṁsā* and both are connected with *yāga.* However, there is a distinction in which these are connected with *yāga. Paśuhiṁsā* at *agniṣomīya* is a part of the sacrifice as an *aṅga,* as it is *kratvartha.* Hence, it does not attract the general prohibition '*mā hiṁsyāt*', 'do not cause injury'.

On the other hand, the *hiṁsā* generated by *śyena yāga* is a result of the *yāga.* The result is desired by the *puruṣa.* It is *rāgataḥ prāpta,* i.e. motivated by the desire of the person but not *śāstraprāpta.* Hence, it attracts the prohibition *'mā hiṁsyāt'.* Not performing *śyena yāga* does not lead to any adverse religious result. While not offering *paśu* at *agniṣomīya* will adversely affect the performance of the sacrifice. That is why *agniṣomīya paśuhiṁsā* is excluded from the scope of the prohibition, Further, *prāyaścitta,* i.e. expiation, is prescribed for *śyena yāga* while no such *prāyaścitta* is prescribed for *agniṣomīya paśuhiṁsā.* Therefore, these two are not on a par. *Paśuhiṁsā* at *agniṣomiya* is *dharma* while *śyena yāga* that results in the death of the enemy is *adharma.*[50] We may compare these two acts of *hiṁsā* to the *hiṁsā* at the battlefield as a duty by the soldier and the same soldier killing his neighbour for personal enemity.

In course of this discussion, *Tarkatāṇḍava* gives an interesting information—originally *śyena yāga* was envisaged to destroy the foreign enemies.

XXI

VĀKYABHEDA, i.e. SPLITTING ONE STATEMENT INTO TWO INJUNCTIONS

A Vedic statement should be interpreted as enjoining one action or one item. If it is taken as enjoining more than one, it results in two statements. This is technically designated as *vākyabheda*. This is a great drawback. It is a greater drawback than *lakṣaṇā*. Śabara puts it briefly as *nahi vidheḥ vidheḥ ca ekavākyatā bhavati,* i.e., two injunctions cannot make one statement or one sentence. In view of this the Vedic passages are interpreted in the *bhāṣya* all along as conveying only one injunction and the passages that appear to enjoin more than one item are suitably interpreted to have *ekavākyatā* with the injunctive statement. Avoiding *vākyabheda* and identifying one injunction is a major methodology adopted in the bhāṣya for interpreting the vedic statements. This has helped to sort out the injunctive passages and non-injunctive passages.

We will notice a few examples of avoiding the contingency of *vākyabheda.*

In the statement *'nivītam manuṣyāṇāṁ prācīnāvītaṁ pitṛṇām upavītam devānām upavyayate devalakṣmameva tatkurute',* the modes of wearing the sacred thread are stated as *upavīta, prācīnāvīti* and *nivīta.* While performing the rituals connected with men the sacred thread should be worn in *nivīta* style, connected with manes in *prācināvīta* style and connected with deities in *upavīta* style. If this statement is taken as enjoining these three modes of wearing the sacred thread, it will result in three injunctive sentences, that is to say, one sentence is treated as three sentences. This is *vākyabheda.* This should be avoided. Therefore, it should be taken as enjoining the *upavīta* mode for the deities. The other two modes meant for men and manes are stated here only to praise the *upavīta* style. Therefore, that part of the statement is *arthavāda.* It is not *vidhi.*[51]

At *jyotiṣṭoma,* elevan *yūpas* are prescribed. With reference to these *yūpas,* it is stated that *'yūpasya antike agnī mathitvā yūpāhutiṁ juhoti'*—preparing the sacred fire near the *yūpa* the *āhuti* be offered. Here, if both the preparation of the sacred fire and preparing it near the *yūpas* are taken as enjoined, it will result in *vākyabheda,* that is to say, one statement leading to two injunctions. Hence, it is ruled that *manthana,* i.e. preparing the sacred fire is enjoined here. Normally the *āhuti* is offered at *āhavanīya.* When it is enjoined that a sacred fire be prepared for offering *āhuti* for *yūpa,* it follows that it has to be near the *yūpa.* Therefore, no specific injunction is necessary to indicate the place. Moreover, the expression *antika,* i.e., close, is vague. If it is very close, the *yūpa* will be burnt. Therefore, it cannot be enjoined. It should be left to the convenience of the sacrificer. Further, instead of taking the preparation of the sacred fire for *yūpāhuti,* if the *antikatva,* i.e. closeness of offering *āhuti,* is enjoined, the *āhavanīya* itself will be required to be brought to the place of *āhuti.* This is not possible. Therefore, only the *manthana,* i.e. preparing the sacred fire, is enjoined by this statement. Hence, there is no *vākyabheda.* (S.B. 11-2-26)

At *jyotiṣṭoma, avabhṛta yāga* is prescribed. In connection with this *yāga* it is stated that *'apsu tṛṇaṁ prāsya āghāram aghārayati'* 'having spread the grass on water, he sprinkles *ghṛta.*' If this statement is taken as enjoining *tṛṇaprāsana,* i.e. spreading the grass, and also offering *āghāra,* it will result in *vākyabheda.* Therefore, it has to be taken as enjoing *tṛṇa prāsana* only while *āghara* is the auxiliary of *avabhṛta.* Hence, there is no need to separately enjoin it.

While discussing the eligibility to perform the sacrifice, a question is raised whether such persons who are not able to carry out all the details of a sacrifice are eligible to perform the sacrifice or not. For instance, a lame person is not able to perform *Viṣṇukramaṇa,* a blind person is not able to observe *ājya avekṣaṇa.* Are these persons eligible or not? *Pūrvapakṣin* suggests that the injunction *Svargakāmo yajeta* may be taken as enjoining the full details for those who are able and without such details for those who cannot perform them. However, this will result in *vākyabheda,* since it enjoins different ways of performance for different persons. This cannot be allowed. (S.B. 6-1-6)

At *Kuṇḍapāyinām ayana* two sacrifices are enjoined as *'māsam agnihotram juhāt'* and *'māsam darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta'.* Here the question arises whether the auxiliary of a month's time is enjoined for these two sacrifices or two separate sacrifices of the same name, the duration of which is one month, are enjoined. To settle this question we have to take into account an earlier remark, viz., *upasadbhiḥ caritvā,* i.e. after performing the *upasads.* There are no *upasads* at the well-known *agnihotra* or *darśapūrṇamāsa.* Hence, *māsāgnihotra* and *māsa darśapūrṇamāsa* have to be considered as separate sacrifices. Now, the *Pūrvapakṣin* argues that *upasads* also may be taken as enjoined. This is not possible. Enjoining two items by one and the same statement will result in taking it as two sentences and injunctions. This is not justified. For a sacrifice that is already enjoined, two subordinate items cannot be enjoined by a single statement, while a new sacrifice can be enjoined together with more than one subordinate item.[52]

There is an interesting example where *vākyabheda* is avoided by *viśiṣṭa vidhi.* The statement *'śoṇam ānaya'* appears to enjoin the bringing of tawny colour. The colour cannot be brought as it is a quality. To avoid this difficulty, if the horse that has tawny colour is also taken as enjoined, it will result in two injunctions and *vākyabheda.* This is avoided by considering that a tawny coloured horse is enjoined here.[53]

The above examples reveal that avoiding *vākyabheda* is a major methodology to correctly identify the exact nature of the main and subsidiary acts of sacrifices.

In connection with *vākyabheda,* an important point to be noted is that there can be no syntactical unity between two injunctions, two subordinate items, and between a *mantra* and a *brāhmaṇa* passage. These support each other in organising the sacrifice but do not form one syntactical unit.

In the above presentation, an attempt is made to cover all important aspects of the semantics of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* Examples are mostly drawn from *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* area. The views of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya are quoted and compared. Mīmāṁsā has a special approach in some respects. This is highlighted. Critical comments are added from the inter-disciplinary point of view. There is much scope for inter-disciplinary approach with a modern perspective in this subject.

ABBREVIATIONS

B.K.	*Bhāṭṭa Kaustubha*
Bh.R.	*Bhāṭṭa Rahasya*
J.S.	*Jaiminī Sūtrāni*
N.M.	*Nyāya Muktāvali*
M.N.P.	*Mīmāṁsā Nyāyaprakāśa*
S.B.	*Sābara Bhāṣyam*
S.B.T.	*Śabdabodhatarangiṇī*
Pr.P.	*Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*
T.T.	*Tarkatāṇḍavam*
T.B.	*Tattvabindu*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. J.S. I-1-5, SB I-1-5.
2. S.B.I-1-1.
3. Ibid. VI-1-1.
4. J.S. I-3-30, SB I-3-30.
5. Ibid. X-3-44.
6. S.B. I-3-30.
7. NM p.368.
8. SB I-1-5.
9. Ibid. IV-1-15.
10. Ibid. I-3-9.
11. Ibid. I-3-10.
12. Ibid. I-2-41.
13. J.S. III-2-1.
14. S.B. X-1-33 to 48.
15. Ibid. X-1-14.
16. Ibid. VI-8-35.
17. Ibid. VI-1-44.
18. Ibid. I-4-23.
19. Ibid VI-4-42.
20. Ibid. IV-4-19, XII-2-24.
21. Ibid. III-1-18.
22. Ibid. II-1-37.
23. Ibid. 1-1-25.
24. Ibid. III-3-14.
25. Bh.K. p.120.
26. T.T. Vol. II, p.23.
27. S.B. II-1-48.
28. Ibid I-1-24.
29. SBT, p.2.
30. S.B. I-1-25.
31. SBT p.159-163.
32. Ibid p.170-172.
33. Ibid p.174-175.
34. Ibid. p.178.
35. Ibid. p.192.
36. TB, p.113.
37. T.T. Vol.I, Pr.P. p.403.
38. Pr.P. p.384, 394.
39. J.S. I-1-25.

40. Bṛ p. 391-92.
41. Pr. P. p.412.
42. Bh.R p.8.
43. T.T. p.339.
44. Bh.R. p.10.
45. Ibid. p.15.
46. Ibid. p.12.
47. Pr.P. p.451.
48. M.N.P.
49. Ibid.
50. T.T.
51. S.B. III-4-9.
52. Ibid. II-3-24.
53. Ibid. II-2-27.

III

Dharma—The Central Theme of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

CHAPTER 7

Exposition of Dharma as the Central Theme of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

I

THE DIMENSIONS OF DHARMA

The expression *dharma* has a wide range of meanings. This word is derived from the Sanskrit root *dhṛ* to support, to sustain. Keeping this basic meaning intact, various shades of meanings are developed in its use in the areas of (i) ethics and morality; (ii) social realtions; (iii) religion and philosophy; (iv) law, and all other areas of life with reference to human conduct, duties, and responsibilities.

In the area of ethics and morality, it means right, just, virtuous, good, duty, etc.

In the area of social relation, it refers to the duties of *varṇa* and *āśrama,* social customs and practices, and certain personal and social virtues to be developed by every member of the society. Manu concisely puts them under five heads.

ahiṁsā, satyam asteyaṁ śaucam indriya nigrahaḥ.[1]
etaṁ sāmāsikaṁ dharmaṁ cāturvarṇye abravīt manuḥ.

Not injuring anyone, truthfulness, non-stealing, cleanliness of mind, body and speech, restraint of senses constitute *dharma* that are to be practiced by all. This is an essential civic code of conduct for all members of the society.

In the area of religion, rituals and worship connected with religious practices are considered as *dharma.*

The *dharmas* in all these areas are not exclusive of each other. One cannot ignore ethical and social values and confine oneself only to the practice of rituals, worship and related forms as *dharma* in the religious field, nor can one totally ignore the religion and be content with practicing ethical and social values. All these are essential aspects of *dharma.* That is why the same word *dharma* is used for all these. This has made the expression *dharma* untranslatable in English or any other language. The expression *dharma* represents a multidimensional concept. Its particular dimension has to be kept at the focal point in the particular context.

Pūrvamīmāṁsā Concept of Dharma

Without giving up this multi-dimensional import of the term *dharma*, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* uses it in the area of *Śrauta* religion in the sense of *Yāga*, i.e. sacrifice enjoined by Vedic injunctions. The word *dharma* is used with reference to the total programme of sacrifice. It is also used with reference to various aspects of sacrifice that are enjoined by Vedic injunctions. The very fact that these are enjoined by the Veda, elevates them to the status of *dharma*, i.e. the sacred duty.

Jaimini declares *codana lakṣaṇaḥ artho dharmaḥ*

'*Dharma* is what has been enjoined by the Veda'.

Sacrifice has four important components,[2] viz., (i) *dravya*, i.e. the *havis* to be offered, (ii) *devatā*, i.e. the deity with reference to whom it is offered, (iii) *kriryā*, i.e., the main and subsidiary programmes of the sacrifice, (iv) *tyāga*, i.e. withdrawal of the ownership of the *dravya* to be offered by the sacrificer and *prakśepa*, i.e. putting the *dravya*, i.e. *havis*, in the sacrificial fire. The *yāga* consisting of these four components is *dharma*. Such *yāgas* are enjoined by Vedic injunctions and these lead to the individual and social welfare. Jaimini explains *dharma* as *cōdana lakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ* that which is enjoined by a Vedic injunction and leads to the welfare. For instance, the Vedic injunction '*Agñihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*' enjoins *agnihotra yāga* that leads to *svarga*.

The Role of Pūrvamīmāṁsā

Vedas consist of Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upaniṣads. Among these, Brāhmaṇas describe a large number of *yāgas*. The details required for the performance of these *yāgas* are also given. The Brāhmaṇas of *Yajurveda*, particularly that of the *Taittirīya Śākhā*, describe the major sacrifices. However, these are not described in an organized way. It is difficult to distinguish in different sacrifices the main and the subordinate positions, procedures, etc. Here and there, there are conflicting statements also. There are differences among different *Śākhās* in respect of same items and procedures. Probably, the priests reconciled these at the time of actual performance by discussion. At the time of Brāhmaṇas, the performance of sacrifices was a living programme and priests were quite conversant with it. In due course, *śrauta sūtras* were formulated to describe the procedure of the performance of sacrifice. The largest number of *śrauta sūtras* belong to the *Yajurveda* which is primarily concerned with sacrifices. *Baudhāyaṇa* and *Āpastambha śrauta sūtras* of the *Yajurveda* give a fairly good account of major sacrifices.

The *śrauta sūtras'* approach is descriptive. These describe the details of the sacrifice step by step following the procedure of the performance. However, these do not discuss the rationale underlying the introduction of certain items or procedures. These are just a diary of performance. In the section called *paribhāṣasūtras*, some technical points are explained. However, a full discussion and the interpretation of the statements in the Brāhmaṇas connected with sacrifice is not found in *śrauta sūtras*. The Jaimini *sūtras* of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* are formulated to play this role.

dharme pramīyamāṇe hi vedena kāraṇātmanā
itikartavyatā bhāgam mīmaṁsā pūrayiṣyati [3]

Vedas are the means to comprehend *dharma.* Mīmāṁsā is an aid to interpret the Vedas.

The Classification of Vedic Statements

In the context of the organization of sacrifice, Vedic statements are classified into five groups, viz., (i) *vidhi,* i.e. injunctive statements, (ii) *mantra,* i.e. hymns to be recited at the sacrifice, (iii) *nāmadheya,* i.e. titles of the sacrifice, (vi) *niṣedha,* i.e. prohibitions, (v) *arthavāda,* i.e. eulogy.

Among these, *vidhi,* i.e. injunctive statement is most important. It conveys *dharma* which is not conveyed by any other *pramāṇa.*

The Classification of Injunctions

(a) Injunctive statements are classified into four groups from the point of view of the matter provided by them: (i) *uptattividhi,* i.e. the injunctive statement that enjoins the sacrifice, e.g. *agnihotraṁ juhoti,* the *agñihotra* sacrifice is enjoined; (ii) *viniyogavidhi,* i.e. the injunctive statement that enjoins the connection between *aṅga,* i.e. auxiliary and *pradhāna,* i.e. main, e.g. *dadhnā juhoti,* i.e. performs *homa* with curds. Here the connection between the auxiliary and the main is enjoined; (iii) *adhikāra vidhi,* i.e., the injunctive statement that conveys the result of the sacrifice, e.g. *Yajeta svargakāmaḥ*; (iv) *prayogavidhi,* i.e. the statement that conveys the main sacrifice together with the statements that convey various *aṅgas,* has to be taken as one statement. This conveys *prayoga,* i.e. the total organization of the sacrifice. This organization is of the nature of performing various items on their respective occasions without any interruption. This is technically called *prayoga prāśubhāva,* i.e. performance of sacrifice without interruption.[4]

The first three types of injunctions provide for (i) the sacrifice, (ii) the auxitaries and (iii) the result. Therefore, this classification is based on the matter provided. The instance of *viniyoga vidhi,* viz., *dadhnā juhoti* also happens to be *guṇavidhi,* since *guṇa,* i.e. an auxiliary is enjoined by it. The injuction '*somena yajeta*' is considered as *viśiṣṭa vidhi,* since both the sacrifice and its auxiliary, i.e. *soma* are enjoined by this injunction. This does not result in any *vākyabheda,* i.e. treating one injunction as two, since, these two are not separately enjoined.

(b) The injunctive statements are classified in another way also. This classification is based on the manner in which these operate. These are (i) *apūrvavidhi,* (ii) *niyamavidhi* and (iii) *parisaṅkhyāvidhi.*

(i) *Apūrva vidhi:* Most of the injunctions come under *apūrva vidhi,* which is an injunction that enjoins a sacrifice, an auxilary, a *saṁskāra* or a procedure, that is not conveyed by any other *pramāṇa.* Therefore, all these are of the nature of *apūrvavidhi.*

(ii) *Niyama vidhi:* When there are more than one possibilities of performing an item, making one of them as mandatory, it is *niyama vidhi.* The expression *niyama* means mandatory, e.g. *vrīhīn avahanti,* i.e. removes the husk of the paddy by threshing. The husk of the paddy could be removed in other ways also. However, this injunction makes it mandatory to remove it by threshing only. This leads to the generation of *apūrva.*

(iii) *Parisaṅkhyā vidhi:* When two items are simultaneously presented, exclusion of one of them is *parisaṅkhyā,* e.g. *pañca pañcanakāḥ bhakṣyān,* i.e. five kinds of birds of five nails are to be eaten. Eating both these five kinds and other five nailed birds is open to a person who is interested in eating such birds. However, this injunction excludes all others except these five. The intention of this injunction is more to exclude others than to permit the eating of these five.

The role of these three is summarised as under:

vidhiḥ[5] *atyantam aprāpte niyamaḥ pākṣike sati*
tatra ca anyatra ca prāpte parisaṅkhyeti gīyate.

These three injunctions prescribe the manner in which an injunction is to be operated. *Apūrva vidhi* fully affirms the performance of the item enjoined. The *niyama vidhi* affirms the performance of one of the alternatives and *parisaṅkhyā vidhi* excludes an item that is simultaneously present elsewhere.

All Vedic injunctions occurring in Brāhmaṇa statements are classified into these types of injunctions and the Brāhmaṇa texts are thus interpreted. This avoids confusion, overlapping and other lapses.

(c) Later Mīmāṁsā works further classify these in several ways. We may notice some of the groupings to realize the hard work undertaken by these writers to make the process of organizing the sacrifice precisely and faultlessly. It is faultless performance of the sacrifice that is *dharma* for the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*

(i) *Utpatti, viniyoga,* etc., are examples of four types of injunctions which can be categorized broadly into two types: (a) *kratvartha,* i.e. those that serve the purpose of sacrifice; (b) *puruṣārtha,* i.e. those that serve the purpose of the sacrificer.

(ii) Another[6] way of classifying injunctions is:

Sāmānyavidhi, viśeṣavidhi, pratiprasava vidhi, abhyanujnā vidhi, upasaṁhāravidhi, vyavasthāvidhi, paryudāsa vidhi, abhāvavidhi, sādhāraṇya vidhi, and *utkarṣavidhi.* These eleven types of injunctions are further grouped as *dṛṣṭārtha* and *adṛṣṭārtha.*

Mīmāṁsā bāla prākaśa elaborately works out these divisions and gives examples from both *Śrauta* and *Smārta* rituals. This gives an idea of the systematic interpretation of ritual texts.

The Concepts of Śābdībhāvanā and Ārthībhāvanā[7]

Mīmāṁsā texts explain the procedure of an injunctive statement enjoining *dharma,* i.e. *yāga.* The statement '*yajeta svargakāmaḥ*' enjoins *yāga* for obtaining *svarga.* The verb *yajeta* contains the verbal root *yaj* and the termination *liṅ,* i.e. optative termination. This suffix

has two aspects, viz., verbal termination in general and optative in particular. Both these aspects convey *bhāvanā*. The expression *bhāvanā* is a technical term. In Mīmāṁsā it has been used in two senses: (i) *preraṇā*, i.e. prompting, directing or creating interest, (ii) *pravṛtti*, i.e. initiative, effort.

In the first sense it is called *śābdībhāvanā* and in the second it is called *ārthībhāvanā*. The first is conveyed by the optative and the second by the general verbal termination. As soon as a person hears a statement containing a verb that is in optative, he understands that he is directed to undertake the activity mentioned by the verb. Ordinarily, such a direction is given by a person. However, in the case of a Vedic statement, there is no person behind it. Therefore, the optative suffix itself is taken as giving this direction. Thus, *bhavānā*, i.e. *preraṇā*, the direction given here is taken as given by the optative suffix itself.

Consequently, this aspect of *bhāvanā* is designated as *śābdībhāvanā*. This direction generates initiative on the part of the listener to undertake the activity mentioned in the statement. This initiative is designated as *ārthībhavanā*. The word *ārtha* means the objective, the purpose. Since, this initiative is intended to achieve the objective, i.e. *svarga*, it is called *ārthībhāvanā*.

The Formula of the Organization of the Sacrificial Programme

According to Mīmāṁsā, to implement a direction and an initiative, there are three requirements, viz., (i) an objective, (ii) an instrument, (iii) certain aids. These are termed as *bhāvya, karaṇa* and *itikartavyatā*. These are elicited by raising three questions: (i) *kiṁ bhāvayet*, i.e. what is the objective to be achieved, (ii) *kena bhāvayet*, i.e. what is the means or instrument to achieve it, (iii) *kathaṁ bhāvayeta*, i.e. what are the aids to carry out the action, in other words, the manner in which the activity is to be carried out.

This is a sound formula for programme organization. Though it is evolved in the context of ritual organization, it can be utilized for any programme organization. While undertaking a programme, it is important to clearly envisage the result to be achieved, the means to be adopted or the instrument to be provided and the manner in which the programme is to be carried out. Many programmes fail in the absence of such a clear formula.

Formula for the Application of Vedic Injunction

The Mīmāṁsakas apply this formula as the very role of the Vedic injunction, viz., an injunctive termination prompting the sacrificer to undertake initiative to perform the sacrifice.

The objective of *śābdībhāvanā*, i.e. prompting or generating interest, is to enable the sacrificer to undertake the initiative. Undertaking initiative is *ārthībhāvanā*. Therefore, generating the *ārthībhāvanā* is the objective of *śābdībhāvanā*. This *śābdībhāvanā* is the import of the optative termination *liṅ*. Therefore, the knowledge of this *liṅ* serves as the instrument. Mere cognition of *liṅ* and the comprehension of its import, i.e. *preraṇā* is not

sufficient to produce initiative. It needs to be supported by the information that the activity enjoined for undertaking is a worthy one. This is generally provided by the *arthavādas* mentioned by the side of the injunctive statement. These *arthavādas* as eulogy convey *prāśastya*, i.e. worthiness of the recommended activity. This is *itikartavyatā*, an aid to make the *preraṇā*, i.e. *śābdībhāvanā* effective. Thus, *śābdībhāvanā* plays its role with the objective of generating initiative, with the instrument of the cognition *liṅ*, i.e. optative termination, and with the support of *prāśastyajñāna* which is the worthiness of the recommended activity.

Śābdībhāvanā yāḥ ārthībhāvanā sādhyatvenānveti, liṅādijñānaṁ kāraṇatvema anveti, prāśastyajñānam itikartavyatātvena anveti.

"*Ārthībhāvanā* accords with the *śābdībhāvanā* in respect of the purpose, knowledge of *liṅ*, etc., accords in respect of the cause, while worthiness of the recommended action accords in respect of what is to be undertaken."

These three, viz., the objective, instrument, and the aid are worked out for *ārthībhāvanā* also. For *ārthībhāvanā*, (initiative), the objective of performance of the sacrifice, viz., which means attaining *svarga*, is the objective. The performance of the sacrifice itself is the instrument, and the auxiliaries, namely the *prayājas*, are the aids.

Śābdībhāvanā is a function of the linguistic and psychological level while *ārthībhāvanā* is of the level of actual activity. To execute a programme effectively, one has to prepare oneself both at the psychological and actual programme levels. This formula is evolved by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakās.

The Formula Envisaged by Prābhākaras [8]

It is interesting to note that the Prābhākara School of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* does not accept this formula and evolves its own to enable the sacrificer to undertake the sacrifice.

Prābhākaras[9] reject the concept of *śābdībhāvanā* on the ground that there is no evidence to say that the injunctive suffix has a *vyāpāra* designated as *preraṇā*, i.e. prompting to cause the initiative. The initiative does not necessarily follow on hearing an injunctive statement. Consequently, the idea of *ārthībhāvanā* (initiative), being the result of the *śābdībhāvanā*, also cannot be accepted.

Similarly, to conceive the idea of *prāśastyajñana* as an aid, also does not work. The idea of worthiness of an activity can be an aid to a person but not to a *śabdavyāpara* called *śābdībhāvanā*. Hence, the Bhāṭṭa concepts of *śābdībhāvanā* and *ārthībhāvanā* cannot be accepted.

Prābhākaras explain the process of an injunctive statement in playing its role and enjoining the performance of a sacrifice as follows:

The injunctive termination *liṅ* conveys *kārya*, duty or task to be accomplished. It also conveys *kṛti*, initiative. The *kārya* is also called *niyoga*, which is direction to accomplish the task. The *niyoga* needs a *niyojya* and *kartā*, a person to respond to this direction and act. To accomplish a task or duty, the programme has to be identified. This is *yāga*. This *yāga* is both the subject and the instrument.

The *yāga* provides itself as the subject of accomplishing the task or duty. It is also an instrument to accomplish the task conveyed by the injunctive suffix. It is a *karaṇa,* since the initiative to accomplish the task is operated on it. It is *karaṇa* not in the sense that it produces *apūrva* but in the sense that it is elevated to the status of *kārya.* This *kārya* is designated as *apūrva,* as it is conveyed by the Vedic injunction only and not by any other *pramāṇa.*

The role played by *śābdībhāvanā* and *ārthībhāvanā* to elicit the performer, the performance and the result of the sacrifice, according to Bhāṭṭa's formula, is played by *kārya,* i.e. *niyoga* according to Prābhākaras. This difference is not merely a difference of methodology in the interpretation and application of the injunctive statement but a vital difference in respect of the import of the injunction. Bhāṭṭas hold the theory that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the import of the injunctive suffix while the Prābhākaras hold that *kārya,* i.e. *niyoga* is the import of this suffix.

II

THE INJUNCTION TO STUDY THE VEDA AND TO UNDERTAKE SACRIFICES

The injunction '*Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ*'[10], i.e. undertake the study of Veda, is the chief injunction for all other injunctions that enjoin the sacrifice. This injunction does not merely enjoin acquiring of knowledge of mere words of Veda. In other words, it is not merely *veda-akṣara-rāśigrahaṇa.* Its scope extends to comprehension of the import of the Veda. This comprehension gives the knowledge of sacrifices that are enjoined in Veda. The knowledge of injunctions that enjoin sacrifices, is a part of the knowledge of the import of the Veda. Though, according to Mīmāṁsakas, the word and meaning are naturally related and the comprehension of the meaning should occur in the natural course without any injunction to make effort to comprehend it, this injunction makes it mandatory to acquire the knowledge of sacrifice through the Veda only. The sacrifices are elevated to the status of *dharma* on the ground that these are conveyed by the Veda. It is this the injunction to study the Veda and comprehend its import which by virtue of giving the knowledge of sacrifices, occupies the central position among the Vedic injunctions.

In respect of the status of the injunction to study the Veda, the approach of Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras is quite different. The Bhāṭṭas take the stand that this is an independent injunction while Prābhākaras hold the view that it is a consequential injunction consequent on the injunction to undertake teaching by a teacher. The teaching of Vedas is enjoined by the injunction '*Vedam adhyāpayeta*', i.e. teach the Veda. Consequently, those who are interested in undertaking teaching, will find out suitable boys, make them undergo *upanayana saṁskāra* and give effect to the injunction '*Svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ*' by teaching them. In this way, the injunction to study the Veda is consequential to teaching the Veda. The boys will not take on their own to study initiative the Veda at that stage.[11]

Irrespective of this difference, both of them agree, however, that this injunction enjoins the study of the Veda leading to the comprehension of its meaning that enables one

to undertake the performance of sacrifice. Both of them take this injunction as the subject discussed under the very first Jaimini *sūtra* '*Athāto dharma jijñāsā.*' Since comprehension of the import of the Veda is included in the scope of this injunction, the investigation into the import of Veda becomes necessary. This is exactly the role of Mīmāṁsā. (1-1-1)

III

THE CONCEPTS OF *APŪRVA* AND *SVARGA*

3.1 Sacrifices are enjoined by Vedic injunctions. The results to be realized by these are also stated. For instance, the injunction '*darśa pūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svarga kāmo yajeta*' enjoins the performance of *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice to realize *svarga.* Now this act of the sacrifice comes to an end as soon as all the items of it are completed. However, the result *svarga* does not immediately emerge. The cause should immediately precede the effect. When this does not happen, some intermediary to maintain the continuity has to be envisaged. Hence, *apūrva* is envisaged as an intermediary between the the sacrifice and the result, that is, *svarga.*

This concept is envisaged by *arthāpatti pramāṇa.* Whenever there is a conflict between two facts both of which are supported by appropriate *prāmaṇas,* a third fact has to be envisaged to resolve the conflict. Here, performing sacrifice is enjoined by the *śruti.* A result for it is also stated in that *śruti.* These statements imply the relationship of cause and effect between the two. This cannot be worked out unless the two are interconnected. This difficulty is resolved by envisaging *apūrva* by *arthāpatti.* Since, this *arthāpatti* emerges out of the statements of the *śruti,* it is designated as *śrutārthāpatti.*

The *apūrva* arises when the main sacrifice is successfully completed. It is designated as *paramāpūrva.* The subsidiary acts generate their own *apūrvas.* These are designated as *utpatyapūrva* or *avāntarāpūrva.* For instance, at *darśapūrṇa-māsa* sacrifice, three subordinate acts like *agneya,* etc., are performed on *darśa* and *paurṇamāsā* each. From these arise *utpatyāpūrvas.* Since, these two sets of three acts are performed on separate days a *samudayāpūrva* arises from each set of three acts. Ultimately, these lead to *paramāpūrva* or *phalāpūrva.* This leads to the final result.[12]

Apūrva is a kind of trans-empirical power. It remains with the performer of the sacrifice. Ordinarily the power of an entity remains only with that entity and ceases to exist when that entity ceases. It produces the result for that entity only. However, this is the position in the case of empirical power. *Apūrva* being a trans-empirical power, its way of functioning is quite different from the empirical power. The sacrificial act is empirical. Its continuity, until the result arises, cannot be envisaged. However, as *dharma,* it can generate a trans-empirical power and can lead to the result. In Indian philosophical and religious tradition, the concept of non-empirical power, i.e. *adṛṣta* is accepted by all in some or other form at some or other stage. It remains with the persons concerned. However, it is not cognized by him like his cognition, joy or sorrow.

The Concept of Svarga

There are three kinds of injunctive statements, viz., (i) the injunctive statements that specifically state *svarga* as the result to be realized by performing the sacrifice; (ii) the injunctive statements that mention something other than *svarga* such as *paśu, indriya,* i.e. the strength of senses, etc., as the results; (iii) the injunctive statements that do not state either *svarga* as the result or any other particular result.

In connection with these results, two questions arise: (i) what is the nature of *svarga,* (ii) whether these are realized here only or in some other world or some other birth.

The nature of *svarga* is discussed in *svarga kāmadhikaraṇa.* Jaimini and Śabara do not seem to be particular in identifying *svarga* with another world. They use the expression *prīti* (delight) to convey the meaning of the word *svarga.* This is its primary meaning. But secondarily it is also used in the sense of the means of delight, for instance, the expressions *candanam svargaḥ* meaning the sandalwood paste is heaven, *kauśeyāni svargaḥ,* the silk garment is heaven and so on. However, Śabara cautions that these are not always delightful nor are these delightful to all. Therefore, the word *svarga* should be taken in the sense of the delight that is not mixed with even an iota of sorrow. Since such a delight is not available, if people envisage a world on the basis of reference to it in the Purāṇas and the statements of Siddhapuruṣas, such a place also has to be taken as a means of delight. Even *kāmya* sacrifices are undertaken, because the results obtained from them give delight.[13]

In *viśvajit adhikaraṇa* a more fundamental question is raised. Where is the need to think of such a result as *svarga*? Why not to say that sacrifices, at least such sacrifices for which no result is stated, have no result at all and need not be performed. Once this argument is conceded, it can be extended to such other sacrifices also, the result of which is not empirically realized and do not lead to any observable result. As such, these need not be performed. The only answer to this objection is that these are enjoined by Vedic injunctions. Since Vedic injunctions have enjoined these, we must envisage appropriate result for these, wherever the result is not mentioned. Otherwise, people will not undertake the performance of these sacrifices. Therefore, *svarga,* as the result, whether stated or not, has to be envisaged. From this, it is clear that the concept of *svarga* is introduced to induce the undertaking of sacrifice.[14]

The concept of a sacrifice has a larger dimension. It is not meant for the welfare of the individual performer only. It is meant for the welfare of the whole mankind, all the living beings, and the whole Nature. In view of this, one is sure to derive immense delight by successfully performing this programme. It is believed that it will manifest the trans-empirical power *apūrva* and lead to the welfare of all.

The concept of *svarga* has psychological, ethical and spiritual dimensions. It is a complex concept. Such complex concepts, when put into concrete situations, take a concrete form in the context of a particular cultural tradition. In the context of Indian cultural tradition, it has acquired the form of another world, i.e. heaven. However, Jaimini and Śabara have not given much importance to this concrete form. This is clear from their remarks in *svargakāmādhikaraṇa.*

The concept of rebirth, and *prārabdha karma* also have played their role in clarifying the idea of the result not following immediately after the *kāmya* sacrifice. *Prārabdha karma* is supposed to have prevented the presence of the result immediately and rebirth has provided the scope for its occurence later. The concept of *apūrva* serves as a link between the sacrifice and the result of it.

It is interesting to note Śabara's remark that since the *svarga* in the sense of other world is not observable, it has to be envisaged by *arthāpatti.* Since the delight unmixed with sorrow is stated to be the result of the sacrifice, and since such delight cannot be experienced in this world, the other world, i.e. *svarga,* has to be envisaged. However, even then, it will only be a means of *svarga* but not *svarga* in its primary sense, viz., delight.

IV

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MAIN AND SUBORDINATE ACTS AND GUIDELINES TO DISTINGUISH THEM[15]

(i) The main sacrifices are classified as *prakṛti* and *vikṛti. Darśapūrṇamāsa, Agnihotra,* etc., come under *prakṛti* and *māsāgnihotra, agniṣomīya,* etc., come under *vikṛti.* However, *darvihoma* comes under both *praktti* and *vikṛti.*

(ii) The sacrifices are also grouped as *nitya, kāmya* and *naimittika. Nityāgnihotra, Jāteṣṭi* and *Kṣāmavatī iṣṭi* come under this category.

(iii) *Pradhānakarma* and *guṇakarma* is another way of grouping them. *Agnihotra* is *pradhāna karma* while *agnyā-dhāna* is *guṇakarma. Pradhāna karma* is also known as *arthakarma.*

(iv) *Kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* are another ways of classifying these.

(v) *Kratvartha* is again of two types: *ārādupakāraka* and *sannipātya upakāraka.*

These classifications are based on their nature and role.(MBP p.13-15)

To distinguish the different subbordinate acts, six criteria are laid down, viz., (i) *śabdāntara,* i.e. the verbs of different roots, (ii) *abhyāsa,* i.e. repetition, (iii) *saṁkhyā,* i.e. number, (iv) *nāmadheya,* i.e. different names,(v) *guṇa,* i.e. different kinds of *havis* to be offered, (vi) *prakaraṇa,* i.e. context.

We will take up the examples for each one of these criteria.

Sabdāntara: Use of the verbs of different roots, e.g. '*somena yajeta*', '*ātreyāya hiraṇyaṁ dadāti*', '*dakṣiṇāni juhoti*', here the verbs of three different roots, *yajeta, dadāti* and *juhoti* are employed. These convey three different kinds of acts *yāga, dāna* and *homa.* Therefore, these are three different acts. The expression *yāga* means offering to a deity, *homa* means offering to the sacred fire, *dāna* means giving gift, withdrawing the giver's ownership of the object concerned and investing the ownership of the receiver. Since these three verbs convey different manners of the offering, they constitute different acts.

Here it should be noted that in the act of sale and purchase also the ownership is withdrawn. However, it is withdrawn for a consideration.[16]

Abhyāsa: Repetition of the same verb, e.g. '*samidho yajati*', '*tanūnapātam yajati*', '*iḍo yajati*', etc. Here, the verb *yajati* is repeated. If the offering of all these items is taken as one

act, then, the repetition of the verb *yajati* becomes superfluous. Therefore, each statement has to be taken as enjoining a different act.[17]

Saṁkhyā: Number, when a number is stated along with the act in the very statement by which the act is enjoined, it indicates so many different acts[18], e.g. '*saptadaśa prājāpatyān ālabheta*'. "One should offer seventeen meant for Prajāpati." Here, the number *sapta daśa,* i.e. seventeen, is mentioned along with the act *prājāpatya.* This is the statement by which the act is enjoined. Therefore, seventeen acts of the same name have to be performed.

However, in the instances in which the number is not stated in the statement by which the act is enjoined but is stated by a later statement, it only indicates the repetition of the concerned act so many times, e.g. '*ekādaśa prayājan yajati*', i.e. the *prayājās* be repeated eleven times. (Bh.S.2-2-21)

Sañjñā: Designations, when different designations are stated, the acts have to be treated as different, e.g. '*athaiṣa jyotiḥ athaiṣa viśvajyotiḥ sarvajyotiḥ etena yajeta.*' Here, three different designations are mentioned. Therefore, these have to be treated as three different acts. The expression '*atha*' at the commencement of each also indicates their difference.[19]

Guṇa: When a *guṇa,* i.e. *dravya* of *havis* is already stated for an act, and also another *dravya* is stated, then, two different acts have to be envisaged to accommodate the two *dravyas* of the *havis,* e.g. at *Vaiśva deva yāga, āmikṣā* is already stated as the *havis* to be offered. However, later *vājina* is stated as a *dravya.* This cannot be taken again as a *dravya* for *Vaiśvadeva yāga* since, a *dravya* is already enjoined for this *yāga,* therefore, a separate *yāga* has to be envisaged to accommodate *vājina dravya.*[20]

Prakaraṇāntara: Difference of context, e.g. the statement '*māsam agnihotraṁ juhoti*' enjoins *māsāgni hotra.* Here, the question arises whether the *māsa,* i.e. duration of one month, is enjoined for the same sacrifice as *nityāgnihotra,* or whether it is a separate act. It is ruled that since the context of *nityāgnihotra* is quite different, the *māsāgni hotra* has to be considered as a different act.[21]

V

PRINCIPAL AND AUXILIARIES

Identifying the status of sacrifices and other items such as *dravya* (sacrificial offerings), *guṇa,* the properties of these, *saṁskāra,* i.e. refinements effected to the sacrificial items, is an important requirement to properly organize the sacrifice. Therefore, Jaimini takes up a discussion on these in the third chapter. An auxiliary is designated as *śeṣa* or *aṅga* in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* It is defined under the *sūtra* '*śeṣaḥ parārthavat*'.[22]

An act or an item that is undertaken to serve the purpose of something else is an *aṅga,* i.e. anuxiliary. *Dravya* serves the purpose of the sacrifice. Therefore, there is no doubt about its being an auxiliary. Same is the case with *devatā* (deity); *guṇa* meaning property of the *dravya* to be offered also serves the purpose of the sacrifice by specifying the *dravya* to be offered. *Saṁskāra* meaning refining the *dravya,* the sacrificial instruments, etc., serves

the purpose of sacrifice. Therefore, these are auxiliaries to the sacrifice. *Dravya, guṇa* and *saṁskāra* are expressly mentioned in the *sūtra* '*dravya guṇa saṁskāreṣu Bādariḥ*.[23]

Quoting this view of Bādari, Jaimini extends the scope of auxiliaries to *karma,* i.e. *yāga, puruṣa,* and the result of the *yāga.* He argues that performance of the sacrifice is not the end of it. It has to serve the purpose of providing the result. Therefore, it is also an auxiliary to the result. Similarly, the result serves the purpose of *puruṣa* while the *puruṣa* serves the purpose of performance of the *yāga.* Therefore, these are also auxiliaries. However, there is an important difference between the first three and the last three. The first three have the status of auxiliaries only, while the last three are auxiliaries from the point of view of serving the purpose of the other items and these are principal from the point that the purpose of these is served by others.[24]

In respect of *karma,* there is another dimension. *Karmas,* are of two types, viz., principal and auxiliary. Sacrifices are principal while actions conveyed by the statements '*vrīhin avahanti*' (pounds the paddy), '*tandulān pinaṣṭi,* (grinds the rice), etc., are auxiliaries. Since, both sacrificial activity and the actions like *vrīhin avahanti* are conveyed by the verb, some ground has to be found to distinguish them as principal and auxiliary. Jaimini lays down a convenient ground to distinguish these. In the *sūtra* '*tāni dvividhāni guṇa pradhānabhūtāni*' he states that there are two types of *karma.* In the next two *sūtras* he defines the two. Those actions, that deal with *dravya,* are auxiliary while those, that are independent, are principal. The actions such as pounding the paddy, grinding the rice deal with *dravya.* Therefore, these are subordinate to *dravya.* These are called *guṇakarma.* The *yāgas* do not serve the purpose of *dravya* while the *dravyas* serve the purpose of *yāga.* Therefore, the *yāgas* are principal *karmas.* These are called *arthakarma.* The *karmas* that lead to the result are *arthakarmas* and the *karmas* that serve the purpose of *dravya* are *guṇakarma.* Normally, *guṇakarma* serves some observable purpose such as pounding, grinding, etc. However, there are a few instances where no observable purpose is noticeable for instance, '*puroḍāśaṁ paryagni karoti*', i.e. 'he takes *puroḍāśa* around the sacrificial fire'. Here there is no observable effect on any *dravya* but still this action has to be taken as an auxiliary *karma.* The point to be noted is that whether some observable effect on *dravya* is found or not, all those acts that are concerned with *dravya* are *guṇakarmas.* Some *adṛṣṭa* has to be envisaged as generated by them to make them a part of the sacrificial programme.

The Criteria to Ascertain the Relation between the Auxiliaries and the Principal

To ascertain the relation between the auxiliaries and the principal, six criteria are laid down. These are: (i) *śruti,* Vedic expression; (ii) *linga,* the capacity to be related, (iii) *vākya,* occurrence in one sentence without any case suffix to indicate the connection; (iv) *prakaraṇa,* context; (vi) *sthāna,* place; (vi) *samākhyā,* name. We may notice the following examples where these criteria are applied:

1. *Sruti,* or Vedic expression: This is of three types, (a) *vibhakti rūpa,* i.e. in the form of a nominal case suffix, (b) *ekapadarūpa,* i.e. in the form of a word (c) *ekapratyayarūpa,* i.e. in the form of a suffix.[25]

The stock example given for *vibhakti rūpa* are: (i) *Vrīhīn prokṣati,* which means sprinkles water on paddy. Here sprinkling is an auxiliary to *vrīhi.* This is indicated by the accusative case.

(ii) '*Vṛīhibhiḥ yajeta*', which means one should perform the *yāga* by offering rice. Here the instrumental case conveys that *vrīhi* is an auxiliary to *yāga.* It should be noted here that *vrīhi,* the rice, is an auxiliary through *puroḍāśa.* Another stock example is *aruṇayā somaṁ krīṇāti,* i.e. *soma* stalk is purchased by tawny colour. Here also the third case suffix of the word *aruṇayā* conveys that *arunyā,* meaning tawny colour is an auxiliary. Since, it is a quality, it cannot be a *karaṇa* by itself. Therefore, it has to be taken as *karaṇa* through the young cow.

(iii) *Maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍam prayacchati* which means he gives the stick to *Maitrāvaruṇa.* Here the stick is an auxiliary to *Maitrāvaruṇa.* This is indicated by the suffix in the dative case.

(iv) *Mūlataḥ śākhām parivāsya upaveśam karoti* meaning by cutting the branch at the base, *upaveśa* is prepared. Here, *śākhāmūla* is an auxiliary. This is indicated by the suffix in the ablative case.

(v) *Yajamānasya yājyā,* the *yājyā* has to be performed by the sacrificer. Here, *yajamāna* is an auxiliary of *yājyā.* This is indicated by the suffix in the genetive case.

(vi) *Ahavanīye juhoti,* offers the *havis* in *āhavanīya* fire. Here, *āhavanīya* is an auxiliary of *homa.* This is indicated by the locative case ending.

It should be noted that excepting the nominative case suffix, all other case suffixes convey the auxiliary nature of the items concerned. These case suffixes directly express the auxiliary nature of the items concerned. Therefore, these are designated as *Śruti.*

Two other grounds on which the auxiliary nature of an item is determined by the *Śruti* are: (i) *ekapratyaya rūpa,* i.e. conveyed by the same suffix, e.g., *paśunā yajeta* where the case suffix conveys two facts, namely, number and gender. These two are auxiliaries of *paśu*; (ii) *ekapadarūpa* conveyed by the same word, e.g., *yajeta.* Here the same word conveys *bhāvanā* through the suffix and *yāga* through the root. This indicates that the *yāga* is an auxiliary to *bhāvanā.*[26]

The above scheme of guidelines to determine the nature of auxilaries gives an impression that it is quite simple to determine the same. However, in many instances, certain other factors need to be taken into account to sort out the auxiliaries. For instance, in *Darśapūrṇamāsa,* certain auxiliary items connected with rice, *ghee* and certain other items like milking the cow, etc., are stated. The question arises whether all these auxiliary items are to be observed with reference to all main items and whether there are any specifications. The pūrvapakṣin *argues* that since all these auxiliaries have to contribute to the final *apūrva,* these have to be performed with all main items. The siddhāntin points out that apart from the final *apūrva,* there are intermediary *apūrvas.* The respective auxiliary items will assist the respective intermediary items to generate the intermediate *apūrvas.* Therefore, these have to be performed in an orderly way in keeping with the requirement of each item. For instance, grinding of the rice should be undertaken only in connection with a *yāga* wherein *puroḍāśa* has to be offered. The auxiliary items connected with *ghee* should be performed only in connection with a *yāga* where *ghee* is to be offered.

In case of the auxiliaries that serve an observable purpose it is clear that these are to be performed for such items of which the purpose is served by these. In the case of such auxiliaries that do not serve observable purpose, the *śruti* such as the case suffix should be taken into account, as stated above. In any case these auxiliaries should be connected with the respective items in an orderly way.[27]

Another instance of orderly arrangement of auxiliaries is that of sacrificial instruments. In *darśapūrṇamāsa,* ten sacrificial instruments such as *sphya,* a wooden sword like instrument, *agnihotra havaṇi,* a wooden vessal, *śamyā,* an wooden instrument of *śūla* type, *śūrpa,* etc., are listed. The purpose served by these is also stated. Here, the question is raised whether these instruments be treated as auxiliaries of the items of which the purpose is served by these or be treated as the auxilaries of all. The pūrvapakṣin argues that these are described as *yajñāyudhas,* i.e. the instruments of sacrifice.

These cannot directly serve the *yajña.* These have to aid the sacrifice by serving various items of the sacrifice. Though these are stated to serve specific purposes, there is no reason to restrict their auxiliary nature to specific items only. These have to be treated as auxiliaries of all items. The *siddhāntin* points out that if these are considered auxiliaries of all items, statements prescribing specific purposes become superfluous. Hence, these have to be considered as auxiliaries of specific items taking into account the purpose served by them.[28]

2. *Liṅga*: The second criterion of indicating the auxiliary nature of an item and its association with the main item is *liṅga.* The nature of *liṅga* is explained as *sāmarthya* or capacity. This capacity is of two types, namely, (i) *śabdagata,* i.e. the capacity of the very word to convey the auxiliary nature, for example, '*barhiḥ devasadanaṁ dāmi*'. In this statement, the word *barhiḥ dāmi* conveys the meaning to cut the *kuśa* grass. Therefore, this statement is an auxiliary for the act of cutting the *kuśa* grass; (ii) *arthagata,* i.e. capacity indicated by the purpose to be served, for example, '*svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ*' meaning Veda is to be studied. Here, the study of Veda has the capacity to serve the purpose of conveying the meaning. Therefore, the study of the Veda is an auxiliary to the comprehension of the meaning of the Veda. This comprehension is an auxiliary to *karmānuṣṭhāna,* performance of sacrifice.

It should be noted that in certain instances, *liṅga* operates only when the relation between the auxiliary and the main is known by another *pramāṇa* in a general way. Example is the statement '*barhiḥ devasadanaṁ dāmi.*' This statement occures in *darśapūrṇamāsa* context. Thus, it is already known by the context that it is an auxiliary of some item in *darśapūrṇamāsa.* Its particular nature of being an auxiliary of cutting the *kuśa* grass is conveyed by the *liṅga,* i.e. the capacity of the word *barhi* conveying the *kuśa* grass.

Another instance of *liṅga* operating with the support of another *pramāṇa* is that *pūṣānumantraṇa* hymns serving as an auxiliary of *Pūṣayāga.* Here, the relation of these hymns with a *yāga* is conveyed by the *Samākhyā,* i.e. name of these as *yāganumantraṇa.* The auxiliary nature of these to *Pūṣayāga* is conveyed by the *liṅga,* that is, the capacity of the word *puṣā* to connect it with *puṣayāga.*

It should be noted that in the case of the hymns that are considered as auxiliary, the word concerned should be taken in its primary sense but not in the secondary sense. For

instance, the word *barhi* is to be taken in the sense of *kuśa* grass only and not in the sense of *ulupa* which is another kind of grass.[29]

The process of identifying the auxiliaries and working out their connection with the respective main items is not merely a mechanical process of applying one of the criteria and settling it. A lot of cross checking with other considerations is involved. Such cases are discussed in different *adhikaraṇas* of the third chapter. We may notice one such instance in the context of the application of the *liṅga* criterion.

In *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the drinking of *soma* juice is prescribed. The *bhakṣānuvāka* hymn which states this, mentions four stages in the process of drinking, viz., holding juice cup, examining or observing the juice, tasting and finally drinking it. Here the question arises whether the whole hymn is to be recited or respective portions of it are to be recited at respective stages. In other words, it is to be seen whether the whole hymn is an auxiliary or the respective sections of it. The pūrvapakṣin argues that it is the drinking that is enjoined. The stages preceeding the act of drinking are not enjoined. These are there to serve as the background of drinking. The statement *bhakṣayāmi* is an indication to the fact that the whole hymn is an auxiliary for the act of drinking. The name *bhakṣānuvāka* given to this hymn also confirms the same. The *siddhāntin* points out that though the stages of holding the juice-cup etc., are not directly enjoined, these stages have to be undergone to implement the injunction of drinking. The words conveying these stages have the *sāmarthya*, i.e. *liṅga* to convey the auxiliary nature of these sections of the hymn to the respective stages.[30]

Another example of the application criterion of the *liṅga* taking into account other factors is that of considering the hymns occurring in *Kāmya Kāṇḍa* section as auxiliaries to *Kāmyeṣṭi* in the order in which these are given.

In *Kāmyakāṇḍa* section the hymns to be recited in *Kāmyeṣṭi* with reference to deities Indra and Agni, are given in the order in which the *Kāmyeṣṭis* are listed. Here, the question arises whether these hymns are to be recited in all *Kāmyeṣṭis* and even *Akāmyeṣṭis* with which these deities are connected or the hymns of the respective deities are to be recited in the respective *Kāmyeṣṭis*. The pūrvapakṣin argues that *liṅga*, the capacity to convey the auxiliary nature of these hymns present in them is sufficient to treat them as auxiliaries to all *Kāmyeṣṭis*. This capacity need not be restricted to the particular *Kāmyeṣṭi* with which the deity concerned is connected on the ground that a particular hymn is connected with that deity. Hymns connected with all deities are to be treated as auxiliaries to all *Kāmyeṣṭis*. The siddhāntin points out that before a hymn is considered as an auxiliary, the relation between the deity conveyed by it and the sacrifice has to be ascertained. This means the relation between hymns listed in the Mantrakāṇḍa and the *Kāmyeṣṭis* mentioned in the *Kāmyeṣṭikāṇḍa* has to be ascertained. After this relation is ascertained in a general way, the hymn that conveys a particular deity naturally gets connected with the sacrifice connected with that deity. Hence, there is no question of the hymns of all deities listed in the *Kāmyeṣṭi-mantra-kāṇḍa* being considered as auxiliaries to all *Kāmyeṣṭis*.

From these two examples, it is clear that the criteria laid down for identifying the auxiliary nature of an item are methodically worked out. Economy of effort and orderliness seems to be the guiding factors in applying these criteria.

3. *Vākyam*: The nature of *vākya* is stated as *samabhivyāhāra*, the statement of the principal

and auxiliary in a sentence without indication of this status by case suffixes. An example is '*yajeta svargakāmaḥ*'. Here, the principal nature of *svarga* and the auxiliary nature of *yāga* are not indicated by the accusative and instrumental case suffixes respectively. However, *yāga* has to be taken as the auxiliary to *svarga* as these two are stated together in one sentence.

Another example of *vākya* is, '*yasya parṇamayī juhūḥ bhavati*'. Here, *parṇatā* and *juhu* are stated together in one sentence. The principal and auxiliary status of these two is not explicitly stated by the required case suffixes. However, *parṇatā* has to be considered as an auxiliary of *juhu* on the ground that these two are stated together in one sentence.

The above two examples relate to the *samabhivyāhāra*, i.e. stating together in one sentence. However, there are instances where two sentences are taken as one and the auxiliary and principal nature is settled avoiding the conflict between the two. For example in *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in the hymn *prajāpatiḥ akāmayata* at the commencement the three Vedas, namely, *Ṛk*, *Sāman* and *Yajuṣ* are stated. At the close it is stated that a *Ṛk* hymn be recited loudly, a *Sāman* be recited loudly and a *Yajus* passage be recited slowly. Here, the question arises whether this mode of recitation applies to the respective Vedas or the respective individual hymns. In the first alternative, only the *Ṛks* compiled in *Ṛk saṁhitā* are to be recited loudly while the *Ṛks* occurring in the *Yajurveda* text are to be recited slowly. In the second alternative, all individual *Ṛks* whether these are in the *Ṛgveda* text or the *Yajurveda* text have to be recited loudly. The final ruling given is that the *Ṛk* hymns given in the *Ṛgveda* text only are to be recited loudly. This ruling is given on the ground that the words *Ṛgveda* and *Yajurveda* occur at the commencement of the hymn and are understood in the sense of the *Ṛgveda* text but not in the sense of individual hymns. The closing sentence mentions individual hymns. To avoid the conflict between the observation in the *upakrama*, (commencement), and *upasaṁhāra* (statement at the close), the expression *Ṛk* in the closing remark should be taken in the sense of *Ṛgveda* and the reciting loudly be considered as an auxiliary to the *Ṛks* in the *Ṛgveda* text only. Here, the auxiliary nature is settled by taking the statements occurring at the commencement and at the end as one unit. In other words, the *samabhivyāhāra* of these two is taken into account to settle the point whether reciting loudly is an auxiliary to the individual *Ṛk* or the entire *Ṛgveda*. Hence, it is an instance of *vākya* criterion.[31]

There is another interesting instance of utilizing the criterion of *vākya* to settle the auxiliary status. This arises in a case where the principal is stated in one Veda and the auxiliary in another Veda.

In *Yajurveda ādhāna* is enjoined by the statement '*Vasante vasante brāhmaṇo agnīn ādadhīta*'. But the auxiliaries of it, viz., recitation of *Vāravanti Yajñāyajñīya*, etc., *sāmans* are stated in the *Sāmaveda*. Therefore, the question arises whether the mode of recitation of the *Sāmaveda* or the of *Yajurveda* is to be followed. Here, the ruling is given that when there is a conflict between the auxiliaries stated for the main and the subordinate, the auxiliaries of the main are to be implemented. Here, since, the main item *ādhāna* is stated in the *Yajurveda, the* mode of recitation of *Yajurveda* is the auxiliary to the hymn to be recited at a programme prescribed in the *Yajurveda*. Hence, the *sāmans Vāravanti*, etc., are to be recited in the mode of the recitation of the *Yajurveda*. The ground for such a ruling is that

the statements that enjoin auxiliaries, play their role in association with the statements which enjoin the main as one syntactical unit, i.e. *pradhānaika vākyatā.* Hence, the mode of recitation of the *Yajurveda* needs to be adopted. This is an instance of *vākya* criterion being based on the statements occurring in different Vedic texts.[32]

From this it is clear that the scope of *vākya* criterion is wider than one sentence and one place.

4. *Prakaraṇa,* the Reciprocal Need: The *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice is enjoined '*darśapūrṇa māsābhyaṁ yajeta*'. Here, the result to be obtained by *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice is stated. But the auxiliaries to it are not stated. In the same context through the statements '*samidhā yajeti, tanūnapātam yajeti*', etc. stated five rituals known collectively as *prayājas* are. But the result to be realized by these is not stated. *Darśapūrṇamāsa* needs the auxiliaries while *prayājas* need the result. This reciprocal need could be satisfied if *prayājas* are considered as auxiliaries to *Darśapūrṇamāsa.* The need of auxiliaries is technically known as *itikartavyatākāṅkṣā* or *kathambāvākaṅkṣā.* This requirement of *Darśapūrṇamāsa* needs to be satisfied. When the *prayājas* are treated as the auxiliaries to *Darśapūrṇamāsa,* the result of the same becomes the result of *prayājas* also. This means their need of a result is also satisfied. In this way, the reciprocal need has become the ground for considering *prayājas* as auxiliaries to *Darśapūrṇamāsa.* This is technically designated as *prakaraṇa.* In such instances, the three earlier criteria, namely, *śruti, liṅga* and *vākya* are not available. This is why this new criterion is laid down.

Such a reciprocal need will arise in respect of main and subordinate items. The need in respect of the main item is designated as *mahāprakaraṇa* and in respect of subordinate items as *avāntaraprakaraṇa.* The above example is of the nature of *mahāprakaraṇa.* The instance of *abhikramaṇa,* being an auxiliary to *prayāja,* is *avāntara prakaraṇa.* The fact of *abhikramaṇa,* being an auxiliary to *prayāja,* is confirmed by *sandaṁśa.* When an auxiliary is stated between two other auxiliaries of the same item, it is called *sandaṁśa,* i.e. pressed between the two. The *abhikramaṇa* is stated between the two auxiliaries to *prayāja.*

It should be noted that *prakaraṇa* helps to settle the auxiliary nature of the acts only. Even when it indicates the auxiliary nature of a *dravya* or *guṇa,* it is only through the acts. The auxiliary nature of *dravya* and *devatā* is not conveyed by *prakaraṇa.*

Another important point to be noted is that *prakaraṇa* is not applicable to *vikṛti yāgas.* In *vikṛti yāgas,* there are two types of auxiliaries: (i) auxiliaries that come from *prakṛti yāga* by *atideśa,* (ii) auxiliaries that are newly introduced.

In the case of newly introduced auxiliaries, though these have *bhāvyākāṅkṣā,* there is no *itikartavyatākāṅkṣā,* as it will be satisfied by the auxiliaries brought from *prakṛti* by way of *atideśa.*

In respect of the auxiliaries brought from *prakṛti* also, there is no *bhāvyākāṅkṣā* since it is satisfied at the *prakṛti* level. The criterion of *prakaraṇa* needs the reciprocal *ākāṅkṣā.* In the above two cases, one of the *ākāṅkṣā* is absent in each case. Therefore, *prakaraṇa* does not determine the auxiliary nature in *vikṛti yāgas.* However, the auxiliary nature of newly introduced auxiliaries is determined by the *sthāna* which is based on only one *ākāṅkṣā.*

In this context we may note the nature of *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. In *prakṛti*, all auxiliaries required for a sacrifice are stated. In *vikṛti* all are not stated.[33]

Sthāna or the placement or order: It is of two types, namely, (i) *pāthasādeśya*, i.e. the order in which it occurs in the text, (ii) *anuṣthāna sādeśya*, i.e. the order in which it is performed. The first variety is again of two types: (i) *yathāsaṅkhya pāṭha* or placement in an order, (ii) *sannidhi pāṭha* or placement nearby.

Examples

(i) *Yathāsaṅkhya pāṭha*—the *yājyānuvākya* hymns to be recited in respect of *nirvāpa* to *aindrāgna, Vaiśvānara* should be recited in the same order in which these are stated, that is to say, the first hymn should be recited for the *nirvāpa* of the deity stated first and the second hymn for the second.

In this example, since the deities and the hymns are stated in an order in a series, there is no difficulty in applying the criterion of placement. However, there is another interesting example where, though three hymns are stated in an order, the deities of the first and the third ritual alone are stated. Therefore, the question arises whether the middle hymn be recited at all the three rituals or at the middle ritual only. Here, the criterion of *yathāsaṅkhya pāṭha* comes to help. Since the rituals to be performed are stated in an order and hymns to be recited are also stated in an order, the middle hymn is to be recited at the ritual stated in the middle. For example *Āgneya, upāṁśu*, and *agniṣomīya* rituals are stated in an order. The three hymns '*Agneḥ annam*' '*Dabdhirasya dabdho*', '*Agniṣomayorannam*' are also stated in an order. In the case of first and the third, the deity is mentioned. Therefore, it is easy to relate these hymn with the rituals associated with that deity. But in the case of the middle hymn, even though the deity is not mentioned in the ritual or the hymns, it has to be related with the middle ritual applying the criterion of *yathasaṅkhya pāṭha.*[34]

(ii) *Sannidhi pāṭha*—the auxiliaries newly stated in *vikṛti* are to be related with *vikṛti* only as these are stated near *vikṛti*. *Āmana homas* come under this category. No separate result is to be envisaged for these by *viśvajit nyāya*, as these are stated near *vikṛti* and are meant for the *apūrva* of the *vikṛti.*

(iii) In Jyotiṣtoma, three *paśus agniṣomīya, savanīya* and *anubandhya* are stated. The *paśudharmas*, namely, *upasparśana, paryāgnikaraṇa*, etc., are also stated. Here, the question arises whether these *paśudharmas* are to be performed with reference to all the three *paśus* or one of them. However, these *paśudharmas* are stated on *aupasathya* day. *Agniṣomīya* is performed on that day. Therefore, taking into account the proximity of the these two, *paśudharmas* have to be performed for *agniṣomiya paśu* only.[35]

Samākhyā: *Yaugikī Sañjñā*, i.e. the name that etymologically conveys the item concerned. This is of two kinds, (i) *vaidikī, laukikī*, e.g., *hotṛcamasaḥ*, i.e. the vessel to be used by the *hotā* to drink *Soma*, (ii) *adhvyaryava*, i.e., the items to be attended by the *adhvaryu.*

VI

THE PROCEDURE OF PREFERENCE WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CRITERIA OF AUXILIARIES

When there is a conflict among the six criteria of auxiliaries, namely, *śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa, sthāna* and *samākhyā*, the earlier prevails over the latter, for instance, in case when there is a conflict between *śruti* and *liṅga*. In this case the *śruti* has to be preferred, that is to say, the association of the auxiliary and principal conveyed by *śruti* (case suffixes), is to be preferred to that suggested by *liṅga* (the capacity of the word). Similarly, *liṅga* is preferred to *vākya* and *vākya* to *prakaraṇa* and so on. We will notice one example for each below.

Śruti and Liṅga

It is stated that '*gārhapatya* fire be attended upon by Indra hymn.' Here, the question arises whether Indra is to be attended upon by this hymn or the *gārhapatya* fire or both or the two alternately.

Indra's claim is supported by *mantraliṅga*. *Gārhapatya's* claim is supported by *śruti* since the word *Gārhapatya* is used with accusative case suffix. Both the *pramāṇas*, viz., *śruti* and *liṅga* have to be respected.

Three alternatives are suggested by the pūrvapakṣin on the assumption that *śruti* and *liṅga* are the criteria of equal status. However, *śruti* conveys the auxiliary connection directly while *liṅga* has to assume a *śruti* as its basis and then convey the auxiliary connection. Therefore, the direct *śruti* has to be preferred to *liṅga*. In the present case, *śruti* through the accusative case with which the word *gārhapatya* is used clearly indicates that this hymn is an auxiliary to *gārhapatya* fire and that it has to be attended upon by this hymn. In view of this, the word Indra, occurring in this hymn, should not be taken as referring to the deity Indra but as an adjective of the *gārhapatya* in a secondary sense. From this, it is clear that *śruti* has a priority over *liṅga* as it directly conveys the auxiliary connection.[36]

Liṅga and Vākya

In *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, *puroḍāśa* is addressed by the hymn '*syonam te sadanam karomi*' etc. In the first part of this hymn, it is stated that 'a seat is prepared for you that is made pleasent by sprinkling ghee.' In the second part, it is stated that 'you be seated on it and be firmly placed.' Here, the question arises whether the whole hymn is to be connected with preparing seat and placing *pūroḍāśa* or the first part be connected with preparing the seat and the second part with placing *puroḍāśa* on it.

The pūrvapakṣin argues that it is not proper to consider it as two sentences when it can be treated as one sentence. Therefore, this hymn is to be connected with both

preparing the seat and placing the *puroḍāśa* on it. This position is obtained by the criteria of *vākya.*

However, the siddhāntin points out that *vākya* has to play its role by assuming appropriate *liṅga* and *śruti.* Here, the first part of the hymn conveys the sense of only preparing the seat while the second part conveys the sense of the placing of *puroḍāśa* on it. Both aspects are not conveyed by any part. These parts are not able to assume a common *liṅga* and a common *śruti.* Hence, no *śruti* can be assumed to convey that the whole hymn be connected with the preparation of the seat and placing of the *puroḍāśa* on it. Hence, this hymn cannot be connected with these two together by the criterion of *vākya* taking it as a single *vākya.* On the other hand, if the *liṅga,* i.e. *arthaprakāśana* of each part is taken into account, the required *śruti* may be assumed and each part can be connected as an auxiliary hymn to the respective item, namely, preparing the seat and placing the *puroḍāśa* on it.[37]

Vākya and Prakaraṇa

Whenever there is a conflict between *vākya* and *prakaraṇa,* the auxiliary connection conveyed by *vākya* has to be prefered.

For example, in *Darśapūrṇamāsa* the recitation of *sūktavākyas* '*Agniṣomau idam havirajuṣetam*', '*Indrāgni idam havirajuṣetam*' are prescribed. It is already decided in an earlier *adhikaraṇa* that the names *agniṣomau* and *indrāgni* are to be used at *paurṇamāsī* and *amāvāsyā* respectively. Now the question arises whether the latter parts of both the hymns are to be recited both at *paurṇamāsī* and *amāvāsyā* or the respective latter portion on the respective days.

The pūrvapakṣin argues that these are in *darśapūrṇamāsa prakaraṇa* but not only in *darśa prakaraṇa* or *paurṇamāsī prakaraṇa.* Therefore, the latter portion of both the *sūktavākya* hymn have to be recited on both days. However, the *siddhāntin* points out that the names of the respective deities and the latter portion of each hymn constitute one sentence as there is *samabhivyāhāra.* Thus, the criterion of *vākya* helps to decide that the latter portion of the respective hymn has to be recited on the respective day. *Prakaraṇa* is of the nature of reciprocal need. This need is always between two *vākyas.* Before, *prakaraṇa* assumes *vākya* to attract the two latter portions of the hymn, the very *vākya* of each hymn decides that the respective hymn should be recited on the respective day only for the respective deity. In this way *vākya* prevails over *prakaraṇa.*[38]

Prakaraṇa-Sthāna

(i) In *Rājasūya,* a number of rituals of *paśu, iṣṭi* and *soma* types are prescribed. Among these, *abhiṣecanīya* is a *soma* ritual. Certain items like gambling, discourse on *Śunaśśepa* episode are stated to this ritual. Here, the question arises whether these are the auxiliaries of *abhiṣecanīya* or *Rājasūya* itself. As these are stated

near *abhiṣecanīya*, the criterion of *sthāna* supports these to be the auxiliaries to the *abhiṣecanīya.* However, the *prakaraṇa* is that of *Rājasūya.* The *sthāna* criterion plays its role by envisaging *prakaraṇa, vākya*, etc., as earlier criteria. However, before *sthāna* envisages the *prakaraṇa*, the known *prakaraṇa* of *Rājasūya* settles that these are the auxiliaries to *Rājasūya.* This is an instance of *prakaraṇa* prevailing over *sthāna.* This is an instance of *pāṭhasādeśya* type of *sthāna* being set aside by *prakaraṇa* (Bh.S.III-3-10).

(ii) In *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, in connection with the milking of the cow, certain auxiliaries such as cutting the branch of a *palāśa* tree, taking the calf away, etc., are prescribed. The milking is stated to be made twice, first time at the night of the earlier day and second time on the morning of the next day. Here, the question arises whether the auxiliaries of cutting the branch, etc., are to be performed only on the earlier day or night or on both days. The pūrvapakṣin argues that there is *anuṣṭhāna sādeśya*, i.e. the performance of milking and the auxiliaries of cutting the branch are closely stated to be performed on the earlier night, performance. Hence, these be performed on the earlier night only. However, the *siddhāntin* points out that there is *Darśapūrṇamāsa prakaraṇa* here. The *prakaraṇa* is superior to *sthāna.* Therefore, these auxiliaries need to be performed at the time of milking both on the previous day, and night and in the next morning. This is an instance of *anuṣṭhāna sādeśya* type of *sthāna* being set aside by *prakaraṇa.* (III-6-8).

Sthāna-Samākhyā

In connection with *Darśapūrṇamāsa* there is a group of hymns designated as *pauroḍāśika.* Among these there are certain hymns connected with *sānnāyya* vessels. There is another hymn close to it which refers to cleaning. Here, the question arises whether this hymn is an auxiliary to the cleaning of *sānnāyya* vessel only or to that of all the vessels stated in *puroḍāśakāṇḍa.* In *puroḍāśakāṇḍa*, the vessels *ulūkhala, musala, juhū*, etc., are stated.

The pūrvapakṣin argues that in view of the name *pauroḍāśika*, referring to the cleaning should be considered as an auxiliary to all vessels stated in *puroḍāśa* but not to *sānnāyya* vessel alone. The *siddhāntin* points out that the hymn concerned is stated close to the hymns that are connected with *sānnāyya.* Hence, this is an auxiliary to *sānnāyya* only. The name *pauroḍāśika* does not indicate any relation between the name and the items stated in the section.[39]

VII

KRATVARTHA AND PURUṢARTHA

The acts undertaken for the benefit of the person, i.e. the sacrificer, are *puruṣārtha* and the acts that assist in the accomplishment of the sacrifice are *kratvartha.* The main sacrifices

and their results provide the benefit to the person, i.e. the sacrificer. Therefore, these are *puruṣārtha*. *Prayāja*, etc., are auxiliary acts which help in the accomplishment of the sacrifice *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, etc. Therefore, these are *kratvartha*. There are some acts and items that serve both the purposes. These are both *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*. For instance, *dadhi* (curd) is stated to be offered at the sacrifice by one statement and it is stated to be offered for the benefit of healthy senses by another statement. As per the first statement, it is *kratvartha* and as per the second it is *puruṣārtha*. To put it in the Mīmāṁsā terminology, all acts and items that are elicited by *itikartavyatākāṅkṣā* are *kratvartha* and all those acts and items that lead to satisfy the *bhāvyākāṅkṣā* are *puruṣārtha*.

Some interesting examples to sort out whether certain acts and items are *kratvartha* or *puruṣārtha* are noted in the very first *adhikaraṇa* of Śabara Bhāṣya under the *sūtra* by which these two are defined.

It is prescribed that a *brāhmaṇa* should earn wealth by teaching, receiving gifts, and by priestly vocation, a *kṣatriya* by victory over his enemy, a *vaiśya* by vocations like agriculture. Now, the question arises whether this earning is *kratvartha* or *puruṣārtha*.

The pūrvapakṣin argues that the earning of wealth is restricted to certain means here. Such a restriction has a bearing on its purpose. If it were for his routine use and personal maintainance, the other means like trade and commerce also would have been kept open. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the earning prescribed here is to use it for the purpose of sacrifice to be undertaken, particularly in the case of a *brāhmaṇa*. Therefore, it is *kratvartha*. Otherwise, the restriction of earning by only certain means becomes purposeless.

The *siddhāntin* points out that earning is a voluntary programme to satisfy one's needs. It is not necessary to envisage that it is earned for sacrifice only. The restriction of earning by certain means is intended to guide to follow the appropriate and honest means to one's vocation. Any lapse in following this guideline may lead to other consequences. But this will not make room for treating it as meant only for sacrifice. Hence, earning wealth by a *brāhmaṇa* is *puruṣārtha*. It is not *kratvartha*.[40]

At *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, there are statements like 'water be brought in *camasa* type of cups', 'he who desires to obtain *paśu*' should bring the water in milk vessel. Here, since the benefit of obtaining *paśu* is stated, the use of the milk vessel has to be considered as *puruṣārtha*. However, since the water to be utilized for the sacrifice is brought by it, it has to be considered as *kratvartha*. The net result is that it may have to be treated both as *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*. The *siddhāntin* points out that, as per the second statement using *godohana*, i.e. cow milk vessel, instead of *camasa* type of vessel, is meant primarily for obtaining the benefit of *paśu*. Mere bringing of water could have been done by *camasa* type of cup itself. Therefore, using *godohana* cow milk vessel is *puruṣārtha*.

Another interesting example of sorting out *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* arises from the statement 'one sould not look at the sun when the sun rises in the morning and sets in the evening.'

The pūrvapakṣin argues that this prohibition of looking at the sun at the time of rising and setting is made by a Vedic statement. Therefore, a Vedic statement to look at the sun

in the context of a sacrifice has to be envisaged. No prohibition can be made of something that is not stated somewhere. However, these two Vedic statements need not conflict. Prohibition of looking at the sun relates to the morning and the evening times only and looking at the sun may be envisaged during other times. Now, no benefit for this act of not looking at the rising and setting sun is stated here. Therefore, it is not *puruṣārtha*. Hence, it has to be considered as *kratvartha*.

The *siddhāntin* points out that the statement 'one should not look at the rising and setting sun' occurs in the context of observing certain positive things to be observed. Therefore, the negative particle should not be taken in the sense of a total negation. It should be taken as *paryudāsa*. This means some act implying the absence of looking at the sun has to be observed. Such an act is a determination not to look. Such a determination on the part of the person concerned can not be *kratvartha*. Therefore, it has to be treated as *puruṣārtha*.[41]

The number and gender also are *kratvartha* through the object to which these belong. In the following examples (i) *Agniṣomīyam paśum ālabheta*, 'an animal dedicated to Agni and Soma should be sacrificed', (ii) *Anaḍvāhau yunakti*, 'yokes a pair of oxen', (iii) *Kapiñjalān ālabheta*, 'partridges should be sacrificed'. The numbers one, two and many, indicated by the singular, dual and plural do get connected with the act conveyed by the verb *ālabheta* through the respective objects.[42]

The priests, the place, time, the *dravya* to be offered, all these are the auxiliaries to the respective sacrifices.

The pūrvapakṣin argues that without priests, place, time, etc., the sacrifice cannot be performed at all. Therefore, there is no need to enjoin these. The *siddhāntin* points out that to avoid adopting any place, any time, any *dravya*, these have to be enjoined. These injunctions that state a specific time, specific place and specific *dravya* are *niyamavidhis*, i.e. mandatory injunctions. These avoid chaotic choice of place, time, etc. Since, these are specifically enjoined any lapse in respect of these, will adversely affect the sacrifice.[43]

VIII

THE ELIGIBILITY TO PERFORM THE SACRIFICE

The eligibility for performing sacrifice is stated briefly as '*arthī samartho vidvān adhikriyate*', i.e. a person who desires to obtain the result of the sacrifice and who has the necessary resources and knowledge is eligible to perform the sacrifice. It is also stated as '*adhikāraḥ phalasvāmyam*', i.e. acquiring the ownership of the result is the ground for engaging oneself in the sacrifice.

In respect of eligibility, the first question that arises is whether the persons who have defective senses, such as blind, deaf, dumb, lame are eligible or not. There are certain items in the sacrifice that have to be performed by utilizing these senses. For instance, *ājya avekṣaṇa* (seeing the *ājya*), *mantroccāraṇa* (reciting hymns), *viṣṇukrāmaṇa* (walking) cannot be performed by the blind, dumb, lame persons. It cannot be argued that since such

persons cannot perform these items, the injunctions about these items do not apply to these persons. They can be treated as exempted from these acts and they can get the result from the sacrifice even without performing these items. This position cannot be accepted. These are *kratvartha* items, that is to say, these are part and parcel of the sacrifice. If these are not performed, the performance of sacrifice itself becomes incomplete and does not lead to the result. Hence, such persons are not eligible to perform the sacrifice since they do not satisfy the criterion of *sāmarthya* for eligibility.[44]

An interesting question is raised in the Bhāṣya as to whether the birds and animals are eligible to perform the sacrifice. The birds and animals are also interested in obtaining happiness. They also have the feelings of happiness and sorrow. This is clear from the fact that they move under the shade of trees when there is the heat of the sun and move under the sun when the weather is chill. Further, dogs observe fast on fourteenth day of the month. The *śyena* birds observe fast on eighth day of the month. It cannot be considered as due to some health problem, since, such fast is observed regularly by them. Therefore, it seems, these also can be considered as eligible to undertake sacrifice.

However, these acts of animals and birds are not based on their knowledge of these as *dharma*. An act can be decided as *dharma* or not only by the perusal of the Veda. Birds and animals have no access to the Veda. Further, these do not have any *dravya* of their own to offer. It is true that certain areas in the forest are earmarked for various birds and animals. However, the ownership of these is not granted to them. Hence, birds and animals do not satisfy the criteria of eligibility namely, '*samartha*' and '*vidvān.*' [45]

The Eligibility for Deities

The question whether deities and sages are eligible for undertaking sacrifice is also raised.[46]

The statement '*devā vai satram āsata*', 'gods verily observed *satra*, gives an impression that deities and sages are also eligible for undertaking sacrifice. Further, there is a sacrifice that has to be performed for a thousand years. Deities alone can perform such long sacrifices. However, the *Bhāṣyakāra* rejects the eligibility for deities on the ground that sacrifices are performed through address to deities. If the deities themselves undertake the sacrifice, they have to think of another set of deities to address. This is ridiculous. In the case of sages also, they have to envisage another tradition of sages. Moreover, the deities have no forms. Hence they are not eligible.

The question of eligibility of deities is discussed in *Brahmasūtra* under *devatādhikaraṇa.* Śrī Śaṅkaracārya is not particularly interested in defending eligibility of the deities. He argues in favour of the eligibility of *brahmajñāna* and establishes it. However, certain observations made by him in this context are helpful to support eligibility for *karmānuṣṭhāna* also. He states that deities have form, called *vigraha.* They have the capacity to assume many forms and be simultaneously present at different places. They can be conveyed by the Veda without affecting its eternity. The question of addressing another set of deities of the same name or another set of sages of the same name does not arise, so far as *brahmajñāna* is concerned.

Śrī Rāmānuja also supports the eligibility for *brahmajñāna* for the deities on the same line. Śrī Madhvācārya goes a step ahead and establishes the eligibility for both *karmānuṣṭhāna* and *brahmajñāna* for the deities. The arguments in favour of eligibility for *karmānuṣṭhāna* are stated as under:[48]

(i) In the statement '*devaḥ agnim ādhatte*', 'gods kindle fire', *agnyādhāna* is stated for the deities.

(ii) Chaturmukha Brahmā himself teaches Vedas, hence, the deities do study the Veda. Moreover, they can have the knowledge of it without the study of the Veda. It is *svayaṁ pratibhāta*, 'illuminating by itself', for them.

(iii) Indra, Varuṇa, etc., are the offices of the deities. There is someone or the other all along. Hence Vedic words can convey them without affecting the eternal relation between the word and the meaning.

(iv) The deities have form and can simultaneously be present in many places. Moreover, it is not necessary that they should be physically present at the sacrifice.

In view of this, the deities have eligibility for both *karmānuṣṭhāna* and *brahmajñāna*.

Eligibility of Women

After disposing of the question of eligibility of deities and sages the question of the eligibility of women is taken up for discussion. Aitiśayana, an early Mīmāṁsaka, argues that the expression *svargakāmaḥ* is in masculine gender. Therefore, it seems the intention is to convey that only men are eligible to perform sacrifice. Further, it is stated that a person who kills a child in the womb without being aware whether it is a male or female, kills the sacrifice itself, that is to say, he kills a person who was destined to undertake the sacrifice. The expression *avijñāta*, i.e. without being aware, indicates the possibility of the child being a male child and its killing adversely affecting the programme of the sacrifice. If both the male and the female were eligible, then the adjective *avijñāta* was not necessary to the child in the womb. It would have adversely affected the programme of the sacrifice whether the child in the womb is male or female.

It should be noted that the killing of the female child in the womb is not justified here. Both are declared as highly sinful. But, in the case of the male child, there is the additional sin of adversely affecting the sacrificial programme. Even this will be equalized later in the discussion by granting eligibility to women also. The view of Aitiśayana that the women are not eligible is not the final view.

Another argument to deny the eligibility for women is the lack of resources with them. The sacrifice requires various kinds of grain, *ghee*, etc. The woman does not own these. In fact, she herself is purchased at the time of marriage by offering to her father cows, chariots, etc. She is as much an object of sale and purchase as any other object required for the sacrifice. It is true that she is permitted to earn by stitching cloth, knitting and other minor services. But all such earnings, belong to her husband. She herself is owned by him.

Hence, her earnings also belong to him. She cannot make use of them to undertake the sacrifice.[49]

The above arguments are not sufficient grounds to deny eligibility to women. The masculine gender in the expression *svargakāmaḥ* does not exclude women. The desire for the result of the sacrifice is the ground of the eligibility. This is stated by the expression *svargakāmaḥ*. The desire is common to both male and female. As such, both of them are eligible.

Offering some presents to the parents of the bride does not amount to the purchase of the bride. It is only a custom.

At the time of the marriage the bridegroom makes a promise that he will not transgress her in respect of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. This clearly indicates that they enter into a kind of partnership in respect of persuing these ideals of life. None is the master of the other. The expression *dampati* is explained as *patiśca patnī ca dampati*. The word *dama* means sacrificial fire. *Dampati* means the husband and wife associated with the sacrificial fire. The word *patnī* also means the wife associated with husband in the programme of sacrifice. *Patyurno yajña saṁyoge*, associated with husband in the context of sacrifice. Hence, women are as much eligible to undertake sacrifice as men.[50]

The next question is whether the husband and wife can undertake the sacrifice individually, separately or whether it is a joint programme. The singular in the expression *yajeta* gives an impression that it has to be undertaken separately. However, there are certain items like *ājya avekṣaṇa* and *anvārambha* that have to be done by both. This will not be possible if each one of them undertakes the sacrifice separately. Attending to these items by only one of them will result in the incompleteness in the performance of the sacrifice. It cannot be argued that the items that are to be performed by the wife may be performed by the husband in the sacrifice undertaken by him. These items relate to the sacrifice but not to the person. Hence, personwise allocation will not satisfy the requirement of the programme of sacrifice. This will result in the absence of *sarvāṅgopasaṁhāra*, i.e. implementing all the details of sacrifice. Hence, both have to undertake the sacrifice together. The singular number in the expression '*yajeta*' only indicates the agency of undertaking this act present in the two is one and joint, i.e. *vyāsajya vṛtti*. It does not indicate that the agent is one. It only indicates that the agency is one.

There are certain other acts such as '*yoktreṇa patnīm sannahyati*', 'binds the wife together with a yoke' '*mekhalayā yajamānam*', 'the sacrificer with the girdle', which confirm that both of them participate in the programme together. It is also stated that they attain prosperity together. '*Sampatnī sukṛtena gacchatām*', 'move onwards along with your wife by means of your noble deeds.' All these confirm that the two together have to undertake the sacrifice.[51]

After settling the issue of jointly performing the sacrifice, a statement in connection with *agni ādhāna*, viz., *kṣaume vasānau agnim ādadhitām*, i.e. 'wearing the silk garment *agni ādhāna* is to be performed' needs, examination. Here, the question is raised whether two pairs of *yajamāna* and his wife should perform *ādhāna* or only one pair of them. Here, the word '*vasānau*' is used in masculine gender and dual number. This gives an impression that two men have to perform *agni ādhāna*. In the light of the ruling in the previous

adhikaraṇa, that the *yajamāna* and his wife have to jointly act in the matter of sacrifice, it can be claimed that two pairs of *yajamāna* and his wife have to perform *agni ādhāna*. This difficulty is solved by clarifing that this statement does not enjoin the *agni ādhāna* which is already enjoined, nor does it state the persons who have to perform *agni ādhāna*. It only prescribes the wearing of the silk cloth. Hence, the question whether two pairs have to perform *agni ādhāna* or one pair does not arise here.[52]

Another point to be noted in connection with the participation by the wife in the sacrificial programme is that such of the items where recitation of hymns is required, the *yajamāna* alone has to perform them as his wife has not studied the Veda. The items that are given the designation *yājamāna* and are *kratvartha* come under this category. However, the wife has to observe *brahmacarya*, participate in offering blessings as also in the items that are particularly assigned to her.[53]

The Śūdras do not Have Eligibility for Performing Sacrifice

The right of *śūdras* for performing sacrifice is strongly argued in the *Jaimini sūtras* and *Śabara Bhāṣya*, though ultimately it is not granted. We may first note the arguments that support the right for the *śūdras* to perform sacrifice.

(i) The very first *sūtra* of this *adhikaraṇa* states that the injunctions '*yajata*', '*juhuyati*', etc., are not specifically enjoined with reference to this or that group of the society. These are wide open to all the four *varṇas* of the society: '*caturvarṇyam aviśeṣāt*'. 'There is no exclusion from amongst the four *varṇas*.'[54]

(ii) Sacrifices are meant for obtaining certain results. A person who is interested in obtaining the result of these is stated to be eligible to perform these. *Śūdras* can as much be interested in the result of these as the other groups of the society. '*Nimittārthena bādariḥ tasmāt sarvādhikāram syāt*'. (SB vi-1-27) 'Since this (sacrifice) is performed with a definite purpose, everyone should be alowed to perform it, so says Bādari.' This view is quoted as the view of Badari, an early Mīmāṁsaka.

(iii) The statement '*vidvān agnim ādhatte*', i.e., a person who has studied the Veda undertakes *agni ādhāna*, is a general statement. This does not exlude the *śūdra* from having *agni ādhāna*.

(iv) The argument that if sacrifice is performed without *brahmasāma, vṛta, prakrama* etc. by a *śūdra*, it does not lead to the result concerned, is also not valid. These are stated without reference to any particular sacrifice and are not applicable to a *śūdra*. Moreover, the *vritas* are a kind of *saṁskāra*. These apply only to such persons with reference to whom these are stated. These do not come in the way of *śūdras* performing the sacrifice.

(v) The argument that the *śūdra* has no *upanayana saṁskāra* is not valid. *Upanayana* is intended to get a student by a teacher. A *śūdra* can approach a teacher on his own. He can study on his own also.

These arguments reveal an open mind. There must have been a section of the Vedic people who had an open mind. These arguments represent their thought.

The above arguments given by the Sūtrakāra and explained by the Bhāṣyakāra are countered by the Sūtrakāra himself as follows:

(i) In the context of *agni ādhāna, brāhmaṇa, kṣatriya* and *vaiśya* are specifically mentioned. If *śūdras* were eligible for undertaking sacrifice, they also would have been mentioned along with others for the purpose of *agni ādhāna.*

(ii) Mere interest in obtaining the result of the sacrifice will not entitle one to undertake it. It is only one of the criteria. The other criteria, particularly, the knowledge of the Veda is not found in *śūdras.*

(iii) Studying Veda without *upanayana* is a wrong procedure. Such a study and recitation of hymns at the sacrifice without proper study will not help to obtain the result of the sacrifice.

(iv) The purpose of Vedic injunctions that enjoin the performance of sacrifice is satisfied by *brāhmaṇa,* etc., performing them. Therefore, there is no need to extend the scope to *śūdras.*[55]

These arguments are based on text interpretations. The wider issue has social implications.

The institution of sacrifice is a programme of achieving welfare not only for the individual but for the whole society. It is even more. It is for the welfare of the entire world consisting of all living beings and the nature. It is also a sacred programme. Therefore, it has to be executed by competent persons with necessary discipline. The persons are meant for the programme. The programme is not meant for them. In view of this, if any individual or a group of persons are denied participation in the programme, the intention is to accomplish the programme perfectly and faultlessly but not to deny the opportunity of participation to any person or group of persons. The programme is more important than the persons.

The textual arguments quoted above have this deeper insight as the undercurrent.

Concepts of perfection of socio-religious programmes and procedures go on changing. We have to understand their validity in the context in which they were practised or preached. In due course, the changes take place whether one likes it or not.

One or two other points in connection with the eligibility need to be clarified. One such point is, whether only the person who has already sufficient resources is eligible to undertake the sacrifice or one can acquire the resources and start. In the case of knowledge of the Veda, it is already acquired in response to the injunction to study the Veda. In the case of resources, a person would have acquired some resources for his day-to-day purpose. However, he has to acquire sufficient resources to undertake the sacrifice. He cannot be denied the eligibility merely on the ground that presently he does not possess sufficient resources. Sacrificial programme is not only a rich man's programme.[56]

In an earlier *adhikaraṇa* it was stated that deformed persons like the blind, deaf, dumb, lame, etc., are not eligible to undertake sacrifice. However, those who have certain other defects, which are curable, can undertake sacrifices after having got their defects duly cured.[57]

However, in the case of such defects that are not curable but where the use of the senses concerned is indispensable for the required performance of certain items, the persons concerned are not eligible so far as *kāmya* sacrifices are concerned.[58]

There is another interesting point to be noted in connection with the eligibility to undertake *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice.

The performer of this sacrifice is expected to announce the name of the sage whose *gotra* he belongs to. In this connection, it is stated that the names of one, two and three sages be announced. The fourth and the fifth are not to be announced. For example (i) *bhāradvāja gotro'ham,* (ii) *upamanyu-vaśiṣtha gotro'ham,* (iii) *āṅgirasa-bārhaspatya-bhāradvāja gotro'ham.*

Now, the question arises whether all the three steps are to be announced or only one of them—if one of them, then, which of them. It cannot be taken as all the three are to be announced, as it results in *vākyabheda.* Taking first or second alternatives only, results in incompleteness. Therefore, the third alternative, viz., three names are to be recited, is to be adopted. The other two are stated only to highlight the importance of the third.[59]

The Eligibility of the Rathakāra

Rathakāra is a sub-caste. A person born from the mother of the karaṇi caste and the father of the māhiṣyā caste is of the rathakāra caste. A woman born of the mother of the *śūdra* caste and father of the *vaiśya* caste is karaṇī. A person born of the mother of *vaiśya* caste and father of the *kṣatriya* caste is māhiṣyā.

With reference to a person belonging to the rathakāra subcaste, it is stated that he should perform *agni ādhāna* during the rainy season. The name 'rathakāra could be applied to the *brāhmaṇa*' who was engaged in preparing a chariot. However, it would be a forced application when the word refers to a particular caste by usage. The usage is a stronger evidence in deciding the meaning of a word than etymological explanation. Hence, *agni ādhāna* has to be undertaken by a person of the rathakāra caste.[60]

Another exception is that of *niṣāda sthapati.* A sacrifice related to Rudra is stated to be performed by a *niṣāda sthapati.* Here the word can be taken to mean as a master of *niṣādas* or a person belonging to the *niṣāda* clan. It is taken in the latter sense. This is another instance of a person not belonging to any of the first three *varṇas* being granted eligibility to a particular sacrifice.[61]

These two instances serve more than the sacrificial purpose. These are evidences for the intercourse between *kṣatriyas, vaiśyas* and other castes. Such intercourses do not seem to be between a few individuals. In that case, a new sub-caste would not have emerged. Such processes seem to have been kept continued all along. These sub-castes seem to have adopted different vocations and later on having been identified by those vocations. The progeny of such an intercourse must have acquired a social status by adopting some or other vocation.

IX

SATRA AS A SACRIFICE TO BE PERFORMED BY A GROUP OF *YAJAMĀNAS*

The injunction '*Ṛddhikāmāḥ satram asīran*' enjoins a sacrifice designated as *satra*. It is a *vikṛti* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. While *Jyotiṣṭoma* is performed by one *yajamāna*, *satra* has to be performed by many *yajamānas*. This is indicated by the plural of the verb *asīran*. In this sacrifice, there is no separate *ṛtviks*, i.e. sacrificial priests. The very *yajamānas* play the role of priests, rather priests play the role of *yajamānas*, i.e. '*ye ṛtvijaḥ te yajamānāḥ*.' Since the two roles are combined, there is no need of extending an invitation to priests to participate and assist in the sacrifice. Similarly, there is no need of payment of any fee to the priest cum *yajamānas*. The fee is offered to persuade the priests. Here, since the very priests are *yajamānas*, the question of persuading them does not arise. Now, an important question arises in respect of sharing the result of the sacrifice. There are three possibilities: (i) the result is obtained by all jointly; (ii) a portion of the result is shared by each individually; (iii) each one gets full result. The preference of one of these alternatives depends upon the nature of the agency, i.e. *kartṛtva* envisaged, viz., (i) one agency is present in the whole group; (ii) the agency is present in each by rotation, (iii) the agency is present in each group separately. The first alternative is not possible, as there are many agents, as indicated by the plural. The group is not the agent. The second alternative is also not possible, since in the process of rotation when one is acting as the agent, the other has to remain without it. Therefore, the third alternative has to be preferred. According to this alternative, each one has the agency separately. Consequently, each obtains the full result individually. The result envisaged is *bhadra* or welfare. Each one can have his welfare fully without prejudice to the welfare of other members of the group. It is like a victory in the cricket. Each player gets the joy of the victory individually and fully.[62]

There is an interesting provision in connection with the *satrayāga*. If one of the *yajamānas* dies in the middle of the sacrifice, a person closely related to him should be taken in his place. The bones of the deceased person should be kept packed in *kṛṣṇājina*. After an year a ritual known as *asthiyāga* has to be performed.[63]

Satra has to be performed by *Brāhmaṇas* only. Among *Brāhmaṇas* also those who belong to Vaśiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra *gotras* or the *gotras* that are similar in status are eligible to perform *satras*. Among these, again, those who maintain the sacrificial fire only are eligible.[64]

Sacrificial utensils like juhu etc. commonly belong to all priests. If these are treated as belonging to individuals, then, if one of them dies, these will have to be burnt with him according to the general practice.[65]

The normal rule is that when the *Yajamāna* dies or gets engaged in some other work, he cannot be represented by another person. However, in the case of *satra* if one of the priest cum *yajamānas* dies or leaves, a representative should be taken. This representative has to undergo the necessary *saṁskāras*. However, he is not entitled for the result. Only such *yajamānas* who participate in the sacrifice from the beginning to the end are entitled to this result.[66]

X

VIŚVAJIT SACRIFICE

In *Viśvajit* sacrifice the statement '*viśvajiti sarvasvaṁ dadāti*' enjoins gifting of the entire wealth of the *yajamāna* to the priest by way of *dakṣiṇā.*

In this connection some interesting questions are raised. The first question is, whether the parents also come under the property and are they also to be gifted? To settle this question, the very nature of a gift has to be examined. It is explained as withdrawing one's ownership of the property concerned and investing it with the ownership of the recipient '*svaswatvapari tyāgapūrvakaṁ parasvatvāpādanam.*' This is done in sale and purchase also. But there it is done for a consideration. In the case of a gift, it is voluntarily done. In the case of parents, the ownership is of the nature of father and mother. This cannot be withdrawn by the son and the parentship of the receiver of them as gift cannot be invested by them. Moreover, they are not a property owned by him. Therefore, they cannot be gifted.[67]

Viśvajit sacrifice is undertaken by kings. Therefore, another question arises whether kingdom also can be gifted. This raises the further question whether the king is the owner of the land and other natural resources of the kingdom or it belongs to people and all those living beings who live on it. Jaimini clearly states that '*sarvaṁ prati aviśiṣṭatvāt,* i.e. it belongs to all. King has only to take care of it, maintain the law and order and collect some tax for it. The kingdom is not his personal property. Therefore, he cannot gift it away.

Similarly, the gifting of horses, etc., also is not permitted. These do not come under his personal property.

Transient objects like cot, bed, furniture and house also do not come under his personal property and these are not to be gifted. A *śūdra* who voluntarily stays with the *yajamāna* also does not form his property and should not be gifted.[68]

The wealth that is with the *yajamāna* during the period when he decides to perform *viśvajit yāga* and up to the time of giving the *dakṣiṇā,* is the wealth that is covered by the term '*sarvasyva*', i.e. of the entire. The past wealth is no longer with him and the future earnings are hypothetical. These are not covered by the term 'entire.' He has to give by way of *dakṣiṇā,* the entire present wealth.[69]

At the commencement of the sacrifice, the *yajamāna* should divide his resources into three kinds: (i) for the sacrifice, (ii) for giving gift by way of *dakṣiṇā,* (iii) for personal use. It is only the second kind that has to be gifted. The first should be utilized for the sacrifice all along and even after *dakṣiṇā* is given for the continuing programme of the sacrifice. If he gives as gift even that portion of the resources which is earmarked for the sacrifice, the sacrifice itself will collapse.[70]

These observations of Jaimini in connection with the gift to be given at the *viśvajit yāga* enlighten us in a wider way.

(i) The kingdom consisting of people, other living beings, land and other resources are not a personal property of the king. These belong to the people.

(ii) Parents and servants are not the property of any person.
(iii) Though giving gift is a noble act, practical consideration is to be kept in mind while fixing the quantum and manner of the gift.

Jaimini has not raised the question whether the wife is also a property. It is already decided that she is a *yajamāna* jointly with her husband. She is a part and parcel of the sacrifice. Therefore, such a question does not arise.

XI

PRATINIDHI—REPRESENTATIVE

In the sacrifice when a prescribed item is not available a substitute or representative has to be adopted to complete the sacrifice successfully. The selection of a substitute or representative should be based on its suitability to play the role of the item for which it is a substitute and the necessity of providing such a substitute. Keeping these two guidelines in mind, a few cases of substitution are discussed by Jaimini and explained by Śabara.

At the outset, it is made clear that in the case of the deity, the sacred fire such as *āhavanīya,* the hymn to be recited in favour of a deity or on an item, and the acts like performing *prayāja,* sprinkling water on paddy, no substitute is possible or permitted. The role of these cannot be played by any subsititute. For instance, in the *āgneya yāga* if the sacrificer does not remember the name of Agni on the proper occassion, he should not be substituted by the name Viṣṇu. The purpose to be achieved by addressing Agni cannot be achieved by addressing Viṣṇu The *āhavanīya* fire should not be substituted by ordinary fire. The hymn to be recited at a particular sacrifice should not be substituted by any other hymn. These substitute of fire and hymn cannot serve the purpose intended to be served by the sacred fire or the particular hymn. Similarly, auxiliary acts, like the *prayāja,* etc., and *saṅskāras* like *prokṣaṇa,* etc., cannot be substituted by any other auxiliary. These produce their own *apūrva* which cannot be produced by any other act or *saṅskāra.* A substitute is expected to play the role of the original. If the original is such that its role cannot be played by anyone else, the sacrificer cannot perform the sacrifice with its subsititute. If the sacrificer does not remember either the name of the deity or the hymn which is to be recited or is not able to perform the prescribed auxiliary act or *saṅskāra,* his sacrifice cannot but collapse.[71]

Further, the sacrificer himself cannot be substituted by any other sacrificer after the commencement of the sacrifice. If a sacrificer dies or becomes engaged in another activity and leaves the sacrifice which he has undertaken, a substitute of him as *yajamāna* cannot be taken. The *yajamāna* is the appointing authority of other priests but he himself is not appointed by anyone else. He has voluntarily undertaken the sacrifice. To perform the voluntary act of one person another person cannot be substituted in the middle of the act. To participate in the sacrifice, a person has to be appointed by the sacrificer. In the absence of the original sacrificers no person can be appointed by any other. The result of

an act started by one cannot be obtained by another intervener. The sacrifice concerned has to be considered as failed.[72]

After discussing the instances in which a substitute is not allowed, we will take note of the instances where a substitute is allowed and the manner in which it is allowed.

(i) When a substance to be offered is not available in the middle of the sacrifice, another substance similar to it should be substituted. However, when another similar substance is already prescribed as an alternative, that cannot be taken as a substitute. A different but similar substance should be taken. For instance, when *vrīhi,* i.e. paddy is not available, another grain similar to it, should be substituted. A grain similar to paddy is that which contains largely the particles of *vrīhi.* However, *yava* grain which is enjoined as an alternative and which is also similar to *vrīhi* should not be taken as a substitute in a sacrifice in which *vrīhi* is used to start with, but some other grain that is similar to *vrīhi* should be taken as a substitute. Similarly, in a sacrifice which is started with *yava,* another grain similar to it should be taken as a substitute but not *vrīhi.* Concepts of *pratinidhi* and *vikalpa* are distinct. The provision of an alternate is quite distinct from the provision for the substitute.[73]

The instance of *soma* and *pūtikā* is quite different. *Pūtikā* is not enjoined as an alternative to *soma* but as a substitute of it. Hence, when *pūtikā* is also not available, a plant similar to *soma* has to be substituted.[74]

Similarly, when *nīvāra* grain that is taken as a substitute for *vrīhi* is not available, another grain similar to *vrīhi* only should be taken but not that which is similar to *nīvāra.* However, if *vrīhi* itself is again available then, the sacrifice is to be completed with that only.[75]

When a substitute is taken at the start only in the absence of the original, but later the original is available, the original should be taken instead of continuing with the substitute. For instance, *khadira* wood is prescribed for *yūpa* but if it is not available right at the start, *kadara* can be taken as a substitute. However, if *khadira* is made available before the *paśu* is tied to the *yūpa,* that has to be taken, since, it is originally prescribed. *Saṁskāras* like cutting the wood, etc., that were effected earlier on *kadara,* should be effected on *khadira* which is now taken. The fact that the *saṁskāras* effected earlier on *kadara* have become a waste should be overlooked.[76]

Even if the originally prescribed item, viz., *khadira* is weak and cannot stand cutting, etc., the original item, viz., *khadira* itself should be used. Between the item and its *saṅskāra,* the item is more important than its *saṅskāra.* However, if it is very weak and cannot be utilized at all, then the substitute should be adopted.[77]

Even if the original item cannot stand certain *saṁskāras,* a substitute should not be adopted in its place. Between the item and the *saṁskāras,* the item is more important than the *saṅskāras.* For instance, if *vrīhi* is available only in a small quantity a number of *saṁskāras* such as cutting into four pieces will not be possible but still the *vrīhis* only should be utilized not *nīvāra,* as its substitute.[78]

XII

PRAYOGA VIDHI

Enjoining of the Total Programme of Sacrifice

The main sacrifice is enjoined by *pradhānavidhi.* The auxiliaries are enjoined by *guṇavidhi* and the agent is enjoined by *adhikāravidhi.* The *pradhānavidhi,* in association with other *vidhis,* constitutes one unit. This is designated as *prayogavidhi* as it results in the enjoining of the whole programme of the sacrifice. It conveys that all items connected with a sacrifice should be performed in their respective order without any interruption or delay. This is technically called *prayogaprāśubhāva,* that is, uninterrupted performance of various items. To achieve this, the sequence of various items of the sacrifice is enjoined.

In this connection a question is raised whether sequence is enjoined as an attribute of each item or as an attribute of all the items put together. The first alternative is not possible. The items do not have sequence as their attribute individually and separately. The second alternative is also not possible, since, the *saṅghāta* (togetherness), of these is not enjoined. However, it is ruled that the sequence could be enjoined as an attribute of the items when two or more items are enjoined. When many items are enjoined, these cannot be performed simultaneously. Therefore, the sequence has to be taken as enjoined as an attribute of the items spread over the items like conjunction.[79]

The next question is, what is the basis on which the sequence among different items is to be fixed. In this connection six criteria are laid down, namely, (i) *śruti,* direct statement of the sequence, (ii) *artha,* purpose served by the respective items, (iii) *pātha,* the order in which the item is stated in the Vedic text concerned, (iv) *sthāna,* the place, (v) *mukya krama,* determining the order of the auxiliaries following the order of the main item. Pravṛtti the order adopted for the first time. We will take into account the examples in which the sequence is implemented on the basis these criteria.[80]

Śruti is the direct expression of the sequence in the Vedic statement concerned. This is of two types: (a) mention of the sequence itself. The example is *vedaṁ kṛtvā vediṁ karoti* which means that after preparing the Veda, *vedi* is prepared. Here the suffix in the word *kṛtvā,* meaning 'after', conveys the sequence.

(b) Mention of the item with the attribute of sequence. For example *vaṣatkartuḥ prathama bhakṣaḥ,* i.e. he who announces '*vaṣaṭ*' drinks the *soma* first. Here the sequence is stated as an attribute of *bhakṣaṇa.*

The criterion of *śruti* is superior to other criteria. For instance, *āśvinagraha* is stated in the first place in the Vedic text. But the express statement that '*āsvino daśamo bhavati*' supercedes the order stated in the text. This is an example of *śruti* superceding the *pāṭhakrama.*[81]

Arthakrama is the sequence based on the purpose, '*prayojanavaśena*' *kramanirṇayaḥ arthakrmaḥ.*' According to it, the statement '*agnihotram juhoti*' occurs first followed by the statement '*yavagūṁ pacati*' (cooks the *yavāgū* grain). However, *yavāgū* is meant for *homa.*

Therefore, the cooking of *yavāgū* has to precede the *homa*. This is a case of *arthakrama* superceding *pāṭhakrama*.[82]

Pāṭhakrama is the sequence based on the order of the items mentioned in the text. This is of two types: (a) *Mantra pāṭha*, i.e. the order based on the order of the hymns to be recited, for example, the performance of *āgneya* and *agniṣomīya* has to follow the order in which *yājyā* and *anuvākyā* hymns are stated in the text.

(b) *Brāhmaṇa pāṭha*, i.e., the sequence on the basis of the order in which the items concerned are stated in the Brāhmaṇa text. For example, the *samit, tanunapāt*, etc., are stated in the Brāhmaṇa text as '*samidhā yajati*', *tanūnapātaṁ yajati*, etc. These have to be performed in the same order. It should be noted that the *mantra pāṭha* is superior to the *brāhmaṇa pāṭha*. *Mantras* form the interior of the sacrifice. These are part and parcel of it while *brāhmaṇas* are the external of it.[83]

Sthāna–Place. At *sādyaska* sacrifice, 'three *paśus*', namely, *savanīya, agnīṣomīya* and *anubandhya* are prescribed. For these auxiliaries like *upākaraṇa*, etc., are prescribed for each *paśu*. Here the question arises whether the performance of *upākaraṇa*, (auxiliaries) are to be performed starting with any one of the three *paśus* or with a particular *paśu*. It is ruled that since a particular place is stated for performing *upākaraṇa*, etc., for the *savanīya paśu*, for the other two *paśus* also these should be performed at the same place, since the offering of these *paśus* is stated in one statement. The place for *savanīya paśu* is stated as *āśvinaṁ grahaṁ gṛhītvā savanīyaṁ paśum upākarti*, i.e. after taking *āśvina graha* the *upākaraṇa*, etc., be performed for the *savanīya paśu*. Hence for the other two *paśus* also *upākaraṇa*, etc., are to be performed at the same place.[84]

Mukhyakrama, the auxiliaries are to be performed in the same order in which the main items occur.

(i) The *abhigharaṇa* for the *havis* of *āgneya* and *aindra* is prescribed. It should be performed in the order in which *āgneya* and *aindra* are performed. (M.N.P)

(ii) At *citrāyāga* seven *havis* are to be offered. The fourth and fifth are designated as *sārasvata yāga*. *Sarasvatī* and *Sarasvān* are the deities for these. Auxiliaries, such as *nirvāṇa*, are to be performed for these. Here the question arises whether these are to be performed for *Sarasvatī* first and then, for *sarasvān* or in the reverse order. The usual criteria to settle the order are not available here.

Stating the problem as stated above, it is ruled that the auxiliaries be performed for the *havis* meant for *Sarasvatī* first and then for *Srasvān*. The *yajyānuvakyā* are prescribed first for *Sarasvatī* and then for *Sarsvān*. These give an idea of the order of the main item. The auxiliaries have to be performed in the same order in which the main are performed.[85]

After discussing the sequence to be followed in organizing *prayoga vidhi*, a few other points connected with *prayoga* are discussed. We will discuss some of these to give an idea of the care taken to organize the performance of the sacrifice, (i) *Utkarṣa*, i.e., shifting an item to another place.

At *jyotiṣtoma, praṇayana* of Agni to the place of *agnidhra* and that of Soma to the place of *havirdhāna* is prescribed. These were in *prācīnavaṁśa* place earlier. After the *praṇayana* of these two, cutting of the *yūpa* is stated. However, in *vikṛti yāga*, the cutting of the *yūpa* is

preponed for three days before the time of *dīkṣā*. Here, the question is raised whether the *praṇayana* of Agni and Soma that were to take place before the cutting of the *yūpa* should also be shifted to be observed before the cutting of the *yūpa*. It is ruled that *agni praṇayana* and *soma praṇyana* are not auxiliaries of *yūpaccheda*. Hence these need not be shifted.[86]

At the *cāturmāsya*, on *sākamedha* day, *santapaneṣṭi* is prescribed. It has to be performed at midday. After this the evening *agnihotra* has to be performed. However, if for any unexpected reason *santapaneṣtti* has to be performed in the evening also, the question arises whether the evening *agnihotra* should be postponed until this *iṣṭi* is over. It is ruled that the evening *agnihotra* should not be postponed. It should be performed at its proper time and then *santapaneṣṭi* be continued.[87]

At the *vajapeya*, seventeen *paśus* are prescribed. For these animals, *upākaraṇa*, *niyojana*, etc., are prescribed as auxiliaries. Here the question arises, whether all auxiliaries need to be performed to the first *paśu* and then the same are to be performed for the second *paśu* and so on or each auxiliary has to be performed for all *paśus* one by one. It is ruled that each auxiliary be performed for each *paśu* one by one.[88]

At the *darśapurṇamāsa* in regard to the offering of *āgneya agniṣomīya puroḍāśa*, the auxiliaries stated are four handfuls to be offered twice and annointed thrice. Here the question arises whether one handful is to be offered for *āgneya* and then the second for the *agniṣomīya* etc., separately or four handfuls together for the *āgneya* and four handful together for the *agniṣomīya*. It is ruled that each handful need not be offered separately. Instead of that, four handfuls together are to be offered for the *āgneya* and then four handfuls together for the *agniṣomīya*. The same procedure applies to *avadāna* of *havis*, anointing etc.[89]

XIII

ATIDEŚA: TRANSFERENCE OF AUXILIARIES FROM *PRAKṚTI* TO *VIKṚTI*

Sacrifices are grouped into two catagories: *prakṛti*, (original or primary), and *vikṛti*, (derived). The sacrifices that are self-contained, that is to say, have all the auxiliaries duly stated, are *prakṛti* while such sacrifices of which all auxiliaries are not stated but need to be transferred or adopted from *prakṛti*, are *vikṛti*. For instance, *darśapūrṇamāsa* and *nityāgnihotra* are *prakṛti* and *agniṣomīya* and *māsāgnihotra* are *vikṛti*. The latter requires adoption of some auxiliaries from the former. The process of such adoption is designated as *atideśa*. This is discussed in the seventh and eighth chapters of *Jaimini sūtra* and explained in *Śābara Bhāṣya*. The nature of *atideśa* is briefly stated as

> *Prakṛtāt karmaṇo yasmāt tatsamāneṣu karmasu*
> *Dharmopareśo yatra syāt so atideśa iti smṛtaḥ*
> '*Atideśa*' is the transference of certain auxiliary from sacrifices of primary nature
> to those of secondary nature.'

The criterion to adopt the auxiliaries from a particular *prakṛti* to a particular *vikṛti* is the similarity between the two. This similarity is indicated in four ways:

(i) Common name, e.g. *māsāgnihotra* has a common name with *nityāgnihotra.* Hence, the auxiliaries of *nityāgnihotra* are adopted in *māsāgnihotra.*

(ii) Direct statement, e.g. '*Iṣuṇā abhicārān yajeta*' '*śyenena abhicārān yajeta*'. Here after giving a few auxiliaries of *Iṣu* sacrifice, it is stated that '*itarāt śyena vat.*' Here, the auxiliaries of *śyena yāga* are to be adopted in the *iṣu yāga* because of direct statement.

(iii) Presumed injunction. In *saurya* sacrifice, the auxiliaries of *āgneya* are to be adopted by presumed injunction. The statement '*Sauryaṁ cāruṁ nirvapet brahmavarca-sakāmaḥ*' 'one aspiring for the brilliance of Brahman should make oblation to Sūrya' merely states the sacrifice. The required auxiliaries are not stated. However, the sacrifice cannot be performed without auxiliaries. Therefore, a statement to get the auxiliaries from *āgneya* has to be presumed.

(iv) Name of *Saṁskāra.* It is stated above that on the basis of the common name of *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* the auxiliaries of the *prakṛti* are to be adopted in the *vikṛti.* Similarly, by common name of a *saṁskāra* also a *saṁskāra* stated in the *prakṛti* can be brought to *vikṛti,* for instance, *avabhṛta* bath is prescribed in *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice with certain auxiliary details. It is a *saṁskāra.* Sama is prescribed for the *Varuṇa praghāsa.*

It should be noted that the auxiliaries of any *prakṛti yāga* cannot be adopted to any *vikṛti yāga* indiscriminately. The adoption is primarily guided by similarity to be ascertained by the above criteria.[90]

It should also be noted that there is no provision for the *atideśa* of the result, the rules, the sacrifier and the collectivity as per the statement *phala, niyama, kartṛsamudāyānām ananvayaḥ.* For instance, in regard to the *agnihotra, svarga* is stated as the result. He who desires *svarga* is stated as the agent. There is a special provision that the sacrifice should be repeated so long as the sacrificer is alive. It is also stated that *āgneya,* etc., be performed collectively. All these cannot be transferred or adopted in the *vikṛti yāgas,* such as the *saurya.*

With this background, we may notice a few more instances of *atideśa,* that is, transference or adoption.

It is already stated that the auxiliaries of *nityāgnihotra* are to be adopted to the *māsāgnihotra* as there is a commonness in their names.

However, in the case the *prāyaṇīya,* though it is given as a name of the first day in *dvādaśāha* and also the first day of *gavāmayana,* the auxiliaries of one should not be adopted to the other. On closer observations it will be found that it is not a name but only an adjective of the first day. From this it is clear that Jaimini is very careful in distinguishing the words as names and adjectives.

In the *darśapūrṇamāsa,* the statements, '*camasena apaḥ praṇayet*', '*go dohena paśukāmasyā*' occur. The first statement says 'the water is to be brought in a *camasa* type of vessel.' The second statement says a person who desires to obtain *paśu* should bring it in the vessel used for milking. Here, the question is raised whether the latter is allowed in the *vikṛti* also. It is pointed out that only *kratvartha* items are borrowed from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti.* Bringing water in the vessel used to bring the milk is *puruṣārtha* as it serves the purpose of

obtaining *paśu* for the person concerned. It should be noted here that all *puruṣārtha* items are barred from *atideśa.*[91]

Where there is a smilarity in respect of the deity and the *dravya* of *prakṛti* and *vikṛti,* the question arises which of them is to be preferred for the purpose of adopting the auxiliaries of *prakṛti* to the *vikṛti.* It is ruled that the similarity in respect of *dravya* needs to be preferred. Though both deity and *dravya* are essential for the sacrifice, *dravya* is more important than deity. It is the offering of *dravya* that constitutes the core part of *yāgas.*

In the statement '*āgneyaṁ payaḥ*' both deity and *dharma* are stated. Therefore, the question arises whether the *sānnāyya dharmas* are to be adopted or the *puroḍāśa dharmas. Sānnāyya dharmas* have similarity in respect of the deity and *puroḍāśadharmas* have similarity in respect of *dravya.* As per the above ruling, the *dravya dharmas* have to be preferred.

In this instance, the relative position of deity and *dravya* in a sacrifice is made clear.[92]

XIV

ŪHA: MODIFICATION

After explaining *atideśa,* i.e. transference of auxiliaries from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti,* Jaimini takes up the discussion of *ūha,* meaning modification to be introduced to certain auxiliaries to suit the requirement of *vikṛti.* As a preliminary to it, he raises the question whether the auxiliaries are meant for accomplishing *apūrva* or the *dravya* and the deity with which these are associated. In the second alternative, the auxiliaries associated with *dravya* need not be performed in *vikṛti,* since, the same *dravya* and deity are not adopted to the *vikṛti* but a substitute is adopted. If we go by the first alternative, then, since, these are meant for accomplishing *apūrva,* these have to be performed in *vikṛti* also. For instance, if *avaghāta,* i.e. threshing of rice is meant for rice, it need not be done for *nīvāra* grain, etc., by *ūha.* But if it is taken as meant for the *apūrva,* it has to be performed for *nīvāra* also to accomplish the *apūrva.*

Further, if the auxiliaries are meant for the *yāga* but not for *apūrva,* then, since all *yāgas* are enjoined by the common expression *yajati,* the auxiliaries prescribed for *prakṛti yāga* may have to apply to *vikṛti yāga* by way of *upadeśa* only. Consequently, there will not be any need of *atideśa.* However, if the auxiliaries are meant for accomplishing *apūrva,* then the *apūrva* of *vikṛti* being distinct from that of *prakṛti,* the auxiliaries of *prakṛti* have to be brought by *atideśa.*[93]

Ūha, modification, will be required in respect of three items, namely, (i) *mantra,* the hymn to be recited in favour of the deity, (ii) *sāman,* the mode of chanting of the hymns, (iii) *saṁskāra,* certain types of refinement to be effected on *dravya,* vessels, etc. For instance, the hymn '*agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi*', 'I offer to Agni the enjoyable', prescribed to be recited at *prakṛti yāga,* i.e. *āgneya yāga* is borrowed by the *vikṛti yāga,* namely, *saurya yāga.* Now, this has to be recited in favour of Sūrya who is the deity at the *vikṛti yāga.* Therefore, *āgnaye* has to be substituted by *sūryāya.* This is an instance of *ūha* in *mantra.* The *mantra* is brought by *atideśa* and the name of the deity is substituted by the process of *ūha.*

Sāman, i.e., the mode of recitations.

Saṁskāra is the refinement of *dravya* etc. The statement '*vrīhin avahanti*' enjoins *avaghāta*, i.e. threshing of rice in the *prakṛti yāga*. However, when *nīvāra* grain is used in the *vikṛti* the *saṁskāra* of threshing has to be brought by *atideśa* and has to be effected on *nīvāra* grain. This is *ūha* of the *saṁskāra*.[94]

In the context of discussing the question whether the auxiliaries are meant to accomplish *apūrva*, *dravya*, deity, etc., with which these are associated, an interesting question is raised. In *darśapūrṇa* sacrifice, there are two hymns, viz., (i) '*aganma suvaḥ suvaragam*', 'We have gone to *svaḥ* which is the abode of bliss.' (ii) '*agneraham ujjitim anujjeṣam*', 'I attain prosperity by the prosperity of the sacred fire.' The question arises whether these are meant to define the nature of *svarga* and *Agni* and therefore, the recitation is meant for them or the recitation of these hymns is meant to accomplish *apūrva*, *svarga* and *Agni* being only subordinate items. This question is answered by pointing out that these hymns cannot lead to any result by merely defining *svarga* or *Agni* as a deity. These can lead to the result only when these are taken as meant for the accomplishment of *apūrva*. Hence, these are meant for *apūrva*. Consequently, the *svarga* and the deity are to be considered only as subordinate items (Bh.s IX-1-4,5)

The Deity

While discussing this question, the pūrvapakṣin argued that the deity can bestow the result, i.e. *svarga*. This led to the discussion of the very nature of the deity. We will briefly look at the pūrvapakṣin's arguments and the siddhāntin's reply to it. The pūrvapakṣin argues:

(i) All sacrifices are meant for deities. *Havis* offered in the sacrifices is a kind of food offered to them.
The *dravya* and the act of *yāga* are subordinate to the deity. These are meant for him. He is something like a respected guest.

(ii) The deity has a body and he eats food. His eating is not like ordinary eating. He enjoys only the essence like honey bees sucking the essence. In view of this, we find the food offered to him intact.

(iii) We find the description of Indra as holding *vajrāyudha*, Varuṇa as having *pāśa*, Yama with stick. These clearly indicate that the deities have a form.

(iv) The deities own the property from which they can bestow the needs of the persons who worship them. Indra is described as the Lord of the earth, mountains, water, etc.

(v) The deities are described as bestowing wealth, cattle, progeny, etc., for those who worship them.

(vi) The above points are supported by *smṛti*, *ācāra* and the details given above.[95]

The siddhāntin points out that all these evidences are based on *smṛti*. Nowhere in the *śruti* these are explicitely stated. Moreover, if the deities with body etc., are accepted as described above, the very eternal nature of the Veda will be adversely affected. The so-

called benefits stated to be bestowed by the deities are really the results of the sacrifice, but not the favours bestowed by the deities.

This point has been discussed as a side issue while discussing *ūha*.

We will note a few instances of *ūha*.

At *darśapūrṇamāsa*, with reference to *prastara praharaṇa* the hymn '*ayam yajamānaḥ asau āyurāśāste*' 'Here is the sacrificer, he expects prolongation of his age' is to be recited. This hymn is taken by *atideśa* in the *satrayāga*. The word *yajamānaḥ* that is in singular has to be modified as *yajamānāḥ* in plural as there are many *yājamānas* in *satra*. This is an instance of the *ūha* in a *mantra* in respect of the number conveyed by the suffix.[96]

In Respect of Sāman Some Special Points are to be Noted

(i) *Sāmans* are arranged in three parts, (a) *yoni-grantha*, i.e. the hymns that are sources for applying *sāmans;* (b) *ūha grantha*, i.e. a set of three hymns each sung with a *sāman*; (c) *uttarāgrantha*, i.e. the hymns arranged in groups of three *Ṛks*. These three parts together are called *chandograntha*.

(ii) The *sāmans* are a *saṁskāra* for *Ṛks*. Hence, these are auxiliaries.

(iii) The *sāmans* arranged in *ūha granthas* are *pauruṣeya*.

(iv) Each *Ṛk* in the set of (Bh.S.9-2-1-3) three should be sung with the *sāmaṇ* concerned.[97]

(v) There are a thousand branches of *Sāmaveda*. In course of singing of *sāman*, there are variations in respect of modifying the pronounciation of syllables, separation of them, extending the pronounciations, repetition, pausing and introducing the supporting syllables that have no meaning.

Here, the question arises whether the variations prevalent in different branches are to be applied by all or the respective branches should adopt the respective modes. It is concluded that the purpose of these variations is to make the singing perfect. Since, by adopting the mode of the respective branch this purpose can be achieved, there is no need to try the other modes and create a mix-up.

XV

BĀDHA: EXCLUSION

After the discussion on *atideśa* and *ūha* Jaimini goes to *bādha*, i.e. exclusion. *Atideśa* provided for transference of auxiliaries from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti*. The purpose of transference has been to provide the necessary auxiliaries required to accomplish the *apūrva* of the *vikṛti yāga*, since all required auxiliaries will not have been stated in the *vikṛti*. These transferred auxiliaries has to serve the same purpose that was served in the *prakṛti*. However, in some cases that purpose will not be relevant or required in the *vikṛti*. In such cases, the transference of the concerned auxiliaries is not made. In other words, these are excluded

from the scope of *vikṛti*. This process is designated as *bādha*. The word *bādha* literally means prevention or rejection. The auxiliary that was awaiting transference from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti* is prevented from being transferred as the purpose to be served by it is not required or not relevant.

For instance, with reference to the *kuśa* grass to be used at *prakṛti*, it is stated that these are to be cut and brought for the sacrifice while in *vikṛti* it is stated that the *kuśa* grass that has fallen by itself has to be used. Here, the auxiliary, i.e. cutting has become unnecessary at the *vikṛti*. This act of cutting served the purpose of *apūrva* of the *prakṛti* through the grass. Now, it is not necessary to serve the purpose of the *apūrva* of the *vikṛti*.[98]

At *Kāmyeṣṭikāṇḍa* which is a *vikṛti*, *caru* of a hundred pieces of gold put in *ghee* is prescribed. In the *prakṛti*, *caru* is made of *vrīhi*, i.e. rice the threshing of which is prescribed as an auxiliary of it. However, threshing is not needed for gold pieces. Hence, this is excluded.[99]

Similar exclusion is not to be made for cooking the gold pieces, since it is expressely stated that these gold pieces are to be cooked in *ghee*, *ghṛte śrapayati*. It is true that putting in *ghee* will not have the effect of cooking on gold pieces. However, as it is expressely stated by a Vedic statement, its observation will contribute to *apūrva*. No such express statement is found in respect of threshing at the *vikṛti* level.[100]

The *bādha*, i.e. exclusion, is made on three grounds, viz.,

(i) *arthalopa*, absence of scope to serve the purpose for which the auxiliary concerned is stated in the *prakṛti*,

(ii) *pratyamāna*, providing something else in the *vikṛti* in place of the auxiliary to be transferred from the *prakṛti*,

(iii) *pratiṣedha*, negation of the auxiliary concerned by a direct statement.

The two examples cited above come under the first group. In the first example, the auxiliary of cutting the *kuṣa* grass stated in the *prakṛti* lost its purpose, since, in the *vikṛti* the *kuṣa* fallen by itself is prescribed. In the second example, the auxiliary, viz., the threshing prescribed for the rice lost its purpose since *kṛṣṇāla*, i.e. gold pieces do not need threshing. These two categories come under *arthalopa* group.

Pratyāmnān i.e. providing something else in *vikṛti* in place of the auxiliary to be transferred from the *prakṛti*.

At *soma raudra* sacrifice, it is stated '*śaramayaṁ barhiḥ bhavati*' which means the *śara* grass be spread. This is a *vikṛti yāga*. In the *prakṛti yāga*, *kuśa* grass is prescribed for this purpose. Here, if the word *śaramaya* is understood in the sense of plenty of *śara* grass, taking the *mayaṭ* suffix in the sense of (plenty), it amounts to saying that a few *kuśa* grass that are prescribed in the *prakṛti* need to be mixed with plenty of *śara* grass which are to be spread. However, *śaramaya* cannot be taken in the sense of plenty as per the *Pāṇini* rule. Therefore, this statement conveys the sense of spreading the *śara* grass. Consequently, the spreading of *kuśa* grass that was to be transferred from the *prakṛti* to the *vikṛti*, is prevented. Since the transfer is prevented here by providing another auxiliary, it is a case of *bādha* by *pratyāmnāna*.

Pratiṣedha is the negation of an auxiliary by direct statement. In *cāturmāsya* sacrifice at *mahāpitṛ* sacrifice, it is stated that '*no ārṣeyam vṛṇite, na hotāram.*' Here, *vṛṇīte* means

invites to participate in the sacrifice. In the *prakṛti*, all priests concerned are invited including the two mentioned here. As they are stated to be invited at the *prakṛti* and not to be invited here, it gives a choice either to invite or not to invite. Such a choice is normally not allowed. If it is allowed, the Vedic prescription will be offended in two ways: (i) When they are invited, the statement not to invite is offended. (ii) When they are not invited, the statement to invite is offended. Hence, a choice is not allowed unless it is very much unavoidable. In the present case, there is a way out. The statement '*na ārṣeyam vṛṇite na hotāram*' is to be interpreted in the sense that all except for *ārṣeya* and *hotā* are to be invited. In this way there is a partial *bādha*, i.e. exclusion of a part of the auxiliary. This is *paryudāsa* type of *niṣedha.*

A number of instances, coming under these three groups are quoted by Jaimini and Śabara.

Bādha is also divided into two groups: (i) *prāptabādha,* (ii) *aprāptabādha.* Exclusion of such auxiliaries that were normally eligible to be transferred by *atideśa* but prevented from transfer on the above three grounds is *prāptabādha*; exclusion on the ground that they were not at all expected to serve the purpose is *aprāptabādha.* Pārthasārathi Miśra has designated them as: (i) *prameya apahāralakṣaṇa,* i.e. whose role to convey their purpose is taken away, (ii) *mūlaccheda lakṣaṇa,* i.e. whose very basis is cut away.

The *prāptabādha* type of *bādha* is further classified into several types such as (i) *nitya* is to be set aside by *naimittika,* (ii) *sāmānya* by *viśeṣa,* (iii) *nitya,* by *kāmya,* (iv) *pūrva* by *para,* (v) *sāvakāśa* by *niravakāśa* and so on.[101]

Nitya is Set Aside by Naimittika

At *darśapaurṇamāsa,* the singing of fifteen *sāmans* is prescribed. However, at a sacrifice to be performed by a *vaiśya,* the recitation of seventeen is prescribed. Here, the fifteen prescribed at the *nitya* sacrifice is set aside by seventeen at the *naimittika* sacrifice. Further, if this sacrifice is undertaken for a specific result, viz., *pratiṣṭhā,* then the recitation of twenty-one *sāmans* is prescribed. This sets aside both fifteen and seventeen of both the *nitya* and the *naimittika.* It is a *kāmya* sacrifice. *Kāmya* sets aside both the *nitya* and the *naimittika.* It should be noted here that in *prakṛti* only eleven *ṛks* are stated. These are made up to fifteen by reciting the first and the eleventh thrice. The same procedure should be followed here to get fifteen out of eleven and six more to be added to make up to twenty-one.[102]

The Sāmānya is set Aside by the Viśeṣa

At *jyotiṣṭoma* in the context of purchase of *soma,* it is stated that '*pāde juhoti*', i.e. 'offers *homa* at the footstep.' In the context of moving towards the place of *havirdhāna,* it is stated that '*vartmani juhoti*', 'offers *homa* on the path.' However, there is a general injunction that *homas* have to be offered at the *āhavanīya.* This general provision is set aside by the special provision. It is not a total rejection of general provision, since, the general provision has the scope in other instances.[103]

XVI

VIKALPA AND SAMUCCAYA OPTION AND COMBINATION

Instances of *Vikalpa*, i.e. option between that which is to be transferred from the *prakṛti* and that which is stated in the *vikṛti:*

At *Darśapaurṇamāsa*, *ājyabhāgas* are prescribed for the *yāga* for *agniṣomau*. This has to come to the *paśu yāga* by transference. However, there is expressed statement at the *vikṛti* that '*na tau paśau karoti*', 'these *ājyabhāgas* are not to be performed at *paśu*.' Hence, the performance of *ājyabhāga* at *paśu* is optional.[104]

At a particular rite of *jyotiṣṭoma*, two opposite statements are found— '*atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti*', he takes *ṣodaśī* at *atirātra*', '*na atirātre ṣoḍaśinaṁ gṛhṇāti*', 'he does not take up *ṣodaśī* at *atirātra*.' Since these statements directly conflicting and since both are Vedic statements, taking *ṣoḍaśī* has to be treated as optional. When it is not taken, the sacrifice is not hurt, because the Vedic negation is honoured. When it is taken, the sacrifice is supported because, the positive Vedic statement is implemented.[105]

At *upāṁśu yāga*, the deity is not mentioned. This does not mean any deity may be taken. The deity that is stated for *prakṛti yāga* should be taken.

At the *prakṛti*, three deities, viz., Prajāpati, Viṣṇu and Agniṣomau are stated. Therefore, these have to be adopted optionally.[106]

The instance of combining the *prākṛta* auxiliaries with the auxiliaries of *vikṛti*:

In a few instances, the *prākṛta* auxiliaries are not set aside. These are implemented along with *vikṛti* auxiliaries. We will notice a few such instances.

In *gavāmayana* sacrifice at *Mahāvrata*, it is stated that '*dundubhayo nadanti*', 'the drums produce the sound', '*patnyaḥ upagāyanti*', 'the wives sing in support of it', '*Kāṇḍa vīṇābhih upagāyanti*', i.e. 'they sing on *viṇas* in support.' In the *prakṛti yāga*, the supporting singing is made by the priests. Therefore, the question arises whether the supporting singing by the priests is to be set aside and substituted by the singing of wives or both have to be observed. The pūrvapakṣin argues that since the supporting songs are now to be sung by wives, the purpose of supporting is served by them as provided by the *vikṛti* level itself. Therefore, the providing of supporting songs by priests prescribed at the *prakṛti* level has to be set aside. However, the siddhāntin points out that the expression *upagāna* should not be taken in the sense of supporting the sound of *dundubhī* but in the sense of a seperate song that enhances the total effect. Such enhancement could be done both by the priests as prescribed in the *prakṛti* and also by the wives as prescribed in the *vikṛti*.[107]

At a *satra* of forty-nine days, anointing the body with *guggula kaṣāya* at the time of the morning rituals, anointing with *vaituśrava* at the mid-day ritual and with *saugandhika* at the evening ritual is prescribed. This is a *vikṛti yāga*. In its *prakṛti*, anointing with butter is prescribed. Here, the question arises whether the anointment with butter stated in *prakṛti* be set aside, since anointment by some other items is prescribed at the *vikṛti*. However, the anointment with butter is prescribed at the time of *dīkṣā* while that with *guggula*, etc., is prescribed on the day of *sutyā*. Since these two have to take place on different days, there

is no conflict. Hence, one need not set aside the other. Each serves the purpose of *apūrva* on observing at the time when it is prescribed.[108]

At *Mahāvrta* it is prescribed that the *yajamāna* wears a woollen cloth and his wife wears the cover prepared by *darbha* grass. This is a *vikṛti yāga.* In its *prakṛti,* it was prescribed that both *yajamāna* and his wife wear fresh new clothes. Here, the question arises that since both serve the purpose of covering the body, whether the use of the fresh new cloth prescribed at *prakṛti* be set wide. However, wearing the new cloth is intended to cover the private part of the body while the woollen garment and the *darbha* grass garment are intended to cover the upper part of the body. Hence, wearing of the new cloth prescribed in *prakṛti* need not be set aside by the garment prescribed in *vikṛti.*[109]

At *Vajapeya* the wood of *Khadira* tree is prescribed. The wood of *palāśa* tree is stated as an alternative. However, in the *vikṛti* only *khadira* is stated. Therefore, the question arises whether *palāśa* also is to be brought at the *vikṛti* as an alternative. It is ruled that since *khadira* is expressly stated here, *palāśa* is not to be brought here as an alternative. The *khadira* and *palāśa* would have come as alternatives from the *prakṛti* if one of them was not specially mentioned. Since one of them, viz., *khadira* is mentioned at the *vikṛti,* the other need not be brought by transference as an alternative.[110]

When a separate *dravya* is mentioned at the *vikṛti,* the *dravya* of the *prakṛti* is not to be brought from *prakṛti* by way of transference. The same applies to the deity also.[111]

XVII

TANTRA AS THE TECHNIQUE OF ONE PERFORMANCE SERVING THE PURPOSE OF MANY

Avāpa-the Technique of Helping by Repetition

The expression *tantra* is explained '*sakṛtkṛtaṁ bahūnām upakāri tantram*', i.e. one performance of an item serving the purpose of many is *tantra.* For instance, at *darśapaūrṇamāsa,* three main sacrifices are prescribed on *pūrṇamāsa* day and three on *darśa* day. For these *prayāja* etc., a number of auxiliaries are prescribed. Here, the question arises whether auxiliaries like *prayāja* are to be performed for each main sacrifice separately or one performance of these on *pūrṇamāsī* and one on *amāvāsyā* is sufficient. Applying the technique of *tantra,* it is ruled that one performence of all the auxiliaries is sufficient to accomplish the *apūrva.* In this connection, the attention is drawn to the fact that the performer of all six main sacrifices is one, the place is one, and the time of the performance of the two units of three main sacrifices is one. Hence, one performance of all the auxiliaries will serve the purpose of all. By this ruling it should be presumed that the rule that the auxiliary should be repeated at every main sacrifice is not applicable here.

There is an instance where though the deity is one at two sacrifices and the *dravya* to be offered is also the same, *tantra* is not allowed. This is in connection with a *kāmya paśu*

sacrifice to be performed by a priest who competes to get the assignment of the position of a priest. Here, it is prescribed that a *kṛṣṇagrīva* type of *paśu* is to be first offered to Agni, then a *babhru* type of *paśu* to Soma, then again a *kṛṣṇagrīva* type of *paśu* to Agni. Here, the question arises whether the *kṛṣṇagrīva paśu* to be offered at the first and the third steps, should be offered once only following the *tantra* method or should it be offered separately at these two steps. It is ruled that the *kṛṣṇagrīva paśu* is to be offered separately. It would have been a case of *tantra* if the two sacrifices were consecutive. But a sacrifice in favour of another deity, i.e., *Soma*, and another *dravya* i.e. *babhru* type of *paśu* intervene. This rules out the application of *tantra.*[113]

For *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice which consists of six *pradhāna yāgas*, the time, place and the agents are prescribed. Here, the question arises whether the agent for each *pradhāna* is different or one and the same person has to perform the six *pradhāna* sacrifices. It is ruled that one and the same person may perform the entire sacrifice. Similarly, the place and time are also common. This ruling is based on the guidelines of *tantra.*[114]

At *agniṣomiya paśu yāga* erection of eleven *yūpas* is prescribed. It is prescribed that *āhuti* be offered near the *yūpa.* Here, the question arises whether the *āhuti* is to be offered for each *yūpa* separately or once only applying the method of *tantra.* It is ruled that it is sufficient if it is offered only once.

Ordinarily the auxiliaries are performed at the same place and at the same time where the main is performed. However, there are a few exceptions.

For instance, the sacrificial altar has to be prepared a day earlier as per the statement '*purvedyuḥ amāvāsyāyāṁ vediṁ karoti.*' 'he prepares the sacrificial altar on the immediately preceding *amāvāsyā.*' The *vartana homa* has to be performed at the footstep according to the statement '*pāde juhoti*'.[115]

At *jyotiṣṭoma,* three *paśus* are prescribed. For one of these three, namely, *agniṣomīya paśus* a *yūpa* is stated. Here the question arises whether this *yūpa* is to be utilized for the other two *paśus* also or a separate *yūpa* has to be erected for each *paśu.* It is ruled that one *yūpa* only be used for the three *paśus* since it is not particularly stated that it is meant for one only. This ruling is also based on the method of *tantra.*

Similarly the question whether the chopping the wood of the *yūpa,* drying it and sprinkling water on it, etc., *saṁskāras* also have to be performed once only. (11-3-5)

A piece of wood is taken out from the *yūpa* to anoint the *paśu.* This piece of wood is called *svaru.* Here, the question is raised whether three pieces of wood be taken separately to anoint the three *paśus* or one is sufficient. It is ruled that one is sufficient. The same piece of wood be used to anoint the three *paśus* by *tantra.*[116]

Ādhāna, setting up of the sacrificial fire is an important item. With reference to this programme, the question arises whether it has to be done for each sacrifice separately or the sacrificial fire first set up by a person when he starts his daily *agnihotra* can serve the purpose of all sacrifices undertaken by him later. It is ruled that the *agni ādhāna* first set up can serve the purpose of all other later sacrifices. Therefore, there is no need to set up the fire again and again.[117]

There is another interesting example of *tantra.* At *jyotiṣṭoma,* the *yajamāna* is advised to have a horn of a black deer to scratch the body if there is some sensation requiring

scratching of his body. He is also advised to throw it later. The *ahargana* has to be performed for two or three days. Here, the question arises whether horn has to be thrown away on the first day itself or to be retained till the last day and then only it is to be thrown. It is ruled that it should be thrown away on the last day only.[118]

Sacrificial vessels like *sruk, sruvā*, etc., are prescribed for performing sacrifices. The question arises whether these vessels are to be prepared separately for each sacrifice or have to be used all through for all sacrifices. It is ruled that these have to be used all through the life of the sacrificer. These should be put in the fire along with the body of the sacrificer when he dies.

At *darśapaurṇamāsa*, for threshing of rice, recitation of the hymn '*ava rakṣo*', etc., is prescribed. Here, the question is raised whether the recitation of the hymn is to be repeated at each step of the threshing or once only in course of it. It is ruled that recitation once for the whole act of threshing is sufficient to accomplish the *apūrva*. [119]

Instances of Āvāpa i.e., Repetitions

We have quoted above ten instances of *tantra*. Now, we will mention a few instances of *āvāpa*.

At *jyotiṣṭoma, puroḍāśa* is offered at different times. On these occasions, *puroḍāśa* hymn has to be recited. Here, the question is raised whether the recitation of this hymn at one time is sufficient or it has to be repeated every time the *puroḍāśa* is offered. It is ruled that the recitation of the hymn has to be repeated. The recitation of the hymn is intended to make a reference to the *puroḍāśa* which is offered. Since each time the *puroḍāśa* offered is different, the recitation of the hymn to refer to it has to be repeated .[120]

At *jyotiṣṭoma*, four pits designated as *uparava* are to be dug. While digging these pits, the hymn '*yakṣahaṇa balagahana vaiṣṇavān khanasi*' has to be recited. Here, the four pits are given a common name. Hence, it appears that the recitation of the hymn concerned only once is sufficient. However, since the pits are dug one after the other and these are four different pits, the recitation of the hymn has to be repeated while digging each pit. [121]

At *darśapaurṇamāsa* four *nirvāpas* of handful rice, spreading of five handfuls of *darbha* grass on the altar, taking *ghee* on *juhū* vessel four times are prescribed. For these acts, appropriate hymns are prescribed. Here, the question is raised whether it is sufficient if the respective hymn is recited at the time of the respective act once only or it is to be repeated when each handful of rice, *darbha* grass or *ghee* is placed in the respective place. Since the items, i.e. rice, *darbha* and *ghee* are one though these are taken in different quantities for placing, it appears that the recitation of respective hymns once is sufficient. However, it is ruled that the recitation is to be repeated while placing every handful of rice, etc., since the recitation of the hymn is a *saṁskāra* for each quantity.[122]

At *Rājasūya*, the rituals at which different corns are offered are to be performed. While threshing these corns the recitation of a hymn is prescribed. Here the question arises whether it is sufficient if the hymn is recited when the first variety of corn is threshed or it has to be repeated for each type of corn. It is ruled that the recitation of the hymn has to be repeated since this *saṁskāra* has to be effected on each kind of corn.[123]

At *aśvapratigraha iṣṭi*, offering of as many *puroḍāśas* as the number of horses gifted is prescribed. These *puroḍāśas* have to be offered in four pots. Here, the question is raised whether all *puroḍāśas* are to be put in four large pots or each *puroḍāśas* is to be put in four pots separately. It is ruled that each *puroḍāśa* has to be put in four pots separately. The *saṁskāra*, viz., cooking has to be effected on each *puroḍāśa* separately.[124]

XVIII

PRASAṄGA: EXTENDED APPLICATION

The process of auxiliaries performed with reference to one main serving the other main also is *prasaṅga*. In the case of *tantra* also the same guideline was laid down. However, if the application of the auxiliaries to many is intentional, it is *tantra*. But in the case of *prasaṅga* serving others is a by-product.

It is like a lamp put to light the building also serving to light the road. We will look into a few instances of *prasaṅga* below.

At *jyotiṣṭoma*, offering of *agniṣomīya paśu* is prescribed. Offering of *paśupuroḍāśa* is also prescribed. *Prayāja* and other auxiliaries are prescribed for *agniṣomīya paśu*. The question is raised whether these serve the purpose of *paśupuroḍāśa* also or these have to be performed again. It is ruled that the auxiliaries performed for *agniṣomīya paśu* also serve the purpose of *paśupuroḍāśa*. Hence, these need not be performed again. This ruling is based on the application of the method of *prasaṅga*.[125]

For *jyotiṣṭoma*, a sacrificial altar is erected after performing *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice if one desires to perform *iṣṭi*. The question is whether the same altar is to be utilized or a separate altar has to be erected. This question arises because the altar has to be utilized at these two rituals for different purposes. It is ruled that no separate altar is necessary. The same altar that can be utilized for *pracāra* at the *agniṣṭoma*, and for placing the *havis* at the *iṣṭi* by the application of the method of *prasaṅga*.[126]

Dīkṣaṇīya, etc., *iṣṭis* are prescribed as subsidiaries to the Soma sacrifice. *Anvādhāna* is prescribed for the Soma sacrifice. The kindling of the fire taken out from *gārhapatya* is designated a *anvādhāna*. Here, the question is whether such *anvādhāna* is to be performed for the *iṣṭis* also. It is ruled that it is not necessary to perform it repeatedly. The *anvādhāna* performed for the Soma sacrifice also serves the purpose of the *iṣṭis* by applying the method of *prasaṅga*. The fire can be kept alive by continuously putting *ghee* in it.[127]

For the three sacrificial acts, namely, *ātithyā, upasad*, and *agniṣomīya*, the *barhi* grass is prescribed. For this grass sprinkling with water, cutting on the two sides, etc., auxiliaries are prescribed. Here, the question is whether these auxiliaries are to be performed separately for the *barhi* grass required for each of the sacrificial acts stated above or once only for the whole set of *barhi* brought for the purpose. It is ruled that one performance of the auxiliaries, namely, sprinkling water, etc., for the whole set of *barhi* grass is sufficient. This ruling is based on the application of the method of *prasaṅga*. Though the three

sacrificial acts are different the *barhi* grass on which the *prokṣaṇa*, etc., *saṁskāras* are to be effected is one. Hence, the guideline of *prasaṅga* applies here.[128]

We will now look into a few instances in which *prasaṅga* method is not applicable.

At *darśapaurṇamāsa*, *ārambhanīya iṣṭi* is prescribed. This is performed at the commencement of the first performance of *darśapaurṇamāsa*. It is a *saṁskāra* for the sacrificer. The second and third, etc., *darśapaurṇamāsa* performances are only distinct *prayogas* but not distinct *karmas*. Therefore, the *ārambhaṇiyeṣṭi* need not be repeated at each *prayoga*. However, in the *vikṛti yāga* like *saurya*, *ārambhanīya* has to be performed for each *vikṛti* separately. The *prasaṅga* methodology is not applicable here.[129]

At *jyotiṣṭoma*, the Soma plant is kept in two carts and carried to the *Mahāvedi* place. *puroḍāśa*, and other offerings also are to be carried. Here, the question is whether *puroḍāśa* other offerings also could be put in one of the two carts by which Soma is carried. It is ruled that it cannot be carried by one of these carts. The Soma plant is to be taken to *Mahāvedi* place while *puroḍāśa* and other offerings are to be taken near *gārhapatya* fire. Since the place of the two are different, *puroḍāśa* should not be carried in the cart meant to carry the Soma plant. The criterion of *prasaṅga* is not applicable here.

For the *paśu puroḍāśa*, etc., at Soma sacrifice the vessels such as *graha*, *camasa*, etc., are prescribed. For the *iṣṭi juhu*, etc., other vessels are prescribed. Here, the question is whether the vessels prescribed for *paśu puroḍāśa* could be used for *iṣṭi* also. It is ruled that since separate vessels are prescribed for these two, the vessel of one cannot be used for others.

XIX

THE YĀGAS THAT ARE TO BE PERFORMED ON BEHALF OF THE DEAD

There is a one day sacrifice designated as *sarvasvāra*. At this sacrifice, the *yajamāna* offers himself to the fire at the time of the third *savana* when the *ārbhava* hymn is recited. He requests the other priests to complete the sacrifice. Here the question arises whether the others are eligible to complete the remaining part of the sacrifice. This depends upon the realization of the result. The deceased *yajamāna* cannot have the result since he is dead. The other priests cannot have it since they have not undertaken the sacrifice on their own. Here, it is ruled that the deceased *yajamāna* will have the result since he has offered himself to the fire as a part of the sacrifice. The other priests are the agents as they are directed by the *yajamāna* to complete it. However, such of the items that are to be performed by the *yajamāna* alone need not be performed. The items that are required for the accomplishment of sacrifice must be performed. Further, the hymn that seeks life for him should be recited, since, he has to live up to the time he offered himself to the fire.[130]

The above is an instance of voluntary death. But there is an instance where arises the contingency of the unexpected death in the middle of a sacrifice.

When a *satra yāga* is going on, if one of the *yajamānas* unexpectedly dies, it is prescribed that his bones be preserved for an year, then a ritual called *asthiyajña* be performed. The

prescription is '*asthīni yajayeyuḥ*', 'the bones be made to perform the sacrifice'. Here the question arises whether this sacrifice is to be performed by the very dead person represented by his bones or by some living person keeping the bones by his side. It is ruled that a living person should perform it.

However, if the other option of making the bones to perform the sacrifice is adopted, such auxiliaries as cutting of the hair and nails, etc., that cannot be even nominally performed, should be dropped and others be performed.

XX

DAKṢIṆĀ: FEE TO THE PRIESTS

At the sacrifice *dakṣiṇā* is offered to the priests to encourage them to participate in the sacrifice and play their assigned role. In connection with *dakṣiṇā*, some interesting provisions and obsevations are made by Jaimini and Śabara keeping in mind the human nature and interest. We will take note some of them in the sequel.

The *pauṇḍarīka* sacrifice is to be performed for eleven days. At this sacrifice the *dakṣiṇā* of ten thousand cows and eleven thousand horses is prescribed. The question is raised whether so many cows and horses are to be given every day or for the whole programme. It is ruled that since the services of the priests are requisitioned for the whole programme, the *dakṣiṇā* prescribed has to be given only once. It is the entire programme that leads to the result. *Dakṣiṇā* is an auxiliary of the sacrifice meant for its total performance. It is not an auxiliary of each day's work and participation. It is not day based but programme based.[131]

The next question is, whether payment of the whole of *dakṣiṇā* is to be received in one lump or daily?

In this connection, direction is: '*pratyahaṁ dvādaśa śatam*', 'twelve hundred daily.' Hence, *dakṣiṇā* has to be received every day. *Dakṣiṇā* is meant to encourage the priests. The daily payment will keep them in good spirits.[132]

At the *agni ādhāna*, when it is first performed, certain *dakṣiṇā* in terms of cow, etc. is prescribed. For those who long for prosperity, fame and wealth, a second round of *ādhāna* is enjoined. For this, certain other items such as a chariot that is repaired and rebuilt, a cloth that is repaired and restitched are prescribed as *dakṣiṇā*. Here, the question arises whether the *dakṣiṇās* that are prescribed at both the first and second performances, be given or one of them. It is ruled that since the purpose served at the second performance is quite different from that of the first performance, both need not be given. The *dakṣiṇā* prescribed for the second performance only is to be given on the second performance.[133]

At *āgrāyaṇa* a calf and cloth are offered as *dakṣiṇā*. This sets aside the *anvāhārya dakṣiṇā* to be offered at the *prakṛti*. However, certain auxiliaries of *anvāhārya* have to be continued. Cooking is one of the auxiliaries of the *anvāhārya*. However, this should not be implemented on the calf. Calf is prescribed as *dakṣiṇā* but not its flesh. Therefore, the auxiliary of cooking is not to be implemented.

At the *jyotiṣṭoma*, the *dakṣiṇā* of cows, horses, goats, rice, barley, oil seeds, etc., is prescribed. The quantity is stated as twelve hundred. Here, the question arises whether this quantity applies to all the items or only to the animals, that also only to cows. It is ruled that it applies only to cows.[134]

The next question is, whether this *dakṣiṇā* is to be duly divided and given or the whole is to be given. It is ruled that it should be duly divided and given.

This raises the further question whether it should be equally divided or on the basis of their work load or designation, i.e. *saṁākhyā*. It is ruled that it should be divided on the basis of their designations. These designations are not their normal designations as *brahmā, adhvaryu, hotā*, etc., but such as (i) *ardhinaḥ*, i.e., those who are entitled for half of what the main priests like *brahmā*, get, (ii) *tṛtīyinaḥ*, i.e. those who are entitled for the one-third, (iii) *pādinaḥ*, i.e. those who are entitled for one-fourth of the share.[135]

For one day *vikṛti yāga*, designated as '*bhūḥ*' one cow is prescribed as *dakṣiṇā*. It is a *vikṛti* of *jyotiṣṭoma*. At *jyotiṣṭoma* twelve hundred cows, horses and other animals besides such food grains as *vrīhi* are prescribed as *dakṣiṇā*. Now, since a separate *dakṣiṇā* is prescribed for the *vikṛti*, the *prākṛta dakṣiṇā* has to be set aside. Here, the question arises whether the whole of the *prākṛta dakṣiṇā* consisting of cows, horses, food grains, etc., has to be set aside or twelve hundred cows are to be replaced by the offer of one cow. The ruling given is that the whole of the *prākṛta dakṣiṇā* is to be set aside and only one cow has to be given at the *vikṛti*. Though in *prakṛti* many items are stated as *dakṣiṇā*, all these form only one unit of *dakṣiṇā*. Therefore, the whole of one unit of *dakṣiṇā* that is to be given at the *prakṛti*, has to be replaced by one unit of *dakṣiṇā* consisting of one cow.[136]

XXI

THE ROLE OF ARTHAVĀDA, MANTRA AND NĀMADHEYA IN ORGANIZING THE SACRIFICE

Arthavādas have been a challenge to the Mīmāṁsakas as also a source for developing some new linguistic concepts and canons of interpretation.

(i) The *arthavāda* passages are full of contradictory statements. These statements, seem to be irrelevant and are hard to be sustained by *pramāṇa*. If these are considered as a part of the Veda, the very authoritativeness of the Vedas will collapse.

(ii) *Dharma* as the central theme of the Veda is enjoined by an injunctive statement. In fact, that is the very definition of *dharma*. Every Vedic statement should either convey a sacrificial act or something connected with it. However, *arthavādas* are not of the nature of injunctive statements nor do these state anything connected with the sacrificial act. Therefore, these are irrelevant to the central theme of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, viz., *dharma*.

Śābara quotes a number of *arthavāda* passages to substantiate the above objections. We will take account of a few.

(i) Smoke was seen during the day but not flames of the fire. The flames were seen during the night but not the smoke.
(ii) Prajāpati took out his marrow, i.e. *vapā,* and put it in the sacrificial fire.
(iii) Rudra wept and hence he is called *Rudra.*
(iv) The deities were confused about the quarters such as the east, west, etc.
(v) Mind is a thief while speech is lier.
(vi) A person who performs *Aśvamedha* sacrifice will conquer death, will overcome the sin of killing a *brāhmaṇa.*
(vii) The sacrificial fire should neither be set up on the earth nor in the sky.
(viii) There was a person called *babara,* the son of *Pravahaṇa.*

The first statement states something that is contradicted by our perception.

The second statement states something that is impossible. No person can take out his marrow and be alive to put it in the fire.

The third statement states something that has nothing to do with the sacrifice.

The fourth statement talks of a confusion and does not state anything positive.

Stealing and lying stated in the fifth are the attributes of a person and not of mind and speech.

The claim made in the sixth that the performer of *Aśvamedha* sacrifice will conquer death, etc., gives too many results to one act of sacrifice. This is superfluous.

The prohibition of the setting up of sacrificial fire in the sky is unwarranted, since no fire can be set up in the sky.

The statement that there was a person *babara,* son of Pravahaṇa cuts the very root of *anāditva,* that is beginninglessness of the Veda, since the person mentioned cannot be *anādi.*[137]

These *arthavāda* passages suffer from two drawbacks: (i) *aprāmāṇya,* that is, absence of validity, (ii) *ānarthakya,* that is, not serving the purpose of the sacrificial act.

Śabara introduces three important linguistic concepts, namely, (i) *vākya śeṣa,* (ii) *ekavākyatā,* (iii) *guṇavāda* to meet these objections.[138]

(i) The statements, that are not of the nature of injunction but occur close by, are designated as *vākyaśeṣa,* i.e. supplimentary statements. All *arthavāda* passages come under this category.
(ii) These supplementary statements get associated with injunctive statements and serve the purpose of the sacrificial act. This process is designated as *ekavākyatā,* i.e. functioning as one statement. These two concepts answer the objection *ānarthakya,* i.e. not serving the purpose of the sacrificial act. By this method of *ekavākyatā,* the *arthavāda* serves the purpose of the sacrificial act as much as the injunctive statement. In other words, these are as much *kriyārtha* as the injunctive statements. These are not *anarthaka.*

Now, to answer the other objection that the *arthavāda* passages are contradictory, against the *pramāṇas,* etc., Jaiminī and Śabara have developed the concept of *guṇavāda* which means, the words concerned should be taken in the secondary sense, that is to say, their equation should be comprehended on the basis of common attributes between the two. For instance, the statement '*ādityo yūpaḥ*', 'the sacrificial pole is lustruous like the

sun', *siṁho māṇavakah*, 'boy is as a valiant as lion'. Apart from solving the conflicts in this way, the purport of the entire *arthavāda* passage is envisaged as *prāśastya* (eulogy). Whenever an injunctive statement has *arthavāda* passage by the side of it, that passage glorifies the sacrificial act enjoined by that injunction. This process applies to prohibitions also. The *arthavāda* passage by the side of the prohibition censures the prohibited act. Keeping this role in mind, the *arthavādas* are grouped into two: (i) *Stuti arthavādas* and (ii) *Nindā arthavādas.*

From another point of view *arthavādas* are grouped into three.

(i) *Guṇavāda,* i.e. based on the attribute, e.g. *ādityo yūpaḥ,* the sacrificial pole is lustruous like the sun.

(ii) *Anuvāda,* i.e. statement of that which is already known by other *pramāṇa,* example is *agniḥ himasya bheṣajam,* fire wards off the cold.

(iii) *bhūtarthavāda,* i.e., statement of an event of the past.

Example is *Indro vṛtrāya vajram udayacchat,* Indra threw the *vajra* in favour of *Vṛtra.*[139]

All these statements do not convey any sacrificial act. However, these are connected with the nearby injunctive statements by the process of *ekavākyatā* and serve the purpose of the sacrificial act.

There are two other groups of *arthavādas:* (i) *Parakṛti,* statement of an act performed by a distinguished person, e.g. *agniḥ vā akāmayata,* Agni himself desired.

(ii) *Purākalpa,* statement of a mythological event as narrated in a *Gāthā, śloka* or an episode.[140]

Parakṛti and *purākalpa* type of *arthavādas* are something like folk literature. These contain myths, legends and *gāthās,* that is, proverbial statements and verses popular among common people and inherited from the hoary past. Probably, these were not associated originally with the sophisticated sacrificial institution. These contain rich prehistoric cultural thoughts, beliefs, customs and practices. References are also found to animals, birds, trees, plants, etc., with which early man was friendly. Mīmāṁsakas did not take much interest in this aspect of *arthavādas.* They were only interested in considering this portion of the Brāhmaṇa as authoritative by connecting it with the injunctive statements. For this purpose Śabara has quoted only a few *arthavādas.* Only such *arthavāda* passages that are close to an injunction are handled by the Yājñikas and Mīmāṁsakas. However, the *arthavāda* literature is very rich. There seems to have been a folk tradition along with a priestly literary tradition. The priestly tradition must have accepted it as a part of Vedic tradition and related it with the sacrificial programme. Under the *sūtra* '*tulyaṁ sāmpradāyikam*' (I-2-8), Śabara raises the objection that *arthavāda* portion is likely to be a *pramādapāṭha,* i.e. interpolation. The *sūtra* replies that the *arthavāda* portion belongs as much to a continued tradition as the injunctive statement. So far as their traditionality is concerned, it is common. This reveals that both priestly tradition and folk tradition were considered as equally old, and the priestly tradition accommodated the folklore without prejudice to the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda.

In any case, a detailed study of the *arthavāda* portion of Brāhmaṇas is essential to interlink the *Śrauta* and *Sūtra* traditions which later grew into *Itihāsa pūraṇa* tradition.

XXII

THE ROLE OF MANTRA IN THE SACRIFICE

The definition of *mantra* as given by Jaimini is that it is that portion of the Veda which describe the items employed in the sacrifice: *taccodakeṣu mantrākhyā.* It explains the role played by *mantra* in the sacrifice. (Bh.S.II-1-32) In this *sūtra* '*tat*' refers to the sacrificial items. *Codaka* means to describe or convey. The hymns are employed in the sacrifice to describe the deity, the offering, and the procedure, etc. These hymns contain references to these items and in a way indicate their application in the sacrifice. These are a kind of running commentary on the procedure of the sacrifice.

Since these hymns serve this obvious purpose, these need not be considered as *adṛṣṭārtha.*

After defining *mantra* in general, Jaimini defines hymns of the three Vedas, *Ṛik, Yajus* and *Sāman* separately.

(i) Hymns, that are in the metrical form, are *Ṛks.*

(ii) Hymns, that are in prose form, are *Yajus.*

(iii) Hymns that are sung with musical notes are *Sāmans.* It is the *Ṛks* of *Ṛgveda* when sung with musical notes are known as *Sāman.*[141]

An important point to be noted is that these hymns should be recited only at that place and that time when the particular item announced by these takes place. If the item is shifted to another occasion on appropriate grounds, the hymn concerned also should be recited on that occasion. For instance, recitation of *pūṣāanumantraṇa* is shifted from *darśapaurṇamāsa* to *pūṣayāga.* Another point to be noted is that the words in the hymns should be taken in their primary sense only.[142]

Nigadas, i.e. statements of address such as '*Indra āgaccha*' '*agnīda agnīn vihara*' are included under *Yajus.* These do not form any separate group.[144]

Ūha, i.e. substituted words, for example, Sūrya for Agni in *vikṛti yāga, pravara,* i.e. recitation of the names of three sages, and *nāmadheya,* i.e. the titles of the sacrifice, are not a part of the hymn.[145]

For the convenience of understanding, the hymns of both *Ṛgveda* and *Yajurveda* are grouped into twenty-eight on the basis of the subject described in them.[146]

The hymns gain authoritativeness as they describe the deity, *dravya,* etc., used in the sacrifice and thus contribute to the generation of *apūrva.* This is a general ground for their *prāmāṇya. Mīmāṁsā Bālaprakāśa* quotes the views of Pārthasārathi, Bhattanārāyaṇa and Someśvara in respect of the *prāmāṇya* of *mantras.*

(i) According to Pārthasārathi, the hymns that are employed to convey the main and auxiliary relations by *śruti liṅga,* etc., are considered as *padārthas* that get associated with *mahāvākya* of *prayogavidhi* by the process of *vākyaika vākyatā.* In this way, these contribute to *apūrva* and attain the status of *prāmāṇya,* validity.

(ii) According to Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, the above explanation will make them *pramāṇa* as *padārthas* and not as the *Śabda-pramāṇa.* Hence, their *prāmāṇya* has to be based on *yāthārthya* like that of the *Smṛti.*

(iii) According to Bhaṭṭa Someśvara, regular *prāmāṇya* has to be granted to *mantras.* He mentions a number of contingencies that require *prāmāṇya* for mantras. (a) The deity is envisaged for a sacrifice on the basis of the mention of him in the hymn; (b) The use of *ātmanepada* in the hymn shows the relation of the item concerned to the *yajamāna;* (c) The order of certain items in the *mantra* supercedes the order mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa; (d) The *paśu* mentioned in a general way is taken as *chāga* (goat), as it is mentioned in the *mantravarṇa;* (e) *Ūha,* substitution, is made for the words in the *mantra,* all these will be possible only if the words of the *mantra* are taken as communicative of the meaning. This is why regular *prāmāṇya* is assigned to them.

Even the hymns that are used in *japa,* repetition of sacred words, convey the meaning as all hymns are declared as *pariplava* as per the statement *sarvā ṛcaḥ sarvāṇi yajūṁsi vacastomaṁ pāriplavaṁ praśaṁsanti,* 'all the *ṛks* and all the *yajuṣas* are devoted to praise of *vācastoma pāriplava*'.

From the above discussion, it is clear that the *mantras* play an important role in the programme of the sacrifice.

XXIII

NĀMADHEYA

Nāmadheya is considering certain words in the injunctive statement as titles of the sacrifices.

Certain words in the injunctive statement are considered as *nāmadheya,* titles, on four grounds. We will discuss the same below.

(i) *Matvarthalakṣaṇā bhayāt,* to avoid assigning the secondary meaning to the word by taking it in the sense of *matvartha,* e.g. '*Udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*'

"A person desiring to have *paśu,* should perform a sacrifice with *udbhid,* i.e., sprout of a plant."

Here, both enjoining of a *yāga* for obtaining a *paśu* and enjoining the sprout as an auxiliary to *yāga,* cannot be conceived, since, it will result in *vākyabheda,* that is to say, one statement being taken as two injunctions. To avoid this, if the word *udbhid* is taken in the secondary sense *udbhidvat* envisaging *matup* suffix to it and the injunction is treated as *viśiṣtavidhi,* i.e. an injunction that enjoins a complex of the sacrifice and an auxiliary of it together, its primary meaning will have been given up. Resorting to secondary meaning should be avoided so far as possible. Hence, it is better to take the word *udbhid* as the name of the sacrifice rather than as an auxiliary to *yāga* and try to enjoin both. If both are enjoined, *matvarthalakṣaṇā* cannot be avoided.

Here, a question is raised that *matvarthalakṣaṇā* is accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas in the instance of '*Somena yajeta*' envisaging it as '*somavatā yāgena iṣṭaṁ bhāvayet*' and *viśiṣṭavidhi,* i.e. an injunction of the complex of the sacrifice and its auxiliary. Therefore, why not to follow the same procedure here?

This objection is answered by pointing out that the word Soma is a *rūḍha* word, that is to say, its meaning is fixed by long usage. Therefore, it cannot be taken as a name of the sacrifice while the word *udbhid* (sprout), can be etymologically explained as an act of sprouting and can be applied as a name to a sacrifice that sprouts the result. Hence, the two cases are different.

(ii) *Vākyabheda bhayāt,* i.e. to avoid one statement leading to two injunctions, e.g. *Citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ.* 'He who desires *paśu* should perform the *yāga* with *citrā.*'

Here, the *yāga* with *citrā* as an auxiliary cannot be enjoined. The *yāga* is already enjoined with a number of other auxiliaries such as *dadhi, madhu, ghṛta, dhāna,* etc. The auxiliary *citrā* for *yāga* and *yāga* for the result cannot be enjoined, since this will result in *vākyabheda,* i.e. taking one statement as two injunctions. Therefore, the word *citrā* should be taken as a title of the *yāga* while the *yāga* should be considered as to have been enjoined for the result.

The difference between the earlier and the present example is that in the earlier example there was scope for avoiding *vākyabheda* by resorting to *matvarthalakṣaṇā.* However, being equally a drawback, *matvarthalakṣaṇā* was avoided by considering the word *udbhid* as a title of the sacrifice. But in this example, there is no scope for *viśiṣṭavidhi* by resorting to *matvarthalakṣaṇā,* since, the *yāga* is already enjoined with certain other auxiliaries. Hence, the only way out is to enjoin the auxiliary *citrā* for *yāga* while the *yāga* for the result. This will result in *vākyabheda.* This is avoided by considering the word *citrā* as a title of the *yāga.*

The common point of these two instances is that a word that appears to convey an auxiliary is considered as a *nāmadheya,* i.e. the title of the sacrifice.

(iii) *Tatprakhya śāstrāt,* i.e. since the required auxiliary is already enjoined, e.g. '*Agnihotraṁ juhoti*' here the word *agnihotra* cannot be taken either in the sense that the sacred fire is a place for offering or that of the deity Agni for whom the offering is to be made, since both these are already enjoined. Hence, the word *agnihotra* has to be taken as a name of the sacrifice.

If the compound word *agnihotram* is explained as *agnau hotram* taking the word Agni in the locative case, it would refer to the sacred fire as the place for offering. On the other hand, if it is taken as *agnaye hotram* taking the word Agni in the dative case, it, would refer to the deity Agni for whom the offering is to be made. However, these two, namely, *āhavanīya* fire and Agni as a deity are already enjoined by other injunctions. Therefore the word *agnihotra* cannot be taken as enjoining one or both of these two. Hence, it has to be taken as a *namadheya,* i.e. title.

(iv) *Tadvyapadeśāt,* i.e. as it is stated as an *upamāna,* e.g. '*Śyenena abhicāran yajeta*'. 'A person, who desires to destroy his enemy, should perform *śyena yāga.*'

Here, the question is raised whether the word *śyena* refers to the object, i.e., bird to be offered or it is only a name of the sacrifice. In the *arthavāda,* given for this injunction, there is a comparison of the act of *śyena* bird with the result of this sacrifice. If the *śyena* bird itself is the object to be offered, the comparison should have been with something else. Hence, the word *śyena* should not be taken in the sense of *śyena* bird, as the object of offering, but only as a name of the sacrifice.[147]

CONCLUSION

In the above presentation of the central theme of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* as *Dharma,* an attempt is made to cover all important aspects of the performance of the sacrifice, following the plan of *Jaimini sūtras* and *Śābara bhāṣya.* The *Sūtra,* and *Bhāṣya* go into details of aspects. It will be tedious to the readers who are not regular students of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* to be lost into these details. To cut down the details entirely will also not help the reader. They have to have a fairly good understanding of the plan and purpose of the sacrificial programme and various aspects of it. Therefore, a middle path is followed in this presentation.

Another feature of the presentation is that the technical terms of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* are used with an explanation of their import in English only sparingly. Many of the technical terms cannot be translated into English. Moreover, a student of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* has to familiarize himself with some of the technical terms and mīmāṁsā vocabulary. Otherwise, he will not be able to grasp the spirit of the mīmāṁsā thought.

Apart from the sacrificial programme, there are some social and ethical aspects of the mīmāṁsā thought. While discussing the question of eligibility, the eligibility for women and *śūdras* is raised. On this question some critical observations have been made.

Similarily, while discussing *śyena yāga* the question of the difference between the killing of a goat at the sacrifice and killing an enemy by a sacrifice is raised. It is questioned why one of them is *dharma* and the other *adharma.* Both are enjoined by Vedic injunction. In this connection, attention is drawn to the expression *artha,* i.e. that which leads to the welfare, in the definition of *dharma.*

Many other interesting topics like the quantum and distribution of *dakṣinā,* fee to the priests, the question as to when a representative is allowed, a substitute is allowed, are also discussed.

On going through this essay the reader will not only understand the methodology adopted for the organization of the sacrifice but he will also realize that this methodology can be successfully applied to any other programme or organization.

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90. Ibid. VIII-1-1
91. Ibid. VIII-1-23
92. Ibid. VIII-1-34
93. Ibid. IX-1-1
94. Ibid. IX-1-1
95. Ibid. IX-1-6 to 10
96. Ibid. IX-1-40
97. Ibid. IX-2-1, 2, 3
98. Ibid. X-1-1
99. Ibid. X-12
100. Ibid. X-2-1,2,3
101. MBP p.131
102. BhS. VIII-5-27
103. Ibid. X-8-16
104. Ibid. X-8-1
105. Ibid. X-8-6
106. Ibid. X-8-49, 51
107. Ibid. X-8-51
108. Ibid. X-4-10, 12
109. Ibid. X-4-13, 15
110. Ibid. X-7-51
111. Ibid. X-7-58, 59, 60.
112. Bh.S. XI-1-1
113. Ibid. XI-1-67
114. Ibid. XI-2-1 to 10
115. Ibid. XI-3-1
116. Ibid. XI-3-8 to 12
117. Ibid. XI-3-2
118. Ibid. XI-3-13,14
119. Ibid. XI-4-43,44
120. Ibid. XI-4-55,57
121. Ibid. XI-4-53, 54
122. Ibid. XI-4-46,47
123. Ibid. XI-4-45
124. Ibid. XI-4-41
125. Ibid. XII-1-1 to 7
126. Ibid. XII-1-11,12
127. Ibid. XII-1-20

128. Ibid. XII-1-42
129. Ibid. XII-2-19
130. Ibid. X-2-57,61
131. Ibid. X-6-61
132. Ibid. X-6-68
133. Ibid. X-3-30 to 33
134. Ibid. X-3-39
135. Ibid. X-3-55
136. Ibid. X-3-58
137. SB I-2-1 to 6
138. Ibid. I-2-7, 10
139. AS p.136
140. SB VI-7, 26 to 30
141. Bh.S. II-1-35 to 37
142. MNP p.110, 201
143. Bh.S. II-1-38
144. Bh.S. II-1-34
145. MBP. p.58
146. AS p.106

ABBREVIATIONS

As	*Arthasangraha,* D.V. Gokhale (ed.), Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1932.
Bh.S	*Bhattasangraha of Raghavendratīrtha,* District Karnul, AP: Mantralaya Vṛandāvana Saṁsthā.
J.S.	*Jaiminīya Sūtrāṇi.*
MNP	*Mīmāṁsā Nyāya Prakāśa,* Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
MBP	*Mīmāṁsā Bāla Prakāśa,* Chaukamba Sanskrit Series. No.16.
MS	*Manusmṛti.*
SB	*Śābara Bhāṣyam,* Poona: Anandāśrama.
Pr.P	*Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śālikanatha,* A Subrahmanya Sāstry (ed.), Banaras Hindu University, Darshana Series-4.
BSB	*Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya.*
T.C.	*Tātparya Candrikā of Vyāsatīrtha,* Prof. K.T. Pandurangi (ed.) Bangalore: Dvaita Vedanta Foundation.

CHAPTER 8

The Concept of Veda-*Apauruṣeyatva*

Shashiprabha Kumar

I

Veda is the source as well as the sustaining force for the vast and varied Indian philosophical thought. It is the storehouse of all forms of knowledge and has proved to be the pivot around which the whole lot of subsequent thought-process has been revolving since ancient times. Vedic testimony has been held to be the highest authority for all the *āstika* schools of Indian philosophy. Even the so-called *nāstika* schools of thought have developed in opposition to the Vedic view. Hence they also owe their allegiance to the Veda in some way or the other.

The supremacy, strength and significance of Veda is derived from the fact that traditionally it is taken to be a synonym of 'word' or 'knowledge' which is true, complete and infallible. The unique and unparalleled distinction of Veda is its potency to denote even that which is not to be known by any other means of knowledge.

Authority of Veda is actually rooted in the theory of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva*, variously interpreted by several schools of Indian philosophical thought, although all of them unanimously accept its unquestionable authenticity. The present paper aims to expound and examine the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* and its counter-perspective available in source books of other schools of Indian philosophy.

II

Of all the schools of Indian philosophy, Mīmāṁsā is the most powerful champion of Vedic authority. In fact, the basic orientation of Mīmāṁsā is derived from and dependent upon Vedic sources themselves. This significant stream of Indian philosophy is deeply rooted in the interpretation of Vedic texts and seeks an inquiry into the problems relating to Vedic rituals. Etymologically, the term Mīmāṁsā means investigating a doubtful point and arriving at a conclusion thereon.[1] Traditionally the word has been held to express 'revered thought',[2] since it deals with the interpretation of Vedic statements in accordance with the rituals based upon the sacred sanction of Vedic authority.

III

The primary aim of Mīmāṁsā school is to delineate on the true nature of *dharma* which is injunctive in nature.[3] Accordingly, the central theme of Mīmāṁsā discourse has been the

analysis of *vidhi* or moral injunction. In course of discussion on *codanā* or *vidhi*, the issue of *artha* (purpose as well as meaning) also assumes significance in Mīmāṁsā because there is an underlying relationship between each word and meaning and also between the action and its purpose. From this point of view, word, purpose and action are the three main undercurrents of Mīmāṁsā philosophy since *dharma* is accessible through words which are expressive of purpose and are grouped together and ordered according to particular component actions of the sacrifice. The blending of *śabha* and *artha*, *kratu* and *phala* has much deeper and wider implications from hermeneutic as well as moral angles.

In other words, the following three are the basic pre-suppositions of Mīmāṁsā philosophy:

(a) All such actions which are enjoined in the Veda, comprise of *dharma*. Interestingly, Kumārila in his *Ślokavārtika*, has posited various other notions of *dharma* and, after rejecting all those, he has concluded that they cannot be known through Veda as *puruṣārtha*. It is only *śreya* or happiness attainable by *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* which is meant by *dharma*.[4]

(b) The one and only source of knowing *dharma* is Veda as word or *śāstra*. The very definition of *śāstra* implies those activities or refraining from them which are enjoined by the *śāstra* through eternal or non-eternal statements.[5]

(c) The Veda is self-validated and requires no extraneous source for its authenticity. Here a question naturally arises as to what is the basis for accepting self-validity of the Veda and how to ensure the efficacy of Vedic statements. To this, the reply of Jaimini is stated in the famous *sūtra* as follows: *Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhastasya jñānamupadeśo'vyatirekaścārthe'nupalabdhe tatpramāṇaṁ Bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt.*[6]

It means that the word and its meaning are innately related and their relation cannot be vitiated by any extraneous factor like time, space, situation or person.[7]

"The Mīmāṁsaka's main thesis is that *Dharma* can be known only from the Vedic injunction and in order to establish the infallibility and utter reliability of the Vedic injunction, he has had to prove that: (1) Words are eternal, (2) The Denotations of Words are eternal, (3) The Relationship between Words and their Denotations is eternal, (4) the meaning of the Sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component words, and the Sentence has no meaning apart by itself. As regards the Eternality of the *Sentence*, however, that Eternality cannot belong to the Sentence composed by human beings, and as such it cannot be Eternal: and for the same reason it cannot have an inherent validity, as it is open to the suspicion of having been vitiated at its source by the defects of the man pronouncing the Sentence. But this does not perturb the Mīmāṁsaka; as the only Sentence upon whose *eternality* and *validity* he is keen is the Vedic Injunction, which alone is the valid source of our knowledge of *Dharma*. And as all human or personal associations are open to the suspicion of being vitiated at its source, it becomes necessary for the Mīmāṁsaka to show that the Vedic Sentence is not the work of any person, that the Veda is not the work of any author and that it is Eternal and self-sufficient."[8]

IV

It is against the above background that we can understand the ordering and meaning of Jaimini's *sūtras* in the *tarkapāda*, the very first section of his compendium. After introducing the basic approach of Mīmāṁsā as *dharma* and defining it as injunctive in nature, he puts forth the topic of validity of *dharma*. He goes on to elaborate that none of the accepted *pramāṇas* can validate *dharma* as such because *pralyakṣa* is capable of denoting present objects only and the rest of the *pramaṇas* are in one way or the other dependent upon *pratyakṣa* itself. *Dharma* is neither a physical object nor does it deal with present time alone, rather it encompasses the whole lot of past, present and future human activity and its consequences. Hence, it cannot be held that there is no means available for knowing the true nature of *dharma*.

As stated earlier, Veda or *śāstra* is the only valid means for comprehending *dharma* according to Mīmāṁsā. Therefore, the focus and emphasis on proving the eternity and self-valdity of Veda in the system is quite justified. In the fifth *sūtra* of *tarkapāda*, Jaimini has dealt with this problem and asserted that, the relation of the word with its denotation is inborn, injunction is the means of knowing *dharma*, and it is infallible in regard to all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent.[9] It is to be noted that the term *śabda* here stands for the Vedic or scriptural word, and '*artha*' for *dharma-adharma*, which forms the subject matter of scripture.[10] Hence, neither Jaimini nor Śabara has given a definition of 'word' or 'verbal cognition' in general; they have defined only the particular form of word, i.e. injunction, which is what bears upon the subject-matter of Mīmāṁsā, viz., *dharma-adharma*.

But quite naturally, in the course of discussion of above themes, the basic question relating to verbal cognition in general as well as its validity and realibility has also been discussed in detail in the Mīmāṁsā sourcebooks. To grasp the real import and significance of the concept of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva*, a brief outline of the more general ideas regarding this is called for as follows.

V

The idea of eternity of Veda is so significant in Mīmāṁsā system of philosophy that Jaimini himself has devoted almost eighteen *sūtras* of his first chapter (twelve in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* and six in the form of *siddhānta*) to establish this theory in a firm manner. It will not be out of place to discuss the opponents' arguments and Jaimini's own response to them before we deliberate upon the concept of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* in detail. The objections raised by Jaimini in the form of *purvapakṣa* to the eternity of the word are as follow:

(i) *Karmaike tatra darśanāt.*[11] It is observed that *śabda* is produced only when some individual makes some effort in the form of action. Hence, it is to be inferred that there is a causal relation between human action and the word. Consequently, the word cannot be eternal.

(ii) *Asthānāt.*[12] The word, when uttered, does not last even for a moment. We, therefore, understand that it is destroyed. It is not seen that an object is not

available even if it is present. Hence, we cannot buy the argument that the word is not available even though it is present. Nor can we say that the word has not reached its object, hence it is not being heard because word is the object of *ākāśa* which is present everywhere. But the *śabda,* once uttered, does not last in the place of hearing even for a moment.

(iii) *'Karoti' śabdāt.*[13] Since the terms like *'karoti',* etc., are used with reference to the word, hence it is presumed that the word is produced and not eternal.

(iv) *Sattvāntare ca yaugapadyāt.*[14] it is a matter of everybody's experience that the same word is simultaneously heard but not in a uniform way at various places. This also proves that the word is not eternal because eternal objects are mostly single and uniform.

(v) *Prakṛtivikṛtyośca.*[15] Mutations and permutations are quite obvious in case of the words. This would not have been possible if the word was eternal. Hence, it has to be accepted that the word is not eternal.

(vi) *Vṛddhiśca kartṛbhūmnāsya.*[16] The next and the last argument in favour of non-eternity of words is that the sound gets increased when there are more than one speakers.[17] It means that each speaker contributes some part of the whole word, which being cumulated, gets increased. This should not have been the case if the word would have been eternal. For example, a pot exists as it is, whether there is only one lamp to lighten it up or there are a thousand.[18]

In response to the above objections, Jaimini gives the following arguments and proves that the word is eternal.

(a) *Samaṁ tu tatra darśanam.*[19] As far as the first objection regarding human effort is concerned, it must be stated that even eternal word needs to be manifested and human effort has to be made for that too.

(b) *Sataḥ paramadarśanam viṣayānāgamāt.*[20] The second objection can be met with the argument that the word is only manifested by the conjunction and disjunction of air and is not actually produced. It is, therefore, that the word, being eternal, is already present but is not heard due to absence of manifesting activity.

(c) *Prayogasya param.*[21] Even the expressions like *'karoti'* are indicative of the usage of word and not its production.

(d) *Ādityavad yaugapadyam.*[22] Simultaneous occurrence of one word at several places can also not prove its non-eternity because the same word can be heard at different places like the same Sun appearing to be present at different places.

(e) *Varṇāntaramavikāraḥ.*[23] As far as the mutations and permutations of the word are concerned, they are not real but are actually usages of one letter in place of another and that too is based on resemblance.

(f) *Nādavṛddhiparā.*[24] The next objection regarding increase of sound after cumulative utterance can be met with the argument that word as such is partless. Hence the increase in word does not actually mean anything but the increase of sound, i.e. *nāda.*

VI

In this way, after meeting all the objections one by one put in by the opponent, Jaimini posits some more arguments to prove his point of view regarding eternity of word as follows:

(i) *Nityastu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt.*[25] it is a matter of common experience that the word is uttered for others' use and comprehension. If the word would have been non-eternal, nobody would have been able to communicate with others since it would have got perished just after it was uttered. Moreover, each time one hears a word, it has to be accepted as a new word, if it was to be non-eternal. Obviously, it is against the common experience. Therefore, it is logical to hold that the word is eternal.

(ii) *Sarvatra yaugapadyāt.*[26] A word once uttered denotes a whole class and not merely an individual. Hence, if it is held to be non-eternal, it will be impossible to express the relation between a word and its class. On the contrary, if it is held to be eternal, it can indicate the whole class.

(iii) *Saṁkhyābhāvāt.*[27] A word is uttered eight times but every listener can recognize that it is the same word. Nobody says that eight words have been spoken. He rather knows that the same word which was uttered earlier, is spoken again and is comprehended as such.

(iv) *Anapekṣatvāt.*[28] No sufficient cause is available for the destruction of word. As such, it is not cogent to hold that it is non-eternal.

(v) *Prakhyābhāvācca yogasya.*[29] Some scholars believe that air is the cause of word and hence the word is non-eternal. But neither parts of air are available in the word, nor the word can be touched like air. Hence it is not produced from air and is not non-eternal.

(vi) *Liṅgadarśanācca.*[30] Internal evidence from the Veda also suggests that the word is eternal.

VII

In this way, Jaimini in his Mīmāṁsā system has tried to establish the eternity of word after refuting all the arguments put up by the opponent. But the opponent may again raise an objection as to 'the word may be eternal, but how the eternity of a sentence can be proved, since sentence is a whole consisting of several words and compounds'. In other words, sentences, Vedic or otherwise, cannot be eternal, since they are composed of words and so they are produced.

Jaimini's answer to this objection is that the crux of a sentence is its verb which implies three words: *sādhya, sādhana* and *itikartavyatā*. Hence a sentence is not an independent and separate entity other than the meaning of its words. It is only an understanding of a total sense of the words used in a particular sentence.

Moreover, the ordinary sentences uttered by a human being may be taken to consist of several words and so produced in that form.[31] But as far as the Vedic sentences are concerned, such objections are of no standing since they are not produced by anybody, and

are self-validated. Sentences, ordinary or otherwise, are, according to the Mīmāṁsā, not over and above the meaning of the words which have already been proved eternal.

VIII

This brings us to the question of the relation between word and its meaning. Jaimini has propounded that the relation between word and its meaning is eternal. It is noteworthy that the Indian grammatical tradition also holds the same view.[32] According to Mīmāṁsā, word and its meaning are innately related and are not produced by anybody, not even by God. If some 'person' would have caused this relation, he must be remembered like Paṇini is remembered while using the term *vṛddhi*, etc. Although it is also true that sometimes the memory fails and we are not able to remember certain facts due to some reason but this cannot be held true in case of words and their meanings being used in daily behaviour. Hence, it is appropriate to hold that the word and its meaning are innate, eternal and impersonal, since there is nobody available to create or to relate them.

IX

Several objections have been raised against the Mīmāṁsaka position of innateness of the relation between word and its meaning: These are as follows:

(a) When the word is heard for the first time, its meaning is not known. It is known only after it is heard so many times. Hence this relation is produced and so is non-eternal.

(b) The word and its meaning are not located in the same place. Word is situated in the mouth while the meaning, i.e. the object is available somewhere on the ground.

(c) The word and its meaning are understood as separate when we say—
'This is word and not the meaning.
This is the meaning and not the word'.
So, it is proved that they are not innately related.

(d) The form of both the word and its meaning is also different. The word 'cow' is *uttered* while the meaning of this word is *apprehended*. Hence the relation between these two is born and not innate.

To the above and other such objections raised by the opponent, the Mīmāṁsā reply is that neither perception nor any other means of knowledge can prove that there is some person who created the word and its meaning.[33] Actually it is through a continuous tradition that the relation between the word and its meaning is transmitted from one generation to another and carried forward. Never was there a time or a place where this relation was not available, because if it be accepted that it was not available somewhere at a certain point of time, then naturally the question of its beginning would arise and it would lead to an infinite regress. To avoid this fallacy of infinite regress, it has to be admitted that certain

words were used for the first time and were self-related to their meanings. As such, it amounts to accept innateness of relation between word and its meaning.[34]

As stated above, the Mīmāṁsakas have postulated two theories to uphold the authority of the Vedas: (a) the eternity of the word and (b) its non-personal origination. Obviously the latter is dependent upon the former:[35]

In other words, Veda is not created by any individual, be it human or divine, because, being eternal in nature, it does not need to be created at all.

The second postulate of Mīmāṁsā is slightly but significantly different from the common assumptions of other revealed faiths in as much as they state that "The Veda is not the word of God, but the Word itself. These two postulates of faith, based on some mystic experiences lying at the root of the whole of the *mantra* cult, have not directly helped the Vedicist to give a rational interpretation of the *mantras*, but indirectly they are suggestive of the standpoint from which an approach to such an interpretation is to be made."[36]

X

Since we have already dealt with the issue of the eternity of the Veda or word according to the Mīmāṁsā school, it will be quite appropriate now to deal with the concept of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* in detail. It is necessary to note at the outset the arguments of the opponent for refutation of the Mīmāṁsā view of the impersonality of the Veda and counter-arguments given by the Mīmāṁsaka in defence of his theory. Jaimini himself has raised two objections from the viewpoint of the *pūrvapakṣa* in the last portion of his *tarkapāda* which have accordingly been interpreted by Śabara and quoted by Sāyaṇa in his *Ṛgbhāṣyabhūmikā.*

Pūrvapakṣa

The opponents have raised two main objections against the eternality and impersonality of the Veda as follows:

(A) *Vedānścaike sannikarṣaṁ puruṣākhyāḥ.*[37] Vedas must have been composed by some author just like other worldly compositions because they are named after certain persons. Just as Kālidāsa has authored the *Raghuvaṁśa,* similarly, some author has composed the Vedas also because the branches of the Vedas are known as *Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīya,* etc., only on the basis of their propounders in the same way as the *Rāmāyaṇa* is known as Vālmīkīya and *Mahābhārata* as the Vaiyāsika. The argument can be rendered as an inferential statement as follows:

Vimataṁ Vedavākyaṁ pauruṣeyam
Vākyatvāt
Kālidāsādivākyavat.

In other words, it means that certain persons have actually authored the Vedas and hence they carry their specific names in the form of *Kāṭhaka, Paippalāda,* etc.

(B) *Anityadarśanācca.*[38] Moreover, the Vedas cannot be held to be impersonal because we find many ephemeral things mentioned in them such as *Babara, Prāvahaṇi* and *Kusurvinda Auddālaki*, etc. On the basis of such occurrences, it can be inferred that the Vedas were not written when these persons were alive. That is why we find that many of such statements have a verb form declined in the past tense, e.g. *'akāmayata'*. It is, therefore, quite logical to hold that the Vedas are a work of some author.

The opponent clarifies that the names attached to a particular branch of the Veda definitely denote a relation between the creation and its creator, i.e. the Veda is the *kṛti* and some person is the *kartā.*

Moreover, the names attached to various branches of Vedas cannot simply be held to be the names of instructors or teachers of those branches, since the instructors of one branch of learning may be many but the author is usually one. Hence, if the particular branch of the Veda is carrying a particular name, it goes to prove that it is written by the author of that name.

It is quite possible that sometimes the names of the authors are not remembered after a long duration of time, but it does not mean that the work was not created at all and hence it is eternal for that matter.

Siddhāntapakṣa

To the above two main objections put up by the opponent, Jaimini has responded in the following four *sūtras* in the form of four arguments:

(i) *Uktaṁ tu śabdapūrvatvam.*[39] It has already been stated (in the fifth *sūtra* of *tarkapāda* quoted above) that we propound and subscribe to the theory of eternality of the Veda which means that there is a continued tradition of Vedic studies. Accordingly, from one teacher we go to the earlier one and then the earliest, but we cannot prove that there was a creator, since this chain is eternal.

(ii) *Ākhyā pravacanāt.*[40] Regarding the names of branches of the Veda such as *Kāṭhaka, Kauthuma, Taittirīya*, etc., it is not proper to assume them as authors of the Veda. They are only interpreters or teachers of that particular Veda.

To the above argument of Jaimini, Śabara adds the following in his *bhāṣya*: "Sometimes the names are given to some creation even when it is not created by some particular person but instructed or interpreted by him in an exceptionally effective manner. Seers like Kaṭha have explained the Veda in an extraordinary way, hence the names *Kāṭhaka*, etc., are given to the particular branch of the Veda. Similarly, the *smṛtis* mention the name of Vaiśampāyana who has taught all the branches of the *Yajurveda* while Kaṭha had interpreted only one particular branch of it which came to be known as *Kāṭhaka* because he excelled and specialized in that particular branch."[41]

Obviously, this argument of the Mīmāṁsaka carries some weight, since even in modern times, we do associate certain scholars' names with the branch of knowledge they are specializing in. This viewpoint also provides an important clue to the recognition of interpreters. Since Indian philosophy is basically a tradition-oriented philosophy, one

cannot dismiss this argument simply on the face of it, for there have been great commentators like Śabara, Śaṅkara, Praśastapāda and Vātsyāyana who are no less respected than the original propounders. In this way, Mīmāṁsā does give a respectful position to the teacher and asserts that the names of great teachers, or of students for that matter, of a particular Veda are well known, but the names of their author are not known, since Vedas are not authored by anyone; they are eternal, impersonal and universal.

(iii) *Paraṁ tu śrutisāmānyamātram.*[42] As far as the words like *Babara, Prāvāhaṇi,* etc., are concerned, they denote the general and derivative sense instead of referring to any individuals bearing those names; the apparent similarity in it is based on the sound being heard.

Elaborating on this point of Jaimini, Śabara says that in history, there is no well-known person by the name of Pravāhaṇa. Hence, it is totally unfounded to hold that Prāvāhaṇi is a proper name of a person who is the son of Pravāhaṇa. Regarding the suffix 'i', he says that it signifies the progeny of a person as well as the agent of a verb. To put it in simpler terms, Prāvāhaṇi means any object or individual which or who carries things forward:

Tasmād yaḥ pravāhayati sa prāvāhaṇiḥ.[43]

Evidently, the above explanation of the word 'Prāvāhaṇi' is based on the principle of etymology which is highly appropriate in the case of the Vedic language.

The other part of the Vedic statement concerning *'Babara'* shows only the resemblance of the sound that can be heard when air blows:

Babara iti śabdānukritiḥ.[44]

Hence, the word *'Babara'* is only a common noun and not proper as it is mistaken by the opponent. The air which blows and creates the sound *Ba-ba-ra* is, in fact, the meaning of the word 'Babara' which is onomatopoeic in nature:

Na tu manuṣyo Babaranāmako'tra vivakṣitaḥ Babaradhvaniyuktasya pravahaṇasvabhāvasya vāyoratra vaktuṁ śakyatvāt.[45]

This argument of the Mīmāṁsakas definitely carries some weight, since in literature, the figure of speech called 'Onomatopoeia' is explained as based on resemblance of sounds and there are many words in all languages which testify to this trait.

(iv) *Kṛte vā viniyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ sambandhāt.*[46] The opponents may argue again that there are many Vedic statements which apparently do not convey any sense and seem to be like the utterances of insane persons or children.

For example:

(a) *Vanaspatayaḥ satramāsata.*
Sarpāḥ satramāsata.
i.e. The creepers performed some rituals.
The snakes performed some rituals.

(b) *Jaradgavo kambalapādukāyāṁ dvāri sthito gāyati madrakaṇi.*
Taṁ brāhmaṇī pṛcchati putrakāmā rājan rumāyāṁ laśunasya ko'rthaḥ.
i.e. The old ox wearing chappals and draped in a blanket, is sitting on a gate and sings mad songs. The Brāhmin's wife asks him: When would I get a son? O king! what is the price of garlic in the mine of salt, etc.[47]

The Mīmāṁsakas' response to the above is formulated by Jaimini as in the above *sūtra*. According to Śabara, even such apparently senseless statements in the Veda are not actually meaningless because technically they are *arthavāda* statements meant to eulogise the significance of rituals. It indirectly means that when even the non-living herbs performed the sacrifice, then not to talk of the learned Brāhmaṇas. It is just like saying that in the late evening when even animals do not walk, not to talk of erudite scholars. Apparently, there does not seem any connection between these two statements but actually it intends to prohibit loitering in the late evening for various reasons.[48]

Moreover, all Vedic statements are mutually interrelated and primarily meant to be injunctive in nature; the injunction in fact has three aspects: (a) the goal, (b) the means and (c) the method. It is why as soon as the word *'jyotiṣṭoma'* is uttered, the injunction 'ought' has to be supplied for the sake of expectancy. Thereafter, the question of (a) means arises and the *'Soma'* is stated to be the means. Then the (b) goal of this exercise is sought and *'Svarga'* is given as an answer to it. Lastly (c) the method for performance of *jyotiṣṭoma* is inquired about and the reply is provided accordingly. In this way, the whole injunctive process is so well-knit and logically ordered that the opponents' view regarding its senselessness stands refuted and the authenticity of the Veda stands vindicated.[49]

Sāyaṇa, while explaining the above *sūtra,* has stated further that the learned logicians follow a dictum *'yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ'* which means that the word should be interpreted in the sense in which it is employed and not in the sense it appears to be employed. Accordingly, all Vedic statements are to be interpreted in the injunctive sense only and not otherwise. Of course, some of them are directly injunctive in nature while others are in the form of *arthavāda* and have to be taken only in a eulogistic sense.[50]

Hence the objection raised by the opponents regarding the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda stands refuted. Here Sāyaṇa has shown the fallaciousness of the opponents' argument on another account also. He has taken the following reading of *Jaimini's Sūtra*:

Kṛte cāviyogaḥ syāt karmaṇaḥ samatvāt.

According to him, the word '*cakāra*' in this *sūtra* is used to prove the defectiveness of the inference put in by the *pūrvapakṣa* (quoted above) as follows:

Vedavākyaṁ pauruṣeyaṁ
vākyatvāt
kartranupalambhatvāt.

(v) It is also worth mentioning here that another objection has been anticipated by Sāyaṇa in this regard in his *Ṛgbhāṣyabhūmikā,* which is from the side of Vedāntins and runs as follows:

Bādarāyaṇa, in his *Brahmasūtra,*[51] has stated that Brahman, the omniscient Being is the origin of all scriptures. Interestingly, he has resolved this objection from the Mīmāṁsā standpoint by stating that even according to this *sūtra* of Vyāsa, no individual is held to be the author of the Vedas because Brahman is knowledge itself from the transcendental point of view. In fact, Bādarāyaṇa himself has upheld the eternity of the Veda at the empirical level also, when he says,

Ata eva ca nityatvam.[52]

Many *Śruti* and *Smṛti* statements, like the following two, also support the above thesis:

(i) *Vāca virūpanityayā*[53]

(ii) *Anādinidhanā nityā vāgutsṛṣṭā svayambhuvā*[54]

In this way, on the basis of the above arguments quoted and refuted by Jaimini in his Mīmāṁsāsūtras, the Mīmāṁsakas have tried to prove that the Veda is impersonal, eternal and infallible:

Pauruṣeyaṁ na vā vedavākyaṁ syāt pauruṣeyatā
Kāthakādisamākhyānāt vākyatvāccānyavākyavat
Samākhyānaṁ pravacanāt vākyatvam tu parāhṛtam
Tatkartranupalambhenā syāttato' pauruṣeyatā.[55]

XI

It is worth mentioning here that neither Jaimini and Śabara, nor Sāyaṇa, have taken note of the well-known Nyāya point of view, according to which the Veda is *apauruṣeya* because no ordinary *puruṣa* or being is the author of the Veda but because God, the Omniscient Being, manifests the Veda at the beginning of each creation. In fact, Sāyaṇa himself begins his commentary on the Veda with the following invocatory verse based on a statement of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*:

Yasya niḥśvasitaṁ vedā yo vedebhyo'khilaṁ jagat
Nirmame tamahaṁ vande vidyātīrthamaheśvaram.[56]

It means that the Vedas predate the creation and that God creates the world according to the Vedic knowledge which is eternal, beginningless and endless. Even the very idea of creation belittles the significance of the Veda, so it is held that God did not create the Vedas but effortlessly revealed them. It is, therefore, that we hold them to be the divine manifestation of the eternal knowledge and not a creation anyway. Obviously, Sāyaṇa is here referring to God as the creator of the world but not as the creator of the Vedas, as the Nyāya holds.

On the other hand, Jayantabhaṭṭa, in his *Nyāyamañjarī*,[57] has raised several objections against the Mīmāṁsā position in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* and has refuted them from the Nyāya point of view. It will be quite interesting to quote a portion of the debate as follows:

Nyāya : Vedic sentential construction must presuppose an author because it is sentential construction, like any other sentential construction, found in a non-Vedic text.

Mīmāṁsā : The Mīmāṁsakas may retort to the above by quoting a counter-inference such as:

Vedādhyayanaṁ sarvaṁ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam
Vedādhyayanasāmānyādadhunādhyayanaṁ yathā.[58]

i.e. Vedic study as a whole, like all kinds of other studies, should follow the instructions of a teacher, since Vedic study is just like studying in contemporary times.

Nyāya : The above suggestion is not relevant for proving the proposition because a similar statement can be made in case of the *Mahābhārata* also.

Mīmāṁsā : No, because in case of the *Mahābhārata*, it is unanimously known that it was composed by Vyāsa.

Nyāya : Even in the case of the Veda, it is well known that it was composed by Prajāpati.

Mīmāṁsā : Actually, the Vedic reference to Prajāpati is not meant to convey God as the creator of the Veda since nobody has come across the author of the Vedas.

Nyāya : Then the *Mahābhārata's* reference to Vyāsa also does not denote that he is its author, since nobody has actually seen him.

Mīmāṁsā : Vedas are such an important text that had they been composed by an author, he would not have been forgotten by the generations of Vedic students. Moreover, there is no beginning of creation at all, since the world, too, is eternal.

Nyāya : If a sentential construction could come into existence without an author, then a piece of cloth could as well be produced out of threads without a weaver.

Mīmāṁsā : No, because the Vedas are an extraordinary text.

Nyāya : That is why they should have been composed by some extraordinary author instead of being taken as an authorless composition. Just as extraordinary products, like mountains, are created by somebody much superior than the producer of pots, even so they are to be taken as created by some such agency.

Mīmāṁsā : Nobody remembers the author of the Vedas.

Nyāya : *Anumāna* and *Śāstra* both can prove that an extraordinary person composed them. Hence, it is logical to hold that the same God who created the world also created the Vedas because the composition of the Vedas requires knowledge of the whole world. Moreover, the same God who composed one of the Vedas should be taken to have composed all the four, since the four Vedas teach things interconnected.

In this way, Jayanta has reduced the Mīmāṁsā argument of impersonal authorship of the Veda to the divine origin of the Veda. Even the Yoga philosophy subscribes to this view with the only difference that they call God also as an extraordinary *Puruṣa*. Therefore, according to Yoga, Veda is *pauruṣeya*, because it is manifested by God, a *purusaviśeṣa*[59] while according to Nyāya, it is *apauruṣeya* because no ordinary individual, but God, has created it.

XII

In the light of the above, it may be stated that mostly all the schools of Indian philosophy agree on the self-validity and supreme authority of the Vedas. However, broadly speaking, the following three views[60] are available in Indian tradition regarding the origin of it:

(a) The first view, propounded by Jaimini and elaborated by his followers is that the Veda is self-revelatory, nobody, not even God, has created it. Therefore, it is *apauruṣeya* in the strictest sense of the term.

(b) God created the Vedas. Hence, the Vedas are in the form of God himself. This view is upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga schools of Indian philosophy.

(c) The great seers, called *ṛṣis*, were granted Vedic knowledge by the grace of God after they practised severe austerities. Therefore, they codified this knowledge in language and Vedas were revealed to the humanity.

Out of the above, the first view has been discussed at length in the foregoing pages while the second one has been hinted at in brief. As far as the third view is concerned, we find traces of it in the Vedic sources themselves where the *ṛṣis* are mentioned as the *mantrakṛtaḥ*.[61] In fact, even in this view the seers are not held to be the creators of Vedic knowledge but are believed to be the instructors or interpreters of Vedic verses.[62] Various Mīmāṁsā scholars have explained that *mantras* being eternal, cannot be created—they are either seen or employed in rituals by the seers[63] who have received God's grace and divine insights due to their hard penances and have manifested them for the welfare of the humanity. That is why they are venerated and stated to be the seers of the *mantras*:

Nama ṛṣibhyo mantrakṛdbhyo mantrapatibhyaḥ[64]

Veda is undoubtedly divine knowledge and divine language which can only be transmitted through certain extraordinarily gifted persons called *ṛṣis*. The same fact has been expressed by Yāska in his *Nirukta* at more than one places as follow:

(i) *Sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ*[65]

(ii) In the beginning of *Daivatakāṇḍa*, Yāska explicitly mentions that the *ṛṣis* are the composers of the Vedic verse.

Yatkāma ṛṣiryasyām devatāyāmārthapatyamicchanstutiṁ prayuṅkte taddaivatasya mantro bhavati.[66]

i.e., the deity of the verse is decided according to the intention of the seer who invokes a particular deity with a certain desire.

(iii) Obviously, here is a clear statement indicating the personal intention of the seer, which is reiterated elsewhere too:

Evamuccāvacairabhiprāyairṛṣīṇāṁ mantradṛṣṭayo bhavanti,[67]

i.e., in this way, the insights of seers are based upon their higher or lower intentions.

On the basis of above and many more such internal evidences, it can be assumed that the Indian tradition, while accepting the divinity of Vedic knowledge, does not ignore the human aspect of its manifestation and propagation. In other words, the *ṛṣis* derive some extraordinary powers due to God's grace only after practising austerities and are gifted with the immediate perception of the reality. Their *ṛṣitva* is rooted in the fact that they could directly perceive the truth of knowledge.[68]

Deserving of such Supreme knowledge, the *ṛṣis* do not conserve it for selfish interest, rather they transmit it for the posterity and the tradition goes on continually.[69]

That is why, the Veda is held to be *śruti* or the knowledge acquired by the disciple through oral transmission, directly from the mouth of the preceptors, no less than the seers themselves. In brief, the *ṛṣis* visualized the Vedic verses and exposed them; they did not compose them.

XIII

In view of the above, it is noteworthy that Francis Clooney, in his book *Thinking Ritually*, has given a new twist to this whole discussion. In his view, Mīmāṁsāsūtras 1-5 and 24-25 have dealt with the nature of *dharma* and the ordinary language respectively. Sūtra 27 attempts to extend this possibility to Vedic language also as if it was also an ordinary composition, which it is not. "*Ṛṣis* are thus introduced, obliquely, as a threat to the original authority of the Vedic injunctions. Their function is not being described in a positive fashion, they're introduced only to make clear what their role is not.

"Because the Veda and Vedic sacrifice as communicative of *dharma* depend on an underlying relationship of word, purpose and action, it is always a given, continually actualized system that precedes any particular element involved in it now. The *Ṛṣis* themselves are among these posterior elements, since they are merely "enlisted" to pronounce the Vedic words and hand them down, to make sure the text is known and able to be regularly translated into action. The words are not expressions of human wisdom and are not to be interpreted as statements of human values and goals.

"The importance of human factor is recognized and human beings are used to uphold and further the Vedic tradition. It is conceded that the *ṛṣis* are intimately connected with the texts that bear their names, but the connection is defended in a way that minimizes it. *Ṛṣis* expound the Veda, but their speech is not creative; there is nothing behind it but the ever-existent relationship of word-purpose-action, which can utilize any and all human agents as tools.

"It is here that the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of *apauruṣeyatva* begins to take shape, although without the kind of formal, technical defense that in turn requires further defense and explanation. *Apauruṣeyatva* is used here simply to dismiss the possibility that the *ṛṣis* might have a creative or authorial function in regard to the text. Jaimini's position seems to be that they are secondary, peripheral, whatever their insights or personal qualities might be. That they speak and teach is required and recognized, the remainder of their experiences and abilities is simply irrelevant."[70]

Evidently, the above statement is totally unfounded, since it seems to suggest as if Indian tradition in general, and Mīmāṁsā system in particular propounded the concept of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* to deny the *ṛṣis* their right of authorship. In contrast, the Indian view of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* seeks to uphold the sanctity and authenticity of Veda on one hand, but grants an exalted and unparallelled position to the *ṛṣis*, the original seers of Vedic verses on the other. Clooney himself has elsewhere explained the authorlessness of the Veda according to Indian tradition from another angle and stated:

"The idea of authorlessness in ancient India can be analyzed from a variety of perspectives. For instance, one could look at the grammar of classical Sanskrit itself, on which most Indian theological and philosophical texts were composed. Sanskrit does not understand the structure of a sentence to be that of subject/predicate, but rather that of a verb qualified by various relationships, including the agent and instrument, place, etc., The 'subject' of the sentence is, grammatically speaking, only apparent. Edwin Gerow has explored at length the relationship between certain grammatical structures in the Sanskrit

language and philosophical structures in Vedanta philosophy in particular. His observations on the impersonal structure of Sanskrit are pertinent for a comprehensive understanding of the notion of "authorlessness".[71] In fact the idea of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* is so pervasive in Indian thought that it cannot and should not be studied in isolation.

XIV

To sum up, it may be said that it is in the above and other specifically traditional Indian perspectives that the concept of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva* has to be properly understood and explained. As far as the Mīmāṁsā perspective is concerned, it has to be emphasized that the primary aim of Mīmāṁsakas is to uphold the Veda and its authority. Veda is defined by them as a collection of *vidhi* and *niṣedha,* the other aspects of it being subsidiary. Hence, when the Mīmāṁsakas approach the question of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva,* they intend to highlight the imperativeness which can be well protected if it is of impersonal origin. In other words, to convey the self-validity of Vedic injunctions, the Mīmāṁsakas resorted to the doctrine of eternity of word and defended the idea of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva.* It is against this background that the Mīmāṁsā view has to be comprehended.

In brief, the Mīmāṁsakas emphasise that the Vedic knowledge is Eternal, not produced by anyone, not even by God. The Eternal Vedic knowledge was of course, perceived by the *ṛṣis* and they imparted it to posterity; they first channelized its expression. Hence, it is not proper to propound that the Mīmāṁsā ignores the human aspect of knowledge. Rather, it restores the Vedic testimony to its supreme status through the concept of Veda-*apauruṣeyatva.* "From all this we conclude that the Vedas are not the work of a Personal Author, and being thus free from any defect due to such authorship, the Vedas must be regarded as the only source of knowledge (relating to *Dharma*) which is infallible in its self-sufficient sufficient Validity."[72]

To quote from the Veda itself:

Apakrāman pauruṣeyād vṛṇāno daivyaṁ vachaḥ
Praṇītīrabhyāvartasva viśvebhiḥ sakhibhiḥ saha.[73]

i.e., moving away from the words of human beings, choosing the divine speech, conduct yourself according to the good guidance with all your friends!

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38. Ibid., 1.1.28.
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63. (i) *Ṛṣiratīndriyadraṣṭā mantrakṛt karoti dhātustvatra darśanārthaḥ.*
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CHAPTER 9

Arthavāda

Sindhu Sadashiv Dange

ARTHAVĀDA—MEANING, TYPES AND STATUS

As is well known, the Veda comprises *mantras* and *brāhmaṇas.* The *mantras* make the performer remember several topics or subjects (*arthas*), which are invariably associated with the performance of any ritual.[1] The *brāhmaṇas,* as explained by the *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra,* have injunctions for performing the sacrificial actions, i.e. rites. (*Āp. Ś. S* XXIV 1. 32) The instruction of such rites (*vidhis*) cannot be acquired from any other source except the *brāhmaṇa.* The last part of the *brāhmaṇa* is termed *arthavāda.* (Ibid. 33) *Arthavāda* is defined as a statement containing either praise (*prāśastya*) of the enjoined or condemnation (*nindā*) of the prohibited.[2] Āpastamba states *arthavāda* as having four types and hence, together with praise and condemnation, two more types, viz., *parakṛti* and *purākalpa,* are stated by him. (Ibid) *Parakṛti* states what has been done in the past by a single person, while in the *purākalpa* occurs what has been done in the past by two or more persons.[3] *Arthavāda* itself being from the sphere of sacrifice, these two types of it deal with such accounts, which are also from the same (i.e. sacrificial) context. *Parakṛti* contains the accounts of the sacrificial performances of the celebrated ritualists, as also the accounts of success, achieved by the sacrificers through their sacrifices and gifts. *Purākalpa* signifies the older accounts of sacrificial rituals, performed in former times, by gods as well as men of antiquity. As these two types verge either on praise or condemnation, *arthavāda* is regarded to have only two broad types, viz., that one in praise and that one in condemnation. Śabarasvāmin has added eight more types of *arthavāda,* under the *sūtra* of Jaimini (II. 1.33), thus totalling twelve. He has stated these types with examples.[4]

Śabarasvāmin's classification of *arthavādas,* is a detailed one. But there is another way in which the *arthavādas* are classified in three types, viz., *Guṇavāda, Anuvāda* and *Bhūtārthavāda.*[5] *Guṇavāda* type of *arthavāda* is contrary to our means of perception, such as direct perception, etc. The example is *ādityo yūpaḥ.* 'The sacrificial post is the sun', in which *yūpa* (the sacrificial post) is praised. But this statement of the *arthavāda* is contrary to our direct perception (*Pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). So it is to be understood by indication (*Lakṣaṇā*). As both the sacrificial post and the sun are lustrous in appearance, they are identified. Here the identification is based on the quality (*guṇa*) of being lustrous. Hence this type of *arthavāda* is named *Guṇavāda. Anuvāda* type of *arthavāda* is the one which simply confirms our knowledge (*anuvadati,* i.e. 'speaks after' or follows our knowledge),

acquired by us by the means such as direct perception, etc. The example is—*agnir himasya bheṣajam*—'Agni is a remedy against cold'. The deity Agni is praised here. The quality of Agni of being opposed to cold is known by us by direct perception. The *arthavāda* simply follows this known fact. So is the name *Anuvāda* of this type of *arthavāda*. The third type, i.e. *Bhūtārthavāda*, is one which conveys a matter free from contradiction with other means of knowledge (direct perception, etc.). This type of *arthavāda* simply embodies a statement of the real state of things. The example is '*indro vṛtrāya vadham udayacchat*'—'Indra raised the weapon (i.e. thunderbolt) for striking against Vṛtra.' Here an accomplished fact, in praise of Indra, is described by past event.

The *arthavāda*-portions in the Vedic ritual texts are not taken as expressing their meanings for their own sake. If so taken, it may lead to an occasion of undesirable contingency of having irrelevant portions in the Veda, which has ritual alone in view. Whatever is not connected with any ritual, will stand as irrelevant.[6] And as the Vedic study (*svādhyāya*) is to be recited daily, all the Vedic portions have to be not only meaningful but also relevant. And so the *arthavādas* are regarded as meaningful and relevant.

The point of relevance and usefulness of the *arthavādas* to their respective *vidhi-vākyas*, i.e. statements of injunction, has been discussed by the Mīmāṁsakas at a great length. Sāyaṇa says that Jaimini had to take great pains to establish the authoritativeness of the *arthavādas*.[7] The *prima facie* view is that as *arthavādas* are not injunctive, they cannot have any meaning, i.e. relevance, in the knowledge of *dharma*, for the Vedic texts are mainly injunctive in character. Thus the *arthavādas* stand *anitya* (non-eternal, i.e. irrelevant, and thus not having any authority in the sphere of knowing *dharma*).[8] The siddhāntin states that though the *arthavādas* are not injunctive, they are related in some way to the other part which is directly injunctive. After construing together the two parts, it is seen that the *arthavāda* part serves the purpose of eulogizing and commending what is laid down in the injunctive part (*vidhi*). To take an example from the context of animal-sacrifice, the *vidhi* (injunctive statement) is—'One desirous of prosperity should sacrifice a white (goat) to Vāyu'. The *arthavāda* in this respect is—'Vāyu is the swiftest deity. He runs near Vāyu by his (i.e., Vayu's) own share and he (i.e. Vayu) makes him (i.e. the sacrificer) acquire prosperity'. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 1. 1. 1) The *arthavāda* here, by eulogizing Vāyu, serves to commend the act of sacrificing to the deity Vāyu (a 'white' animal, i.e. goat), which is enjoined by the *vidhi* in the *Kāmyapaśukāṇḍa* (the section dealing with animal-sacrifices, which are undertaken for achieving the desired things. Obviously these animal-sacrifices are optional).

The propriety and status of the *arthavāda*-portions of the Veda have been a point of discussion in the Mīmāṁsā philosophy.[9] The doctrine of *ekavākyatā* (syntactical connection) propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is of great help for knowing the exact status of the *arthavāda*-portions. The doctrine of *ekavākyatā* was originally introduced to the topic of the *mantras* (Yajus—*mantras*) by Jaimini. But it proved to be more effective in the hands of the Mīmāṁsakas in respect of the following two phenomena[10]—

1. There is syntactical connection between the injunctions (*vidhis*) of the subsidiaries (*aṅgas*) and those of the principal (*pradhāna*) *vidhi;*
2. There is syntactical unity between the *arthavādas* and their corresponding injunctions.

The doctrine of syntactical connection (*ekavākyatā*) is taken by the older Mīmāṁsakas with a view to denote *padaikavākyatā,* which takes place through a single word (*pada*), viz., *praśasta*—'Commended'. Thus instead of the verbal knowledge of the usual type, viz., *vāyavyaśvetālambhanena bhūtiṁ bhāvayet,* the verbal knowledge acquired by the *padaikavākyatā* can be expressed as *praśastena vāyavyaśvetālambhanena bhūtiṁ bhāvayet.* This view is strongly rejected by Mādhavācārya, who favours the *vākyaikavākyatā of* the *arthavādas.*[11] The statement of injunction (*vidhivākya*) expects commending the act enjoined by it, for such commending impels a person to undertake the act enjoined. On the other hand, the statement of *arthavāda* expects some act, i.e. object of human pursuit, enjoined by the *vidhi.* The statement of *arthavāda,* indicating by way of *Lakṣaṇa* the excellence (*prāśastya* lit. 'praiseworthiness', so 'excellence'), expected of by the statement of *vidhi,* has *vākyaikavākyatā* with the latter. The instance seen above from the context of (optional) animal-sacrifice, thus means—'As Vāyu, the deity of this animal (here the animal is 'goat') due to his swift-going nature is the giver of fruit swiftly, therefore one should sacrifice an excellent animal (i.e. goat) to Vāyu.' In this way, the two sentences could be connected. *Arthavādas* thus are taken to be an authority in *dharma,* the word *dharma* here standing for rites and rituals, which are prescribed.[12] By commending the *vidhis, arthavādas* are syntactically connected with the latter and stand as their part.[13]

SCOPE OF ARTHAVĀDA

We have noted above that *vidhi* and *arthavāda* are syntactically connected. In spite of being interdependent, the two differ in their structure. The statements *of vidhi* are direct and in most cases pithy. But the statements of *arthavāda,* being declamatory and convincing in nature, are elaborate. The very aim and nature of *arthavāda* serve for the easy entry of etymologies (in most cases coined by the composers of the Brāhmaṇa texts), beliefs and practices prevalent in those times, *gathas* and *ślokas,* traditional, mythical as well as legendary accounts, etc., which primarily come from the secular tradition. We will have occasion to deal though succinctly, with all these, which are strewn in *arthavādas.*

But prior to that, here we come to an important point and it is of the help, in the form of *arthavāda,* rendered by the secular tradition to the sacred Vedic tradition of rites and rituals. Several etymologies, though many of them come from the ritualists, breathe the popular beliefs. About the *gāthās,* Horsch has rightly stated that such anonymous stanzas originated mostly in secular and popular circles. The *gāthā*—literature was derived from the non-hieratic or unorthodox sphere such as the *kṣatriya* milieu or the Vrātya community.[14] On the basis of the *gāthās* are framed the *yajñagāthās,* which we come across in the *Ait.Br.* The *yajñagāthās* extol some sacrificial ritual or practice and are so named. Sāyaṇa explains the term *yajñagāthā* as 'it is one which is sung by all the ritualists having in view a sacrifice.'[15] Recitation of the *gathas* and *yajñagāthās* enjoined in the rituals points out how the priestly class was ever ready to amalgamate the popular traditions to win over new avenues to extend the influence of the sacrificial institution. The *yajñagāthās,* specifically composed on the pattern of the *gāthās,* are the outcome of this very effort on the part of the

Vedic ritualists. Falling in line with the *yajñagāthās* are the *ślokas,* which occur at several places in the Brāhmaṇa texts. At some places, Sāyaṇa calls these *ślokas* as '*mantras*'.[16] Even the legendary and traditional accounts from the *Itihāsa* (which means—'*iti - ha - āsa*', i.e. 'This was so') and Purāṇa,[17] which can be covered by the *parakṛti* and *purākalpa* types of *arthavāda,* also originate from the secular tradition. In the *parakṛti* and *purākalpa* types of *arthavāda,* we have several mythical accounts as also proto-myths or pseudo-myths. Some of these originally might be from the secular tradition, but some others are purposefully carved on the same lines. All these occur in the *arthavāda*—portions, which are stated to support the respective *vidhis* by commending them.

'SACRED' AND 'SECULAR'

Efforts have been made to seek the source of such narrations as also of traditional and legendary accounts, that do not exactly tally with the Vedic ritual tradition. We have already mentioned the view of Horsch that the origin of the *gāthā*-verses was from the non-ritualistic sphere or we may say from the a-ritualistic sphere. While dealing in details with the *Pāriplava,*[18] which figures in the context of the Horse-sacrifice, Chakrabarti has proposed that while some *ākhyānas* (traditional or legendary accounts) originated from the theologians, popular *ākhyānas* developed in all probability on the periphery of the sacred literature itself, being included in the *Svādhyāya.*[19] According to Hariappa, the practice of preserving the narrations of various events was prevalent in the period of *Ṛgveda* or even earlier.[20] Dandekar has convincingly proposed that right from the beginning, there have been two traditions—that of the *mantras* and the other preserved by the *sūtas.*[21] It is very right to see the tradition of the *sūtas* as the source of the secular compositions and narratives.[22] This tradition of the *sūtas* maintained and preserved, by committing to memory, the ancient records and narrations and often added to them. The *sūta* combined in himself the office of the chronicler, composer and narrator. The tradition of the *sūtas* not only preserved the ancient records but also set a norm for composing such type of narrations. The accounts in the Brāhmaṇa texts coming under the *parakṛti* and *gāthās* especially the *yajñagāthās, ślokas,* etc., stated for praising the ritual, are no doubt from the sphere of ritual and are from the ritualists, who were steeped in the sacred tradition. But while dealing with the simple or complex rites and rituals, these *arthavāda*-portions always catch the finger of the secular tradition and come to the profane level. The picture in the Brāhmaṇa texts is of perfect assimilation of the sacred and the secular.

That the sacred has to take the help of the profane or secular can be seen from a parallel from the western world, when we take into account the origin and history of dramatic art there. The chronicles of Greek village communities have the earliest records of dramatic acting. When a festival of any one of their numerous gods was to be celebrated, the Greek villagers used to gather in a group and act as if they were the old gods. There was not much action but probably much dialogue and recitation. These primitive imitations of the life of a god were called "mimes" (giving rise to the word 'mimic'). Out of this practice arose a crude kind of comedy which entertained the citizens of the old Athenian

State. This went on till the rise of the Roman Empire. After the withdrawal of the Roman control from the Western Europe, there were the 'Dark Ages', when there was inactivity and decay in all forms of art. From the middle ages, England and France had groups of travelling entertainers, which were known to the French as '*Jongleurs*'. The performances of these wandering groups attracted the attention of the Church, which started arranging sacred or religious plays drawn from the Bible, at first on the occasions as Christmas or Easter, suiting to those occasions.[23] Gradually other events from the Bible were presented in dramatic form inside the Church. This shows how the Church took notice of the dramatic activities of the travelling commoners and started having such an activity as a counter attaction, with that great storehouse—the Bible-at-hand.

The propriety of the *arthavāda* portions in the Brāhmaṇa texts has to be judged taking into account the relation between the 'sacred' and 'secular' or 'profane'. The Brāhmaṇa texts and the Saṁhitās (particularly the *YV saṁhitās*) display a detailed but early form of Vedic ritual,[24] which is as yet not codified, as we see in the Śrautasūtras. The pattern of the Brāhmaṇa texts and that of the Śrautasūtras, while dealing with the same subject matter (i.e. Vedic ritual) differs from each other. While the Śrautasūtras do not need any supportive matter in the form of praise, for the ritual prescribed by them is fixed and codified, the Brāhmaṇa texts at every rite and ritual seek explanation and forward ritual reasoning or even at times more than one reasonings (even for a single rite or ritual), in the form of *arthavāda*. The *arthavādas* deal with traditional accounts, the oft-repeated being the strife between the gods and the *asuras*, beliefs, practices, etc., prevalent in those times. These all can be said to be from the profane or secular level, from both points of view, viz., 'matter' and 'manner' (in which this secular matter at times is presented). And here we come to the 'loan' of the secular tradition to the sacred tradition. Several *arthavādas* point out that the ritualists have to catch the finger of secular matters and have to come to the profane level for being convincing. But the secular tradition with its traditional and legendary accounts, beliefs and practices is undated due to its hoary past and has remained independent by itself unlike the ritualistic tradition.

We have already taken note of the doctrine of *ekavākyatā* propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas, which establishes the complementary nature of both—the *vidhi* and the *arthavāda*, the latter coming to the secular and a-ritual level—and indicates the equal importance of both. But the undated hoary past of the secular tradition makes us feel that more weightage has to be given to the secular or profane tradition, for it has provided much matter to the *arthavāda*-portions in the sacred tradition. However, we have to admit that this secular tradition of the hoary past has come down to us, only by its being incorporated in the ritualistic tradition in the form of *arthavādas*, in the absence of which, these records of olden mythical and legendary accounts, beliefs and practices would have remained in the form of floating mass of literature, having only the mouth-to-mouth circulation, with a curse of oblivion hanging on them.

The study of the *arthavādas* from the ritual-texts taken up in the pages to follow is from a specific point of view. It is to unearth the cultural data regarding the Vedic India, keeping society at the centre, with its convictions, beliefs and practices, myths and legends and even the philosophical and ethical thoughts entertained by it in the Vedic India. In fact,

vast in number are the *vidhis* prescribed for the small or great rites and rituals and so are the *arthavādas* vast in number. We have the *arthavādas* in the form of etymologies; *arthavadas* regarding the Cosmos, with the sun, moon, constellations and quarters; Time and its units; Water; Trees, Plants and kinds of grass; Animals and Birds; Numbers; Sense-organs and Body-parts; *Varṇa*-system; Family-life; and several countless topics.[25] We are taking here for discussion only selected *arthavādas,* which would give us a much clear picture of the society of those times.

ETYMOLOGIES

Etymology forms a striking feature of many *arthavādas.* Etymologies in the Brāhmaṇa texts have been a topic of great interest and separate study.[26] The method of giving etymology of a word is inherited by the ritual-texts from the ancient works such as *RV* and *AV*,[27] which knew the method of etymology for making clear certain words or concepts. The Brāhmaṇa texts toed the same line taking the help of the tool of etymology, while stating some *arthavādas.* While handling this tool, they proved to be the forerunners of Yāska, the first exponent of the systematized school of etymology, who flourished later, though there were at least sixteen thinkers in this line preceding him, on his own authority, as he mentions them in the course of discussion. The principle propounded by Yāska, viz., 'One should give etymology on the basis of similarity between letters or even syllables of a word' (*Nir.* II. 1) was not only already foreseen by the Brāhmaṇa texts but was also followed by them, while giving etymologies in the *arthavāda*-portions. Moreover, the unique doctrine stated by them that 'Gods love what is abstruse and dislike what is direct or open (*parokṣapriyā vai devāḥ pratyakṣadviṣaḥ*) provided for them a firm basis for forwarding any etymology in any way, of the word required to be explained in the ritual context. The Brāhmaṇa texts are replete with several such etymologies in their *arthavāda* portions, some of them warranted by grammar, but many others though at times irregular, saved by their doctrine of '*parokṣapriyatva*' ('abstruse' being favourite of the gods). Really speaking, it is these etymologies which acquaint us with the various facets of the 'collective mind' of that society. To take some examples.

***Āhuti* (Offering):** The etymology of this word meaning 'offering' occurs in the context of the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices. It is said that the offering given by the sacrificer becomes his body in the yonder world. When he departs from this world, that offering, being behind him, calls out to him, 'Come here; I am here your body'. As the offering thus calls out (*āhvayati* fr. *ā* + / *hve* – 'to call out, invoke'), it is called '*āhuti*' (*Śat. Br.* XI. 2. 2. 6). In spite of being a pithy account, through the etymology it strikes an eschatological note. The *arthavāda* here, based on the etymology of the word *āhuti,* speaks of the belief, based on the *karman*-doctrine, the idea being that the offerings given by the sacrificer in the sacrifice, follow him to the other world and become his body, with which he can enjoy in that world. It is this belief of the ritual thinkers that paved the way for the concept of *apūrva* or *adṛṣṭa,* which is a gift from the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* system to Indian philosophy.[28]

***Avadāna* (Sacrificial portion offered):** While dealing with the chief offerings in the context of the New-moon sacrifice, the etymology of the word *avadāna* is stated. The *Śat. Br.*

here points out that a person who is born owes a debt to the gods. So he satisfies them (*avadayate* fr. *ava* + / *day*) for that debt by making offerings in the fire. This sacrificial portion offered in the fire is called *avadāna*. (*Śat. Br.* I. 7. 2. 6) The *Śat. Br.* in the *arthavāda* in this connection deals with the concept of debts, which a man is required to pay off. It is said that a man, who is born owes a debt to the gods, to the seers, to the fathers and to men. The debt to the seers can be paid off by the study of the Veda, that to the fathers by having offspring and that to the men by giving hospitality to them, when they arrive as guests. (Ibid. I. 7. 2. 1-5) The debt to the gods can be paid off by offerings to them as the word *avadāna* points out. The *arthavāda*-passage is important, for it speaks about the belief in debts in the times of the *Śat. Br.*

Kane points out that the concept of debts was there in India right from the Ṛgvedic times.[29] A prayer in *AV* expresses a wish to be free from the obligations of this world, the next world and the third world. (*AV* VI . 117. 3; also *Tait. Br.* III. 7. 9. 8) The *Tait. Sam.* says that a *brāhmaṇa*, as soon as born, has a threefold debt, viz., of studentship, to the seers (*ṛṣis*); of sacrifice, to the gods and of offspring to the manes (*pitṛs*). A person who has a son, is himself a sacrificer and has lived in the past as a pupil in the preceptor's hermitage, is freed from his debt. (*Tait. Sam.* VI. 3. 10. 5)[30] It is the *Śat. Br.* which has added to this list one more debt and that is the debt to men, as we have taken a note of. The *Mbh.* has pursued this idea by laying down that men owe four debts viz., to the fathers, gods, *ṛṣis* and to men in general and the last debt, is paid back by goodness to all (*Mbh.* Ādi 120. 17-20). Kane points out that this theory of spiritual debts being already in the air, the same sanctity came gradually to be transferred to one's promises to repay monetary debts and carry out other secular engagements.[31]

The *arthavāda* passage about the word *avadāna* is hence important, for the concept of debts and there too the debt to men, which is the addition made by the *Śat. Br.* Paying off debt to men by giving them hospitality when they arrive as guests has culminated in a wider concept and that is of 'entertaining the guest', (*atithi-satkāra*), which invites a deeper study.[32]

***Upavasatha* (Day of fast):** The day preceding the rite of *Agnyādhāna* (the rite of establishing the three fires, viz., *Gārhapatya*, *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇa*) as stated in the *Śat. Br.* (II. 1. 4. 1) as also the day preceding the *Agniṣṭoma* (the principal Soma-sacrifice) as stated by the same text (III. 9. 2. 7) is called the *Upavastha* day. On the *Upavasatha* day, certain rules are to be followed by the sacrificer as also by his wife, one of them being taking food in the daytime only and not at the night-time. (Ibid. II. 1. 4. 1)

The etymology of the word '*upavasatha*' stated as *arthavāda* to glorify the *Upavasatha* day, serves as a help to make us know the belief and practice prevalent about this day in the circle of the ritualists. It is said that the gods, knowing the mind of man, guess that the sacrifice would be performed (and obviously the offerings to them would be given) on the next day. So all the gods come and stay with the sacrificer in his house on the earlier day. This earlier day is called the *Upavasatha* day (fr. *upa* + / *vas* – 'to stay near'). On this day, the sacrificer has to take food only in the daytime, observing fast at the nighttime. (Ibid. II. 1. 4. 1, 2) In the later tradition, the same day came to be recognized as the day of fast for the sacrificer.[33]

Now regarding the sacrificer's taking food or not, the *Śat. Br.* states two viewpoints—one is of *Āṣāḍha Sāvayasa*, according to whom, as the gods are staying with the sacrificer on the *Upavasatha* day without taking any food (for they hope to receive the offerings the next day, when the sacrifice would be started for being performed), so he also should not eat anything and thus observe total fast. (Ibid. I. 1. 1. 7, 8) Yājñavalkya, who is seen as a reformationist at several places in the *Śat. Br.*, has his own opinion to give with regard to the *Upavasatha* day. He says that in the absence of eating anything, the sacrificer would as though become one, who sacrifices for the manes (*pitṛ-karman*), and if he eats, that would mean eating before the gods (for the gods would 'eat', i.e. receive the offerings the next day). Therefore, on the *Upavasatha* day, the sacrificer should eat that which would not be counted as eaten. He should eat only what grows in the forest—may be forest-plants or fruit of trees. (Ibid. I. 1. 1. 9, 10)

The etymology of the word *upavasatha,* coming as *arthavāda,* is important, for it explains the basic idea of fast observed by the sacrificer. It also provides a logical explanation for the fast observed in India by people, as a part of vow followed by them. Moreover, it sheds light on the manner in which a fast-day is observed by the people, by eating the food which they do not eat on normal days. However, this does not apply to a fast-day, on which total abstention from food is observed as per a particular vow.

COSMOS AND THE ENTITIES THEREIN

A picture of the entities in the cosmos, perceived by the Vedic ritualists occurs in the *Jaim. Br.* It is said that Prajāpati in the form of the *Agniṣṭoma* (sacrifice), having the form of a divine circle, becomes extensive. Following him, the sun, the moon, the heavenly vault, the mid-region and this earth are circular in form. (*Jaim. Br.* I. 256-257) The concept of one 'fire' (or the principle of heat) develops into three gods viz., Agni, Vāyu and Āditya. (Ibid. I. 247; II. 87) The sun, dazzling high above, the four main quarters and the four intermediary quarters constitute the divine splendour of the cosmos. (Ibid. I. 252)

Sun

The *arthavādas* in the context of the *Agnihotra* rite clearly point out the close association of the sun and Agni. When the sun sets and goes down, then Agni (fire) is the light. When the sun rises, then Sūrya is the light. Hence, in the evening, while offering libation, the *mantra* is, 'Agni is the light; the light is Agni, Svāhā!' In the morning, the *mantra* accompanying the offering rite is, 'Sūrya (the sun) is the light, the light is Sūrya, Svāhā! (*Vāj. Sam.* III. 9, 10), as pointed out by the *Śat. Br.* (II. 3. 1. 30, 36) The *Tait. Br.* states that as oblations were offered for Agni, the sun also desired to have such oblations offered to him. So both Agni and the Sun coming to agreement decided that the evening offering would be for Agni and the morning offering for the sun. (*Tait. Br.* II. 1. 2. 6) The *Ait Br.* discusses the issue of *Agnihotra* rite and opines conclusively, taking by way of *arthavāda,* the instance of two wheels of a chariot. Of the Year-chariot, day and night are the two wheels. A person, who

offers in the morning prior to the rise of the sun, travels with a chariot having only one wheel. To gain both the wheels for the chariot, the evening offering should be in the night (i.e. after the sunset, when darkness sets in), while the morning offering should be after the sun is actually arisen and is thus seen. (*Ait. Br.* V. 31 = 25.6)

Agni and the sun are mentioned in the context of a special sacrifice prescribed for having a cure for eyesight. The mythical account coming by the way of *arthavāda* states that Rajana Kauṇeya went to Kratujit Jānaki for a cure of the eyesight. The latter performed a sacrifice for the sake of the former. A cake on eight potsherds to Agni and an oblation to Sūrya were offered in this sacrifice. It is said that men see by the eye of Agni and the gods by the eye of the sun. So the offerings to these two deities for getting good eyesight. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 3. 8. 1, 2) The ritual of offering to these two shining deities, which are the deities of light and lustre, to get back the light and lustre of the eyes, is based on the principle of sympathetic magic, or as Frazer would like to call it 'homeopathic magic', viz., 'Like produces like'. This belief percolates even upto the Puranic times.[34]

The mythical account coming by way of *arthavāda* occurs at many a place in the ritual texts and requires consideration to some extent. To stress the importance of reciting the *Divākīrtya sāmans* on the *Viṣuvat* day,[35] the *Pañc. Br.* has a mythical account to give by way of *arthavāda.* It is said that once the demon Svarbhānu struck the sun with darkness, but the gods drove away that darkness by singing the *Divākīrtya sāmans.* These *sāmans* are said to be the rays of the sun, by which they take hold of the sun (*Pañc. Br.* IV. 6. 12, 13). The same mythical account occurs in the *arthavāda,* which praises the *Svara sāmans.* (Ibid. IV. 5. 1, 2) These *sāmans* are to be chanted in the *Gavām-ayana sattra* (i.e. sacrificial session) on the three days which precede the *Viṣuvat* day (i.e. the middle-most day) and again on the three days which succeed this day. Hence these six days are called *Svarasāman* days. In the context of the *Dvādaśāha* (Twelve-day) sacrifice, the *Pañc. Br.*, while laying down the *sāmans* of *Ārbhavapavamāna* laud of the eighth day, eulogizes the *Bhāsa sāman* with a similar mythical account, which comes by way of *arthavāda.* It is said that when the demon Svarbhānu struck the sun with darkness, by singing the *Bhāsa sāman,* Atri repelled the darkness and the sun shone again. (Ibid. XIV. 11. 14) At all these places, the belief seen is in the efficacy of chanting a *mantra* in the form of *sāman.*[36]

The mythical account figuring as *arthavāda* regarding the demon Svarbhānu can be traced back to the *RV,* where Atri is said to have found with the *mantra* (*turīyeṇa brahmaṇā*— 'with the fourth *mantra*') the sun, concealed by the demon Svarbhānu (*RV* V. 40. 6) and to have placed him in the sky. (Ibid. 8) Several other ritual texts mention this myth.[37]

The mythical accounts in the Brāhmaṇa texts and the references from the *RV* and *AV* are a clear indication of a solar eclipse, which had taken place in the hoary past. Most probably it was a 'total' eclipse of the sun, which was an event to be remembered and obviously to be recorded in the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas. The pseudo-myth of the demon Svarbhānu taking the sun in his clutches got developed in the *Mbh.* and the Purāṇas, in a full-fledged myth of the demon Rāhu (-Ketu) swallowing the sun and the moon.[38] However, the original myth is of a demon seizing the sun and it occurs in other mythologies

also with slight difference. Instead of a demon, we have at times a fierce beast chasing the sun or the moon, finally swallowing him.[39] The belief thus stands universal.

Now about the role of Atri in rescuing the sun from the clutches of the demon:

Referring to *RV* (V. 40. 6, 8) where the Svarbhānu-myth with a mention of Atri occurs for the first time, Tilak says that an eclipse of the sun was first observed with any pretensions to accuracy by the sage Atri.[40] This experience, when 'seen' by Atri with his mental eye and divine power, there issued forth from Atri's mouth a *mantra* ('*brahman*' *RV* IV. 40. 6), which served as a rescuer of the sun from the demon. The same power of *mantra* is eulogized, when the importance of various *sāmans* to be chanted in this regard is spoken of by the *Pañc. Br.* in the *arthavādas.*

Interestingly even now in India, on the day of solar or lunar eclipse, in the period called '*vedha*' (fr. the root / *vyadh*—'to fix on a target, pierce'), i.e. when the demon Rāhu (-Ketu) actually is believed to come near the sun or the moon, keeping the luminary in his range and then becoming ready to attack (and swallow) it, it is advised and is still a practice to read the scriptural texts or chant the *mantras* and *stotras.* The persons following this might not be conversant with the exact *mantra* of Atri or might not even know the 'power' of *mantra* as such, but still they follow in the foot-steps of that 'unseen' seer—the great Atri.[41]

Moon

The main trait of the moon is that even after 'dying', he is born again. The moon is not seen on the New-moon Day. (*Kauṣ.* Br. III. 6) *Ṣaḍ. Br.* gives an elaborate *arthavāda* in this respect. It is said that the gods get consecrated for sacrifice in the first half of the month and they partake of Soma-juice in the next half through three cups (*pātras* meaning 'vessels', but here taken as 'cups'), viz., the earth, mid-region and heaven. The Ādityas partake of the first five *kalās* (parts) of the moon by the divine cup, i.e. 'heaven', up to the fifth day; the *Rudras* the next five *kalās* up to the tenth day with the 'mid-region' cup and the Vasus, the next five *kalās* by the fifteenth day with the 'earth' cup. Only the sixteenth part of the moon remains. Hence it is that the moon is said to be endowed with sixteen parts. On the New-moon day, the moon becomes very feeble due to only one part remaining with him, as noted above. Hence on that fifteenth night ('New-moon day' night), the gods with Indra as their chief sit by the side of the moon, as do the relatives, being apprehensive of the death of father, grandfather, great grandfather or any old man in the family, when he is suffering from serious illness. (*Ṣaḍ. Br.* V. 6. 2) The New-moon day, being associated with such inauspiciousness, is enjoined to be avoided for any study-session.

But the moon is born again and again. This thought occurs in the theological discussion (*Brahmodya*) between the *Hotṛ* and the Brahman priests in the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice (*Śat. Br.* XIII. 2. 6. 11; also the *mantras* from the *Vāj. Sam.* XIII. 9, 10 in this regard). This cosmic drama of the moon's Birth, Death and Rebirth has given this celestial luminary its own importance even in comparison with the sun and has fathered the firm belief that it is the moon, who stretches out, i.e. extends the length of life (i.e. bestows long life), as the Saṁhitās declare in unequivocal terms.[42]

Constellations

The knowledge about constellations forms an integral part of the sacrificial lore, for the constellations are mentioned in connection with various rituals.[43] In the context of New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices, the *Tai. Sam.* has an *arthavāda* to state. It is said that when Indra, taking his thunderbolt, went against Vṛtra, Heaven and Earth (*Dyāvāpṛthivī*) entreated upon Indra not to hurl the thunderbolt at them and chose a boon that Heaven (i.e. the sky) should be adorned with consellations and the Earth with variegated things. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 5. 2. 5) The general belief regarding the constellations is that they are the lights of those righteous men (*jana*) who go to the celestial world. (*Śat. Br.* VI. 5. 4. 8) Constellations are said to be the houses of gods. (*Tait. Br.* I. 5. 2. 6)

The *Tait. Br.* speaks of two types of constellations, viz., *Devanakṣatra* and *Yamanakṣatra.* The list of the *Devanakṣatras* starts with *Kṛttikās* and ends with *Viśākhās* and that of the *Yamanakṣatras* begins with *Anūrādhās* and ends with *Apabharaṇīs.* (Ibid. I. 5. 2. 6, 7) The *Tait. Br.* in the *arthavādas* points out that under the *Yamanakṣatras,* the *asuras* were defeated or suffered hard in wordy attacks from the gods.[44]

Noteworthy is the concept of 'Nakṣatriya' Prajāpati spoken of by the *Tait. Br.* in the *arthavāda* passage, where some constellations are said to form the body of Prajāpati as, *Hasta* as the hand (i.e. two hands); *Citrā* as the head; *Niṣṭyā* (*Svātī*) as the heart; *Viśākhās* (two stars) as the thighs and *Anūrādhās* as the feet. (Ibid. I. 5. 2. 2) In later times, the Purāṇas elaborate this concept and speak of constellations as a whole forming the body of Viṣṇu (*Vām. P.* 54 the whole chap.), Janārdana Viṣṇu (*Bhaviṣya P.* Uttarakhaṇḍa 108.16 ff) or even Śiva (*Vām. P.* 5.38 ff), taking these gods to be the 'Nakṣatra-Puruṣa.'[45]

Though performed on the terrestrial plane, the Vedic sacrifice takes into its gamut the concept of even the celestial world—with the sun, moon and the celestial bodies like constellations—which is the world of light, 'light' being regarded as the first of the gifts of life.[46]

QUARTERS

Quarters mentioned in Vedic rituals, instead of being simply 'directions' (fr. the root diś—'to point'), stand as factors conducive to some miraculous effect.

Quarters are believed to have divine origin. A mythical account coming as *arthavāda* in the *Śat. Br.* points out that when Prajāpati united with the sky ('*divam*'—'*dyu*' Fem.) by means of the sun, there arose an egg. The juice sticking to the shell of the egg gave rise to intermediate quarters and the principal quarters came out of the shell itself. (*Śat. Br.* VI. 1. 2. 4) The belief that by the quarters, these worlds are firmly joined together with the sun is seen in an *arthavāda,* which occurs in the context of the *Agnicayana* rite (rite of building the Great Fire-altar). In this rite, in the period of consecration, the sacrificer has to carry Agni in an earthen fire-pan by means of netting (*śikya*). The strings of the netting holding the fire-pan and thus bearing Agni are likened to the quarters as the latter firmly join the worlds with the sun. (Ibid. VI. 7. 1. 16) The strings of the netting are six and so are the quarters six in number. (Ibid.) The six quarters, not specified here, are certainly the four

main quarters, viz., East, South, West and North, and the two—*Ūrdhvā* (Upper One) and *Adharā* (Lower one). The same belief is noted in later times as can be seen in the *Var. P.* Brahmā having created the creatures thought as to who would support them. As he thought, there came forth from his ten ears (as he had five heads) ten brilliant girls. They became the six main quarters (as we have already noted above) and the four intermediary quarters. (*Var. P.* 29.3 ff) This shows that Brahmā created the quarters (in a way, they are his daughters) to support the creatures, i.e. the worlds. The idea that the world has to be supported as resting on something is marked even in ancient Egyptian mythology, where we have an idea that the world is supported on firm pillars.[47]

The most auspicious of the quarters is the east, as it is the quarter of the rising sun and in the sacrifice, of Agni. The *Kauṣ. Br.* states that the gods having reached the heavenly world by means of the introductory sacrifice (*Prāyaṇīya iṣṭi*) could not discern the quarters. But when a libation of butter was offered to Agni, he discerned for them the eastern quarter. Therefore, in the sacrifice, they lead Agni forward to the east and the sacrifice is extended eastwards (*Kauṣ. Br.* VII. 6). The same thought occurs in the *Śat. Br.* (III. 2. 3. 16). The mythical account stated in the context of *Agnipraṇayana* rite (leading Agni forward to the east) can be noted in this context. Māthava, king of Videgha, always used to keep Agni in his mouth. When addressed by his priest Gotama Rāhūgaṇa, Māthava made no answer, fearing that Agni might fall from his mouth. The priest began to invoke Agni with various *mantras*. Then he invoked Agni with the *RV*-verse (V. 26.2), containing the word *ghṛta* in the word '*ghṛtasno*' (Vocative Singular of '*ghṛtasnu*') addressed to Agni. Having heard only the word *ghṛta* (meaning 'accumulated clarified butter'—which is favourite of Agni), Agni Vaiśvānara flashed forth from the king's mouth. The story goes on further stating that from the river Sarasvatī where Māthava was at that time, Agni went on eastwards, burning all rivers and stopped at the river Sadānīrā, the boundary of the Kosalas and the Videhas. (*Śat. Br.* I. 4. 1. 10-14) Initially, this myth indicates the eastward spread of the sacrificial religion of the Aryans, by the time of the *Śat. Br.* It has to be noted that this historical detail is enshrined in a myth which serves as a 'charter' for the rite of *Agnipraṇayana* (to the east).

East, being the source of the solar light, is connected with the world of heaven and is taken to be the abode of gods. The *Śat. Br.* often states this quarter to be the quarter of the gods. (Ibid. I. 7. 1. 12; - 8. 3. 18; - 9. 3. 13) This belief is echoed by the *Vām. P.* in later times, when it says that to the east stay the gods such as Nārāyaṇa, Nara, Brahmā, Śiva along with Indra (*Vām. P.* 21.21 f). With this same belief, the sacrificial hall (*śālā*) is to be erected with its top-beams running from west to east (it being hence called *Prācīnavaṁśa*) and even while offering to gods, one has to stand with his face towards the east. (*Śat. Br.* III. 1. 1. 6) In later times, Purāṇas contain significant details, which speak of the importance of the east. (*Vām. P.* 21. 21-23; *Agni P.* 209. 21; 210.15 ab)

Next to the east in importance comes the north, which is stated on several occasions in rituals. As the east is associated with the gods, the north is with men (human beings). The northern region was well known for its cultured speech-habits. A mythical account coming by way of *arthavāda* in the *Kauṣ. Br.* states that when the gods reached the heavenly world by means of the *Prāyaṇīya iṣṭi*, they could not discern the quarters. The deity Pathyā

Svasti when propitiated with a libation, discerned for them the northern quarter. Pathyā Svasti, originally the deity of paths, becomes (the deity) Speech (*Vāc*) in the ritual-texts.[48] The *Kauṣ. Br.* remarks here that in the northern quarter, speech is uttered with more discernment and men go northwards to learn speech. They hearken a person who has come from the north. (*Kauṣ Br.* VII. 6) While the gods in general are associated with the eastern quarter, it is Rudra alone who is taken to be having north as his quarter, as can be seen from some ritual details (Ibid. II. 2; *Śat. Br.* II. 6. 2. 5; the mythical account regarding *Nābhānediṣṭha* in the *Ait. Br.* V. 14 = 22.9).

The southern quarter is associated with the Fathers as also Death. The *Śat. Br.* prescribes a place of worship to be somewhat raised up towards the south, for, as the *arthavāda* points out, if it is inclined towards the south, the sacrificer would quickly depart from this world to yonder world. (*Śat. Br.* III. 1. 1. 2; for the same idea Ibid. I. 2. 5. 17)

West, being the quarter of the setting sun, is believed to be associated with the evil spirits, for these have their sway only when the sun sets and darkness ushers in. In the *Agnicayana* rite (i.e. the rite of building the Great Fire-altar), there is a ritual of ploughing the sacrificial ground, to (symbolically) provide food for Prajāpati. The *Tai. Sam.* says that in this ritual, if he looses the animals to the west, the evil spirits will destroy them. (*Tait. Sam.* V. 2. 5. 3)

North-east, the intermediary quarter (of east and north), is regarded as having a special importance in the Vedic ritual tradition. This quarter is called also *aparājitā*, i.e. 'unconquered'. A mythical account by way of *arthavāda* occurs in the *Ait. Br.* in the rite of buying Soma (-shoots), bringing it to the sacrificial ground and taking it down from the east facing the north-eastern quarter. It is said that in every quarter, the *asuras* conquered the gods, except in the north-eastern quarter. The *Ait. Br.* states that in this quarter one should strive or cause striving, for one has power to dispose of debts in this quarter. (*Ait. Br.* I. 14 = 3. 3)

The south-western quarter is ascribed to Nirṛti which is the deity of death and evil. In the *Agnicayana* rite, at the piling of the *Gārhapatya* fire, he places three bricks which are dried up or baked with the chaff-fire (the bricks being called *tuṣapakvāḥ*). Here the chaff (when burnt, of black colour) indicates the form of Nirṛti and the sacrificer, priest, etc. go to the south-west tc propitiate Nirṛti. (*Tait. Sam.* V. 2. 4. 2, 3) The *Śat. Br.* also mentions this detail and names the three bricks 'Nairṛti'. With these bricks, they proceed towards the south-west, it being the quarter of Nirṛti. (*Śat. Br.* VII. 2. 1. 3, 7, 8)

The auspicious quarters thus were—east, north and north-east, while south and south-west were not so, south being allotted to Fathers (*pitṛs*) and south-west to Nirṛti. Practically the same beliefs are attached to the quarters in the Puranic age[49] and the same are seen even in the modern-day (Hindu) India.

TIME

The all-pervading concept of Time with its units are dealt with in many *arthavādas*. The smallest unit of time is 'day and night' on which are established the seasons and months. (*Śat. Br.* XII. 8. 2. 35) The *Mait. Sam.* says that white is the form of the day and dark, i.e.

black, that of night. (*Mait. Sam.* II. 5. 7) Even the white spots on the spotted black antelope skin stand for the colour of the day and the black colour that of the night. (*Tait. Sam.* VI. 1. 3. 2) The *Śat. Br.* states the origin of day and night through a mythical account. It is pointed out that Prajāpati made the day from the light, which was there with him on creating the gods and the night was created from the darkness which was with him, after creating the *asuras* (*Śat. Br.* XI. 1. 6. 11) The *Jaim. Br.* points out that everything here has a limit, but the day and night do not have any. (*Jaim. Br.* III. 357) In the context of the *Atirātra* sacrifice (day-followed by-night sacrifice), the *Jaim. Br.* states that day is not without night and night not without day. Day and night are the ones who create the concepts of 'past' and 'future' times. (Ibid. I. 207) Day and night are taken to be the symbols of Time. This can be noted in the context of the Agnicayana rite, in the process of heating the fire-pan (*ukhā*) made of clay. The *Śat. Br.* points out that the divine protectresses, viz., the days and nights have already heated the clay fire-pan in the lap of the earth and now he heats it by them. Everything here is covered by days and nights. (*Śat Br.* VI. 5. 4. 6) The *arthavāda* is important for the subtle concept indicated in it that the clay fire-pan was lying in the interior of the earth in the form of mere clay from time immemorial. 'Days and nights' indicate this principle of Time.

Together with days and nights, in the year are established fortnights, months and seasons. (Ibid. XII. 8. 3. 14) A year consisting of twelve months has at times an intercalary month, i.e., a thirteenth month, which is not a regular feature of every year. The *Ait. Br.* tries to identify the thirteenth month with the Soma-seller, from whom Soma (-shoots) is purchased. It says that as the thirteenth month is non-existent (i.e. not a regular feature of the year), so is the Soma-seller non-existent. (*Ait. Br.* I. 12 = 3.1) The Soma-seller does not get either the *Somakryaṇī* cow (the cow, by giving which Soma is purchased) or the gold (which is given in compensation for the cow. (*Śat. Br.* III. 3. 3. 7)[50] Thus both the thirteenth month and the Soma-seller are regarded as the same in status. Even the half-months are joined with the year. It is said that he presses the Soma-shoots for twenty-four times. The twenty-four half-months are joined with the year, which is Prajāpati, which again is the very sacrifice. (Ibid. IV. 1. 1. 15)

Seasons are regarded as having great importance in the ritual tradition. A mythical account by way of *arthavāda* in the *Śat. Br.*, occurring in the context of New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices, brings out the importance of the seasons in the ritual tradition. It runs as follows. The seasons were desirous of having a share of offerings in the sacrifice of the gods. Even when requested for this by the seasons, the gods did not approve of them. The seasons then went to the *asuras*, who, with the help of the seasons, throve so much that even without tilling, the plants ripened forth for them. The gods decided to invite the seasons by offering prayer to them first of all at the sacrifice. Agni sent by the gods approached the seasons, assuring them of a share in the sacrifice among the gods. The seasons said to Agni that they would let the latter share along with them in the sacrifice, for he had obtained for them a share in the sacrifice among the gods. (Ibid. I. 6. 1. 1-8) This *arthavāda* is important in more than one ways. It speaks of the importance of the seasons. It mentions the offering-prayer to the seasons, along with Agni. Again, it indicates how the principle of heat (here 'Agni' is mentioned)—heat of the sun—gives rise to different

seasons. It is said that the same year has different forms because the seasons differ. (*Kāṭh. Sam.* XX. 10; XXI. 3) The seasons come again and again but do not wither away. (Ibid. XX. 10; *Tait. Sam.* V. 3. 1. 2)

A mythical account by way of *arthavāda* occurs in the *Jaim. Br.*, regarding the creation of the seasons. Prajāpati toiled (and with that heat) he created summer; so it is very hot in summer. When he toiled for the second time, the rainy season came forth. In the rainy season, it rains but it is also hot. When he toiled for the third time, he created the season *Hemanta*, which is very cold. Then he created spring from summer, autumn from rainy season and *Śiśira* from *Hemanta*. (*Jaim. Br.* III. 1) Elsewhere the *Jaim. Br.* states the names of the six seasons in order, viz., spring (*Vasanta*), summer (*Grīṣma*), rainy season (*Varṣā*), autumn (*Śarad*) and the two seasons of winter, viz., *Hemanta* and *Śiśira*. (Ibid. II. 356) The two seasons of winter at times are taken together. Hence, the seasons are mentioned as being 'five' or 'six' (if the winter-seasons are taken separate) in number.

All the units of time are established in the year. They are the days, nights, fortnights, months and seasons. (*Śat. Br.* XII. 8. 3. 14) The concept of eternal Time is seen in the year, which revolves without end. (Ibid. IV. 3. 1. 7)

The year is often identified with Prajāpati or Agni (the deity of sacrifice). In the context of New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices, we read that Prajāpati created a counterpart of himself and that is in the form of *saṁvatsara* (Year). The *arthavāda* states that the word *saṁvatsara* has four syllables and so has the word *prajāpati* four syllables. Year, thus, is a counterpart of Prajāpati. (Ibid. XI. 1. 6. 13) That Prajāpati or Agni or Sacrifice is the Year occurs many a time in the Brāhmaṇa texts. (Ibid. VII. 4. 2. 30; X. 4. 1. 16; X. 5. 4. 10; XI. 1. 1. 1; *Jaim. Br.* III. 326; III. 375)

It seems that among the units of time, *Saṁvatsara* (Year) is set as a limit. It is said that the knowledge of *Pravargya* is to be imparted to one, who dwells with him as a pupil for one year. (*Śat. Br.* XIV. 1. 1. 27) Though the smallest unit, day is the foundation of Year. It is the 'day', which gives the concept of 'past' and 'future'. In fact, 'past' only, passing through 'present', becomes 'future'. Agni, Vāyu, the Sun, Indra and the Moon—the age-old deities—rule over the 'past' and the 'future'. (*Jaim. Br.* II. 431) The Vedic belief reflected here comes very close to the thought of Plato that God wished the created world to resemble the 'intelligible' one as far as possible. It was not possible for the world to be eternal and the nearest analogue to eternity which God could provide was to make 'a moving image of eternity'. This is 'Time'. The image of eternity has a motion according to number, i.e., divisions of time. 'Past' and 'Future' are created species of time, which we wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; strictly 'was' and 'will be' are to be asserted only of generation in time, for they are motions.[51]

The *Śat. Br.* says that year is the same as Death, for it is he (i.e. Year or Time = Prajāpati), who by means of day and night, destroys the life of mortal beings. He who knows Year to be Death as also *Antaka* (one who brings about the end) does not reach the end of his life before old age and attains full extent of life. (*Śat. Br.* X. 4. 3. 1, 2) This thought occurs, in the context of the *Agnicayana* rite, in a mythical account which is stated by way of *arthavāda*. The gods were afraid of Prajāpati (= Year = Death = *Antaka*). In order to attain immortality, gods performed several sacrifices. But they did not attain immortality.

Then Prajāpati told them the entire procedure of building the Great Fire-altar, i.e., the *Agnicayana* rite. The gods performed it and became immortal. Death was afraid of being deprived of his share, if all men following the gods would become immortal, and approached the gods with anxiety. The gods consoled by saying that thenceforward no one would become immortal with the body. After Death's taking away the body (of men) as his share, men would become immortal only through knowledge or through holy work. In the ritual context, this knowledge obviously is of building the Great Fire-altar and the holy work is building the Great Fire-altar. Those who do not know this become the food of Death time after time. Through the Great Fire-altar, the sacrificer gains Agni Prajāpati, Year,[52] Death and *Antaka.* (Ibid. X. 4. 3. 1-11) In the context of the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices, *Saṁvatsara* (Year) is said to be '*sarvatsara*', i.e. that 'which steals everything' (*sarva*—'all'; / *tsar*—'to steal, to approach stealthily'). One who has the knowledge of *Saṁvatsara* is not overcome by any evil. (*Ibid.* XI. 1. 6. 12)

The concept of Time symbolized by that of Year ultimately points to Death—the only reality of life—nevertheless assuring us of immortality through knowledge and holy work. If we widen the scope of 'knowledge and holy work' to spheres other than that of the *Agnicayana* rite, this thought enshrined in the *arthavāda*-passage coming from the hands of the ritualists soars high to become an excellent philosophical thought.

NUMBERS

The concept of number plays an important role in the *arthavādas* regarding sacrificial details and accessories. Resorting to a particular 'number' or making up for a particular 'number' is prominently seen in the permutation and combination of metres, depending upon the number of syllables in each foot (line) of a verse in a particular metre or in all feet (lines) of a verse in that metre. Such combinations are mentioned by the expressions, viz., *sampad, sampadyate, abhisampadyate,* etc. which indicate a certain result to be achieved (from *sam* + / *pad* or *abhi* + *sam* + / *pad*), and this result is a full or perfect form of the sacrifice in hand.[53]

We take here a couple of examples of such '*sampad*'. While going to fetch the *Ekadhanā* waters for pressing the Soma-shoots, twenty verses of the *Aponaptrīya* hymn (praising the god Apāṁ-napāt) are to be recited. He recites the first verse thrice and the last one thrice. They make up twenty-four, for though originally it is 1 + 18 + 1 = 20, after being rearranged, it is 3 + 18 + 3 = 24. These twenty-four verses are said to accomplish the *Gāyatrī—sampad* (*Kauṣ. Br.* XII. 3), for a verse in the *Gāyatrī* metre has total twenty-four syllables (eight in each of its three feet). The *sampad* noted above indicates that even when the *Gāyatrī* metre was associated with the morning-pressing (normally), there was another tradition of reciting verses in some other metres in the morning-pressing. Hence, the effort to have the *sampad* of the *Gāyatrī. Sampads* on similar lines are stated by the *Kauṣ. Br.* (XIX. 4) and the *Tait. Br.* (I. 1. 5. 3). Such *sampads* for getting the *Gāyatrī* metre are for obtaining Agni—the very Sacrifice—for the *Gāyatrī* is said to be a favourite metre of Agni.

A *sampad* of *Anuṣṭubh* metre occurs in the context of the *Agnicayana* rite. A seven-versed hymn, i.e. seven *mantras* from the *Vāj. Sam.* (XVIII. 68-74), is to be recited. The mythical

account states that Indra saw the seven-versed hymn suitable for making good what was deficient, for reducing what was redundant and for making perfect what was imperfect. Now these verses become equal to the *Anuṣṭubh*, for the *Anuṣṭubh* is Speech and it is by Speech that he secures for Agni all that which is as yet not secured for him. (*Śat. Br.* IX. 5. 2. 1, 8) The seven verses are as follows—two *Gāyatrīs* (24 × 2 = 48 syllables), four *Triṣṭubhs* (44 × 4 = 176 syllables, for a verse in *Triṣṭubh* metre has eleven syllables in one foot and has four feet, thus having 44 syllables) and one *Anuṣṭubh* (32 syllables, for a verse in *Anuṣṭubh* metre has four feet, each foot having eight syllables). These come to 256 syllables (48 + 176 + 32 = 256), which would make eight *Anuṣṭubhs* (of the seven verses). So this *sampad* is for getting Speech, which secures everything not yet obtained for Agni.

While enjoining an interesting *sampad* of the *Anuṣṭubh* metre on the tenth day of the *Daśarātra* (ten-days') sacrifice, the *Kauṣ. Br.* states that he should recite there the *Virāj* verses. According to the *Kauṣ. Br.*, the *Virāj* and the *Anuṣṭubh* are the same (though the three-footed, i.e. *Tripadā Virāj* has thirty-three syllables, each of its feet having eleven syllables, while the *Anuṣṭubh* has thirty-two syllables), for neither by one syllable is a metre made different nor even by two (*Kauṣ. Br.* XXVII. 1).

Thus the *sampads* are not mere arithmetical calculations but are laid down for getting a positive result. However, the 'number' of syllables in a metre was of great importance, as we have seen in the *sampads*, which are discussed above.

Apart from the context of metres, the belief and practice of using a particular number of entities or things in a ritual are based on the principle of magic, viz., 'Like produces like'. Here are some ritual details having a particular 'number', when viewed in a general manner.

Number 'Two' stands for a pair, which means strength and a productive union. This is the *arthavāda* stated when in the *Pravargya* ceremony, the vessels to be used are taken in pairs. (*Śat. Br.* XIV. 1. 3. 1) Such a pairing is very important in sacrifice.[54]

Number 'Three' generally stands for the three worlds. This concept occurs in the *arthavāda* when three times circumambulation of the dead horse is prescribed in the Horse-sacrifice. (*Tait. Br.* III. 9. 6. 2)

Number 'Four' could be joined with the concept of four (main) quarters, four hooves, etc. In the context of *Brahmaudana* (rice prepared in a special manner), it is said that the waters to be used for cooking are *catuṣṭayī* (fourfold), for they are brought from four quarters. The *arthavāda* in this connection states that the horse in the Horse-sacrifice belonging to Prajāpati has four hooves. (Ibid. III. 8. 2. 1)

Number 'Five' is generally connected to the concept of Year. In the rite of buying Soma from the Soma-seller, it is said that the priest should bargain five times. The *arthavāda* points out that the sacrifice is of equal measure with the Year, which has five seasons (when the two seasons of winter are taken together). When he bargains for Soma five times, he obtains Soma, i.e. sacrifice, in five divisions. (*Śat. Br.* III. 3. 3. 5) In the context of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, it is enjoined that he should press Soma (i.e. Soma-shoots) at each turn, five times, if he is desirous of cattle. The *arthavāda* states that he thereby acquires cattle, for the cattle (sacrificial animals) consist of five parts.[55] The

arthavāda then points to the five seasons in a Year, equating Prajāpati with Year and Sacrifice with Prajāpati. (Ibid. IV. 1. 1. 16)

The *arthavādas* connected with number 'Six' speak invariably of six seasons, which make up for Year. (*Tait. Br.* III. 9. 6. 2; *Śat. Br.* II. 2. 3. 26; VI. 5. 4. 9 etc.)

To come to number 'Seven':

In the *Pravargya* rite, seven oblations are prescribed to be offered in fire. The *Śat. Br.* says that the vital airs in the head have seven channels and these he bestows on Agni. (Ibid. XIV. 2. 2. 39) In the rite of *Agnicayana* while making a fire-pan (*ukhā*), seven balls of cow-dung are used, accompanied by the recitation of seven *mantras*. The *Śat. Br.* here relates the number seven to sevenfold deities and to the seven vital airs, which are in the head. It is said here that the expression seven times seven (7 × 7 = 49) is also spoken of as seven. Thus by the number seven, he as though puts the vital airs into the head, i.e. Agni. (Ibid. VI. 5. 3. 11) The same *arthavāda* connecting number 'seven' to the seven vital airs or breaths occurs at other places. (Ibid. IX. 3. 1. 8; *Tait. Sam.* V. 1. 7. 1) The belief about number seven is primarily of completeness or totality, as can be seen from the *RV* and *AV*. Agni (fire-god) is said to have seven tongues (or flames) or has seven sisters. (*RV* I. 71. 7; Ibid. I. 164. 3 where seven sisters of the Sun-god are spoken of) 'Seven' regions of the earth speak of totality. (Ibid. I. 12. 16; IX. 114. 3) Taking seven steps together (*AV* V. 11. 9) is indicative of permanent or complete friendship. The rite of 'Saptapadī' in the marriage-ritual, in which the bridegroom and the bride, take seven steps together, also falls in the same line and is a symbol of permanent friendship.[56]

The belief in number 'eight' or 'eighth' seems to be of 'pervading' as pointed out by Yāska from the root / *aś*—'to pervade'. (*Nir.* III. 10) The pervading one becomes the overpowering one.[57] The *arthavāda* from the *Ait. Br.* will be helpful in clarifying this, for prior to Yāska, much earlier, the *Ait. Br.* takes help of the same root (i.e. / *aś*) to explain the word *aṣṭa* (i.e. Eight). In the rite of buying Soma, while carrying the Soma (-shoots), eight verses are prescribed to be recited to win powers and strengths. A mythical account by way of *arthavāda* occurs here. When Soma was bought and he was going to men, his powers and strengths went away to the quarters. These they sought to win by one verse, but they could not; with two, with three, with four, with five, with six, with seven—but they could not win. But they won with eight verses. So the word *aṣṭa* from / *aś*—'to pervade', here 'to obtain'. (*Ait. Br.* I. 12 = 3. 1)

There are several such numbers about which *arthavādas* could be noted.[58] Nevertheless we have to take into account the number 'Hundred'. The *arthavādas* explaining the significance of number 'Hundred' are practically the same at every place. The wish of the ancient people that a man should live for hundred years is spoken of in these *arthavādas*. In the additional rite concerning the Soma-sacrifice, the gold to be used is of hundred measures. (*Tait. Sam.* III. 2. 6. 3) The sacrificer should breathe over the gold, which weighs hundred (*kṛṣṇalas*). (*Ibid.* III. 3. 4. 3) The normal term of man's life is thought to be of hundred years. This is in a way immortality, which a person is expected to achieve through the number hundred. Thus the mention of a particular number is not simply arbitrary but is meaningful, for that particular number serves as a factor complementary to sacrifice.

WATER

Water is one of the requisites of Vedic sacrifice and hence is glorified in many *arthavādas.*

Due to the cleansing nature of water, many *arthavādas* speak of water as a purifying agent. (*Śat. Br.* I. 2. 5. 23; I. 7. 4. 17; II. 6. 2. 18 etc.) At times this purification by water is from the spiritual point of view. It is said that when the sacrificer consecrated for sacrifice sips water, he becomes internally pure. (*Tait. Sam.* VI. 1. 1. 3) While being consecrated for the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice, when the sacrificer takes bath, it is said that water makes him internally pure, for man indeed is impure and is dirty within as he speaks untruth. (*Śat. Br.* III. 1. 2. 10)

In some *arthavādas* water is glorified as having a healing effect. When he digs for the site of an altar, he as though acts cruelly with the ground. So he pours down water, for healing the ground which is dug up. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 6. 5. 2) In the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice, while fixing the *Audumbarī* (a post made of the Udumbara tree), he undertakes digging and then pours water in that pit. The *arthavāda* states that water is poured to give soothing effect to the earth as there is caused injury to the earth in the process of digging. (*Śat. Br.* III. 6. 1. 19)

In some *arthavādas* the concept is of expiating by means of water. In the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices, he touches the sacrificial cake over with water, either once or thrice. This is undertaken in the process of preparing the sacrificial cake, for when they thresh or grind the rice-grains, they either injure or tear asunder the rice-grains. Water being a means of expiation, he thereby expiates with water. (Ibid. I. 2. 2. 11) In the *Agnihotra* rite, while the milk for the offering of *Agnihotra* is put on the fire (for being cooked), if any of the three unclean animals, viz., a vicious boar, a vicious ram and a dog, runs about in between the *Gārhapatya* and the *Āhavanīya* fires, he should pour water out of a bowl of water, from the ground in front of the *Gārhapatya* (fire-altar) upto the *Āhavanīya* (fire-altar), for whatever is injured or unpropitiated in the sacrifice, for all that the means of propitiation or expiation is water. (Ibid. XII. 4. 1. 5)

The *arthavāda* in the *Tait. Sam.*, in the context of Soma-sacrifice, speaks of the medicinal qualities of water. It is said that the life and breath of a person, who draws the Soma-shoots, depart. So he should touch waters, for the waters are medicine. (*Tait. Sam.* III. 3. 4. 3)

That water is an elixir of immortality is spoken of by an *arthavāda* in the *Śat. Br.*, in the context of the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice, when the priests touch their respective cups (*camasas*) filled with water and also touch their faces with water. (*Śat. Br.* IV. 4. 3. 15)

The *Vasatīvarī* waters, which are collected on the previous day of sacrifice and are prescribed to be used in sacrifice, are to be brought from the flowing current of waters. The statements of *arthavāda*, in this connection, bring forth several beliefs regarding the flowing waters. It is said that when the head of the sacrifice was cut off, its sap entered the (flowing) waters. The same he could gather from the flowing waters and put it into sacrifice. (Ibid. III. 9. 2. 1-4) Everything on this earth, including the wind, takes rest while the flowing waters do not. So they are collected for protection. (Ibid. III. 9. 2. 5)

The *Vasatīvarī* waters are to be collected by daytime. They are to be taken with radiance or light in them (i.e. in day-time), or having deposited gold (in a jar) they are taken if the sun has already set[59] or they are to be taken from the *Vasatīvarī* waters kept in a jar of a *brāhmaṇa*, who performs many sacrifices and so has collected (prior) the *Vasatīvarī* waters. (*Tait. Sam.* VI. 4. 2. 2) It has to be noted here that the *Vasatīvarī* waters are connected either with the sun or Agni or gold or a *brāhmaṇa*, all of these having lustre (in the case of a *brāhmaṇa*, the lustre of *brahman*). It is a warning that the sacrificer should not take stagnant waters, for in that case he would cause Varuṇa to seize his sacrifice. (Ibid. VI. 4. 2. 4)

For the lustration of the king in the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, waters from various places are brought, the common idea being of waters standing for vigour (*Śat. Br.* V. 3. 4. 1-21), though the *arthavāda* differs in each case. The waters in this lustration ritual are of seventeen kinds. As Prajāpati, identified with the very sacrifice is seventeenfold, the *Adhvaryu* priest makes the sacrificer-king Prajāpati, i.e., the very Sacrifice. (Ibid. 22, 23)

In the scheme of creation, water stands for female principle. This is brought out in the *arthavāda*, which occurs in the context of the rite of *Agnyādhāna* (i.e. establishing the fires, viz., *Gārhapatya*, *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇa*). When he brings waters, it is said that waters are female and Agni the male. He thus provides for Agni, a productive mate in the form of waters. (Ibid. II. 1. 1. 4) In the rite of *Agnicayana*, a mythical account occurs which states that Prajāpati desired to create the universe from the primeval waters. So he entered the waters with the three Vedas. Thereafter was created the golden egg, which was the first expression of creation. Agni (-Prajāpati) is the male principle and the waters stand for the female principle. (Ibid. VI. 1. 1. 10) Elsewhere the creation is said to come into existence from the waters alone, which has to be regarded as the female principle. (Ibid. XI. 1. 6. 1) Such an account is thought of from the fact of life, when the actual birth of a child is seen from a female only in the process of child-birth. When thought of as the only factor in the process of creation, the waters are said to be the foundation of everything. (Ibid. VI. 8. 2. 2)

TREES, PLANTS AND VARIETIES OF GRASS

Trees, plants and some kinds of grass having unique importance in the Vedic ritual are glorified in some *arthavādas*.

Lord of the forest (Vanaspati) figures as a separate deity. The *arthavāda* states that due to the offering to Vanaspati, the sacrificer's oblation (i.e. the sacrificial animal) goes to the gods with life, for the lord of the forest stands for the breaths of the sacrificial animal. (*Ait. Br.* II. 10 = 6. 10) The deity of the forest (Vanaspati) which is in the form of huge trees and *Araṇyānī* which in reality is the whole forest deified can be traced to *RV.*[60]

The tree struck by lightning was thought to be of special importance. The *Tait. Br.* enjoins *sambhāra*,[61] from a tree struck by lightning. The *arthavāda*, while glorifying this *vidhi*, states that the Maruts once terribly troubled Agni with waters and grabbed his heart. It became the lightning. (*Tait. Br.* I. 1. 3. 12) The *sambhāra* of a sacrificial stick from a

lightning-struck tree stands for the heart of Agni, who is to be established with his very heart.

Several trees have been reckoned as the sacrificial trees. A detail common about them according to the *arthavāda* in the *Śat. Br.* is of their being green and thus fresh, for that is what constitutes their living element, by which they are vigorous and possessed of strength. (*Śat Br.* I. 3. 4. 1)

Here are some striking *arthavādas*, glorifying certain trees. The fruits from the *Aśvattha* tree (*Ficus Religiosa*) are to be used in the great anointing (*Mahābhiṣeka*) of the king, the *arthavāda* stating that the *Aśvattha* tree stands for the overlordship of the trees (*Ait. Br.* VIII. 16 = 39.2). The kindling sticks from an *Aśvattha* tree, which is here called '*citriya*' are enjoined to be placed on fire (Agni), on which *Brahmaudana* (rice cooked in *ghee*) is to be prepared. The *arthavāda* based on etymology states that by this *vidhi*, there will be '*citra*', i.e. shining prosperity. (*Tait. Br.* I. 1. 9. 5 and Sāyaṇa's comm. on that) The belief reflected in the *arthavāda* that propitiation of Agni with the kindling sticks of '*citriya*' leads to '*citra*', is obviously based on the principle of sympathetic magic (or as Frazer would like to say, 'homeopathic magic.').

The Vedic ritual texts enjoin the use of the *Palāśa* (*Butea Frondosa*) wood on quite a number of occasions. We here take a note of the *arthavāda*-account which occurs in the context of the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice, which is the principal Soma-sacrifice. The *Śat. Br.* here mentions a footless archer aiming at the *Gāyatrī* (metre), when she was carrying off Soma. The archer severed one of her feathers or one of the leaves of King Soma (i.e. of the Soma-plant) and falling down it became the *Palāśa* tree (*Śat. Br.* III. 3. 4. 10).[62] The frequent use of the *Palāśa* wood in the Soma-sacrifice has given rise to such an *arthavāda*-account, showing the importance of the *Palāśa* tree as equal to that of Soma in the Vedic ritual tradition.

The Udumbara tree (*Ficus Glomerata*) has prime importance in the Vedic ritual. The oft-repeated *arthavāda* about it is that it stands for strength and food. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 5. 4. 3, 4) In the rite of *Agnicayana*, while tending the fire in the fire-pan, he has to offer an Udumbara-stick on fire. A mythical account occurs at this *vidhi*. When the gods and *asuras* (both born from Prajāpati) vied with each other, all the trees went to the side of the *asuras*, except the Udumbara, which did not forsake the gods. With the victory over the *asuras*, the gods took possession of the latter's trees also. The gods favoured the Udumbara tree by placing in it all the pith and essence of all the trees. So the Udumbara tree is always moist, full of milky sap and has fruit equal to that of all the other trees. This tree is all food, acquired from all trees and Agni is gratified by such food. (*Śat. Br.* VI. 6. 3. 2, 3)

The fact to be noted about the Udumbara tree is that small fruits cling right to the stem of the tree and the stem oozes out milky sap. Hence, it could come in line with such other trees that stand as the Mother-goddess trees, for the small fruits clinging to the stem of the tree bear resemblance with the breasts. We note such Mother-goddess trees in some ancient mythologies. The Mexican Mother-goddess of this kind was Mayauel, who was believed to be a woman of four hundred breasts and the gods on account of her fruitfulness changed her into the plant Maguey. The wine of this plant is called "pulque"[63] The Greek goddess Artemis was believed to have four hundred breasts and was the Fig—(tree)—

goddess, the fig fruits regarded as teats in ancient times. The green part of the fig tree including the fruit, distil a white milk-like juice in abundance. As the fruits in the fig tree appear before the leaves, the tree was personified as "goddess of many breasts".[64] The ancient Egyptian goddess Hathor was the sycamore tree is one of her forms. The peculiarity of the sycamore tree is that the fruit all adhere to the stock of the tree and not to the end of the branches.[65] It has to be mentioned that nowhere the Brāhmaṇa texts mention the Udumbara tree as a Mother-goddess tree. But when the Udumbara tree is spoken of as 'strength and food', it is clear that rather than simply glorifying the tree through a ritual metaphor, they certainly reflect some mythological belief about this tree.

To come to a couple of plants. In the *Agnicayana* rite, when the Great Fire-altar is built up, the sacrificer or the priest on his behalf, fastening to a cane a frog, *Avakā* plant (a mossy plant, generally known as *śaivāla*) and a bamboo (*vetasa*)-shoot, drags them, over all the parts of the Fire-altar (*Śat. Br.* IX. 1. 2. 20), and thereby places calmness into Agni's own self. (Ibid. 30) The *Śat. Br.* states here the *arthavāda*, in which occurs the etymology of the word *avakā* as also of the word *vetasa*. It is said that the vital breaths made Agni and sprinkled water on him. That water dripped off and became frogs. The waters said to Prajāpati that their essence (*ka*) had gone down (*avāk*). So they (i.e. waters) came to be known as *Avākkās*. They mystically call waters *Avakās* (mossy plants), for the gods love what is abstruse. (Ibid. IX. 1. 2. 21, 22, 24) Pointing to the bamboo-shoot, Prajāpati said that he (i.e. Vanaspati—the Tree-god residing in every tree or plant, here in the *vetasa*-shoot) should know (*vettu saḥ*) and he should taste (*sam vettu*). They mystically call bamboo-shoot 'vetasa', from the words *vettusa* and *samvettu*, the root being / *vid*—'to know'. (Ibid. 20, 22) The *vetasa* (bamboo-shoot) is said to be the flower of waters. (*Tait. Sam.* V. 4. 4. 1) The use of the *avakā* and the *vetasa* plants is based on the belief that they being waters would bring coolness and the principle of magic working here is 'Like produces like'.

Several types of grass are mentioned in the ritual texts and the *arthavādas* about them are interesting. To take some examples. The *Tait. Sam.* prescribes that the sacrificer be purified with bunches of Darbha grass. The *arthavāda* points out that when Indra slew Vṛtra, the latter died upon the waters. The pure, divine and sacrifice-worthy part of the waters went out and became Darbha grass. When the priest purifies the sacrificer with the Darbha-grass, he purifies him with waters which are pure, divine and fit for sacrifice. He purifies him with two stalks, meaning 'by day and night'; with three stalks meaning 'with three worlds'. (*Tait. Sam.* VI. 1. 1. 7)

While prescribing the *Ādāra* plants as the substitute of Soma-plants (i.e. Soma-shoots), it is said that if they cannot get the *Ādāra* plants, the sacrificer or the priest may press down *Dūrvā* grass as it is akin to the Soma-plants. (*Śat. Br.* IV. 5. 10. 5) The importance of the *Dūrvā* grass is brought out through the etymology of the word *dūrvā*. In the rite of building the Great Fire-altar (i.e. *Agnicayana* rite), the *Dūrvā* brick is placed on the naturally-perforated (*Svayam-ātṛṇṇā*) brick. It is said that when Prajāpati having created the universe, became exhausted and was disjointed, his hair were lying on the ground and those became the *Dūrvā* grass. As the vital breath went out of Prajāpati, he fell down. He said that the vital breath has undone or harmed him. Hence, the name *dhūrvā* (fr. / *dhūrv*—

'to undo, injure, harm'), which is *dūrvā*, mystically called so, for the gods love what is abstruse. The *Dūrvā* grass is the *kṣatra* (the ruling power) for it is the vital sap or breath. Placing the *Dūrvā* brick is like placing all plants. (Ibid. VII. 4. 2. 10-12)

Practice of using some of the trees, plants, etc., in the Vedic ritual from bygone times compelled the ritualists to give some kind of *arthavādas*. These *arthavādas* are perfectly based on the principles of sympathetic magic. On the basis of 'A part stands for the whole', a stick or faggot of a sacrificial (*yajñiya*) tree stands for that tree and its ritual use. We have marked the principle 'Like produces like', when the use of Avakā plants and bamboo-shoots is explained through *arthavāda*. Some trees are said to have been born from a limb of Prajāpati or from his bones, flesh, phlegm etc. At the basis of this is the universal concept of the splitting up of the body of a Creation-Being, giving rise to several things and beings in this world. Lang notes various trends in the savage myths of creation, one of them being that the world or its various parts, had been formed out of the body of some Supernatural Being, a god or a giant or a member of some mysterious race. On the Indian scene we have the Great Cosmic *Puruṣa* of the famous *Puruṣasūkta*, from whose body parts everything in this universe comes into existence. (*RV* X. 90)[66]

ANIMALS AND BIRDS

The *dravya*[67] or the material to be offered in sacrifice, could be in the form of an animal or a simple corn-offering in the form of a sacrificial cake or a pap (i.e., *caru*) etc. In the case of animal-offering, the animal offered is regarded as closely connected with the god, at times through its colour or form. To take a note of some animals.

Of all the sacrificial animals, goat (*aja*) is regarded as the most prominent animal. A hornless goat (*tūpara*) is to be offered to Prajāpati to beget offspring and cattle. The *arthavāda* points out that such a goat is believed to possess the characteristics of the domesticated animals, viz., beard that of man; lack of horns as that of horse; having incisors on one side only that of cattle; having sheep-like hooves and the nature of goat. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 1. 1. 5; cf. *Śat. Br.* VI. 2. 2. 15) A mythical account coming as *arthavāda* points out that the sacrificial essence went out of man, subsequently entered the horse, then the ox, later the sheep and then the goat. Thereafter it entered the earth to come out in the form of rice and barley, of which is made the sacrificial cake i.e. *puroḍāśa*. (Ibid. I. 2. 3. 6, 7) The *Ait. Br.* states that as the sacrificial essence dwelt for the longest time in goat, goat is the most often employed of all the sacrificial animals. (*Ait. Br.* II. 8 = 6.8) The *Tait. Sam.* enjoins an offering of a white beast (goat) to Vāyu. (*Tait. Sam.* II. 1. 1. 1) The *Śat. Br.* connects this white, bearded goat to Prajāpati, saying that such a goat to be offered to Vāyu Niyutvat (Vāyu having a team of horses) has come into being from the seed of Prajāpati. (*Śat. Br.* VI. 2. 2. 6) Having such 'goat-Agni-Prajāpati' close connection spoken of or reflected in the *arthavāda* in view, the tradition of the *Śrautasūtras* prescribes offering of oblation, on the right ear of a she-goat (*Bhār. Ś. S.* IX. 4. 5) or according to some, in the absence of a she-goat, on the ear of the he-goat. (*Āp. Ś. S.* IX. 9. 3) The same belief percolates, when the *Mbh.* speaks of the Naigameya Agni becoming goat-faced to amuse

Skanda. (*Mbh.* Vana *parvan* 226. 29; 228. 3, 5) The *Agni P.* (156.10 b) and the *Sk. P.* (IV. 40. 46 ab) speak about the holiness of goat's mouth. Even the sculptures display goat as a symbol of Fire-god.[68]

The sacrificial horse is believed to have been created by the gods from the Sun. (*RV* I. 163. 2d; *Ait. Br.* VI. 35 = 30.9) In the *Agnicayana* rite, the horse is made to smell a layer of bricks. The horse is said to be the yonder sun and the bricks are the creatures on the earth or the worlds. (*Śat. Br.* VII. 3. 2. 12, 13) This horse has to be white, for it is the form of the sun, which shines yonder. (Ibid. 16) The *arthavāda* in the *Śat. Br.* in the context of the Sadyaskrī sacrifice,[69] clearly speaks of this. When the Angirases officiated as priests for the Ādityas in the Sadyaskrī sacrifice, to them was offered *Vāc* (Speech) as *dakṣiṇā* (sacrificial gift), which they refused to accept. Then to them was offered Sūrya (the Sun) as *dakṣiṇā*. Hence, in the Sadyaskrī sacrifice, a white horse stands as the *dakṣiṇā*. (Ibid. III. 5. 1. 17-20)

As the sun and Prajāpati (i.e. = Agni, the deity of sacrifice) are believed to be the two forms of the same principle, viz., Agni, horse is said to be the form of Prajāpati also. This is noted at various places in the Vedic ritual texts. (*Tait. Br.* II. 7. 2. 3; III. 9. 8. 2; *Jaim. Br.* II. 129) The *arthavāda* states that the eye of Prajāpati swelled and fell away. It became a horse. As the eye swelled (*aśvayat* fr. / *śvi*—'to swell'), the *aśva* (horse) has its name (*Tait. Sam.* V. 3. 12. 1, 2). Barring a couple of references where horse is said to belong to Varuṇa (*Śat. Br.* V. 3. 1. 5; *Tait. Br.* III. 9. 16. 1), the horse is primarily related to Prajāpati and originally to the sun.

Unlike that of goat or horse, the actual sacrifice of a black antelope is not mentioned in the ritual texts.[70] Again though related to Agni-Prajāpati, goat and horse are not directly identified with him. But the black antelope is said to be the very sacrifice[71] (and obviously Prajāpati), as can be noted from the *arthavādas*. The *Śat. Br.* states a mythical account that the sacrifice did not resort to Śaṁyu, the Son of Bṛhaspati, entered fire and emerged from it in the form of a black antelope (*Tait. Sam.* V. 2. 6. 4, 5; for the sacrifice escaping the gods, becoming a black antelope and roaming about, *Śat. Br.* I. 1. 4. 1).

Bull and cow, the domesticated animals familiar right from the Ṛgvedic times, figure in the Vedic rituals also. To take a couple of *arthavādas* into account about these. The bull (*ṛṣabha*) is Prajāpati. (Ibid. V. 2. 5. 17) In the *Rajasūya* sacrifice, a cake on twelve potsherds is offered to Indra and Agni and the *dakṣiṇā* to the priest is a bull. The *arthavāda* states that by its shoulder, the bull is of Agni's nature and by its testicles he is of Indra's nature. (Ibid. V. 2. 3. 8) After the rite of *ratninām haviṁṣi* (i.e. offerings given by the king, in the houses of important personalities in his kingdom, prior to the *Rajasūya* sacrifice), he offers a *caru* to Soma and Rudra. The *arthavāda* states that when Svarbhānu, the *asura*, struck the sun with darkness, the latter could not shine. Soma and Rudra removed that darkness and with evil removed, the sun shines yonder. So a *caru* is offered to them. This rice is cooked (for *caru*) in the milk of a white cow, which has a white calf. (Ibid. V. 3. 2. 1-2) It is clear that the white colour of the cow and the calf stands for light as also the sun.

The *Somakrayaṇī* cow (by giving which Soma is purchased) is said to be of tawny (*babhru*) colour and having red-brown eyes (*piṅgākṣī*) as the *Tait. Sam.* (VI. 1. 6. 7, 8) and the *Śat. Br.* (III. 3. 1. 13-15) point out. The tawny colour of the Somakryaṇī cow and also the

red-brown colour of its eyes are akin to the colour of Soma. The principle 'Like produces like' works here. The cow in the ritual of purchasing Soma stands for *Vāc* (Speech),[72] who was sent by the gods to the *gandharvas* for bringing back Soma stolen by the latter. She (*Vāc*—a 'woman') allured the *gandharvas*, they being fond of women and she then returned to the gods taking Soma with her. The mythical account runs further that both the *gandharvas* and the gods tried to woo *Vāc*, the former reciting the Vedas to her and the latter creating the lute and playing on it and singing for her, she ultimately turning to the latter (i.e. gods), for women are attracted to him who dances and sings. (*Śat. Br.* III. 2. 4. 1-6, 10)

In the rite of *Agnicayana*, a live tortoise is enjoined to be kept at the lowest level. (Ibid. VII. 5. 1. 1) The *arthavāda* in the same context states that the sacrificial cake becoming a tortoise crawled after the Aṅgirases, when they went to the world of heaven. The live tortoise when placed at the lowest level leads the sacrificer straight to the world of heaven. (Ibid. V. 2. 8. 4, 5) In the some context, the *Śat. Br.*, while enjoining the placing of a live tortoise, says that Prajāpati having become a tortoise created the beings. (Ibid. VII. 5. 1. 5) Prajāpati in the shape of a tortoise crept over the three worlds. (Ibid. 9) Tortoise is also said to be the sun. (Ibid. VII. 5. 1. 6) This gets related to the world-wide belief that tortoise is a solar animal. The folk-belief is that a turtle when killed will not die until sun-down.[73]

Here we have taken note of the *arthavādas* which deal with the *vidhis* related to or mentioning some animals. In fact, there are many such animals which figure in the *arthavādas* and the *vidhis*.[74] Here we come to an important point and that is—the skin or hide of an animal, made use of in the Vedic ritual. Such a skin or hide is used as standing for that very animal of which the skin or hide is.[75] Such a use is obviously based on the principle of magic viz., 'A part stands for the whole.' The sacrificer sitting or stepping on a goat-skin is made Prajāpati. (Ibid. V. 2. 1. 24; *Tait. Br.* I. 3. 7. 7) The sacrificer should be anointed on a goat's skin, if he is desirous of prosperity. (*Śat. Br.* IX. 3. 4. 14) The skin of the black antelope is looked upon as the very sacrifice and hence is prescribed in the rituals. (*Tait. Sam.* V. 1. 4. 2; V. 1. 6. 3; *Śat. Br.* VI. 7. 1. 6; IX. 3. 4. 10; XII. 8. 3. 3; XIV. 1. 2. 1, 2 etc.) The tiger-skin is regarded as a symbol of Soma (*Tait. Br.* I. 7. 8. 1; *Śat. Br.* V. 4. 1. 11), as also of the lordly power of wild animals. (*Ait. Br.* VIII. 6 37. 2) In the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, the king to be rejuvenated has to put on the shoes of boar's skin. Thereby he firmly establishes himself in the essence of the cattle. (*Śat. Br.* V. 4. 3. 19) The *Tait. Br.* also while prescribing the shoes of boar-skin says that boar is the mettle (*manyu*) of the animals, which the king places in himself by wearing such shoes. (*Tait. Br.* I. 7. 9. 4)

Though mentioned at a few places, the image of a bird is always present before the Vedic ritualists. The *Śat. Br.* clearly states that the sacrificer fashions Agni (i.e. the Great Fire-altar) into a beautiful winged bird. (*Śat. Br.* VI. 7. 2. 5-8; IX. 2. 3. 34; IX. 4. 4. 4, 6) The *Śat. Br.* states the *arthavāda* that according to some, the Great Fire-altar is built in this shape with the thought that Agni (in the form of this Fire-altar) having become a bird, shall bear the sacrificer to the sky. (Ibid. VI. 1. 2. 36) In the context of the third thirty-three day rite, the *Pañc. Br.* points out in the *arthavāda* that these days are winged. Whatever desire

the sacrificers want to see fulfilled, they reach it by these days, for wherever a bird desires to go, it reaches there. (*Pañc. Br.* XXIV. 3. 3)

FAMILY-LIFE

Many *arthavādas* have dealt with the family-life of the then people and thus have come to the profane level.

The concept of family-unit in view of the Vedic ritualists is of one's own self, wife and children. This is shown by the *Jaim. Br.* in the context of the *Parikrī* sacrifice—one-day sacrifice—in which they recite the triplets (each being a group of three *ṛcs*). The second triplet has the *ṛcs*, which, according to the *arthavāda*, stand for this unit and on this unit depends the circle of relatives. (*Jaim. Br.* II. 123)

The worldly phenomenon of male and female forming a 'productive' pair is at the basis of many *arthavādas*. When the sacrificer's wife looks at the sacrificial butter, a '*mithuna*'—productive pairing—is formed between a woman (female) and 'seed'—here butter, representing the seed. (*Śat. Br.* I. 3. 1. 18)[76]

The wife of the sacrificer has a special importance in the whole set-up of sacrifice. The *Jaim. Br.* while prescribing the place of the sacrificer's wife, states that she is indeed the half of the sacrificer's soul. (*Jaim. Br.* I. 86) The *Tait. Br.* has already expressed this thought in the *arthavāda*. (*Tait. Br.* III. 3. 3. 5) As the very sacrifice is for procreation (of everything in the universe), by the active and the positive presence of wife in the sacrifice, the sacrifice is made to have a pair. (Ibid.) The *Tait. Br.* also states in the *arthavāda* that the sacrificer not having a wife is one who is not a sacrificer at all, for without her, he will not be able to procreate the issues. With her by his side, he performs the real sacrifice. (Ibid. II. 2. 2. 6; III. 3. 3. 1)

The conviction in the Indian culture that woman is not to be killed occurs in the *Śat. Br.* in the context of the *Mitravindā* sacrifice. While creating human beings, Prajāpati toiled. From him who was worn out and heated, *Śrī* (Splendour or Glory) came forth and stood there resplendent and shining. The gods wanted to kill her and take everything from her. But Prajāpati said to them, "Śrī is a woman. People do not kill a woman. They rather take anything from her leaving her alive. (*Śat. Br.* XI. 4. 3. 1, 2)

The practice prevalent in the then society is explained in an *arthavāda*, which figures in the context of the sacrifice called *Aikādaśina*. In this sacrifice, eleven posts are planted in the ground; the twelfth is made to lie to the south of the altar and the thirteenth one, which is a shorter one and is called *Pātnīvata*, is for the wives of the gods, as a group. Each pole is girded with two girdles. The *arthavāda* explains that as women outnumber men, man gets many wives but the wife does not have many husbands. (*Kāṭh. Sam.* XXIX. 8; for the same idea *Mait. Sam.* IV. 7. 9)

The domination of male in the patriarchal form of the society is marked in an *arthavāda*, which occurs in the context of the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices. It is said that he brushes the dipping-spoon ('*sruva*' Mas.) first and then the other offering-spoons ('*srucaḥ*' Fem.). The *arthavāda* states that the offering-spoon (here many such spoons) is

female, while the dipping-spoon is male, which is brushed first. Although several women meet together, the one that is, as it were, the only young male (*kumāraka* lit. 'young boy') goes there first and others (i.e. women) follow him. Thus is indicated the importance of the male, even though he may be of young age. (*Śat. Br.* I. 3. 1. 9)

At several places the fertility aspect of female is mentioned in the *arthavāda* passages. We take one example. In the *Agnicayana* rite, when the fire-pan is made, he pours sand into it and then milk. (Ibid. VII. 1. 1. 41, 44) The *arthavāda* here states that the fire-pan is a female. A female first receives seed (here 'sand') and then milk. The sand (seed) is below and the milk is above, indicating here the respective parts of the female's body.

In the context of New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices, the *Śat. Br.* states that a person is born with four debts, which he has to pay off during his life-time. Debt to gods he pays off when he performs a sacrifice to them. That to the seers (*ṛṣi*-s) he pays off, when he studies the Veda. When he is bound to wish for offspring, he pays off the debt to Fathers (*pitṛs*). Debt to men he pays off when he is bound to practise hospitality. (Ibid. I. 7. 2. 1-5) The *Śat. Br.* (XI. 5. 6. 1) and *Tait. Ār.* (II. 10) speak of the five great daily sacrifices.[77] viz., *Devayajña*—daily offerings to the gods; *Brahmayajña*—daily study of the Veda (Brahman); by which is paid off the debt to the *ṛṣis*; *Pitṛyajña*—daily offerings given to the *pitṛs*, with a wish to continue the family-line by having issues (mainly male); *Bhūtayajña*—offering daily an oblation to beings and *Manuṣyayajña*—giving hospitality to guests, by which the debt to men is paid off. Though *Manuṣyayajña* is spoken of by the *Tait. Ār.* (II. 10), it is already stated by the *Śat. Br.*, as is noted above.

The practice of honouring the guest dates back to the *RV.* Agni is called often an *atithi* (guest) in the house of the sacrificer. (*RV.* I. 73. 1 c; IV. 4. 10 cd; V. 1. 9 d; VII. 42. 4 b; VIII. 19. 8 a) The *AV* devotes one full *kāṇḍa* (XV *kāṇḍa*) for this, eulogizing the *Mahāvrātya* and deals with the hospitality shown to him.

In the ritual tradition, Soma is the celebrated guest. Hence when purchased, he is offered hospitality, which is said to be the head, i.e. the first and foremost ritual, in the sacrifice. (*Śat. Br.* III. 4. 1. 1) The sun is regarded as 'the guest par excellence' or 'excellent guest'. Hence oblations are offered to fire when he comes in the morning and also when he sets and the darkness ushers in. In the evening, i.e. when the sun sets, he enters fire (Agni), which is his womb, from where he comes in the morning.[78]

It has to be noted that the idea underlying the hospitality to be shown to the guest was not of universal kindliness as maintained by Kane,[79] but was of fear of the guest, who was invariably a person unknown to the householder, since guest ('*atithi*') was always a person wandering from place to place.[80]

Right from the Ṛgvedic times, the concept of *atithi* is viewed in two ways, viz., bad and good. Being a stranger, the guest (*atithi*) is initially regarded as having a potentiality to do harm, thus causing fear-complex in the mind of the householder. But if he is given proper honour and hospitality, the guest can bless the householder.[81]

There are several such facets of the family-life of a householder dealt with in the *arthavādas*. But a unique *arthavāda* to be taken note of speaks of the 'house' itself as having a separate identity. The *Śat. Br.* states that when a householder (maintaining the three fires) returns from a journey, he may have a small or big cause to be angry at anything. But

whatever he wants to say or do, he should rather do it on the next day. (Ibid. II. 4. 1. 14) The *arthavāda* here is significant. It is said that with the thought as to what the householder will say and what he will do on that occasion, the house trembles with fear and is liable to crush the householder's family. But the same house receives the householder with confidence, if the latter neither speaks nor does anything, on his return from the journey.

CONCLUSION

The aim of performing sacrifice is brought out in an *arthavāda* in the *Śat. Br.* It is said that the altar is female and fire (Agni) is male. The woman lies embracing the man, by which a copulation productive of offspring is there. (Ibid. I. 2. 5. 15, 16) The sacrifice is for procreation on the cosmic level (as bringing timely rains, making seasons, etc.) as well as on the terrestrial level in all spheres. This is brought out through the man-and-woman relationship leading to the procreation of offspring, taking the altar to be female and Agni as male.

The *arthavāda* regarding the *yūpa* (sacrificial post) also states the same fact. Though fixed on the terrestrial plane in the sacrifice, the *yūpa* is understood to reach the region of gods.[82] The *Tait. Sam.* in the context of the Soma-sacrifice, explains how the sacrificial stake (*yūpa*) touches all the three regions viz., the nether region, earth and through mid-region the heaven. (*Ibid.* VI. 3. 4. 6)

Thus the sacrifice performed on the terrestrial region extends far above and reaches the cosmic region in the thought of the Vedic ritualists. In this process, the *arthavādas* perform their role perfectly well of glorifying every single detail of the rites and rituals, taking the help of the secular tradition with its beliefs and practices or at times coming to the profane level in order to be convincing. The *arthavādas* serve as a pointer to this trend of assimilation of the 'secular' with the 'sacred'.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Arthasaṅgraha*, Paranjape, S.M. (ed.), Bombay, 1927, p. 251.
2. Ibid. p. 353—*prāśastyanindānyataraparam vākyamarthavādaḥ /*
3. *Mīmāṁsābālaprakāśa*, p. 51.
4. A couple of these types with example of each can be seen.
   (i) stating a reason (*hetu*)-*śūrpeṇa juhoti tena hyannam kriyate /*
   (ii) expressing a doubt (*saṁśaya*)-*hotavyam gārhapatye na hotavyam /*
5. *Arthasaṅgraha*, p. 361.
6. *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtra* I. 2. 1.
7. see Sāyaṇa's Introduction (*bhūmikā*) to his commentary on the *Ṛgveda*. see *RV*, I *maṇḍala*, Pune: Vaidik Samshodhan Mandal, 1933, p. 10—*arthavādabhāgasya prāmāṇyam mahatā prayatnena jaiminiḥ samarthayāmāsa /*
8. *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtra* I. 2. 1.
9. Ibid. 1-18.
10. see P.D. Navathe,"On the Mīmāṁsā Doctrine of Ekavakyatā", *Proceedings* of the Winter Institute on Ancient Indian Theories on Sentence—Meaning, University of Poona, Pune, 1980, p. 190.
11. Ibid. p. 192 f.
12. *Jaiminīya-nyāyamālā* I. 2. 1. 1-3.

13. *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtra* I. 2. 7, 22.
14. Paul, Horsch, *Die vedische Gāthā-und Śloka Literatur,* Bern: Francke Verlag, 1966, III part of the book, chapters on Origin and Development of the *gāthās.*
15. see Sāyaṇa's comm. on *Ait. Br.* III. 43 = 14, 5; V. 6 = 22. 1; VII. 8 = 32. 7; VII. 9 = 32. 8.
16. see Sāyaṇa on *Śat. Br.* X. 5. 2. 4; XI. 5. 5. 12 etc.
17. *Gop. Br.* I. 10 mentions the Itihāsa-veda and Purāṇa-veda ('*veda*' meaning 'lore' fr. / *vid*—'to know') separately, also see Vārttika and Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini Sū. IV. 2. 60. Itihāsa, as we have noted, is explained as *iti-ha-āsa* ('This was so') and the Purāṇa could mean an ancient text. The etymology stated in the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa,* though from later times, throws light on the nature of Purāṇa as viewed in tradition. *Brahmāṇḍa P.* II. 4. 4. 54 cd—*yasmāt purā hyaṇantīdam purāṇam tena cocyate.* 'As they sound (speak) it in ancient times, it is called Purāṇa.'
18. Pāriplava is a cycle of legends, consisting of mini-cycles, each of ten days. This cycle lasted for one year, while the sacrificial horse was away from the sacrificial chamber with the royal entourage. At the end of the daily rituals, chief of lute-players used to sing the deeds of the past kings, thus bringing the present sacrificer-king in line with the royal sacrificers of the past. In the Pāriplava, mention is specifically made of the '*veda*' (lore) of various tribes that are present at the recitation of these cycles. At these cycles, it is the Vedic priest Hotṛ that narrates the particular tribal '*veda*' (*Śat. Br.* XIII. 4. 3. 3-15).
19. Samiran Chandra Chakrabarti, "A Study of the Pāriplava", *Indo-Iranian Journal,* 32, Kluwer Academic Publishers (printed in the Netherlands), 1982, p. 262.
20. H.L. Hariappa, *Rgvedic Legends through the Ages,* Poona, 1953, p. 132.
21. R.N. Dandekar, "The Mahābhārata: Origin and Growth", *University of Ceylon Review,* 12, 1954, p. 65.
22. (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Sūta—The Paurāṇika", *Purāṇa,* Varanasi: All India Kashiraj Trust, 40(2), July 1998, pp. 83-91.
23. see Intrn. to *Hamlet* by W. Turner, Bombay: The Educational Publishing Company, 1959, p. i f.
24. see Sadashiv A. Dange, *Vedic Sacrifices—Early Nature,* Vols. I and II, New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2000. Dange has noted the variations from the ritual-texts (Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas) regarding the rites and rituals in the various sacrifices and has shown how the 'sacrificial ritual' was evolving and only later on, was seen as having a 'fixed' form.
25. see (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, *Vedic Beliefs and Practices through Arthavāda,* Vols. I & II, New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2005.
26. One such work, though extending its scope to the etymologies from the Saṁhitās and even the Upaniṣads, is by Fatah Singh, *The Vedic Etymology,* The Sanskrit Sadan, Kota, 1952.
27. e.g., *RV* III. 29 11—the etymology of the word *mātariśvan* from the root / *mā*—'to measure'. 'As he (i.e., Vāyu) is measured in the mother (i.e., the mid-region) he is called Mātariśvan.'
    AV X. 2. 28 cd, 30 cd—As he knows the *brahman's* town (*puram brahmaṇaḥ*), so he is called '*puruṣa*'.
28. *Apūrva* or *adṛṣṭa* is what is stored to the credit of the sacrificer in the other world, when he performs a sacrifice here and offers to the gods.
29. P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra,* Vol. III, 2nd ed. Poona, BORI, 1973, pp. 414 ff.
30. To explain the word *avadānam,* the *Tait. Sam.* (VI. 3. 10. 5) and the *Śat. Br.* (I. 7. 2. 6) use the term *avadayate.* Keith translates the word *avadayate* as (he) 'performs'. vide A.B. Keith, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittiriya Sanhita,* pt. 2, HOS Vol. XIX, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass: 1967 (1914), p. 526. He says—"this (debt) he performs (*avadayate*) by these cuttings off—(*avadāna*)—", the context being of the animal—sacrifice (*Tait. Sam.* VI. 3. 10. 5). Eggeling translates the word *avadayate* as he 'satisfies', though in the note he says that the word is really derived from *ava-dā* (*do*) 'to cut off', vide J. Eggeling, *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* pt. I, SBE Vol. 12, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988 (1882), p. 191 note 1. Whitney states the root / *day*—'to share', and says that it is a secondary form of / *dā*—'to divide' from which it is hardly worth separating. See W.D. Whitney, *The Roots, Verb—Forms,* and *Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language,* Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1945 (Leipzig, 1885), p. 70.
31. P.V. Kane, *op. cit.,* Vol. III, p. 416.
32. see (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Atithi: A Probe in Concept", *Studies in Indology* (Prof. Mukund Madhav Sharma Fel. Vol.), Delhi: Sri Satguru Pubns., a division of Indian Books Centre, 1996, pp. 119-122.
33. *Śāṅkh. Ś. S.* XII. 32; *Manu S.* XI. 190; *Yāj. S.* I. 175; III. 190; also Eggeling, *op. cit.,* pt. I, SBE Vol. 12, p.5 note 1.
34. *Brahma P.* 29.35 cd, 36—One who worships the sun with a lamp, containing ghee or sesame-oil does not become blind. *Ibid.* 27. 36 ab—The giver of a lamp gets faultless eyesight. cf. *Agni.* P. 200. 3 a; also *Var. P.* 207. 53 cd—People obtain lustre by giving a gift of lamp.

35. The Viṣuvat day is the middle-most day of the Gavām-ayana, the sacrificial session of which goes on for one year's period. It has two wings of the series of sacrifices at each side and it imitates the two rafters of a roof joined firmly at a central beam (*Pañc. Br.* IV. 7. 1; *Tait. Br.* I. 2. 3. 1).
36. See (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Sāman-s and Lauds", *Aspects of Speech in Vedic Ritual,* New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 1996, pp. 182-205.
37. *AV* XIII. 24. 12, 36; *Tait. Sam.* II. 1. 22. 1; *Śat. Br.* IV. 3. 4. 21; V. 3. 2. 2; *Pañc. Br.* IV. 5. 2; VI. 8. 1; *Kauṣ. Br.* XXIV. 3; *Jaim. Br.* I. 80.
38. *Mbh.* Ādi 14. 5-9 (southern version); Ādi 17. 4-8 (Crit. Ed.); Ādi 19. 4-9 (northern version) *Padma P.* Brahmakhaṇḍa 10. 21; also *Agni P.* 3. 14-16; *Brahma P.* 106. 24-31. for more details, see Sadashiv A. Dange, *Encyclopaedia of Puranic Beliefs and Practices,* Vol. IV, New Delhi: Navrang Pubn., 1989, p. 1115 f, under "Planets".
39. See G.V. Davane, "The Rāhu-Ketu Myth", *Perspectives in the Vedic and the Classical Sanskrit Heritage,* New Delhi: D.K. Print World (P) Ltd., 1995, pp. 135-138.
40. B.G. Tilak, *Orion,* Poona: Tilak Brothers, 1893, p. 159.
41. As the demon Svarbhānu or Rāhu (—Ketu) in later literature, strikes the sun with darkness or swallows the latter, there is said to be darkness everywhere. This is taken to be the conditino of the universe prior to creation, when there was darkness and waters everywhere. see (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Ṛgvedic Accounts" *Myths of Creation,* (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, (ed.), Bombay: Bombay Uni. Pubn., 1987, pp. 7-11. Even now in orthodox Hindu houses, there is a practice of keeping the idols of gods under waters from the period of '*vedha*' to that of the actual sight of the sun after the eclipse. The same practice is followed at the time of lunar eclipse.
42. The *mantra* is *pra candramā tirate dīrgham āyuḥ* (*AV* has '*tirase*' for '*tirate*'). *RV* X. 85. 19 d; *AV* VII. 81. 2 d; XIV. 1. 24 d; *Tait. Sam.* II. 4. 14. 1 d; *Mait. Sam.* IV. 12. 38 d; *Kāṭh. Sam.* X. 12 d, also *Nir.* XI. 6 d.
43. For detailed information about the constellations, see A.A. Macdonell, and A.B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects,* Vol. I under the title "Nakṣatra"; Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pt. I, 1974, pp. 495 ff.; Pandit R. Vasantkumar "Origin and Growth of the Jyotiṣa-śāstra", *Journal of the University of Bombay,* Vol. XXVI (New Series), Part 2, Arts No., Sep, 1957, pp. 83-90; also (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Constellations", *Hindu Domestic Rituals—A Critical Glance,* Delhi: Ajanta Pubns., 1985, pp. 1-9; also by the same author, the chap. "Sun, Moon and Constellations", *Vedic Beliefs and Practices through Arthavāda,* Vol. I, New Delhi: Aryan Books International.
44. Sāyaṇa in his commentary on this passage states that these constellations are known as Yamanakṣatra-s, for they like Yama became the cause of *asuras*' death.
45. See Sadashiv A. Dange, *Encyclopaedia of Puranic Beliefs and Practices,* Vol. I, New Delhi: Navrang Pubn., 1986, p. 306.
46. James Hastings, (ed.) *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. XII, p. 457 a
47. Rundle Clark, R. T. H., *Myth and Symbol in Ancient Egypt,* London: Thames and Hudson, 1959, p. 236.
48. (Mrs.) S.S., Dange, "Pathyā-Svasti—the Vedic Deity of Paths", *Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal,* Panjab University, Hoshiarpur, Vols. XXXVII—XXXVIII, June-Dec. 1999-2000 (pub. in 2002), pp. 1-5.
49. See Sadashiv A. Dange, *Encyclopaedia of Puranic Beliefs and Practices,* Vol. IV, New Delhi: Navrang Pubn., 1989, pp. 1145-1149. (under the title "Quarters").
50. Eggeling, *op. cit.*, pt. II, SBE Vol. 26, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988 (1885), p. 71 note 1, where he quotes the texts which point out the unkind treatment given to the Soma-seller. However he rightly points out that 'the whole transaction was a feigned purchase, symbolising the acquisition of the Soma by the gods from the Gandharvas.'
51. See J. Hastings, (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. XII, p. 343 b.
52. Interestingly the process of building the Great Fire-altar is spread over the period of a year. see Eggeling, *op. cit.*, pt. IV, SBE Vol. 43, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978 (1885), Intrn., p. xix.
53. See (Mrs.) S.S., Dange, "Sampad-s of Metres", *Aspects of Speech in Vedic Ritual,* New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 1996, pp. 113-145.
54. Sadashiv A. Dange, "Sex-Coupling in Sacrifice (Mithunīkaraṇa)", with the chart, *Sexual Symbolism from the Vedic Ritual,* Delhi: Ajanta Pubns., 1979, pp. 51-70.
55. The *Śat. Br.* points out that hair, skin, flesh, bone and marrow are the five parts of the sacrificial animal and applies these metaphorically to the five stages, while making the *puroḍāśa* (sacrificial cake) ready. *Śat. Br.* I. 2. 3. 8.
56. For more information on this point, see (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Symbolism of the Numbers Three and Seven", *Hindu Domestic Rituals—A Critical Glance,* Delhi: Ajanta Pubns., 1985, pp. 64-69.

57. For the full explanation of '*aṣṭama*' ('Eighth'), see Sadashiv A. Dange, "Aṣṭama", Vidarbha Samshodhana Mandala, *Annual No.*, Nagpur, 1991 (pub. in 1992), pp. 13-23.
58. For the *arthavādas* and the beliefs reflected in them, see (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, the chap. "Complementary Numbers", *Vedic Beliefs and Practices through Arthavāda*, Vol. I, New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2005.
59. The *Śat. Br.* states that if the waters are required to be collected after sun-set, he has to hold a fire-brand or a piece of gold close above the waters. This is for having the effect of the yonder burning sun (*Śat. Br.* III. 9. 2. 9) on waters, for both fire and gold are shining by nature. It is often said that fire is the other form of the sun. for gold as the seed of Agni. Ibid. II. 1. 1. 5.
60. A.A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995 (1898), p. 154.
61. Two types of *sambhāras* are mentioned prior to the establishment of the fires in the rite of Agnyādhāna The *sambhāras* are the things comprising earth and those from the wood of certain trees. The things from the earth are—sand, saline earth, earth dug up by moles, earth from an ant-hill, clay from a never-drying lake, pebbles and gold. The things relating to wood are—sticks or faggots from the following trees viz. Aśvattha, Udumbara, Parṇa (or Palāśa), Śamī, Vikaṅkata and a tree struck by the lightning. for detailed information, see Sadashiv A. Dange, *Vedic Sacrifices—Early Nature*, Vol. I, New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2000, pp. 21-26.
62. See Eggeling, *op. cit.*, pt. II, p. 78 for *Śat. Br.* III. 3. 4. 10. Here the word '*gāyatrī*' is taken in the sense of the genitive case i.e. '(feather) of Gāyatrī'. This shows a doubt on the part of the *Śat. Br.* regarding the exact entity to whom the *parṇa* (taken as 'feather' or 'leaf') belonged. The composer of the *Śat. Br.* is here relating the mythical account available in his times. The older version seems to be of the *Tait. Sam.* (III. 5. 7. 2), where a leaf of Soma is said to be cut off. The earliest version is of *RV* (IV. 27. 3, 4).
63. Donald Mackenzie, *Myths of Pre-Columbian America*, London, year not mentioned, p. 177. The botanical name of the plant Maguey is "Agave Americana" and "pulque" the name of wine from it, is derived from the language of the natives of Chile.
64. Ibid. pp. 182-183.
65. Ibid. p. 183.
66. See (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Ṛgvedic Accounts", *Myths of Creation*, (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, (ed.), Bombay (Mumbai), University of Bombay Pubn., p. 8.
67. *Kāty. Ś. S.* I. 2. 2 stating that *dravya* (material of offering), *devatā* (deity, to which offering is made) and *tyāga* (ritual of offering) form the triad in the Vedic sacrifice.
68. R.C., Agrawal, "Agni in Early Indian Art", *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIII, pt. I, Apr. 1965, p. 151 ff., figure on p. 153.
69. Sadyaskrī is a one-day (*ekāha*) Soma-sacrifice at which the consecrations, buying and pressing of Soma are compressed into one day. see Eggeling, *op. cit.*, pt. II, SBE Vol. 26, p. 114 note 3.
70. See Sadashiv A. Dange, "The Riddle of the Black Antelope", *Images from Vedic Hymns and Rituals*, New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2000, pp. 276-283.
71. *Śat. Br.* III. 2. 1. 8, 28; VI. 4. 1. 6; IX. 3. 4. 10 etc.
72. Ibid. III. 2. 4. 10, 15; also Ibid. III. 3. 1. 16. Such a cow is without any bodily defect, is uniform (*ekarūpā*), for Speech is also uniform and perfect.
73. H.M., Hyatt, *Folk-lore of Adams County Illinois*, New York, 1935; also (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, *Bhāgavata Purāṇa—Mytho-social Study*, Delhi: Ajanta Pubns., 1984, pp. 240-241.
74. for this, see (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Animals and Birds", *Vedic Beliefs and Practices through Arthavāda*, New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2005.
75. (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, "Animal-Hides", *Hindu Domestic Rituals—A Critical Glance*, pp. 82-87.
76. See note 54 supra.
77. For the Pañca Mahāyajñas, see Kane, P. V., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pt. I, BORI, 2nd ed., Poona, 1974, pp. 696-704.
78. *Ait. Br.* (V. 29-31 = 25. 4-6) has a long discussion about the exact time of the morning offerings, whether before the rise of the sun or after it, the *Ait. Br.* opting for the latter practice.
79. Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pt. II, 1974, pp. 749 ff.
80. *Nir.* IV. 5 for the etymologies of the word '*atithi*', (i) from the root / *at* 'to go'; (ii) from the word '*tithi*' (day) and the letter *a* in the word *atithi* meaning 'comes', from *abhi*' / *i*.
    Sāyaṇa derives the word *atithi* (*RV* VIII. 84. 1 a) from the root / *at*—'to go', with the *uṇadi* suffix *ithin*.
81. See note 32 *supra.*
82. See Sadashiv A. Dange, "*Axis Mundi* and the Vedic Yūpa", *Gleanings from Vedic to Puranic Age*, (Mrs.) S.S. Dange, (ed.), New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2002, pp. 13-24.

ABBREVIATIONS

AV	*Atharvaveda*
Ait. Br.	*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*
Āp. Ś. S.	*Āpastamba Śrautasūtra*
Āśv. G. S.	*Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra*
Bhāg. P.	*Bhāgavata Purāṇa*
Gop. Br.	*Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*
Jaim. Br.	*Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*
Kāṭh. Sam.	*Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*
Kāty. Ś. S.	*Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*
Kauṣ. Br.	*Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*
Mait. Sam	*Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*
Manu S.	*Manusmṛti*
Mārk. P.	*Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*
Mbh.	*Mahābhārata*
Nir.	*Nirukta*
P.	*Purāṇa*
Pañc. Br.	*Pañcaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*
RV	*Ṛgveda*
Ṣaḍ. Br.	*Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*
Śāṅkh. Ś. S.	*Śaṅkhāyana Śrautasūtra*
Śat. Br.	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*
Sk. P.	*Skanda Purāṇa*
Tait. Ār.	*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*
Tait. Br.	*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*
Tait. Sam.	*Taittirīya Saṁhitā*
Vāj. Sam.	*Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*
Vām. P.	*Vāmana Purāṇa*
Var. P.	*Varāha Purāṇa*
Yāj. Sm.	*Yājñavalkyasmṛti*

ABBREVIATIONS

BORI	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series
SBE	Sacred Books of the East Series

CHAPTER 10

Śrauta Religion

T.N. Dharmadhikari

The term religion is used here to designate *Dharma* which according to the Mīmāṁsakas is synonym of *Yajña*, the sacrifice or ritual. Śabaraswāmī, while commenting on the very first *sūtra* of Jaimini, viz., '*athāto dharmajijñāsā*', states that the study of the Vedas is a prerequisite to investigate into the religion, i.e. *Dharma* which is expressed by the term *Yajati* (performs sacrifice) and that which leads to *Niḥśreyasa*—the eternal bliss—viz., *Jyotiṣṭoma*[1] etc.

Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra (Āpśs) states that the *Mantras*[2] and the Brāhmaṇas are the authority for sacrifice, i.e. for the Śrauta-religion and that the Vedas are constituted of both, *Mantras* and Brāhmaṇas. *Kauśika-Sūtra*[3] and *Śabara*[4] corroborate with this view. The Smṛtis[5] also opine that the Vedic texts are the final authority for the religion. Thus, all the four Vedas—viz., The *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Atharvaveda*, with their Saṁhitās and Brāhamaṇas are involved in explaining the *Dharma*—the Śrauta religion, i.e. the institution of sacrifice.

It may be noticed that all these four Vedas consist of *Mantra*-portions named as Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇa-portions, more or less commentary on their Saṁitā texts. Brāhmaṇas, according to the tradition, include the Āraṇyakas and even the Upaniṣads. Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and, to a certain exent, the Āraṇyakas are directly related to the *Karma-kāṇḍa*, the performance of sacrifice, and the Upaniṣads form the *Jñānakāṇḍa*. The Upaniṣads are not directly concerned with the prescription of the performance of sacrifice. They are rather the texts on philosophy. Though the proper scope of the Upaniṣads is to explain the nature of *Jīva*, the individual Soul, Brahman, the Universal Soul and their relation with each other and also with the creation, they occasionally shed light on the theology underlying the concept of sacrifice.

The four Vedas, referred to above, are found in more than one recension. The *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā* is found in Śākala school. It is regarded that the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* belongs to this school. Of the other recensions of the *Ṛgveda*, only *Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa* has come down to us.

The *Yajurveda* is found divided into *Kṛṣṇa* and *Śukla* recensions. In *Kṛṣṇa* recensions the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇa portions are intermingled together. These are not sharply separated from each other. In *Śukla* recensions, the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇa portions are sharply separated. The Brāhmaṇa is compiled in the books of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*.

Further, the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* is found in four schools, viz., *Taittirīya, Maitrāyaṇī, Kāṭhaka* and *Kapiṣṭhala*. Of these only the *Taittirīya* school is entirely alive in oral tradition

while other schools have lost their oral traditions and are found only in printed or manuscript forms.

The oral tradition of the *Śukla* school of *Yajurveda* is still alive in *Vājasaneyi-Mādhyandina* and *Kāṇva* recensions. Separate books of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of these two recensions are also available, but the oral tradition of the *Kāṇva-Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* appears to have been lost. The Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads of these schools are included in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* only. The famous Īśopaniṣad finds its place in the 40th chapter of their Saṁhitās.

The *Sāmaveda* is still alive in oral traditions, in Kauthuma, Rāṇāyanīya and Jaiminīya schools. *Gāna-Granthas* of these schools, along with ten Brāhmaṇas of these are available either fully or partly.

The *Atharvaveda Saṁhitā* of Śaunaka is still lingering in traditional recitation, but the Paippalāda school is found only in print and in manuscripts. *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* belongs to this tradition.

The Śrauta ritual procedure requires four categories of priests, i.e. *Ṛtviks* as based on these four divisions of the Vedas. The *Āpastamba śrauta Sūtra* (Āpśs)[6] states that sacrifice is performed with the help of the three Vedas. The basic sacrifice, viz., the *Agnihotra*, i.e. daily morning and evening offerings, requires one priest only. He belongs to the *Yajurveda* school. The *Darśa-pūrṇamāsa*, i.e., New moon and Full moon sacrifices, are based on the *Ṛgveda* and the *Yajurveda*, while the *Agniṣṭoma* (*Soma*) sacrifice is performed with the help of the three Vedas. The inclusion of the fourth Veda, i.e. the *Atharvaveda* in the Śrauta religious performances appears to be a later one.

According to the *Baudhāyana Śrauta-Sūtra*[7] (Bśs), a group of sixteen priests with four principal categories are employed in the Soma sacrifies. The groups are as follows:

(i) *Adhvaryu*, *Pratiprasthātṛ*, *Neṣṭṛ* and *Unnetṛ*, all belong to the *Yajurveda*.

(ii) *Brahmā*, *Brāhmaṇācchaṁsī*, *Āgnīdhra* and *Potṛ*, all belong not particularly to one Veda (or to the *Atharvaveda*.)

(iii) *Hotṛ*, *Maitrāvaruṇa* i.e., *Praśāstṛ*, *Acchāvāka* and *Grāvastut*, all belong to the *Ṛgveda*.

(iv) *Udgātṛ*, *Prastotṛ*, *Pratihartṛ* and *Subrahmaṇya*, all belong to the *Sāmaveda*.

In addition, *Sadasya*, *Abhigara*, *Dhruvagopa* and *Saṁśrāva*, not belonging to any particular Veda, are optionally prescribed by the Bśs.

Besides, ten or eleven *Camasādhvaryus* are also empoyed in the Soma-sacrifice.

The daily *Agnihotra* rite requires only one *Ṛtvik*, i.e., one priest, viz., the *Adhvarya*. The *Darśa* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices require four *Ṛtviks*, viz., *Adhvaryu*, *Brahmā*, *Hotṛ* and *Āgnīdhra*. In the *Cāturmāsya* sacrifice, an additional priest, i.e., the *Partiprasthātṛ*, is required. In the *Paśubandha*, i.e., the animal sacrifice, the sixth priest, *Maitrāvaruṇa* is additionally required. In Soma sacrifice, all the sixteen priests referred to above are required. One additional priest, viz., *Sadasya* is also chosen optionally.

The *Adhvaryu* and/or the priests of his group perform their duties in sacrifices, employing the *Mantras* from one of the schools of the *Yajurveda* and following the injunctions laid down by the Brāhmaṇa text and the relevant Śrauta-sūtra of that school. Similarly, the

Hotṛ and/or his associate-priests perform their duties, employing the *Mantras* from one of the schools of the *Ṛgveda* and following the instructions of the Ṛgvedic Brāhmaṇa and the Śrauta-sūtra. Thus the *Udgātṛ* and/or the members of his group sing *Sāmans* and perform their duties according to one of the schools of the *Sāmaveda*, as per injunctions laid down by their respective Brāhmana and Śruta-sūtra. *Brahmā* and/or his associates also follow the *Atharvaveda*[8] and its Brāhmaṇa. However, the *Brahmā* priest is required to supervise the procedure of the sacrifice, and if any of the details of the sacrifice goes wrong, he advises the expiation. At times, he has to chant some special *Sāmans*[9] or to recite the *Sūktas*[10] like *apratiratha* from the *Ṛgveda*. He should therefore be *Sarva-veda-vid*, knower of all the Vedas.[11]

Thus, all the four Vedas are required for the performance of the Vedic sacrifice. But, according to Sāyaṇācārya, *Yajurveda* which sequentially fabricates the details of the sacrifice, is the substratum of sacrifice, as it forms the canvas on which the other Vedas draw the pictures.[12]

Members of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya class are entitled to perform sacrifices. Occasionally, the Niṣāda-sthapati or Rathakāra is allowed to perform some sacrifices.[13]

However, only members belonging to the Brāhmaṇa class are entitled to discharge the duties of the *Ṛtviks*,[14] i.e. the priests.

Now, what is *Yajña*? According to the Mīmāṁsakas, it is another name of *Dharma* (religion).[15]

Kātyāyana confirms that *Yajña* consists of three[16] factors, viz.,

(i) *dravya*—the material of oblation.

(ii) *devatā*—principal and auxilliary deities to whom the oblations are to be offered and

(iii) *tyāga*—offering of some oblation to some deity.

In addition to these factors, employment of *mantras* by the priests is also important.

Excepting in the Sattra-sacrifices, the *Dakṣiṇā* is paid to priests. Though they are hired by the sacrificer, they are treated as messengers of gods.[17]

The sacrificer is required to set up three fires at *Agnyādhāna* rite and since then he has to offer oblations at them. The three fires are named as *Gārhapatya*, *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇa*. The altar, i.e. *vedi* and the pits, i.e. *āyatanas*, mounds, i.e. *dhiṣṇyās* are prepared in a confined enclosure called *Vihāra*.

Generally oblations are baked or cooked on the *Gārhapatya* and offered to the deities, at the *Āhavanīya* fire. *Dakṣiṇāgni* is used for cooking the *anvāhārya* rice to be given away as *Dakṣiṇā* to the priests in the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices and also for the rites related to the *Pitṛs*, i.e., the deceased ancestors.

The pit for the *Gārhapatya* fire is circular in shape and is situated to the west of the altar. To its east, the *Āhavanīya* fire pit is constructed. It is square in shape. To the south of the *Gārhapatya*, the *Dakṣiṇāgni* pit is constructed. It is semi-circular in shape.

In *Varuṇapraghāsa-parvan* of the *Cāturmāsya* sacrifice and in the Paśubandha, additional altars are prepared. In Soma sacrifices, however, the altar is extended to the east and consists of *Sadas* pandal, *Haviradhāna* pandal and *uttaravedi*, and also *Āgnīdhrīya* pandal and *Mārālīya* shade. The *Uttaravedi* is constructed in the form of a square mound or mounds of different shapes. In *Ahīna* sacrifices, big pits are prepared, wherein the *Āhavanīya* fire is placed.

The perspective of Śrauta rites is extensive. They may be captioned under (1) *Homa* (2) *Iṣṭi*, (3) *Paśu* and (4) *Soma* sacrifices. *Pravargya* may not be regarded as a separate or independent rite. It is augmented to the Soma sacrifices, optionally.

These four categories of the rituals may again be divided into two, viz., *Nitya* (obligatory) and *Kāmya*, for fulfilling certain desires. The *Nitya*, i.e. the obligatory sacrifices may be regarded as the norms while in *Kāmya* sacrifies, certain modifications as prescribed by the ritual texts are effected, as far as the deities and oblations are concerned.

The types of the sacrifices may again be analysed in three divisions, viz., *Pākayajñas*, *Haviryajñas* and *Somayajñas*. Of these *Pākayajñas* are the *Gṛhya*-rites while *Haviryajñas* and *Somayajñas* are known as Śrauta-rites.

Seven *Pākayajñas* are enumerated as follows: *Huta, Prahuta, Āhuta, Śūlagava, Bali-haraṇa, Pratyavarohaṇa* and *Aṣṭakā homas* (Bśs 244). However, Bśs states that *Pākayajñas* are innumerable. Whatever is offered outside the *Vihāra*, may be termed as *Pākayajña*.[18]

Seven *Haviryajñas* are enumerated as follows: *Agnyādheya, Agnihotra, Darśapūrṇamāsa, Āgrayaṇa, Cāturmāsyāni, Dākṣāyaṇa* and, *Kuṇḍa-pāyinām ayanam* (Bśs 24.4). According to the *Gautama Dharma sūtra* (1.8.20), the seven *Havis* sacrifies are *Agnyādheya, Agnihotra, Darśapūrṇamāsa, Āgrayaṇa, Cāturmāsyāni, Nirūḍhapaśubandha* and *Sautrāmaṇī*. The *Lāṭyāyanaśs* (5.4.23) substitutes the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* in place of *Āgrayaṇa*.

Seven *Soma-Yajñas* are enumerated as follows: *Agniṣṭoma, Atyagniṣṭoma, Ukthya, Ṣoḍaśī, Vājapeya, Aptoryāma* and *Atirātra*.

In the above Soma-sacrifices, Soma is pressed and its juice is offered to deities, on only one day of the sacrifice. Hence these Soma sacrifices are called *ekāhas*, i.e., having the duration of one day.

The Soma-sacrifice in which Soma is pressed and its juice is offered for two to twelve days are named as *Ahīnas*.

Soma sacrifices in which Soma is pressed and its juice is offered for twelve days or more are termed as *Sattras*. In Sattra-sacrifices, all the priests are regarded as *Yajamānas*, and *dakṣiṇā* is not offered to them.

However, a twelve-day Soma sacrifice with some variations has the characteristics of both *Ahīna* and *Sattra*.

A Soma sacrifice extending over one full year, i.e. when the Soma-juice is offered on all the days of the year is known as *Ayana*.

Thus, after dealing in general with the salient features of the Śrauta religion, let us come to some of the important sacrificial rituals.

I

AGNYĀDHEYA

As a pre-requisite for performing subsequent rituals, it is necessary for a sacrificer, to set up three sacred fires, viz., *Gārhapatya*, *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇa*. According to some schools,

Sabhya fire has also to be set up. The *Āvasathya* fire has also to be set up at the time of marriage. It is also called *aupāsana* and *vaivāhika.*

Vedic texts have prescribed certain rituals for setting up these fires, which the sacrificer has to perform.

Before the performance of the rituals for setting up the fires, the sacrificer has to get prepared the *araṇīs,* i.e. churning logs from the Aśvattha tree grown in the womb of the Śamī tree. He should also get prepared the implements like srucs, i.e. ladles, *sruvas,* i.e. spoons, *sphya,* i.e., a wooden sword, *camasas,* i.e. square vessels, *antardhānakaṭa,* i.e. a small wooden curtain, etc. all from the wood.

He should also collect the following materials, i.e. *sambhāras* for placing in fire-pits. These are sand, salty soil, soil dug by rats, soil dug by boar, soil of anthill, the wet soil from the sides of rivers/ponds, gravels and pieces of gold, etc.

Similarly, he should collect sticks of the following wood, viz., Aśvattha, Uḍumbara, Parṇa, Śamī, Vikaṅkata, the tree struck by lightning, the leaf of lotus, etc.

The sacrificer should get the shade prepared with bamboos, its roof pointing to the east. He should also prepare the altar and fix the places for *Gārhapatya, Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇa* fires. To the north of the *Gārhapatya,* he should tether a spotted goat.

The sacrificer should get shaved his hair and beard. He and his wife should trim their nails and take bath.

The *Adhvaryu* should take the portion of the fire from the *Aupāsana* fire and put it on the place fixed for the *Gārhapatya,* for cooking *Brahmaudana* rice. He should cook that rice and offer a portion of it to that fire. He should pour clarified butter on the remaining cooked rice and give it to four priests. He should then take three sticks of the Aśvattha and besmear them with the *Brahmaudana*—rice and offer them in the fire. The four priests should consume the *Brahmaudana*—rice. Boons are to be granted to priests. The priests should keep offering enkindling sticks to that fire throughout the night.

Next morning the *araṇīs* be heated on the *Brahmaudanika* fire and that fire be extinguished. The *Adharyu* should sprinke water over the places fixed for the fires and place the materials, i.e. *sambhāras,* over them. He should also place pieces of gold over the materials. He should churn the fire form the *araṇīs,* and place that churned fire on the place of the *Gārhapatya.* He should place the enkindling sticks of Asvattha wood on it and let it flame up. He should lift up that burning stick and place it in a pan. He should lift the pan up and make the sacrificer recite the formulas called '*Agni-tanu*' (Apśs 5.10.7) in the ear of a horse kept aside. He should carry the pan towards the east. The horse should also walk towards the east. He should make the horse put his right foot upon the materials deposited in the *Āhavanīya* fire-pit and should place the fire from the pan in the pit of the *Āhavanīya. Brhamā* priest should rotate the chariot—wheel from the *Gārhapatya* to the *Āhavanīya* fire pit. The *Āgnidhra* should place the fire, either churned out or brought from common fire-place and deposit it in the *Ānvāhārya*-fire (*Dakṣiṇāgni*) pit. The *Adhvaryu* should offer Agnihotra libations without employing any formula.

Thus the fires are set up and the sacrificer has to take care to keep all of them or at least the *Gārhaptya,* burning continuously.

After setting up the fires, the *Adhvaryu* should offer a cake baked on eight potsherds, to Agni.

The dice play takes place near the *Sabhya* fire. The sacrificer wins in the dice game. The sacrificial fees are distributed.

The *Adhvaryu* thereafter proceeds to perform the *Pavamānahavīṁṣi* (*tanu-havīṁṣi*). He offers caked to *Agni Pavamāna*, *Agni Pāvaka* and *Agni Śuci*, each baked on eight potsherds. He also makes *pūrṇāhuti* offering on the *Āhavanīya* fire.

He should then perform the *Anvārambhaṇīyā* sacrifice and begin offering New-moon and Full-moon, i.e., *Darśa—pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices on every New-moon and Full-moon day and thereafter continue to offer them till his last breath or for thirty years.

II

AGNIHOTRA

After formaly setting up the sacred fires, the sacrificer is required to make daily evening and morning *Agnihotra* offerings as long as he is alive or for thirty years.

The sacrificer himself should offer the daily evening and morning *Agnihotra* at least on Full-moon day and New-moon day. On other days the *Adhvaryu* or the disciple of the sacrificer may make the *Agnihotra* offering. However, the sacrificer or his wife must be present at that time.

The sacrificer should either permanently maintain all the three fires incessantly burning or at least he should keep the *Gārhapatya* fire burning continuously. In case, only the *Gārhapatya* fire is kept burning, the *Adhvaryu* should take up portions of fire from the *Gārhapatya* and place them in the *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇāgni* fire-pits at sunrise and sunset.

The sacrificer, the *Adharyu* or the disciple should add fuel to the sacred fires. For *Agnihotra* offerings he should use cow's milk, rice-grains, barley, clarified butter or curds. If the sacrificer offers cow's milk, he should get the cows milked. He should heat the milk and allow it to become cool. He should draw the milk in the *Agnihotra* ladle for four times with the spoon and should place a fire-stick over the ladle. He should, then, place that stick on the *Āhavanīya* fire. He should, then, make the offerings over that stick. In the evening, he should offer the first libation to Agni and the second to Prajāpati. In the morning, he should offer the first libation to Sun and the second to Prajāpati. The sacrificer or the *Adhvaryu* should consume the milk remaining in the ladle and wash it clean and pour that wash-water over the gound at the rear of the *Gārhapatya*. If the sacrificer's wife is present, he should pour that water in the cavity of her folded hands.

The sacrificer then recites the relevant prayers to the fire.

III

NEW-MOON AND FULL-MOON SACRIFICES (DARŚAPŪRṆAMĀSAU)

The New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices are performed on different days. However, both are combined and they form one unit. These two rituals are treated as one sacrifice.

Before offering the first New-moon sacrifice, the sacrificer has to offer two *Sārasvata* oblations and *Anvārambhaṇīyā iṣṭi*.

The sacrificer, who has set up the sacred fires should then offer the New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices. The preliminary rites of this iṣṭi should be performed on the new-moon day and full moon-day, and the principal rites and offerings should be performed on the following *pratipad*-day. However, in case of the Full-moon sacrifice, the sacrificer may go through the preliminary rites on the *pratipad* day itself which follows the full-moon day. The day previous to the *pratipad* day is termed as the *upavasatha* day. The New-moon and Full-moon sacrifices are performed at the joints of the bright half and dark half of the lunar months.

In New-moon sacrifice, the principal deities and oblations offered to them are as follows:

(a) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni

(b) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indrāgnī or the *sānnāyya*, i.e. curds and milk to Indra or Mahendra

In Full-moon sacrifice, the principal deities and oblations offered to them are as follows:

(1) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni,

(2) The clarified butter to Prajāpati, Viṣṇu or Agnīṣomau,

(3) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Agnīṣomau,

(4) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Vaimṛdha Indra. This is optionally offered.

However, the procedure of these two units consists of many smaller ritualistic details. They may be summarized as follows: (1) shaving (on the *upavasatha-parva*-day), (2) cleaning the fire pits, (3) taking the fire from the *Gārhapatya* and placing it in the fire-pits of the *Dakṣiṇa* and *Āhavanīya*, (4) adding the fuel to the fires, (5) entering upon a vow, (6) choosing the *Brahmā* priest, (7) placing the *praṇītā* water to the south of the *Āhavanīya*, (8) spreading the sacrificial grass, (9) arranging the sacrificial utensils, (10) measuring out the grains for oblations, (11) consecrating the *prokṣaṇī* water, (12) sprinkling the *prokṣaṇī* water over the oblation material and utensils, (13) threshing paddy, (14) arranging potsherds in the *Gārhapatya* fire-pit, (15) threshing oblation corn and pounding it into flour, (16) drawing clarified butter in the vessel, (17) prepartion of a Veda (bunch of sacrificial grass), (18) preparation of oblation, i.e. cakes, or *caru*, (19) placing the vessel of clarified butter on the *Gārhapatya*, (20) placing the oblation cakes on potsherds for baking, (21) washing the vessels and the fingers after preparation of cakes and placing that wash-water aside, along with the stickings of wet flour, (22) offering the wash-water to the *āptya* deities, (23) cooking of *anvāhārya* rice, (24) measuring the altar and cleaning it,

(25) *stambayajur-haraṇam,* i.e. removing the clods and grass outside the *vedi* along with the evil spirits and preparing the *vedi,* (26) placing *prokṣaṇī* water, fire sticks and bunches of the sacrificial grass, (27) cleansing the spoons and ladles, (28) girdling the wife with a belt of *darbha* blades, (29) wife looking at the clarified butter, (30) purifying the clarified butter, (31) drawing the melted clarifed butter in the ladles, (32) sprinkling the water over the kindling woods and the sacrificial grass, (33) spreading the sacrificial grass over the altar, (34) placing the enclosing sticks on three sides of the *Āhavanīya* fire-pit, (35) placing the ladles on the altar, (36) taking out the cakes from the potsherds, (37) counting the potsherds and taking them out, (38) placing the oblations on the altar, (39) recitation of the *sāmidhenī* formulas by the *Hotṛ,* while *Adhvaryu* offers *sāmdhenī* sticks on the *Āhavanīya,* (40) first *āghāra* offering to Prajāpati, with clarified butter, by means of spoon and second to Indra, by means of a ladle, (41) Nivid formulas referring to the ancestors of the sacrificer, to be recited by the *Hotṛ*-priest and invocation of the deitites, (42) choosing of the *Hotṛ* priest and his *japa,* (43) *prayāja* offerings with clarified butter to the deities of the *prayājas*—viz., Samidhaḥ, Tanūnapāt or Narāśaṁsa, Idaḥ, Barhiḥ and Svāhākṛtiḥ, (44) *ājyabhāga* offerings of clarified butter to Agni and Soma, (45) principal offerings of cakes, etc., to the relevant principal deities of the *iṣṭi* (as referred to above), (46) *sviṣṭakṛt* offerings (portions of oblations) to Agni, (47) *prāśitra*—i.e., a portion of cake, to be given to the *Brahmā* priest, (48) performance of *iḍā,* its invocation, consuming the portions from *iḍā,* (49) distributing the cooked *anvāhārya* rice to the priests, (50) *anuyāja* offerings to Barhiḥ, Narāśaṁsa and Sviṣṭakṛt—the deities of *anuyāja,* (51) *devebhyaḥ āhutiḥ,* (52) *srug-vyūhanam,* i.e., separation of the ladles, (53) *sūktavāka*—placing the bunch of *prastara* on the *Āhavanīya* fire, (54) *saṁsrāva-bhāgāhutiḥ,* (55) *patnī-saṁyāja* offerings by wife—to Soma, Tvaṣṭṛ, Devānām patnīḥ and Agni-Gṛhapati; *patnīḍā*—consuming of *iḍā,* etc., (56) *saṁsrāvāhutiḥ,* (57) two libations on the *Dakṣiṇā*-fire, (58) offering of the *piṣṭalepa*—wet flour stuck at the vessels, (59) loosening of Veda-bunch and unfastening the girdle by the wife, (60) spreading the Veda-grass over the altar and placing fuel-stick on the *Āhavanīya,* (61) *samiṣṭayajus* offerings, (62) offering to *Divya Nabhas* and to *Rudra-Paśupati,* (63) pouring *praṇītā*-water over the altar, (64) pouring water in cavity of the folded hands of the sacrificer, (65) three *viṣṇu*—steps to be strided by the sacrificer towards the east, (66) sacrificer should gaze at his share in oblation, and gaze at earth, (67) prayer to the *Gārhapatya* and other fires for blessings, (68) release of vow, (69) consuming the share of oblation by the sacrificer.

These are only the salient features of the *Pūrṇamāsa iṣṭi.*

In New-moon sacrifice, however, the sacrificer, in addition to the above items, is required to perform on the New-moon day, *piṇḍa-Pitṛyajña* in which oblations are offered to deceased forefather of the sacrificer.

If the sacrificer is entitled to offer *sānnāyya,* the *Adhvaryu* should make arrangement for the milking of at least six cows, heat the milk and curdle it, on the New-moon day. The cows are also milked for the fresh milk on the *pratipad* day.

This *Nitya iṣṭi* serves as a model for all the *Naimittika* and *Kāmya-iṣṭis.* In such *Naimittika* and *Kāmya-iṣṭis,* some modifications are effected especially in the cases of the principal deities and the oblations offered to them, as prescribed by the relevant Vedic texts.

IV

CĀTURMĀSYĀNI

All the Yajurvedic Brāhmaṇa texts deal with the procedure of the *Cāturmāsya* sacrifice. *Śāṅkhāyana Brāhmaṇa* of the *Ṛgveda* and the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* of the *Atharvaveda* also prescribe this sacrifice. The *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa* and the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* deal with the *Cāturmāsya* as characterized by the Soma-sacrifice.

Cāturmāsya consists of four *parvans*, viz., *Vaiśvadeva*, *Varuṇa-praghāsa*, *Sākamedha*, and *Śunāsīrīya*. The performance of these *parvans* extends over the period of one full year. As the name '*Cāturmāsya*' itself indicates, there should be an interval of four months between the performance of two *parvans*, i.e. each next *parvan* is performed after four months after the performance of the preceding *parvan*. Actually the three *parvans* cover the period of one year, and the problem arises as to when the fourth *parvan*, viz., the *Śunāsīrīya* is to be performed. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.6.3.10, therefore states that, by offering the three *parvans* in three periods of the year, one covers the whole year. Hence, one may perform the *Śunāsīrīya parvan* any time after the performance of the third, i.e., the *Sākamedha-parvan*. However, it also prescribes that, if the sacrificer desires to perform the *Cāturmāsya* sacrifices again, he should perform the *Śunāsīrīya parvan* on the preceding day of the Full-moon day of the Phālguna and begin the *Vaiśvadeva parvan* on the Full-moon day. (Ś Br. 2.6-3.10-13)

It appears that the *Cāturmāsya* was originally a part of the *Rājasūya*-sacrifice. Excepting only the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, all the Yajurvedic texts deal with the *Cāturmāsya* in the prescription of the *Rājasūya* only. It was later extracted out from the *Rājasūya* and was performed independently.

It also appears that originally there may have been only first three parvans of the *Cāturmāsya*, since the three *parvans* cover one full year. Again though the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* (I.10) treats the *Cāturmāsya* separately, i.e., independent of the *Rājasūya*, it prescribes the portion of *Śunāsīrīya* only in the *Rājasūya*-section. (*Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* 2.6.3 and 4.3.3)

The *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* states that the *parvans* of the *Cāturmāsya* are to be performed at the joints of the seasons because the period joining the seasons causes diseases. MaitS. 4.3.3, however, prescribes the rainy seasons for performing the *Śunāsīrīya*. (*Varṣye udake yajeta.*)

In all the four *parvans*, the first five principal deities and the offerings to them appear to be common.

Vaiśvadeva-parvan

In *Vaiśvadeva parvan* the following oblations are offered:

(i) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni,
(ii) A *caru* (cooked rice) to Soma,
(iii) A cake baked on twelve potsherds to Savitṛ,

(iv) A *caru* to Sarasvatī,

(v) A *caru* to Pūṣan.

These five offerings are named as *sañcara-havīṁṣi*, since they are common to all the *parvans*. The next offerings pertaining to this *parvan* are:

(vi) A cake baked on seven potsherds to Maruts,

(vii) An *āmikṣā* to Viśvedevas, and

(viii) A cake baked on one potsherd jointly to Dyāvāpṛthivī.

Thus there are totally eight principal offerings in this *Parvan*.

Varuṇa-praghāsa-parvan

First five offerings are the same as in the *Vaiśvadeva parvan*. However, a cake to Savitṛ is baked on eight potsherds instead of on twelve. The next offerings are:

(vi) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra-Agni,

(vii) An *āmikṣā* to Maruts and to Varuṇa,

(viii) A cake baked on one potsherd to Ka.

In this *parvan* one additional priest, the *Pratiprasthātṛ* is employed. The *Adhvaryu* prepares two altars adjacent to each other. One is prepared for the *Adhvaryu* and the other for the *Pratiprasthātṛ*. On the northern altar, the *Adhvaryu* constructs a squre mound and makes a square navel in the middle of that mound.

In this *parvan*, *pṛṣadājya*, i.e., speckled ghee is used for *Anuyāja* offerings.

Varuṇa and Maruts are two additional important deitis in this *parvan* and *āmikṣā* is offered to them. Along with the *āmikṣā*, a ram and an ewe prepared out of barley flour are also offered to Varuṇa and Maruts respectively.

The sacrificer's wife offers the *Karambha*-pots made of flour, placed in the winnowing basket. Before offering the *Karambha* pots, the *Pratiprasthātṛ* asks her the question: who is your paramour? She should proclaim if she has any. Thereby she is released from the untruth and becomes fit for the sacrifice. The concept of confession appears to have been resorted to here. If she has none, she should confirm accordingly.

At the end of the *Varuṇa-praghāsa-parvan*, the *Avabhṛtha* rite is gone through. The scrappings of *āmikṣā* to Varuṇa is the principal oblation in this rite. The *Avabhṛtha* rite is similar to that observed at the end of the Soma sacrifice.

Sākamedha-parvan

The performance of this *parvan* is spread over two days, and it consists of a few *iṣṭis*, besides the regular offerings, i.e. *Mahāhavīṁṣi*.

On the first day the following iṣṭis are performed:

(i) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Anīkavat Agni to be offered at sunrise,

(ii) A *caru* to Sāntapana Maruts in mid-day, and

(iii) A *caru* cooked in milk of all the cows belonging to the sacrificer, to Gṛhamedhin Maruts in the evening.

The scrapping of this *caru* is kept aside for *pūrṇa-darvī* offering in the next morning offering.

Pūrṇa-darvī homa: Next day in the early morning, the scrapping of *caru* kept aside at *Gṛhamedhīyā iṣṭi* is drawn in a ladle. A bull is brought near the altar. When the bull makes a roaring sound, the *Adhvaryu* offers that scrapping on the *Gārhapatya*-fire. If the bull does not roar, he offers it with the consent of the *Brahmā* priest. This rite is called *Pūrṇadarvī-homa.*

Krīḍanīṣṭi: At the sunrise a cake baked on seven potsherds is offered to Krīḍin-Maruts.

Mahāhavīṁṣi: First five *sañcara* offerings as in *Vaiśvadeva parvan.*

(vi) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Agni and Indra
(vii) A *caru* to Indra and
(viii) A cake baked on one potsherd to Viśvakarman

Mahāpitṛyajña: After offerings of the *Mahāhavīṁṣi*, the ritual of *Mahāpitṛyajña* follows. In this *Mahāpitṛyajña*, the following oblations are offered:

(i) A cake baked on six potsherds to Soma-Pitṛmat,
(ii) *Dhānās* (fried grains) to *Pitṛs barhiṣads.*
(iii) *Mantha* (Flour of *dhānā*) mixed with the milk of cow whose calf is dead, to *Pitṛs-agniṣvāttas*

A square mound for altar is constructed towards the south of the *Dakṣiṇa* fire. All offerings are made on *Dakṣiṇa* fire.

The balls of cooked rice are placed at the three corners of the altar and are dedicated to three ancestors of the sacrificer. *Anuyājas* are also offered.

Tryambaka offerings: The *Adhvaryu* prepares as many cakes as are the members of the family of the sacrificer with one additional cake. Each cake is baked on one potsherd. The cakes are placed in a basket of grass. While the additional cake is placed in a hole made by moles, the sacrificer meditates upon one whom he hates.

The portions from the cakes are offered to Rudra on the fire-brand taken from the *Dakṣiṇa* fire and placed on the crossing of roads, by means of a middle leaf of a *palāśa* twig. The priests, the sacrificer and the members of his family go round the fire three times, by left, beating their left thighs. Even maidens desiring husbands go round the fire. The sacrificer throws up with his palms, the remains of the *Rudra*-cakes and tries to catch them while they fall down. The *Adhvaryu* should collect them in a pair of buckets, hang them on the end of a bamboo shaft, which is then kept on a branchless tree or on a bamboo tree or on ant hill. They all come back home without looking behind, and wash their hands.

Śunāśirīya-parvan

Next day, the *Śunāśirīya parvan* be performed.

First five oblations are as per *sañcara* offerings. The next oblations are:

(vi) A cake baked on twelve potsherds to Indra Śunāsīra,
(vii) *Payas* (milk) to Vāyu, and
(viii) A cake baked on one potsherd to Sūrya.

The sacrifical fee to the priests is a plough with six oxen or a pair of strong bulls. This *Śunāsīrīya*, rite appears to be related to agriculture.

V

SAUTRĀMAṆI

Sautrāmaṇī is enjoined in two forms—viz., *Caraka Sautrāmaṇī* and *Kokila-Sautrāmaṇī. Kokila* is narrated in seven *haviḥ-saṁsthās,* while *Caraka* is enjoined in connection with the *Rājasūya. Caraka* or *Kokila* may be performed after the *Agnicayana.* These forms may be categorized either under *Nitya, Kāmya* or *Aṅgabhūta* of the *Rājasūya/Agnicayana.*

Both of them are characterized by *iṣṭi,* as well as by *Paśu.* In both forms, *surā* (wine) is required as one of the oblation materials.

Caraka: For preparing *surā,* the sacrificer purchases the sprouts of grass from an eunuch, in exchange of lead. With some other requisites of preparing *surā,* the sprouts are kept for fermenting for three nights. On the fourth day, three or four victims are offered. The *grahas* (pots) of *surā* are drawn. The *surā* vessel is taken to the *Dakṣiṇa* fire-place.

The sacrificial post is fixed.

A goat of smoky-colour for *Aśvinau,* a ram for *Sarasvān* and a *Ṛṣabha,* i.e. a bull for Indra are immolated and offered in this sacrifice. If the sacrificer has vomitted *surā* due to its excessive drink, he offers an additional goat to Bṛhaspati by way of expiation.

After the omentum offering, the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛ,* offer *surā* cups to Aśvinau, Sarasvān and Sutrāman Indra. The *surā,* left over, after the offering, is given to a Brahmin for drinking. If such Brahmin is not available, it is poured on an ant-hill.

The wooden post is fixed near the *Dakṣiṇa* fire. A dish with holes is placed in a noose and is hanged to that post and the percolation of *surā* from the dish on the *Dakṣiṇa* fire is allowed.

After the offering of the *paśu-puroḍāśa* and the cooked limbs of the victims and performance of the *anuyājas,* the *Adhvaryu* inserts the iron spokes, used for picking the heart of *paśu,* at the place joining the wet and dry areas of water-place.

After *Avabhṛtha,* the *Caraka Sautrāmaṇī* concludes.

Kokila: On the first day a victim is offered to Indra. A bull is given as *Dakṣiṇa.* A *caru* is offered to Aditi. A calf is given as *Dakṣiṇa:*

The *surā* is fermented for three nights.

On the fourth day, after measuring out the clarified butter, he should also measure out milk for oblations. The *surā* is filtered. Clarified butter and milk are drawn in cups for Aśvinau, Sarasvān and Sutrāman Indra. The flour of barley, that of wheat-grains and of *upavāka* grains are added in the cups for Aśvinau, Sarasvān and Sutrāman Indra respectively. The *surā* cups are also drawn for them. Hairs of a lion, tiger and wolf are placed in the *surā*-cups drawn for Aśvinau, Sarasvān and Sutrāman Indra respectively. Three victims are offered.

Forty cows and a mare with a calf are to be given as *Dakṣiṇa.*

The fire is placed on a mound constructed towards the south of the Āhavanīya-fire. The *Adhvaryu*, the *Pratiprasthātṛ*, and the *Āgnīdhra* stand facing east and simultaneously offer milk cups with their left hand on the *Āhavanīya* fire and *surā* cups, with their right hand on the southern mound, to the above three deities respectively. The three priests and the sacrificer consume the remaining milk from the milk cups. Other performances regarding *surā* resemble those in *Caraka Sautrāmaṇī.*

After offering the limbs of victims, the *yūṣa* (soup of meat) is filled in the horns and hoofs of victims and is offered. The remaining portion of *yūṣa*-offering is collected in a separate pot. The sacrificer takes a seat on a chair towards the south of the *Āhavanīya* and he is sprinkled with that *yūṣa. Sviṣṭakṛt* offering and further rituals are performed. *Avabhṛtha* ritual is executed.

A victim is offered to Vayodhas Indra. A bull is given as *Dakṣiṇa.* An *iṣṭi* for Aditi is performed. A *caru* is an oblation to Aditi in this *iṣṭi.*

VI

PAŚU (VICTIM) OFFERING

Paśu-sacrifice forms one of the three categories of Śrauta sacrifices—viz., *Iṣṭi, Paśu* and *Soma.* It is performed independently every year in the rainy seasons. Optionally it is performed twice a year, at the beginning of the *udagayana* and *daskṣiṇāyana.* The victim in the *Nitya* (obligatory) *Paśu* sacrifice should be a he-goat offered either to Indrāgnī or to the Sun god or to Prajāpati.

In Soma sacrifice also a victim is offered to *Agnīṣomau* on the previous day of Soma-offering and also to Agni on the day of soma-offering, i.e. on *sutyā* day. A victim for undergoing the expiation is also offered on this *sutyā*-day. Besides, in the sacrifices like *Vājapeya* and others, additional number of victims are offered as per Vedic injunctions. In *Kāmya-paśu* section of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* (II.I) a number of victims have been prescribed for fulfilling the desires of the sacrificer. The *Agnīṣomīya paśu* in Soma sacrifice appears to be a model of all *paśu*-offerings.

The ritual of victim offering requires six priests viz., *Adhvaryu, Pratiprasthātṛ, Hotṛ, Maitrāvaruṇa* (*Praśāstṛ*), *Āgnīdhra* and *Brahmā.*

A cake, i.e. *puroḍāśa,* is offerd to the same deity to whom the victim is offered. The sacrificial fee for the *paśu*-sacrifice is a bull or a milky cow or a boon to the priests.

Yūpa, the sacrificial post, made either of *Palāśa, Khadira, Bilva* or *Rohītaka* wood is to be prepared. It should be fashioned with eight corners. It should be three or four *Aratnis* in height, with the upper tip for placing a *caṣāla* i.e. wooden ring.

A separate altar is prepared which resembles that in the *Varuṇa-praghāsa* of the *Cāturmāsya.*

The rites, viz., entering upon a vow by the sacrificer, taking the *praṇītā* water forward, *ājya-bhāga*-offerings, cutting the *iḍā* portions, pouring the water from the *pūrṇapātra* vessel in the cavity of the folded hands of the sacrificer, *viṣṇu-steps* etc. are also performed in the animal sacrifice as in the *Darśa-pūrṇamāsau.*

The *yūpa* is fixed to the east of the *Āhavanīya* fire. The *svaru*, i.e., first chip fallen out, while cutting the post, is also tied on the sacrificial post.

The *Adhvaryu* touches the victim with a *darbha*-blade.

The fire is churned out from the *Araṇīs*.

The priests tie the victim to the post and sprinkle it with water. It is anointed by the clarified butter on its forehead, shoulders and hips.

A staff of udumbara wood is given to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest.

There are eleven *prayāja* and eleven anuyāja offerings to be performed in the *Paśu*-sacrifice. The collection of *ṛk*-formulas named as *yājyās* in *prayājas* are referred to as *Āpri-sūktas*.

A fire-brand is waved around the victim, three times, and also around the clarified butter, *śāmitra*-fire-place, the sacrificial post, the *cātvāla* pit and the *Āhavanīya* fire.

The *Adhvaryu* places the fire in the *śāmitra*-shade. The *Śamitā* holds the animal's mouth tightly and controls its breath and quietens it or he tightens the noose of the cord round the neck of the victim and quietens it.

The *Adhvaryu* offers the clarified butter on the *Āhavanīya* fire. The sacrificer's wife pours the water over the quietened victim's mouth, nostrils, eyes, navel, penis, thighs and feet.

The Adhvaryu puts a blade of *darbha* grass near the victim's navel and cuts it with a knife, along with its skin. He takes the part of that *darbha* blade and anoints it with the blood of the victim and throws it on the *cātvāla*. The sacrificer stresses down that blade with his foot.

The *Adhvaryu* then pulls out the omentum of the victim on two frying sticks, i.e. *vapā-śrapaṇī*. The *Pratiprasthātṛ* heats the omentum, holding it over the *Āhavanīya* fire. The *Adhvaryu* pours clarified butter over it.

The *prayājas* are offered. Two *ājyabhāga* oblations are offered. The *Adhvaryu* draws clarified butter in the *juhū* and places in it a piece of gold and a portion from the omentum and offers it to the relevent deity on the *Āhavanīya*-fire. He also throws the frying sticks on the *Āhavanīya*-fire. All the priests, the sacrificer and his wife sprinkle themselves with water. The *Adhvaryu* disects the victim and cuts off the various parts of it—viz., heart, tongue, chest, left arm, liver, testicles, middle part of intestine, anus, right buttock, etc. He also cuts off the parts of right arm, thin entrail, left buttock as well as the broad intestine, tail, throat tube, spleen, upper part of udder, fleshy part covering the heart.

The *Adhvaryu* should throw the excreta of the animal in a pit dug at the rear of the *śāmitra* shade and to the north of the *utkara*.

He picks up the heart of the victim on the iron-spoke and bakes it on the *śāmitra* fire. The other cuttings of the animals are cooked in a boiling vessel.

A cake baked on eleven potsherds is offerd to the same deity to which the victim is offered.

The cuttings of the victim are dipped in the water three times. He puts heart on the top of the other cuttings. He pours the spotted ghee over the heart and also on all the portions. He draws the fat into the *vasāhoma*-ladle and pours clarified butter over it. He takes the cuttings of the victim in two ladles. He pours the remaining fat from the

vasā-homa-ladle into the *iḍā*-vessel and puts in it the remaining portions of the chest and other cuttings, viz., heart, tongue, etc.

He offers spotted ghee to Vanaspati, by means of *juhū*. He places the *iḍā* vesel with portions of cuttings, in front of the *Hotṛ*-priest. *Iḍā* is invoked. The portion of the entrail is given to the *Āgnīdhra*, and that which is above the udder to the *Hotṛ*. The *Āgnīdhara* takes the fire from the *śāmitra*-shade and deposits it on the northern hip of the altar. The *Pratiprasthātṛ* offers pieces of the third largest portion of the entrail to the *Upayaj*-fire.

Anuyāja-offerings are made. The *svaru*, i.e. chip of *yūpa* is also offered to the fire.

The *Patnīsaṁyāja* rite is performed with the offering of a tail of the victim or with clarified butter.

After offering the *samiṣṭa-yajus* oblations to the fire, the priests go to the water place and poke the iron-spoke, that picked the heart, at a place where dry and wet soils meet near the water place. They all touch the water. The *Adhvaryu* then puts the fire sticks on the *Āhavanīya* and the *Gārhapatya* as a mark of the conclusion of the sacrifice.

The separate animal-sacrifice is regarded as one pulled out from the Soma-sacrifice and the modification of the *Agnīṣomīya-paśu* offering.

There are, however, a number of *paśu*-sacrifices enjoined to fulfil the desires of the sacrificer. (Cp. Ts. 2.1.1)

VII

AGNIṢṬOMA

Agniṣṭoma is the norm, i.e. *prakṛti* of all the *Soma*-sacrifices. It is the first among the seven *Soma-saṁsthās*. The *mantras* from all the three Vedas are employed in this ritual. Sixteen priests divided into four groups discharge their duties. Additionally, *Sadasya* is also chosen as the seventeenth priest. Ten or twelve *camasādhvaryus* are employed for offering soma-juice from the *camasas*. It is also customary to appoint upagātṛs (cosingers) to associate the priests of *Udgātṛ*-group to help them in chanting the *Sāmans*.

One whose father or grandfather has not performed the Soma-sacrifice is not entitled to perform the Soma-sacrifice unless he undergoes expiation. The sacrificer is, however, required to perform the Soma-sacrifice, every year in *vasanta* season. This sacrifice requires five days for its performance, but the Soma-juice is offered on the last day of the sacrifice. On the first day all the sixteen priests are chosen for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice. The place for sacrifice is fixed. A sacrificial pandal, viz. the *prācīnavaṁśa* is constructed. The sacrificer and the wife take bath and sip water, with a view to become pure outwardly and inwardly. As a part of *dīkṣā*, the butter is applied to the body of the sacrificer, the collyrium is applied to his eyes. He is cleansed and purified by means of a bunch of sacrificial grass. The *Adhvaryu* offers *dīkṣā*-libations called *audgrabhaṇa* for the sacrificer. A girdle of *śara* grass is tied round his waist. The wife is also girdled with a belt of sacrificial grass. Thus the sacrificer with his wife is initiated in the Soma-sacrifice. Both of them have to observe some vows during the period of sacrifice. *Dīkṣaṇīyā iṣṭi* is

performed. A cake baked on eleven potsherds is offered to Agnā viṣṇū as the principal oblation of *Dīkṣaṇīya iṣṭi.* The sacrificer is declared as initiated, i.e. *dīkṣita.*

On the Second day, the sacrificer sends his messenger (saṁhāra) to acquire the necessary materials and requisites including money for the sacrifice. The *Prāyaṇīyā iṣṭi* is performed. The principal deities of this *iṣṭi* are:

(1) Pathyāsvasti, (2) Agni, (3) Soma, (4) Savitṛ and (5) Aditi.

The clarified butter is offered to the first four deities, while *caru* (cooked rice) is offerd to Aditi. The scrappings of the *caru* are kept protected. In the last *iṣṭi,* viz., in the *Udayanīyā,* the corn for the caru is measured out over these scrappings.

Purchase of Soma: The soma stalks are purchased from the seller of Soma, in exchange of a calf one year old, the gold and other objects. When the calf is taken to the soma-seller for purchasing Soma-stalks, the oblation of clarified butter is offered at the seventh footprint of the calf. The *Adhvaryu* collects the clods from the seventh footprint and gives it to the sacrificer, who again gives it to his wife. She keeps it at home. The soma is selected and tied in the garment and is placed in the cart yoked with two bullocks. It is taken to the *prācīnavaṁśa* pandal. *Ātithyā iṣṭi* is performed in honour of Soma, who is regarded as a guest-king. Viṣṇu is the principal deity of this *iṣṭi.* The corn for oblation is measured out by the sacrificer's wife, when one bullock of the cart is released and the other is still yoked. The soma stalks are placed on the *Āsandī,* near the *Āhavanīya.* A cake baked on nine potsherds is the oblation offered to Viṣṇu. In this *iṣṭi,* the fire is again churned out from the *Araṇīs* and the fire thus produced is thrown in the *Āhavanīya* fire.

Tānūnaptra: In the *Tānūnaptra* rite, the priests touch the clarified butter and take an oath that they will cooperate with each other till the conculsion of the Soma-sacrifice.

Somāpyāyana: The priests sprinkle water over the Soma-stalks and keep them fresh. This rite is performed for three days.

Nihnava: All the priests touch the *prastara,* i.e. the bunch of sacrificial grass, in the *vedi* and offer prayers to Dyāvāpṛthivī. This rite is also performed for three days.

Pravargya: The rite is performed for three days in morning and evening. It is not performed during the first Soma sacrifice of the sacrificer. The *Mahāvīra* pots of clay with three elevations are prepared and baked before the initiation, i.e. *dīkṣā* of the sacrificer. In this ritual, the clarified butter is poured in the *Mahāvīra*-pot and is heated to its boiling point on a special mound. The *Hotṛ* recites the formulas and the *Prastotṛ* chants the relevant *Sāmans.* The cow's milk and goat's milk is added in heated clarified butter. Consequently a flame flares up high. This mixture is termed as *Gharma,* which is futher offered in the Āhavanīya to Aśvinau and Indra. Two cakes each baked on one potsherd are offered to Rauhiṇau.

Upasad iṣṭi: This *iṣṭi* is performed for three days after each performance of *Pravargya.* The principal deities of this *iṣṭi* are Agni, Soma and Viṣṇu. The clarified butter is offered to them. After *Upasad,* the *Subrahmaṇya* priest invokes and invites Indra for ensueing the Soma-sacrifice (*Subrahmaṇyāhvāna*). The *Pravargya, Upasad* and *Subrahmaṇyāhvāna* are performed on three days in the morning and in the evening.

On the fourth day of the Soma sacrifice, after the performances of *Pravargya* and *Upasad,* the *Subrahmaṇya* priest recites his invocations, mentioning in them the names of the father and the sons of the sacrificer.

After both the morning and evening *Pravargya*, and the *Upasads*, the utensils used for *Pravargya* are placed on the *Uttara-vedi*. They are arranged in the shape of a *Puruṣa*, or in a circular shape. The fire from the *Āhavanīya* in *prācīna-vaṁśa* is taken to the *uttara-vedi* and placed there. Hereafter the fire on the *uttara-vedi* is designated as *Āhavanīya*. The original *Āhavanīya* in the *prācīna vaṁśa* is named as *Gārhapatya* or *Śālāmukhīya* and the original *Gārhapatya* is termed as *Prājahita* or *Prācīna-gārhapatya*.

Two carts are taken to the *Mahāvedi* from the east of the *prācīnavaṁśa* and they are placed at the rear of *uttara-vedi* on two sides. The *Havirdhāna* pandal is erected over them. Towards the west of this *Havirdhāna* pandal, another shade termed as *Sadas* is also constructed. In the middle of *Sadas*-shade a post of Udumbara wood is fixed. Towards the north of the *Havirdhāna* pandal, the shade for *Āgnīdhra's* mound is erected, half inside the *vedi* and half outside it. Towards the south, the *Mārjālīya-dhiṣṇyā*, for washing utensils, etc., is construted. Beneath the southern cart, four holes named as *Uparavas* are dug up. They are linked with each other from beneath. Two boards of the Udumbara wood are placed over the *Uparavas*. The skin of a red bull is spread over it. To the east of it, a mound for placing the soma-cups and goblets is constructed. It is constructed with the clods of earth dug from the *cātvāla*. One mound is constructed in the *Āgnīdhra* shade with the earth-clods brought from the *cātvāla* for keeping the *Āgnīdhra's* fire. Similarly, six mounds are constructed in the *Sadas* pandal for *Hotrakas* to the east of the *audumbarī* post with the clods of earth brought from the *cātvāla*.

The *Adhvaryu* puts *idhma*, i.e. fire sticks on the *Śālādvārya*, i.e., *Śālāmukhīya* fire in the *Prācīna-vaṁśa*. He scatters the earth-clods collected from the seventh foot-mark of the *Somakrayaṇī* calf, to the west of the *Śālādvārya* fire. The priests hold the ladles filled with clarified butter and proceed further to the *Mahāvedi* along with the sacrificer. The members of the sacrificer's family touch the sacrificer. They also proceed to the *Mahāvedi*. The *Adhvaryu* covers them with a piece of cloth held over them. Before proceeding further, the *Adhvaryu* offers an oblation of clarified butter on the fire-stick previously placed on the *Śālādvārya* fire. They take with them burning fire from the *Śālādvārya* and proceed further to the *Mahāvedi*. They also take with them the soma-stalks, pressing stones, *droṇa-kalaśa*, soma-cups, bundles of *idhma*, sticks for roasting omentum, the cords, the churning logs, etc. They proceed by the north of the *Sadas* and set the fire on the *Āgnīdhra* mound in the *Āgnīdhra* shade. The *Adhvaryu* offers a libation on the *Āgnīdhra* fire. They proceed further and place the bundle of soma-stalks on the southern *havirdhāna* cart.

Vasatīvarī water is brought from the river in the evening and is placed in the *havirdhāna*-pandal.

Agnīṣomīya paśu is offered on this day; along with the *paśu-puroḍāśa*.

Savanīya day: On the fifth day of the *Agniṣṭoma*, the soma-juice is offered to various deities, in three *Savanas* (sessions).

Prātaḥ Savana

The priests wake up in the early dawn, even before the birds make sound. They make preparations for crushing and pounding the soma-stalks and for filtering the soma-juice.

The *Adhvaryu* offers the *Kratukaraṇī*-offering in the *Āhavanīya*.

The *Āgnīdhra* measures out the *havis* material for a cake to be baked on eleven potsherds for Indra and also the fried grains, coarse flour with curds (*Karambha*), curds and *Payasyā*.

The *Unnetṛ* arranges the utensils such as soma cups and goblets on the *Khara* (mound).

The *Hotṛ* recites the verses composed in seven metres for *Prātaranuvāka* dedicated to Agni, Uṣas and Aśvinau.

The *Pūtabhṛt* and *Ādhavanīya* jars filled with water are placed on the northern cart.

The *Adhvaryu* offers libation with a *pracaraṇī* ladle on the *Āhavanīya* fire.

He brings the *ekadhanā* water while the sacrificer's wife fetches the *pānnejanī* water, for washing the feet of the immolated victim.

The priests and the sacrificer sit round the pressing boards placed on the Uparava holes.

The *Adhvaryu* measures out the soma-stalks on the *Upāṁśu-savana*-stone and strikes against it with another stone (*upala*). He pours the *nigrābha* water over it. The *Adhvaryu* collects the juice in the *upāṁśu*-cup. Six stalks of soma are placed upon the cup.

The *Adhvaryu* then offers the oblation of curds to Prajāpati by means of a four-cornered *graha*, i.e., goblet made of the udumbara wood. He then takes water and milk in that goblet and stirs three stalks of soma in it and offers them (as being *adābhya* and *aṁsu* libations). After the *upāṁśu* goblet is offered, they begin crushing and pounding the soma-stalks and filter it through the strainer of wool, i.e., *daśāpavitra* and collect the juice in the *droṇa-kalaśa*. Next, goblets are directly filled up from the stream filtered down from the *daśāpavitra*. *Pūtabhṛt* and *Ādhavanīya* pitchers are placed on the northern *havirdhāna* cart.

Antaryāma graha is offered at the time of sunrise. Various grahas, i.e., goblets, and *camasas* i.e. cups are arranged on the *Khara*, i.e., the mound constructed towards the east in the altar.

The priests belonging to the *Sāmaveda*, sitting towards the north of the *havirdhāna* cart, chant the *Bahiṣpavamāna stotra*. The *graha* (goblet) for *Aśvinau* is drawn and placed on the *khara* after the *Bahiṣpavamāna* is chanted.

Savanīya victim is offered to Agni, in parts, during three sessions of the day.

The *Adhvaryu*, *Pratiprasthātṛ*, Sacrificer, *Brahmā*, *Hotṛ* and five *Hotrakas*, viz., the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, *Brāhmaṇācchaṁsī*, *Neṣṭṛ*, *Potṛ* and *Acchāvāka* offer prayers to the fire and proceed to the *sadas* pandal. The *Hotṛ* and the other *Hotrakas* take their seats in the *sadas* pandal towards the west of their respective mounds, facing east. The priests belonging to the *Sāmaveda* sit around the *audumbarī* post.

The *Savanīya-puroḍāśa*, viz., *dhānās*, i.e. grains, *karambha*, i.e., coarse flour mixed with curds, *parivāpa*, i.e. fried grains of barley, a *puroḍāśa* (cake) and *payasyā* are offered to Harivān Indra, Pūṣanvān Indra, Sarasvatī, Bhāratī, Indra and Mitrāvaruṇau respectively.

The goblets of soma are offered to the dual divinities, viz., Indra-Vāyū, Maitrāvaruṇau and Aśvinau.

The *Adhvaryu* takes the *Śukra* cups and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* takes the *Manthin* cups. They wipe out the dust from below the cups; thereby they drive away the priests of the *Asuras*,

viz., *Ṣaṇḍa* and *Marka*, for whom these goblets were drawn. Finally, these *grahas* are offered to Indra, simultaneously by the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛ*.

Six *camasādhvaryus* offer the soma juice from their *camasas*.

The six *Hotrakas* (other than the *Hotṛ*), viz., the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, the *Brāhmaṇācchaṁsī*, the *Acchāvāka*, the *Neṣṭṛ*, the Potṛ and the *Āgnīdhra* are entitled to recite the *yājyā* formulas in the Soma-sacrifice. The *camasas* belong to them and they are offered by the *Camasādhvaryus.*

The remaining portion of soma-juice in the cups, after offering them to the dual divinities, is consumed by the *Adhvaryu* and the *Hotṛ*.

The *Iḍā* related to the *savanīya-puroḍāśa* is invoked and a portion of it is consumed.

Then, the priests excepting the *Unnetṛ*, *Grāvastut* and *Subrahmaṇya* consume the soma-juice (*savana-mukha-soma-bhakṣa*). The *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* do not have their own *camasas.* They drink the soma from the *Hotṛ camasa* and also from the *camasas* belonging to the *hotrakas,* or from the *camasas* of other priests. The soma-juice is added to the *camasas* and they are placed under southern *havirdhāna* cart. Thereafter they are known as *Nārāśaṁsas* (they are again filled with the soma-juice from the *droṇa-kalaśas* at proper time).

The *Acchāvāka* has still not entered the *Sadas* pandal. He recites his formulas, from outside the altar. His *camasa* is again filled up with soma, after it is offered and consumed. Thereafter the *Acchāvāka* enters the Sadas-pandal.

The *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* offer the *Ṛtu-grahas* dedicated to the months of the year.

Thereafter are offered the oblations of the soma-juice from the soma-cups, associated with the chanting of the *stotras,* i.e. *sāmans* and the recitation of *śastras,* i.e. Ṛgvedic formulas by the *Udgātṛs* and *Hotrakas* respectively.

These offerings are made in three sessions.

Following is the list of *Stotras, Śastras* and their deities in their sequential order.

Stotra	*Śastra*	*Deity*
Morning pressing		
(1) Bahiṣpavamāna (already chanted)	Ājya Śastra by Hotṛ	Indrāgnī
(2) First Ājya-stotra	Prauga Śastra by Hotṛ	Viśvedevas
(3) Second Ājya-stotra Maitrāvaruṇa	Maitrāvaruṇa Śastra	(Ukthya-graha for) Maitrāvaruṇa
(4) Third Ājya-stotra	Brāhmaṇācchaṁsi Śastra	(Ukthya graha for) Indra
(5) Fourth Ājya-stotra	Acchāvāka Śastra	(Ukthya graha for) Indrāgnī
Mid-day pressing		
(6) Mādhyandina-Pavamāna	Marutvatīya Śastra by Hotṛ	Marutvān Indra
(7) First Pṛṣṭha-stotra	Niṣkevalya Śastra by Hotṛ	Mahendra

(8) Second Pṛṣṭha-stotra	Maitrāvaruṇa Śastra	Indra
(9) Third Pṛṣṭha-stotra	Brāhamaṇācchaṁsī Śastra	Indra
(10) Fourth Pṛṣṭha-stotra	Acchāvāka Śastra	Indra
Third pressing		
(11) Ārbhava-Pavamāna	Vaiśvadeva Śastra by Hotṛ	Viśvedevas
(12) Agniṣṭoma Stotra	Āgnimāruta Śastra by Hotṛ	Agni and Maruts

Mādhyandina-Savana

In the mid-day pressing, the entire quantity of soma-stalks is taken for pounding.

The *Grāvastut* priest covers his eyes with a piece of cloth and recites the formulas related to the stone used for pounding the soma. A turban is given to him.

The cups are filled with soma-juice. *Mādhyandina pavamāna stotra* is chanted. *Savanīya puroḍāśa* is offered as per procedure of the morning pressing. *Śukra* and *Manthī grahas* are offered (to Indra).

The *dakṣiṇā* in the form of cows is offered at the *Mārjāīya* place.

The *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* simultaneously offer the soma to Marutvān Indra, after the *Hotṛ* has recited the *Marutvatīya śastra. Nārāśaṁsa camasas* are shaken. The soma-juice is filled in the *Śukra-pātra* for Mahendra. The *camasas* are also filled with the soma-juice. The first *Pṛṣṭha stotra* is chanted. The *Hotṛ* recites the *Niṣkevalya śastra.* The soma is offered to Mahendra. *Nārāśaṁsa camasas* are shaken.

Then, the soma-juice is drawn in the *Ukthya-pātra* from the *Ukthya-sthālī* for Indra. *Camasas* are also filled with soma. Second *Pṛṣṭha stotra* is chanted. *Maitrāvaruṇa* recites the *śastra.* Soma-cups and *camasas* are offered. Soma is consumed.

Again the soma is drawn in the *Ukthya-pātra* for Indra. *Camasas* are also filled with soma. Third *Pṛṣṭha stotra* is chanted. The *Brāhmaṇāccaṁsī* recites the *śastra.* Soma-cups and *camasas* are offered. The remaining soma is consumed.

The remaining soma from the *Ukthya-shālī* is entirely drawn in the *Ukthya-pātra* for Indra. Fourth *Pṛṣṭha stotra* is chanted. The *Acchāvaka* recites the *śastra* for Indra. The soma-cups and *camasas* are offered. The remaining soma is consumed.

Thus the second session comes to an end.

Tṛtīya-Savana

In the beginning of the third session, *Lokadvāra Sāman* is chanted. In this session, the refuge of the soma-stalks already pounded in the *Mādhyandina savana* is used for crushing. The soma-stalks placed over the *upāṁśu*-pot are added to the refuge and then it is crushed. The refuge that is crushed in the third session, is thereafter mixed in the *Ādhavanīya* water and is protected for the *Avabhṛtha.*

The portion of the soma from the *Āditya-sthālī* is taken in the *aupaśaya pātra.* The hot milk is corrugated and is poured in that *pātra* and is offered to Āditya. The soma-cups are

filled with the soma, the priests proceed for the *Ārbhava-pavamāna*. The *Ārbhava-pavamāna stotra* is chanted in the *sadas*-pandal. The limbs of the *savanīya* victims and the *savanīya puroḍāśa* are offered. *Savanīya iḍā* is invoked. After the soma is consumed, the priests offer the portions from the *puroḍāśa* to their ancestors. The *Savitṛ*-cup is offered.

The *Vaiśvadeva graha* (cup) is filled with soma. The *Hotṛ* recites the *Vaiśvadeva śastra* and soma is offered to *Viśvedevas*. The caru is offered to the Soma-deity.

The soma-juice is drawn in the *Upāṁśu-pātra* from the *Āgrayaṇa-sthālī* for Patnīvān Agni. The *Āgnīdhra* offers it on the fire.

The Soma is filled in the *Hotṛ-camasa* and then in other *camasas*. The fire is ignited on the *dhiṣṇyas* (the mounds) of the *hotrakas*. The *Agniṣṭoma sāman* is chanted. At the same time the sacrificer's wife pours the stream of water from the *pānnejani sthālī* on her waist which flows to her laps and further to feet.

The *Hotṛ* recites the *Āgnimāruta śastra*. The *Pratiprasthātṛ* picks up the *Dhruva-sthalī*, previously placed near the northern *havirdhāna* cart and pours the soma-juice into the *Hotṛ-camasa*.

After the recitation of the *śastra* by the *Hotṛ*, the *Hotṛ-camasa* and other *camasas* are offered. The remaining soma-juice in the *Hotṛ camasa* and other *camasas* is entirely consumed. *Camasas* are filled with water. *Dūrvā* and *darbha* grass are placed on them.

Thus, totally twelve *stotras* and twelve *śastras* are chanted and recited and the *grahas* (soma-cups) are offered.

Then the third *Savana* comes to an end. Further the *Anuyāja*, *Sūktavāka* and *Śaṁyuvāka* rites are performed.

The *Unnetṛ* pours the remaining soma-juice from the *Āgrayaṇa-sthālī* in the *droṇa-kalaśa* and puts some *dhānās* (fried grains) in it. He lifts the *droṇakalaśa* over his head and then offers it to the *Āhavanīya*. The priests consume the grains left in the *droṇa kaalśa*.

The fire sticks are offered in the fire. *Dūrvā* grass is mixed in the remaining water in the *Ekadhanā* pitcher. It is taken in the *camasas*. The priests take their respective *camasas* and go to the *cātvāla*. They go to the *Āgnīdhrīya* shade and consume the drops of curd. Having come out of the *Āgnīdhrīya*-shade, they release the vow of friendship.

Patnīsaṁyāja and *Viṣṇukrama* rites are performed.

Avabhṛtha

The sacrificer, his wife and the priests go to the water place with the utensils used for soma and the material required for the *Avabhṛtha*-rite. The *Prastotṛ* chants *sāmans* at three places on the way. A cake baked on one potsherd is offered to Varuṇa in water. The refuge of soma and all the utensils stained with soma are thrown in the water.

The sacrificer and his wife also put all material that was related to *dīkṣā*, in the water, and take final bath in it.

They return to the sacrifical pandal. While returning, they collect fire sticks on the way. Having come back to the pandal, the fire sticks are offered to the *Śālāmukhīya* fire.

Udayanīyā iṣṭi is performed on the *Sālāmukhīya* fire. The scrappings of the *caru* of *Prāyaṇīyā iṣṭi* is taken in the oblation of *Udayanīyā*. Aditi is the principal deity. The *yājyās*

and *puronuvākyās* of *Prāyaṇīyā* are recited as *puronuvākyās* and *yājyās* respectively in the Udayanīyā.

Anūbhandhyā vaśā (barren cow) or *Āmikṣā* is offered to the Mitrāvaruṇau. Devikā oblations are offered.

Sadas-pandal and *Havirdhāna*-pandal are demolished. The sacrificial grass is burnt on the *Āhavanīya* fire. The sacrificer recites prayers to the deities and returns with his fires. On another place he offers *Udavasānīyā iṣṭi.* A cake baked on five or eight potsherds is offered to Agni. Having returned home, he makes evening *Agnihotra* offering.

In the *Agniṣṭoma,* four types to *stomas* of *sāmans* in the *stotras,* viz., *Trivṛt, Pañcadaśa, Saptadaśa* and *Ekaviṁśa*—are employed by the *udgātṛ*-priests. It is, therefore, called *Jyotiṣṭoma* (i.e., *catuḥṣṭoma*). *Stomas* mean multiplication of formulas in the *sāmans* while they are chanted. Thus, the system of four types of *stomas* applied in the *stotras* of the *Agniṣṭoma,* is as follows:

Morning pressing

(1) Bahiṣpavamāna—stotra—Trivṛt—stomas.
(2) First Ājya stotra—Pañcadaśa—stomas.
(3) Second Ājya stotra—Pañcadaśa—stomas.
(4) Third Ājya stotra—Pañcadaśa—stomas.
(5) Fourth Ājya stotra—Pañcadaśa—stomas.

Mid-day pressing

(6) Mādhyandina—pavamāna—stotra—Pañcadaśa—stomas.
(7) First Pṛṣṭha stotra—*Saptadaśa*—stomas.
(8) Second Pṛṣṭha stotra—*Saptadaśa*—stomas.
(9) Third Pṛṣṭha stotra—*Saptadaśa*—stomas.
(10) Fourth Pṛṣṭha stotra—*Saptadaśa*—stomas.

Third pressing

(11) Ārbhava—pavamāna—stotra—Saptadaśa—stomas.
(12) Agniṣṭoma—Yajñāyajñīya stotra—Ekaviṁśa stomas.

From the above table, it will be clear that the three *pavamāna-stotras* are based on three *tṛcas* or *pragāthas* but the *stomas* are respectively nine, fifteen and seventeen. It may be further noted that the remaining *stotras* are based either on single *tṛcas* (i.e. a group of three verses), or on *pragāthas* (i.e. a group of two verses).

VIII

UKTHYA

After the recitation of twelve *stotras* and *śastras,* and after having offered the *grahas* (soma-cups) and *camasas,* as in *Agniṣṭoma,* additional three *stotras* are chanted, three *śastras* are recited and the additional three *grahas* (soma-cups) are offered in Ukthya sacrifice. The

Maitrāvaruṇa priest recites the thirteenth *śastra* and *soma-graha* (cup) is offered to Indrāvaruṇau. The *Brāhmaṇācchaṁsī* recites the fourteenth *śastra* and the soma-graha is offered to Indrā-Bṛhaspatī. *Acchāvāka* recites the fifteenth *śastra* and the soma-graha is offered to Indrāviṣṇū. Thus, totally there are fifteen *stotras* chanted and fifteen *śastras* recited. Since three additional *grahas* of soma are offered, some additional quantity of soma-stalks is purchased at the time of purchasing the soma stalks.

In this ritual one additional victim, viz., a goat is offerd to Indrāgnī, along with the *savanīya* victim.

Ukthya counted as the third in the seven *soma-saṁsthās* is also a *catuḥṣṭoma*—i.e. *trivṛt, pañcadaśa, saptadaśa* and *ekaviṁśa stomas* are chanted in this sacrifice. Consequently, the three additional *stotras* are chanted in *ekaviṁśa-stomas.*

IX

ṢOḌAŚĪ

After offering the fifteen *grahas* (soma-cups) as in *Ukthya,* along with the chanting of fifteen stotras and fifteen *śastras,* one additional *graha* of soma is offered to Indra. One additional *stotra* is chanted in the third session when half of the orb of the sun has gone down the horizon. The sixteenth *śastra* is recited by the *Acchāvāka. Ṣoḍaśī* is also *catuḥṣṭoma.* The *ṣoḍaśī-stotra* is recited in *ekaviṁśa stomas.*

One additional victim, viz., a *vṛṣṇi* (a ram) is offered to Indra along with those to Agni and Indrāgnī on the Soma-pressing day.

X

ATYAGNIṢṬOMA

Atyagniṣṭoma is counted as the second in the list of seven *Soma-saṁsthās.* In Atyagniṣṭoma, *Ṣoḍaśī graha* is offered to Indra, immediately after the offering of the twelfth *graha* of *Agniṣṭoma,* dropping the three *Ukthya grahas.* Consequently, three *stotras* and *śastras* related to *Ukthya* are dropped. Thus in *Atyagniṣṭoma,* thirteen *stotras* are chanted and thirteen *śastras* are recited.

XI

ATIRĀTRA

In *Atirātra* sacrifice, thirteen *stotras* and thirteen *śastras* are additionally chanted and recited after the chanting of sixteen *stotras* and reciting of sixteen *śastras,* as in the *Ṣoḍaśī.* Thus a total of twenty-nine *stotras* are chanted and the equal number of the *śastras* are recited in the *Atirātra.* Indra is the deity of the additional twelve *stotras* and *śastras.* The last

stotra and *śastra* is dedicated to *Āśvinau*. The additional twelve *stotras* are chanted in *Pañcadaśa stomas* while the last, i.e., the thirteenth *stotra*, termed as Sandhi-*stotra*, is chanted in *trivṛt-stoma*. The *Hotṛ* recites the *Āśvina-śastra*. All these *stotras* and *śastras* are chanted and recited during night. The recitation of the *Āśvina śastra* is finished at the sunrise of the next day. One ewe is to be offered as a victim to Sarasvati, in addition to the victims offered in the *Ṣoḍaśī*-sacrifice.

XII

APTORYĀMA

In the *Aptoryāma*, four stotras are chanted and four śastras are recited in addition to twenty-nine *stotras* and *śastras* of *Atirātra*. Thus there are thirty-three *stotras* and thirty-three *śastras* chanted and recited in the *Aptoryāma*. All the additional four *śastras* are dedicated to Aśvinau and recited by the *Hotṛ*, *Maitrāvaruṇa*, *Brāhmaṇācchamsī* and *Acchāvāka* priests repsectively. Other details resemble those in the Atirātra. However, *Caturviṁśa* (24), *triṇava* (27), *trayaśtriṁśa* (33), *catuścatvāriṁśa* (44) and *aṣṭācatvāriṁśa* (48) *stomas* are also employed in some of the *stotras* in the *Aptoryāma*.

XIII

VĀJAPEYA

One additional *stotra* is chanted and one additional *śastra* is recited in the *Vājapeya*, after the recitation of sixteen *stotras* and *śastras* of *Ṣoḍaśī* sacrifice. Thus in the *Vājapeya*, seventeen *stotras* are chanted and seventeen *śastras* are recited.

The figure seventeen bears a great significance in the Vājapeya sacrifice. This figure is always identified with the Prajāpati, who is counted as seventeenth, the sixteen being his *Kalās*. Each of the seventeen stotras in the *Vājapeya* is chanted in seventeen *stomas*. (cp. Tāṇḍya Br. 18.6.5—*yet saptadaśa stotrāṇi tenordhvam āpnoti, yat sarvaḥ saptadaśa tena tiryañcam*). Seventeen priests (including *Sadasya*) are chosen.

In the *Vājapeya*, *surā*, i.e., wine-cups are drawn along with the cups of soma-juice. This is the uniqueness of the *Vājapeya*. However, *surā*-cups are not offered, but only shaken over the *Āhavanīya*. The material for *surā* is so fermented that *surā* becomes available on the soma-pressing day.

The mound, i.e., *khara* is prepared to the south-east corner of the *havirdhāna* pandal for placing the soma-cups. One additional mound is prepared to its south or west for placing the seventeen *surā*-cups.

A race of seventeen chariots is another special feature of the *Vājapeya*. In the *Mādhyandina* session, the preparations for the race of seventeen chariots are made. Three horses are yoked to each chariot. The chariots are placed to the east of the *Āhavanīya*,

facing east. An archer throws an arrow from his bow to the east or north. From the place where the arrow falls, he throws another arrow. Thus he throws seventeen arrows and fixes the distance for the race. A post of udumbara is fixed at the point of the last throw. That is the last limit for the race.

The *Pratiprasthātṛ* measures out the *nīvāra* grains for cooking *caru* in seventeen pots. *Caru* is cooked in milk and clarified butter is poured into it. The *caru*-pots are placed near the *cātvāla*. King's descendants protect them.

One post is fixed in the *cātvāla*. A wheel of udumbara wood, having seventeen spokes, is fixed on it horizontally. The Brahmā priest sits on that wheel.

After the offerings of oblations to the Maruts, the sacrificer sits in his chariot. The chiefs of towns and other important persons also sit in other chariots. The horses of the chariots smell the *caru* of *nīvāra*. The *Adhvaryu* alongwith the sacrificer sits in the chariot of the sacrificer and holds the reigns of the horses of the chariot. Seventeen drums are beaten. The wheel on which the *Brahmā* is seated is rotated thrice. *Brahmā* chants the *Vāji-sāma*. The chariots begin to run a race. The sacrificer's chariot first reaches the udumbara post, because the horses to his chariot were yoked with the sacred formula. The chariots go round the udumbara-post and return back to the *cātvāla*, where the horses again smell the *nīvāra-caru*. One *kṛṣṇala* of gold is given to all the charioteers excepting the sacrificer. They all give that *kṛṣṇala* to the *Brahmā* priest. In addition to that, a golden vessel weighing one hundred *kṛṣṇalas* filled with honey is given to *Brahmā*. Before the race, the sacrificial fees of seventeen types are distributed among the priests.

The sacrificial post of *bilva* or *khadira* tree, measuring seventeen *aratnis* in height, is fixed. Seventeen pieces of cloth are tied around the post. The *caṣāla* placed on the top of the post is made of flour or *godhūma* (wheat).

On the soma pressing day, the following victms are offered. One goat to Agni, one to Indrāgnī and one to Indra; spotted *vaśā* to Maruts, ram to Sarasvān, ewe to Sarasvatī and seventeen goats to Prajāpati.

After the chariot-race is over, the sacrificer and his wife climb up the sacrificial-post, with the help of a ladder, and declare that they have reached the heaven. The priests prepare a fold of a leave of Aśvattha tree containing salty soil in it, hang it to the long cane and strike that fold of salty soil against the face of the sacrificer.

When the sacrificer descends down the *yūpa*, he is made to sit on the *āsandī* (chair) and is consecrated with water.

The *Udgātṛ* chants the first *Pṛṣṭha stotra* and the *Hotṛ* recites the *Niṣkevalya śastra*. The *soma-graha* (cup) is offered to Mahendra. Seven *Atigrāhya-grahas* are offered by the *Pratiprasthātṛ*, *Nestṛ* and *Unnetṛ*.

After the *ṣodaśī-graha* is offered in the third session, the *Udgātṛ* chants the *Vājapeya-stotra*. The *Hotṛ* recites the *Vājapeya-śastra*. Seventeen soma cups and seventten *surā*-cups are drawn for Prajāpati. The priests take up seventeen *soma-grahas* and offer them to the *Āhavanīya*. The priests partake of soma-juice.

The *Pratiprasthātṛ* and the sixteen charioteers (excepting the sacrificer), who ran the race, take up the seventeen *surā grahas* and shake them on the *mārjālīya dhiṣṇya*.

Near the southern buttock of the altar the charioteers snatch the *surā* cups from each other and consume them.

Next ritual is similar to that of the *Agniṣṭoma.* The *Vājapeya* is prescribed in three types, viz., *Āpta Vājapeya, Kuru-Vājapeya* and *Saṁsthā-Vāyapeya,* with little differences in details.

Thus there are seven *Nitya Soma-saṁsthās* prescribed by the Vedic texts. Based on them there are many modificatory soma-rituals to be performed with a view to fulfil the desires of the sacrificer.

XIV

AGNICAYANA

Agnicayana is not a separate sacrifice. It is a ritual optionally augmented to the Soma sacrifice. The *Uttara-vedi* in the soma-sacrifice is constructed in certain shapes, eg., *Śyena* (falcon), *alaja, Kaṅka,* etc., by means of baked bricks. That constructed mound is named as '*Agni*', '*Citi*' or '*Agniciti*'.

Before the soma-sacrifice, the sacrificer and the *Adhvaryu* bring the earth-clods and prepare the *ukhā* pot and a brick square in size. Three lines are drawn on this brick. A portion of fire is taken from the *Gārhapatya* and is placed to its east. The *ukhā* pot and the brick are baked on that fire.

On the Full-moon day or on the New-moon day, a victim, i.e., a goat is offered to Niyutvān Vāyu. The head of the victim is kept protected. A head of the horse and that of a warrior killed in battle is obtained. A head of a wild goat and that of a snake is also obtained.

The utensils for *Pravargya* rites are prepared. The bricks in required number and of required shapes for constructing altar, are prepared and baked.

The sacrificer undergoes *dīkṣā,* i.e., consecration. *Dīkṣaṇīyeṣṭi* is performed. A cake baked on twelve potsherds is offered to Vaiśvānara Agni, a cake baked on eleven potsherds is offered to Agnāviṣṇū, and cooked rice (*caru*) to Aditi. These are the principal oblations and the deities of this *iṣṭi.*

Fuel of enkindling sticks is placed in the *ukhā* pot and clarified butter is poured into it. The fire is burnt around the *ukhā* pot. The fuel placed in *ukhā* pot catches fire. This fire is called the ukhya fire.

The sacrificer wears a necklace of gold having a plate with twenty-one knobs. The *ukhā* pot with fire is placed in the noose made of *muñja* grass, having six strings. The sacrificer covers his shoulder with a hide of black antelope and keeps that noose suspended down from his neck. He keeps it navel high and proceeds four steps towards the east (*Viṣṇu-krama*). Turning back, he takes aside the noose and places the *ukhā* pot on a small *āsandī.* Enkindling-sticks are added to the *ukhā* fire.

Next day he offers prayers to that *ukhya* fire. The sacrificer thus repeats the *Viṣṇukramas* and the prayers. On the last day of *dīkṣā,* the sacrificer places the *ukhya* fire,

the *Gārhapatya* fire and *Dakṣiṇa* fire in a cart. The sacrificer and his wife also sit in the cart and proceed to the sacrificial pandal. (or he deposits the two fires—*Gārhapatya* and *Dakṣiṇa*—in the *araṇīs* and takes them with him).

The *Adhvaryu* deposits the *Gārhapatya* and *Dakṣiṇa* fires in their respective pits in the *Prāgvaṁśa* pandal and *ukhya* fire to the east of the *Gārhapatya.*

The mounds are constructed in the *Uttara vedi,* for all the three fires. The mound for the *Gārhapatya* should be knee-high. The fire from the *ukhya* is palced on this mound.

The empty *ukhā* pot, the noose, the chair of *ukhā,* the string of the necklace and three black bricks baked on chaffs, are taken to the south-west and placed there. They then return without looking back.

The *Prāyaścitteṣṭi* is offered.

The measurement of the *Mahāvedi* takes place. Soma is purchased and *Ātithyā iṣṭi* is performed. At the place fixed for the *Uttara-vedi,* the ground for *citi*-construction is measured out. The Āhavanīya fire will be kept on this construction having the shape of a Śyena-bird; (or any other prescribed shape) The mound in the shape of Śyena has five parts—viz., the middle portion (*ātmā*), the right and left wings, the head and the tail. It is constructed in five layers. The layers are cemented with mortar. Each layer is constructed with one thousand bricks. Thus the five layers require five thousand bricks. In the first *cayana,* the construction of a mound is knee-high. In the second *cayana,* the mound requries ten thousand baked bricks for ten layers; the mound will be navel-high. In the third *cayana,* the construction of mound requires fifteen thousand bricks for fifteen layers, and mound will be mouth-high.

After the ground for the mound (*citi*) is measured out, it is furrowed with a plough yoked with twelve bulls. The bulls are then given to the *Adhvaryu.* The grains are sown in the furrows which are covered with sand. The pebbles are placed on the border of the measured ground.

The rites from *Ātithyā* up to *Pravargya* and *Upasads* are performed as prescribed in the Soma-sacrifice.

In the middle of the ground measured for *citi,* the bunch of *darbha*-grass is placed. The horse is brought there and is made to place his right foot over it. A leave of lotus is placed there and a golden image of *Puruṣa* is also placed. The ladles filled with clarified butter and curds, the heads of victims, the living tortoise, the *Avakā*-grass, the mortar filled with grass and the pestle, etc. are also placed.

Bricks of various sizes and names are placed in order as prescribed by the ritual-texts. While performing the rites of construction of mound, the *Adhvaryu* and the sacrificer wear the skins of black antelope on their shoulders.

As a part of the Soma-sacrifice, the *Upasad* offerings are made on three consequent days, after the *dīkṣā.* On the first *upasad* day, the first layer is constructed. On the following days, next layers are constructed (one layer is constructed on each next day).

When the mound of five layers is constructed, the *Adhvaryu* offers the continuous libation of milk of sheep or a deer by means of the leave of *arka,* held knee-high, navel-high and mouth-high on the north-east corner of the mound. While offering, the *Adhvaryu* recites *Śatarudrīya*-formula dedicated to Rudra (Ts 4.5.1). The leave of arka is thrown away at a

place where cattle do not move on. The *Adhvaryu* goes round the mound of *citi*, pouring water from a pitcher three times and without pouring water, three times. The frog is tied at the end of a long cane, along with the weed of *Śaivāla* (blyxa octandra); that frog is dragged over the mound of the *citi*. The portion of fire taken from the *Gārhapatya* is placed on the *citi* mound.

The *Vaiśvānara* offerings of clarified butter are made.

Vasordhārā offering of clarified butter is continuously made by means of a special long ladle of udumbara wood having two bowls at two ends and a channel connecting them.

The *caru* is cooked in the clarifed butter remained in the *vasordhārā* ladle. The priests consume that *caru*. The gruel of wild corn and cultivated corn are separately cooked. The *Adhvaryu* offers them on the *Āhavanīya* fire.

A sacrificer is made to sit on the *Āsandī* placed near the southern wing of the *citi* and is sprinkled with the residue of the oblation by the *Adhvaryu*.

The *Uparava* holes are dug hereafter. *Dhiṣṇyas* for the *hotrakas*, etc., are constructed. *Agnīṣomīya* victim is offered. After the omentum offering, eight *devasū* offerings are made.

Next day the contemplated Soma sacrifice (i.e., Soma-pressing, etc.) is performed.

After the Soma sacrifice, the sacrificer is required to perform the *Sautrāmaṇī* ritual.

According to the different desires of the sacrificer, *citis* of various shapes (mounds) are prescribed. They are named as, *Chandaściti*, *Śyenaciti*, *Kaṅkacitī*, *Alajaciti*, *Praugaciti*, *Ubhayataḥ-prauga-citi*, *Rathacakraciti*, *droṇaciti*, *Samuhyā citi*, *Paricāyya-citi*, *Śmaśāna-citi* (TS: 5.4.11), etc.

XV

RĀJASŪYA

A ruling king is entitled to perform this sacrifice. It is framed with many *iṣṭi*-rituals and six soma sacrifice, viz., (1) *Prāyaṇīya Agniṣṭoma* (*Pavitra*), (2) *Abhiṣecanīya*, (3) *Daśapeya*, (4) *Keśavapanīya*, (5) *Vyuṣṭi dvirātra* and (6) *Kṣatrasya dhṛtiḥ*.

After proper *dīkṣā* rites, the *Prāyaṇīya Agniṣṭoma* (*Pavitra*) is performed. It is *catuḥṣṭoma*. One thousand cows are given as *dakṣiṇa* in this sacrifice.

After the conclusion of the *Prāyaṇīya Soma* sacrifice, eight *iṣṭis* are performed as follows:

Anumatyādi iṣṭis: First *Adhvaryu* offers an oblation of claried butter, with a *sruva*, on the *Gārhapatya*. The *Adhvaryu* then goes to a place where there is a self-made pit and places a burning ember and offers a cake baked on one potsherd to Nirṛti. The whole cake is offered. He places there a piece of black cloth and black chaff as *dakṣiṇā* and returns without looking back. Having washed his hands and feet, he offers again an oblation of clarified butter on the *Gārhapatya* fire by means of *sruva*. He then offers a cake baked on eight potsherds to *Anumati*.

After the conclusion of the *anumati iṣṭi*, the *Adhvaryu* offers the following seven *iṣṭis* on the following seven days. One *iṣṭi* is performed on one day. (1) *caru* to Aditi, (2) a cake

baked on eleven potsherds to Agni and Viṣṇu, (3) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Agnī-ṣomau (4) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra; (5) a cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni and curds to Indra, (6) a cake baked on twelve potsherds to Indrāgnī, *caru* to Viśvedevas and Soma and (7) *caru* to Sarasvatī and Sarasvat.

Four Parvans of Cāturmāsya: After these seven *iṣṭis* he performs four *parvans* of the *Cāturmāsya* sacrifice, i.e., *Vaiśvadeva, Varuṇa-praghāsa, Sākamedha* and *Śunāsīrīya.* Each next *parvan* is performed after four months of the previous *parvan.* Thus the performance of four *parvans* of *Cāturmāsya* cover one year.

Indraturīya: After the *Śunāsīrīya parvan,* the rituals of *Indraturīya* are performed in which four oblations are offered as follows: (1) a cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni, (2) *caru* of *gavīdhuka*—grains to Rudra; (3) curds to Indra and (4) *caru* of barley (*yava*) to Varuṇa.

Pañcedhmīya: On the same night, the ritual of *Pañcedhmīya* is performed. The *Āhavanīya* fire is placed in the pits at four corners and also in the middle of the pit. Five sticks are placed on each of the five portions of fire. Oblations of clarified butter are offered on each of them. With the *upaveṣa* (the fire stirring stick), he brings all the fire-sticks in the middle and again offers five oblations of clarified butter, by means of a *sruva.*

Apāmārga offerings: Next day in the early morning, before the *Agnihotra* offering, a burning ember from the *dakṣiṇa*-fire is taken to the self-made pit and is deposited there. The *Adhvaryu* offers on it the flour of *apāmārga,* by means of a *sruva,* made of *parṇa*-wood. This *apārmārga* offering is made with a view to spell out the demons.

Devikā-havīṁṣi: After the *apāmārga* offerings, five *devikā-havīṁṣi* are offered as follows: (1) a cake baked on twelve potsherds to Dhātṛ, (2) *caru* to Anumatī, (3) *caru* to Rākā, (4) *caru* to Sinīvālī and (5) *caru* to Kuhū.

Three iṣṭis: Then three rituals each consisting of three offerings are performed as follows:

1. (i) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Agnāviṣṇū,
 (ii) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indrāviṣṇū,
 (iii) a cake baked on three potsherds to Viṣṇu.
2. (i) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Agnīṣomau,
 (ii) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra and Soma,
 (iii) *caru* to Soma.
3. (i) *caru* to Soma and Pūṣan,
 (ii) *caru* to Indra and Pūṣan,
 (iii) *caru* to Pūṣan.

Two iṣṭis: Then follow two rituals, each containing one oblation as follows: (I) a cake baked on twelve potsherds to Vaiśvānara and (II) a *caru* of barley to Varuṇa.

Ratinām-havīṁṣi: On the next twelve days, the sacrificer (the King) offers the oblations called *Ratninām havīṁṣi.* Each day the King goes to one of his chief's (*Ratnin*) house and offers oblations as follows:

(1) In the house of *Brahmā*-priest, a *caru* to Bṛhaspati,
(2) In the house of *Rājanya,* i.e. chief Kṣatriya, a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra,

(3) In the house of his queen, a *caru* to Aditi,
(4) In the house of *Vāvātā*, i.e. the second wife of the king, a *caru* to Bhaga,
(5) In the house of *parivṛkti*, i.e. a neglected wife of the king, a *caru* of black rice broken by her nails to Nirṛti,
(6) In the house of the chief of army, a cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni,
(7) In the house of a chariot-driver, a cake baked on ten potsherds to Varuṇa,
(8) In the house of a chief of the village, a cake baked on seven potsherds to Maruts,
(9) In the house of chamberlain, a cake baked on twelve potsherds to Savitṛ,
(10) In the house of a charioteer, a cake baked on two potsherds to Aśvinau,
(11) In the house of a tax-collector, a *caru* to Pūṣan,
(12) In the house of the chief of gambling house, a *caru* of *gavīdhūka* to Rudra.

Next day the king with the priests performs the *iṣṭi* in his own house, in which he offers—(1) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra Sutrāman and (2) a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra Aṁhomuc.

Abhiṣecanīya-Soma-Sacrifice: Next day the *Abhiṣecanīya Ukthya Soma* sacrifice begins. In place of *dīkṣaṇīya*, *Maitrā-bārhaspatya iṣṭi* is performed. In this *iṣṭi*, a *caru* of broken grains, cooked in the milk of while cow, having white calf, is offered to Bṛhaspati and a *caru* of unbroken grains cooked in self-melted clarified butter and cooked in a pot of four corners made of udumbara wood, is offered to Mitra. The *vedi* is also self-made, the *darbha* grass are self-cut, fuel stick is also self-made (i.e., not cut). When the pot of *caru* to Bṛhaspati is placed on the fire for cooking, he should put over it, the pot of aśvattha wood for cooking the *caru* in melted butter, to Mitra.

Devasuvāṁ havīṁṣī: In *Abhiṣecanīya Soma*-sacrifice eight *devasuvāṁ havīṁṣu* are offered as follows:

(1) A cake of black rice baked on eight pot-sherds to Agni Gṛhapati,
(2) A *caru* of *Śyāmāka* rice to Soma-Vanaspati.
(3) A cake of rice which ripes swiftly, baked on twelve potsherds to Savitṛ-Satya-prasava,
(4) A *caru* of *Gavīdhuka* rice to Rudra-Paśupati,
(5) A *caru* of *Nīvāra* to Bṛhaspati-Vācaspati,
(6) A cake of big rice baked on eleven potsherds to Indra Jyeṣṭha,
(7) A *caru* of *Ambā*-rice to Mitra-Satya, and
(8) A *caru* of *Yava* (barley) to Varuṇa-Dharma-pati.

The *Savanīya-paśu puroḍāśa* also is offered.

Before the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering in the *devasuvāṁ havīṁṣi*, the *Brahmā* holds the king's hand and prays that the eight principal deities of *devasuvāṁ havīṁṣi* may accord consent to the King in all his kingly activities and make him free from all the enemies, may promote him to great lordship to rule over the people. *Brahmā* decalres him to be a king of subjects. The king then cleanses his mouth and steps three *Viṣṇukramas* to the east.

In the *Āgnīdhrīya* shade, the priests draw water brought from various places, into the *grahas*, i.e. cups, for consecrating the king. The waters are poured in a big vessel and placed between the mounds of the *Hotṛ* and the *Brāhmaṇāccaṁṣi*. The gold pieces measuring hundred *kṛṣṇalas* are placed in it. The water is thus purified by gold. The water is then

poured in four pots made of *palāśa, udumbara, aśvattha* and *nyagrodha* wood. The sacrificer, the king wears the garment besmeared with clarified butter and also a white turban.

The king is cleansed by means of a bunch of one hundred *darbha* blades. He is made to eat curds, fruit of *udumbara* and sprouts of grains.

The king is brought out of the *Āgnīdhra*-shade.

The priests declare 'this king, the son of... has been notified for great lordship, great over-lordship and a great ruler over the people. This is your king, O Bharatas'.

The *Adhvaryu* then give him a bow and an arrow and makes him mentally proceed to all quarters for winning victory against foes. The Adhvaryu also follows him mentally.

The *Adhvaryu* offers an *iṣṭi* to Maruts with a cake baked on twenty-one potsherds and also to Viśvedevas with *āmikṣā*.

The *Adhvaryu* offers six *Pārtha* offerings of clarified butter to Agni, Soma, Savitṛ, Sarasvatī, Pūṣan and Bṛhaspati, before the consecration of king.

He also makes six offerings named as *Bhutānām aveṣṭayaḥ* to Pṛthivī, Antarikṣa, Dyu, Sūrya, Candramas and Nakṣatras, before the consecration.

After consecration also, the *Adhvaryu* makes six Pātha offerings to Indra, Ghoṣa, Śloka, Aṁsa, Bhaga and Kṣetrasya-pati.

He also offers *bhutānām aveṣṭayaḥ*, after consecration, to Āpaḥ, Oṣadhīḥ, Vanaspatiḥ, Carācara, Pariplava and Sarīsṛpa.

Towards the east of the *dhiṣṇya* of the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest, in *Sadas* pandal, a chair of khadira or udumbara is placed; it is covered with a skin of a tiger, with its neck towards east and hairy side upwards. The gold measuring hundred *kṛṣṇalas* is placed over it. The gold is also placed in the vessel to be used for consecration.

While ascending the *Āsandī*, the king strikes the eunuch seated to the right, with the lead and sets aside a piece of copper to his left foot.

The *Adhvaryu* consecrates by sprinkling water over the king, from the vessel having hundred holes. The *Adhvaryu* offers the *Prareka* offering to Rudra on the *Āgnīdhra's* fire, with the water remaining in the vessel of consecration.

The king then goes to the house of his queen; being touched by her and by his dearest son, he makes the Saṁśrāva offerings.

Then the *Adhvaryu* sprinkles the king with the water from the cup of *parṇa*-wood, the *Kṣatriya* sprinkles the king with the water from the cup of *udumbara* wood, the *Vaiśya* with the water from the cups of *aśvattha* wood and a common man, i.e., *janya,* from the cup of the *nyagrodha* wood.

The chariot is kept ready; the king proceeds towards it, with three *Viṣṇu*-steps. Seated in the chariot he proceeds for winning victory. He throws the arrow towards the *Rājanya* standing towards east or north and wins him and turns right. He wears a pair of shoes of the skin of a boar and descends down the chariot.

He puts on his shoulders the beads of silver, copper and gold. After the invocation of *Iḍā*, he takes out the beads and gives these to the *Brahmā* priest.

He then makes the *Ratha-vimocanīya* offering. The king is made seated on the chair of the *khadira*-wood covered with hide. The priests and the *Ratnins* take seats around him.

The king addresses the *Adhvaryu*, the *Brahman*, the *Hotṛ* and the *Udgātṛ*, with—'O Brahman'; the four priests respond—'You are Brahman, the Savitṛ of the instigation, You are Indra of true force, You are Mitra, easy to serve, You are Varuṇa of true rule', respectively.

The Brahmā priest gives a *sphya* (*vajra*) to the king and also five dices.

Avabhṛtha of *Abhiṣecanīya* is performed.

Saṁsṛpām havīṁṣi: After the *Abhiṣecanīya,* ten *Saṁsṛp iṣṭis* are offered, one on each day. They are as follows:

(1) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni,
(2) A *caru* to Sarasvat,
(3) A cake baked on twelve potsherds to Savitṛ,
(4) A *caru* to Pūṣan,
(5) A *caru* to Bṛhaspati,
(6) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra,
(7) A cake baked on ten potsherds to Varuṇa,
(8) A *caru* to Soma,
(9) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Tvaṣṭṛ,
(10) A cake baked on three potsherds to Viṣṇu.

On the seventh day of the above *saṁsṛp* offerings, the sacrificer undergoes the *dīkṣā* of the *Daśa-peya-Soma* sacrifice. Soma is purchased. *Ātithyā iṣṭi* is performed. On the next day, after the *saṁsṛp* offering of a *caru* to Soma, the first *Upasad* is performed. On the next day, the *saṁsṛp* offering of a cake to Tvaṣṭṛ is offered between the morning and evening *Upasad.* On the next day, a cake to Viṣṇu is offered after the evening *Upasad* offering.

Daśapeya soma sacrifice: In the next *Daśapeya* soma-sacrifice, the performance of *dīkṣā* and purchase of Soma is done on the same day. '*Apsudīkṣā*' of normal Soma sacrifice is substituted by wearing a garland of twelve lotus flowers. The Soma is purchased in exchange of ten young bulls who have stopped drinking mother-cow's milk.

At the time of arranging the utensils, ten additional *camasas* are placed and drawn. Soma of each *camasa* is consumed by ten Brahmins. Thus, one hundred Brahmins drink the Soma from the ten *camasas.* Therefore, this sacrifice is named as *Daśa-peya.* All the *stotras* in this sacrifice have seventeen *stomas.* The *Hotṛ* in this sacrifice should belong to *Bhṛgu-gotra.*

Diśām-aveṣṭayaḥ

Five offering are offered as follows:

(1) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni,
(2) A cake baked on eleven potsherds to Indra,
(3) A *caru* to Viśvedevas,
(4) *Āmikṣā* to Mitrāvaruṇau,
(5) A *caru* to Bṛhaspati.

***Paśu-bandha* with two Victims**

They are offered as follows:

(1) A pregnant sheep bearing two teats at throat to Aditi, and
(2) Four-year-old white cow to Maruts.

Sātyadūta-offerings

They are offered as follows:

(1) A cake baked on twelve potsherds to Aśvinau and Pūṣan jointly,

(2) A *caru* to Sarasvat of True speech, and

(3) A cake baked on twelve potsherds to Savitṛ of True impulse.

Prayuj offerings

The *first set* of six *Prayuj* offerings are offered

(1) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni,

(2) A *caru* to Soma,

(3) A cake baked on twelve potsherds to Savitṛ,

(4) A *caru* to Bṛhaspati,

(5) A cake baked on eight potsherds to Tvaṣṭṛ,

(6) A cake baked on twleve potsherds to Vaisvānara.

The *Second set* of *Prayuj* offerings on the next day:

(1) A *caru* to Sarasvat,

(2) A *caru* to Pūṣan,

(3) A *caru* to Mitra,

(4) A *caru* to Varuṇa

(5) A *caru* to Kṣetrapati, and

(6) A *caru* to Aditi.

Five Soma sacrifices

Then, the following five Soma sacrifices are performed consecutively as a part of the *Rājasūya*:

(1) *Keśa-vapanīya,*

(2) *Vyuṣṭi-dvirātra,*

(3) *Agniṣṭomātirātra,*

(4) *Kṣattrasya dhṛtiḥ,*

(5) *Triṣṭomaḥ Agniṣṭomaḥ*

Thus the *Rājasūya* is concluded.

XVI

AŚVAMEDHA

A king desirous of becoming a sovereign performs the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice.

First, the king performs *Sāṅgrahaṇī iṣṭi.*

The king declares his intention, i.e., *saṅkalpa* to perform the sacrifice under Citrā constellation. He then fixes some sacred place for the performance of the sacrifice. He sends his messenger (*Soma-pravāka*) to invite the priests and brings them honourably by means of elephants, chariots, horses, etc. The sacrificer, the king, then undergoes *dīkṣā.* The king gets shaved, takes bath and wears new garments.

He arranges to bring waters from four corners—the waters from well, lake, pond and stream. The *Adhvaryu* measures out rice grains four times and cooks the *caru* in the waters brought from four places. He pours ample clarified butter in it. Four principal priests consume that *caru,* i.e., *Brahmaudana.*

The *Adhvaryu* prepares a cord twelve or thirteen *aratnis* in length by means of *darbha-*blades and dips it in the clarified butter left in the vessel of *Brahmaudana.* This cord is used for tying the horse. The sacrificer gives gold to the priests as sacrificial-fee.

With the permission of the *Brahmā-*priest, he ties the horse which is selected as a victim, to the sacrificial post.

The horse is taken to a water-place for cleansing him with water. A dog having two spots over his eyes is also taken with him. The dog is killed by a son of a female servant, i.e., *dāsī* by striking the pestle of a *Sidhraka-*wood. The killed dog is thrown under the feet of the horse, when the horse is being cleansed in water. Finally, the dog is thrown in water towards the south of the horse.

The horse is taken out of water on the bank of the water place.

The *Brahmā* priest holds the hand of the king, the sacrificer.

Four priests—viz., *Adhvaryu, Brahmā, Hotṛ* and *Udgātṛ,* each backed by hundred princes, chiefs of towns, warriors and tax-treasurers respectively stand towards the four directions of the horse and sprinkle the horse with water. The king contemplates on the drops of water, falling down from the body of the horse and recites the *stokya* formulas (TS 7.1.14). A cake baked on eight potsherds is offered to Savitṛ. Before *sviṣṭakṛt* offering of the *iṣṭi,* the libations are offered along with the recitation of *Aśvacarita* formulas (TS 7.1.19).

The Sacrificial horse is then set free for one year, under the protection of warriors. During the period of one year, three *iṣṭis* are performed by the sacrificer i.e. the king on each day of the year.

Every morning and evening the brahmins and the warriors playing on *Vīṇā* sing the glory of the king, the sacrificer. The king also hears the *Pāriplava-*stories narrated by the *Hotṛ.*

There are three Soma sacrifices performed in the *Aśvamedha.* The first is *Catuḥṣṭoma Agniṣṭoma,* the third in *Sarva-stoma-Atirātra.* The second Soma-sacrifice is an important one. In this Soma-sacrifice, the *Udgātṛ* priest does not chant the *udgītha* in the Bahiṣpavamāna-stotra. Instead the mares are brought near the horse. The neighing sound of the horse on seeing the mares is regarded as the *udgītha* of the *Bahiṣpavamāna stotra.*

Twenty-one sacrificial posts are fixed. The horse is tied to the middle post. Many cords are tied to the body of the horse. Various wild and tamed victims are tied to the posts. After waving the lighted embers round them, they are released.

A blanket besmeared with clarified butter is sperad. A hide and a golden board is placed on it. The horse is taken over it and immolated. Covered with a garment the queen sleeps near the immolated horse.

The horse is dissected and limbs and marrow, etc., are offered. The horse has no omentum. Consequently, there is no ommentum offering.

The king is then made to sit on a tiger's or a lion's skin. The hide of a bull with a piece of gold is held over his head. The priests pour water on his head.

Next day, the third Soma sacrifice (*Atirātra*) is performed, it concludes with the *Avabhṛtha* bath. Next day the libations of clarified butter are offered on the bald head of a person born in *Atri*-family, suffering from white leprosy and having twany eyes.

Thus the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice is concluded.

XVII

YĀTU: MAGIC ELEMENT IN SACRIFICE

Abhicāra means witchcraft or black magic. Though noted by the Vedic texts, it is prohibited by the Mīmāṁsakas, since, it does not yield good fruit. On the other hand, it brings calamities to the performer. Such sacrifices bringing '*anartha*' are therefore '*niṣiddha*'. The Vedas do not enjoin them, but only point out their relation with the fruit they bear. This is made clear by the writers like Laugākṣi Bhāskara while explaining the definition of *Dharma* (*śyenādau ativyāptivāraṇāya* '*artha*' *iti*).

While commenting on TS 2.2.9—'*āgnāvaiṣṇavam ekādaśakapālam nirvaped abhicaran*' (one who practises witchcraft should offer a cake baked on eleven potsherds to Agni and Viṣṇu), Bhaṭṭa-Bhāskara has defined the term '*abhicāra*' as '*aniṣṭakāriṇam prati aniṣṭācaraṇam*', i.e., inflicting injury against one who has done wrong to us. According to this definition, *abhicāra* is a reaction to stop the black magic practised by evil spirits and enemies. Such kind of *Yātu* may be categorized under *Naimittika* type. It is often found prescribed in Vedic texts.

There are some *Yātus* which may not be termed as *abhicāra*.

Eg: After the *Avabhṛtha*, the sacrificer and the priests come back from the place of water. While coming back from there, they do not see backwards. This is also a *Yātu* for avoiding the clutches of Varuṇa's noose. In *Agnicayana*, the *ukhā* pot, its swing and three black bricks are taken to the south-west quarter and placed there. The priests while returning, do not see backwards to avoid the evil forces of *Nirṛti*.

After uttering the names of *Rudra*, *Rakṣas*, dead *Pitṛs* and *Nirṛti*, the priests touch water to disconnect the evil spirits working against them.

Even the placing of *paridhis* (enclosing sticks) at the three sides of the *Āhavanīya*, stop entrance of evil spirits inside the fire pit.

Stamba-yajur-haraṇam in the *iṣṭi* sacrifice is done with a view to suppress down the *Rakṣas* called Araru and prohibit him from going to *svarga*.

Before placing the potsherds inside the *Gārhapatya*, for baking the cakes, the *Adhvaryu* takes out two burning embers of *Āmād* and *Kravyād Agni* and throws them outside.

Waving the burning embers around the cakes or other oblations, the victim, etc., is practised for keeping the *Rakṣas* away.

The *Adhvaryu* collects the earth from the seventh foot print of *somakrayaṇī* cow. He draws a circle around that footprint and stops the entry of evil spirits inside.

Before depositing the sacred fire, the sacrificer takes a vessel filled with water and goes to the place where cross roads meet. The sacrificer looks into the water and recites

the formulas called *Pāpmano Vinidhayaḥ* (BŚS 2.5). He then pours the water on that place and returns home without looking back. Thereby the sins given up by the sacrificer do not follow him.

It is believed that all such types of *Yātus* destroy evil spirits and prove to be protective for the sacrificer. Since protection of sacrifice and the sacrificer is essential, these are deemed necessary in ritual practices.

In the *Aśvamedha*, the queen sleeps near the dead horse. This also amounts to *Yātu* which is deemed necessary for fertilization.

In *Avestan Yasna* also, the bronze pestle is used to make bell-like sound to exorcise evil influences and to proclaim the victory of divine elements.

XVIII

SACRIFICE IN THE ṚGVEDA

Śrauta religion was a growing and developing institution, conceptually and constructionally, right from the days of the *Ṛgveda* and it reached its climax in the days of the *Yajurveda*.

It is generally held that the original Ṛgvedic religion was more simple and that it consisted of addressing prayers to the divinities in nature for propitiating them and thereby fulfilling one's own desires pertaining to material life.

The arrangement of the *Ṛgveda* is also not congenial to the performance of any particular rite; it does not follow any ritual-order. The employment of many Ṛgvedic *sūktas*, in the sacrifice is again not beyond doubt. Even the traditional commentator of the *Ṛgveda*, viz., Sāyaṇācārya states that the *viniyoga* of many *sūktas* is '*Laiṅgika*', i.e. may be determined with some clue to the deity mentioned in it.

Lagadha's *Vedāṅga Jyotiṣa*, however, opines that the Vedas are inclined to promote sacrifices (*Vedā hi yajñārtham abhipravṛttāḥ*).

It is true that the *Ṛgveda* rituals were not as elaborate as those found in the *Yajurveda*. But this may be due to the fact that the Ṛgvedic text deals with *Hautra* section of sacrifice, and has a limited scope in the procedure of sacrifice.

It is, however, beyond doubt that the religion of sacrifice formed the background of the *Ṛgveda* also.

The fourfold division of priests was known to the *Ṛgveda*. In this respect, the verse- '*ṛcām tvaḥ poṣam āste pupuṣvān, gāyatram tvo gāyati śakvarīṣu. Brahmā tvo vadati jātavidyām, yajñasya mātrām vi mimīta u tvaḥ*' (X. 71.11) is very important.

The term *Ṛtvik* occurs many times in the text of the *Ṛgveda*. Besides, the following priests in sacrifice were familiar to the *Ṛgveda*, viz., *Hotṛ* (I. 1.1, I.1.5. etc.), *Potṛ* (I.94.6, II. 5.2., IV. 9.3 etc.), *Neṣṭṛ* (II. 5.5, I. 15.3 etc.), *Agnīt* (I. 162.5, II. 1.2., X. 91.10), *Praśāstṛ* (I. 94.6, II. 3. 6.6., X. 91.10, II. 5.4. etc.), *Udgātṛ* (II. 43.2 etc.).

The choosing of the *Hotṛ* priest is referred to in the *Ṛgveda* II.9.1.

Soma sacrifices must have played an important role even in Ṛgvedic rituals, since the entire nineth *Maṇḍala* is dedicated so Soma. The words referring to the three sessions of

the soma crushing, viz., *Prātaḥ-sāva* (for *Prātaḥsavana*) (III. 28.1, III. 5.2.4, X. 112.1), *Mādhyandina-savana* (III. 28.4, IV. 35.7), *Tṛtīya-savana* (IV. 34.3, IV. 35.9) are frequently used in the *Ṛgveda*. *Ṛgveda*-sūktas X. 76, X. 94, X, 175 are composed in praise of stones used for crushing Soma. The filter (*Pavitra*) of white wool of ram, for filtering soma is refered to in the *Ṛgveda* IX. 67.19, IX. 6.1, IX. 7.6 etc. The words like *Prayāja* (X. 51.8,9), *Anuyāja* (X. 182.2, X. 51.9) occur in the *Ṛgveda*. Similarly the words, viz., *Sruc, Sruva, Darvī, Juhū,* etc., also are found in it. In the context of animal sacrifice, the word *Yūpa* (I. 15.14 V. 2.7), and *Yūpavraska* (I. 162.6) are used in the *Ṛgveda*. *Yūpa* is praised in one of the *sūktas* (III.8) of the *Ṛgveda*. *Āprī-sūktas* used as *Prayāja-yājyās* in animal sacrifice have also been collected in the *Ṛgveda* (Cp. VII. 2, III. 4 etc).

Ṛgveda X. 114.5 refers to twelve *grahas* (cups) of soma to be offered in the Soma sacrifice.

Atirātra Soma-Sacrifice, forming one of the seven *soma saṁstās*, has been referred to in the Ṛgveda VIII. 103.7.

It may again be noted that an elaborate sacrifice like *Aśvameda* is referred to in the *Ṛgveda* V. 27.4. The *Ṛgveda* I. 162 gives a good number of details of the *Aśvamedha*.

It is not necessary to multiply the references to sacrificial terms in the *Ṛgveda* since these are many. I have quoted a few instances to prove that, the Śrauta religion has deep roots in the Ṛgvedic *sūktas*.

XIX

PHILOSOPHY OF SACRIFICE

Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā 1.4.10 states '*na tasya sāyam aśnīyāt yasya prātar yakṣamāṇaḥ syāt*', i.e., the sacrificer should not consume in the evening that food which is to be offered in sacrifice, next day morning.

Similarly, the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* 12.7 and *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* 4.3.2, in the context of *Āgrayaṇa iṣṭi* enjoins '*Yad aniṣṭvā āgrayaṇena navasy aśnīyāt, devānām bhāgam pratikḷptam aśnīyad, tasmād nāniṣṭvāgrayaṇena navasyāśnīyād*', i.e., the corn of new harvest should not be partaken unless it is offered to the deities.

These statements throw sufficient light on the philosophy of sacrifice. It is thereby suggested that as a gratitude to the divinities and to community the sacrificer should give a portion of his earnings to the deities, and in a wider sense, to the community, before he enjoys their shares for himself. Performance of sacrifice is thus a practical lesson, in '*tena tyaktena bhuñjīthāḥ*', that is, one should enjoy with a sense of detachment, as taught by the *Īśopaniṣad*. Sacrifice is, therefore, treated as the '*Sreṣṭhatama karma*', the best amongst the actions.

Time and space (i.e., *Kāla* and *Loka*) are held as important factors in the peformance of sacrifice. The entire schedule of the sacrificial procedure turns round the wheel of time and space. The time is regarded as *deva-cakra* and one rotation of a year is considered as

Prajāpati. Brahman in action is also identified with Prajāpati who manifested *Kāla* and *Lokas*. The sacrifice is, therefore, looked upon as a replica of the creation itself.

Certain sacrifices, like *Rājasūya* and *Aśvamedha*, indicate their political and social aspects also.

The golden image of the *Puruṣa*, placed in *Agnicayana*, calls for the concept of *Virāṭ Puruṣa* which is further reflected in the *Puruṣa-medha*.

The urge of the sacrifice to become all and become one with the *Puruṣa* is also reflected in *Agnicayana* and *Sarvamedha* sacrifices.

The material gains yielded by the sacrifices, therefore, are to be regarded as secondary, that is, *ānuṣaṅgika* only.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Śabaraswāmī* on *Jaiminīya Sūtra* (JS) I.1.i-अधीतो वेदः धर्मजिज्ञासायां हेतुः। ...यजतिशब्दवाच्यमेव धर्मं समामनन्ति। ...कोऽर्थः? यो निःश्रेयसाय ज्योतिष्टोमादिः।
2. *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra* (Āśs) 24.1.30.31 मन्त्रब्राह्मणे यज्ञस्य प्रमाणम्। मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोर्वेदनामधेयम्।
3. *Kauśika-sūtra* 1.13 आम्नायः पुनः मन्त्राश्च ब्राह्मणानि।
4. Śabara or *JS* 2.1.32 मन्त्राश्च ब्राह्मणाश्च वेदः, and also cp Pratijña pariśiṣṭa of Kātyāyana.
5. *Manu Smṛti* (2.13) धर्मं जिज्ञासमानानां प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः।
6. *Āpśs* 24-1.3-7 यज्ञं व्याख्यास्यामः ...स त्रिभिर्वेदैर्विधीयते। ऋग्वेदयजुर्वेदसामवेदैः। ऋग्वेदयजुर्वेदाभ्यां दर्शपूर्णमासौ। यजुर्वेदेनाग्निहोत्रम्। सर्वैरग्निष्टोमः।
7. *Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* (Bśs) 2.3.-अथ प्रतिप्रस्थाता नेष्टोन्नेतेत्यध्वर्युपुरुषाः। ब्राह्मणाच्छंस्याग्नीध्रः पोतेति ब्रह्मणः। मैत्रावरुणोऽच्छावाको ग्रावस्तुदिति होतुः। उद्गाता प्रस्तोता प्रतिहर्ता सुब्रह्मण्य इत्युद्गातुः। अभिगरो ध्रुवगोपः संश्राव इति सदस्यस्य। स्वप्रधानाः। अप्रधाना इत्येके। दश वा एकादश वा चमसाध्वर्यवः। अन्यदक्षिणाभिः परिक्रीता भवन्तीति विज्ञायते। cp.also *Āpśs* X 1.8-11 तान् वृणीते चतुरः सर्वान् वा एकैकशः। अध्वर्युं प्रतिप्रस्थातारं नेष्टारमुन्नेतारम् इत्यध्वर्यून्। ब्रह्माणं ब्राह्मणाच्छंसिनम् आग्नीध्रं पोतारम् इति ब्रह्मणः। होतारं मैत्रावरुणम् अच्छावाकं ग्रावस्तुतमिति होतॄन्। उद्गातारं प्रस्तोतारं प्रतिहर्तारं सुब्रह्मण्यमिति उद्गातॄन्। सदस्यं सप्तदशं कौषीतकिनः समामनन्ति। स कर्मणामुपद्रष्टा भवति।
8. *Vaitāna sūtra*-अथर्वाङ्गिरोविदं ब्रह्माणम्।
9. *Āpśs* 5.16.6-ब्रह्मा अग्न्याधेये सामानि गायति। Gopatha Br. 2.5.8 ब्रह्मा रथचक्रं सर्पति-वाजिसामाभिगायति। Also *Gopatha-Br* 2.5.7, *Vaitāna-sūtrā* 5.3.16 etc.
10. Vaitāna sūtra 3.3.11-प्रोह्यमाणेऽप्रतिरथं जपति। cp also Gopatha Br. I.1.18.
11. *Āpśs* 2.4.1, 16-19 ऋग्वेदेन होता करोति। सामवेदेनोद्गाता यजुर्वेदेनाध्वर्युः सर्वैर्ब्रह्मा।
12. *Sāyaṇa-bhāṣya-bhūmikā* of *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* I.1.1. कर्मकाण्ड-विषये यजुर्वेदस्यैव प्राधान्यात्। आनुपूर्व्या कर्मणां स्वरूपं यजुर्वेदे समाम्नातम्। तत्र तत्र विशेषापेक्षायामपेक्षिता याज्यापुरोनुवाक्यादयः ऋग्वेदे समाम्नायन्ते, स्तोत्रादीनि तु सामवेदे। तथा सति भित्तिस्थानीयो यजुर्वेदश्चित्रस्थानीयावितरौ। तस्मात् कर्मसु यजुर्वेदस्यैव प्राधान्यम्।
13. *Kātyāyana* śs I. 1. 16 ब्राह्मणराजन्यवैश्यानां श्रुतेः। I.1.19-रथकारस्याधाने। 1.1.12 निषादस्थपतिर्गाविधुकेऽधिकृतः। Āpśs 24.1.2 स त्रयाणां वर्णानां ब्राह्मणराजन्ययोः वैश्यस्य च।
14. *Āpśs* 24.1.21 ब्राह्मणानामार्त्विज्यम्। Kātśs 1.2.8 ब्राह्मणा ऋत्विजः।
15. Śabara on JS1.1.1
16. *Kātyāyana śs* यज्ञं व्याख्यास्यामः। द्रव्यं देवता त्यागः।

17. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*-I.7.32 देवदूता व एते यदृत्विजः।

18. *Bśs* 24.4-अपरिमिता उ ह एके ब्रुवते। यच्च किंच अन्यत्र विहारात् हूयते सर्वास्ता पाकयज्ञसंस्था इति।

ABBREVIATIONS

Āpśs	*Āpastamba-Śranta-Sūtra*
Bśs	*Baudhāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra*
JS	*Jaiminīya-Sūtra*
TBr	*Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*
TS	*Taittiriya Saṁhitā*
ŚS	*Śrauta-Sūtra*

The diagrams in the following pages—Courtsey Dr. C.G. Kashikar


दर्शपूर्णमास विहारः
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5
1 गार्हपत्यः
2 अन्वाहार्यपचनः
3 आहवनीयः
4 वेदिः
5 उत्करः
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
चातुर्मास्येषु वरुण-प्रघास - विहारः
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1 गार्हपत्यः
2 अन्वाहार्यपचनः
3 आहवनीयः
4 वेदिः
5 पाशुबन्धिकी वेदिः (उत्तरा)
6 उत्तरवेदिः
7 चात्वालः
8 उत्करः
9 दक्षिणावेदिः
10 दक्षिणाहवनीयः
11 उत्तरनाभिः
(स्केल-१ इंच : ४० अंगुलानि)


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2 अन्वाहार्य पचनः
3 आहवनीयः
4 वेदिः
5 पाशुबन्धिकी वेदिः
6 उत्तरवेदिः
7 चात्वालः
8 उत्करः
9 उत्तरनाभिः
10 पैतृकीवेदिः
11 प्रणीतान्वाहार्य पचनः
(स्केल- 1 इंच : ४० अंगुलानि)


पशुबन्ध-विहारः
बौधायनश्रौतसूत्रानुसारेण
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2 अन्वाहार्य पचनः
3 आहवनीयः
4 वेदिः
5 पाशुबन्धिकीवेदिः
6 उत्तरवेदिः
7 चात्वालः
8 उत्करः
9 यूपावटः
10 उत्तरनाभिः
(स्केल- 1 इंच : ४० अंगुलानि)


अग्निष्टोम·विहारः
[बौधायनश्रौतसूत्रानुसारेण]
महावेदिः
22
संचरः
हविर्धानम्
21
आग्नीध्रीयम्
मार्जालीयम्
संचरः
संचरः
प्राग्वंशः
3
4
5
2
10
(स्केल- 1 इंच : ४० अंगुलानि)
27
11 औदुंबर्यवटः
12 होतृधिष्णियः
13 प्रशास्तृधिष्णियः
15 पोतृधिष्णियः
16 नेष्टृधिष्णियः
18 आग्नीध्रीयधिष्णियः
19 मार्जालीयधिष्णियः
20 उपरवाः (4)
21 खरः
22 उत्तरवेदिः
23 उत्तरनाभिः
24 यूपावटः
26 उत्करः
27 शामित्रम्
1 गार्हपत्यः
2 अन्वाहार्यपचनः
3 आहवनीयः
4 वेदिः
5 निहावः
6 प्रणीतास्वरः
7 उद्वासनीयखरः
8 उत्करः
9 उच्छिष्टखरः
10 पत्नीशाला


प्रथमः प्रस्तारः

CHAPTER 11

Kinds of Vedic Sacrifices

T.N. Dharmadhikari

Veda consists of two sections, viz., *Pūrva-kāṇḍa* and *Uttara-kāṇḍa.* These two sections are also termed as *Karma-kāṇḍa* and *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* respectively.

Tradition defines the Vedas as '*alaukikārtha-bodhakāḥ*', i.e. the Vedas reveal the knowledge of that object which cannot be grasped by any of the common means of knowledge, e.g., *Pratyakṣa* or *Anumāna,* etc. That object is twofold, viz., *Dharma* and *Brahman.* According to the Mīmāṁsakas, *Dharma* is identical with *Yajña,* i.e., sacrifice. ('*yāgādiḥ eva dharmaḥ*'—Artha-saṅgraha of *Laugākṣi Bhāskara*). Sacrifices are enjoined by the *Karma-kāṇḍa* section of the Vedas. The *Jñana-kāṇḍa* deals with *Brahmopadeśa* or *Brahmopāsti.* The *Brahman* also cannot be grasped by the common means of knowledge and its experience leads to *kramamukti* or *sadyomukti.*

The famous opinion of Lagadha, the composer of the *Vedāṅga jyotiṣa,* viz., '*Vedāḥ hi yajñartham abhipravṛttāhḥ*' (i.e., the Vedas are earnest in promoting the sacrifice), mainly refers to the *Karma kāṇḍa* of the Vedas.

The types of the sacrifices can be classified in five groups, viz., *Nitya* (compulsory), *Naimittika* (occassional), *Kāmya* (performed for fulfilling certain material desires or personal advantages), *Prāyaścitta* (expiatory) and *Niṣiddha,* (prohibitted).

NITYA-SACRIFICES

Nitya sacrifices, as the term indicates, are to be performed regularly. They are compulsory and not optional. They do not depend upon any desire of the sacrificer for any personal gain. On the other hand, if one does not perform the *Nitya* sacrifices, he incurs sin. Yājñavalkya in his *Smṛti* (3.219) states—'*Vihitasyānanuṣṭhānān ninditasya ca sevanāt / anigrahāc cendriyāṇām naraḥ patanam ṛcchati*', i.e., a person meets serious downfall, if he does not perform, the *Nitya* sacrifices, enjoined to be performed regularly, and if he performs the *Niṣiddha* rites which are prohibited for him, and also if he does not restrain his senses.

Thus the performance of *Nitya* sacrifices avoids the diminution that might have accrued by their non-performance (cp. Sāyaṇa in his introduction to the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* (TS) '*Nitya-naimittikānuṣṭhānād akaraṇe pratyavāyarūpam aniṣṭam parihriyate*').

Secondly, if such *Nitya* sacrifices are not performed, their Vedic injunctions will loose their propriety and will be rendered superfluous cp Vidyādhara's commentary on *Kātyāyana*

śrauta sūtra. I. 2. 11—'*yadi niyamena anuṣṭhānaṁ na syād, tarhi vidher vaiyarthyam āpadyeta*'... etc.).

Thirdly, the *Nitya* sacrifices, performed without indulging in fruit, purify the intelligence and the mind of the sacrificer and create the urge in him to realize and experience the *Brahman*. Thus the *Nitya* sacrifices become the cause of *Brahmajñāna* through purification of the mind of the sacrificer. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.22) confirms this view, stating—'*tam etam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena, dānena tapasā...* .' etc. (The Brahmins desire to know the *Brahman* by means of Vedic studies, *yajña* sacrifice, *dāna* gift and *tapas* austerity). Obviously *Yajña* here points to *Nitya* (and *Naimittika*) sacrifices and not to *Kāmya* and never to *Niṣiddha* sacrifices.

Further, as Sāyaṇācārya[1] remarks in his introduction to the TS, that even the *Nitya* sacrifices also yield their fruit, which are unavoidable. Thus, in the Vedic sentences like—'*yāvajjīvam agnihotraṁ juhoti*', though there is no mention of yielding any fruit like heaven, the sacrificer obtains it, being unavoidable. Just as, the mango seed is sown particularly for its fruit, even then its shade and the blossom-fragrance of that tree also become available, similarly, the *dharma*, being practised, also yields its fruit.

Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra I. i. 3, '*Phala-yuktāni karmāṇi*' also opines that all the *karmas* enjoined by the Vedas yield their fruit. Thus, even the *Nitya* sacrifices do yield their fruit, but they are to be compulsorily and regularly performed, without indulging in the fruit they yield. The sacrificer cannot depend upon his sweet will for performing or not performing them. He has no choice. He must perform the *Nitya* sacrifices.

Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifices are noted as *Nitya* sacrifices. *Āpastamba śrauta-sūtra* 3.14.8 enjoins that one desirous of obtaining heaven, should perform *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. Rudradatta the commentator here explains—'*Nityau darśapūrṇamāsau aphalārthinā apy anuṣṭheyau iti sthāsyati-tathā api svargam kāmayamānasya tam api sādhayataḥ iti,*' i.e., *Nitya darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are to be performed even by one who does not cherish the desire to obtain the fruit. If these sacrifices are performed by one who desires heaven, his desire also will be fulfilled.

Kātyāyana śrauta-sūtra I. 2. 18—'*Viguṇe Phalanirvṛttir aṅga-pradhāna bhedāt*' states that the *Nitya* sacrifices, even they are *viguṇa*, i.e. deficient in auxiliary rites, do yield fruit. *Nitya* sacrifices also have *Pradhāna* (i.e., main rites) and *Aṅga* (auxiliary) rites. The injunctions like '*tābhyām* (i.e. *darśa-pūrṇamāsābhyām*) *yāvajjīvaṁ yajeta* (*Āpastamba śrauta sūtra*—3. 14. 11), relate the *Pradhāna* rites only, with '*yāvajjīvam*.' Cp. Vidyādhara's commentary on this *sūtra*–'*Nitye karmaṇi viguṇeṣv api phalotpattir bhavaty eva, aṅga-pradhānabhedāt, yāvajjīvam darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ yajeta iti vākyena hi pradhānayor eva yāvajjīva-rūpa-nimitta-sambandhaḥ śrūyate, na tv aṅgānām, ataḥ pradhāna-mātrakaraṇe samartho 'pi nitye' dhikārīti.*). All this discussion aims to explain that, as far as possible the *Nitya* sacrifice should be performed with its auxiliary rites; but if, at times, it becomes impossible to perform all the *aṅgas*, (auxiliary rites), one should at least continue to perform the *pradhāna* rites throughout the whole life. (Cp. Jaiminīya sūtras 6. 3. 1-7)

This concession, however, is not allowed for the *Kāmya* sacrifices. In the *Kāmya* sacrifice, e.g., '*citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*' (TS 2. 4. 6), the sacrifice (*yajeta*) appears to be the means for its fruit, viz., possessing the cattle (since *citrayā*[2] is in instrumental case). The

sacrifice can be the means of the fruit, if it is performed with its *pradhāna* and auxiliary rites. Otherwise, the injunctions regarding the performance of *aṅgas* will be superfluous. It purports to say that the sacrificer should proceed to offer *Kāmya* sacrifice only if he is able to perform it with all its auxiliary rites, because *Kāmya* sacrifices are not obligatory, i.e. compulsory. The performance of sacrifices referring to their fruit, depend on the desire of the sacrificer.[3] (Cp Śabara on *Jaiminīya-sūtra* 6.3.9.) Śabara says '*sāṅgād hi phalaṁ śrūyate, na kevalāt*', i.e., the fruit has been declared to follow from the principal rite performed with all its auxiliaries and not from the principal rite only.

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Nyāyaratnamālā*, having first refuted the *Guru-mata* (i.e., Prābhākara view) establishes his own *siddhānta* with respect to *Nitya* and *Kāmya* sacrifices. He states—

'*Nimittaśravaṇān nityam yathāśakti prayujyate/*
Kāmyaṁ ca tad abhāvena nikhilāṅga-samanvitam//

(*Nyāyaratnamālā*, p. 146, Varāṇasī edn 1982)

[Because the *nimitta* (the cause) is referred to in the *Vidhi*-sentence of the *Nitya*-sacrifice, it is performed as per the ability of the sacrificer. In the absence of such a cause in the *Vidhi*-sentence of *Kāmya* sacrifice, it has to be performed along with its *aṅgas* also]

Thus in the *Vidhi*-sentence, '*Yāvaj Jīvam agnihotram juhoti*', due to adherence of the word *yāvat*, the *jīvana* (life) is understood to be the *nimitta* (cause) of the *Agnihotra-homa*. [cp. *yāvac-chabdānubandhāj jīvanaṁ homa-nimittatvena avagamyate*—(*Nyāyaratnamāla*)]. When *nimitta* (cause) is present, the *naimittaka* (result) must follow. Then only the word *nimitta* appears to be purposeful. Otherwise, its use will be rendered futile. What is then the result that must follow in case of the above sentence? If the *Agnihotra* has to be performed for the full span of life, it must join the sacrificer with its inevitable fruit, the result. The fruit (result) of the *Nitya Agnihotra* is avoiding the possible *pratyavāya* (hindrance) in the form of sin, which may have accrued from the non-performance of the *Nitya Agnihotra* rite.

Now the question arises why *svarga* is not to be regarded as the result of the *nimitta* here. The answer is that *svarga* is not expected by those who are *mumukṣus*, i.e. desirous of liberation from the bondage of *Karman*, while *pratyavāya-parihāra*, i.e. keeping away the sin is expected by all those who perform the *Nitya* sacrifice, like *agnihotra*, etc.

The sacrifice named *Vighana* is enjoined for destroying the accumulated sin. [Cp TBr 2.7.18—*Vi pāpmānaṁ bhrātṛvyaṁ hate ya etena yajate...*' etc. (one who performs this sacrifice-viz., *Vighana*, destroys the enemy, viz. sin). Cp also Tāṇḍya Br. 19.18.1-2–*athaiṣa Vighanaḥ, indro' kāmayata pāpmānaṁ bhrātṛvaṁ vihanyām iti, sa etaṁ vighanam apaśyat, tena pāpmānaṁ bhrātṛvyaṁ vyahan, vi pāpmānaṁ bhrātṛvyaṁ hate ya evaṁ veda*—(Now through this *Vighana*, Indra desired, I may destroy the enemy, viz., the sin. He beheld the *Vighana* sacrifice and with the help of it he destroyed the enemy (sin). One who knows this, destroys the enemy, the sin).]

It may now be pointed out that since the *Vighana* sacrifice is also enjoined for destroying the sin, it may also be regarded as a *Nitya* sacrifice, and be performed as per the ability of the sacrificer, allowing the deficiencies of *aṅga* (auxiliary) rites. The answer is that the destruction of the possible sin is the result of the performance of the *Nitya* sacrifice like *Agnihotra*; while in case of *Vighana* sacrifice, the desire of destroying the sin

is the cause of performing that sacrifice. Therefore, *Vighana* cannot be captioned under the *Nitya* sacrifice. It is performed with the concrete desire of destroying the accumulated sin. Consequently, the *Vighana* sacrifice is a *Kāmya* sacrifice, and has to be performed with all its *aṅgas*, i.e. auxiliary rites.

Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra inunciates that the performance of vows, the *Naimittika*, i.e. occasional sacrifices, *Agnihotra, Darśapūrṇamāsau Dākṣāyaṇa, Āgrayaṇa, Nirūḍha paśubanda, Cāturmāsya* and *Soma* sacrifices do not depend on the desire of the sacrificer.[4] They are compulsory, i.e. *Nitya* and not *Kāmya.*

At times certain rites of *Kāmya* nature, are enjoined amid the *Nitya* sacrifices. To illustrate—*Āpastamba śrauta sūtra* 3.9.4 prescribes as follows—'*rākām putrakāmo yajeta, sinīvālīṁ paśukāmaḥ, kuhūṁ puṣṭikāmaḥ.*' Having offered four *Patnī-saṁyājas to* Soma, Tvaṣṭṛ, *Devānām patnīḥ* and *Agni Gṛhapati* for the sake of the sacrificer's wife, the *Adhvaryu* proceeds to offer three *Kāmya* oblations. He should offer a libation to *Rākā* for a sacrificer who desires to beget a son, to *Sinīvālī* for a sacrificer who desires to own cattle and to *Kuhū* for a sacrificer who desires nourishment. These rites refer to the desires of the sacrificer. Hence they are not *Nitya,* i.e. not to be compulsorily performed. But the next *sūtra*—'*nityavad eke samāmananti*' optionally treats these rites as *Nitya.* In that case, the rites are not performed with the desires as stated in the previous *sūtra.* Rudradatta on this *sūtra* comments '*Nityavad yathā nitye, kāmopabandha-rahitam ity arthaḥ.*' Further, he comments—'*Nityapakṣe vikṛtāv api gacchanti.*' That is to say—if these rites are treated as *Nitya,* then their applications are extended to the *Vikṛti* (modified) sacrifices also. One can safely conclude from this comment that the '*atideśas*', i.e. transferring of *aṅgas* from *Prakṛti* to *Vikṛti* sacrifices, can be adopted from the *Nitya* sacrifices only and not from the *Kāmya,* since they themselves are treated as *Vikṛti* sacrifices.

After the prescription of the *Anvārambhaṇīyā iṣṭi, Āpastamba śrauta sūtra* 5.23.6 prescribes a *Kāmya rite*—'*agnaye bhāgine'ṣṭākapālaṁ yaḥ kāmayeta bhagī annādaḥ syām iti*'. One should offer a cake baked on eight potsherds to Agni, if he desires to be fortunate and eater of food.' Next two *sūtras* (5. 23. 7-8) further state '*Nityavad eke samāmananti, nānātantram eke*', i.e. this rite be treated as *Nitya* or performed as a *Kāmya* rite. Rudradatta here comments—'*Nityasya kāmyasya ca nānātantratvavikalpaḥ*', i.e., there is option of its adopting as *Nitya* or *Kāmya.*

Let me now dilate on the point of sacrifice with reference to Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā. Both of them condemn[5] the sacrifice and also recommend[6] it. This apparent contradiction has to be reconciled. I may point out that the sacrifices when condemned, refer to *Kāmya* sacrifices, and when recommended, to *Nitya* sacrifices, because the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā preach only on spiritual level while *Karmakāṇḍa* prescribes them on mundane level also, since '*Dharma*' has to bring about both the *abhyudaya* and *nisśreyasa* for a common man.

Further, Bhagavadgīta 2. 39-40 reads—in the context of '(*karma*) *yoga buddhi*'—'*nehābhikrama-nāśo'sti pratyavāyo na vidyate / Svalpam apy asy dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt.*' It means—in (*Karma*)—yoga there can be no loss in whatever is undertaken, there is no diminution also. Even small performance protects one from great fear. I think, this verse may be read in the light of '*viguṇe phalanirvṛttiḥ aṅga-pradhāna-bhedāt*' (*Kātyāyana śrauta*

sūtra 1. 2. 18), which allows the performance of *Nitya* sacrifice, even if it is deficient in its *aṅgas*. I find that—'*Nehābhikramanāśo'sti...*' of the Bhagavadgītā and '*viguṇe phalaniṣpattiḥ*' of Kāt śs reveal the same spirit of *Nitya* sacrifice.

KĀMYA-SACRIFICES

Vedic texts enjoin the *Kāmya homas, Kāmya iṣṭis, Kāmya Paśu*-sacrifices and even *Kāmya Soma*-Sacrifices, e.g. *Jaya-homāḥ* (TS 3. 4. 4), *Abhyātāna-homāḥ* (TS 3. 4. 5-6), *Rāṣṭrabhṛt-homāḥ* (TS 3. 4. 7-8); *Catur-hotāraḥ* (TA 3. 1-10, TBr 2.2-3), *Kūṣmāṇḍa-homāḥ* (TA 2. 3-8) etc. are regarded as the *Kāmya-homas*. (Cp *Śrautakośa* Vol. I, Sanskrit Section, Dr. C.G. Kashikar, pp. 122-144).

The entire first *prapāṭhaka* of the TS *kāṇḍa* II, enjoins the *Kāmyapaśus* while the next three *prapāṭhaks* of the TS *kāṇḍa* II deal with the *Kāmya-iṣṭis*.

Kāmya Darśa-purṇamāsau have also been noted. They are as follows—

(i) *Āgnāvaiṣṇaveṣṭi* (TS 2. 5. 4), (ii) *Sākamprasthīyeṣṭi* (TS 2. 5. 4/5), (iii) *Sumanā nāmeṣṭi* (TS 2. 5. 5), (iv) (*Dākṣāyaṇa yajñaḥ* (TS 2. 5. 5), (v) *iḷādadhaḥ* (Ait Br 3. 40), (vi) *Sārvaseni—yajñaḥ* (Śāṅ Br 4. 6), (vii) *Śaunaka-yajñaḥ* (Śāṅ Br 4. 7), (viii) *Vasiṣṭha-yajñaḥ* (Śāṅ Br 4. 8), (ix) *Munyayanam* (Śāṅ Br. 4. 10), (x) *Turāyaṇam* (Śāṅ Br 4.11) etc. (For details Cp. *Śrautakośa* Skt. Vol. I, Dr. C.G. Kashikar, pp. 320-326).

Kāmya Soma Sacrifices have been prescribed in Tāṇ Br. 16-20, Bśs 16-18, Āpśs 22-23 etc.

Even *Kāmya Citis* have been enjoined by Ts 5. 4. 11.

NAIMITTIKA—OCCASIONAL SACRIFICES

Naimittika sacrifices are held at par with the *Nitya*-sacrifices, in the sense that they are not performed with reference to fulfilling any personal desire, but when occasions occur they are to be performed compulsorily, e.g. TS 2. 2. 2 enjoins '*yasya gṛhān dahati—agnaye kṣāmavate puroḍāśam aṣṭākapālaṁ nirvapet*', i.e. if the sacrificer's house catches fire, he should offer a cake baked on eight potsherds to *Kṣāmavat Agni*.

Thus, if the *nimitta* of burning the house occurs, this offering becomes obligatory.

PRĀYASCITTAS-EXPIATIONS

According to Jaimini and Śabara, the expiations are of two kinds. Some are enjoined for mending the lapses and others are prescribed as a part of the sacrifical performances, to be performed under certain contingencies.—(Cp. *Prāyścittāni dvi-prakārāṇi / Kānicit vaiguṇyasya pramādād āpatitasya samādhānārthāni / Kānicit nimitte karmāṅgāni.*—JS-Śabara 12.3.6).

For example '*yadi ṛkto yajña ārtim iyāt, bhūḥ svāheti gārhapatye juhuyāt, atha yadi yajuṣṭo, dakṣiṇāgnau bhuvaḥ svāheti, yadi sāmataḥ, svaḥ svāheti āhavanīye, yady avijñāto bhūr bhuvaḥ svaḥ svāheti āhavanīya eva.*' (i.e. if the sacrifice suffers loss due to *Ṛk.* (verse), he should

offer a libation with the formula '*bhūḥ svāhā*' in the *Gārhapatya* fire; if from *Yajus* (prose formula), he should offer a libation with the formula '*bhuvaḥ svāhā*' in the *dakṣina* fire; if from *Sāman* (chant), he should offer a libation with '*svaḥ svāhā,*' in the *Āhavanīya* fire. If he does not know from which the loss has occurred, he should offer with '*bhūr bhuvaḥ svaḥ svāhā*' in the *Āhavanīya.*) Here the expiation is meant to make the loss good, i.e. to mend the discrepancy.

If, in case, there are several expiations laid down to correct the same discrepancy, one should optionally undergo one of the several expiations. (Vide JS-Śabara—12. 3. 16).

Another kind of expiation is not meant to mend the lapses. Such expiations are not laid down for omission of what is enjoined or for committion of what is forbidden. For example, if the sun rises before the sacrificer has performed the *Agnihotra*, he should offer the cooked rice to Mitra, also a cake baked on one potsherd to Sūrya; the sacrificer and his wife should add fuel to fires and restrain their speech and observe fast during the day, etc. ('*yasyāhutam agnihotram sūryo' bhyudiyāt, maitram carum nirvapet, sauryam eka-kapālam*'; also, '*yasyāhutam agnihotraṁ sūryo' bhudiyāt, agniṁ samādhāya vācaṁ yatvā dampatī sarvāhṇam upāsīyātām*'. Maits 1. 8. 9). In this case the sacrificer has not omitted what is enjoined or committed what is forbidden. There is nothing to be mended here. The Vedic text here prescribes some rites when the contingency of the sunrise occurs before the *Agnihotra* offering. (*Kevalam abhyudaye nimitte karma vidhīyate*-Śabara-12. 3. 17) In such cases, all the expiations should be undergone by the sacrificer together. (Cp. JS-Śabar 12. 3. 17)

It may be noted here that such expiations appear like '*Naimittika*' kind of sacrifice.

In this context, Cp *Kātyāyana Śrauta sūtras* 1. 8. 11-15 also.

NIṢIDDHA—PROHIBITED

The Vedas have pointed out such sacrifices which, if performed, lead to hell. The Vedic sentence '*Śyenena abhicaran yajeta*' describes the *Śyena* sacrifice for him who desires to destroy the enemies by means of '*abhicāra*', the black magic. This *śyena* sacrifice is '*Veda-pratipādya*', propounded by the Vedas. It is also '*prayojanavat*', since its purpose is destruction of enemies. But it is not '*artha*', i.e. not desired, because the destruction leads the sacrificer to hell. Therefore, the *Śyena* sacrifice is *Niṣiddha*, prohibited.

It may be noted here that the *Śyena* sacrifice brings about the destruction of the enemy which amounts to *hiṁsā* and the *hiṁsā* is the cause for leading the sacrificer to hell.

It may be argued here that a (goat) is killed even in the *Soma* or *Paśu* sacrifice. If killing leads the sacrificer to hell, *Soma* and *Paśu* sacrifices also should lead him to hell and consequently they be regarded as prohibitted. The answer is, killing of *Paśu* in *Soma* or in *Nirūḍha-paśubandha* is the *aṅga* of that sacrifice. Therefore, killing does not have the fruit separate from that of *Soma* or *Paśu* sacrifices, which is *svarga*—(Cp. *Jaiminīya-nyāya-mālā-vistara*—on JS 1.1.2.—'*yady api śyenasya śatruvadhaḥ phalam, na narakaḥ, tathā' pi tasya vadhasya narakahetutvād vadhadvārā śyenaḥ anarthaḥ / na ca evam agnīṣomīyapaśu—hiṁsāyāḥ api vadhatvena narakahetutvam syād iti śaṅkanīyam / tasyāḥ kratvaṅgatvena kratuphala-vyatirekeṇa phalāntarābhāvāt.*')

Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa 4. 2. 1-2 prescribes *Śyena*[7] sacrifice, 4. 4. 1-2 enjoins *Saṁdaṁśa*[8] sacrifice and 4. 5. 1 relates *Vajra*[9]—sacrifice which come under the *abhicāra* and hence, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, are *niṣiddha,* i.e. prohibited.

Iṣu[10] is the name of *Viṣṭuti* of certain *Trivṛt Sāma.* One employing black magic (*abicāra*) should chant in that *Viṣṭuti.*

A question arises here—if *Śyena, Saṁdaṁśa, Vajra* and the like are evil rites, why are they laid down by the Veda, or if these rites are prescribed by the Vedas, how can they be evil?

Śabara on JS 1. 1. 2 answers '*naiva śyenādayaḥ kartavyā vijñāyante / yo hi hiṁsitum icched tasyāyam abhyupāyaḥ iti hi teṣām upadeśaḥ.*'

Mimāṁsā paribhāṣa remarks in this context—viz., '*nanu evam abhicārasya vedoktatvād ābhicārike karmaṇi āstikānam api pravṛttiḥ syād iti ced na / vedokto' pi abhicāro vedavihito na bhavati, phalatvāt / phalam na vidheyam, kintu phalam uddiśya tat-sādhakatvena karma vidheyam iti siddhāntāt, ataḥ abhicārasya avihitatvena pratyavāya-janakatvam.*'

The gist of the above two passages is: some people are inclined to bring about the destruction of enemies by *abhicāra.* To them, the Veda only points out that *Śyena* and such other sacrifices are the means for that. The Vedas do not intend to enjoin them.

Secondly, '*abhicāra*' is the *phala,* the fruit of the Śyena sacrifice and the *Phala* can never be enjoined. Hence, Vedas do not enjoin the *abhicāra,* they have referred to it as the fruit (*Phala*). Thus Veda states—'*abhicaran yajeta*', and not '*abhicaret*'.

This is the analysis of the sacrifices, comprising *Nitya, Naimittika, Kāmya, Prāyaścitta* and *Niṣiddha* types.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *yāvajjīvādi-vākyeṣu anuktopy avarjanīyatayā svābhīṣṭaḥ svargaḥ prāpyate—tathā cāpastambaḥ—'tad yathā āmre phalārthe nimite chāyā gandha ity anūtpadyete evam dharmam caryamāṇam arthā anūtpadyante'* (Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra 1.20.3). Also '*...nitya—naimittikābhyām ānuṣaṅgika-svarga-prāptiḥ*'.
2. *Citrā* is the name of the sacrifice (*citrāyāgena paśum bhāvayet.*)
3. *Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra* 1. 2. 10—*Phalayuktānām ārambhe yāthākāmī, Phalārthitvāt.*
4. *Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra* 1. 2. 11, 12, 13—*Na niyama-nimittāgnihotra—darśapūrṇamāsa,—dākṣāyaṇāgrayaṇa—paśuṣu, pravṛtteḥ / some caike / cāturmāsyeṣu cartumukha—śruteh...* etc. Also Cp Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra 4. 2. 47-49.
5. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*—1. 2. 7—'*plavā hy ete adṛḍhā yajñarūpāḥ*', 1. 2. 8—*avidyāyām antare vartamānāḥ—imam lokam hīnataram viśanti*; Bhagavad-gītā '*yām imām puṣpitām vācam* (2. 42-44); *traividyā mām somapāḥ...* 9.20; *te tam bhuktvā svargalokam viśālam*—9-21. etc.
6. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1. 2. 1—*mantreṣu kavayo yāny apaśyan tāni tretāyām bahudhā santatāni / tāny ācaratha satyakāmāḥ...*, also 1. 2. 3. *yasyāgnihotram—ā saptamāt tasya lokān hinasti /. Chāndogya* 2. 31. 1-*trayo dharmaskandhāḥ yajñaḥ adhyayanam dānam iti.* Bhagavad gītā—*yajña-dāna-tapaḥkarma na tyājyam kāryam eva tat,* 18.5; *yajñāyācarataḥ karma samagram pravilīyate*—4. 23; *nāyam loko' sty ayajñasya kuto'nyaḥ...* 4. 31. etc.
7. *Athaiṣa Śyenaḥ / abhicaran yajeta /*
8. *Athaiṣa Saṁdaṁśaḥ / abhicaran yajeta /*
9. *Athaiṣa Vajraḥ / abhicaran yajeta /*
10. Cp. *Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa* 3. 5. 1-2 *Iṣuḥ trivṛto viṣṭutiḥ / abhicaran stuvīta.*

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait Br	*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*
Āpśs	*Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra*
Baudśs	*Baudhāyana śrauta sūtra*
JS	*Jaiminīya-sūtra*
Kātśs	*Kātyāyana śrauta sūtra*
Maits	*Maitrāyaṇī-Saṁhitā*
Śāṅ Br	*Śāṅkhāyana-Brāhmaṇa*
TĀ	*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*
Tāṇ Br	*Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*
TS	*Taittirīya Saṁhitā*

CHAPTER 12

Avestan *Yasna**

T.N. Dharmadhikari

The extant Avestā literature is divided into five groups, viz., 1. the *Yasna*, 2. the *Vīsparad*, 3. the *Vendidād*, 4. the *Yasht* and 5. the *Khordeh Avestā*.

The *Yasna* consists of seventy-two chapters, which include seventeen chapters of *Gāthās*—the metrical compositions of the prophet Zarathustra himself.

The *Yasna* is regarded as the basic text for rituals. The *Vīsparad* and *Vendidād* are not recited exclusively as independent texts in the ceremonies. In the ceremonial recitation of *Vīsparad*, its chapters are either supplementary to or interwoven with those of *Yasna*. In the ceremonial recitation of the *Vendidad*, all the three texts, i.e., *Yasna*, *Vīsparad* and *Vendidad* are recited and their chapters are intermingled and arranged in a certain order for recitation (Cp. Ervad Dr. R.P. Peer's Preface to the first English edition of the *Gāthā Bā Māni*).

Yasna (skt-*Yajña*) is the daily form of ritual worship performed in the fire-temples of Zoroastrians. The ritual is performed within a fixed enclosure called *Pāwī* situated inside the fire temple; named as *Yazishn-gāh* or *urvis-gāh*.

Every form of Zoroastrian prayer, ritual or worship begins with washing of hands, face and feet, wiping the face with handkerchief and recitation of certain prayers. It is followed by untying and retying of *pādyāb-khushtī* the sacred girdle round the waist.

The performance of the *Yasna* begins in the early hours of the morning when the light of the sun falls on the earth. This is the most beneficial time for pounding *Haom* (Skt. *Soma*) twigs.

In the *Pāwī* (enclosure), three stone-stands are arranged. A fire vase (*Ātashgāh*) of metal is placed on one stone-stand. On the other (*Alātgāh*), the utensils are arranged. On the third stand (*Zotgāh*), covered with a mat, the priest takes his seat.

The fire vase on the stone-stand is empty, but covered with a lid. A layer of ash (*ādur-wastar*, i.e. garment of fire) is spread on the lid. The fire (*Dādgāh*) is kept burning over it. Only pieces of sandalwood and fragrant dust is added to it, as fuel, to keep it burning. No oblation is directly offered (i.e. thrown) on the sacred fire. This fire is placed at the south end of the ritual enclosure, the direction of goodness and bounty. The fire is addressed as

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* [I have based this article mainly on the *Yasna*. I have given only the gist of the Avestan ritual, with the help of 'A Persian offering—The *Yasna*: A Zoroastrian High Liturgy' by Dastur Firoze M. Kotwal and James W. Boyd; and the Introductions to Avesta (in Devanāgarī) by Ervad M.F. Kanga and N.S. Sontakke. I have also consulted Ervad Dr. R.P. Peer, in writing this article. I am very much thankful to them all.]

the son of Ahura Mazda, worthy of praise and adoration. (Cp *tava ātarś puthra ahurahe mazdāo-Yasna*–introduction 3; also–*āfrīnāmi tava ātarś puthra ahurahe mazdāō–Yasna* ha 62 etc.). The sacred fire in the Zoroastrian liturgy is not a symbol of cosmic order and infinite light, but a sample of those universal realities actually present in the consecrated ritual area. The fire exemplifies the cosmic order. It is a spark of the Infinite. Therefore, it is addressed as the son of god. It exemplifies the cosmic principle of Right-order (*Aśa Vahiśta*). It is the exemplification of creative energy of God in each atom and cell.

The liturgical utensils (*Ālāt*) used in the *Yasna* ceremony are as follows:

(i) *Māh-rue*—moon shaped. it is a pair of metalic crescent-shaped stand, with three legs. (*māh*—skt-*mās*-moon, mind). They represent dual nature in the universe and man. One is the lower-self (*dehātmā*) and another the spiritual self (the eternal Truth-*muktātmā*).

(ii) *Barsom*—Formerly a bundle of pomegranate twigs tied together with a cord of date-palm. Presently metal wires are used. According to Prof. M.F. Kanga, they represent the channels of human psychic forces emanating through the three *nāḍīs* from the Nervous Plexuses as 7 × 3 = 21.

(iii) *Māh-rue tāy*—The metal wire (formerly a twig) placed across the base of the two *māh-rues*.

(iv) Mortar and pestle of metal, for pounding *Haom*-twigs.

(v) Cups and saucers, known as the '*tashte*'.

(vi) Metal-ring tied with white bull's hair known as *varas-ni-viti*.
(Three strands of the bull's hair are tied to a ring. The strands of hair are from a living consecrated white bull (known as '*varasyō*'). The bull is the epitome of good and beneficent creation of Ahura Mazda. The physical presence of the bull's hair actualizes the power of the living bull in the ceremony. The hairs must be from a living bull. When that bull dies, all the high liturgies come to stand-still, until a new, purely white bull is consecrated.—Dastur Kotwal).

Near the fire stand, the chips of sandalwood and loban are placed on two smaller stone-blocks. A pair of tongs and a ladle are also placed in a tray. During the actual performance of the *Yasna* ceremony, the priests should not walk through the place between the fire-stand and the ritual-table for any reason. They should only walk along the circumference of the *Pāwī*.

The Prefatory rites (*paragnā*) are performed by the assistant priest called *Rāspī* and the proper *Yasna* is conducted by the chief priest called *Zōt*.

In present days, only two priests are required for the ritual ceremony. They are: 1. *Zaotar* (*Zōt*, skt-*Hotar*) and 2. *Rāspī*- i.e., *Atarevaxś*. But formerly eight priests were employed as follows.

1. *Zaotar* = *Zōt*, (skt *Hotar*)—the chief priest, who recites the holy text and performs the most important ritual ceremonies (from *zu*, *skt hve* = to invoke).
2. *Hāvanān*—who pounds the *Haom* (Soma, from skt *su-sunoti*, 5th conjugation, = to pound).
3. *Ātarevaxś*—who tends the fire (like Vedic *Āgnīdhra*).
4. *Frāberetar*—who brings to *Zaotar* all implements required for rituals (skṭ—*prabhṛ*).

5. *Aberetar*—who brings the holy water (skt—*ap-bhṛt*).
6. *Āsnātār*—who washes the *Haom* (*Soma*) and utensils (skt—*ā* + *snā*).
7. Rathviśkara—who mixes the *Haom* juice with she-goat's milk and
8. *Saraośāvarez*—who superintends the ritual and even prescribes punishment for negligence in rituals (like *Brahmā* priest in Vedic sacrifice).

(Compare Vīsparat Kart 3 for these names).

The assistant priest (*Rāspī*) sits cross-legged on the square-stone-seat, covered with a mat and carpet during the prefatory service, and the chief priest (*Zōt*) sits on it during the *Yasna* proper. This seat is called *Zōt-gāh*.

The container of consecrated water containing she-goat's milk and a box containing *Haom* twigs are placed in the niche of a nearby wall. A metal cup containing *Haom* and pomegranate twigs and a date-palm-leaf are placed in another niche for taking lateron into use in the proper ceremony. One cup on the ritual-table contains consecrated water. A second cup also contains consecrated water to be used for preparing a mixture with milk, *Haom* and pomegranate twig. In the third cup is placed a ring tied with three strands of hair of a living, white and consecrated bull. In a saucer placed near the third cup, three *Haom* twigs and one pomegranate twig are placed. A mortar is also placed on the ritual table. A saucer containing a round flat wheat bread (*drōn*), with nine marks and a bit of clarified butter on it, is placed. Two metal stands of three legs each (*Māh-rue*) covered with twenty-one metallic wires (*barsom*) tied with date-palm leaf are also placed. On the left side of the table, one wire is placed across the base of the *Māh-rue*. A knife is also placed.

The Assistant priest (*Rāspī*) performing prefatory service, draws water from the well and purifies all the ritual instruments to be used in the liturgy, including two-crescent-shaped stands (*māh-rue*), saucers, cups, metal wires (*barsom tāy*) and even the metal ring tied with the bull's hair. he also fills the *kuṇḍī*, (the metal basin) and other vessels with water. The ritual actions along with the recitation of *mānthras* (skt-*mantras*) make the utensils consecrated.

The priest then approaches the she-goat, washes her udders and milks her and collects the milk in the container. He pats the goat after milking her, reciting—*hazangrem baēsharanām bāevarē baeshazanām* (= May you have thousandfold health, ten thousand-fold health). He takes the milk to his seat.

Rāspī goes to a palm tree with a knife and a pitcher of consecrated water, washes the required blade of palm leaf three times and cuts it and puts it in a pitcher. He also approaches a pomegranate tree, washes its twig of the necessary length and cuts it.

Rāspī takes his seat and arranges the implements properly. He places the bunch of *Barsom* wires between the two *Māhrue* tops. He holds one *Barsom* wire in his right hand, and a bunch of twenty-two wires in his left hand and recites proper formulas. He touches the bunch of wires at both ends, with a single wire.

He picks up the girdle and ties it round the bunch of wires. He dips the bunch into the *kuṇḍī* water thrice and cleans the girdle and the wires. He ties two knots on the bunch of wires with girdle. He then places the tied bunch of *Barsom* between two *māhrue* tops. He takes out one *Barsom* wire from the bunch and puts it between the lower leg of two

pedestals. (Formerly, *Barsom* used to be the twigs of a growing tree. Later metal wires were substituted for the twigs).

The priest takes five or seven *Haom* twigs already purified, from the box, cleanses them and consecrates them by reciting certain formulas over them. He places three twigs in the metal mortar (*hāvanī*) and places the rest near the legs of *māh-rue* stands.

He takes *Barsom* wire in his left hand and a ring in his right and recites relevant formulas. He dips the ring in the *Zaothra* cup and deposits it into a special cup on the work table.

He looks at the *Haom* twigs, pomegranate twigs, at the *Zaothra* (*Zōt*) cup, sandalwood and at the fire and recites the relevant formulas.

He then picks up the twigs of *Haom* and pomegranate in his left hand. He reverses the mortar and strikes it against the work-table thrice. He puts the *Haom* twigs and pomegranate twigs in the mortar with his right hand. He then picks up the *Zaothra* cup and pours some water from it into the mortar. He takes the filtering dish having nine holes, from the *kuṇḍī*, fills it with water and places it over *Zaothra* cup (near *Māhrue*). The *Zōt*-priest places sandalwood, and the incense on fire. The *Rāśpī* priest takes the pestle out of the *kuṇḍī*, touches the work-table, with the lower thick end of the pestle and also with its other end. He strikes the mortar with the pestle on the four sides of the work-table.

The *Rāspī* pounds and crushes the twigs in the mortar with pestle three times and strikes the *hāvanī* with the pestle and creates the bell-like sound. He pours the water from the cup into the mortar. He touches the *Borsom* bundle of wires, the milk saucer, the cup filled with *Haom* extract and the table. He puts the bits into the mortar. The juice in the mortar is poured through the filter-dish, gradually into the special cup kept for collecting *Haom* extracts. Thus the *Haom* cup is filled to its brim. The pestle is cleansed and removed to the *kuṇḍī*. The mortar is also cleansed. He places the filter dish on the top of the mortar and puts the ring on it and pours the juice in the cup from over the ring in the filter. He allows few drops fall on the work-table through the dish and also in the cup of water (of *Zōr*). He again pours the *Haom*-juice from the mortar into the cup and removes the ring and the mortar.

This is the first extract of the *Haom* juice and is meant to be partaken by the *Zot*-priest, lateron during the *Yasna* ceremony proper.

He places the cup of *Haom* near the cup of *zōr* water and places the single *Borsom* rod on the saucer meant for milk, near the legs of the *Māh-rue* stand. Now the *Zōt*-priest recites the formulas (*Ahunavars*). He washes his hands, takes a pitcher of water and goes near the fire altar and recites the prayers. He washes the stone-stool where the fire vase is placed.

Rāspī priest picks up his *Barsom* rod in his left hand and the ring in his right and recites the formulas. He puts the ring into a special container, dipping it into *zōr*-cup. He puts the Borsom rod over the saucer (meant for milk). He brings the pitcher containing milk and pours some milk into the milk-dish on the work-table. With his clean hand, he brings the sacred bread (*drōn*). The clarified butter is deposited on it. It is placed on a special dish. He recites the formulas and leaves the boundary of enclosure (*pāwī*). He unties and reties his *Kushtī*. *Zōt* is already present there by the time the *Rāspī* retires.

After this prefatory rite (*Parāgṇā*), the *Yasna* proper is conducted by *Zōt*, the principal priest with *Rāspī* rejoining the ritual.

Yasna ritual is based on the *Yasna*-section of *Avestan*-text containing 72 chapters known as '*hā*' (Av. *hāiti*).

Zōt priest first recites the invocatory chapters of *Yasna* up to chapter VIII. He then consumes a part of *Drōn*, (the sacrificial bread) (*Yasna* hā 8). He then praises the *Haom* with the recitation of formulas (*Yasna* 9-11) and partakes of the *Haom* juice in three draughts. Further, he recites the prayers addressed to *Haom* twigs, pomegranate twigs, goat's milk (*Jīvām*) and the water in the cup of *Zōt*. The *Zōt* priest ties up the two ends of the palm leaf twigs to the *Borsom*.

Then there is a second preparation of *Haom*. The *Zōt* strikes the mortar filled with *Haom* twigs and pounds them with the pestle while chanting the formulas (*Yasna hā* 27.1).

The partaking of this second preparation of *Haom*-juice is left for any Zoroastrian at the completion of the cremony.

The *Zōt* priest crushes the *Haom* twigs with the pestle. He then rings sounds, like bells, against the side of the mortar (*Yasna* hā 27.3-5, also *Yasna* hā 31.5-10, *Yasna* hā 32.3-6 and 7 onwards etc.).

Further the *Rāspī* receives the chalice from the *Zōt* and takes it to the fire altar, puts incense on the fire and brings back the container to the *Zōt*. This indicates the offering of the sacred mixture to the fire-deity (*Yasna* hā 34.4).

(*Yasna* hā-s 28-52 contain mainly the *Gāthā* part of the *Yasna*. This part does not contain much ritual).

The section from Hā 54 to 72 is then recited, in which the final *Haom* mixed together with other ingredients is prepared.

After *Zōt* has recited the portions of *Yasna* hā 59.19, Rāspi faces the fire, stands by the left side of the *Zōt* and recites the formulas from *Yasna* hā 59.30, 32. The Zot leaves his seat and joins *Rāspī* in reciting the formulas from *Yasna* hā 65, standing near his seat.

Zot hands over his bunch of *Borsom* to *Rāspī*.

At the end, both *Rāspī* and *Zōt* untie and tie again their *kushtīs*. Both of them go to the well from which they had brought water at the beginning, carrying the mortar and the chalice containing the consecrated *Haom* extract and pour them into the well as a sacred libation. This marks the completion of the cycle of creation, i.e. whatever was taken from the nature was given back to it.

The *mānthras* (skt. *mantras*) are recited by the priests, throughout the *Yasna* ceremony. The term *mānthra* means 'an instrument of thought.' There is a metaphysical correspondence between sound uttered and the reality it signifies. *Mānthras* by themselves as printed or unuttered words are dead things. Therefore, they must be uttered. They have an informative and performative functions. According to Zoroastrian belief, they are the revealed words.

The fundamental aim of celebrating the *Yasna* liturgy is to please the exalted Lord of wisdom—*Ahura Mazda*, all Sprits and Beings of his good creation. *Śraośa*, a representative of *Ahura Mazda*, is also invoked. *Mithra* and all other spiritual *Yazatas* are also invoked.

It may be noted that the Vedic ritual had developed in a very intricate and extensive form in comparison with that of the *Avestā.* However, there are some basic similarities also in these two rituals. First, Agni occupies a prominent place in both the Vedic and Avestan rituals. The offerings of *Drōn* and *Haom* of Avestan ritual may be compared with the Vedic *Puroḍāśa* and *Soma* respectively. In Vedic sacrifice, *Soma* is offered in three sessions, viz., *Prātaḥ savana, Mādhyandina savana* and the third (evening) *savana. Pitṛyajña* is offered in the afternoon of the New-moon day.

The *Yasna* ceremony, with some exceptions, is always performed in *Hāvangāh,* i.e., morning time. [The day is generally divided into five periods viz., (1) *Uśahina* (*Uṣas*-early dawn), (2) *hāvanī* (*savanī-su*-to crush) related to soma-pressing, (3) *Rapithwana* mid-day, (4) *Uzayerina*-related to afternoon and, (5) *Aiwi Sruthrena*—from sunset onwards. These five periods are prescribed for periodical ceremonies.].

The recitation of the *mānthras* are accompanied with the Avestan ritual actions, just as the *mantras* are recited alongwith the Vedic rituals. The selection of eight priests in the earlier rituals of *Avestā* and sixteen or seventeen in the Soma-sacrifices are more or less a similar factor. Even the names and functions of some of the priests resemble with each other, e.g. *Zōt,* i.e., *Zaotar* = *Hotar. Brahmā* is expected to supervise the entire sacrifice and to advise expiations, like the *Sraośāvarez* in Avestā. *Āgnīdhra,* as the name itself suggests, is one who tends fire and is similar to Avestan *Ātarevaxś,* who also tends the fire.

Borsom, the metal wires, formerly the twigs of tree, may remind us of the *barhis* in Vedic rituals etc.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Avestan *Yasna*—Utensils
A: Reservoir of consecrated water (zōr). The vessel named as *kuṇḍī.*
B: A pitcher of water for washing hands of *Zōti* or *Rāspī.*
C: Two blocks for placing sandal wood chips.
D: Dish with *Drōn.*
E: Seat of sacred fire.
F: Fire-altar (*ātaś—gāha*).
G: Seat for *Rāspī.*
H: Work-table (*ālāt gāha*).

Untensils on work-table

1. Māh-rue with Borsom bunch of wires.
2. Saucer containing milk (Jīvām) mixed with water.
3. Mortar (*Hāvanī*) and pestle.
4. The knife for preparing girdle of Borsom, for cutting twigs of pomegranate tree and for cutting a blade from the palm leaf.
5. Cup-containing consecrated water (*zaothra*).
6. Cup-with ring (*varesa-angushtrī*) with bull's hair.
7. Saucer to take water from the *kuṇḍī.*
8. Cup with saucer. Saucer with nine holes used as a filter of *Haom* juice. Cup holds the filtered *Haom* juice.
9. Cup-reserve of *Haom* juice.

The diagram in next page—Courtesy V.S. Mandela, Pune.



Arrangement of the various Apparatuses and Implements used in the Yasna—Ceremony as they would appear at the Stage of Hā 27.

CHAPTER 13

Murāri Miśra's Contribution to Pūrvamīmāṁsā

Ujjwala Jha

Murāri Miśra, the exponent of the third school of Mīmāṁsā flourished around twelfth century A.D. He established the third school of *Pūrvamīmaṁsa* (*PM*) by writing probably a full-fleged commentary on the *Jaimini sūtra* (*JS*)*. Here, we find that he is different from the founders of the other two schools of *PM*. The other two schools, namely, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara came into being through the commentaries of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prābhākara Miśra. But these were written on the *Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmin (*ŚBh*) on the *JS*. As these two scholars interpreted the *ŚBh* differently on certain significant issues, two independent schools of *PM* were established through these differences.

Murāri Miśra, appearing on the scene some six centuries later than these two mīmāṁsakas, seems to have written a commentary on *JS* and expressed quite different views regarding certain important philosophical and epistemological issues.

This commentary of Murāri is the primary source to understand his contribution to Mīmāṁsā but this is not the only source to know his views. At least his view on 'validity of knowledge' is often quoted by different texts on Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā. So these texts also give us valuable information regarding Murāri's views on various issues.

Needless to say that to attempt to reconstruct the doctrine of Murāri on the basis of the available materials, namely, the two remnants of Murāri's work and the various references to his doctrine in various philosophical texts is, indeed, an interesting endeavour. Nevertheless, it is not so easy to do. It is interesting because, Murāri must have been a great original thinker who has left behind his own mark in his field and if we succeed in reconstructing his doctrine we would have an access to another store of knowledge in Indian philosophy. But it is not easy and hence a challenging task because the material on Murāri at our disposal is very scanty.

Under these circumstances, it would be fair to define and demarcate the scope of this endeavour. In other words, it is necessary to spell out the limitation of this paper and also

* Up to the third decade of the last century, very little was known about Murāri Miśra, the founder of the third school of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*. (PM). In this and the following decades some fragments of his work, i.e., his commentary on *Jaimini sūtras* were published in the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras (JORM) and Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune (ABORI). These *adhikaraṇas* are the only direct source to know his views on various important philosophical and logical concepts—as no other work of Murari himself or any commentary on any of these fragments has seen the light of the day yet. There are not some other manuscripts even to collate with. These facts make it very difficult to edit his text.

the line of thinking and investigation which we are going to follow. Firstly, we should be clear about what we mean when we say that Murāri was the founder of the third school of *PM*. Do we intend to show that Murāri held independent views quite different from the other two schools of *PM* on each and every topic of *PM* of Indian philosophy? Obviously not. That will be an absurdity. No two schools of thought differ on each and every point. It is not true that even Kumārila Bhaṭa and Prabhākara Miśra held different views on all points of Mīmāṁsā philosophy. But the fact is that these two schools have independent views on certain issues only and on the rest of the issues they share identical opinions. Similarly, Murāri need not differ on each and every philosophical, logical and ritual point, from the other two schools, in order to establish a third school of *PM*. Nevertheless, it is but necessary that he holds distinct views on certain issues, relevant to the school of *PM* in particular and Indian philosophy in general, which would allow him to claim a new school of thought quite distinct from the other two schools of *PM*.

Thus, our aim in this paper would be to point out only those issues where Murāri maintains altogether different views vis-á-vis the views of Kumārila and Prabhākara.

Another guiding principle adopted by us in this paper is not to do anything more than to infer Murāri's opinions on various issues of Indian philosophy from the arguments he himself has presented in his available works and from the references to his doctrine by other scholars. We have to resort to inferences and implications because we do not have today any access to Murāri's complete works, which might have presented a clearer picture of his own views.

Another guiding line of thought followed by us is an already accepted stand that if a certain view is presented by some scholar and if it is not refuted by him in any form, then it implies that he shares that view. Thus, if Murāri employs certain tools for his analysis and if he does not show any adverse opinion towards them, it has been believed that he agrees to those tools. This approach of philosophical enquiry would be quite in keeping with Vātsyāyana, the composer of *Nyāyabhāṣya* on the *Gautamasūtras* who says: *paramatam apratiṣiddham anumatam iti hi tantrayuktiḥ*.

The main structure of this section will be to state first the views of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools on a particular topic and then try to see, compare and contrast with these two schools the views of Murāri on the same topic, if available. If, in case, there is none, corresponding to the two schools in either Murāri's texts or in the references to him in the other texts, we will clearly state so and would go to the next issue.

With this background, let us now proceed to search out Murāri's ideas pertaining to philosophy, logic and ritual. To begin with his philosophical ideas, let us see what his attitude is towards this world of ours. In other words, let us see whether he is a realist like the Naiyāyikas or an idealist like the Vedāntins and the Buddhists.

In the *Anyathākhyātivāda* of the *TC*, Gaṅgeśa begins conclusive discussion as follows: '*Satyasthale pravṛttimātram prati...*' etc. While commenting on this line, Mathurānātha, in his *Rahasya* has recorded an interpretation of the word '*Satyasthale*' by Murāri's followers. He writes:

Miśrānuyāyinastu, satyasthale iti
saṁvādipravṛttau ityarthaḥ.

Thus, '*Satyasthala*' is paraphrased as '*Saṁvādipravṛtti*' which means the inducement towards fact or reality.

This implies that Murāri agrees to the dichotomy, *Samvādipravṛtti vs Visaṁvādipravṛtti*, i.e. a fruitful endeavour *vs* frustrated endeavour.

Again, in the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* Murāri says, '*Yatra viśiṣṭo' rthaḥ satya eva tatra bhramatvaṁ na bhavati.* That is, where the qualified meaning corresponds to the fact, there is 'no illusion there'. Here also the contrast between true knowledge and false knowledge or illusion is brought about very clearly.

From these two statements, we can definitely draw some conclusions. There is in them a clear reflection of Murāri's view on the reality of the world. Fruitful endeavour (*saṁvādipravṛtti*) presupposes existence of entities with which human being behaves while frustrated endeavour (*visaṁvādipravṛtti*) presupposes the illusive existence of entities. Now, since both the types of behaviour are prompted by knowledge, ultimately we will have to have two categories of knowledge, one that leads to fruitful behaviour or endeavour, and the other that leads to frustrated behaviour or endeavour. In other words, it is clear from this that Murāri agrees that there are true knowledges and illusions or false knowledges. Once this is accepted, we can easily deduce that the objects of true knowledge are real and those of false knowledge are unreal.

At the level of our ordinary behaviour, the above concept of reality works quite well. But we have no means to ascertain whether Murāri also accepted any ultimate reality over and above the objects of true knowledge. Umeśa Miśra quotes a line from *Nyāyamālā*, which runs as follows: '*Brahmaike, vyavahāre tu dharmidharmādhārapradeśaviśeṣāḥ vedāntāḥ Murāri Miśrāśca.*'

If this statement really belongs to our Murāri, then we will have to accept that Murāri accepted relative reality of this world and the ultimate reality is the Brahman only.

In that case, Murāri will not only differ from the Prābhākara school which does not accept illusion, but he will no longer remain a Mīmāṁsaka, since, according to both the schools of *PM*, the realities are many and not one like the Advaitins. But it seems very unlikely considering the influence of the Prābhākara school and that of the Naiyāyikas on our Murāri.

Following this line of approach, we will try to construct the views of Murāri on various issues. This will enable us to place Murāri in his proper position and perspective:

We shall discuss: (1) Murāri's Concept of *Prameya*, (2) Concept of *Pramāṇa*, (3) Theory of Knowledge, (4) Validity of Knowledge, (5) Qualifier & Indicator, (6) Sentence-unity, (7) *Kārya* & *Siddha*, (8) *Tantra* & *Āvāpa.*

After looking into these issues, we shall try to evaluate Murāri's position in the system of Mīmāṁsā and also in the sphere of Indian philosophy.

I

MURĀRI'S CONCEPT OF PRAMEYA

Before going into the main theme let us remember two points again:

(i) The sources to know Murāri are very limited and these are his work, which is available only in fragments and various references to his views by other scholars and philosophers in the form of *pūrvapakṣa*. This again makes two points: (a) Murāri's view was, though different, not accepted by the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā systems at large, but still (b) they could not ignore his view and made it a point to record the same and refute. Thus, we should remember that the philosophers have contributed by recording his views and informing us about them.

(ii) Because of (i) and because there is no other source in the form of commentaries on him, the views of Murāri expressed here are revisable if we unearth some more sources to understand him. Even the manuscripts are scanty and the texts have been edited and published on the basis of *codex unicus*.

Thus, the research on Murāri has a lot of possibilities in future. With this, let us now turn to the concept of *prameya* according to him that we can gather from the above mentioned sources.

It will not be out of place if we briefly mention the position of the other two schools regarding the issue. It will bring out the exact difference and similarity of Murāri from the other two schools.

The Bhāṭṭa School

This school has accepted only 5 *prameyas*: *dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya* and *abhāva*. *Dravya* is defined as the locus of quality and size. According to this school there are eleven *dravyas*: *pṛthvi, ap, tejas, vāyu, ākāśa, kāla, dik, ātman, manas, tamas* and *śabda*.

Guṇa is defined as that which is different from action, possesses *aparajāti* and cannot be a material cause.

Jāti is defined by the Bhāṭṭa school as: It exists in an individual, is eternal, an object of perception and is different and also identical simultaneously with the individual.

Karman is that which resides in the substance or *dravyas*, other than the *vibhu* and *nitya*. It also can be perceived and it is the cause of conjunction and disjunction. It is accepted as of five types: *utkṣepaṇa, apakṣepaṇa, ākuñcana, prasāraṇa* and *gamana*.

Abhāva is the entity which is grasped through the sixth means of knowing, i.e. the *anupalabdhi-pramāṇa*. It is classified into *prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsā-bhāva, atyantābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva*.

The Prābhākara School

This school accepts eight categories of entities namely: *dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya, samavāya, saṁkhyā, śakti* and *sādṛśya*.

Prābhākaras accept nine *dravyas,* namely: *pṛthivī, ap, tejas, vāyu, ākāśa, kāla, dik, ātman* and *manas.*

Guṇas, according to this school, are twenty-two in number. Excepting *saṁkhyā* and *adharma,* these are the same as accepted by the Nyāya system.

Karman, according to this school, is not perceptible but is inferred from the conjunction or disjunction of a *dravya.*

Jāti is real and distinct from an individual which is its locus. It is a perceptible category.

Prābhākaras accept *samavāya saṁbandha* just as the Nyāya system does but the difference between the two is that it is not eternal in this system. They say that it is produced in an individual of the same class and is destroyed along with the individual.

Saṁkhyā is accepted by this school to be a distinct category which distinguishes them from the Bhāṭṭas. According to Bhāṭṭas, it is a quality. This is the same view as that of the Nyāya system.

Śakti or Potentiality is also a distinct *padārtha* or category according to the Prābhākara school. Bhāṭṭas, again, accept it as a *guṇa.*

Sādṛśya or similarity for Prābhākaras is a distinct category. Bhāṭṭas have not accepted it to be so. According to the argument of the Prābhākara system, it should be accepted as a different category because it cannot be grouped under any of the other already accepted categories. It is known by us just as any other category and that proves its existence beyond doubt. It exists but cannot be included under any class of categories already accepted and hence it is said to be an independent category.

The Third School of Murāri Miśra

In the works of Murāri we find references to (1) *dravya,* (2) *guṇa,* (3) *karman,* (4) *sāmānya* and (5) *abhāva.*

Let us look into it in an elaborate manner:

Dravya: In the *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa,* we find the following statement. Murāri, here, is talking about the view of *kecit. "Sa ca upakāraḥ ātmāśraya evotpadyate. Na tūtpattyapūrvāśritaḥ; Dravyasyaiva samavāyi-kāraṇatvāditi kecit."*

This means: the *upakāra* is produced in the soul and not in the *utpattyapūrua* because a substance alone can be the material cause.

This view has been refuted by others (*anye tu*) by saying that this view favours the doctrine of the Nyāsa-Vaiśeṣika system and hence it should be rejected. As a matter of fact, this *upakāra* is a *śakti* and it can exist in the *utpattyapūrva.*

Neither of these views has been refuted by Murāri. In any case, we do find here the use of the term *dravya* which is a categorical term and hence it needs to be noted. Needless to say that we do not find any definition of *dravya* here. But most probably it is conceived as the locus of quality by Murāri. It also is reflected in the reference to *guṇa.*

Guṇa: In the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa,* we find the following:

Yathā hi paṭasya rakto guṇaḥ tathā prāśastyam api vāyvādīnām. This means, just as 'red' is the quality of a cloth, in the same way 'praise' is (the quality) of the deity Vāyu, etc. It is obvious from this that here, *dravya* is conceived as the locus (*ādhara*) of quality and the quality as located (*ādheya*) in *dravya.*

Jāti: We find the following statement in the *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa* of Murāri: *Sa tvaneka (eka) eva jātivadanekāśrita iti kecit.* This says: That (*upakāra*) is to be postulated as one and it resides in many (individuals) of the same class. It seems from this that Murāri accepts the universal to be one residing in many as a separate category.

Karman: Though Murāri has used the term *Karman* many a time, we do not find that it is used in a categorical sense even once. Let us see some of the references: (1) *Jīvanasya karmavyāpyatvam avagamyate.* It is understood that life is pervaded by activity. (*Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa*); (2) In the *smṛtyadhikaraṇa* of Murāri we find the following: *Smārte karmaṇi bahūnām mantrāṇām eva smṛtyā viniyogāt.*

In these references the word *karman* stands for rite or sacrifice. As per the injunction, '*yāvajjīvam Aghihotram juhoti*', an *Agnihotrin* has to perform the *Agnihotra* as long as he lives. Therefore, the performance of sacrifice pervades the lfie of the *Agnihotrin.*

There also are some more references like, *Kānicit karmāṇi smārtāni kānicit śrautāni.* But in all these references *karman* stands for 'ritual' or 'rite' and is not used in the categorical sense. Nevertheless, one may say that since 'ritual' is also an activity, there is every possibility that Murāri accepted '*karman*' as a category.

Abhāva: That Murāri accepted *anupalabdhi* as a means of knowledge will be clear from the '*Pramāṇa*' section of this paper. In other words, *abhāva* or absence is conceived by Murāri as an object of *anupalabdhi pramāṇa.* Another point is that in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa and also in the *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa* of Vardhamāna we find a view of Murāri in the following way: According to Murāri Miśra, *pratibandhakābhāva* is not the cause of the effect but it is the delimitor of causality.

From this reference to his view also it is clear that Murāri accepted absence as an object of cognition. It is, however, not clear whether he accepted all the four types of absence as accepted by the Navya-nyāya system.

Let us now look into Murāri's general concept of *pramāṇa* and then proceed to the *pramāṇas* accepted by him.

II

MURĀRI'S GENERAL CONCEPT OF PRAMAṆA

Before we give an account of the specific *pramāṇas* accepted by Murāri, let us have a survey of the concept of *Pramāṇa* according to the other two schools of *PM.*

The Bhāṭṭa School: Though the Bhāṭṭa School will define *pramāṇa* as '*pramākaraṇa*', 'an instrument of valid knowledge', yet according to them, the word *pramā* here stands for '*ajñātatattvārthajñāna*', i.e. 'a valid knowledge of an entity which was not known before'. Thus, their definition of *pramāṇa* becomes, '*ajñātatatattvārthajñānasādhanaṁ pramāṇam*'[7] which means, an instrument of the valid knowledge of real object, that was not known before.

By the adjective *ajñāta*, 'unknown', in this definition, remembrance and restatement are excluded from becoming *pramāṇa* while by the word *tattvārthajñāna*, doubt and illusion are excluded from being valid cognitions.

The Prābhākara School: The Prābhākaras define *pramāṇa* as *anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam*, i.e. an experience is *pramāṇa*. According to them, there is nothing called a false knowledge or illusion. While distinguishing *pramāṇa* from *phala*, they say that if the word *pramāṇa* stands for the valid cognition, the *phala* will be either *hāna* or *upādāna* and if the word *pramāṇa* stands for the instrument by which the valid knowledge is generated, then the *phala* will be the valid cognition itself. Thus, when the word *pramāṇa* stands for cognition it would be derived as, *pramīyate yat* and when it stands for the instrument of knowledge, its etymology would be, *pramīyate anena.*

School of Murāri: Turning to Murāri we find that there is no specific statement attested which can be said to be the definition of *pramāṇa*. Nevertheless, we can guess in a very general way from some of his statements what Murāri had in his mind regarding the general concept of *pramāṇa*. Let us have a look at the following statement of him in his *Arthavādādhikaraṇa*:

Codanāsūtre ko dharmaḥ ityetasmin praśne
na pratyakṣādigamyaḥ, kintu codanāgamyaḥ

Here, the word *pratyaksādigamyaḥ* can be dissolved as *pratyakṣādinā gamyaḥ* and the word *codanāgamyaḥ* as *codanayā gamyaḥ*. Thus, when Murāri says that the knowledge of *dharma* is generated by an injunctive sentence (*codanā*) and not by perception it is clear that he conceives *pratyakṣa* and *codanā* as the instruments of valid knowledge.

Similarly, Murāri has also used such expressions as, *pramāṇāntarasiddha*, 'known by another *pramāṇa*', *kāryam arthaṁ pratipādayataḥ vedasya prāmāṇyam*, 'Veda, i.e., an injunctive sentence which generates the knowledge of *kārya* is *pramāṇa*', and the like.

All these point out to the fact that Murāri looks at *pramāṇa* as an instrument of valid knowledge.

Now observe the following statement of Murāri from his *Mantrādhikaraṇa*.

Na hi tatkālīnaṁ mantroccāraṇaṁ rāddhānte 'pi pramāṇam, tasya prameyatvāt. Tatkālīnasya ca prakāśanasya smaraṇarūpasyā-pramāṇatvena akiñcitkriyārūpatvāt.

"Neither the utterance of the *mantra* at the time of sacrifice is authoritative even in the conclusion, because it is *prameya* (that is, to be known). And since the understanding of the meaning from the *mantra* at the time of sacrifice is remembrance, it is not authoritative and hence it does not serve any purpose."

Here the expression '*smaraṇasya apramāṇarūpatvāt*' is to be noted. Murāri clearly says that remembrance is not *pramāṇa*. From this, we can easily infer that Murāri also must have contributed to the view that a knowledge of an object which was not known before is *pramāṇa*.

Although we do not find any clear-cut definition of *pramāṇa*, from all these, as discussed above, we can conclude that Murāri too, like the Bhāṭṭas, will define a *pramāṇa* as that which reveals an object which was not revealed before.

Pramāṇa

Let us now take up the *pramāṇas* one by one and see what Murāri has to say about them. However, we shall first see how the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras have defined them.

Pratyakṣa

The Bhāṭṭa School: The *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* is defined by the Bhāṭṭa School as, *indriyārthasannikarṣajaṁ pramāṇaṁ pratyakṣam,* i.e. the true knowledge produced by the sense-object-contact is called *pratyakṣa.* The Bhāṭṭas accept six senses namely, *cakṣu* (eyes), *rasanā* (tongue), *ghrāṇa* (nose), *sparśana* (skin) *śrotra* (ears) and *manas* (mind). The *sannikarṣa,* i.e. contact according to them, is of two types (1) *saṁyoga* and (2) *saṁyuktatādātmya.*

The Prābhākara School: Prābhākara School has defined perception as '*sākṣāt pratītiḥ*', i.e. direct apprehension. This apprehension consists of three things, namely, the object of knowledge, the knowledge itself and the knower. For instance, if 'X' knows a pot by perception, then the knowledge of 'X' will reveal three things, namely, the pot, the knowledge of the pot and the knower. The form of the knowledge of 'X' will be, *ayaṁ ghaṭah, ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmi.* This peculiar theory of perception, by Prābhākaras, is known by the name, *tripuṭipratyakṣavāda.*

The School of Murāri: Turning to Murāri, we again find that although there is mention of the word *pratyakṣa* in his works, still we do not find any clear-cut description of the process of perceptual cognition. Neither there is any direct description nor is there any clue to infer such a process. The only statement we can make with certainty is that Murāri accepted *Pratyakṣa* as one of the means of valid knowledge.

Anumāna

The Bhāṭṭa School: The Bhāṭṭas define inference as follows: *Vyāpyadarśanāda-sannikṛṣṭārthajñānam anumānam:* "*anumāna* is the knowledge of the object, which was not known before, on perceiving the pervaded (*hetu* or probans)."

The Bhāṭṭas maintain their stand that inference also like any other valid cognition apprehends something that was not known previously. So far as the *parārthānumāna* is concerned, he accepts only three members and not five members, as the Naiyāyikas propose.

The Prabhākara School: The definition of *anumāna pramāṇa* given by the Prābhākaras is as follows: The cognition of the invariable relation between two things 'X' and 'Y' helps the cognizer to know 'Y' when 'X' is seen, through the remembrance of the invariable relation between 'X' and 'Y'.

Like the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras also accept only three *avayavas* in the *parārthānumāna.*

The School of Murāri: Before making any statement about Murāri's concept of Inference, let us first have a look at the following statements of him as it will give us clues to come to a conclusion.

1. *Anumānaikadeśabhūtā hi pratijñā*
   tatsādhakena hetunā sambadhyate.

Here he clearly states that *pratijñā* is a member of an inference or syllogism. This inference is certainly the *parārthānumāna.* Obviously, he has also accepted that another member of the Inference is the probans (*hetu*) on the basis of which what is to be established is established.

Let us see the following now:

2. *Na hi anumānavākyāni hetusvarūpatatpratibandhādipratipādakatvena vyutpannāni; kintu pramāṇāntarasiddhahetusvarūpatatpratibandhādismaraṇadvārā anumānajñānotpādakāṇi. Ataḥ śābda eva anumānavākyasya nāsti, śabdabhāvena prāmāṇye pratijñāmātreṇa sādhyapratītau, hetvādi-prayogavaiyarthyāt.*

Here, there is a clear mention of *parārthānumāna* (*anumānavākyāni*). It consists of sentences. Some sentence states the proposition (*pratijña*) some other probans (*hetu*) and still other the relationship between the *hetu* and *sādhya* (*pratibandha* or *vyāpti*).

Not only this, Murāri also states the process by which an inferential cognition is generated. He says that the sentences in the syllogism do not stop only by telling the nature of *hetu* and the relation between a *hetu* and a *sādhya.* But the function of these syllogistic sentences terminates only after the inferential cognition is produced through the remembrance of the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between the *sādhya* and the *hetu* which is already known by some other *pramāṇa* like perception, etc.

Naturally, what we find here is that Murāri has presented a clear account of the epistemology of inferential cognitioni. We understand that according to Murāri, a *hetu* is already known by other *pramāṇa* along with its invariable relationship with the *sādhya.* This is the reason that he says that the inferential cognition is generated by the remembrance of *vyāpti.* But it is not clear, whether he accepted a three-member-syllogism, like the other two schools of *PM* or the five-member-syllogism, like the Naiyāyikas.

In this connection Murāri has made a valuable observation. He says that to generate a verbal understanding is not the sole purpose of the members of the syllogism. Because,

if it were so, the understanding arising from those sentences would not, in any way, be different from the verbal understanding. Therefore, he emphatically says that the understanding arising from a member of the syllogism is not a verbal understanding. And if it is accepted that the knowledge is a verbal knowledge, then the mention of the members other than the *pratjiñā* would become redundant, because the *pratijñā*-sentence itself will cause the knowledge of the *sādhya*.

This comment of Murāri is fundamental, since he clearly points out here to the distinction between the *parārthānumāna* and the *śabda-pramāṇa*.

Similarly, in the *Ekādaśādhikarāṇa*, we find a reference to the well-known example of *anumāna*, namely, *parvataḥ vahnimān, dhūmāt*. This has come in the context of *Tantra*. Murāri says: '*yathā hi dhūmasyoparibhāgasthitasyāpi parvatasyaikatvānnāpakṣadharmatā tathā ca vikṛtāviva tantratvavyutpādanaṁ prakṛtau phalataḥ siddyati ityeke tadvat*'.

Here, Murāri, has given the similie of the well-known example of the inference to explain the nature of *tantra*.

He says that as in case of *dhūma* and *parvata, dhūma* is not present all over the mountain, but it is present on the top of the mountain, still, since the mountain is only one, there is no difficulty in explaining the *pakṣadharmatā* in the smoke.

Śabda

The Bhāṭṭa School: *Mānameyodya* defines *śabda-pramāṇa* as

Atra tāvatpadairjñātaiḥ padārthasmaraṇe kṛte
Asannikṛṣṭavākyārtha-jñānam śābdam itīryate

First, the words are known, then the meanings of the words are known and then by *lakṣaṇā* these word-meanings convey the meaning of the sentence not known earlier. This theory of the Bhāṭṭas is known as the abhihitānvaya-vāda.

The Bhāṭṭas like the Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras accept *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi* as the causes of verbal understanding.

There are two types of *śabda* namely, *pauruṣeya* and *apauruṣeya*. *Pauruṣeya śabda* is the sentence of a reliable person, and *apauruṣeya śabda* is the Vedic sentence.

The Prābhākara School: *Śabda pramāṇa* is defined as a cognition of something not present before the eyes, and which is produced by the knowledge of words. Obviously, the verbal cognition is also the cognition of the thing which was not known by any other means of knowledge before.

According to Prābhākara, words express their meanings together with their relations with other meanings. Thus, the sentence-meaning is expressed by the words. This theory of the Prābhākaras is known as the *Anvitābhidhānavāda*.

According to the Prābhākaras, the verbal cognition arising from the Vedic words or sentences alone is valid. Since the sentences other than the Vedic ones are not capable of expressing the meaning not known by the other means, before.

The School of Murāri: Before we reconstruct his concept of *śabda-pramāṇa*, let us consider the following statements of Murāri.

1. ...*Ataḥ śābda evānumānavākyasya nāsti, śabdabhāvena prāmāṇye pratijñāmātreṇa sādhyapratītau hetvādiprayogavaiyarthyāt.*

We have discussed this passage in connection with *Anumāna*, and have pointed out how Murāri has distinguished *anumāna* from *śabda*. Thus *śabda* is a distinct *pramāṇa* which causes a verbal understanding quite distinct from other varieties of cognitions.

Now consider the following sentences:

2. *Pratyekaṁ padārthāḥ smaryante teṣām ca bhedāgrahād viśiṣta ikārthavyavahārakāritvaṁ bhramatayā avabhāti.*

This has been said while explaining how verbal understanding arises from the *arthavāda*-sentences. He spells out the sequence of the process of verbal understanding here. First, the knowledge of a word reminds one of its meaning and then the meanings of the constituents of the sentence form the sentence meaning.

Murāri says the following at another place:

3. *Krameṇānvitābhidhāne ekasmin api vākye prāptyanuvādayoḥ sambhavāt.*

Here also it is stated clearly that the verbal understanding arises in a sequence. He very often uses the word *anvitābhidhāna* in the sense of verbal understanding. It should be noted that Gaṅgeśa also uses sometimes the same word for verbal understanding.

About *yogyatā* Murāri says:

4. *Tasmādanvitābhidhāne eva yogyatā kāraṇam, na tu ekavākyatāvadhāraṇe.*

Here, the role of *yogyatā* is clearly stated. *Yogyatā* is the required condition of verbal understanding. It is very likely that Murāri would agree to all the three factors for verbal understanding namely, *ākāṇkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi.*

All these statements of Murāri clearly demonstrate the epistemology or the process of verbal understanding intended by him. He seems to be the upholder of the theory of *Abhihitānvayavāda* since he does not say that a word expresses its meaning along with any other related meaning. On the other hand, he says that each word expresses its own meaning and then the verbal understanding arises.

Upamāna

The Bhāṭṭa School: The *Upamāna* is defined as follows:

Dṛsyamānārthasādṛśyāt smaryamāṇārthagocaram
Asannikṛṣṭasādṛśyajñānaṁ hyupamitirmatā.

Having seen the similarity in the object present before one's eyes, one acquires the knowledge of similarity with the remembered.

The Prābhākara School: There is no difference of opinion on this point between the Bhāṭṭa school and the Prābhākara school except for the fact that the Prābhākaras accept similarity as an independent category of entities.

The School of Murāri: Nothing could be said about Murāri's concept of *upamānapramāṇa* since no statement regarding it is attested either in his texts or in the references to him.

Arthāpatti

The Bhāṭṭa School: The *arthāpatti* is defined as:

Anyathānupapattyā yadupapādakakalpanam
Tadarthāpattirityevaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ bhāṣyabhāṣitam.

i.e., "when something cannot be explained otherwise, the presumption which makes it explicable is called *arthāpatti.*"

For instance, suppose, Devadatta is alive and he is not in the house, then his absence in the house cannot be explained unless it is presumed that he exists somewhere else.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, *arthāpatti* is the reconciliation between two otherwise irreconcilable facts. This is not the required condition of *anumāna.*

The Prābhākara School: According to Prābhākaras, in a case, where the well-ascertained perception of a thing or things remains unexplained unless another thing is presumed, then this presumption of that another thing is *arthāpatii.*

The Prābhākaras explain the difference between *arthāpatti* and *anumāna* in a different way. They say, the basis of the difference is the doubt. The perception of one thing remains unexplained in the absence of something and therefore it becomes doubtful. And to remove this doubt the help of the presumption is taken. Such is not the case in inference as the *hetu,* i.e. the basis of *anumāna* is well established and not at all an object of doubt. Had it been an object of doubt, there could have been no inferential cognition from such a *hetu* at all.

The School of Murāri: There is no definition as such of the *arthāpatti pramāṇa* in any of the Murāri's texts. But there are expressions which can give us clue to infer his position. Consider the following sentences from his *Arthavādādhikaraṇa*:

(i) ... *arthājjātasyārthajñānasya*

(ii) *Sahetukam kāryam pratipannam sahetukatvāya pratibandham ākṣipati...*

(iii) *Na, pratibandhasya pratītihetutvāt tadākṣepam antareṇa pratītirevāsiddhatvāt. Na tu sarvatra ākṣepaḥ sambhavati Rudrarodanādi-hetusvarūpe nityānityasaṁyogavirodhāt.*

Similarly the following from the *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa:*

(iv) *Niyojyastu niyoge pratīte caramam ākṣepaṇīyo viṣayavat pratītiraghaṭakatvāt.*

In these expressions Murāri has used the words, *arthāt, ākṣipati,* and *ākṣepa. Arthāt* means by implication, *ākṣipati* will stand for 'implies' and *ākṣepa* will mean implication. These words are very often used in the context of the *arthāpattipramāṇa.*

Thus, it is almost certain, that Murāri too approves of the *arthāpatti pramāṇa* and the nature of this *pramāṇa* is also the same as that of the other two schools of *PM.*

One point, which could not be ascertained is whether Murāri accepted *śrutārthāpatti* or not. The Prābhākaras did not accept *śrutārthāpati* as is well known.

Anupalabdhi

The Bhāṭṭa School: The Bhāṭṭas define *anupalabdhi* or *abhāva pramāṇa* as:

Athopalambhayogyatve satyapyānupalambhanam
Abhāvākhyaṁ pramāṇaṁ syād abhāvasyāvabodhakam.

If something is not perceived even when there is a capacity of its being perceived, then that which reveals the absence of that thing, is called *anupalabdhi pramāṇa or abhāva pramāṇa.*

The Prābhākara School: The Prābhākaras do not require to accept the *anupalabdhi pramāṇa* because they do not accept absence as a separate entity.

The School of Murāri: Only once Murāri has used a typical and important term connected with the *abhāva pramāṇa.* That term is *yogyānupalabdhi.* He says in the *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa: yadyapi pratyakṣo vedo yogyānupalabdhyā nirākṛtah, tathāpi nityānumeyo vedo mūlaṁ bhaviṣyati.*

While establishing the authoritativeness of the *smṛtis,* Murāri says, even if the Vedic injunctions cannot be found which are the basis of the *smṛti*-rites, because there is *yogyānupalabahi,* still those rites could be said to be based on the inferred Vedic injunctions.

The term *yogyānupalabdhi* ends in the instrumental case-ending which indicates that *yogyānupalabdhi* is a *karaṇa* and hence a *pramāṇa.* It cannot be ascertained whether Murāri treated *anupalabdhi* as a *sahakāri-kāraṇa* with reference to the perception of absence like the Naiyāyikas. Most probably it is not the case and he accepts the *anupalabdhi* or *abhāva pramāṇa.*

By saying *yogyānupalabdhi,* Murāri clearly accepts that we can talk of an absence of only that entity which is fit to be known by some *pramāṇa* like *pratyakṣa,* etc. This condition is acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas as well as to the Naiyāyikas.

III

MURĀRI'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Here, we would like to discuss the following issues and search for the views of Murāri on that:

1. Nature of knowledge,
2. Whether a knowledge can be true and false or not, and
3. Whether a knowledge can be an object of another knowledge or not.

With regard to (1), all Indian philosophers agree that knowledge reveals an object, and hence *prakāśakatva* is the nature of knowledge. Murāri too does not differ on this issue.

So far the issue (2) is concerned, all do not see eye to eye. The Prābhākaras are on one side and the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas on the other. The Prābhākaras hold that a knowledge can never be false. It is only the *vyavahāra* that can be false and never the knowledge. The Prābhākaras are afraid of the fact if knowledge is accepted as false also, since knowledgeness is present in all knowledges, true or false, there can be no confident

(*niṣkampa*) behaviour possible, because always there will be a doubt in the mind of the knower. But this stand of the Prābhākaras has been challenged by the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas. Both these schools accept false knowledge.

Murāri, too, accepts the dichotomy of true knowledge and false knowledge. A knowledge, the object of which corresponds to the fact is a true knowledge, and the knowledge, the object of which betrays the fact, is a false knowledge, holds Murāri. He has used, several times, words like *yathārtha, bhrama, bhrānti* and *viparyaya* in the context of knowledge.

With regard to issue (3), we can say that, while the Prābhākaras hold that the knowledge is self-illuminating, the Bhāṭṭas think that knowledge cannot be an object of preception. They say that knowledge cannot be known directly, but it can only be inferred. When some object is known by someone, there arises known-ness in that object and on the basis of that known-ness the revealer knowledge is inferred. Thus, one knows one's own knowledge by inference.

The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, hold that knowledge is revealed by itself. It is *sva-prakāśa* or self-illumined. It does not require another knowledge for its illumination. To make it clear, the Prabhākāras give simile of lamp. As the lamp does not need another lamp to reveal itself and as it reveals itself at the time it reveals its objects, in the same way, knowledge reveals itself and at the same time reveals its objects also.

Murāri

Turning to Murāri, we find that he holds, unlike the other two schools of *PM*, an altogether new doctrine and says that knowledge is perceptible. A determinate knowledge (*vyavasāya*) becomes the object of *anuvyavasāya* according to him. While discussing the validity of knowledge we shall be discussing about it in detail.

In this matter Murāri seems to have been influenced by the Naiyāyikas' theory of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas too accept that knowledge is perceptible and accordingly *vyavasāya* is known by *anuvyavasāya.*

This is how Murāri shows his distinctness with reference to the theory of knowledge from the other two schools of *PM.*

IV

MURĀRI'S VIEW ON VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

The problem of the validity of knowledge is a much debated topic in Indian philosophy. All Indian philosophers do not see eye to eye on this problem. If we classify their opinions they will fall under the following groups:

(i) Both validity and invalidity of knowledge are known internally—the view held by the Sāṁkhyas.

(ii) Both validity and invalidity are known externally—the view of the Naiyāyikas.

(iii) Invalidity is internally known and validity is known externally—the Buddhist view.

(iv) Validity is known internally whereas invalidity is known externally—the view of the Mīmāṁsakas.

We are mainly concerned, here, with the Mīmāṁsā view on the validity of knowledge only. Though, this is a fact that all the three schools of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* unequivocally hold that knowledge is self-valid, still they differ in their explanation of this self-validity.

Before we take up the main issues for discussion, let us first make it clear what self-validity of knowledge means. Self-validity is the property of knowledge that is self-valid. It is formally defined as the state of being an object of a cognition which is produced by the factors which reveals the cognition. What does it mean? Let us try to understand this with an example.

Suppose 'X' has perceptual knowledge of a pot. Then 'X' will express this knowledge as 'This is a pot'. In other words, this will be the verbalization of the perceptual knowledge of pot, which is technically known as *vyavasāya*, i.e., direct knowledge of a pot. This knowledge is revealed by another knowledge called *anuvyavasāya* which is expressed, as, 'I know a pot'. Since this *anuvyavasāya* makes 'X' aware of his knowledge of pot, i.e. *vyavasāya*, i.e. *jñānagrāhakasāmagrī* which stand for the factors which reveal the *vyavasāya.* In other words, this second knowledge, i.e. *anuvyavasāya* has an object in the form of the first knowledge, i.e. *vyavasāya.*

Thus, the factors that reveal the *vyavasāya*, i.e. *jñānagrāhakasāmagrī* is *anuvyavasāya* and the object of knowledge produced by such factors (*tajjanayagrahaviṣaya*) is *vyavasāya.* Therefore, 'the state of being an object of a cognition which is produced by the factors which reveal the cognition' (*jñānagrāhakasāmagrījanyagrahaviṣayatva*) exists in *vyavasāya* which amounts to saying that self-validity (*svatogrāhyatva*) exists in *vyavasāya.* Therefore, *vyavasāya* is self-valid.

Now, let us analyze step by step how all the three schools of Mīmāṁsā differ in their views while explaining this *jñānagrāhakasāmagrī* in the above-mentioned definition of self-validity.

Let us first examine the view of Prābhākaras. For Prābhākaras, knowledge is self-illumined. So they do not require another knowledge to reveal one knowledge. The same knowledge reveals object as well as itself, just like a lamp reveals all the things in a room as well as it itself. This also explains why *vyavasāya* itself, for the Prābhākaras, is expressed as 'I know a pot', and not as, 'This is a pot'. This means that *vyavasāya* has revealed not only its object, i.e. *ghaṭa* but also the *vyavasāya* as well. Thus *jñānagrāhakasāmagrī* for the Prābhākaras is *vyavasāya* itself, and the same *vyavasāya*, i.e. *jñānagrāhakasāmagrī* produces the knowledge of validity existing in *vyavasāya.*

Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṁsā, on the other hand, holds that knowledge is supersensuous. It cannot be an object of perception. According to them, knowledge is inferred on the basis of some probans (*liṅga*) which is produced in an object by knowledge. Now, what can be the probans for such an inference? They say when an object is known by perception some property called known-ness (*jñātata*) is produced in the object by knowledge and on the basis of this 'known-ness' the knowledge is inferred. The following is the form (*prayoga*) of the inference in case of the direct knowledge of a pot: The pot

is the object of knowledge which possesses the potness as its qualifier and that is possessed of potness as its qualificand, because it possesses known-ness qualified by potness. On the basis of this inference of knowledge based on 'known-ness', the validity existing in the knowledge is known.

Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭas, this inferential knowledge reveals the validity existing in the *vyavasāya* and therefore this inference is the *sāmagrī* which reveals the knowledge, i.e. *vyavasāya* and the knowledge produced by such inference (i.e., inferential knowledge) only produces the knowledge of validity existing in *vyavasāya.*

In this way, *vyavasāya* is self-valid for the Bhāṭṭas.

Now we proceed to the third School of *Pūrvamīmāmsā,* i.e. the School of Murāri Miśra. According to Murāri Miśra, however, *anuvyavasāya* reveals the validity of *vyavasāya.* For him also, the form of *vyavasāya* in case of the direct knowledge of a pot is, 'this is a pot', and the second knowledge, i.e. the awareness about the first knowledge, i.e., *anuvyavasāya* is, 'I know a pot'.

As this *anuvyavasāya* reveals *vyavasāya,* it also reveals the validity existing in *vyavasāya,* holds Murāri. Thus, *anuvyavasāya* is the revealer of the *vyavasāya,* and since the same reveals the validity in *vyavasāya,* therefore, the knowledge, i.e. *vyavasāya* is self-valid.

Thus, as far as the self-validity of knowledge, i.e. the state of being an object of a cognition which is produced by the factors which reveal the cognition, is concerned, all the three schools of Mīmāṁsā agree to it but they differ in stating its *sāmagrī.*

As we have seen above, according to the Prābhākaras this *sāmagrī* is *vyavasāya* itself while according to the Bhāṭṭas it is *anumiti* and according to the school of Murāri Miśra it is *anvyavasāya.*

Now, let us turn to the *Prāmāṇyavāda* of *TC* where Gaṅgeśopādhyāya has discussed five forms of the self-validity of knowledge. We have chosen here only the first form for discussion out of the five.

The first form runs as follows: '*jñānaprāmāṇyaṁ tadaprāmāṇyāgrāhaka-yāvajjñānagrāhakasāmagrīgrāhyaṁ na vā.*'

Let us look into the meaning of this form and then we shall discuss the propriety of each and every expression in the form one by one. The meaning: whether or not the validity of knowledge is the state of being an object of all those cognitions which are produced by the factors which reveal the cognition and which do not reveal the invalidity of the same cognition. The question is answered in affirmative by the Mimāṁsakas and in negative by the Naiyāyikas. In other words, affirmative answer to this question leads to the theory of self-validity of knowledge and *vice versa.*

We have just seen the meaning of the expressing *jñānagrāhakasāmagrī.* We have also observed that there are three qualifiers to this *sāmagrī* in the above-mentioned first form of self-validity of knowledge discussed by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. Let us now discuss the propriety and purpose of adding these qualifiers.

First of all we shall discuss the necessity of adding *yāvat* as an adjective to *sāmagī.* *Yāvat* means as many, so many, i.e. all. Although it appears to be an adjective of *sāmagrī,* it is impossible to be so because the diverse factors cannot produce a single knowledge. It requires to be interpreted as a qualifier of *graha* (knowledge), because otherwise there

will arise the contingency of having no contradiction with the theory of the Naiyāyika. No such contingency will arise, however, if it qualifies the knowledge. How? Let us discuss in detail, in order to catch the point.

According to the Naiyāyikas the validity of knowledge is known by an inference like, 'This knowledge is valid, since it has produced fruitful inducement.

Now, if the word *yāvat* is totally dropped, the definition will be applicable to any knowledge which includes even inferential knowledge, and in that case there will arise a contingency called *siddhasādhana.* If the Mīmāṁsakas also accept that inferential cognition reveals the validity of knowledge, then there is no need of raising such a question as whether a knowledge is self-valid or not. Thus, to avoid all this, the word *yāvat* is added.

With this addition the form under discussion will mean: Whether or not the validity of knowledge is known by all possible and accepted knowledges namely, *vyavasāya, anuvyavasāya,* etc., produced by the factors that reveal the knowledge but do not reveal the non-validity of the knowledge. Thus, by adding *yāvat* the cognitions like *vyavasāya,* etc., are included, with which the Naiyāyikas will not agree as they accept that *anumiti* alone reveals the validity of knowledge and never a *vyavasāya* or an *anuvyavasāya.* In this way, the word *yāvat* establishes the contradiction.

Now, let us examine the propriety of the qualifier *aprāmāṇyāgrahaka,* i.e. that which does not reveal the invalidity. Suppose, this adjective of *sāmagrī* is absent. Then what would be the result? Obviously, there will arise a contingency that an invalid knowledge also will be called self-valid. What does it mean? Let us consider one case where such contingency may arise: Let us take up the case of a knowledge: 'This knowledge is false'. That this knowledge is false is a fact. Now, if the condition *aprāmanyāgrāhaka* is not laid down, the invalidity existing in the above knowledge will not be revealed and as a consequence of this, the above-mentioned knowledge will have to be treated as valid. Thus, in order to exclude such an incorrect knowledge from the expression, this adjective is added.

Moreover, since that alone 'which does not reveal the invalidity' is not a sufficient condition, one should add that which does not reveal the invalidity of the same knowledge', i.e. *vyavasāya.* Why? In the above example, i.e. 'This knowledge is false'. The *anuyavasāya* of it is a valid cognition, but nevertheless it reveals the invalidity of *vyavasāya.* Here *vyavasāya* will become self-valid which in fact is invalid unless we specify the locus of the validity to be revealed, and that of the invalidity not to be revealed. This is achieved by adding the adjective '*tad-aprāmāṇyāgrāhaka*' to this statement.

Thus, the self-validity means not requiring any factor other than those required for the revelation of the knowledge and the validity existing therein. Having understood the exact implication of the theory of self-validity, let us now reconstruct the theories of self-validity relating to all the three schools of Mīmāṁsā, and then attempt to show how the same statement is true and uniformly applicable to all these schools.

Self-validity, according to the Prābhākara school: In order to construct the whole theory of this school, let us take one example. Suppose 'X' has the direct knowledge of a pot. This knowledge is produced, say, by the contact of the sense-organs and the object. Since, according to the school of Prabhākara, knowledge is self-illumined, the form of the

vyavasāya will be, 'I know the pot'. Now, as 'X' has the knowledge of a pot, as per the statement of self-validity the knowledge is revealed by the same knowledge and the factors which revealed the knowledge, also revealed the validity of that knowledge. Now, what is the factor here which revealed the knowledge? Naturally, according to Prabhākara, it is only *vyavasāya.*

Thus, the validity existing in *vyavasāya* is known by the factors which revealed *vyavasāya,* namely, the *vyavasāya* itself. So is the knowledge, i.e. *vyavasāya* is self-valid. Again, since the same *vyavasāya* did not reveal the invalidity existing in itself, it is self-valid, according to the definition of self-validity.

For the Bhāṭṭa school, the process is not so simple, because knowledge is inferred according to them and not preceived as it is beyond the reach of any sense-organ (*atīndriya*). So, when 'X' has the knowledge of an object, say, pot, that is, when the *vyavasāya* is there as 'This is a pot', some property called known-ness (*jñātatā*) is produced in the pot and on the basis of this known-ness as probans the knowledge is inferred. The following is the form and process of the inference: The pot forms the object of the knowledge which has the pot as its qualificand and potness as its qualifier as it possesses the property called known-ness qualified by potness. On the basis of such inference, the knowledge is inferred.

Here, the factors which produced the inferental cognition are *parāmarśa,* etc., as they produce this inferential cognition which reveals the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge, i.e. of *vyavasāya.* Thus, as per the generalization expressed in the statement *vyāvasāya* is self-valid for the Bhāṭṭas also.

Murāri Miśra holds that *anuvyavasāya* reveals the validity existing in *vyavasāya.* Thus, for this school, the form of the *vyavasāya* is, 'this is a pot' and the form of the *anuvyavasāya* is, 'I know a pot', and the same, i.e. *anuvyavasāya* reveals the validity of *vyavasāya.*

According to Murāri, the fact is as follows: The second knowledge is the direct knowledge or after-knowledge of the first knowledge. In other words, an *anuvyavasāya* has *vyavasāya* as its object, and *vyavasāya* is produced by the contact of sense-organ and an object. An *anuvyavasāya* is produced by mind. Nevertheless, it is a perceptual knowledge. The following is the process of its production: By definition any perceptual knowledge has to be produced by sense-organ-and-object contact. What could be the contact here? The object here is the knowledge (*vyavasāya*) which is the quality of the soul. Since the object is internal, no external sense-organ can come in contact with this knowledge. Naturally, the sense-organ will be the mind itself. What is the contact? The contact is obviously *saṁyukta-samavāya,* because the mind is connected with the soul by the relation of contact. In the soul the knowledge is present by the relation of inherence. Thus, the contact between the mind and the object, namely, the *vyavasāya,* will be the *saṁyukta-samavāya.*

This contact is one of the factors which produce direct knowledge of *vyavasāya,* i.e. *anuvyavasāya.* And this *anuvyavasāya* reveals the validity of the *vyavasāya.* In this way, *vyavasāya* is self-valid for the Miśra School.

The above analysis of the theories of self-validity also clearly demonstrates how the statement of self-validity is uniformly applicable to all the three schools of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* This could be possible because of the word *yāvat* introduced in the statement which incorporates all possible options of the Mīmāṁsakas. Thus, *vyavasāya, anumiti* and

anuvyavasāya are included as the revealers of this validity with which the Naiyāyiyikas disagree.

Now let us turn to the third *vipratipatti* of the *Prāmāṇyavāda* of *TC*. This *vipratipatti* is identified as referring exclusively to the doctrine of Murāri on the validity of knowledge of Mathuranatha in his gloss called *Rahasya*. According to this third *viprattpatti*, the validity of *vyavasāya* is known by the revealer of this *vyavasāya*, i.e., the *anuvyavasāya*. We have already discussed how *anuvyavasāya* reveals the validity of the *vyavasāya*.

This distinct view of Murāri was noted by many scholars after Gaṅgeśa also. Gaṅgeśa's son Vardhamāna, Rucidatta Miśra, Jagadīśa, Viśvanātha, Rāmarudra Bhaṭṭācārya and Gāgā Bhaṭṭa are a few among them. It is interesting to note that all of them have uniformly stated Murāri's view on this issue.

By the by some remarks on the stand of Murāri Miśra regarding the theory of self-validity are in order:

1. The above discussion has demonstrated the fact that it is this view of Murāri on the validity of knowledge which has been continuously quoted since the time of Gaṅgeśa, up to recent philosophers. Thus, it is not unlikely that Murāri was recognized as the holder of a new school of thought because of this very doctrine. His other views might have been treated as marginal.
2. It seems that Murāri is very much influenced by the Nyāya system in this respect. Though he maintains that knowledge is self-valid like the other two schools of Mīmāṁsā, he accepts many concepts of the Naiyāyikas. For example, he accepts that the object of *anuvayavasāya* is *vyavasāya*. By accepting this, he distinguished his doctrine from that of Prābhākaras and Bhāṭṭas. Nevertheless, he accepts that '*auvyavasāya is vyavasāyapratyakṣa*' which amounts to saying that knowledge is known by perception, which is a Nyāya view.
3. He accepts *manas* as an internal sense-organ for the perception of internal objects. This is also basically a Nyāya concept.

V

MURĀRI'S VIEW ON QUALIFIER AND INDICATOR

In the preceding pages we have seen the stand of Murāri on 'Validity of Knowledge'. In this section, we propose to discuss the concepts of *viśesaṇa* and *upalakṣana* as per the definitions given by Murāri Miśra in one of his works namely, *Tripādīnītinayanam*. Before we take up the definitions given by Murāri for discussion, let us see how the other systems of Indian philosophy conceive these two terms namely, *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣana*. Accordingly this section is divided into four parts:

I. Mimāṁsakas' Opinion
II. Naiyāyikas' Standpoint
III. Murāri's Conception
IV. Conclusion

Although, we are mainly concerned here in this section to discuss, compare and contrast Murāri's concepts of *viśeṣana* and *upalakṣana*, in the background of Bhāṭṭa School of Mimāṁsā, Prābhākara school of Mimāṁsā and Nyāya system of Indian philosophy, still a line or two about the position of these concepts in Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali will not be out of place.

Pāṇini uses the word *viśeṣaṇa* in the rule 2. 1. 57, i.e., *viśeṣaṇaṁ viśeṣyeṇa bahulam* and in 1. 2. 52, i.e., *viśeṣaṇānāṁ cājāteḥ*, and the word *lakṣaṇa* in the rule 2. 3. 21, i.e., *itthambhūtalaksaṇe*. Naturally, in the rule 2. 1. 57 he states a pair of concepts. The word *viśeṣaṇa* is paraphrased as *viśeṣaka* by Kātyāyana and as *bhedaka* by Kāśikākāra. Kāśikākāra also paraphrases *viśesya* as *bhedya*. Thus, what distinguishes is a *viśeṣaṇa*. Udyota makes it further specific by rendering the pair as *vyāvartya* and *vyāvartaka*. Needless to say, that this paraphrasing of Udyota is based on later development in systems like Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya.

Mīmāṁsakas' Opinion

Although any elaborate discussion on the conceptual analysis is not found in any Mīmāṁsā text, still from the use of these terms in those texts and from the contexts in which these are used, we can form some idea about Mīmāṁsakas' concepts of *viśeṣana* and *upalakṣaṇa*.

While pleading in favour of his own doctrine of *ākṛti* as the expressed sense of a word, Śabara states that if a *viśeṣaṇa* is not known to a person, he cannot have *viśiṣṭajñāna*. Thus, since it is observed that after hearing the word '*go*' one gets the knowledge of *gotvaviśiṣṭa-go* which is a *viśiṣṭa-jñāṇa*, it is necessary that one must have the knowledge of *gotva*, prior to the knowledge of *gotva-viśiṣṭa-go*.

Naturally, if the word '*go*' is to generate a *viśiṣṭajñāna*, *gotva* must be known from the word itself. Therefore, it is argued that the word '*go*' expresses *gotva*, i.e. *ākṛti* and the individual, i.e. *gotvaviśiṣṭa-go* is understood by implication.

The opponent holds that an individual indicated by an *ākṛti* is the expressed sense of a word. To refute this position of the opponent, Śabara argues, let us compare two words, namely, *daṇḍin* and *go*. Both these words generate *viśiṣṭajñāna*. We have already noted that the word *go* generates the knowledge of *gotva-viśiṣṭa-go*. Similarly, the word *daṇḍin* also generates the knowledge of 'a man with a stick' which also is a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*. But in the knowledge of 'a man with a stick' we can account for the knowledge of stick from the part of the same word, i.e. from *daṇḍa* and man from the suffix *in*, whereas there is no part in the word *go* which can be taken to express *gotva*. Naturally, as the *viśeṣaṇa* cannot be understood from any part of this word and since without the knowledge of it, the qualified knowledge is impossible to occur, it should be accepted that the word *go* itself expresses *gotva*.

Śabara does not use the word *upalakṣana* but he uses two words, namely, *lakṣaṇa* and *cihna* in the sense of *upalakṣaṇa*. It is also very clear from this discussion that Śabara talks of these two terms, i.e. *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* in the context of qualified knowledge. Naturally, according to him, both these terms are expressive of *prakāra* or qualifier in a qualified cognition.

Kumārila expresses his views on this issue in his *Tantravārttika* which are in full agreement with Śabara's *Bhāṣya.* while commenting on Śabara, Kumārila clearly states that *viśeṣaṇa* as well as *upalakṣaṇa* is the distiguisher or qualifier.

While explaining the comparison between the two words, i.e. *daṇḍin* and *go,* offered by Śabara, Kumārila adds one more example of *upalakṣaṇa.* He says, that it is not improper to hold that the *viśeṣya* is conveyed by a word like *daṇḍin* or *devadattagṛha,* because the *viśeṣaṇa,* i.e. *prakāra,* namely, the *daṇḍa* and *kākanilayana* can be known by word and by perception respectively in the case of *daṇḍī puruṣaḥ* and *kākavad devadatta-gṛham.* But such is not the case with the word *go.* Because there is no part in it which can generate the cognition of *gotva.* And unless *gotva,* i.e., *viśeṣana* is known there cannot arise a qualified knowledge from the word *go.* Thus, Kumārila says that since *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* occurs when we hear the word *go,* it means that *viśeṣaṇa* is known, and since it is not known from any other means as mentioned above, *gotva* itself is to be treated as the *vācya,* i.e. expressed meaning of the word *go* and the individual is understood by implication.

It is interesting to note that Kumārila replaced the word *lakṣaṇa,* used by Śabara, by *upalakṣaṇa,* in the same sense of *cihna* as used by Śabara. Nevertheless it is different from *viśeṣaṇa.*

Now let us turn to the Prābhākara school of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* In the *Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara Miśra, we get a still better picture because he discusses the issue a bit more elaborately, in the same context, i.e. *ākṛti* is the expressed meaning of a word.

Prabhākara, in a way, tries to define *upalakṣana* which was not done either by Śabara or by Kumārila. He states: '*upalakṣaṇam hi nāma nātmākāratayā upalakṣyam upalakṣyayati*' and gives an example: '*Yathā yatra ayam kākaḥ ado devadattasya gṛham iti na kākākāram gṛham avasīyate.* That is, *upalakṣana* say 'X' is that which does not indicate something, say 'Y', in the form of 'X'. For instance, the house of Devadatta is not presented in the knowledge as identical with the crow by the expression, '*Yatra ayaṁ kākaḥ ado devadattasya gṛham*'. In other words, crow does not generate an understanding of the hosue as crow, but as distinct from crow.

Prabhākara makes his idea of *upalakṣaṇa* further clear by giving another example. The example is of *pañjarastha siṁha,* i.e. a lion in a cage and it is explained by Śālikanātha in *Ṛjuvimalā* as: Suppose, one has seen a lion always in a cage. It is but natural that whenever he hears the word *siṁha,* he understands a *pañjara* as well. Similarly, when *vyakti* is understood from the word *go, gotva* is regularly understood along with it, because of the regular association. Thus, the individual can be the expressed meaning of a word and the *ākṛti* can be understood by indication. This is the stand of the opponent which is answered by Prabhākara in the following way: It is true that such a person understands the cage also, whenever he hears the word lion, but he understands it as being different form the lion. That is to say, he does not understand the cage in the form of lion but as distinct from lion. It is not true in the case of *go* and *gotva.* That is, the cowness is not understood as different from cow. Thus, the example, given by the opponent, does not prove the contrary.

Needless to say that we are not concerned with the argument about the meaning of the word here, but, nevertheless, this discussion helps us to form the idea of *upalakṣaṇa* in the mind of Prabhākara.

The concept of *upalakṣaṇa* is further elaborated by Prabhākara as follows: *yatra ākārāntaravivekaḥ tatra ākārāntaram upalakṣaṇam. Yathā daṇḍī ityeva daṇḍī-veśeṣāvagatau nanvayane daṇḍasya anvayaḥ. Yatra punaḥ daṇḍītayā eva avagamyate na viśeṣataḥ tatra tathābhūtasyaiva anvayaḥ śakyate vaktum.*

That is, when something, say 'X' is known as distinct from something say 'Y', 'X' is called *upalakṣaṇa*. For instance, when the very word *daṇḍin* is expressed to indicate some particular person, the stick is nothing but a mark which indicates that person. And, in that case, in the expression '*daṇḍinam ānaya*' the stick need not be connected with the act of bringing. But when some particular person is not conveyed by the word *daṇḍin* but any person with a stick, then naturally the stick is a *viśeṣaṇa* and it is not an *upalakṣaṇa* or indicator any more, and in such a case, the stick is connected with *kārya*, i.e. an action, say, bringing. This clearly reveals the view of Prābhākara that *upalakṣana* is not connected with action. Moreover, he has expressed this view himself when he says '*upalakṣaṇative na aṅgaṁ bhavati.*

It can be observed from this that Prābhākara also does not talk of *viśeṣaṇa* so elaborately. He only states keeping in line with the *ŚBh* that the knowledge of *viśeṣaṇa* before *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is essential. Nevertheless, it is clear that it is Prabhākara who attempted to define the concept of *upalakṣana* for the first time. In other words, he provided a criterion to decide whether 'X' is *upalakṣaṇa* or not, over and above a mark.

Bhavanātha, a follower of Prābhākara, puts the same concept in his *Mīmāṁsānayaviveka* as *pṛthagbhūte hi dharmiṇy upalakṣaṇam.*

That is, when something known is different from that on the basis of which it is known, then that on the basis of which it is known is called *upalakṣaṇa*. This is how this definition is explained by the commentator Varadarāja: To be more precise, when something, say, 'X' is known as differentiated on account of something, say 'Y' then 'Y' is called *upalakṣana*. Thus, only when the house of Devadatta is known as differentiated on account of *kāka*, the latter is an *upalakṣaṇa*. But this is not the case with *viśeṣaṇa* obviously because, it is not the case that cow, possessed of cowness, is known on account of some property other than cowness. Naturally, cowness is a *viśeṣaṇa* and so the expressed meaning of the word *go* has to be *gotva*. Bhavanātha establishes this point with the same example as given by Prābhākara.

From the above discussion of both the schools of Mīmāṁsā we observe that there is full agreement with the fact that cowness, in the knowledge of 'cow with cowness', arising from the word *go*, is a qualifier and cannot be treated as an indicator, whereas the crow, in the knowledge of Devadatta's house arising on account of crow, is nothing but an indicator. The only contribution of Prābhākara in this respect is a positive attempt to define the concept of *upalakṣana*.

Although they have not talked much about *viśeṣaṇa* except for the *Bhāṣya* statement that, that which is directly connected is *viśeṣaṇa* and that which is distantly connected cannot produce a qualified knowledge, still by implication, we understand that they treat *viśeṣaṇa* as something which is directly connected to the *viśeṣya* in the knowledge.

II. Naiyāyikas Standpoint

Let us now turn to the Naiyāyikas. Unlike the Bhāṭṭas, they concentrated on defining these two concepts right from the beginning. It was Udayana among the old Naiyāyikas, who in his *Kiraṇāvalī,* initiated a semantic definition of these terms The discussion occurs in the context of a qualified knowledge, '*dve dravye*', i.e. 'there are two substances'. In this cognition, *dvitva* is *viśeṣaṇa* and the substances are the *viśeṣya.* But the problem is according to the metaphysical and ontological stand of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, number two onwards all higher numbers are produced by a knowledge called *apekṣā-buddhi* and since knowledge is not a permanent entity, after disappearance of the *apekṣā-buddhi* number two is bound to disappear. In the process of cognition, by the time one gets the qualified cognition, '—there are two substances—', number two has already disappeared.

Naturally, the question arises: how can this knowledge take place when, *dvitva,* i.e. *viśeṣaṇa* is not present at the time of its production? In answer to this question, Udayana argues that although *viśeṣaṇa* or qualifier is the cause of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* or qualified knowledge, it need not be an object of the same knowledge. Therefore, though the number two is not present at the time of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna,* the knowledge of it can be the cause of the qualified knowledge '*dve dravye*', and thereby its state of being a *viśeṣaṇa* remains intact. The only condition for being *viśeṣaṇa* is that it must exist in the same *viśeṣya* which is the *viśeṣya* of the qualified knowledge.

Udayana defines *Viśeṣaṇa* as, '*samānādhikaraṇam avacchedakaṁ viśeṣaṇam*' meaning a *viśeṣaṇa* is that, which distinguishes its locus being existent in the same locus. He also illustrates the case with the example of *nīlam utpalam.* Here, the blue colour, being present in it distinguishes the locus of the blue colour, from the loci, namely lotuses of red, white etc. Therefore, blue colour is a qualifier.

He defines *upalakṣaṇa* as '*avacchedakatva—aviśeṣe' pi vyadhikaraṇam upalakṣaṇam.* It means: An *upalakṣana* is that which distinguishes a locus which is not its locus. No example of *upalakṣaṇa* is given by Udayana. But it is quite obvious from the definitioin that when the *kāka* is not connected with the house of Devadatta, at the same time it distinguishes the house, it is *upalakṣaṇa.*

It is quite apparent from the definitions offered by Udayana, that both the *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* share the nature of differentiating something from the other, which is in quite accordance with Kumārila. In addition, Udayana has also provided the criterion to distinguish *viśeṣaṇa* from *upalakṣaṇa* as *samānādhikaraṇatva* and *vyadhikaraṇatva.*

In his *Saptapadārthī,* Śivāditya Miśra reproduces Udayana's definitions of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* by simply replacing the word *avacchedaka by vyāvartaka.* Thus, the respective definitions are: *Samānādhikaraṇaṁ vyāvartakaṁ viśeṣaṇam* and *vyadhikaraṇaṁ sad vyāvartakam upalakṣaṇam.*

It is worth noticing that he gives his own interpretation of the word *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and *vaiyadhikaraṇa.* He interprets *sāmānādhikaraṇya* as *ekavibhaktyantapadavācyatvam* and *vaiyadhikaraṇya* as *bhinnavibha-ktyantapadavācyatvam.*

Thus, Śivāditya tries to define these concepts formally. If there is a formal agreement of adjectival and substantive forms, it is *viśeṣaṇa* whereas, if there is no such agreement,

it is a case of *upalakṣaṇa*. Naturally, in *rūpavān ghaṭaḥ, rūpa* is *viśeṣaṇa*, whereas in the case of *jaṭābhīḥ tāpasaḥ, jaṭā* is *upalakṣaṇa*.

When we come to Gaṅgeśa, we find that an elaborate discussion (*vāda*) on these concepts is added by him in his *TC* where he has taken into account various previous definitions given by his predecessors.

While refuting Śivāditya's interpretation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* Gaṅgeśa argues that if *viśeṣeṇa* is defined as '*viśeṣyasamānavibhaktikatvam*' the definition will over apply to the case of *kākavaddevadattagṛham*, where *kāka*, in fact, is *upalakṣaṇa* and not *viśeṣaṇa*.

The commentator Rucidatta adds that it will not only apply to the crow but also to the string of the expression *ghaṭaḥ paṭaḥ*, etc., because here too both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* show one and the same nominative ending.

In this way, having refuted some other views Gaṅgeśa gives his own view. He explains the point as follows: After the qualified knowledge, namely, *daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*, a person with a stick, has occurred, it is understood that the person with a stick is different from those who do not have sticks. Although there are two properties in the person namely, *daṇḍa* and *puruṣatva*, the locusness of difference in the person with the stick is delimited by the stick and not by *puruṣatva* (personness), because in that case *puruṣatva* cannot differentiate this person from other persons who do not have sticks simply because in them too *puruṣatva* exists. Not only that, even at the time when the stick is not with that person there is no difference of that person from other persons (who do not have sticks) and as such no difference exists in that person and so no knowledge of difference is possible. Therefore, *daṇḍa* alone is the delimitor of the locusness of difference in the person with the stick.

In case of *kākavad-devadatta-gṛham*, of course, the difference from all those houses that are not of Devadatta is understood in the house of Devadatta but the delimitor of this locusness of the difference cannot be *kāka* since even in the absence of *kāka*, namely, when the *kāka* is moving in circle over the house of Devadatta or when it was associated with the house in the past, the difference is known alike.

The following is the main difference between these two concepts according to Gaṅgeśa:

The knowledge of difference in the qualified object cannot occur in the absence of *viśeṣaṇa*, whereas, even if the *upalakṣana* is absent, it can cause the knowledge of difference through its own knowledge. Accordingly, Gaṅgeśa defines *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* as follows:

That which distinguishes something from other being a delimitor of the locusness of the difference to be known is a *viśeṣaṇa* and any other distinguisher different from it is called *upalakṣaṇa*.

Gadādhara, while explaining the rule of Pāṇini '*Itthambhūtalakṣaṇe*' (P.2.3.21), looks at this problem in a different way.

He has tried to establish that *viśeṣaṇa* is understood from a possessive suffix, whereas, *upalakṣaṇa* is known by an instrumental suffix. For example, *daṇḍī puruṣaḥ* and *jaṭābhiḥ tāpasaḥ*. Here, *daṇḍa* is *viśeṣaṇa* because it is understood from a word ending in the possessive *suffix in*, whereas, *jaṭā* is *upalakṣaṇa* because it is understood from a word ending in instrumental.

If this view is accepted, then both *kāka* and *jaṭā* will have to be treated as *viśeṣaṇa* in the expressions, *kākavad-devadatta-gṛham* and *jaṭāvān tāpasāḥ*, which is contrary to the fact as it is shown by Gaṅgeśa.

No doubt, it would have been the ideal position to correlate one particular concept with one particular expression, but it cannot be maintained since in the expression, '*kākavad devadattasya gṛham*' *kāka* is treated by all as *upalakṣana.*

Śaṅkara Miśra, on the other hand, makes a very bold statement in his *Upaskāra* as follows:

Yadā Devadattagṛhe kākavattā tadā kākaḥ viśeṣaṇam eva,
Yadā tu upari bhraman san kākaḥ tadā upalakṣaṇam.

Thus, according to this view, when the crow sits on the house of Devadatta, it is *viśeṣaṇa* and the same crow if it is not connected with the house but if on the basis of its knowledge Devadatta's house is located it can be called *upalakṣaṇa.*

What is deduced from Śaṅkara Miśra is, when a person observes the crow sitting on the house, the crow must be treated as *viśeṣaṇa* because in that knowledge the crow itself appears as a qualifier of the house, but when the crow is not there and still one gets the knowledge of the house on account of the previous existence of the crow on the house, the crow does not appear as the qualifier of the house, but merely the structure of the house indicated by the knowledge of the crow appears as the qualifier of the house and so crow is called *upalakṣaṇa.*

This is how the Naiyāyikas have contributed to these notions by way of defining these concepts as comprehensively as possible in order to include all the cases, discussed above.

III. Murāri's Conception

Coming to Murāri, we find that in his *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* of *Tripādīnītinayana* he has offered a different set of definitions of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa.* The context in which Murāri defines these two terms is the question of establishing a connection between the *arthavāda* sentences and the *vidhi* sentences, i.e. between the *prāśastya* and the *vidheya, yāga.* Murāri holds that *prāśastya* (praise of deity, the constituent of the sacrifice) is an *upalakṣana* to *yāga,* sacrifice and then defines the two terms *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* as intended by him.

When he starts defining, the beginning remark itself is surprising. He says: *Na vyāvartakam upalaṣaṇam viśeṣaṇam vā.* Neither *upalakṣaṇa* nor *viśeṣaṇa* is a distinguisher.

Naturally, by making such a statement he attracts all our attention towards him because it is apparently all contrary to what we have been discussing so far. But we are pracified by his next statement which in reality is the definition of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣana.* He says: *Kāryāṅgaṁ sat sambaddhaṁ viśeṣaṇam, kāryānaṅgaṁ sat sambaddhaṁ ca upalakṣaṇam.* 'That which is subsidiary to *kārya* and at the same time is connected with the *viśeṣya* is called *viśeṣaṇa* and that which is not subsidiary to *kārya* and at the same time is connected with *viśeṣya* is called *upalakṣaṇa*'.

Naturally, it is evident from the definitions that *vyāvartakatva* does not constitute the body of the definition. While explaining the reason for it, he points out that *vyavaccheda, vyāvṛtti* or differentiation is the purpose of both *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* and, as such, it need not enter into the text of the definition. This is also so because *vyāvṛtti*, i.e. differentiation is common to both the concepts. Strictly speaking, in a definition, only *asādhāraṇadharma*, that is, the unique property is to be stated as per the definition of definition.

Let us now see how the definition of *upalakṣaṇa* given by him applies to *prāśastya*. The sentence, '*vāyavyaṁ śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ*' enjoins the *kāmya-paśuyāga*. And this sacrifice has been praised, through the praise of the deity by the *arthavāda* sentences, '*vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā*, etc. Now, how to connect this praise with the *yāga*, is a problem which is solved by Murāri by saying that it is connected to *yāga* being an *upalakṣaṇa*. Let us see how it is connected to *yāga*.

Devatā, which is praised, is directly connected with *yāga*, being the very form of *yāga*. But *prāśastya*, being connected with the deity of that sacrifice directly, simply acts as a distinguisher of the *yāga* and is not connected with it directly. And thus it becomes an indicator of *yāga*.

Thus, according to Murāri's concept, whether something is *upalakṣāṇa* or *viśeṣaṇa*, can be decided only in the context of an action. Say, for instance, in the expression, '*Kamaṇḍalunā chātram ānaya*' *kamaṇḍalu* is *upalakṣaṇa* because it is not a subsidiary to action of bringing, but it simply points to the student who is to be brought. If the speaker intends that the student should be brought along with the *kamaṇḍalu* the normal expression would '*Kamaṇḍalumantaṁ chātram ānaya*' or '*Kamaṇḍalunā saha chātram ānaya*' and in that case the *kamaṇḍalu* will be a *viśeṣaṇa*. But if it is simply, '*kamaṇḍalunā chātram ānaya*', then it is not necessary that the student should be brought along with the *kamaṇḍalu*, because that is not intended there.

Let us now analyse and examine another statement of Murāri regarding *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. In his *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa* he writes:

'*Dvitīye tu svargakāmanopalakṣitakartṛviśeṣa eva samarpyamānaḥ kiṁ kāmanayā kālaviśeṣayoginyā upalakṣyate gṛham iva kākena, yad idānīṁ kākavad devadattīyam iti, sadā yogena vā.*

In the second chapter of Jaimini, it has been discussed whether the desire of heaven associated with a particular time indicates the performer of the sacrifice as the crow indicates the house such as, this house is of Devadatta indicated by the crow present at this moment of time. Or whether the performer is known by his having the desire of heaven always.

Here, an occasional desire of heaven is conceived as an *upalakṣaṇa*. Thus, here, Murāri thinks that, that which being present for a particular time only, distinguishes 'X' from 'Y', is an *upalakṣaṇa*, whereas that which being always present distinguishes 'X' from 'Y' is a *viśeṣaṇa*.

IV. Conclusion

From the above discussion, we arrive at the following conclusion regarding *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa.*

(i) Pāṇini used the terms *viśeṣāṇa* and *lakṣaṇa.* Although the term *viśeṣaṇa* continued to be used in that sense, the term *lakṣaṇa* seems to have been replaced by *upalakṣaṇa.*

(ii) Till Śabara, the same term *lakṣaṇa* is used in the sense of *cihna,* a mark, but is replaced by *upalakṣaṇa* from Kumārila onwards.

(iii) Prābhākara seems to be the first among the Mīmāṁsakas to attempt a definition of the term *upalakṣaṇa.*

(iv) Among the Naiyāyikas, it is Udayana who presented definitions for both *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa.*

(v) Gaṅgeśa supplied a comprehensive definition of these concepts.

(vi) Murāri defined them with a different parameter, the hint of which he obtained from Prābhākara. To be precise, Murāri's concept of *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* is totally different from that of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya school but is closer to that of Prābhākara to the extent that both conceive these concepts in terms of action. Nevertheless, Murāri states them in clear terms with further specification by adding the qualification *sambaddha* to the respective definitions.

(vii) Duration of time is another factor to distinguish *upalakṣaṇa* from *viśeṣaṇa* according to Murāri.

VI

MURARI'S VIEW ON SENTENCE-UNITY

In this section we are going to discuss what Murāri has to say about the concept of sentence-unity, and how the sentence-unity is achieved. The discussion about sentence-unity appears in the context of the establishment of the authoritativeness of the *arthavādas* in Murāri's texts. The *pūrvapaksin* argues that the *arthavādas* are merely narrative sentences and they do not convey any action to be undertaken. And therefore, they are not fit to get construed with the *vidhis,* injunctions that express *kārya* or an action to be undertaken. But the fact is that unless the *arthavādas* are connected with the *vidhis,* it cannot be established that they are authoritative. Now the question arises how to connect them. Here comes the discussion on the concept of *ekavākyatā,* according to the *PM.*

Now, before we examine what Murāri has to say about this, let us, first, see what Jaimini has to say on this issue. Jaimini has defined a single sentence in the context of fixing the extent of *Yajurmantra* in his *sutra* 2.1.46 which runs as follows: *Arthaikatvād ekam vākyam sākāṅkṣaṁ ced vibhāge syāt.*

"If it were a case that (an expression or expressions) serve a single purpose (or that it expresses a single composite meaning) and if it were a case that on separation of any

constituent of the expressions the separated constituents become expectant of each other (i.e., they cannot express one composite meaning any more), then that expression or those expressions can be said to form sentence-unity or a single sentence."

Let us consider the following example, so that the context will become clear: In the context of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, there occur the following expressions: *Devasya tvā savituḥ prasave-aśvinor bāhūbhyāṁ pūṣṇo hastābhyām agnaye juṣṭaṁ nirvapāmi.* Now, here, we can clearly observe that there are four parts of the expression of *mantras.* As a matter of fact, each part could be taken as a separate sentence or *mantra.* But if we think of the conditions laid down in Jaimini's definition given above regarding the extent of a single sentence, we realize that if we take any of the four parts of the *mantra* mentioned above separately, it will be expectant of something to express its meaning fully. To elucidate the point, let us take the first part separately. The first part is '*Devasya tvā savituḥ prasave*' Does this part of the sentence express any complete meaning? The answer is, 'no', obviously because there is no verb in this sentence (if at all we want to call it a sentence) and so, it cannot express any idea by itself. One can easily observe the same position in the case of the other three parts also.

But, on the other hand, if we take all the four parts together, they do express one single idea, namely, 'I measure the grains for Agni by the arms of Aśvins and the hands of Pūṣan'.

Thus, the conditions stated in *JS.* 2.1.46 help decide the extent or unit of a single sentence. And, accordingly, the *nirvāpa* is performed by reciting the whole *mantra.*

Now let us see some other cases which are different from the above. In the above-mentioned *mantra* there was only one verb. But, there are some expressions which contain more than one verb. Even then, they are not fully independent or inexpectant so far as their meanings or purposes are concerned. Though they have independent verbal forms, they do expect something to make their meanings complete.

Let us take an example. There is one injunction '*Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*' and there is another one, '*Dadhnā juhoti*'. Now, both these sentences have separate verbal forms and they are also capable of expressing some action to be undertaken. Still, they have an expectancy of each other, because even if the first sentence makes one know about the action to be performed, he does not know after reading this sentence how and with what he should perform the same. On the other hand, when one reads only the second sentence, he knows that he has to offer curds in the sacrifice. Here, however, he does not understand what the main sacrifice is for which he has to offer the oblation of curds and for what purpose.

Thus, these two sentences, read separately, do not make much sense. But, if these are read together as a single expression or sentence, they will express a complete meaning. Thus, in this case, these two sentences are required to get connected with each other so that a complete meaning is understood from them.

Now, let us see still another case where there are different verbal forms but all of them are not injunctive, as in the preceding case. In such cases also it is necessary to unite the two or more sentences as a single sentence for understanding a consistent and complete meaning from them.

There is one group of *arthavāda* sentences, namely, '*Vāyur vai kṣepiṣthā*... etc. And there is another sentence which enjoins a sacrifice, namely, '*Vāyavyaṁ śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ*'. The first group of sentences here contains all narrative sentences and they do not express any *kārya* or action to be performed. These sentences simply praise the deity *Vāyu*, which is the deity of the sacrifice to be undertaken as per the second sentence. Naturally, it has an expectancy towards some sentence that expresses an action which has *Vāyu* as its deity. And, on the other hand, the second sentence, namely, '*Vāyavyaṁ śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ*', has an expectancy of some praise that will produce an inclination in the mind of a man to take up the activity enjoined by it.

So, if these two sentences get connected, they will express a complete meaning that can lead to the inducement of a man to the activity enjoined by that injunctive sentence.

Now, here the question arises, how to connect these two sentences, namely, the *vidhi* and the *arthavāda*. This question arises because the *arthavāda*-sentences do not express any *kārya*-sense and because their meanings lose relevance for connection with the sense expressed by the *vidhi*. Naturally, to make the relation possible, one has to discard the sentence-meaning of the *arthavāda* and in its place one has to accept some meaning which could be related to the meaning of the *vidhi*. Naturally, one has to take resort to *lakṣaṇā*. But which *lakṣaṇā*, *padalakṣaṇā* or *vākyalakṣaṇā*? Obviously, one should accept here *vākyalakṣaṇā* in order to discard the whole meaning of the *arthavāda*-sentences. Thus, by the *vākyalakṣaṇā* the *arthavāda*-sentence will express *prāśastya*, praise (of the *yāga* or sacrifice) which is just a word-meaning. In this way, the *arthavāda*-sentence is brought to the level of a word and then the *prāśastya* gets connected with the *vidhi*-sentence. And, thus, the united sentence expresses the praised *yāga* that is to be performed.

So far we have seen two different cases where two sentences are connected. In one case, two sentences, both expressing *kārya*-sense, formed one single sentence. In the other case, one sentence expressing *kārya* formed sentence-unity with the other being a narrative expression. In the first case, the two sentences are fit to be related with each other since they are on the same level with reference to the meanings they convey and hence they are connected without any difficulty. This type of sentence-unity is called *vākyaikavākyatā*, the unity of two sentences. In other words, when the expressed meanings of two independent sentences are fit to be united and when consequently they get united, the expressions of the two sentences are said to form one single sentence.

In the second case, we saw that one sentence is an injunction whereas the other is a narrative sentence and we also saw that the expressed meaning of the narrative sentence was not relevant to the meaning of the *vidhi* and hence to make it relevant the entire narrative expression was treated to convey 'praise' by *vākyalakṣaṇā* and later it was connected with the meaning of the injunctive sentence. This type of sentence-unity is called *padaika-vākyatā*, unity of sentence with a *pada*.

Here since the *arthavāda*-sentence conveyed mere 'praise' which is nothing more than a word-meaning, it is, as if, the fact that the injunctive sentence is being united with another word (*pada*). Hence the *padaikavākyatā*.

Thus, there are two types of sentence-unity accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas, namely, *vākyaikavākyatā* and *padaikavākyatā.*

With this background, let us now turn to Murāri and see what his idea is about these two types of sentence-unity.

Needless to say that when the verbal understanding of the sentence-meanings from two sentences have *kārya* as their object and both the meanings are related with each other, it is said that there is sentence-unity between the two sentences. Compare the following remarks from the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa, 'Yatra dvayam evānvitābhidhānaṁ kāryaviṣayam, dvayoś ca vākyārthayoḥ parasparānvayaḥ, tatraikavākyatā yathā adhikārāṅgavākyayoḥ kāryābhidhānena vākyaparyavasānāt. ...*

Consider the following statement in the *Arthavādādhikaraṇa:*

Vākyaikavākyatā caivamanuvādavidhyuddeśayoḥ syāt svārthabodhe paryavasānāt.

Here it is clearly stated that if the sentence meanings of the sentences which are to be united are significant, those sentences can be said to form a single sentence.

Now observe the following statement from the same *Arthavādādhikaraṇa:*

Padārthapratītisthānīyatvād atropadeśavākyatā eva.

Since the *prāśastya-jñāna* is nothing more than a knowledge of word-meaning there is sentence-unity called *upadeśavākyatā* or *padaikavākyatā* between the *arthavāda*-sentence and the injunctive sentence.

From these statements it is very clear that Murāri's concept of *vākvaikavākyatā* and *padaikavākyatā* does not differ from that of the established views of the other two schools of *PM.*

Let us see some more cases from the same *adhikaraṇa.* Here, one opponent remarks that the sentence-unity is possible only among words expressive of an action and the *kārakas* that help the action come into existence. And this is possible only on the basis of the case-endings that are expressive of the relations between the *kārakas* and the action. But in the present case of the *arthavādas* and the *vidhis,* however, there are two different and independent verbal forms governing two independent sets of *kārakas,* and so, these two cannot form one single sentence but are explicitly two different sentences.

On this, Murāri says that even if these are two different sentences, one having an injunctive verbal form and the other a verbal form that expresses an already established thing or past action, they can form one single sentence. Because they can be construed with each other as expressive of *hetu* and *hetumat,* i.e. a ground and that which requires that ground.

To explain what he means by that, Murāri gives the following example:

'*Malinaṁ te vapuḥ vartate, snāyāḥ*'.

'Your body is dirty, you should take bath'.

These are two different sentences having two different verbal forms. One expresses existence (*vartate*) and the other is an injunctive form of a verb namely (you) should take bath (*snāyāḥ*). Thus, the first sentence namely, 'your body is dirty' is the ground or reason (*hetu*) for the second sentence, 'you should take bath' (*hetumat*). So, according to Murāri any two sentences can form a single sentence provided the meanings of the two sentences are related by the relation of *hetu-hetumadbhāva.*

Thus, the condition laid down to form a single sentence is the causal relationship between the meanings of the two expressions to be united as a single expression.

In another place Murāri says that *Naikapratīti-kāritvam ekavākvatāva dhāraṇahetuḥ kintu ekārthapratītiparatvam.*

Here, Murāri talks about how the extent or unit of a single sentence is to be known or decided. He says that to decide that a particular expression or expressions constitute one single sentence, it is not necessary that it must cause one single verbal understanding but what is required is that it must stand for an understanding of one single composite meaning, because, even if the sentence-meaning is not understood from an expression, still the expression can be one single sentence. To illustrate Murāri gives an example of the sentences of cheat (*vipralambhaka*). Now, from the sentence of a cheat, one can never have an understanding of something real but still the sentence of a cheat is one single sentence.

Murāri further argues that to determine the *ekavākyatā, yogyatā* or compatibility is also not a ground because, again, the sentences of a cheat, inspite of their being incompatible, are understood as separate sentences. In other words, in each sentence, *ekavākyatā* is understood.

Thus, according to Murāri, *yogyatā* is a necessary condition for getting the verbal understanding only, but it is not so in the case of ascertaining the sentence-unity.

From whatever is stated and discussed above, we conclude that Murāri too held the same notion of *vākyaikavākyatā* and *padaikavākyatā* as held by the other two schools of *PM.* Nevertheless, Murāri has made better clarification of the idea by pointing out the ways and means by which the sentence-unity is determined. His discussion on the function of *yogyatā* is very much illuminating.

VII

MURĀRI'S VIEW ON KĀRYA AND SIDDHA

Concept of *Kārya* is much discussed a concept in the system of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* because it is an important postulation of the 'Intermediate Causal Link' (*apurva*) between the performance of sacrifice and its result, namely, heaven, etc. It has also another meaning which is common to the classical Sanskrit language, i.e. something to be done or to be achieved. Actually, this is the primary meaning of the word which is extended by the *Mīmāṁsakas* to the meaning of *apūrva* mentioned above.

In this section, I have discussed the definitions of *kārya* and *siddha* as given by Murāri Miśra, the exponent of the third school of *PM.* I have also tried to analyse the definitions and point out how Murāri differs from the *Prābhākaras.*

The context in which Murāri speaks about the concepts of *kārya* and *siddha* is that of establishing the validity of the *arthavāda*-sentences of the Veda. The *Jaiminisūtra* 1.2.1 states that, that part of the Veda, which does not enjoin any activity, is not valid because the whole Veda is meant for prompting men into some action, some performance:

Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām (JS. 1.2.1)

According to this rule the position of the *arthavādas* becomes doubtful as they are nothing more than narrative sentences. The sentences like Vāyu is the swiftest deity or he cried, etc. (i.e. *vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā or so'rodīt*) have nothing to do with any activity. They either narrate some facts or tell some story of the past. And hence, these sentences cannot be considered, as valid as per the rule stated above. But there is a way of making them valid and that is to unite them with the injunctive sentences, because, if they are connected with the injunctions, they can be treated as expressive of the *kārya* or action. To explain, if a particular *arthavāda* is connected with a particular injunction, it becomes just a part of the injunctive sentence and a sentence expresses only one coherent meaning according to the Mīmāṁsakas. Thus, the *arthavāda* united with an injunction will express the same action as expressed by that injunction and will become valid with reference to *Dharma*.

Anticipating this possibility, the opponent of the Prābhākara begins with an argument which rules out this very possibility. Murāri has quoted the *pūrvapakṣa* of the Prābhākara in the very beginning of his *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* of *Tripādinītinayana*. The argument of the opponent of the Prābhākara, as stated by Murāri, is that *arthavādas* cannot be treated as expressive of *kārya* because there is no ground to connect them with the injunctions. It is implied here that if they are so connected, they will expressed the same meaning as that of the injunctions and will be valid so for as *Dharma* is concerned.

Murāri, at the very outset, rejects this formation of the *pūrvapakṣa*. According to him, instead of arguing in this way, one should rather state it this way: It is not possible to argue on the side of the validity of the *arthavāda* with reference to *Dharma* because they are expressive of the *siddhārtha*, i.e. they express meanings which are already accomplished and do not prompt men into any action. Further, one should consider the question: why sentence-unity between the *arthavādas* and the injunctions is not possible? The answer to this question would be, only the *kārya*-meaning can be related to another *kārya*-meaning. And the *arthavādas* do not convey *kārya*-meanings.

On this, the opponent is reminded of the case of *niyojya*. *Niyojya* is that person who is prompted to take up an action (vide: *Niyojyaśca kāryaṁ yaḥ svakīyatvena budhyate*) (*Vākyārthamātṛkā* of *Prakaraṇapañcikā*).

The person obviously cannot be treated as *kāryārtha* or *sādhāyrtha*. He is no doubt a *siddhārtha*. Then, the opponent asks, how is it that the *niyojya*, being *siddha*, is not construed with the meaning of the injunction which is *kārya*? Here is the case of a *siddhārtha* being connected with a meaning which is not *siddha*. If this is allowed, there should be no difficulty in connecting the meaning of the *arthavādas* with the meaning of the injunctions. Not only this but there are also some more cases likes that of Time, etc., which are also *siddha* and in spite of this fact are connected with the *kārya* or meaning which is yet to be achieved or established, i.e. the action. If one argues here that because of their association with the action, they become *sādhya*, this will lead to the fault of mutual dependency: If there is association with the action, the *siddha* entities become *sādhya* and if they are *sādhya*, they can be associated with the action. To quote Murāri:

kriyānvaye sādhyatā, sādhyatve ca kriyānvaya iti duruttaram itaretarāśrayaṁ syāt.

(vide: *A Reconstruction of the Third School of PM.* by Ujjwala Panse, Sri Satguru Publications, New Delhi, 1990, p. 113)

To avoid this fault of mutual dependency, Murāri argues, we should define the concepts of *kārya* and *siddha* as also their scope. It is here that Murāri has defined these two concepts. He says:

Tasmād evaṁ vācyam—kṛtyānurañjanayogyaṁ kāryam atra abhipretam. Tacca dvayam—niyojyakoṭiḥ viṣayoktiś ca. Koṭidvayabahirbhūtaṁ siddham abhipretam (vide ibid., p. 113).

In this context, *kārya* is that which is fit to be associated with an action. This again should be divided into two groups, namely, the group of *niyojya* and the group of *viṣaya.* To explain: one group of *kārya* will be the person who is prompted to take up an activity and the other will be that of the object of performance, namely, *yāga* or sacrifice. Whatever falls outside the domain of these two is to be considered as *siddha.*

In other words, Murāri intends to say that *kārya* consists of two heads (1) *Niyojya,* i.e. the performer or the person to take up the action and (2) the sacrifice itself. Nothing more nothing less. Whatever is not covered by these two heads, is not fit to be called *kārya* but should be named as *siddha.*

The meanings conveyed by the *arthavādas* like, *so'rodīt* or *vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā,* etc. obviously, do not fall under these two and hence cannot be called *kārya.* Thus, that which is not fit to be included in these two groups cannot be called *kārya* and in turn cannot be connected with the injunction or the meaning of injunctive sentence, e.g., 'the weeping of Rudra' or 'swiftness of the deity *vāyu*', being past and present respectively, cannot form either of these two groups and hence are *siddha* and not *kārya.* Therefore, they cannot be united with injunctive sentences.

Murāri has pointed out here the way of forming an appropriate *pūrvapakṣa.* He has defined these two concepts in this particular context, because he wants to avoid the ambiguity. By defining *kārya,* the way he has done it, he has included the *siddha niyojya* in the category of *kārya* and has brought it to the level where it is connected with the sacrifice which is *kārya* without any difficulty.

Observations

From the way Murāri has defined *kārya,* it is clear that whatever is *kriyārtha,* that is, meant for an action, is *kārya* for him, of course, besides the action itself. The *JS* 1.2.1 states that only that part of the Veda is valid which is meant for some or the other action and whatever does not help the action in any way to come into the being, is not valid because the Veda, as a whole, is meant for prompting man into action. This implies that whatever is already an accomplished entity, cannot be considered as valid in the context of *Dharma* unless and until it is associated with an action. I think, what is meant by the word *kriyārtha* in *JS.* 1.2.1, corresponds to Murāri's idea of *kārya.* To make it clear, look how Murāri has defined it. He says *kṛtyānurañjanayogya* is *kārya,* that is, is fit to be related with an action. In other words, *kārya* is that which will help the action to come into existence in some way or the other. By defining it this way, what could he achieve? It is this: As per the primary or say conventional meaning of *kārya,* we cannot include any already established entity in the sphere of it because it, that way, corresponds to the concept of *sādhya,* as it were. Thus, we cannot think

of any *siddha* entity becoming *kārya*, i.e. *sādhya* as per the primary meanings of both. But by defining the concepts the way he has done it, Murāri can include the *niyojya*, i.e. the performer of the sacrifice in the domain of *kārya* entities. The performer actually brings about the action and he is truly indispensable so far as any performance of sacrifice is concerned. But, as per the rule that *kārya* alone can be related with *kārya*, there is no way to connect the performer with the action if the primary meanings of *kārya* and *siddha* are taken into account, and thus, he will remain unconnected with the action which in no way is desirable. But Murāri's definition of *kārya* includes *niyojya* also in the realm of *kārya* and solves the problem. Thus, the purpose of the definition is clear from the context in which Murāri' has defined *kārya*.

If we compare Murāri's concept of *kārya* with that of the *Prābhākaras*, it becomes evident that Murāri's concept is wider than that of the *Prābhākaras*. To elaborate: the *Prābhākaras* have also defined *kārya* as *kṛtisaṁbandhi hi kāryam* (vide *Tantrarahasya*, p. 46), i.e. they also intend that, that which is related with the *kṛti* is *kārya* but here the term 'related' is used in a restricted sense. The meaning of 'related' is 'produced by', i.e. to say that which is produced by *kṛti* is *kārya* and not merely what is related in any way, so to say. Śalikanātha has expressedly said that *kārya* is *kṛtisādhya* (vide *Prakaraṇapañcikā, vākyārthamātṛkā*, verse 7). Thus, this definition of *kārya* will not allow *niyojya* to become *kārya* in any way. Śālikanātha has defined it in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* as follows: It is different from the sacrifice, exists at different time than the sacrifice and is fit to be related with *niyojya* (vide *vākyārthamātṛkā*, verse 23). Obviously what the *Prābhākaras* have in mind is *apūrva* which is produced by the sacrifice and nothing else.

Thus, from whatever we have discussed so far, it is clear, that, as per the definition of Murāri, we can include '*Prābhākaras*' *kārya*, i.e. *apūrva* under the concept of *kārya* as it is fit to be related with *kṛti* by *janya-janaka-bhāva* relation as well as we can bring *niyojya, kāla*, etc., also under the domain of *kārya*. Because Murāri has stated the relation in general and not in any particular relation, *Apūrva* can very well be included in the *viṣayakoṭi* of *kārya* as it will form the object of sacrifice as also of *kṛti*.

VIII

MURĀRI'S VIEW ON TANTRA AND ĀVĀPA

Tantra and *āvāpa* are important concepts in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* as they are directly involved in deciding the scope of the performance of particular subsidiary rite. These two concepts are discussed by Śabara in the 11th chapter of his *bhāṣya*. He has commented on the concept of *tantra* elaborately. *Āvāpa*, however, is not, discussed at any length. It seems that this concept is somewhat simpler than *tantra*.

Tatra yat sakṛt kṛtaṁ bahūnām upakaroti tat tantram ity ucyate. Yathā bahūnāṁ brāhmaṇānām anulepanam. (*ŚBH* on *JS* 11.1.1).

"That which being performed once helps many is what is called *tantra*, just as a lamp lit among many Brahmins (gives light to all of them). (And) that which helps by repeated

performance, is called *āvāpa*, just as in anointing the same Brahmins, (each one has to be anointed separately.)"

Ritualistic example of *tantra* is that of *agnyādhāna*. The fire once placed ceremonially, i.e. as per the prescribed injunctions, helps the offerings of many oblations alike, explains Śabara. He has also said elsewhere in the *ŚBh.*: *Tantraṁ nāma sādhāraṇo dharmagrāmaḥ. Sa yeṣāṁ pradhānaṁ tāni tantrīṇi pradhānāni*, which also helps us understand what *tantra* is.

The concept of *āvāpa* is less controversial or we may say less complicated. There is no complication because the performance takes place as many times the rite is enjoined. Hence, there is no question of defining the area or scope of application of this concept.

But such is not the case with *tantra*. There is another concept, namely *prasaṅga*, which is similar to the concept of *tantra* and hence makes it somewhat difficult, as it were, to decide whether a particular performance in a particular situation helps many, being *tantra*, or whether it is a case of *prasaṅga*, because *prasaṅga* also helps more than one, be it undesirable. To understand it properly, let us see in brief, what is *prasaṅga*. Śabara has defined *prasaṅga* as follows:

Anyatra kṛtasyānyatrāpi prasaktiḥ prasaṅgaḥ. Yathā pradīpasya prāsāde kṛtasya rājamārge'pi ālokakaraṇam. (*ŚBh.* on *J.S.* 12.1.1).

"That which is performed for something else extends somewhere else for which it is not meant. As a lamp kindled in the palace of a king also illumines the highway before the king's palace."

It is clear that the lamp in the example is not meant for illuminating the street but it does so without any additional effort. If we compare the example of *tantra* with this one, the difference between the two becomes obvious. The lamp kindled among many Brāhmaṇas was meant for them when it was kindled. In other words, the agent knew that his act was going to oblige more than one and knowingly he performed the act with an intention of helping many thereby. But the lamp in the example of *prasaṅga* is meant only for the illumination of the palace and not for that of the street. Nevertheless, it illumines the street all the same. Here the agent does not intend or expect to illumine the street, that is, he does not intend that the act taken up by him should oblige more than one, but still this is what actually happens.

Since both the cases have a meagre degree of difference, there is a chance that one takes or rather mistakes one for the other. And this is the reason perhaps why the concept of *tantra* is discussed at length by Śabara in the 11th chapter of his *bhāṣya* and by Murāri in his monograph entitled, *Ekādaśādyā-dhikaraṇa.*

We have seen how Śabara has explained the difference between the two concepts and how he has defined *āvāpa*. Now, let us see what Murāri has to say on the concepts of *tantra* and *āvāpa*.

When we come to the *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa* of Murāri, we find that he begins by quoting the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* XI. 1.1, and takes up the concept of *tantra* at first, for discussion.

He has clearly stated in this text that *āvāpa* is a general rule because it is nothing but the performance as many times as it is enjoined. Hence, there isn't a question or doubt about its nature. Therefore, the subject matter of the chapter is *tantra*, i.e. the chapter aims at discussing the concept of *tantra* and not that of *āvāpa*.

To quote Murāri, *āvāpastu yathāprāptibhedenānuṣṭhānam iti suvyaktam eva. Tantram evādhyāyārtho nāvāpaḥ prāpitibhedena āvāpasya autsargikatvenā-jijñāsitatvāt.* (vide: *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa*).

The first line mentioned above is the definition of *āvāpa* given by Murāri. He has also given another definition of *āvāpa* in the *adhikaraṇa* which runs as follows: *anekārthasyānekam anuṣṭhānam anekārtham āvāpaḥ*, that is, performances, subsidiary to many and meant for many are what is called *āvāpa*. But he does not discuss the concept of *āvāpa* any more anywhere in these two places, the reason of which he has stated himself. (ibid)

By saying that *tantra* is the object of discussion of the 11th chapter, Murāri has expressed his view that it is more complicated a concept which needs to be discussed at length.

He has taken into account some of the possible definitions of *tantra* and has discarded all of them on some ground or the other and has offered a definition which he thinks as a proper definition of *tantra*.

Some of the definitions that he has refuted are in order: *yadi sakṛttvam eva tantratvam, tadā some dīkṣaṇīyādīnāṁ tantratvaṁ syāt.*

"If *tantra* is defined as oneness, then even the *dīkṣaṇāyeṣṭi* in the Soma sacrifice will have to be treated as *tantra*, because it is performed once in the sacrifice and hence possesses oneness namely *tantratva*." This definition, thus, suffers from the fault of over-application. He then takes up another definition: *Athānekopakārakatve saty ekatvaṁ, tarhi prasaṅge 'pi tantratva-prasaṅgaḥ.*

"If we define it as being one, subsidiary to many or helping many, then this definition will over-apply to the concept of *prasaṅga*."

One more definition refuted by Murāri is, *anekaśeṣatve saty ekam anekopakārakaṁ tantram.* "*Tantra* is that which is subsidiary of many and being one, helps many." This definition will not apply to the *puroḍāśakapālas* as it suffers from the fault of *avyāpti* or narrow application. Murāri concludes this phase of discussion by saying that *tantra* cannot also be defined as 'the absence of repetition'. It should rather be defined as 'one performance which is meant for all'. To quote Murāri: *nāvṛttyabhāvaḥ tantratvam, kintu ekasyānuṣṭhānasya sarvārthatvam.* (ibid)

Once we define *tantra* in this way, it means that if one performance is meant for all, then there remains no purpose to be served by another performance and as such the act is not performed again. But the point to be noted is that it is not this absence of second performance which is called *tantra* but the first performance which was meant for all. Murāri says: *tathā ca prayojanābhāvād anuṣṭhānāntaraṁ na bhavati. Na tu saiva tantratā. Yena eva padārthasyaikam anuṣṭhānam anekārthaṁ tantratā.* (ibid) It is clear from this statement of Murāri that he does not want to define the concept negatively but insists that instead of defining it as an absence of something, it should be defined in a positive manner so that one is able to know what consists of *tantra* or what is the referent of this term.

Murāri has also quoted the definition of *tantra* as given by Śabara and has made a comment on it which is significant. To quote Murāri: *atra bhāṣyam—tantram nāma 'yat sakṛtkṛtaṁ bahūnām upakaroti tad aprayojye prasaṅge ca gatam iti matvā ṭīkākṛtā vyākhyātam—tantraṁ nāma bhedena prāptau satyāṁ sakṛdnuṣṭhānenārthasiddhiḥ.* (ibid)

The *ŚBh* definition of *tantra* is overapplicable to *prasṅga* and hence the commentator has explained it as, '*tantra* is that which is enjoined separately (but) the purpose is served (merely) by its one performance'.

We have to translate it in this way, according to Murāri. After quoting the above comment of the *ṭikākṛt*, Murāri explains that the obtaining of the purpose cannot be treated as *tantra*, because it will go against the *ŚBh*, if we accept such a view, but the subsidiaries of the main sacrifice or main *apūrva* to be produced by the sacrifice are named as *tantra*.

Observations

To conclude, from whatever we have discussed so far, we feel that Murāri has contributed to the system of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* in various ways: (1) He has distinguished himself by commenting on the concept of *tantra* as elaborately as has not done by Kumārila. The *Ṭupiṭīkā* on the 1st *adhikaraṇa* of the 11th chapter of the *ŚBh* is very short whereas Murāri has written a separate *adhikaraṇa* on it. We are not in a position to say anything for certain about Prabhākara as *Bṛhatī* on that part of *ŚBh*., is not available to us today. But, so far as Kumārila is concerned, Murāri has shown his difference clearly. (2) Murāri's style does not match exactly with that of Śabara. Śabara has given many examples of *tantra* for clarifying the concept, whereas Murāri has discussed various definitions of *tantra* and by showing the faults of over-application or narrow application in certain cases, has refuted them all, and has presented a definition which he thinks proper. In this way, he has contributed to clarify the concept by defining it precisely. We can see that he has been influenced by the style of Navya Nyāya which also aimed at clarifying the concepts by defining them as precisely as possible. (3) His one more contribution is of a different type and that is the quotation of the comment of a *ṭīkākṛt*. This *ṭīkākṛt* seems to be none but the great Guru, that is, Prabhākara. The same line is quoted by Candra, a follower of the Prābhākara School of *PM* in his *Nyāyaratnākara* under the name of the *Guru*. Thus, even if the *Bṛhatī* or *Laghvī* are not available on the 11th chapter of the *Śbh*, we can have an access to the opinion of Prābhākara only because of Murāri and the other writer mentioned above. (4) The quotation is aptly stated for removing the defect in the *ŚBh* definition of *tantra*. The quoting of the comment of the *ṭīkākṛt* is worthy of mention because otherwise the definition offered by Śabara really suffers from the fault of over-application. In case of *prasaṅga*, it is not the case that there is separate injunction which enjoins its separate performance but the purpose is served automatically by one performance. But this is exactly the situation in case of *tantra*. And this is the actual difference between the two. To understand the difference between these two concepts, the comment of the *ṭīkākṛt* is very much helpful.

CONCLUSION

In this section we propose a brief survey of the main results of our study. We would like to highlight some of the points, both logical and philosophical, on which Murāri held his own

views quite distinct from others. Similarly, we would also like to point out those well-known philosophical concepts of Indian philosophy which were known to him.

As we have already stated earlier, our study has unavoidable limitations because of insufficient materials available to us. We had at our disposal only some *adhikaraṇas* of Murāri and the references to some of his doctrines made by various philosophico-logical texts. Naturally, the conclusions drawn here are not to be taken as final. There is scope for revision, if we succeed in discovering other works of Murāri. But till that date, our reconstruction may be taken as valid.

Let us now, first of all, jot down the concepts Murāri either mentions or has made use of, from *PM* and from other systems of Indian philosophy.

We have seen in the *Pramāṇa* Section above that Murāri mentions the following *pramāṇas:*

(1) *Pratyakṣa*, (2) *anumāna*, (3) *śabda*, (4) *arthāpatti* and (5) *abhāva*. No reference is, however, found to *upamānapramāṇa*. These *pramāṇas* are conceived by him as the instruments of valid cognition. We may further add that Murāri mentions the word *pratyabhijñā* in his *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa*. He says:

Yadākhyātena kartuḥ saṁkhyā bodhitā tadā saṅkhyeti pratyabhijñānāt kartṛparatā.

"When there is the cognition of the doer through a statement, then via the recognition of the involvement of the person in the act there is the understanding of him."

Obviously, one can say from this expression that Murāri accepted the category of cognition called *pratyabhijñā* just as the Naiyāyikas accepted it.

So far as the *anumāna* is concerned, Murāri uses almost all terms of the *anumāna prāmaṇa* such as, *pakṣa, hetu, sādhya, pratibandha* (*vyāpti*), and so on. Murāri has given the full account of the process of the operation of the *parārthānumāna*. As a matter of fact, his entire argument has the form of the *parārthānumāna*. He first states the *pratijñā* which contains the mention of *pakṣa* and *sādhya*, and, then he writes the *hetu-vākya*. After that, he examines whether the given reason is invariably concomitant with the *sādhya* or not. Eventually, he also points out if the given *hetu* is fallacious or not. In this connection, he uses the terms like *anaikāntika, vyabhicārin, bādhita*, etc.

Murāri has used many technical terms relating to inference. These are, *pratijñā, hetu*, etc. Another point worth noting in this connetion is that *parārthānumāna* consists of sentences (*avayavas*), still the knowledge generated by these sentences is not a verbal knowledge but an inferential cognition.

It is to be noted that Murāri refers to *pariśeṣānumāna* in his *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa*. He writes:

Pariśeṣānumānam idam ... Pariśeṣād jñānam avaśiṣṭam.

"This is *parisaṣānumāna* ... The rest is knowledge by *Pariśeṣa*."

It refers to the notion of *pariśeṣa* as given by Vātsyāyana in the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, namely,

Prasaktapratiṣedhe anyatrāprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ.

"When the relevant is negated and has no relevance anywhere else, there is thorough knowledge of the rest."

Thus, it can be seen that Murāri is fully conversant with the entire technique of inference as proposed by the Naiyāyikas. Though we do not find any specific definitions of the terms, it is very likely that Murāri must be using those terms in the sense already being used in.

As Murāri has given a full account of the process by which inferential cognition is generated, he has also given the description how verbal understanding is generated. But we cannot reconstruct a fuller description of the epistemology of other types of cognitions.

Out of the *prameyas*, Murāri directly mentions *dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya* (*jāti*) and *abhāva* by name. If he accepted only these five *prameyas*, then he is in full agreement with the Bhāṭṭas who too accept these five only. But we can say nothing with certainty at present because we have no access yet to the entire work of Murāri.

No reference is found to the *premeyas* like *samavāya, śakti, saṁkhyā* or *sādṛśya* which are accepted by the Prābhākaras, or to *viśeṣa* as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, for the time being we can say that Murāri accepted five categories like the Bhāṭṭas.

Murāri's Contribution to Mīmāṁsā System

The very fact that Murāri created a new school of thought among the Mīmāṁsakas, is the greatest contribution to the system. He selected the *Jaiminisūtras* to discuss the main problems of the Mīmāṁsā system and presented his discussion in the *adhikaraṇa*-style. While composing each *adhikaraṇa*, he has taken into account all the existing thoughts on the particular issue. This has enriched not only his discussion but the Mīmāṁsā system as a whole. We find references to even such authors and texts which are not available today. For instance, he makes mention of the view of some Nandana in his *Mantrādhikaraṇa* and *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa*. But no text is handed down to us under the name of Nandana today. Likewise, he presents the interpretation of a line from the *ŚBh* by some commentator under the name *Ṭīkākṛt* in his *Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa*. Śabara defines *tantra* as '*tantraṁ nāma yat sakṛtkṛtaṁ bahūnām upakaroti*'. Here, the *Ṭīkākṛt* thinks that this definition will over-apply to *prasaṅga* and hence he interprets the line as *tantraṁ nāma bhedena prāptau satyāṁ sakṛdanuṣṭhānenārthasiddhiḥ.*

This line could not be traced in any existing literature on Mīmāṁsā. But it is obvious that there must have been some commentator on the *ŚBh*, whom Murāri has referred to here. The source of this information is only Murāri.

While examining the above interpretation of the *Ṭīkākṛt*, Murāri comments on the expression '*arthasiddhiḥ*' as follows:

'*Siddhyati anena iti karaṇavyutpattyā kāryasādhanatayā prayājādiḥ uktaḥ.*
Na tu kāryasiddhir eva tantram iti uktiḥ bhāṣyavirodhāt.

From this statement one can judge easily that Murāri does not want to go against the *ŚBh.*

As a matter of fact, Murāri wants to explain everything in consonance with the *Bhāṣya* unless it becomes obligatory on his part to go against it, because of some fundamental difference in the philosophical views of Murāri. For instance, in the sentence, *Vaiśvadevena yajeta* the term *Vaiśvadeva* is treated as the name of a sacrifice in the *siddhānta.* But

according to Murāri, this term stands for the deity *Viśvedeva* and not for the sacrifice. This information could be gathered from the following statement of Vardhamāna in his *Prakāśa* on the *Jātiśaktivāda* of the *śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *TC*:

Viśvadevatātvāṅgīkartṛ-miśra-matam tu na siddhāntaḥ, uktayukteḥ iti nirgarvaḥ.

Likewise, Murāri has contributed to Mīmāṁsā by clarifying various Mīmāṁsā concepts namely, *Kiñcitkriyā, śruti, liṅga, parisaṅkhyā,* etc. He has also discussed, at times, the preference of these *aṅgabodhaka-pramāṇas.*

These are some of the angles from which we may make an assessment of the contribution of Murāri to the Mīmāṁsā system.

Murāri's Contribution to Indian Philosophy

In the preceding section, we evolved our angles to look at the contribution of Murāri to the Mīmāṁsā system in particular. In this section, we would try to identify his contribution to Indian philosophy in general. To achieve this, we would point out Murāri's independent views on philosophical and logical issues. Some of such issues are as follow:

1. Murāri held quite a different view on the validity of knowledge. We have already seen in the previous section that according to him, the validity of *vyavasāya* is known by *anuvyavasāya.*

2. Regarding the theory of knowledge he seems to have been influenced by the Naiyāyikas to the extent that a *vyavasāya* can be the object of *anuvyavasāya.* This position is not acceptable to the other two schools of *PM.* For the Prābhākaras, *vyavasāya* becomes the object of *vyavasāya* itself and for the Bhāṭṭas *vyavasāya* can never be an object of perceptual cognition. It is always an object of inference. Though Murāri differed from both the schools, still he maintained that knowledge is self-valid and in this respect he differed from the Naiyāyikas also.

3. In his definition of *Viśeṣaṇa* and *Upalakṣana* also he differs from all others. He defines *viśeṣaṇa* as 'that which is connected (to *viśesya*) being a subsidiary to an action' and *upalakṣaṇa* as 'that which is connected but is not subsidiary to action'. He needed such a definition of *upalakṣana* to declare that *prāśastya* is related to sacrifice as its *upalakṣaṇa.* This was, indeed, a new approach to the problem of relating the *arthavāda*-sentences with the injunctive sentences in order to achieve the validity of the narrative sentences of the Veda.

4. The Naiyāyikas hold that the absence of an obstacle or impediment (*pratibandhaka*) is a common cause to any effect. On this point too, Murāri maintains his distinct view. According to him, the absence of an impediment should not be given the status of a cause when it can be treated as the delimitor of the state of being the cause (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*). And a delimitor of the state of being the cause is never a cause since it is redundant as a cause (*anyathāsiddha*). Hence, Murāri does not accept the absence of impediment as a cause of an effect.

5. Murāri has contributed to Indian philosophy in various ways. One such way is to clarify and define various concepts. As he attempted definitions for various concepts of the Mīmāṁsā system like *liṅga, kiñcitkriyā, tantra* and *āvāpa,* he also offered clear-cut definitions

of the concepts like *kārya* (*sādhya*) and *siddha* which are basic concepts of Indian philosophy. He defines *kārya* as '*kṛtānurañjanayogyam*'. According to it, that which is fit to be associated with volition, is *kārya* or *sādhya*. Similarly, he defines *siddha* as 'that which is outside the sphere of that which is fit to be associated with volition'. That which is associated with the volition, falls under two groups—(1) the performer of the action and (2) the object of the external activity of the performer. Anything which is neither (1) nor (2) will be treated as *siddha*. Murāri's this notion of *kārya* and *siddha* should solve the problem of relating an 'already accomplished entity' with a 'to be accomplished' entity in a sentence-meaning.

6. Murāri's another contribution by way of clarification of concepts would be his remarkable observation on the nature and function of the *parārthānumāna* and the *śabdapramāṇa*. Though *parāthānumāna* consists of sentences (*avayayas*), still it is not a *śabda-pramāṇa* as we have already pointed out. The *avayayas* of the *parārthānumāna* form a process by presenting *pakṣa, sādhya, hetu, vyāpti* and so on, the knowledge of the relationship of which ultimately results in an inferential cognition. Hence the *parārthānumāna* represents a complex process through which a particular knowledge comes into existence. Had the *parārthānumāna* not been different from the *śabdapramāṇa*, the very *pratijñā-vākya* would have been enough to know the *sādhya*. Thus, the *pratijñāvākya*, '*parvato vahnimān*' itself would have generated the inferential knowledge, 'the mountain has fire.' The other sentences (*dhūmāt* etc.) would have become redundant and hence unnecessary. Therefore, Murāri categorically denies that these member-sentences of the *parārthānumāna* do not produce verbal understanding in the sense that the knowledge arising from them is produced by the *śabdapramāṇa*. The function of these sentences is simply to reveal the nature of *hetu, vyāpti*, etc. and nothing more nothing less. This is indeed a valuable comment of Murāri.

7. If anyone simply reads just the beginning portions of Murāri's available *adhikaraṇas*, one gets an impression that his composition has a particular logical structure. At the beginning of each *adhikaraṇa*, the foremost problem before Murāri is how to show the relevance (*saṅgati*) of the discussion of the subject-matter of this *adhikaraṇa* with that of the immediately preceding one. It implies that he wants to follow strictly the structure of an *adhikaraṇa* as laid down by the tradition which consists of *viṣaya*, 'subject matter', *viśaya*, 'doubt or various alternative propositions', *pūrvapakṣa*, 'opponent's view', *siddhānta*, 'conclusion' and *saṅgati*, 'propriety or relevance of the discussion'.

He has made his contribution in the form of *adhikaraṇa* also by proposing various ways to achieve *saṅgati*. When one remembers that the basic principle of interpreting a text, as per mīmāṁsā is, *saṅgati* i.e. coherence, one realizes how Murāri is a hard-core mīmāṁsaka. *Saṅgati* or coherence is the essential factor of any discourse and hence different types of coherence are discussed in the *mīmāṁsā-śāstra*. They are: *śāstra-saṅgati*, *adhyāya-saṅgati*, *pāda-saṅgati* and *adhikaraṇa-saṅgati*. These are different units of discourse among which, *śāstra* is the biggest one and *adhikaraṇa* is the smallest one. In other words, *adhikaraṇa-saṅgati* is the basis of the *śāstra-saṅgati*. Every *adhikaraṇa* must be a coherent in itself and should be coherent with the *pāda* i.e. subchapter. The same is true about the *pāda* and the *adhyāya*. This is how the coherence of the *śāstra* as a whole is achieved. Thus, it is significant that Murāri talks about the *adhikaraṇa-saṅgati* so vividly.

These are some of the points which require special mention with regard to his contribution to Indian philosophy in general and to Pūrvamīmāṁsā in particular.

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IV
The Review of Pūrvamīmāṁsā Doctrines in Vedānta and Nyāya

CHAPTER 14

Utilization of Mīmāṁsā Nyāya in Vedānta

K.T. Pandurangi

The expression Mīmāṁsā is used in the sense of *Vedārtha vichāra*, i.e. investigation into the import of Veda. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* has undertaken such investigation in the area of organizing sacrifices and rituals while Vedānta has undertaken in the area of discovering the nature of *Brahman*. Therefore, these two schools of Indian philosophy are designated as *Karmamīmāṁsā* and *Brahma Mīmāṁsā* respectively.

In order to identify the details of the sacrificial programme accurately, the language of the Veda had to be correctly analysed and interpreted. It was a two-way effort: (i) The sacrificial programmes were to be organized coherently and purposefully. (ii) The Vedic language was to be interpreted to provide such an organized sacrificial programme. A kind of coordination between the language and activity was to be achieved. A set of common guidelines to interpret the Vedic language, particularly, the language of the Brāhmaṇa portion of Veda and to organize the sacrificial programme, relating the subordinate items and main items, prescribing the responsibilities and duties of the sacrificer and priests, identifying the purpose served by different items, the nature and the role of the injunctions, and the final goal were to be formulated. This is carefully done in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*. These guidelines are given in the form of rulings in different *adhikaraṇas* of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtras*. These are designated as *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas*.

Vedānta also has to investigate into the import of the Vedic language in the area of *Brahmavidyā*. It is also a two-way effort: (i) The nature of *Brahman*, the nature of *Jīva*, the nature of the world, the process of creation, various kinds of *upāsanās*, and the final goal that are described in the Veda, particularly, in the Upaniṣads have to be correctly understood. (ii) The Vedic language has to be interpreted to provide this knolwedge consistently. Vedānta utilizes the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* guidelines to interpret the Upaniṣadic texts.

An interesting development in Vedānta is that different schools of Vedānta utilize the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas* to interpret the same passages of the text and arrive at different conclusions. Sometimes, one school takes one *nyāya* and the other school a different nyāya to interpret the same text. The applicability or inapplicability of certain *nyāyas* is also discussed. The very nature of the *nyāya* is differently explained. In a way, Vedānta further elucidates the *Mīmāṁsā nyāyas*. Therefore, a study of the utilization of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāya* in Vedānta is quite rewarding. The utilization of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas* in Vedānta is made in following ways:

(i) To support the interpretation of *śruti* text offered by the respective school;

(ii) To reject the interpretation of *śruti* text by other schools;

(iii) To clarify the nature of the doctrines and concepts of the respective schools

Keeping these guidelines in mind, the utilization of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas* in Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita is briefly presented.

Vāchaspati Miśra, Vedānta Deśika and Vyāsatīrtha utilize the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas* to interpret *śruti* texts and *brahmasūtras* in their commentaries, viz., *Bhāmatī*, *Śrutaprakāśikā* and *Tātparya Candrikā* in support of their respective schools. In some cases, they also utilize these to justify the formulation of the *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* of *adhikaraṇas*. To settle the preference of *Saguṇa śruti* or *Nirguṇa śruti* a number of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas* are quoted.

In Dvaita-Advaita polemics on the concept of *mithyātva*, the relative position of perception and *śruti* in comprehending reality, the relative position of *abheda śruti* and *bheda śruti*, the *Mīmāṁsā nyāyas* are pofusely quoted in *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Advaita siddhi*. The commentaries on these two quote the full texts of the respective *adhikaraṇa* of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and work out their applicability or otherwise in detail. A study of this is a kind of inter-disciplinary study of Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā. As it is neither possible nor advisable to undertake an exhaustive study in the present context, a selective study is presented in the following articles.

I

ADVAITA VEDANTA

N. Veezhinathan

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* is indispensable in the resolution of the metaphysical perplexities of the Advaita Vedānta. The latter seeks to erect a structure of thought which involves relegation of the perceived phenomenal universe into the limbo of non-reality. The maxims derived from the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtra*-s stabilize the Advaitin's view and are not antagonistic to it. Some of them are discussed in this paper.

APACCHEDA-NYĀYA

The Advaitin holds the view that the ultimate reality termed *Brahman* is non-dual. It is non-dual in the sense that there is no second entity apart from it. An objection suggests itself at this stage that *Brahman* cannot be considered to be non-dual in the above sense because perception gives us the knowledge of the existence of the world of objects.

The Advaitin answers the above objection by saying that there would be contradiction to the non-dual nature of *Brahman*, only if the world given in perception is real. It, however, is not so. The Upaniṣadic texts such as "the effects like pot, etc., are only referred to by

words; they have no independent reality; and it is only the causal element clay that is real"[1] state that the world of objects have no reality. The element of clay, too, which is the cause of pot, is an effect and hence that, too, is non-real. It is only Brahman, figuratively viewed as the cause of the world through the principle known as *māyā* or *avidyā*, which is real. It is real in the sense that it is not sublatable in the three divisions of time—past, present and future. The existence of the world, known to be indeterminable or *mithyā* from the Upaniṣadic texts, would in no way impair the non-dual nature of *Brahman.*

It is objected that the world cannot be treated as indeterminable because such a position is opposed to perception which in forms like "*ghaṭaḥ san*" "being the pot", comprehends the reality of objects like pot, etc. Thus there arises a conflict between perception and the Upaniṣadic texts like the one cited above. At this stage, one is forced to discuss the relative strength of perception and verbal testimony. And for that purpose the Advaitin applies the maxim known as *apaccheda-nyāya.*

The maxim known as *apaccheda-nyāya* is arrived at in the section known as *apacchedādhikaraṇa*[2] in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtra.* In this *adhikaraṇa,* the import of the scriptural text "Should the *Udgātṛ* let go, the sacrifice should be concluded without any fee and the sacrifice should be performed again; and, should the *pratihartṛ* let go, the entire wealth of the sacrificer must be offered as the sacrificial fee" is dealt with. This we shall explain now.

In the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the priests should go around the sacrifical fire by holding the waist-cloth of the priest in front. If by negligence the *Udgātṛ,* that is, the priest who chants the hymns of the *Sāmaveda,* lets go the waist-cloth of the priest in front, then to expiate this, the sacrifice must be concluded without giving any sacrificial fee to the priests. If, however, the priest *pratihartṛ,* who chants the hymns of the *Ṛgveda,* does so, then to expiate this wealth of the sacrifice must be completed by giving the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee. If by chance the two let go the waist-cloth successively, then the sacrificer should conclude the sacrifice by performing the occasioned rite relating to the later loss of grip, that is, by giving no fee or by giving the entire wealth as the fee as the case may be. If the two let go the waist-cloth simultaneously, then it is left to the option of the sacrificer to conclude the sacrifice either by giving no fee or by giving his entire wealth as the fee. The point that is relevant to our discussion is that the subsequent one is more powerful than the antecedent one.

It follows from the above that in the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice if the *Udgātṛ* lets go the waist-cloth first, then there arises the cognition of the obligation to conclude the sacrifice without paying any sacrificial fee to the priests as an expiation. Subsequent to this, if the *pratihartṛ* lets go the waist-cloth of the person in front, then there arises the cognition of the obligation to conclude the sacrifice by paying the entire wealth of the sacrificer as the sacrificial fee. When the later event arises, then the cognition of the obligation to conclude the sacrifice in a specific manner, invalidates the cognition of the obligation to conclude the sacrifice in a different manner which arose by the earlier event. What we derive from this is that the subsequent cognition invalidates the earlier one. When viewed in this light, the cognition that the world is real which arose earlier from perception, is invalidated by the cognition that the world is indeterminable which arises subsequently from the Upaniṣads. The

world, therefore, is indeterminable; and the existence of the indeterminable world will in no way contradict the non-dual nature of the world.

To sum up: On the basis of the maxim arrived at in the *apacchedādhikaraṇa*, the Advaitin states that the cognition of the world arisen from perception is invalidated by the cognition of the indeterminability of the world that arises subsequently from the Upaniṣadic texts.

Herein the following objections are raised :

(1) When the *Udgātṛ* and the *Pratiharta* let go the waist-cloth successfully, the cognition of the obligation to conclude the sacrifice in a particular manner relating to the earlier event is sublated. But the scriptural text that gives rise to the earlier cognition does not become insignificant or devoid of content. It is because that text is valid in cases where *Udgātṛ* alone lets go the waist-cloth in front of him, or where *Udgātṛ* lets go the waist-cloth subsequent to *Pratihartṛ* letting go the waist-cloth or wherein both *Udgātṛ* and *Pratihartṛ* let go the waist-cloth simultaneously. But, if the cognition of non-reality arising from the Upaniṣadic text invalidates the cognition of the reality of the world arising from perception, then the perceptual cognition will become devoid of content. The result of the argument is that perception, as a proof, cannot be a valid one.

(2) Further, the cognition of an obligation, relating to the later loss of grip, does not in fact invalidate the cognition of the obligation relating to the earlier loss of grip. Both cognitions are valid. There is no contradiction between the two. This the Dualistic School explains by making a reference to the black and red colours that originate in succession in a cherry fruit. In the latter, black colour arises first and then, by destroying that colour, red colour arises. The cognition of the two colours are valid and the later cognition of red colour does not invalidate the earlier cognition of black colour. In the same way, in the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice too, the cognition to perform the expiatory act relating to the later loss of grip, does not invalidate the cognition to perform the expiatory act relating to the earlier event. Both cognitions are valid and the texts that give rise to such cognitions also are valid.

(3) Ānandabodhācārya, in his work *Pramāṇamālā*, has said that the knowledge arising from the Upaniṣadic texts that speak of the non-reality of the world invalidates the cognition of the reality of the world arising from perception, because the Upaniṣadic texts have for their import the non-dual *Brahman*; they are subsequent to perception when viewed under *apacchedanyāya* and are free from any defect. They are similar to the statement "This is not a serpent."[3]

It is argued that the Upaniṣadic texts cannot have for their import the non-dual *Brahman* as there is perception which comprehends duality that is opposed to non-duality. The contention that the knowledge arising from the Upaniṣads, being subsequent, sublates the earlier cognition arising from perception is also not valid. This is so because it is not an invariable rule that which is subsequent would sublate the earlier one. For the erroneous cognition which arises subsequent to the valid cognition does not remove the latter although it is subsequent. Further, the fact that the Upaniṣads are free from any defect would be fully justified only by their conveying an entity that is different from non-dual *Brahman*.[4]

The Advaitin answers the above objections thus:

(a) The perceptual cognition, when sublated by the cognition arising from the Upaniṣads, does not become devoid of any content. This is so because it is admitted that the content of perceptual cognition possesses empirical reality or *Vyāvahārikasatyatva.*

(b) In the case of the cherry fruit, the cognition of black colour and that of red colour do arise at different times. Hence the two cognitions do not contradict each other. In the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, on the other hand, when two events have occurred successively, the obligations to perfrom the expiatory rites relating to the two events cannot be performed simultaneously. Hence, the cognition of the obligation to perform the expiatory rite relating to the later loss of grip invalidates the cognition of obligation to perform the expiatory rite relating to the earlier loss of grip.

(c) The content of the cognition arising from perception is an empirically real object while the content of the cognition arising from the Upaniṣads is *Brahman* which is absolutely real. It has been said that the erroneous cognition, which arises subsequent to valid cognition, does not remove the latter, and in the same way, the cognition of the import of the Upaniṣads arising subsequently will not remove the perceptual cognition that arose earlier. It is answered that the subsequent one should not be contradicted by any other *pramāṇa* in order to sublate the earlier cognition. The erroneous cognition which comes subsequent to the valid knowledge is contradicted by another *pramāṇa* and hence it does not serve as an illustrative example. Here the earlier cognition arising from perception is contradicted by the subsequent cognition which arises from the Upaniṣadic texts and which is not contradicted by any other *pramāṇa.*[5]

UPAKRAMA-NYĀYA

It may be argued that just as scripture is known to be of greater force than perception on the basis of the maxim arrived at in the *apacchedādhikaraṇa,* so also perception is known to be of greater force than scripture on the basis of the maxim arrived at in the *upakramādhikaraṇa.* As a result of this, there is no stronger reason to decide that only *apaccheda nyāya* operates in the case of conflict between perception and scripture.

The maxim arrived at in the *upakramādhikaraṇa* is as follows: if a particular section of a text conveys a unitary sense, and if there is noticed any apparent contradiction between the meanings of the initial passage and that of the concluding passage, then the concluding passage must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the meaning of the initial passage. This is so because the initial passage is of greater force than the concluding passage.

The above position is explained further by saying that at the time of the origination of the knowledge of the meaning of the initial passage nothing is opposed to it, as the knowledge of the meaning of the concluding passage which is opposed to it has not arisen.

And, the knowledge of the meaning of the concluding passage, at the time of its origination, has the knowledge of the meaning of the initial passage opposed to it. In other words, the former is *asañjāta-virodhi,* that is, it has nothing opposed to it at the time of its origination, while the latter is *sañjāta-virodhi,* that is, it has something opposed to it at the time of its origination itself. It is on the basis of this that the former is said to be of greater force than the latter, and the concluding passage must be interpreted in such a way as not to have any conflict with the meaning of the initial passage.

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* school explains the above maxim by making a reference to a particular section of the Veda which deals with a sacrifice that is to be offered to Varuṇa. The initial passage of that section of the Veda is: 'Prajāpati gave a horse to Varuṇa and He performed four potsherd sacrifices as an offering to Varuṇa.' From this it is known that one who gives horses by way of gift must perform as his duty consequent on the gift a sacrifice as an offering to Varuṇa. The initial passage, thus, speaks of the performance of a sacrifice as an offering to Varuṇa by one who gives horses by way of gift.

The concluding passage is: 'As many horses as one receives by way of gift, so many potsherd sacrifices one has to perform as an offering to Varuṇa.' From this it is known that one who receives horses by way of gift has to perform a sacrifice as an offering to Varuṇa.

Thus the meanings of the initial and the concluding passages are contradictory to each other as the former speaks of a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by one who gives horses by way of gift, whereas the latter speaks of a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by one who receives horses by way of gift. The whole section of the Veda which deals with the sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa cannot be taken to be valid, if the initial and the concluding passages convey that such a sacrifice is to be performed by persons possessing opposite characteristics such as giving horses by way of gift and receiving horses by way of gift. Hence one of the two passages must be taken in its secondary sense to suit the meaning of the other. As we have said earlier, the initial passage is more powerful than the latter one, and hence the latter must be interpreted in a secondary sense in order that it may have no conflict with the meaning of the initial passage. The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* school, therefore, interprets the word 'receives' in the concluding passage in the sense of 'causes to receive' by adding the causative suffix (*ṇic*). Now the concluding passage would mean 'As many horses as one causes to receive by way of gift, so many four potsherd sacrifices one has to perform as an offering to Varuṇa.' This is exactly the import of the initial passage. It is only when the latter passage is interpreted in conformity with the meaning of the initial passage we can maintain that the whole section deals with a sacrifice to be offered to Varuṇa by persons having similar characteristic of giving horses by way of gift.

The point that is of importance here is: The Dualists argue that the relation between perception and *mithyātva-śruti* must be viewed in the light of the above maxim. Perceptual cognition of the world arises earlier and it is not opposed to anything because at the time of its origination, the knowledge arising from the *mithyātva-śruti* which is opposed to it has not arisen. Hence it is *asañjāta-virodhi.* The knowledge arising from the *mithyātva-śruti,* however, at the time of origination itself, has perceptual cognition opposed to it. Hence, it is *sañjāta-virodhi.* According to the maxim arrived at in the *upakramādhikaraṇa,* the initial cognition, since it is *asañjāta-virodhi* is more powerful than the latter cognition of *mithyātva-*

śruti which is *sañjāta-virodhi*. Hence, perceptual cognition invalidates the knowledge arising from *mithyātva-śruti*.

The Advaitin argues that the above contention, namely, that perceptual cognition which arises earlier invalidates the subsequent cognition arising from the *mithyātva-śruti* on the basis of the maxim of *upakrama-nyāya* is wrong. It is because the *upakrama-nyāya* is applicable only when there is contradiction between the initial passage and the concluding passage of a particular section of a text that conveys a unitary sense. This means that the contradiction that is to be resolved by the application of *upakrama-nyāya* is between two sentences which come under a single *pramāṇa*, verbal testimony. In other words, the *upakrama-nyāya* is applicable only when there arises contradiction between two sentences. In the present case, the contradiction is between perception on the one hand and *mithyātva-śruti* on the other. This means that the contradiction is not between two sentences but between two different *pramāṇas*. Hence, the *upakrama-nyāya* does not apply here. The *apaccheda-nyāya* alone applies; and, the subsequent cognition arising from the *mithyātva-śruti* invalidates the earlier cognition arisen from perception.[6]

SĀMĀNYA-VIŚEṢA-NYĀYA

The powerful nature of perception is sought to be proved on the basis of another maxim arrived at from the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtra:*

aviśeṣeṇa yacchāstram anyāyyatvāt vikalpasya tatsandigdham ārāt viśeṣaviśiṣṭam syāt[7]

This aphorism discusses the scope of the injunctive text—*pade juhoti*. In connection with the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, it is said that the *soma*-creeper is to be bought by giving a calf which is tawny in colour, is one year old and has yellowish eyes.

aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṁ krīṇati

Then the tex, *pade juhoti*, enjoins that one shall make the sacrificial offering in the footprints of the calf in the path through which it is led to the place wherein the *soma*-creeper is bought. This text makes reference to the specific location where the sacrificial offering is to be made.

But there is a general rule—*āhavanīye juhoti*. According to it, any sacrificial offering in general is to be made in the *āhavanīya*-fire.

Now the question arises as to whether one should make the offering in the footprints of the calf in accordance with the specific rule, *pade juhoti* or in the *āhavanīya*-fire in accordance with the general rule, *āhavanīye juhoti*. The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtra* referred to above states that in the context of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice at the time of making the sacrificial offering what would come to one's mind immediately is the footprints of the calf as the location of offering. It is because the text, *pade juhoti*, occurs therein. And the rule, *āhavanīye juhoti*, has relevance in the case of offerings other than the one that is to be made in the footprints of a calf. It comes to this that the specific rule or the one that makes

known something individually is more powerful than the general rule or the one that makes known the class of individuals. The former is, therefore, more powerful than the latter. This maxim is known as *sāmānya-viśeṣa-nyāya*.

On the basis of this maxim, it may be argued that perception comprehends the reality of the objects individually in the form 'the pot is real,' while the *mithyātva-śruti* conveys in a general way the absence of duality, and, so perception which is specific is more powerful than verbal testimony and also the inference that refer to absence of duality or the non-reality of objects in general. Hence the perceptual cognition cannot be invalidated by the cognition arising from inference and verbal testimony.[8]

The Advaitin answers the above objection by stating that the maxim, *sāmānya-viśeṣa-nyāya*, is applicable only in those cases where the general rule and the specific one are ascertained to be valid. The text, *āhavanye juhoti* and the one, *pade juhoti*, are valid and so it is reasonable to conclude that the general rule is superseded by the specific rule. But in the case of perception and verbal testimony, the latter is ascertained to be valid as it is free from any defect, while the former is not so, as there is every likelihood of its being associated with defect. Hence, there is no scope for the application of the maxim of *sāmānya-viśeṣa-nyāya* in the case of perception and verbal testimony. It comes to this that one cannot argue that perception, as it comprehends every object specifically, is more powerful than verbal testimony—the *mithyātva-śruti* which makes reference to the objects of the world in a general way and so it would invalidate the latter.

The Advaitin further points out that if it is insisted that, that which makes reference to the individual would invariably supersede the one which refers to the class of individuals irrespective of whether they are valid or not, then the erroneous cognition of the form 'This cow is the horse' which is perceptual and which makes specific reference to the cow as the horse will not be invalidated by the cognition arising from the statement—'A cow will never become a horse,' as this is a general statement signifying the difference between the class of cows and the class of horses. But it is invalidated. The point that is to be noted here is that the cognition arising from a statement referring to an individual, cannot be considered to be more powerful than the statement that makes reference to the class of individuals unless both the texts are valid. Perception comprehends the objects individually as real, no doubt; and, verbal testimony refers to the whole class of objects as non-existent in *Brahman* or non-real. Yet, on the basis of the *sāmānya-viśeṣa-nyāya*, the former cannot invalidate the latter, as verbal testimony is valid, while perception is not. In the same way, inference too is ascertained to be valid on the ground that it is free from fallacies. Hence the cognition arising from it referring to the class of objects as non-real will not be invalidated by the cognition arising from perception although the latter refers to the reality of the objects individually. From this, it follows that *sāmānya-viśeṣa-nyāya* operates in the cases of two texts not only on the ground that one refers to the individual and another to the whole class of individuals but also on the ground that both are valid. Between perception on the one hand, and inference and verbal testimony on the other, this maxim is not applicable as the validity of the former is not ascertained while that of the latter has been determined although the former makes reference to the individual and the latter refer to the whole class of individuals.[9]

SĀVAKĀŚA-NIRAVAKĀŚA-NYĀYA

Yet another maxim on the basis of which perception may be proved to be more powerful than inference and verbal testimony is *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa-nyāya.* This maxim may be explained as follows:

Initiation ceremony *(dīkṣaṇīyā iṣṭi)* is one of the subsidiary rites of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice. In connection with it, it is laid down that it must be performed by reciting *mantras* either in a loud voice or in a low voice according to one's wish.

yāvatyā vācā kāmayeta tāvatyā dikṣaṇīyāyām anubrūyāt

In connection with the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice itself it is read that whichever religious rite one should perform prior to the offering of a sacrificial animal with reference to the deity, Agniṣoma, it must be performed by reciting the relevant *mantras* in low voice.

Yatkiñcit prācīmaṁ agnīṣomīyāt tena upāṁśu caranti

The religious rites that are to be performed prior to the offering of the sacrificial animal with reference to the deity, Agniṣoma, consists of the initiation ceremony too besides the act of soliciting the priests, spreading of the *darbha*-grass, etc.

Now, according to the first text, one is enjoined to perform the initiation ceremony by reciting the *mantras* either in a loud voice or in a low voice as one wishes. The second text enjoins that the initiation ceremony must be performed by uttering the *mantras* in a low voice. Thus there is apparent contradiction between the two texts.

Jaimini resolves the contradiction by stating that if one performs the initiation ceremony by uttering the *mantras* in a low voice on the authority of the second text cited above, namely, *yat kiñcitprācīnam,* etc., then the first text, *yāvatyā vācā,* which enjoins the performance of the initiation ceremony by uttering the *mantras* in a loud or low as one wishes, would become devoid of any scope whatsoever. The text thereby would be rendered futile (*niravakāśa*). To avoid this unwelcome position, it is concluded that the initiation ceremony must be performed by uttering the *mantras* relating to it either in a loud voice or in a low voice. The text, *yat kiñcitprācīnam,* etc., which enjoins that whichever religious rite one should perform prior to the offering of the sacrificial animal to the deity, Agnīṣoma, must be performed by reciting the relevant *mantras* in low voice is operative in respect of other rites such as soliciting the priests, spreading of the *darbha-grass,* etc. (*sāvakāśa*). Thus Jaimini is of the view that if a text is likely to become devoid of any scope and thereby insignificant, then it remains powerful. In the present case, the text that enjoins the performance of religious rites like the initiation ceremony, soliciting the priests, spreading of the *darbha*-grass, etc., by uttering the *mantras* in a low voice are understood to have reference to the rites excepting the initiation ceremony chiefly to accommodate the text that prescribes the performance of it by uttering the *mantras* in a loud or a low voice as one wishes. Otherwise, the latter text would become devoid of content. This is an instance where the *sāvakāśaniravakāśa-nyāya* is applied.[10]

When viewed in the above light, it is argued, if the cognition that arises from the *śruti* texts that the objects of the world are non-real invalidates the cognition that arises from

perception that the objects of the world are real, then the latter would become devoid of content *(niravakāśa)*. On the other hand, if it is held that the cognition arising from perception invalidates the cognition arising from the *śruti* texts, the latter will never become devoid of content as we could interpret it in such a way not to have any conflict with perception.[11]

The Advaitin points out that on the basis of six indicatory marks it is ascertained that the *śruti* texts such as *tat tvam asi* and the like have for their import the non-dual *Brahman*. And the *mithyātva-śrutis* signify the world to be non-real thereby confirming the non-dual nature of *Brahman*. The cognitions arising from these *śruti* texts invalidate the perceptual cognition that points to the reality of the world and of the difference between the soul and *Brahman*. Thereby the perceptual cognitions do not become devoid of content. It is because we assign empirical validity to the content of perceptual cognition. This means that the perceptual cognitions refer to objects which have empirical reality, that is, they are subject to sublation by the direct knowledge of *Brahman*; but they are not sublated till the rise of the knowledge of *Brahman*. It emerges from this that the perceptual cognitions, that the world is real and that there is difference between the soul and *Brahman* when invalidated by the cognition arising from the *śruti* texts, do not become devoid of content. The world and the difference between the soul and *Brahman* are treated as provisionally or empirically real. Hence, the maxim of *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa-nyāya* cannot be applied in the case of perception and verbal testimony.[12]

BAHUBĀDHĀ-NYĀYA

According to this maxim, when a particular subsidiary factor (*aṅga*) is applicable to a larger number of rites comprising a group, then the subsidiary factor that is enjoined with reference to a small number of rites of that group, must be given up. And in respect of the small number of rites too, the subsidiary factor of the large number of rites must be applied.[13]

On the basis of this maxim, it is contended that the reality of the world is essential so that inference could function, the sacrificial rites prescribed in the ritualistic section of the Vedas could be performed, the texts that speak of the creation of the world may be treated as valid, and meditation on God, as endowed with all attributes, could be pursued. If the world were treated as non-real, then the larger number of the above-mentioned facts should have to be overlooked. And it is against the maxim of *bahubādhā-nyāya* explained by Jaimini. Hence in order that the secular and sacred activities may be carried, and in order that the ritualistic section of the Vedas, the texts that speak of the creation of the world and prescribe meditative exercises on God may be treated as valid, one must accept that the world given in perception is real. And, verbal testimony which, according to the Advaitin, speaks of the world as non-real, must be re-interpreted in such a way as to accommodate what is given in perception.[14]

The Advaitin points out that the application of the *bahubādhā-nyāya* is relevant only in those cases where the validity of the two factors, which are noticed to be opposed to one

another, is either undecided or decided. If one of the two factors is ascertained to be valid and if the other lacks certitude, then there is no need for the application of this maxim at all; for, the sublation of the one that lacks certitude by the other whose validity is certain, would ensue as a matter of course. In the case of perception and verbal testimony consisting of the *mithyātva-śruti* and the texts like *tat tvam asi,* the latter is decided to be valid while the former is not so. Hence, although perception has reference to many factors, yet it cannot invalidate the *mithyātva-śruti* and the texts like *tat tvam asi,* etc., on the basis of the *bahubādhā-nyāya.*

Further the cognition that the body is the self arises from perception of the forms 'I am fair-complexioned,' 'I am a human being,' etc., and also from inference and secular statements. The point that is to be emphasized here is that the cognition of the body to be the self arises from many sources although these sources are not valid but have a semblance of possessing validity (*pramāṇābhāsa*). Yet, it is sublated by the cognition arising from a single *pramāṇa,* namely, the *śruti* text that signifies the self to be different from the body. If the *bahubādhā-nyāya* is to be applied, then one cannot have the cognition of the self as different from the body and one would continue to have the false notion of the body to be the self which is derived from the sources each one of which has a semblance of a *pramāṇa.*'[15]

It comes to this: perception cannot be considered to be valid and powerful on the basis of the maxim known as *bahubādhā-nyāya.*

SAṀYOGA-PṚTHAKTVA-NYĀYA

This maxim is arrived at in the *saṁyoga-pṛtaktvādhikaraṇa* of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtras.* The aphorism in this *adhikaraṇa* is as follows:

ekasya tu ubhayatve saṁyogapṛthaktvam[16]

'In the case of one being used in two statements, would there be separation in the union?'

There are two texts: "*khādire paśuṁ badhnāti* (one is to tie the sacrificial animal in the ebony stake)" and "*khādiram vīryakāmasya yūpam karoti.* (he who desires strength is to make the stake of ebony)." Here ebony subserves the sacrifice and also the desire for strength. Thus it has two relations, one to the sacrifice and another to the fruit. This is ascertained on the basis of the two texts cited above. The word *saṁyoga* in the aphorism means a sentence wherein there is the relation (*saṁyoga*) of one word-meaning to the other; and, there is twofoldness of the sentence (*pṛthaktva*).

The Advaitins hold that *karmas* allotted to one's stage of life have a twofold relation, one with the fruits specifically enjoined and another with the desire to have the knowledge of *Brahman* through the cleansing of the heart (*sattva-śuddhi*). There are texts such as "He, who desires heaven, shall perform the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice" enjoining the relation of the *jyotiṣṭoma* rite to the fruit, heaven. There is another text "Men of spiritual birth desire to have the knowledge of *Brahman* by the study of one's Veda, by the performance of sacrifice and offering of gifts and by austerity in the form of fasting"[17] which prescribes the *karmas*

relating to the stages of the celibate, of the householder and of the hermit as the means to the attainment of desire to have the knowledge of *Brahman*. There is no inconsistency in the same subsidiary, viz., *karma* having this twofold relation. This the Advaitin affirms by adopting the *saṁyogapṛthaktva-nyāya*.

CONCLUSION

The interplay between the Upaniṣadic teaching and the principles of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* school is, indeed, characteristic of the writings of the Advaitins and the Dvaitins.

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4. *Nyāyāmṛta* (Nmṛ) of Vyāsatīrtha, Vol.I and II, Published along with the *Advaita siddhi* (AS) of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Banaras: Ṣaḍdarśana Prakāśanapratiṣṭhānam, 1977, p.150
5. AS, pp.150 ff.
6. *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha*, Secunderabad: Śrīmad Appayya Dīkṣitendra Granthāvali Prakāśanasamiti, 1973, pp.234-236.
7. *PMS*, 10.8.16
8. *Nmṛ*, p.122
9. *AS*, p.123
10. *PMS*, 9.1.2
11. *Nmṛ*, pp.123-124
12. *AS*, p.124
13. *PMS*, 12.2.22
14. *Nmṛ*, pp.124-25
15. *AS*, pp.124-125
16. *PMS*, 4.3.3
17. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.22

II

VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDANTA

K.E. Devanathan

In Viśiṣṭādvaita, in the context of establishing *Brahman* as possessed of all noble qualities and devoid of all defects and resolving the apparent conflict between *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* statements, *Mīmāṁsānyāyas* are utilized.

SĀMĀNYA-VIŚEṢA-NYĀYAḤ
CHĀGO VĀ MANTRAVARṆĀT[1] (PMS. 6-8-1030)

At the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, offering of an animal is enjoined by the injunction '*Agnīsomīyaṁ paśum ālabheta*', an animal dedicated to Agni and Soma should be sacrificed. In the *mantra* to be recited in this context a particular animal, viz., goat, is mentioned. In view of this, the scope of the animal to be offered is restricted to the particular animal. This process is designated as *sāmānya-viśesa-nyāya*. Here, there is no conflict between the statement of injunction and *mantra*. In the injunction an animal in general is stated while in the *mantra* a particular animal is stated. This particular animal also, being one of the animals, is covered by the injunction. However, taking into account the particular animal stated in the *mantra*, the scope of the injunction is restricted to the particular animal. Śrutaprakāśikā explains the nature of this *nyāya* as *avirodhe'pi sāmānyaśabdasya upāttaviśeṣaviṣaye saṅkocaḥ*.

This *nyāya* is utilized in Viśiṣṭādvaita to restrict the scope of *nirguṇa śruti*[2] to deny the *heyaguṇa* only with reference to *Brahman*. The *nirguṇaśruti* superficially appears to deny all attributes of *Brahman*. However, the statements *apahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ*, etc., deny particular attributes. In the light of this the scope of *nirguṇaśruti* has to be restricted to the denial of *apahatapāpmatva*, etc., *ḥeyaguṇa* only by applying *sāmānya-viśeṣa-nyāya*.

VIRODHĀDHIKARAṆA NYĀYAḤ (ŚRUTIPRĀBALYĀDHIKARAṆANYĀYAḤ)
(1-3-2,2) VIRODHE TU ANAPEKṢAM SYĀDASATI HI ANUMĀNAM

The *Śruti*[3] statement *audumbarīṁ spṛṣtvā udgāyet* and the *Smṛti* statement *audumbarī sarvā veṣṭayitavyā* are in conflict with each other. If the *audumbarī* pole is entirely covered as per the *Smṛti*, it cannot be touched. If it has to be touched, as per *Śruti*, it cannot be entirely covered. This conflict is resolved by covering partially leaving some space to touch it. Here *Śruti* is preferred to *Smṛti*. The *Śruti* directly conveys its purport while *Smṛti* enables us to infer the *Śruti* that is the basis of its purport, and then conveys it. This means that while the *Śruti* conveys its purport immediately, the *Smṛti* takes a little more time. Hence, one has to act as per the *Śruti*. However, *Smṛti* is not totally set aside, since, its purport, i.e. covering the pole is partially given effect. In the *sūtra* the clause *virodhe tu anāpekṣaṁ syāt* conveys that when there is a conflict between *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, the *Śruti* which does not depend upon any other *pramāṇa*, prevails. The clause *asati hi anumāṅam* states that when there is no conflict between *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, the *Smṛti* enables us to infer the *Śruti* that is the basis of it and conveys its purport. In such cases it has to be implemented.

This *nyāya* is based on two grounds.

(i) Definiteness of one being earlier and the other later.

(ii) Conflict between the two.

In the present instance, *Śruti* proceeds to convey its purport earlier than *Smṛti*, and there is a conflict between the two.

This nyāya is applied in Viśiṣṭādvaita to established the fact that *saguṇa* statements set aside the *nirguṇa* statements. The *nirguṇa* statements are of the nature of negation. The negation requires comprehension of the entity that is to be negated. Therefore, the

comprehension of *saguṇavākya* of *Śruti* has to take the first place. This satisfies the condition of priority and posteriority. The conflict between *saguṇaśruti* and *nirguṇaśruti* is clear. In view of this, the *saguṇaśruti* sets aside the *nirguṇaśruti.* The restriction of the scope of *heyaguṇarāhitya* is already explained.

In the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-nyāya* utilized here, though the conflict is pointed out between *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, the *Śrutitva* and *Smṛtitva* are the grounds for the *paurvāparya* that settles the *bādhyabādhakabhāva.*

ASAÑJĀTAVIRODHA NYĀYAḤ

This *nyāya* is developed in *Upakramādhikaraṇa Vedadharmatādhikaraṇa* and applied in *Vāruṇeṣṭyadhikaraṇa* also.

In the *visayavākya* "*Prajapatirakāmayata prajāḥ sṛjeyā*, etc.,"[4] at the commencement, *agneḥ ṛgvedaḥ vāyunā yajurvedaḥ*, etc., are mentioned. At the conclusion, individual hymns are mentioned.

There has to be an agreement between the beginning and the conclusion. Therefore, the question arises whether the words *Ṛgveda* etc., mentioned in the beginning be taken to mean *Ṛk*, etc. individual hymns or *Ṛk* etc. words mentioned in *upasaṁhāra* be taken to mean the entire text. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that the *upakrama* statement is of the nature of *arthavāda* while *upasaṁhāra* is of the nature of injunction. Therefore, the words *Ṛgveda*, etc. occurring in the *upakrama* are to be taken in the sense of the individual hymns by *lakṣaṇā.*

The *siddhāntin* points out that the *upakrama* statement is first comprehended and the words *Ṛgveda* etc., are to be taken in the sense of the entire text. There was no opposition to take these in this sense at this stage. Their position is that of *asañjātavirodha.*

But in the case of the statement in *upasaṁhāra* as the meaning of *Ṛgveda* etc., is already fixed for the words, *ṛk* etc. cannot be taken in the sense of individual hymns, since it violates the agreement between *upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra.* Therefore, *upakrama* has to be preferred to *upasaṁhāra.* This process is designated as *asañjātavirodhanyāya.*

This *nyāya* is applied in *Vāruṇeṣṭyadhikaraṇa* also. In the *viṣayavākya* of *vāruṇeṣṭi*[5], 'Prajāpati, who gave horses to Varuṇa is stated to have performed *vāruṇeṣṭi*'. This statement is of the nature of *arthavāda.* However, later in the statement "*yāvato'śvān gṛhṇīyāt tavato vāruṇan catuṣkapālān nirvapet*" *vāruṇeṣṭi* is enjoined to the receiver. This statement is of the nature of injunction. Applying the *asañjātavirodhanyāya* developed in *upakramādhikaraṇa* earlier, it is concluded here that *upakrama* statement prevails over the later statement. Hence, the giver has to perform this sacrifice. The word *pratigṛhītā* has to be taken in the causal sense of *pratigrāhayitā.*

Normally, a *nyāya* is developed in one *adhikaraṇa.* A separate *adhikaraṇa* is not formulated to demonstrate the same *nyāya.* This fact is noticed by Pārthasārathi. He explains the purpose of demonstrating the same *nyāya* in this *adhikaraṇa* by saying that here the conflict between *upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra* is more clear and needs to be resolved.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita this *nyāya* is utilized to establish that *saguṇaśruti* prevails over *nirguṇaśruti.* It is already pointed out that the comprehension of *saguṇaśruti* has to preceed

that of *nirguṇaśruti.* There is no opposition of *nirguṇaśruti* at that stage. The position is of the nature of *asañjātavirodha.* The comprehension of *saguṇaśruti* prevents taking the *nirguṇaśruti* at their face value.

In this context a ticklish question is raised in Śrutaprakāśikā and solved.

If an earlier cognition prevents the later cognition opposed to it, then, let the cognition *idaṁ rajatam* prevent the cognition *na idaṁ rajatam.* Śrutaprakāśikā answers that there is a distinction between *sattayā jñāpakapramāṇa* and *jñeyatayā jñāpakapramāṇa.* Sense perception comes under the first category. When *śukti* is perceived, the cognition 'this is not silver' arises without depending upon anything else. This cognition arises by sublating the earlier cognition 'this is silver'. Therefore, the question of its preventing the cognition 'this is not silver' does not arise.

IV

BHŪYASĀṀ SYĀD BALĪYASTVAM ITI NYĀYAḤ VIPRATIṢIDDHADHARMĀṆĀṀ SAMAVĀYE SYĀT SADHARMATVAM (12-2-7-22)

In the *kāmyeṣṭikāṇḍa* seven *yāgas* with the offerings of *aṣṭakapālapuroḍāśa* to Agni, *ekādaśakapālapuroḍāśa* to Indra and *dadhi madhu ghṛtam āpaḥ dhānāḥ* offering to Prajāpati are stated. Among these *aindrapuroḍāśa* and *prājāpatyadadhi* are the *vikṛti* of *amāvāsyā. Madhu dadhi ghṛtam āpaḥ* are *vikṛti* of *paurṇamāsī.* The *ājyabhāga* is to be performed for all these together once only. Therefore, the question arises whether *amāvāsya* hymn, i.e. *vṛdhanvatī* hymns, are to be recited or *paurṇamāsya* hymns, i.e. *vārtraghnī* hymns, are to be recited. It is concluded that since *amāvāsya* items are only two and *paurṇamāsya* items are many, the *paurṇamāsya* hymns are to be recited. This process is designated as *bhūyasāṁ balīyastvam.*[6]

This *nyāya* is utilized in *Indraprāṇādhikaraṇa* in Viśiṣṭādvaita.[7]

na vakturātmopadeśād iti ced adhyātmasambandha bhūmā hi asmin.

In this *adhikaraṇa*, the pūrvapakṣin argues that in the *upakrama* passages Indra states '*māmeva vijānīhi*', '*māmupāsva*', '*triśīrṣāṇāṁ tvāṣṭram aham.*' These statements suggest that Indra is stated as *upāsya* here. Therefore, the concluding statement '*ānando'jaro'mṛtaḥ*' should be interpreted as applicable to Indra only.

The *siddhāntin* rejects this claim by pointing out that a large number of attributes of *Paramātman* are stated here. Therefore, *Paramātman* has to be taken here as *upāsya.* This conclusion is drawn by the application of the *Mīmāṁsānyāya: bhūyasāṁ syāt balīyastvam.* The phrase *adhyātmasambandhabhūmā hi asmin* is explained as *paramātmāsādhāraṇasambandho'dhyātmasambandhah. tasya bhūmā bahutvam.*

Ordinarily *upakrama* statement prevails over *upasaṁhāra* statement and the latter is suitably interpreted to resolve the conflict. However, since a large number of the attributes of *Paramātman* are stated in this context, *upakrama* has to be set aside by *bhūyasāṁ balīyastvanyāya.*

Śrutaprakāśikā explains the ground for setting aside *upakrama* in another way. *Upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra* are only a part of the entire discourse. When these only conflict, *upakrama* is preferred. But when *upakrama* conflicts with the main purport of the whole discourse, it has to be set aside.

V

SARVAŚĀKHĀPRATYAYANYĀYAḤ
EKAṀ VĀ SAṀYOGARŪPACODANĀ ĀKHYĀ AVIŚEṢĀT (2-4-2-9)

The performance of *agnihotra* is enjoined in texts like *Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka, Kāṇva Mādhayandina* and *Taittirīya* for the followers of these *śākhās*. Therefore, the question arises whether the *agnihotra* enjoined in these texts are different or one. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that these are different. He bases his argument on the following grounds:[8]

(i) These have different names such as *kāṭhakam agnihotram, kālāpakam agnihotram* etc.
(ii) These have different forms such as *ekādaśakapāla, dvādaśakapāla.*
(iii) These have different *dharma* such as *aśvadāna-ādāna.*
(iv) There is repetition of these in different *śākhās.*
(v) The offering before sunrise and after sunrise is censured.
(vi) It is impossible to perform all the subsidiary items prescribed in different texts.
(vii) The closing of it is stated in a different way.
(viii) Different types of explanations are prescribed.
(ix) In one *śākhā* the recitation of *bṛhatsāma* is stated and in another *śākhā* that of *rathantara* is stated. Therefore, *agnihotra* stated in different *śākhās* have to be treated as different.

Nāma-rūpa-dharma-viśeṣa-punarukti-nindā-aśakti-samāpti-vacana-prāyaścitta-anyārtha-darśanāt śākhāntareṣu karmabhedaḥ syāt. (II-4-2-8).

This contention of the *pūrvapakṣin* is rejected by the *siddhāntin* by pointing out that the criteria repetition, etc., indicate only enjoining of *Karma* but not their distinction. The distinction has to be assumed on the ground of occurrence of these in different texts.

This can be accounted by taking the position that the same *agnihotra* is enjoined for the persons of different *śākhās* in the respective texts. Just as the *agnihotra* enjoined in one *śākhā* text is the same for all followers of the *śākhā*, the *agnihotra* stated in all texts is one and enjoined for the followers of all the *śākhā* texts.

This *sarvaśākhānyāya*[9] is actually quoted in the Śrībhāṣya on *Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaraṇa* under the *sūtra sarvavedāntapratyayaṁ codanādyaviśeṣāt.* (III-3-1). The *vidyas* like Vaiśvānara are stated in many *śākhā* texts. Therefore, the question arises whether these are different *vidyās* of the same name or one. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that since these are stated again and are different in contexts, these have to be treated as different *vidyās.* The *siddhāntin* points out that the injunctions like *upāsīta* and *vidyāt* have the same meaning. He quotes the *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtra: Ekaṁ vā saṁyogarūpacodanākhyāviśeṣat* that settles the *agnihotra* stated in different texts as one, and demonstrates the grounds stated in that *sūtra* to consider *Vaiśvānaravidyā* as one.

This question[10] is again raised in *sarvābhedādhikaraṇa* (III-3-10)

Prāṇavidyā is described both in the *Chāndogya* and *Vājasaneyaka.* In these, it is stated that *prāṇa* be meditated upon with the attributes of *jyaiṣṭhya* and *śraiṣṭhya.* The *vāk,* etc., senses are described with the attributes of *Vasiṣṭhatva,* etc.

These attributes stated to belong to *prāṇa* only as *vāk,* etc., are regulated by *prāṇa.* However, in the *prāṇavidyā* described in the *Kauṣītakī,* the *jyaiṣṭya* and *śraiṣṭhya* attributes

only are described. The *Vasiṣṭhatva* attribute is not mentioned. Therefore, the question is whether the *prāṇavidyā* described in these is one or different. The *pūrvapakṣin* naturally utilizes the ground *rūpabheda* mentioned in the *pūrvapakṣa* of *sarvaśākhāpratyoyanyāya* of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and argues that these are different. The *siddhāntin* points out that there is no *rūpabheda.*

The Śrībhāṣya interpretation of these two *adhikaraṇas* indicates that the *sūtrakāra* himself has *sarvaśākhāpratyayanyāya* in mind.

Aruṇādhikaraṇanyāya

Arthaikatve dravyaguṇayoḥ aikakarmyānniyamaḥ syāt (3-1-6-12)

When an object and a quality could be connected with one action, these should be taken as qualification and qualified with each other and be connected with that action.

Dravya guṇayoḥ arthaikatve ekakriyānvayitve sambhavati tayoḥ mitho'nvayaniyamaḥ.

This *nyāya*[11] is illustrated by taking the passage *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṁ krīṇāti.*

Here *aruṇayā* cannot be connected with the action of purchase, as it is *karaṇa* directly. Therefore, it has to be separated from this sentence and connected with the other items in the context. The *siddhāntin* points out that the instrumental case suffix of the word *aruṇayā* indicates that it is a *karaṇa.* To manage this status, it has to be envisaged that it plays this role through the *ekahāyinī,* i.e. cow which is a *dravya* plays the role of *karma.*

In this passage the word *aruṇayā* which is in instrumental case refers to the quality, i.e. colours as *karaṇa.* However, a quality cannot be the *karaṇa* directly for an action. It cannot be taken as conveying an object possesing a colour and then connected with the action since, a *karaṇa,* i.e. *ekahāyinī* is already connected with it. This will lead to *vākyabheda.* It cannot also be enjoined as a quality of *ekahāyānī.* One and the same *ekahāyānī* cannot be *aṅga* for the action and *pradhāna* for *aruṇayā.* Therefore, the word *aruṇayā* has to be taken out of this sentence and connected with other items stated in the context.

The *siddhāntin* points out that the instrumental case of the word *aruṇayā* clearly indicates that it is a *karaṇa.* If it is not possible for a quality to be a *karaṇa* directly, it has to be envisaged through an object. When an object and a quality could be connected with an action, these should be taken as the qualified and the qualification and be connected with the action. In the present case, the colour is a qualification and *ekahāyanī* is qualified. Therefore, there is no need to separate the word *aruṇayā* from the sentence to avoid *vākyabheda.*

In Śrībhāṣya[12] the *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* of this *adhikaraṇa* are differently presented. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, a word does not convey *ākṛti* only. It conveys *ākṛtiviśiṣṭavyakti.* Similarly, a word that conveys a quality, conveys the object also that has the respective quality. In the present case, the word *aruṇayā* conveys the object that has the colour. The word *ekahāyanī* also conveys an object. Therefore, these two words cannot get connected with each other and convey a *karaṇa* for the action *kraya,* i.e., purchase. Hence, the word *aruṇayā* has to be separated from this sentence, and connected with the other item stated in the context. The *siddhāntin* points out that there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between

aruṇayā and *ekahāyanyā*. This indicates that these two words refer to one and the same object. The word *aruṇayā* refers to an object that is qualified by colour and *ekahāyanyā* refers to the same object because of *sāmanādhikaraṇya* with it. Kaiyaṭa has explained *sāmanādhikaraṇya* as *bhinnapravṛttinimittānām ekasminnarthe pravṛttiḥ*. Therefore, there is no difficulty in these two getting connected with the action. The connection between the *ekahāyanī* and the action *kraya* is conveyed by the sentence, the connection between the attribute colour and the object is conveyed by *prātipadika*, i.e. nominal stem and the identity of the object conveyed by the two words is conveyed by *sāmānādhikaraṇya*.

The conclusion of the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa* stated above is utilized to interpret the *Śruti* statement *tat tvamasi* in Viśiṣṭādvaita. In this statement, there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between *tat* and *tvam*. The word *tat* conveys *Paramātman* who is the cause of the world, who has all auspicious attributes and who is free from all drawbacks. The word *tvam* conveys him only as qualified by *jīva* and his body.

Utsargāpavādanyāya

The statement *mā hiṁsyāt sarvabhūtāni* prohibits the killing of all living beings in a general way. The injunction *agnīṣomīyaṁ paśumālabheta* enjoin the offering of an animal at the sacrifice. This is a case of *utsarga* and *apavāda*, i.e. a general rule and an exception to it. The scope of the general rule has to be restricted to the instance other than that for which an exception is made.

In Śrībhāṣya[13] a different stand is taken in this case under the *sūtra aśuddham iti cenna śabdāt* (B.S.III-1-25). This instance is not considered as an instance of *utsarga-apavādanyāya*. It is pointed out that offering of an animal at the sacrifice by killing it is not an act of *hiṁsā*. The animal that is killed is stated to attain heaven *hiraṇyaśarīraḥ ūrdhvaṁ svargaṁ lokam eti*. An act that provides higher good is not *hiṁsā*, i.e. injury, even though it causes suffering. The surgical treatment by a doctor is not an act of injury since, it provides better health. Therefore, the prohibition not to injure an animal, does not cover the animal that is offered at the sacrifice. Hence, there is no need to consider it as an exception and treat it as an instance of *utsarga-apavādanyāya*.

Jartilayavāgūnyāya

In the context of *Agnihotra*, offering of *jartila*, i.e. forest oil seeds, and *yavāgu*, i.e. forest wheat is enjoined. In the next sentence, the offering of these is prohibited. Then, the offering of milk is enjoined. Here the question arises whether these are to be offered alternately or only milk is to be offered. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that these have to be alternatively offered. The *siddhāntin* points out that milk only has to be offered, and the reference to other two are to be considered as *arthavāda*. The other two are mentioned to bring out the superiority of milk for the purpose of offering.[14]

In Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, this *nyāya* is utilized in *Bhūmādhikaraṇa*. In this *adhikaraṇa*, the meditation of *nāma*, etc., up to *prāṇa* is stated. Then the meditation of *satya*, i.e.

Brahman, is stated as highest and is enjoined. The *nāma*, etc., are stated to indicate the superiority of *satya*.

This nyāya is also utilized in *vaiśvānaravidyā*. Under the *sūtra bhūmaḥ kratuvajjyāyastvam* (III-3-53) the meditation of Vaiśvānara is enjoined. While enjoining meditation on Vaiśvānara in the form of three worlds, the meditation on *svarga, āditya, vāyu, ākāśa*, etc., as parts of his form is also mentioned. Therefore, the question arises whether the Vaiśvānara's whole form of three worlds is to be meditated on or only the parts. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that separate meditation on the parts has to be undertaken since separate results are stated. The *siddhāntin* points out that the meditation on the whole form is superior. The statement of different results for the meditation on parts is only partial statement of the whole result. These are not separate results.[15]

The expression *kratuvat* in the *sūtra* indicates the utilization of another *Pūrvamīmāṁsānyāya*. At the *jāteṣṭi* offering of *puroḍāśa* of different quantity, such as *aṣṭakapāla, daśakapāla*, etc., is stated with different results. Finally, offering of *dvādaśakapāla* is stated with the result in the form of *tejas, annāda, indriya* and *paśu*. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that these are different rituals, since different results are stated. The *siddhāntin* points out that the *dvādaśakapāla-iṣṭi* is only enjoined here as it leads to greater results. This *nyāya* is also utilized to point out that the whole form of Vaiśvānara be meditated on.

Pratinidhigrahaṇanyāya

Sāmānyaṁ taccikīrṣāhi (VI-3-27)

Under the *sūtra śrutipramāṇatvāt* (vii-1-1) it is stated that when the prescribed *dravya* to be offered at the sacrifice is not available, a substitute be offered. Here, a question is raised whether any other *dravya* be taken as a substitute or a similar *dravya* only. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that any other *dravya* may be taken. The *siddhāntin* points out that the expression *vrīhi*, i.e. rice, conveys *vrīhi-vyakti* and also its constitutent part. Therefore, a *dravya* which is similar to it and has some constituents has to be taken as a substitute. This will satisfy the requirement of offering *vrīhi* to some extent. If any other *dravya* is taken, the requirement will be totally given up. Therefore, a similar *dravya* is to be taken as a substitute. Substituting *pūtika* plant for *soma* plant is given as a standard example for this nyāya.[16]

This *nyāya* is utilized in Viśiṣṭādvaita to support the *sat-khyāti* theory of error.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, all objects consist of all five elements, earth, water, etc., by the process of *pañcīkaraṇa*, i.e. the process of mixing of the five elements in a prescribed proportion. The constituents of each element are present in other elements to some extent. The elements are given the name on the basis of the majority of the constituents. For instance, *śukti*, i.e. shell contains the majority of the constituents of itself. But it also contains the constituents of *rajata*, i.e. silver. Normally an observer perceives *śukti*, as *śukti*. However, on account of defective vision, distance etc., when he feels that he is perceiving silver, he is not totally wrong. Because, the constituents of *rajata* are present in *śukti*. Because of similarity the object of his perception *śukti* is substituted by *rajata*.

The constituents of *śukti* that are in larger number are not perceived on account of the defects while the constituents of *rajata* that are few are perceived. It is not a case of perceiving *śukti* as *rajata* but it is a case of perceiving the *rajata* aspect in *śukti* as *rajata*. This process is designated as *satkhyāti* as against the *anyathā-khyāti* of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* who state that *śukti* itself is perceived as *rajata*.

Apacchedādhikaraṇanyāya (vi-5-19)

purvāparye pūrvadaurbalyaṁ prakṛtivat (VI-5-19-54)
At the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the priests *adhvaryu*, *prastotā*, etc., are required to proceed from the place of *havirdhāna* to that of *bahiṣpavamāna* holding the cloth of the next priest in the line. If the cloth held is left, then different *prāyaśchittas* are prescribed in the case of different priests for this lapse. When one of them commits this lapse, then the *prāyaścitta* prescribed in his case has to be observed. If two of them simultaneously commit the lapse, then there is an option to observe one of the *prāyaścittas* prescribed in their case. However, when two of them commit the lapse one after the other the question arises, whether the *prāyaścitta* prescribed for the earlier is to be observed or that of the latter. The *pūrvapakṣin* argues that when the earlier lapse has taken place, the possibility of the latter is not yet known. Therefore, there is no opposition to it. When the latter occurs as it is opposed to earlier, the question of observing the *prāyaścitta* for it, setting aside the earlier *prāyaścitta*, does not arise.

If it is argued that when the latter has arisen without depending upon the earlier and when these are opposed, the earlier cannot set aside the latter. Then an option has to be given to observe one of them. In any case, the earlier cannot be set aside.

The *siddhāntin* points out that the earlier cannot prevent the latter in the present case, since, the latter is prescribed by a direct *śruti*. When the knowledge of the latter to observe the *prāyaścitta* prescribed for it arises, the observation of *prāyaścitta* prescribed for the earlier is set aside by it. Without setting aside the earlier, the latter cannot take place. When there is a conflict between the earlier and the latter, the earlier is to be set aside.[17]

Upakramanyāya, i.e. *asañjātavirodhanyāya*, applies only to such instances where the latter depends upon the earlier and their status as earlier and later is settled. *Apacchedanyāya* applies to such instances where the earlier and later position is not fixed.

paurvāparyaṁ virodhaśca purvāprāmāṇyameva ca.
niyamānnāsti yatrāsau apaccheda nayaḥ smṛtaḥ.

This *nyāya* is utilized in Advaita to say that *nirguṇaśruti* prevails over the *saguṇaśruti*. However, the status of *saguṇaśruti* and *nirguṇaśruti* as earlier and later is settled. *Nirguṇaśruti* is of the nature of negation while *saguṇaśruti* provides a *pratiyogin*, i.e. counter-entity for it. Therefore, *apacchedanyāya* cannot be utilized to take the position that *nirguṇaśruti* prevails over the *saguṇaśruti*.

Na Vidhau Paraḥ Śabdārthaḥ

The Mīmāṁsakas state that in the case of injunction, secondary meaning should not be resorted. However, they have made a few exceptions to this rule. The following are some of the exceptions:

(i) *darśapūrṇamāsābhyaṁ svargakāmo Yyajeta*
The expressions *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa* are taken in the sense of a group of three rituals stated to be performed on *amāvāsyā* and *paurṇamāsī* respectively. These expressions are not taken as conveying two separate sacrifices of these names. This is a case of *samudāyalakṣaṇā.* (PMS. II-2-3)[18]

(ii) In the instance of *śyenena abhicaran yajeta* the word *śyena* which means a bird of that name, is taken as a name of the sacrifice by *gauṇavṛtti.* (PMS. I-4-5)

(iii) In the instance of *ardham antarvedi minuyād ardhaṁ bahirvedi* the place for the installation of *yūpa* is stated as half in the altar and half outside the altar. This is taken to mean the middle place by way of *lakṣaṇā,* i.e. secondary meaning.

Such process of adopting the secondary meaning is utilized in Viśiṣṭādvaita while explaining the nature of *dhyāna.* The term *dhyāna* is explained as a continuous reflection like the flow of oil. This *Smṛti,* when intensely developed, becomes similar to perception. It is enjoined by the *Śruti*: *Atmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ.* Here, the expression *darśana* is taken in the sense of *darśanasamānākāra* (Sr.P.58)[19]

Na Pṛthivyām Agniścetavyaḥ Nāntarikṣe na Divi

In Pūrvamīmāṁsā under the *sūtras abhāgi pratiṣedhāt* (PMS.I-2-5) and *antyayoḥ yathoktam* (PMS I-2-18) the implication of the statement *na pṛthivyām agniscetavyaḥ,* etc., is examined. Here, the question of *agnicayana* over *antarikṣa,* and *dyuloka* does not arise. Therefore, the denial of the same is superfluous. Offering *agnicayana* on earth cannot be totally denied. Therefore, the next sentence in the context, viz., *hiraṇyaṁ nidhāya cetavyam* has to be taken into account and the denial of *agnicayana* on earth should be understood in the sense that it should not be performed on the earth without placing gold on it. The denial of *antarikṣa,* etc., is to highlight the importance of placing of the gold.[20]

This process is utilized in Viśiṣṭādvaita to explain the import of *nāyam atmā pravacanena labhyaḥ na medhayā na bahunā śrutena. yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ.*

The denial of *śravaṇa, manana* etc., is made here to highlight the importance of choosing by God himself. Mere *śravaṇa* etc., will not help unless God chooses. *Dhruvā Smṛti,* that is, *bhākti* enables to get chosen by God.[21]

Śrutyādi Baliyastvāt (B.S.III-3-47)

Under this *Sūtra, Śruti, Liṅga* and *Vākya* criteria are mentioned. Under B.S.III-4-44, *prakaraṇa* is mentioned. These criteria are utilized in Mīmāṁsā to determine *aṅgatva* while in Vedānta these are utilized to settle the import. In Viśiṣṭādvaita the statements *manaścitaḥ*

vākcitaḥ prāṇacitaḥ, etc. are considered as *vidyārūpa* but not as *kṛipārūpa* applying the criteria of *śruti* and *liṅga*, setting aside *prakaraṇa*.

Aṅgeṣu Yathāśrayabhāvaḥ (BS.III-3-59)

The Pūrvamīmāṁsā concepts of *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* are utilized here. The *udgithopāsanā* enjoined in connection with *udgīthakratu* is decided to be *kratvartha*.

Vāyum Śabdad Aviśeṣaviśeṣabhyām (BS. IV-3-2)

The Pūrvamīmāṁsā concept of the basis of sequence, i.e. *krama*, viz., *śruti*, *artha*, *patha* are introduced to develop *pūrvapakṣa*.

These are a few examples of the utilization of *Pūrvamīmāṁsānyāya* concepts in Viśiṣṭādvaita. The *nyāyas* and concepts utilized for the development of the *siddhānta* of Viśiṣṭādvaita are mentioned here. There are many more *nyāyas* that are mentioned in course of presentation of the *pūrvapakṣa*, particularly, the *pūrvapakṣa* based on Advaita viewpoint. That requires a separate study.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. PMS, VI.8.20
2. Śru.p. p.195
3. PMS, I.3.2
4. PMS, III.3.2
5. PMS III. 4-36
6. PMS, XII.2.22, SD p.864
7. Sr. B
8. PMS, II.4.2
9. B.S. III.3.1
10. Sr. B. III.3.10
11. PMS. III.1.12
12. Sr.P p.214
13. B.S. III.1.25
14. PMS. X.8.7
15. B.S. III.3.53
16. PMS. VI.3.17
17. PMS. V.1.54
18. PMS. II.2.3, I-4-5
19. Sr.P. p.58
20. PMS. I-2-18
21. Sr.P.60

ABBREVIATIONS

PMS. *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtras*—Pune: Anandaśrama,
S.D. *Shāstradīpikā*—Varanasi: Krishnadasa Academy, (Reprint Nirnaya Sagar)

B.S.	*Brahmasūtrāṇi*—Kanchipuram: Ramanuja Granthamāla.
Sr. B.	*Śrībhāṣyam*—do-
Sru. P.	*Śrutaprakāśikā*—Chennai: Viśiṣṭādvaita Prachārini Sabhā.

DVAITA VEDĀNTA

K.T. Pandurangi

I

1.1 In Dvaita Vedānta classics like *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Tātparya candrikā*, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāyas* are utilized in developing two important doctrines.

(i) *Brahman* is *saguṇa*. He is not *nirguṇa*. The *saguṇa śrutis* cannot be set aside by *nirguṇa śrutis*.

(ii) The reality of the world is ascertained by perception. The *śruti* cannot set aside the reality of the world cognized by perception.

The following *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* (PM) maxims are utilized to support these two doctrines.[1]

(i) *Upakrama prābalya nyāya (asañjāta virodha nyāya).*

(ii) *Śruti liṅga nyāya (śīghra gāmitva nyāya)*

(iii) *sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya*, i.e. the maxim of that which has no scope prevailing upon that which has other scope.

(iv) *Bāhulya nyāya*, i.e. the maxim of that which supports many prevails over that which supports one or two only.

(v) *Upajīvyanyāya*, i.e. the maxim of that which is the basis or source of something prevailing over that which is dependent on it.

(vi) *Paśu-chāga nyāya* (The maxim of a class word being taken in the sense of an individual of that class.)

(vii) *Upāṁśu nyāya*

(viii) *Yuktiyukta nyāya*

It is not feasible to give full detail of these nyāyas developed in *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*.

Therefore, the ruling given under each nyāya and its application in the Vedānta will be presented.

1.2 Upakrama Prābalya Nyāya, i.e., the Maxim of Asañjāta Virodha

This *nyāya* is developed in *upakramādhikāraṇa* (*Vedadharmatādhikaraṇa*) of PMS. It is also stated in *vāruṇeṣṭyadhikaraṇa*.

Ṛgveda, *Yajurveda*, etc., entire texts of the Veda are mentioned at the commencement, i.e. *upakrama*. At the close, i.e. *upasaṁhāra*, *Ṛk*, *Yajus*, etc., individual hymns are stated to be recited loudly and slowly. Here, the question is raised whether the entire text of the respective Veda is to be taken for the purpose of such recitation or the individual hymns

are to be taken. It is ruled that it applies to the entire text. The ground for this ruling is that when one reads the first statement, he comprehends it without any restriction or limitation. There is no opposition to this statement at that stage. The later statement restricting the scope to the individual hymns has to be reconciled with the earlier statement and the difference between the two has to be resolved. The underlying principle of this ruling is that there was no opposition when the earlier statement was comprehended (*asañjāta virodha*).[2]

This nyāya is also illustrated by *Varuṇeṣṭyadhikaraṇa*. In this *adhikaraṇa*, Prajāpati, who gave horses to Varuṇa is stated to have performed *vāruṇeṣṭi*. This statement occurs at the commencement, i.e. *upakrama*. However, later it is stated that *vāruṇeṣṭi* be performed by the receiver of the horses. This has resulted in a conflict between *upakrama* and *upasaṁhāra*. Since these two statements form a part of the same discourse, there has to be agreement (*ekavākyatā*) between the two. Hence, it is suggested that the word *pratigṛhītā*, i.e. receiver occurring in *upasaṁhāra* passage be taken as *pratigrāhayitā*, i.e. he who makes someone to receive, that is to say, the giver, and be reconciled with the *upakrama* statement. In this way the *upakrama* is preferred to *upasaṁhāra*.[3]

This maxim is utilized by the Dvaita to support the preference of *saguṇa śrutis* to *nirguṇa śrutis*. Before one proceeds to comprehend the implication of *nirguṇa śrutis*, he has to comprehend the *saguṇa śrutis*. The denial of attributes is not possible unless these are known. Therefore, the attributes are to be comprehended earlier. When these were comprehended through the relevant *śrutis*, there was no presentation of the opposite position. It was *asañjāta virodha* position. Hence, the so called *nirguṇa śrutis* later on, have to be reconciled with *saguṇa śrutis*. This can be managed by conceding that *nirguṇa śrutis* deny only *heya guṇas*, i.e. prejudicial attributes. The *śrutis apahatapāpmā*, etc., bring out this fact.

1.3 Srutiliṅgādhikaraṇa Nyāya, i.e., Śīghragāmitva Nyāya (PMS III-3-14)

The *śruti* '*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate*' states that 'with the hymn of Indra, *gārhapatya* be attended.' Here, a question is raised whether Indra be attended by this hymn or *gārhapatya*. The accusative case suffix expressly states that *gārhapatya* be attended. However, since the hymn mentions the name of Indra and thereby indicates that Indra be attended. The direct expression is designated as *śruti* while indication is designated as *liṅga*. As soon as the import of the accusative suffix is comprehended, it is comprehended that *gārhapatya* is the object to be attended here. In the case of Indra, he has to be inferred as the object to be attended on the ground that he is mentioned in the hymn. This is a slow process. Therefore, it is concluded that *gārhapatya* be attended by the *Aindrī* hymn. The instrumental case suffix in the word *Aindryā* also expressly states that the hymn is subsidiary to the *gārhapatya*. Here, *gārhapatyopasthāna* expressly stated by the accusative suffix is preferred to that of *Indropasthāna* indicated by the *liṅga*. The underlying principle of this maxim is that which proceeds to provide the required comprehension earlier be preferred to the other which is slow.[4]

Dvaita utilizes this maxim to support the fact that *saguṇa śrutis* be preferred to *nirguṇa śrutis,* since these are comprehended directly by *śrutis* earlier. Without the comprehension of the attributes to be denied, the *nirguṇa śrutis* cannot play their role. Therefore, the comprehension of *nirguṇa śruti* is slow like that of the *liṅga.* Hence, *saguṇa śrutis* prevail over *nirguṇa śrutis.* The latter have to be suitably interpreted to reconcile them with the former.

1.4 Sāmānyaviśeṣa nyāya, i.e. the Maxim of General and Particular

This nyāya is evolved in *vartmahomādhikaraṇa* of PM. (X-8-8) In the context of proceeding to purchase the Soma plant at the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the statement '*pade juhoti*' enjoins that an offering be made in the footstep of the calf to be given for purchasing the Soma plant. However, there is a general injunction that all sacrificial offerings be made in *āhavanīya.* Therefore, the conflict between these two injunctions needs to be resolved. It is resolved by giving a ruling that the injunction relating to the particular prevails over that which is of a general nature. This ruling is applied to many other instances like '*vartmani juhoti*', '*patnī samyājan juhoti*', etc. The particular is preferred to general on two grounds.[5]

(i) The general injunction has to be ultimately applied to particulars only. Therefore, when there is a particular injunction in certain cases, the general injunction has to be applied to other particulars only excluding such a particular for which there is a special injunction.

(ii) The particular injunction has no other scope. It is *niravakāśa,* while the general has scope in other cases for which there is no special provision.

This maxim is utilized in Dvaita classics to support the preference of *saguṇa śrutis* over *nirguṇa śrutis.* The *saguṇa śrutis* enjoin the particular attributes like *sarvajñatva. Satyakāmatva, satyasaṅkalpatva,* etc., while *nirguṇa śrutis* deny the attributes in a general way. In view of these *saguṇa śrutis,* the total denial of all attributes by the *nirguṇa śruti* is not desirable. This general injunction has to find its scope in denying the *prākṛta* attributes *satva, rajas* and *tamas* and also *heya guṇas.* This procedure of preference for the particular is found in the instances like '*puroḍāśaṁ caturdhā karoti.*' There is a general statement '*puroḍāśaṁ caturdhā karoti*' but also there is a special statement '*āgneyaṁ caturdhā karoti.*' This is an instance of the preference for the particular.

1.5 Sāvakāśa niravakāśa nyāya, i.e. Maxim of the Availability of Scope and Absence of Scope

In the context of the recitation of hymns at *dīkṣaṇīya* ritual, it is stated that '*yāvatyā vācā kāmayate tāvatyā dīkṣaṇīyāyām anubrūyāt*', i.e. the hymns to be recited at *dīkṣaṇīya* may be recited as one likes, i.e. loudly or slowly. The *dīkṣaṇīya* is a preliminary ritual of *jyotiṣṭoma* as a *saṁskāra* for the sacrificer.

In the context of *jyotiṣṭoma,* there is another statement that for the items before *Agnīṣomīya,* the hymns be recited in a low voice, i.e. *yatkiñcit prācīnam agnīṣomīyāt ten*

upāṁśu caranti. Here is a conflict between the two statements. This is resolved by applying the maxim of *sāvakāśa* and *niravakāśa.* The expression *sāvakāśa* means that which has some other scope. A *śruti* statement cannot be totally rejected. Between the two conflicting *śruti,* if one of them could be suitably interpreted to avoid the conflict, then, that *śruti* is *sāvakāśa* while the other *śruti* which cannot be explained in any other way, is *niravakāśa.* The latter has to be preferred and former be explained away. In the example given above, the recitation of hymns in low voice, can be implemented in case of other preliminary item than *dīkṣaṇīya.* Therefore, it is *sāvakāśa* while the option given as loudly or slowly is intended only for *dīkṣaṇīya.* Therefore, it is *niravakāsa.*[6]

Dvaita utilizes this maxim to prefer the *saguṇa śrutis* and explain the *nirguṇa śrutis* differently. In other words, the *saguṇa śrutis* are considered as *niravakāśa* and *nirguṇa śrutis* as *sāvakāśa.*

On behalf of the Advaita, it is argued that the *tātparya liṅgas,* viz., *upakrama, upasaṁhāra,* etc., support the preference of *nirguṇa śrutis.* However, Dvaita claims that the *upakrama,* etc., support the preference of *saguṇa śrutis.* The application of these criteria is worked out in detail in Dvaita classics.

1.6 Bahubādhā nyāya, i.e. The maxim of preference for that which serves many purposes to that which serves only a few

In the context of *kāmyeṣṭi,* seven rites are prescribed. Two of these are *vikṛtis* of *amāvāsyā* and five are *vikṛtis* of *paurṇamāsī.* The *ājyabhāga* has to be performed for all these together once only. For *amāvāsyā vṛdhanvati* hymns are prescribed. For *paurṇamāsī, vārtraghnī* hymns are prescribed. Since all the five rites are to be performed together, one of the hymns has to be selected for all. Under the circumstances, it is ruled that the hymns prescribed for *paurṇamāsī* be preferred and recited for all the seven rites. The underlying principle of this maxim is that which serves the purpose of many is to be preferred. It is not proper to set aside many and favour the few.[7]

Dvaita classics utilize this maxim to support the preference for *saguṇa śrutis* which are there in large number. These mention a large number of attributes while *nirguṇa śrutis* are a few. The *saguṇa śrutis* provide the knowledge of attributes necessary for meditation, provide the knowledge of rituals, the knowledge of creation of the world, etc. In this way, these provide for a wider range of knowledge, while *nirguṇa śrutis* are negative. Hence, *saguṇa śrutis* have to be preferred to *nirguṇa śrutis.*

2.1 It is interesting to note that Dvaita utilizes these very maxims to establish the superiority of perception in respect of the comprehension of the reality of the world and to reject the concept of *mithyātva,* i.e. projection of the world over *Brahman.* Since, the nature of maxims is already explained above, their application in respect of perception is briefly noticed here.[8]

Upakramādhikaraṇa nyāya, i.e. the reality of the world is comprehended by the perception '*san ghataḥ*', i.e. the jar exists. Though this comprehension relates to the present time,

there is no evidence to prove the absence of its reality in the past or future. The validity of perceptual cognition is intrinsic. In fact, the validity of all cognitions is intrinsic. The inference and *śabdapramāṇa* cannot set aside the cognition of the reality of the world duly obtained by perception.

When the perceptual cognition arose, there was no other cognition opposed to it. If any cognition arises later by inference or scripture, it cannot set aside the valid perceptual cognition. Perceptual cognition is superior to that of inference or scripture in the area that primarily belongs to perception. It arises earlier. Therefore, it is *asañjāta virodha.* In this way, the *upakrama nyāya,* i.e. the maxim of *asañjāta virodha* is utilized to establish the superiority of perception and the reality of the world. Consequently, the *mithyātva* of the world is rejected.

2.2 On behalf of the Advaita, it is argued that *upakramanyāya* is applicable only when the evidences on both sides are equal and a reconciliation is required. In the case of perception which is supposed to establish the reality of the world and the *aikya śruti* that implies the *mithyātva* of the world, the *śruti* is superior to perception. The perception is prone to be erroneous. Therefore, the two cannot be treated on equal footing. Hence, *asañjātavirodhanyāya* cannot be applied here.[9]

The Dvaita rejects this claim. No doubt can be entertained in the case of such a perception that is duly scrutinized. The perception '*san ghataḥ*' is such a valid perception. The purport of the so called *mithyā śruti* is yet to be determined. It cannot be taken for granted that the perception of the reality of jar, etc., is a *bhrama.*

2.3 *Śrutiliṅgādhikaraṇa nyāya,* i.e. the maxim of *Śīghragāmitva* also supports the superiority of perception and the reality of the world.

Perception provides the cognition directly and immediately while inference and *śabda* are slow. Therefore, neither the inference of *mithyātva* nor that of the *aikya śruti* can set aside the cognition of the reality of the word obtained by perception.

On behalf of the Advaita, it is argued that though inference and *śruti* are slow, when the purport of *śruti* is duly determined, it can set aside the cognition obtained by perception. However, the Dvaita points out that the Advaita interpretation of *śruti* is not valid.

2.4 The *sāmānyaviśeṣa nyāya,* i.e. the maxim of preference of particular statement to that of a general statement also supports the superiority of perception and the reality of the world. The perception comprehends particular objects jar, etc., as real while the *aikya śruti* denies them in a general way.

On behalf of the Advaita it is argued that this maxim is applicable to only such instances where both general and particular are based on equally valid evidences. However the perception and *śruti* cannot be treated on equal footing. The perception is likely to be erroneous while *śruti* is absolutely valid.

The untenability of this explanation is already pointed out from the Dvaita side.

2.5 *Sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya,* i.e. the maxim of availability of scope in other ways or the absence of it, also supports the superiority of the perception and the reality of the world.

The perception has no other scope than conveying the objects as they are while *śruti* can be differently interpreted and reconciled with the cognition provided by the perception. Therefore, perception is *niravakāśa* while *śruti* is *sāvakāśa*. According to this maxim, *niravakāśa* has to be preferred to *sāvakāśa*. Hence, the perception that conveys the reality of the world is superior to the *śruti* in this respect.

2.6 *Bahubādhanyāya* i.e. the maxim of preference of that which serves many purposes than that which serves a few purposes.

This maxim also supports the superiority of perception and the reality of the world. The perception which comprehends the reality of the world serves many purposes. The inference itself is based on it. It enables the performance of rituals by conveying the reality of the world, and enables one to undertake meditation, etc. Therefore, the Advaita *śruti* should not be interpreted as denying the reality of the world but should be differently interpreted.

2.7 On behalf of the Advaita, it is argued that in the illustration given for this maxim, the contingency of setting aside many items is stated as the basis of this maxim but the Dvaita claim of superiority of perception is based on many evidences. Therefore, this maxim cannot be utilized to support the superiority of perception. *Driṣṭānte bahu viṣaya bādhaḥ atra bahubhiḥ it vaiṣamyāt.*

The Dvaita points out that the basis of this maxim is the contengency of setting aside many. Whether these are items or evidences is a matter of detail. *Nahi dṛṣṭānte sarva sāmyam.* An example need not be exactly the same in all respects.

This debate on the reality or otherwise of the world, and *saguṇa* or *nirguṇa* nature of *Brahman* is carried on making finer and finer points by the commentators of *Nyāyāmṛta* and *Advaita siddhi* generation after generation. Very subtle points of epistemology, logic and linguistics are presented. It is an intellectual treat. However, the above presentation of the utilization of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* maxims by the Dvaita and Advaita has a limited purpose of drawing attention to the utility of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā nyāya* for Vedānta.

3.1 Apaccheda nyāya

This is a maxim of later setting aside the earlier. This nyāya does not help to set aside perception by *śruti.*

The discussion of *apacchedanyāya* is spread over four *adhikaraṇa* in PMS. It gives rise to quite interesting points.[10]

At *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, the priests *adhvaryu, prastotā,* etc., are required to proceed from *havirdhāna* place to *bahiṣpavamāna* place holding the waist cloth of the next priest in a line. If the waist cloth held is left, then, different expiations are prescribed in the case of different priests for this lapse. When one of them commits this lapse then, the expiation prescribed in his case has to be observed. If two of them simulteneously commit the lapse, then, there is an option to observe one of the expiations. However, when two of them commit the lapse one after the other the question arises whether the expiations prescribed

for the former is to be observed or the latter. It is ruled that the former cannot prevent the latter, since, it is prescribed by a direct *śruti.* When the expiation prescribed for the latter is comprehended, the observation of the expiation for the former is set aside. *Upakramanyāya,* i.e. *asañjātavirodha nyāya* applies to such instances wherein the later depends upon the earlier and their status as earlier and later is fixed. *Apaccheda nyāya* applies to such instances where in the earlier and later position is not fixed.

The Advaita utilizes this maxim to establish that the perception of the reality of the world is set aside by the *mithyātva śruti,* since perception takes place earlier than the cognition provided by *śruti.* The later sets aside the earlier.

The question involved here is not so simple. To comprehend the full implications of this maxim, the details that have given rise to this maxim have to be fully studied. The expiations prescribed for the lapse are as under:

(i) If the *Pratihartā* commits the lapse, the entire wealth set for the sacrifice be given as *dakṣiṇā.*

(ii) If the *Udgāta* commits the lapse, the sacrifice should be completed without giving *dakṣiṇā* and should be performed again. Whatever was to be given as *dakṣiṇā* in the first performance, the same should be given in the repeated performance.

(iii) If the *Udgāta* and *Pratihartā* commit the lapse simultaneously, there is an option to choose one of the expiations.

(iv) If the *Udgāta* commits the lapse earlier and then the *Pratihartā,* the expiation prescribed for the latter, viz., the entire wealth, be given.

(v) If *Pratihartā* commits the lapse earlier and than the *udgāta,* the expiation prescribed for the *pratihartā,* viz., offering the entire wealth, be observed.

3.2 From these details it is clear that in the fourth alternative the expiation prescribed for the earlier is set aside by the later. This ruling of earlier being set aside by the later is utilized in Advaita to claim that the reality of the world cognized by perception which occurs earlier is set aside by the *mithyātva śruti* that occurs later.

In this context, it is to be noted that the expiation prescribed for the *pratihartā* is not totally set aside. It has a scope when the *pratihartā* alone commits the lapse, or the two simultaneously commit the lapse or the *pratihartā* commits the lapse later. Such a scope is not available for perception. Therefore, the perception is *niravakāśa* while *śruti* is *sāvakāśa.* This is why it could be interpreted suitably.

Further, *apaccheda nyāya* applies to such instances only where one being earlier and the other later is not fixed, if the earlier is not totally invalidated and the conflict is not clear. The case of perception is quite different from this. The position of earlier and later is fixed between perception and *śruti.* Here perception will become invalid if it is set aside as there is no other scope, and the conflict between the reality conveyed by perception and so called *mithyātva śruti* is clear. Hence, *apaccheda nyāya* has no scope in this case. *Śruti* cannot set aside perception as per this nyāya merely on the ground that the perception is earlier. On the same grounds it may also be stated that *nirguṇa śrutis* cannot set aside the *saguṇa śrutis.*[11]

3.3 On behalf of Advaita, it is argued that perception is also *sāvakāṣa.* Its scope can be explained as conveying empirical reality. The *śruti* is superior to perception since its

import is firmly determined by *upakrama,* that is, cannons of interpretation. It is absolutely valid as it is not contradicted by any other *pramāṇa.* However, Dvaita points out that the concept of empirical reality is yet to be established. The very concept of *mithyātva* which is the basis of emperical reality, *vyāvahārika satyatva,* is yet to be established. *Upakrama, upasaṁhāra* do not support the Advaita interpretation of *śruti.* Therefore, the validity of *śruti* has to be maintained by suitable interpretation. In view of this, *śruti* cannot set aside perception by the application of *apaccheda nyāya* in respect of the reality of the world.[12]

Moreover, there is *upajīvya-upajīvaka* position between perception and *śruti* in respect of the objects that belong to the area of perception. The *apaccheda nyāya* applies only to such cases where the earlier and later position is not based on *upajīvya-upajīvaka* position.

4.1 Instances of Secondary Meaning for Śruti

Dvaita Vedānta takes a firm stand that the reality of the world cognized by perception as '*san ghataḥ*', i.e. the jar exists, cannot be set aside by *śruti.* Wherever, there is a conflict between perception and *śruti,* the *śruti* has to be suitably re-interpreted. In support of this point, some PM instances are adduced as under:

In *Arthavādādhikaraṇa* under the *sūtra* '*śāstradṛṣta virodhāt*' (PMS I-2-2) the *śruti,* '*tasmād dhūma eva agneḥ divā dadṛśe na arciḥ, tasmād arcireva naktam dadṛśe na dhūmah*' is quoted and it is argued that this *śruti* cannot be taken as valid since it is opposed to the cognition of perception. This is replied under the *sūtras* '*guṇavādaḥ*' and '*dūrabhūyastvāt*' (PMS I-2-10,12) by pointing out that the above *śruti* should not be taken literally. It should be taken in the secondary sense. It is intended to glorify the two deities Agni and Sūrya.[13]

In this instance it is clearly stated that wherever there is a conflict between perception and *śruti* the *śruti* needs to be suitably interpreted and reconciled, and perception is to be preferred to it as a matter of fact.

4.2 In *Mantrādhikaraṇa,* under the *sūtra* '*artha viprati ṣedhāt*' (PMS I-2-36), the *śruti* '*aditir dyaur, aditir antarikṣam aditir mātā sa pitā sa putraḥ*' is quoted and it is argued that one and the same cannot be present in two distant places simultaneously and be both father and mother. It is against the cognition of perception. Therefore, this *śruti* is not valid. This is replied under the *sūtra* '*guṇādapratiṣedhaḥ*' (PMS I-2-39).

This is replied by stating that 'the import of this *śruti* should not be taken literally. The opposite attributes are stated here to glorify the deity Aditi. This is another instance, where perception is not set aside by *śruti* but *śruti* itself is reconciled to perception.[14]

4.3 In a group of five *adhikaraṇas* known as *tatsiddhipeṭikā* (PMS I-4-23) it is stated that Vedic words may be taken in the secondary sense on the following five grounds.[15]

(i) *Tat-siddhi*—performing the functions of one by another, e.g., *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ,* the sacrificer is called *prastāra* in the sense that he sometimes performs the functions of *prastara* such as holding the srug and other sacrificial instruments.

(ii) *Jāti*—possessing the same characteristic, i.e. both being held as born from the mouth of the God.

(iii) *Sārūpya*—similar form, e.g. *ĀditYo yūpaḥ.* Here both Āditya and *yūpa* are said to have similar form such as brightness.

(iv) *Praśaṁsā*—praise, e.g., *apaśava vā anye go-aśvebhyaḥ.* The animals other than cow and horse are not animals at all. Here, by denying usefulness to other animals, the usefulness of cow and horses is praised.

(v) *Bhūmā*—presence in many, e.g. *Sṛṣṭīḥ upadadhāti.* The word *sṛṣṭi* occurs in this context. Therefore, even those hymns that do not contain the word *sṛṣṭi* should be recited at *upadhāna,* i.e. placing the bricks. Here, the word *sṛṣṭi* is taken to mean both the hymns that contain the word *sṛṣṭi* and those that do not have that word, since the majority of hymns in that context contain the word *sṛṣṭi.* Thus *bhūmā* is the ground here.

(vi) *Liṅga samavāyaḥ*—presence of the attributes, e.g. Recitation of a group of hymns containing the attribute *prāṇabhṛt.* The attribute *prāṇabhṛt* is expressly found in the first hymn only. The other hymns in the group contain the word *prāṇa* only. However, these are also to be recited on the ground that these are associated with the hymn that has the attribute *prāṇabhṛt.*

In all these instances, literal meaning of the word concerned is not adopted. A meaning based on some or other attribute connected with the literal meaning is adopted. From this it is clear that the *śruti* is not always taken in the strictly literal sense whenever there is some or other difficulty in taking it that way. Therefore, *śruti* cannot set aside the cognition of the reality of the world obtained by perception.

4.4 On behalf of the Advaita it is argued that the conflict between perception and *śruti* presented in the above instances quoted from PM is in respect of the empirical reality, i.e. *vyāvahārika satyatva* comprehended by perception and the conflict with it at that level. However, the *Advaita śruti* rejects the *pāramārthika* reality to the world. The import of the *Advaita śrutis* is duly established by the canons of interpretation such as *upakrama, upasaṁhāra,* etc., while the reality conveyed by the perception as '*san ghataḥ*' is not duly scrutinized.

The acceptance of *lakṣaṇā* in the case of *tat-tvam asi* is not so much to avoid a conflict with perception but to sustain *akhaṇḍārthatva.* Therefore, this cannot be cited as an example of reconciliation of *śruti* to avoid the conflict with perception. Further, resorting to *lakṣaṇā* has not resulted in giving up the primary meaning here. The primary meaning of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is *aikya,* that is, reference to a common entity. This is not given up here.

The Dvaita replies back to say that *upakrama,* etc., do not support the *akhaṇḍārthatva* of *śruti.* The concept of the empirical reality is not established as yet. Therefore, these concepts cannot be utilized to invoke *śruti* to set aside the reality of the world cognized by perception.

Use of Upakrama, Upasaṁhāra, etc. as Criteria to Interpret the Śruti

In *Vedānta,* six guidelines are used to determine the purport of a text. These are designated as *tātparya liṅgas.* It is interesting to note that both Dvaita and Advaita use these guidelines to interpret the same text and arrive at different results. While applying these guidelines, PM maxims are also applied. This is explained here by one such interpretation.

The Dvaita takes up a discourse in the *Atharvaṇa Upaniṣad* to demonstrate that the six guidelines, that is, *upakrama, upasaṁhāra* etc., support the distinction between *Jīva* and *Īśvara*.[16]

Upakrama—The statement at the commencement of the discourse, viz., '*Dvā suparṇā*', two birds, *Īśvara* and *Jīva*, supports their distinction.

Upasaṁhāra—The statement at the conclusion, viz., '*paramaṁ sāmyam upaiti*', i.e., the jīva attains similarity with Īśvara' supports the distinction of the two. Similarity is always between two distinct objects.

Abhyāsa—Frequent mention, viz., '*tayoḥ anyaḥ*' '*anyam īśaṁ*', '*anaśnan anyaḥ*' etc., frequently state the distinction between the two by the expression '*anyaḥ*'.

Apūrvatā—Presentation by a unique evidence. The distinction between *Jīva* and *Īśvara* is not conveyed by ordinary evidences such as perception. It is conveyed by Veda only.

Phala—Statement of the benefit, *puṇya pāpe vidhūya*, that is, the *jīva* gets rid of *puṇya* and *pāpa*.

Arthavāda—Eulogy, '*asya mahimānam*' 'His glory'.

Upapatti—The reason to distinguish between viz., one who enjoys the fruits of the deeds and the other watches.

By presenting the above analysis of the application of *upakrama* etc. as criteria, the Dvaita establishes the distinction between Īśvara and Jīva.

The Advaita Demonstrates **Upakrama,** *etc., Differently in the Same Discourse*[17]

In the *śruti* '*yat tat adreśyam agrāhyam*', etc., the concept of *abheda* is initiated at *upakrama*. In the *śruti*, '*puruṣa eveidam sarvaṁ*' *abheda* is mentioned in the middle of the discourse. In the *śruti* '*pare avyaye sarve ekībhavanti*' *abheda* is affirmed at *upasaṁhāra*. This is the purport of the total discourse, while '*dvā suparṇā ete*', quoted by Dvaita is a part of the discourse that occurs in the middle. Therefore, that portion has to be treated as *avāntara prakaraṇa* 'secondary context', and has to be interpreted in tune with the *mahāprakaraṇa*' 'The main context'. In view of this the *śruti* '*paramam samyam upaiti*' has to be taken as conveying *abheda*. The distinction between *jīva* and *Īśvara* indicated by one 'enjoying the fruit' and the other only 'watching it' should not be taken as final and real.

The Dvaita disagrees with the above approach. According to it, in the first section it is the supremacy of *Akṣara* which is described and not the *abheda*. In the second, the fact of *Akṣara* being the cause of all is brought out. In the third section, the distinction between *Īśvara* and *Jīva* is stated by '*dvā suparṇā*' *śruti* to affirm the supremacy of *Īśvara*. Therefore, there is no question of any *mahāprakaraṇa* and *avāntara prakaraṇa* here. The *śruti* passages '*puruṣa evedaṁ sarvam*' and '*pare avyaye sarve ekībhavanti*' do not convey *abheda* at all. This is explained while discussing the import of such *śruti*.

The application of the criteria like *upakrama* etc., is worked out in *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* and in many other instances both by the Dvaita and Advaita.

II

USE OF PŪRVAMMĀMSĀ NYAYA TO CLARIFY DVAITA INTERPRETATION AND DOCTRINE

1.1 Justification of the Injunctive Nature of Jijñāsā

In *Jijñāsādhikaraṇa* the question, whether the *śruti* texts (i) *śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ,* (ii) *tad vijijñāsasva* (iii) *ātmani eva ātmānaṁ puśyet,* etc., could be taken as injunctions that enjoin the inquiry into the nature of *Brahman* or these *śrutis* are not of the nature of injunction, is raised. A number of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* (PM)- maxims are used to present the *pūrvapakṣa.* These are appropriately explained in the *siddhānta* to arrive at the conclusion that these *śrutis* are of the nature of injunction.[18]

(i) The purvapakṣin argues that though the suffix '*tavya*' in the expressions *mantavya,* and *nididhyāsitavya* ordinarily conveys an injunction, certain exceptions are made in PM. For instance, in the context of enjoining *upāṁśuyāga* the expression *yaṣṭavya* occurring in the passage, '*viṣṇuḥ upāmśu yaṣṭavyaḥ prajāpatiḥ upāṁśu yaṣṭavyaḥ*', etc is not taken as an injunction but the *tavya* suffix is taken in the sense of desirable, *arhārtha.* Similarly the expressions *mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ* have to be taken as desirable but not in the sense of an injunction. (PMS II-2-9)

(ii) The expressions '*paśyet*' and '*vijijñāsasva*' also do not convey the injunction of the enquiry into the nature of *Brahman.*

The primary meaning of these expressions is cognition and will. These two cannot be enjoined. The secondary sense *vicāra,* enquiry, cannot be assigned to these expressions. Taking an injunction in the secondary sense is not justifiable. Such a course is prohibited by Śabara. The *śruti* passages containing these expressions are intended to describe *Brahman.* Therefore, the injunctive role of these is prevented, *i.e. vidhiśakti pratibandha.* This prevention of the injunctive role is supported by quoting the maxim of *tryambikādhikaraṇa* (PMS. X-5-8) of PM. In *Tryambikādhikaraṇa,* in the passage '*yadabhighārayet rudrāya*' the expression *abhighārayet* is in injunctive suffix. But still this statement is not taken as an injunction. It is taken as *arthavāda.* Its role as injunction is prevented by the fact that it is intended to glorify the injunction of *abhighāraṇa* stated in the passage. Similarly, the *śruti* passages containing the expression '*paśyet*', '*vijijñāsasva*' with injunctive suffixes are intended to just describe *Brahman.* Hence, these cannot be taken as enjoining the enquiry into the nature of *Brahman.* (TC. 69,72)

The *siddhāntin* points out that on a proper examination, the PM maxims quoted by the pūrvapakṣin do not come in the way of considering the above passages as injunctions.[19]

(i) There is a difference between '*upāṁśu yaṣṭavyaḥ*' and '*śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ.*' In the first case, it is a part of a sentence starting from the mention of *jāmitā,* i.e. laziness and ending with the warding off laziness. If the statement *viṣṇuḥ upāṁṣuḥ yaṣṭavyaḥ,* etc. are taken as injunctions, it will result in *vākyabheda,* i.e. splitting one sentence into two. Therefore, the *tavya* suffix in these statements is taken in the sense of desirable, i.e. *arhārtha.* In the case of '*śrotavyaḥ, mantovyaḥ,* etc., there is no such contingency. Hence, this can be taken as an injunction. It can be further connected with the

sentences that describe *Brahman* as in the case of the injunctions of *prayāja*, etc., with the sentence that describes *Darśapūrṇamāsa.*

(ii) The expressions '*paśyet*' and *vijijñāsasva* that refer to congnition and will can be taken in the secondary or extended sense *vicāra,* i.e. enquiry. An injunction can be taken in the secondary sense if there is the difficulty in taking it in the primary sense. In the instance of '*somena yajeta*' the expression *somena* is taken in the extended sense *Somavatā* by resorting to *matvartha lakṣaṇā.* (TC. pp.79-80)

In this discussion not only the interaction between Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā is found but also Vedānta putting the Mīmāṁsā maxims in the right perspective is found.

The Word Jijñāsā Conveys the Meaning Vicāra by Rūḍhi

In the expression *Brahmajijñāsā* the word *jijñāsā* conveys the desire for cognition as its primary meaning. However, the desire cannot be enjoined. Nobody can be forced to desire in a certain way by an injunction. Therefore, the meaning *vicāra,* i.e., inquiry, is assigned to this word. In this context a question is raised whether this meaning is obtained by *lakṣaṇā* or by *rūḍhi.* Śrī Vyāsatīrtha holds the view that it is obtained by *rūḍhi.*

In the instances of *lakṣaṇā,* the unsuitability of the primary meaning is taken into account and then a secondary meaning is assigned. However, in the case of *rūḍhi* the meaning is directly comprehended. In the case of such words that have a primary meaning based on etymological grounds but by a long usage have developed a conventional meaning, the latter becomes its meaning by *rūḍhi.* This prevails over the etymological meaning. For instance, the word *pravīṇa* etymologically conveys the meaning 'an expert in playing *vīṇā*' but by long usage it has come to mean an expert in general. The word *kuśala* etymologically means skilled in cutting the grass but by usage it has come to mean a skilled person. The word *maṇḍapa* originally meant a place where the scum of the boiled rice, i.e. *maṇḍa* is served, but has come to mean an arched place in general. All these are the instances where the *rūḍhi* prevails over the etymological meaning. These are not considered as instances of *lakṣaṇā.* Similarly, the word *jijñāsā* has come to mean *vicāra* by *rūḍhi.* There is no need of any *lakṣaṇā.* In this connection PM example of the usage of the word *aparimita* in the sense of plenty is given. (PM VI-7-10)

The Status of 'Om' in Brahmasūtra

In Dvaita Vedānta tradition, '*Om*' is added before and after *Brahmasūtras.* This addition is made by way of *adhyāhāra,* i.e. introducing an additional word. This *Om* is considered as an *avayava,* i.e. a constituent part of the *sūtra.* It continues in the following *sūtras* also. This is called *ūha* here.[20]

The term *ūha* has a special meaning, viz., substitution. In PM certain guidelines are laid down for introducing *ūha.* In the present case of *ūha* of *Om* in the *Brahmasūtra,* it has to be examined whether *PM* guidelines are satisfied. This is discussed in TC (pp.82-92) quoting the relevant *PM* guidelines and the examples.

(i) In PM *Ūha* means substitution. For effecting *Ūha* a *sthāni*, i.e. a word that is to be substituted is necessary. For instance, the word '*agni*' is *sthāni* in *prakṛti yāga* which is substituted by the word *sūrya* in the *vikṛti yāga* while reciting the hymn concerned. (PM IX-3-1). No such word is found in the *Brahmasūtra* which is required to be substituted by *Om.*

(ii) Even if the term *Ūha* is taken in the sense of *adhyāhāra*, i.e. introducing an additional word, *Om* cannot be introduced as an additional word. To introduce an additional word, *ākāṅkśā*, i.e. the need or expectancy of such an addition is necessary. For instance, in the instance of '*sam yajña patiḥ*' there is the need of *adhyāhāra* (PM.II-1). Similarly, in the instance of '*Iṣe tvā urje tvā*' also there is the need of *adhyāhāra* (PM. II-16). In both these instances there is the need of a verb. In the present case there is no such need.

(iii) The substituted word is not to be considered as a constituent of the hymn. According to the guidelines laid down in PM in respect of the status of a substituted word, it is clearly stated that *ūha, pravara* and *nāmadheya* are not a part of the hymn. (PM II-1-10) Therefore, *Om* cannot be considered as an *avayava*, i.e., a constituent of the *sūtra.*

(iv) If '*Om*' has a meaning and it is a constituent of the *sūtra*, it has to get syntactically connected with the word *Brahman.* This is not possible. The word *Brahman* is not a separate unit in the *sūtra.* It is a part of the compound word *brahmajijñāsā.* Therefore the word '*Om*' cannot get connected with it.

(v) If the word '*Om*' is continued in other *sūtras* also by way of *anuṣaṅga,* then, its meaning has to be taken into account in those *sūtras* also and get syntactically connected with the other words in the *sūtra.* However, in PM it is clearly stated that the words taken in a sentence by way of *anuṣaṅga* do have meaning and get connected with the other relevant word. This is found in the instances of '*acchidreṇa pavitreṇa*' '*tanuḥ varṣiṣtha*', etc. (II-1 and II-1-17) Stating these difficulties in respect of introducing the word '*Om*' in the *sūtra* by way of *ūha, Candrikā* offers solutions for these difficulties.

(i) The term *Ūha* is not to be understood in the sense of substitution. It has to be taken in the sense of *adhyāhāra*, i.e. introducing an additional word. Therefore, there is no need of any '*sthāni*', a base word for substitution.

(ii) The *ākāṅkṣā*, i.e. the need to add this word by way of *adhyāhāra* is necessitated by the *śruti* '*śravati anomkṛtaṁ brahma*', etc. which states that '*Om*' must be added before and after a *sūtra.*

Om is both Dṛṣṭārtha and Adṛṣṭārtha

An important point to be noted in this connection is that *Om* is both *adṛṣṭārtha* and *dṛṣṭārtha.* It helps to retain the *sūtra* and its meaning in the mind firmly. This is *adṛṣṭārtha.* It conveys meaning. This is *dṛṣṭārtha.*[22] In PM, such a position of both *adṛṣṭārthatva* and *dṛṣṭārthatva* is accepted in respect of *mantra* and *prakṣepa,* and *adṛṣṭārthatva* in respect of *tyāga.* (PMS IV-2-7)

(i) The employment of '*Om*' at the end of a *sūtra* and continuation of '*Om*' in other *sūtras* is for *adṛṣṭārtha* only. Such a position of an item being *dṛṣṭārtha* in some respect

and *adṛṣṭārtha* in other respects is found in PM in the instance of recitation of hymns. The recitation of hymn in a sacrifice is *dṛṣṭārtha* since the *dravya* and *devatā* are reminded by it. However, the recitation of the hymn as *japa*, i.e. repeated recitation, is *adṛṣṭārtha* (PMS. I-2).

(ii) Though the word *Om* appears to get syntactically connected with *jijñāsā* on closer observation, it will be found that it has to get connected with the word *Brahman* as it is not possible to get connected with the word *jijñāsā*. For this purpose *aṅgāvatāra* maxim of PM has to be applied. This maxim is developed in connection with the measurment of *yūpa*. In *vājapeya* sacrifice, a measurment of seventeen forearms is mentioned. The question whether this is a measurment of some item connected with *vājapeya* sacrifice directly or that of an item connected with a subordinate item, i.e. *paśu*, is raised. It is concluded that it is a measurement of *yūpa* that is connected with *paśu*, instead of conceiving such a length to an item like *ṣoḍaśī* which is directly connected with the sacrifice. This is an instance of *aṅgāvatāra nyāya*, i.e., applying a point to a subordinate item which *prima facie* appears to be connected with the main item (PM III-1-8). This maxim is to be utilized to connect *Om* with the word *Brahman*. In PM, there are a few other instances also where certain items get connected with *upasarjana*, i.e. subordinate items than the main. *Prāśastya* conveyed by *arthavāda*, *Daṇḍa* in the instance *daṇḍi praiṣān anaḍvāha*, etc., are such instances.

Adhyayana is both Dṛṣṭārtha and Adṛṣṭārtha

The injunction '*svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ*' serves two purposes. (i) It enjoins the study of the Veda in order to comprehend its meaning which enables him to perform sacrifices. This is *dṛṣṭārtha*. (ii) If it is not studied, it leads to *pratyavāya*, since its study is obligatory. This is *adṛṣṭārtha*. This injunction of the study of Veda necessitates the enquiry into the import of the entire Veda.[23]

In support of the contention that *adhyayana* is both *dṛṣṭārtha* and *adṛṣṭārtha* a number of PM instances are quoted in *Nyāyāmṛta* (Nmṛ).

(i) A *puroḍāśa yāga* is prescribed as a subordinate item of *agniṣomīya paśu*. This is *dṛṣṭārtha* as it is a *saṁskāra* for *dravya* and *devatā*. However, in respect of *tyāga* it is *adṛṣṭārtha*. (PMs IV-3-7)

(ii) In connection with *Agnihotra*, two injunctions are found '*dadhnā juhoti*' and '*dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*.' The *dadhi* mentioned in the first injunction is *kratvartha* and that stated in the second injunction is *phalārtha*. This is another instance of *ubhayārtha*. This position is designated as *saṁyoga pṛthaktva*. Here two purposes served by one item are stated by two statements (PMS IV-4-3).

(iii) In the context of *Darśapūrṇamāsa*, two injunctions are found, viz., (i) He who desires *svarga* should perform *darśapūrṇamāsa*; (ii) One should perform *darśapūrṇamāsa* all along his life.

Here the former states the *kāmya* status and the latter the obligatory status of *darśapūrṇamāsa*. This is another instance of one act serving two purposes. (PMS II-4-1)

Justification of Duel Number Referring to One

In *Guhādhikaraṇa* (BSB I-2-3) of *Brahmasūtra bhāṣya*, the *śruti* '*Ṛtam pibantau sukṛtasya loke*', etc., is interpreted as refering to the two forms of *Brahman*, viz., *ātmā* and *antarātmā* and it is concluded that *Brahman* present in the heart receives the fruits of the good deeds of the *jīva*. The dual number does not refer to *Jīva* and *Īśvara* but to the two forms of *Brahman* according to Dvaita interpretation. In this context a question is raised whether the dual number is justified if *Brahman* is taken as referred to here. This is justified by quoting a number of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* instances. In these instances, the number singular, dual or plural is not strictly taken into account on various grounds.[24]

(i) In *Darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, it is prescribed that the hymn '*patnīm sannahya*' be recited. The word *patnīm* is in singular. However, when there are more than one wife, the question arises whether the singular of the word *patnīm* be substituted by the dual or plural number as the case may be. It is ruled that the singular number need not to be substituted by the dual or plural. The recitation of the hymn is not confined to only such a performance where in only one wife participates. The reference to the wife is more important than the number. Therefore, the number need not be substituted.

This ruling is applied here to point out that the dual in the word *pibantau* does not come in the way of considering *Brahman* as conveyed by this *śruti* (PMs.IX-3-6) (TC II-77).

(ii) In connection with *Agniṣomīya paśu*, the hymn to be recited, viz., '*aditiḥ*' *pāśān pramumuktvā*' has the word '*pāśān*' in the plural. Since, there is only one *pāśa* in the *prakṛti yāga*, the question arises whether this hymn be recited in the *vikṛti*, viz., *paśugaṇa* where in there are many *pāśas* or it should be recited in *prakṛti* only ignoring the plural. It is ruled here that it should be recited in *prakṛti* only. The ground for this ruling is that reciting the hymn with reference to *pāśa* is more important than the number of it. This ruling is also utilized to point out that the *śruti* that contains the word *pibantau* in the dual may be taken to refer to *Brahman*. PMS IX-3-5 (TC.II-77)

(iii) In the statement *Agnīn ādadhīta*, the plural is taken into account even though it is an attribute of *uddeśya*, i.e. the subject. In the statement *udavasaya pṛṣṭa- śamanīyena yajeran*, the plural is not taken into account even though it is an attribute of the *vidheya*, predicate. From this it is clear that it is not the fact being an attribute of the subject or predicate that is the ground for not taking it into account or for taking it into account but the fact of its being opposed to a known attribute. This ruling is the basis for not taking into account the singular in '*gṛhaikatvādhikaraṇa*.' In the statement '*daśa etān adhvyaryuḥ gṛṇhati*' the plural number of *gṛhas* is already known. Therefore, the singular of *gṛham* in '*gṛham sammārṣti*' is not taken into account. In the present case of '*ṛtam pibantau*' the singular nature of *Brahman* is already stated in the previous statement *yasya brahma ca kṣatraṁ ca* by *yasya*. Therefore, the dual of *pibantau* need not be taken into account.

(iv) In the hymn '*medhapataye medhaṁ medhapatibhyāṁ medham*' the word *medhapati* refers to the pair of *agniṣoma* deities. Here, as deity, these two are one but they have the two names as their *adhiṣṭhāna*. Hence, they are referred to both by singular and dual. Similarly, *Brahman* also can be referred to in the duel taking into account his two forms *ātmā* and and *antarātmā* and in singular taking into account his very nature.

The above references to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* instances not only support an interpretational point of Vedānta but also bring out the meticulous approach of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* for the interpretation of Vedic texts. A fresh approach to the interpretation of PM instances as in the case of *gṛham sammārṣṭi* is also found.

Justification of the Word Aditi Belonging to Viṣṇu Prakaraṇa

(i) In *attādhikaraṇa* of BSB, the pūrvapakṣin argues that the word Aditi need not be taken in the sense of Viṣṇu though the context is that of Viṣṇu. In support of this the ruling given in *pauṣṇa peṣaṇādhikaraṇa* is quoted. In the context of *darśapūrṇamāsa,* by the statement '*puṣa praviṣṭabhāgaḥ*' *peṣaṇa,* i.e. grinding for the deity of Puṣā, is stated. However, no deity of this name is available at *darśapūrṇamāsa.* Therefore, the question arises whether the name Puśā be interpreted as applicable to Agni or the item of *peṣaṇa* be sifted to *vikṛti yāga* where the deity Puṣā is available. It is ruled that the item of *peṣaṇa* be sifted to *vikṛtiyāga. Vākya* is a stronger evidence than *prakaraṇa.*

The pūrvapakṣin quotes this ruling and argues that the name Aditi be taken to mean Aditi but not *Brahman,* i.e., Viṣṇu, on the ground that the context is that of Viṣṇu and he is *attā* in the sense of *saṁhārakartā,* i.e. destroyer. The name Aditi be taken out of the context of Viṣṇu and a context of Aditi be envisaged as in the case of Puṣā (PMS III-3-18). The *siddhāntin* points out that an item is taken out of context only when it cannot be implemented in that context. In the case of the name Aditi, there is no such difficulty. On the contrary the import of the expression Aditi, viz., *sarvasaṁhāra kartṛtva,* i.e., destroying all, applies to Viṣṇu more appropriately than to Aditi. (TC II-56,59)[25]

(ii) In the context of *darśapūrṇamāsa,* the statement '*abhikrāmaṁ juhoti*' is found. Here, a question is raised whether this *abhikramaṇa* is to be undertaken by the performer of the entire *darśapūrṇamāsa* or *prayāja* only.

It is ruled that it is to be undertaken by the performer of *prayāja* only. For this purpose *prayāja* is considered as a sub-context. This ruling is utilized by the pūrvapakṣin to claim that a sub-context be envisaged for Aditi and separated from the context of Viṣṇu. But the *siddhāntin* points that the statement in respect of *abhikramaṇa* is between two other statements related to *prayāja.* Such an occurence is technically known as *sandaśa*. Such a position is not found in the case of Aditi (PMs. III-1-10) (TC II 56-59).[26]

Justification of the Presence of Opposite Attributes

In *Akṣarādhikaraṇa* (BSB I-3-3), while discussing the import of the *śruti* '*asthūlam anaṇu*', etc., to justify the presence of opposite attributes such as *aṇutva* and *mahatva,* a number of PM instances are quoted. Some of them are noticed here.

(i) In *Darvihomādhikaraṇa* (PMs. VIII-4-2), the status of *darvihoma* is discussed. It is stated that it cannot be a *viktti* of either *soma yāga* or *nāriṣta homa.* It has to be treated as a separate *homa.* It is also not a *prakṛti,* since, no other *homa* is derived from this. Therefore,

both *prakṛtitva* and *vikṛtitva* are absent in it. Similarly, *prakṛta aṇutva* and *prakṛta mahatva* are absent in *Brahman.*[27]

(ii) *Darśapūrṇamāsa* is *prakṛti* only. *Paśugaṇa,* etc., are *vikṛti* only. But *Agniṣomīya* is both *prakṛti* and *vikṛti.* Just as these opposite attributes are present in one, *aṇutva* and *mahatva* are present in *Brahman.*

(iii) *Avaghāta,* grinding the rice, is *dṛṣṭārtha* only. *Prokṣaṇa,* sprinkling with water, is *adṛṣṭārtha* only. However, *sviṣṭakṛt* rite is both *dṛṣṭārtha* and *adṛṣṭārtha.*

(iv) The *adhikāra* for *kāmya* rites and *nitya* rites normally are vested in different persons but in the case of *jāteṣti,* it is vested in the same person.

(v) The *vṛīhi* is *kṛtvārtha* only, *godohana* is *puruṣārtha* only, but *dadhi* is both.

The above instances of PM are not quoted to state the opposition of these pairs in their very nature. These are quoted to point out that the attributes that are normally not found together are found together in certain cases. In each case, there is a ground for it. Similarly, *aṇutva* and *mahatva* that are not found together in *prākṛta* objects, are found together in *Brahman. Śruti* sometimes states the presence of opposite attributes in *Brahman* and sometimes states the absence of these. When the presence is stated, then, these should be taken as *aprākṛta,* i.e., non-material attributes, but when the absence is stated, it should be taken as the absence of *prākṛta* attributes. In this way, the presence of opposite attributes is justified. The above instances from the PM are quoted to show that the attributes that are normally not present together are present in some special cases. (TC, Vol.II 288)

The Maxims that Support the Distinction of Īśvara and Jīva

In PM, six criteria are laid down to distinguish rituals. These are utilized in Dvaita Vedānta to support the distinction between *Īśvara* and *Jīva.* These criteria are stated as (i) *śabdāntara* (ii) *saṁkhyā,* (iii) *abhyāsa,* (iv) *guṇa,* (v) *prakaraṇāntara,* (vi) *samjnā.*

The application of these criteria is illustrated as under:[28]

(i) *Sabdāntara,* the presence of different verbs indicating distinct actions, e.g., *Eṣaḥ eva jīvaṁ prabodhayati etasmāj jīvaḥ uttiṣthati.* God awakens the *jīva* and *jīva* becomes active from God.

(ii) Sāṁkhyā, number, e.g. *Dvā suparnā,* two birds, *Īśvara* and *Jīva.* Here, the number two indicates the difference.

(iii) *Abhyāsa,* repeated reference, *nityaḥ paraḥ nityo jīvaḥ,* that is, *Īśvara* is eternal and *jīva* is eternal. Here, the repetition of the predicate brings out their difference.

(iv) *Guṇāntara,* distinct attributes, that is, the attributes *atti,* i.e. enjoys *anaśnan,* that is, 'does not enjoy' distinguishes *Īśvara* from *jīva.*

(v) *Prakaraṇāntara,* different contexts, e.g, *yato vāco nivartante,* i.e., all words return from him. This is the context of *Īśvara* and this does not apply to *jīva.*

(vi) *Sañjñā,* different designations, e.g., *Īśvara* and *Jīva.*

These criteria are utilized in PM to interpret the text to identify the distinct rituals. Similarly, Vedānta also can utilize these to interpret the text to identify the distinction between *Īśvara* and *Jīva.* (Nmṛ. Vol.III-482).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Nmr. p.159, Vol.3
2. PMS. III.3.2
3. PMS. III.4.37
4. PMS. IV.3.14
5. PMS. X.8.8
6. PMS.
7. PMS. XII.2.7
8. Nmr. Vol.I p.276
9. AS p.278
10. PMS. VI.5.54
11. Nmr. Vol.I, p.364
12. AS Vol.I p.366
13. PMS. I.2.2, 1.2-10,12
14. PMS. I.2.36,37
15. PMS. I.4.23
16. Nmr. Vol.3, p.490
17. AS p.422, PMs. 2.2.4
18. T.C. Vol.I, p.69-72
19. T.C. Vol.I, p.79-80
20. PMS. VI.7.10
21. T.C. Vol.I, pp.82-92
22. T.C. Vol.I, p.83, PMs. IV.2.7
23. Nmr. p.645
24. BSB. I.2.3, T.C. Vol.II, p.77, PMs. 9.3.
25. T.C. Vol.II, p.56, PMs. III.3.18
26. T.C. Vol.II, p.56, PMs. III.1.10
27. BSB, Vol.I, 3.3 PMs VIII-4-2
28. Nmr. Vol.III, p.482

ABBREVIATIONS

PMS	*Pūrvamīmāṁsā Sūtras*—Pune: Anandāśrama.
Nmr.	*Nyāyāmṛta*—Advaita Siddhi (Three Volumes) Bangalore Dvaita Vedanta Foundation.
A.S.	*Advaitasiddhi,* -do-
T.C.	*Tātparya Candrikā* (Three Volumes), -do-
BSB	*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śrī Madhvācārya* with commentaries (Seven Volumes), -do-

CHAPTER 15

The Review of Pūrvamīmāṁsā Doctrines in Vedānta

K.T. Pandurangi

The philosophical problems dealt with by the six major schools of Indian philosophy are the same. However, their approaches are different. This depends upon the world view adopted by them. Majority of Indian philosophical schools are realists within realism, there are two approaches, viz., (i) *Pariṇāma vāda*, i.e. the theory of evolution; (ii) *Ārambhavāda*, i.e. the theory of creation. From these two points of view, these schools work out their theory of knowledge, epistemology, ontology, ethics, etc. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* has a special field of exploring *dharma*. The Vedas are the main source of this field. This involves interpretation of Vedic texts. Vedānta also depends on Upaniṣad portion of the Veda. These two schools are interested in *śabdapramāṇa*. For this purpose, Mīmāṁsā has developed a theory of language and the methodology of interpretation. The concepts of this area are discussed and debated by all the schools of Indian philosophy. They interact with each other, criticize each other and are influenced by each other. Therefore, in course of the study of each school, the views of other schools have also to be taken into account. With this in view, a brief account of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* doctrines made in the works of the three major schools of Vedānta, namely, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita is attempted here. This brief review is intended only to give an idea of the different approaches of Mīmāṁsā and Vedanta on these issues. The detailed study has to be made separately.

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

R. Krishnamurthy Shastry

In respect of the number of *Pramāṇas*, Bhāṭṭas and Advaita are in agreement. Both of them accept six *pramāṇas* adding *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* to the well-known four *pramāṇas*, namely, *pratyakṣa*, etc., as accepted by Nyāya. *Śabdapramāṇa* is accepted as the supreme. Its validity is intrinsic. The other *pramāṇas* operate only within the field of *avidyā*, according to Advaita.

I

COGNITION

The cognition obtained by the senses, etc., is designated as *vṛttijñāna,* while the cognition of *antaḥkaraṇa* and its attributes is designated as *Sākṣi jñāna.* The cognition is an attribute of *manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa.* In respect of the ontological status of *manas,* there are two views: (i) *Bhāmatī* accepts *indriyatva* status of *manas* and accepts *aparokṣajñāna,* i.e. direct cognition of Brahman through *Manas* (ii) *Vivaraṇa* does not accept the status of *indriya* to *manas* and accepts the concept of *śabdāparokṣa,* that is to say, the realization of the cognition of Brahman through the statement '*tat tvam asi.*' The very definition of *pratyakṣa* is given in such way that the second view is accommodated.[1]

The concepts of *ātman* and *manas* in Advaita are quite distinct from that of Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya. Consequently, the whole process of obtaining cognition and the nature of cognition are quite distinct.

The role of senses is to generate *vṛtti* that manifests *caitanya* both at the level of the knower and the object. This happens by the contact of the senses and the object. The Advaita does not accept *samavāya* relation. It accepts the *tādātmya* relation. To perceive the object and its attributes, a three level relation, viz., *saṁyoga, saṁyuktatādātmya* and *saṁyuktatādātmya-tādatmya* is envisaged. The terminology of this relation is the same as that of Bhāṭṭas.

Advaita accepts the *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* kinds of perception. But *nirvikalpaka* is not conceived merely as an earlier stage of *savikalpaka* cognition but as of a different kind. It is a cognition in which no relation is involved. It is non-relational cognition, i.e. *saṁsarga anavagāhi jñānam.* The *śruti* statement '*tat tvam asi*' provides such cognition. The *aparokṣajñāna* of Brahman is of this type. The object of such congnition, viz., Brahman is *akhaṇḍa,* i.e. attributeless and partless. *Tat tvam asi,* etc., *śruti* statements convey this. Therefore, these are called *akhaṇḍārtha* statements.[2]

II

ANIRVACANAYAKHYATI

In respect of *bhrama,* wrong cognition, Advaita has altogether a different theory. They do not accept either *viparītakhyāti* of Bhāṭṭas or *ākhyāti* theory of Prābhākaras. According to Advaita, when an observer cognizes a shell and takes it to be a piece of silver, a *prātibhāsika* silver is projected on the shell. According to Advaita, there are three levels of reality, viz., (i) *Pāramārthika,* (ii) *Vyāvahārika,* (iii) *Prātibhāsika.* Brahman alone is *pāramārthika* reality. The empirical world is only *vyāvahārika.* The silver that is projected over the shell is only *prātibhāsika.* This projected silver is neither real nor unreal. It is *anirvacanīya,* i.e. cannot be described in either way. Since the content of this cognition is *anirvacanīya,* Advaita theory

of *bhrama* is designated as *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. In this respect, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita totally differ.

The projected silver is an outcome of *vivarta*, i.e. projection. It is not *pariṇāma*, i.e. modification. When the cause and the effect belong to the same level of reality, then the effect is a *pariṇāma* of the cause, but when they belong to different levels of reality, it is *vivarta*. In the case of shell-silver, the shell belongs to *vyāvahārika* level and the silver belongs to *pratibhāsika* level. As per *viparīta khyāti*, the relation between the shell and silver does not exist. In *akhyāti* the difference between the shell and silver is not realized. However, in *anirvacanīya khyāti* the shell exists at *vyāvahārika* level and silver exists at *prātibhāsika* level. From *pāramārthika* point of view, the cognition of shell is also *bhrama*. From *vyāvahārika* point of view, the cognition of silver is a *bhrama*. But the nature of the silver is *anirvacanīya*. Therefore, its cognition is designated as *anirvacanīya khyāti*.[3]

According to Advaita, the dream objects also are *prātibhāsika* while Mīmāṁsā considers them as real.

III

ANUMITI, I.E. INFERENCE

Advaita does not consider *parāmarśa* as a necessary intermediary step for the inference. Bhāṭṭas also dispense with *parāmarśa*. *Vyāptijñāna* or its *saṁskāra* is the means of inference. The consideration of *saṁskāra* as the cause does not warrant the inference to be treated as *smṛti*, since it is not produced by *saṁskāra* only. In fact, *vyāpti smṛti* is also considered as a cause. At *smṛti* stage also *saṁskāra* continues.[4]

The *Vyāpti* relation is comprehended by the observation of the co-presence of the *hetu* and *sādhya* supported by non-observation of the *hetu* going astray. Frequent observation of the co-presence is not necessary.[5]

Later Mīmāṁsā writers like Nārāyana and Cidānanda hold the view that frequent observation of co-presence supported by *tarka* is necessary to comprehend *vyāpti*. When someone raises the objection 'let there be smoke but not the fire', then, proposing a counter argument that in that case the fire and smoke cease to be the cause and effect and rejecting the objection is *tarka*. This *tarka* is helpful not only to inference but to all other *pramāṇas*.

Nyāya has put *anumāna* into three groups, viz., (i) *anvaya-vyatireki*, (ii) *kevalānvayi*, (iii) *kevala vyatireki*. Advaita does not accept *kevalānvayi*, since, the absence of everything can be demonstrated with reference to Brahman. *Vyatireki* is also not accepted, as it does not positively help the inference. *Anvayi* type only is accepted. In the case of a person who does not comprehend *anvaya vyāpti* in respect of smoke and fire, his comprehension of the presence of fire is obtained by *arthāpatti* but not by *vyatireka vyāpti*.[6]

Mīmāṁsakas broadly accept the three groups. However, some of them do not accept *vyatireki*.

Vedāntaparibhāṣā accepts only *anvayi* as stated above. However, its commentator accepts other groups excepting *kevalānvayi*.

Both Mīmāṁsā and Advaita accept only three steps for the formulation of *anumāna*, viz., *Pratijñā, hetu* and *udāharaṇa.*

IV

UPAMĀNA, I.E. RESEMBLANCE

Advaita and Mīmāṁsā define the *upamāna* in the same way. A person, who goes to a forest, happens to observe the similarity of the forest cow with the village cow. Then he comprehends the similarity of the village cow with the forest cow. Here, the cognition of similarity observed in the forest cow is the means and the comprehension of the similarity in the village cow is the result. This cannot be considered as inference, since, there is no *vyāpti* relation between the two. Nor can it be considered as remembering the similarity in the village cow since, before observing it in the forest cow, it was not experienced.[7]

The Nyāya analysis of *upamāna* is rejected by both Advaita and Mīmāṁsā.

V

ARTHĀPATTI

Arthāpatti is defined in the same way by Advaita and Mīmāṁsā. It is utilized to establish their special doctrines. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* utilizes it to establish *śakti* in general, and *apūrva* in particular.

Advaita utilizes *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* to establish *mithyātva* of *śūkti rajata* and *śrutārthāpatti* to establish *mithyātva* of the world.[8]

The shell-silver is perceived but the same is sublated later. This cannot be explained unless the *mithyātva* of the silver is assumed by *arthāpatti.* This is a case of *dṛṣṭārthāpatti. Śruti* declares '*tarati śokam ātmavit*', i.e. he who realizes Brahman, overcomes the bondage. This can be explained by assuming the *mithyātva* of the bondage. This is a case of *śrutārthāpatti.* The purpose of *arthāpatti* is to resolve conflict between the two positions both of which are supported by appropriate *pramāṇa,* by assuming a third position. This *pramāṇa* is fully utilized by both Advaita and Mīmāṁsā.

VI

ANUPALABDHI, I.E. ABSENCE OF COGNITION

When an object capable of being cognized by a *pramāṇa* is not cognized, then, this absence of cognition leads to the cognition of the absence of the object concerned. For instance, a jar on the ground is capable of being cognized by the eye when there is sufficient light and

no hindrance. However, if it is not cognized when the eye is duly employed, the absence of this cognition leads to the cognition of the absence of the very object. This *pramāṇa* is accepted by both. A special point in Advaita approach needs to be noted. The ground is the object of perception according to both. It is only the absence of the jar on the ground that is to be cognized by *anupalabdhi*. But according to Advaita, when the ground is pervaded by *pramātṛ caitanya* as a result of *vṛtti*, the absence of jar is also covered by it. Consequently, the cognition of the absence of the jar also has to be considered as perception. Advaita says there is no harm in accepting it as perception but still *anupalabdhi* is the means for it. One kind of *pramāṇa* can be the means of another kind of *pramāṇa* as in the case of '*daśamaḥ tvam asi*'. Here, the means is *śabdapramāṇa* while the result is *pratyakṣa*.[9]

VII

ĀGAMA, I.E. VERBAL TESTIMONY

In the area of *āgama pramāṇa*, there are some important differences between Advaita and *Pūrvamīmāṁsā*.

(i) The nature of *apauruṣeyatva* and *nityatva* of the Veda is differently explained in Advaita. At the commencement of each creation Īśvara recites the Veda exactly in the same way in which it was recited in the earlier cycle of creation. In the case of other *pauruṣeya* statements, each statement is different from the earlier statements. These do not need a similar statement earlier. These are not uniform. However, in case of the Veda, it is always uniform. It is in this sense that the Veda is *apauruṣeya* and the other statements are *pauruṣeya*.

(ii) Mīmāṁsakas consider that only such sentences that convey action are authoritative. The Vedic sentences that enjoin some or other action are authoritative. The sentences that merely state what is already there are not authoritative. The authoritativeness of these is rejected on two grounds.

(a) stating already known is purposeless

(b) stating something already stated by other *pramāṇa* makes it *sāpekṣa*. Consequently, the *nirapekṣatva* condition of *prāmāṇya* is violated.

These grounds are rejected by Advaita. It is not necessary that the sentences that state what is already there, state what is already known by some other *pramāṇa*. The facts that are not already known are also stated by such sentences. For instance, the identity of *jīva* and Brahman which is already there, is not already known. Hence, the statements that state this are authoritative.

The purpose to be served by the sentences is of two types: (i) obtaining what is not yet obtained, (ii) obtaining that which is already there. Activity is the means for the first type of result and knowledge is the means for the second type. In view of this, the statements (i) *tamevaṁ vidvān amṛta iha bhavati*, (ii) *tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ*, etc., which convey Brahman are authoritative.

The Jaimini's statement that '*āmnāyānāṁ kriyārthatvāt*, applies only to *Karmakāṇḍa* portion. Strictly speaking, even the statements that enjoin sacrifices also ultimately contribute to attain liberation.

(iii) For the comprehension of the sentence meaning, in addition to *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *āsatti, tātparyajñāna* is also considered as an essential requirement in Advaita. In fact, *tātparya* plays a very important role in determining the import of many important Vedic statements, particularly, the statements that convey the identity between Brahman and *jīva*. The expression *tātparya* should not be taken in the sense of a statement 'made with the desire to convey what is stated in it' but it should be taken in the sense 'a statement that is capable of conveying what is stated in it.'[11]

(iv) The word meaning is of two types, viz., (a) primary, (b) secondary. The denotative power to convey the primary meaning is designated as '*śakti*.' The *śakti* is considered as a separate category both in Advaita and Mīmāṁsā. The primary meaning of a word is *jāti*, i.e. universal or class-characteristic *Vyakti* is comprehended along with *jāti*.

The secondary meaning is designated as *lakṣaṇā*. It is of three types. Among these *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* serves a special purpose in Advaita. It is utilized to interpret the statement '*tat tvam asi*', here '*tat*' refers to *sarvajña, sarvaśakti Īśvara* and *tvam* refers to *alpajña, alpaśakti jīva*. With these opposite attributes, their identity cannot be conveyed. Therefore, both these words are taken in the sense of *śuddha caitanya* by *jahat-ajahat lakṣaṇā*.

The word *jahat* means not taking into account while *ajahat* means taking into account. Here, *Sarvajñatva* attribute of Īśvara and *alpajñatva* attribute of *Jīva* are not to be taken into account and *śuddha caitanya* aspect has to be taken into account while comprehending the import of the words *tat* and *tvam*. This will enable one to comprehend the identity of the two, that is to say, there is no *jīva* apart from Brahman. Thus, *jahadajahat lakṣaṇā* plays an important role in Advaita.

However, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* feels that there is no need of any *lakṣaṇā*. When two words conveying two qualified objects are incongruent, because of the incongruency of qualifications, the qualifications have to be ignored. Hence, the purpose of conveying identity can be achieved without *lakṣaṇā*.[12]

An important point to be noted in Advaita in respect of *pramāṇas* is that excepting the Advaita *śrutis* all other *pramāṇas* operate only in the field of *avidyā*. These are authoritative only at the *vyāvahārika* level. As regards the *prameya*, the Advaita scheme of *prameya* is altogether different from that of Mīmāṁsā.

VIŚIṢTADVAITA VEDĀNTA

K.E. Devanathan

In respect of the doctrines of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* the two schools, viz., Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras considerably differ. Viśiṣṭādvaita has some similarity in respects of some doctrines

particularly of Prābhākaras and differs from them in other respects. A brief review of these aspects is attempted here.

I

THE COGNITION

According to Bhāṭṭas, cognition is an attribute of *ātman*. It is defined as that which is the cause of all activities. When the cognition arises, it invests its object with the capacity to reveal itself. This capacity is designated as *prākaṭya*, i.e. to be revealed, or *jñātatā*, i.e. to become known. It enables us to infer the cognition that has arisen. For instance, the cognition of the jar is inferred by the fact that the jar is revealed. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa states in *Mānameyodaya* that the cognition is known by *arthāpatti*.[1]

The Bhāṭṭas do not agree with *svaprakāśatva*, i.e. self-revealing theory of Prābhākaras. They argue that the cognition is not self-revealing, because, it is also an object. The comprehension is of a cognition that arises by its cognition, because, it is comprehension like comprehension of the cognition of some other person.[2]

Prābhākaras do not agree with the above stand of Bhāṭṭas. They state that instead of adopting such a roundabout procedure for the comprehension of the cognition, it is better to consider it as self-revealing. It cannot be argued in favour of making the very object self-revealing, because these being constant, there will be the contingency of objects being revealed all the time including during the deep sleep also.

In every cognition the knower, the object and the cognition are presented. The knower and the object are revealed by the cognition and the cognition reveals itself. All cognitions are of the nature of direct perception.[3]

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita also, the cognition is self-revealing. The cognition not only enables to comprehend the objects but it enables to comprehend itself. The role of the cognition is to reveal objects by its very presence. Naturally it reveals itself also. It is the very nature of cognition. It cannot be argued that just as the tip of the finger cannot touch itself, the cognition cannot be both the agent and the object of cognition. Just as the *ātman* is the agent to know itself and the object of its cognition, the cognition also can be the agent and the object for the cognition of itself.

II

THE DREAM OBJECTS

Both Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras consider the dream objects as not true. But Viśiṣṭādvaita considers them as true. The dream objects are true and their cognition in the dream is also true. But in *Brahmasūtra* '*vaidharmyāt ca svapnādivat*'[4] the difference between the waking state objects and the dream objects is stated. This requires an explanation if the

dream objects are also considered as true on a par with the waking state objects. It is explained as follows: the context of this *sūtra* is the context of refuting the Buddhist's view. Both Buddhists and Vedāntins are agreed on the point that the outside objects are not present in the dream cognition. In respect of the internal objects, Buddhists hold that these are not true while Vedāntins hold that these are true. Keeping the pūrvapakṣin's view in mind the example of dream objects is given in the *sūtra*. Further, the expression *ādi*, i.e. refers to *māya*, i.e. magic and other items. The *vaidharmya* is stated primarily keeping these in mind. Moreover, Buddhists do not accept the authority of *śruti*. Therefore, there is no point in answering the *pūrvapakṣa* made by the Buddhists on the basis of truthfulness of dream objects.

III

NIRVIKALPAKA COGNITION

According to Bhāṭṭas, at the *nirvikalpaka* stage of perception, *jāti*, *guṇa* and *vyakti* are cognized without realization of their status as attributes and object and without their syntactical association indicating this status. It is a cognition that is comparable to the cognition of children and dumb persons.[5]

According to Prābhākaras, at the *nirvikalpaka* stage of cognition *jāti*, *guṇa* and *vyakti* are cognized without realization of the continuing nature of *jāti* in other *vyaktis*, and the specific nature of *vyakti*.[6]

Viśiṣṭādvaitins does not accept the views of Nyāya and Bhāṭṭas that at the *nirvikalpaka* stage the attributes *jāti*, *guṇa*, etc. are cognized in an isolated way. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, all cognitions are cognitions of the qualified objects only. Even at the *nirvikalpaka* stage the object is cognized as qualified by *jāti* and other attributes. However, the continuing nature of *jāti* is not realized in the first observation as there is no *saṁskāra* of previous observation. Keeping this fact in mind *nirvikalpaka* stage is defined as *saṁskāranirapekṣa-indriyajanyajñāna*, i.e. the cognition that is produced by the senses without the cooperation of the *saṁskāra*. *Savikalpaka* is that which is produced with the cooperation of the *saṁskāra*. It is the co-operation of *saṁskāra* that enables the observer to realize the continuing nature of *jāti* etc., at the *savikalpaka* stage.

The difference between the *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* is put in another way also. At *nirvikalpaka* stage the object is cognized as qualified by a few attributes only, and at the *savikalpaka* stage by all attributes. The use of the expression *nirvikalpaka* for the first stage is not in the sense that the object is presented without being qualified by any attribute but it is used in the sense that it is presented as qualified only by a few attributes. For example, a poor person is sometimes described as *nirdhana*, without any property, in the sense that he has limited property.[7]

Mīmāṁsakas' contention that cognition at the *nirvikalpaka* level is something like the cognition of children and dumb persons and it is indistinct, is not acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita. If it were indistinct, the child would not have proceeded to take it. The child

proceeds to suck the breast only because it cognizes the attributes of the milk. The dumb person may not be able to use the name, but he cognizes the other attributes along with the object. Therefore, there is no such stage of cognition where the object is cognized without its attributes.

Nyāya tries to establish the nature of *nirvikalpakajñāna* as a cognition of an object without being qualified by the attributes like *jāti* etc. on the ground that the cognition of an attributed object needs the cognition of the attributes before it. This earlier cognition of attributes cannot be again of the nature of an attributed object. This will lead to infinite regress. Therefore, a stage of cognition when attributes only are cognized has to be envisaged. This stage is the *nirvikalpaka* stage. This argument is also not acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita. There is no ground to hold that for the cognition of an attributed object, the cognition of the attributes is necessary earlier. When the means of cognizing the object and its attribute are common, there is no difficulty in cognizing both simultaneously. In the instance of *surabhicandanam,* a fragrant piece of sandalwood, the fragrance and the wood are not cognized by the same means. The wood is cognized by the eye and the fragrance by *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti.*

IV

THE RELATION BETWEEN WORD AND MEANING

According to both Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras, the relation between word and meaning is *pratyāyaka-pratyāyya,* i.e. that which makes it known and that which is known. The word makes the meaning known. Therefore, it is called *pratyāyaka* and the meaning is known. Hence, it is called *pratyāyya.* No other relation such as cause and effect, conjunction, inherence, etc. is possible between the word and the meaning. This relation is natural and permanent. It is not fixed by any human agency. It is not a convention laid down by any individual. Words do not need any physical contact with the object to convey them as in the case of senses for conveying the objects, nor do they need any *vyāpti* relation as in the case of inference. There is a natural relation between the word and the meaning conveyed.[8]

Here, the question arises, if the relation between the word and the meaning is natural, one should have comprehended the meaning of the word on the very first occasion of hearing it. This does not happen. This objection is answered by pointing out that though the relation between the two is natural, it has to be comprehended. The elder's conversation is an aid to comprehend it. Though the eye has a natural capacity to perceive the object, it needs the aid of light. Similarly, the aid of elder's conversation is an aid to comprehend the fact that such and such a word conveys such and such a meaning.

Prābhākaras also explain the relation between the word and the meaning in the same way. However, they insist that *vṛddhavyavahāra* is the only way to comprehend the meaning of the words. They also insist that the meaning of words is comprehended as connected with the action conveyed by the verb. Words do not convey their meaning in isolation.[9]

Viśiṣṭādvaita agrees with the position that the relation between the word and the meaning is natural and eternal. But they do not agree with Prābhākara's view that this relation is comprehended through elder's conversation only. They also do not agree with the contention that words convey their meanings as connected with the action conveyed by the verb. Even the statements that do not have a verb as also isolated words convey their meaning. This position can be explained by quoting three situations.

(i) A person instructs another one to inform Devadatta that 'a son is born to him' with gesticulation. The other person informs Devadatta. A third person accompanying him who did know the meaning of this statement comprehends the meaning of the same. Here, there is no verb nor the words in the statement are connected with the action.

(ii) Children are made to learn meanings of words by being introduced as 'she is mother, he is father, she is sister', etc. Here also there is no connection with any action.

(iii) A person informs Devadatta 'a son is born to you'. On hearing this, Devadatta's face reveals that he is happy. A person standing by observes this. He concludes that Devadatta's joy is due to the statement heard by him. From the context of the statement made, he comprehends the meaning of the statement. Here also the words are not connected with any verb and word meanings are not connected with any action.

In view of this, Viśiṣṭādvaita concludes that words conveying meaning as connected with the action conveyed by the verb need not be insisted upon. Both *kāryavyutpatti* and *siddhavyutpatti* are possible. It depends upon the context and the form of the statement.[10]

V

THE MEANING OF THE WORD

According to Bhāṭṭas, the word conveys *jāti*, i.e. class characteristic, the universal. The *vyakti*, i.e., the object, is conveyed by *arthāpatti* according to old Mīmāṁsakas. But later Mīmāṁsakas hold the view that as, *jāti* and *vyakti* are identical, when *jāti* is conveyed the *vyakti* is also conveyed. This does not lead to the contingency of *jāti* also becoming *anitya* i.e. perishable on account of the *vyakti* being perishable. In the complex of *jāti* and *vyakti*, the *jāti* aspect is permanent while *vyakti* aspect is perishable. According to *Khaṇḍadeva*, *jāti* is the meaning and *vyakti* is conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*.

It should not be argued that one and the same word cannot have two denotative powers. It can be there as in the case of the stock example of *lakṣaṇā*, viz., *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*. The maxim, viz., a word once used yields only one meaning, is also not violated, since one meaning is conveyed by the primary denotative power and the other meaning is conveyed by the secondary denotative power.

According to Prābhākaras, words have two types of power, viz., (i) *smārika*, i.e. reminding power, (ii) *ānubhāvikī*, i.e. providing direct cognition. The *jāti* is conveyed by the first aspect. *Vyakti* is also presented by the same as per the maxim 'between two related items, the cognition of one leads to the cognition of the other.'

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the word conveys the *vyakti* qualified by *jāti*. In other words, the object qualified by its attributes is the meaning of a word. The Viśiṣṭādvaita has developed the concept of special relation designated as *apṛthaksiddhi*, i.e. non-separability or one not being without the other. This is the relation between *jāti* and *vyakti*. In view of this, *jāti* cannot be cognized without the cognition of *vyakti*. Viśiṣṭādvaita further expands the scope of the meaning to the *ātman* who is the locus of the cognition and *paramātman* who is the locus of *ātman*. Every word conveys *jāti, vyakti, ātman* and *paramātman*. The scope of the meaning of a word extends up to *paramātman*. However, ordinary people comprehend only the first two levels of meaning while learned men comprehend up to *paramātman*. The *Chāndogya śruti* '*anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi*' informs that *paramātman* enters into all objects and assumes the names and forms of all objects.

It cannot be argued that if all words convey *paramātman*, then these will be synonyms. Different words convey different forms of *paramātman*. The lexicons also will not be a waste of effort for the same reason.[11]

VI

THE IMPORT OF THE INJUNCTION

In the injunctive statement '*svargakāmo yajeta*' the *liṅ* suffix conveys the injunction. According to Bhāṭṭas, the import of this injunction is *pravartanā* or *preraṇā*, i.e. impelling to undertake the sacrificial activity. As it is conveyed by the word, it is called *śābdī bhāvanā*. It is of the nature of conveying *iṣṭasādhanatā*, i.e. the means to achieve the desired object. *Iṣṭasādhanatva* is the import of injunction according to Maṇḍana Miśra and Pārthasārathi. However, Khaṇḍadeva holds the view that *pravartanā* is not the same as *iṣṭasādhanatā*. It is only a *vyāpāra* or function of the *liṅ* suffix that prompts to undertake activity. *Iṣṭasādhanatva* of *yāga* is inferred from this. It is not included in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix.

Prābhākaras totally differ from Bhāṭṭas. According to them *kārya* or *niyoga* is the import of the injunctive suffix. It is also called *apūrva* since it is conveyed by the Vedic injunction only but not by any other *pramāṇa*.[12]

Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not accept both these views. They hold the view that *kṛtisādhyatva* is the import of the injunction. *Vedārthasaṅgraha* clearly states that *kṛtisādhyatva* is the import of the injunctive suffix. However, in *Nītimālāniyoga* i.e., wish of the authoritative person is stated as the import of the injunctive suffix.

Vedāntadeśika mentions both *kṛtisādhyatva* and *niyoga* as the import of the injunctive suffix. He rejects both *Śabdabhāvanā* theory and *Iṣṭasādhanatva* theory.

Prābhākara's theory of *kārya* or *apūrva* being conveyed by the injunctive suffix is rejected on the ground that the denotative power of the injunctive suffix to convey the *apūrva* cannot be satisfactorily explained. Here, the questions are raised whether the denotative power of *liṅ* to convey *apūrva* is comprehended before the *apūrva* is comprehended or after it is comprehended? It cannot happen before the comprehension of *apūrva* since, the denotative

power cannot convey an unknown entity. If it is after *apūrva* is known, then, it will lead to reciprocal dependency, i.e. *anyonyāśraya* as the comprehension of *apūrva* requires the comprehension of the denotative power to know it and the comprehension of the denotative power requires the comprehension of the *apūrva* to denote it.

The Bhāṭṭa's theory of *pravartana* as a *vyāpāra* of the injunctive suffix i.e. function of the injunctive suffix is also rejected by Viśiṣṭādvaita on the ground that the words cannot have any *vyāpāra*.

The two views of Viśiṣṭādvaita, viz., (i) *kṛtisādhyatva*, and (ii) *niyoga* are brought under one head *kṛtyādhīnasiddhyarhatva* by Sri Uttamuru Veera Raghavacharya. The addition of the clause *arhatva* accommodates *niyoga*, i.e. the desire of an authoritative person. *Niyoga* conveyed by Vedic injunction is of the nature of the wish of the God. It is an order of the God.

VII

THE THEORIES OF ABHIHITĀNVAYAVĀDA AND ANVITĀBHIDHĀNAVĀDA

It is well known that in respect of the sentence meaning the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda* is held by Bhāṭṭas and the theory *anvitābhidhānavāda* is held by Prābhākaras.

Viśiṣṭādvaita does not particularly support one of these. Bhāṭṭa Parāśara is of the opinion that Śribhāṣya is in favour of *anvitābhidhāna* theory. On the other hand, Śrī Rāmamiśra takes the view that Bhāṣyakāra is in favour of *abhihitānvaya* theory. However, Vedāntadeśika states that both are acceptable to us. In Sarvārthasiddhi he remarks '*guru-kumārilaparigṛhītaṁ pakṣa-dvayamapi āśritya parapakṣavādināṁ pratikṣepamāha.*[13]

In Vedārthasaṅgraha Śrī Rāmānuja observes that the *Śruti* statements '*satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma*', '*ānando brahma*', etc., convey Brahman qualified with all attributes. This supports *anvitābhidhāna* concept.

Bhāṭṭa Parāśara clearly states in his Tattvaratnākara that Yāmunācārya favoured *anvitābhidhāna*. He also states that the six objections against this theory are rejected by six arguments.

In Vedārthasaṅgraha a statement that supports *abhihitānvaya* is also found. It reads as follows: '*evaṁ bodhakānāṁ padasaṅghātānāṁ saṁsargaviśeṣabodhanena vākyaśabdābhidheyānām uccāraṇakramaḥ yatra puruṣabuddhipūrvakaḥ.*' This remark appears to support the Nyāya explanation of *abhihitānvaya*. Similar other remarks are quoted by Vedāntadeśika from *Śrībhāṣya* that support *abhihitānvaya*.

In Sarvārthasiddhi Vedāntadeśika narrates *anvitābhidhāna* procedure, raises some objections and refutes them.

(i) According to *anvitābhidhāna* theory, first words convey their meaning, then, *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā*, etc., are taken into account, then the words express the connected meaning, and finally the meaning is comprehended. This is a circular procedure. This drawback is technically designated as *cakraka*.

(ii) *Ākāṅkṣā*, etc., are taken into account after the words present the objects to the mind, and the meaning is comprehended after the *ākāṅkṣā*, etc., are taken into account. This involves reciprocal dependency. This is technically designated as *anyonyāśraya*.

These objections are rejected by explaining the procedure of comprehension of the sentence meaning as per *anvita* theory. The words do not convey the connected meaning at the very first stage. As soon as the words are heard, the objects referred to by them are reminded. Then, the *ākāṅkṣā* etc., are taken into account, then the words convey the connected meanings. Thus, there is no room for either *cakraka* or *anyonyāśraya*.

Vedāntadeśika defends *abhihitānvaya* theory also by answering the objections raised against it.

The main objection against *abhihitānvayavāda* is that it requires:

(i) a denotative power for words to convey their meaning, (ii) a denotative power for word meanings to convey the sentence meaning, (iii) another denotative power to the words to invest the word meanings with the power to convey the sentence meaning.

Quoting these objections, Vedāntadeśika replies that so far as the first denotative power, viz., a denotative power to convey the word meaning is concerned, it is acceptable. But a denotative power to word meanings to convey the sentence meaning is not necessary. It is the very nature of word meanings to lead to the sentence meaning. No separate power is necessary. Consequently, no third power is necessary to invest the word meanings with the power to convey the sentence meaning.

From this reply another important point becomes clear. The reply envisages the meaning of the words as the means for the sentence but not the words. Nyāya holds the view that the words are the means for sentence meaning and the word meanings are only an intermediary *vyāpāra*. But the Bhāṭṭas take the view that the very word meanings are the means of sentence meaning. Thus the procedure of *abhihitānvaya* adopted by Nyāya is slightly different from that of Bhāṭṭas.

VIII

KHYĀTI THEORY

In respect of *khyāti*, i.e., perceptual error, the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras adopt different theories. The Bhāṭṭa theory is designated as *viparītakhyāti*. According to this theory, an object is wrongly cognized as another object. For instance, when a shell is cognized as silver, it is a case of *viparītakhyāti*, i.e. wrong cognition. Here both shell and silver exist. The shell is present before the observer and the silver also exists elsewhere. But the characteristic of silver, viz., silverness is not in the object, i.e. shell, which is now wrongly cognized as silver. The relation between the shell and the silverness does not exist. This has resulted in the wrong cognition. It is the similarity between the shell and the silver that has led to this wrong cognition.[14]

Prābhākaras explain the nature of this cognition differently. According to them, it is not a single cognition. The statement made as 'this is silver' on observing the shell consists

of two cognitions, viz., 'this' and 'silver'. 'This' refers to the object perceived that is present before. But the object present before is perceived merely as an object without its special characteristic shellness. The cognition 'silver' is not a perceptual cognition. It is a memory of the silver seen elsewhere earlier. However, since, these two cognitions, viz., 'this' and 'silver' occur in quick succession, the observer does not realize the difference between the two cognitions and their objects. Hence, he proceeds to fetch the object present before and realizes the difference between the object of the perception and the object of memory. The non-realization of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects is *akhyāti*. This process of analysing the wrong cognition is designated as *akhyāti* theory. Here, the object of perception referred by 'this' exists, therefore, it is a true cognition. The object referred by 'silver' which is an object of memory is also true. Therefore, the statement 'this is silver' is not untrue. In fact, this statement does not represent a single cognition that may be examined as true or not true. It represents two cognitions both of which are true. It is the non-realization of the difference between the two that has led to the failure of the practical result, but not the absence of the truth of the two cognitions. For Prābhākaras all cognitions are true cognitions.[15]

Viśiṣṭādvaita also holds the view that all cognitions are true cognitions. But they explain cognitions like that of shell-silver differently. Every object contains the three elements earth, water and fire by the process of *trivṛtkaraṇa*. However, in some objects one of these three is in greater quantity than others. This is not the case only in respect of basic elements but also in their later products. In short, every object has the presence of the other objects in some degree. Normally, when one observes an object, he identifies it as that object the element of which is more prominently present and makes use of it for appropriate purpose. But sometimes he is led to cognize it on the basis of some other element which is not so prominently present. Then, of course the practical result fails. However, such a cognition is not untrue, since, the element identified by him is present in the object.

In the shell-silver example, the observer cognizing the shell as silver is not untrue, because the elements of silver are also present in the shell. In all such cognitions, the object cognized is present. This process of analysing such cognitions is designated as *satkhyāti* theory.

Viśiṣṭādvaita points out that Mīmāṁsā has utilized this idea of an object containing the elements of similar other object in fixing the substitutes for sacrificial offerings. For instance, the *pūtika* plant is considered as a substitute for *soma* plant on the ground that the two are similar to each other and the two contain the elements of each other. Similarly, *nīvāra* is considered as a substitute for *vrīhi* on the same ground. Thus, the basis of *satkhyāti* is accepted by Mīmāṁsā. In view of this, *satkhyāti* theory has to be accepted. However, in the case of the cognition of the body as the soul, the *trivṛtkaraṇa* formula cannot be applied. In such cases, *akhyāti* may be accepted.

Inference

Cārvākas do not accept *anumāna*, i.e. inference, as a *pramāṇa*. They argue that if *vyāpti* relation is worked out with a particular *sādhya*, then, it will not be able to establish the other

sādhyas. On the other hand, if it is worked in a general way, no particular *sādhya* can be established by it. This objection is met with by different schools in different ways.

Vedāntadeśika pinpoints the Cārvākas by retorting that if you try to establish the *aprāmāṇya* of *anumāna* by *anumāna*, you have to accept the *prāmāṇya* of that *anumāna*. If that *anumāna* is *apramāṇa*, then, it cannot prove the *aprāmāṇya* of *anumāna* as a whole. In either case, you will not be able to establish the *aprāmāṇya* of *anumāna*. Similarly, the argument that '*vyāpti* cannot be established, since, the invariability of the relation cannot be established', is also not a valid argument, because, this very argument has to have invariable relation.

Rebutting the argument of Cārvākas, Vedāntadeśika clarifies the position as under: The *vyāpti* is comprehended in a general way between the *hetu* and *sādhya*. With the aid of *pakṣadharmatā* the particular *sādhya* is established.[16]

Both Viśiṣṭādvaita and Bhāṭṭas do not accept *kevalavyatireki*. The other two, viz., *kevalānvayi* and *anvayavyatireki* are accepted.[17]

In respect of *prameyas*, the approach of Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā are quite different.

DVAITA VEDĀNTA

Veera Narayana Pandurangi

In Dvaita Vedānta works, particularly in *Nyāyasudhā* and *Tarkatāṇḍava*, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* doctrines such as the concepts of *prākaṭya* of Bhāṭṭas and *kārya* of Prābhākaras and the *akhyāti* theory are reviewed. In the course of this review, these Mīmāṁsā doctrines are presented clearly and their drawbacks are pointed out. This helps us to understand them in a wider perspective. A brief account of this review is presented below.

I

THE WORD MEANING

The Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras consider *jāti*, i.e., the universal, that is, the class characteristic as the meaning of a word.

The Bhāṭṭas argue that if the *vyakti*, i.e. the object, is considered as the meaning of a word, then, for each object a separate word will have to be envisaged. Hence, *jāti*, i.e. the universal, is the meaning. However, the *vyakti*, i.e. the object, is also conveyed by way of *lakṣaṇā* or *ākṣepa*.

For the same reason, the Prābhākaras also consider *jāti* as the meaning of the word. They state that since, the *jāti* cannot remain without *vyakti*, the object, the *vyakti* is also conveyed as both are the objects of the same cognition. The *vyakti* need not be considered separately as a meaning of the word in addition to *jāti*.

Dvaita Vedānta does not agree with the above view. Dvaita considers the *vyakti*, object, as the meaning. It points out that the argument that if the *vyakti* is considered as the meaning, then, separate words have to be envisaged for each object is not a valid argument. One and the same word can be applied to all members of a group on the basis of similarity. Dvaita does not accept the kind of universal, i.e. *jāti,* that is accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsakas. According to Dvaita, one and the same *gotva,* i.e. cowness, is not spread over all cows. Each cow has its own cowness. However, the cowness of each cow is similar to the cowness in other cows. Therefore, the question of taking the cowness as the meaning of the word to use the same word for all cows does not arise. It is the similarity of all cows that enables us to employ the same word to all cows.

Further, mere cowness cannot be conveyed by the word cow. It has to be conveyed as present in the object cow. Otherwise, it will be difficult to distinguish the cow, horse and other animals. It will also be difficult to syntactically connect the word with case suffixes. If the object is not conveyed by the word, *karmatva,* etc., meaning of the case suffixes cannot be connected with the word meaning, i.e. *Jāti.* It will also not be possible to have *lakṣaṇā* since the meaning, i.e. *gaṅgātva* cannot lead to the *lakṣaṇā* of *tīra,* i.e. bank.

If the *vyakti* is to be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā,* then it will lead to the contingency that all words in a sentence are *lākṣaṇika* words. When it is possible to consider *vyakti* as the meaning of the word, there is no need to resort to *lakṣaṇā.*[1]

Viśiṣṭādvaita holds the view that the *vyakti* qualified by *jāti* is the meaning of the word. Nyāya is quite liberal in this respect. According to it, *jāti, vyakti* or *ākṛti* may be taken as the meaning of the word depending upon the nature of the statement. For instance, in the statement '*gauḥ nityaḥ*' the meaning refers to the *gotva.* This statement means that the *gotva* is eternal. In the statement *ghaṭaḥ anityaḥ,* the word *ghaṭaḥ* means the *vyakti,* i.e. the object *ghaṭa* i.e. jar. In '*piṣṭamayī gauḥ*', i.e. the cow prepared by the rice flour, the word *gauḥ* means *ākṛti.* Therefore, the meaning should not be pinned down to one of these in all sentences. A section of Naiyāyikas also say all these are the meanings of the word as per the *sūtra* '*jāti-ākṛti-vyaktayaḥ padārthāḥ.*' This is not a correct approach. The concept of *ākṛti* cannot be properly explained.

Presenting all these views, *Pramāṇapaddhati* concludes that the *vyakti* is the meaning of the word.[2] *Tarkatāṇḍava* elaborates this point further. The *vyakti* is the meaning. It is designated as *śakya,* i.e. the meaning conveyed by primary denotative power. Attributes like *jāti, guṇa, karma,* etc., are *śakyatāvacchedaka,* i.e. specifiers of the meaning. These are as much objects of the cognition of word meaning as the meaning is. In fact, these are the grounds to employ a word with reference to a particular object. This role is designated as *pravṛtti-nimitta.*[3]

II

CRITICISM OF ABHIHITĀNVAYA THEORY

The Bhāṭṭas explain the sentence meaning by *abhihitānvaya* theory. According to this theory, the words in a sentence remind their meanings. These word meanings aided by

ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and *sannidhi* form the sentence meaning. This procedure is not acceptable to Dvaita. The following drawbacks of this theory are pointed out:

(i) The words remind the *padārthas* that belong to the past and future times also. Therefore, the cognition of the syntactical association, that has to take place at the present, cannot be achieved by them.

(ii) It cannot be argued that it is the remembering of *padārthas* produced by the words that leads to the formulation and the comprehension of the sentence meaning. Remembering is *nirvyāpāra,* i.e., actionless. Hence, it cannot cause anything. Remembering the denotative power cannot be considered as *vyāpāra* since the *padārthas* have no denotative power. Words only have the denotative power but not the word meanings.

(iii) If remembered word meanings lead to the sentence meaning, then, even a group of words like *ghataḥ karmatvam, ānayanaṁ kṛtiḥ* which also remind the word meanings, should have led to the sentence meaning.

(iv) The stock example of *abhihitānvayavādins,* viz., *śvetaḥ aśvo dhāvati*' to demonstrate that the *padārthas* lead to *vākyārtha* is either *arthāpatti* or *anumāna.* It is not verbal communication at all.

(v) When the language is learnt through elder's conversation, it is through the sentence meaning of the nature of connected word meanings but not through the isolated word meanings.

On these grounds, *abhihitānvaya* theory is rejected by the Dvaita.[4]

Dvaita Vedānta adopts *anvitābhidhāna* theory on the following grounds:

(i) *Anvaya,* i.e. the connection of the word meanings with the meanings of the other relevant words has to be conveyed by the words. If it is obtained by any other means, it will cease to be verbal communication.

(ii) Even *abhihitānvayavādins* have accepted *anvitābhidhāna* in the case of the meanings of *prātipadika* and *pratyaya,* and *khaṇḍavākya* and *mahāvākya.*

(iii) *Anvaya* is a kind of link between the word meanings. If it is not conveyed by the words, it cannot be a link between the two that are conveyed by the words.

(iv) If *anvaya,* i.e., the connection, is not conveyed in a general way right at the time of conveying the word meaning, there will be no initiative to ascertain the specific relation between the word meanings to form the sentence meaning.

On these grounds, *anvitābhidhāna* has to be accepted.[5]

Dvaita and Prābhākara agree in adopting *anvitābhidhāna* theory. However, there is a difference of opinion on the point whether it is *sāmānya-anvitābhidhāna* or *viśeṣānvitābhidhāna.*

Udayana has raised a number of objections against *anvitābhidhāna.* The objections of *anyonyāśraya, paryāyatva* and *vaiyarthya* were already raised and answered by Śālikanātha. But still Udayana repeats them. *Tarkatāṇḍava* answers them. A few more objections such as '*anvitasya anvayaḥ*', '*anvayāṁśe anvayaḥ*', etc., raised by Udayana are also answered.

III

THE IMPORT OF THE INJUNCTION

Indian philosophers debate a good deal on the import of the injunction. The optative suffix, i.e. *liṅ* conveys the injunction. Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsakas consider that *preraṇā*, i.e. impelling to undertake activity, is conveyed by the injunctive suffix *liṅ*. This *preraṇā* is of the nature of *iṣṭasādhanatā*, i.e. state of a means for achieving the desired object. For instance, in the injunctive statement '*darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta*' the injunctive suffix *liṅ* in the verb '*yajeta*' conveys that the performance of the sacrifice is *iṣṭasādhana*, i.e. is a means for achieving the desired result. The expression *svargakāma* specifies this result as *svarga* and the expression *darśapūrṇamāsa* specifies the activity to be undertaken. The whole injunctive statement conveys that the performance of *darśapūrṇamāsa* is a means for the desired object i.e. *svarga*. It is *iṣṭasādhanatva* of *yāga* that is conveyed by the injunctive suffix in the verb *yajeta*. Later writers of Bhāṭṭa school, particularly, Khaṇḍadeva is of the opinion that *preraṇā* i.e., impelling to undertake the activity, is the primary meaning of the injunctive suffix. From this *iṣṭasādhanatva* is inferred. It need not be included in the scope of the meaning as its cognition is available by inference.

Prābhākaras consider that *kārya*, i.e. this is a task or duty to be undertaken by me, '*mama idaṁ kāryam*' is the import of the injunctive suffix. This *kārya* is also designated as *niyoga*, i.e. a direction to undertake activity. It is also called *apūrva* as it is not conveyed by any *pramāṇa* other than the Vedic injunction.

The concept of *kāryatā* of Prābhākaras is explained as *kṛtisādhya* and *kṛtipradhāna*, i.e. that which is to be accomplished by *kṛti*, i.e. initiative, and the goal of the *kṛti*.

Tarkatāṇḍava points out that this *prādhānya* or the fact of being the goal is possible only if it is envisaged as *iṣṭasādhana*. A person aims at something as a goal only if it is *iṣṭasādhana*, i.e. means of a desired object. Even the Prābhākaras have taken *iṣṭasādhanatā* as a ground for *kāryatā*.

Since *iṣṭasādhanatā* is sufficient to prompt the activity, there is no need of a separate concept designated as *kāryatā*. In fact, *iṣṭasādhanatā* itself is *kāryatā* in the sense that it prompts to undertake activity.

There is another important aspect of the concept of *kāryatā*. *Kārya* which is stated to be the import of the injunction attains the status of *apūrva* when the *kārya* is accomplished by performing the sacrifice. This remains until the result *svarga* is realized. The sacrifice which is perishable and does not continue until the realization of the result is not able to procure the result for the performer. Therefore, something that endures until the result is obtained has to be envisaged. This is *apūrva*.

Tarkatāṇḍava does not agree with this contention. It is pointed out that the optative suffix neither states the *yāga* as direct cause nor a cause through an intermediary. It only states that it is a cause. It only requires a *sādhana*, that is, a means to achieve the result that by not undertaking which the result is not obtained is the means of it. It need not immediately precede it. A means that is not present immediately before, need not be

considered as not a cause. Firewood is considered as a cause of cooking. Similarly, eating *ghee* is stated to be the cause of good health. Here also the act of eating *ghee* does not precede the good health. The argument that 'there is an intermediary process between the eating of *ghee* and developing the health, though the presence of such an intermediary process is not observable, its absence is also non-observable. This is sufficient to envisage the cause and effect relation between the two', does not help the present case. Here, the so called *apūrva* is beyond sense perception. Hence, its presence or absence cannot be ascertained.

In view of the above, immediate precedence is not the ground for something to be the cause. But invariable presence before the effect is the ground to be a cause, or to have a potency to produce the effect is the ground to be a cause.

Further, there may not be any objection to envisage *apūrva* to explain the cause and effect relation between *yāga* and *svarga* by way of *arthāpatti* but to consider *apūrva* as an import of the injunction is unwarranted.

It is also difficult to envisage the denotative power for the optative suffix to convey *apūrva*. The *apūrva* is stated to be achieved by *kṛti*. It is permanent and it provides the result. There is no ground to say that an entity of such features is conveyed by the optative suffix. Even if it is conveyed, there is no means by which it could be comprehended. It cannot be comprehended by elder's conversation as it is supposed to have been conveyed by Vedic injunction only.[6]

IV

ARTHĀPATTI, UPAMĀNA AND ANUPALABDHI

Dvaita does not accept these three as separate *pramāṇas*. *Arthāpatti* is included under *anumāna*. The stock example of *arthāpatti* that Devadatta, though alive, is not found at home leading to the *arthāpatti* of his presence outside, could be managed by the inference as 'Devadatta is present outside his residence, because he is alive but not found at home'. In view of this, *arthāpatti* need not be considered as a separate *pramāṇa*.[7]

Upamāna is not a separate *pramāṇa*. It can be explained in the following ways:

(i) That the forest cow is similar to a village cow, is perception.

(ii) On perceiving the similarity of the village cow in the forest cow, the cognition of the similarity of forest cow in the village cow is inference. The form of the syllogism is as under:
The village cow is similar to forest cow because the forest cow is similar to the village cow. Whichever is similar to something, that is similar to this thing like the twin children.

(iii) The statement that village cow and the forest cow are similar is verbal testimony.

In the light of these explanations, it is clear that there is no scope to consider *upamāna* as a separate *pramāṇa*.[8]

Anupalabdhi or *abhāvapramāṇa* is also not a separate *pramāṇa*.

(i) The cognition of the absence of jar on the ground is perception. The non-cognition of the jar is only a ground for it. It is not a separate *pramāṇa.*

(ii) The cognition of the absence of the eye for Devadatta is inferred from his inability to see objects.

(iii) The absence of Kauravas today is cognized by the verbal testimony that they were there in remote past, as stated in the epic.

(iv) The absence of happiness and sorrow is cognized by *sākṣipratyakṣa.*

In view of this, there is no scope for a separate *pramāṇa* as *anupalabdhi.*[9]

V

THE COGNITION

Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsakas consider cognition as an activity of the *ātman.* It is not directly cognized. It is only inferred. When there is a contact between the eye and the object, the cognition arises in *ātman* as its activity. This invests the object observed with a special capacity designated as *prākatya,* the capacity to reveal itself. As a result, the object is revealed. From this, the observer infers that the cognition of that object has arisen. This contention is not acceptable to the Dvaita. An object will be revealed as soon as it becomes the object of the cognition. There is no need to invest it with any special capacity to reveal itself. The fact of its being an object of the cognition is sufficient to reveal itself. Moreover, the object of past and future cannot be invested with any special capacity.

The definition of valid cognition given by Bhāṭṭas as the cognition of the objects as they are and are already not known is also not acceptable. This definition excludes memory as it conveys the facts that are already known. However, memory is valid cognition, as it conveys the objects as they are.[10]

Prābhākaras define cognition as direct experience. They also exclude memory from the scope of valid cognition. This is not acceptable to the Dvaita as already stated. Moreover, the doubt and false cognition are also direct cognitions. These cannot be considered as true cognitions. The Prābhākaras consider these also as true but their arguments and analyses of these cognitions are not convincing.

VI

THE AKHYĀTI THEORY

The Prābhākaras do not accept false cognition at all. According to them all cognitions are true. The shell-silver cognition which is considered as false cognition by all others is also not false according to Prābhākaras. It is not a single cognition. The statement 'this is silver' represents two cognitions. 'This' represents the cognition of the shell that is present before the observer. However, the shell is not cognized with its special characteristic but

it is cognized as 'this' in a general way. The 'silver' represents another separate cognition. This is the memory of the silver seen in the past. However, the reference to the past is deleted in this memory. These two cognitions, viz., perception of the shell as 'this' and the memory of the silver, occur in such a quick succession that their difference is not realized. Consequently, the observer proceeds to fetch the silver and fails. However, the two cognitions 'this' and 'silver' are true since these agree with the facts conveyed by them. Hence, this is a case of non-realization of difference but not a case of false cognition. This analysis of the cognition is designated as *akhyāti*.[11]

Nyāyasudhā quotes this theory in detail and points out that the statement 'this is silver' cannot be considered as representing two cognitions. The cognition of silver referred to in this statement cannot be considered as memory. Prābhākara's contention that the observer proceeds to fetch the object present before him because he has not realized the difference between what is seen and what is remembered, is also not a valid contention.

The non-realization is a negative factor. This cannot induce a positive act of proceeding to fetch the object present before the person concerned. Further, the question whether the observer has not realized merely the difference or the identity also, has to be examined. If he has not realized the identity, then, he will not proceed to fetch it. If he has cognized the identity which is really not there, then it amounts to *anyathākhyāti*. It will be explained later that this *anyathākhyāti* is of the nature of cognizing the silver which is really not present.[12]

The Bhāṭṭas adopt the theory of *viparītakhyāti*. According to them, there is *tādātmyāropa* of the silver over the shell. Now, this *tādātmya*, identity, is really not present. Therefore, the *viparītakhyāti* also boils down to the cognition of something that is not really present.

In the light of this, the Dvaita explains the nature of wrong cognition as '*asataḥ satvena pratītiḥ*', understanding of the non-existent as existent.

When a person affected with a defective eyesight, and absence of proper light, etc., observes a shell, his previous impressions of silver get revived and he cognizes the silver which is really not present before him. It is not brought by *jñānalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* as envisaged by Nyāya, nor is there the *tādātmyāropa* of a remembered silver as envisaged by Bhāṭṭas. It is just not there. The defective eyesight, the revival of the previous impressions, etc., contribute to the cognition of the silver that does not exist before the observer. However, for such a cognition of a non-existing object there are two requirements: (i) *adhiṣṭhāna*, i.e. an object to serve as a base. In the present case the shell is the base, i.e. *adhiṣṭhāna*. (ii) Earlier cognition of a similar object. In the present case, it is the silver seen earlier that is *sadṛśavastu*. The contact between the *adhiṣṭhāna*, i.e. shell and eye and the revival of the impressions of silver seen earlier lead to the cognition of silver which is really not present before him. This position is stated as '*asataḥ satvena pratītiḥ*.' The silver is the object of this cognition not as *viṣaya*, i.e. really existing object, but as *ullikhita*, i.e. an object that is referred to.[13]

In this context two important points have to be noted.

(i) Buddhists also hold the view that *asat* is cognized as *sat*. But the *adhiṣṭhāna* is also *asat* for them. It makes a distinction between the Dvaita and Buddhist views.

(ii) The cognition of *asat* is involved in some form or other in all the theories. In *anyathākhyāti* of Nyāya type the relation between *śukti* and *rajatatva* is *asat*. In *viparītakhyāti* of Bhāṭṭas the *tādātmya* between the shell and silver is *asat*.

Even in the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of Advaita, the silver that has *prātibhāsikasattā* and has no *vyāvahārikasattā* is taken as *vyāvahārikasat* by the observer when he proceeds to fetch it. This amounts to *vyāvahārikasattvena asataḥ rajatasya vyāvahārikasatvena pratītiḥ*.

From this, it is clear that *asataḥ sattvena pratītiḥ* is involved in all theories of wrong cognition. Therefore, it is better to evolve a simple theory of wrong cognition as '*sataḥ asattvena pratītiḥ*.' This definition is adopted by the Dvaita. The circumstances under which such cognition arises are also explained. It is also made clear that the object of such cognition is not *viṣaya* type as in the case of true cognition but *ullekha*, reference type.

VII

PRAMEYAS, I.E. CATEGORIES

(i) The Bhāṭṭas accept only five categories dropping *samavāya* and *viśeṣa* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Prābhākaras drop *viśeṣa* and *abhāva*. They add *śakti*, *saṁkhyā* and *sādṛśya*.[14] The Dvaita accepts the five categories accepted by Bhāṭṭas. They also accept *śakti* and *sādṛśya*. The *sāmānya* accepted in the Dvaita is not the same as in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṁsā. It does not pervade all members of the class. It is present in each member of the class separately. *Viśeṣa* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas type is not accepted by the Dvaita. It has its own special concept of *viśeṣa*. *Samavāya* is not accepted by the Dvaita. It is interesting to note that the Dvaita adds two more categories, viz., *viśiṣṭa* and *aṁśī*.

(ii) Bhāṭṭas consider *tamas*, i.e. darkness as a *dravya*. The Dvaita also accepts it as a *dravya*. Prābhākaras do not accept it as a *dravya*.

(iii) *Śabda* is considered as *dravya* by Bhāṭṭas. However, Prābhākaras and the Dvaita consider it as a quality.[15] Dvaita considers the *varṇātmaka śabda* as *dravya*.

An important point on which Prābhākaras and the Dvaita agree is that *bheda*, i.e. the difference is an intrinsic attribute of the object. When an object is comprehended, its distinction from all other objects is also comprehended in a general way. To comprehend the distinction from a particular object, the presentation of that object as a *pratiyogin* is required. The cognition that an object is distinct from all other objects arises along with the cognition of the object itself.[16]

The above review of Mīmāṁsā doctrines in Dvaita works is intended only to draw the attention of the readers to some important differences. A detailed study of this has to be made separately.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Advaita

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3. Ibid. p.135
4. Ibid. p.189
5. Ibid. p.201
6. Ibid. p.203
7. Ibid. p.226
8. Ibid. p.311
9. Ibid. p.321
10. Ibid. p.301
11. Ibid. p.286
12. Ibid. p.275

Viśiṣṭādvaita

1. M.M. p.248
2. Ibid. p.250
3. Pr.P. p.170
4. B.S.B.
5. S.D. p.48
6. Pr.P. p.160
7. N.D. p.188
8. S.D. p.90
9. Pr.P. p.232
10. T.M.K. p.74-75
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13. S.S. p.391
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15. Pr.P. p.49-50
16. N.P. p.154,156
17. M.M. p.56-57

Dvaita

1. T.T. Vol.II p.218-233
2. P.P. p.399
3. T.T. Vol.II p.247
4. Ibid. P.206
5. Ibid. P.159
6. Ibid. Vol.III, p.1-25
7. P.P. p.435
8. Ibid. p.437
9. Ibid. p.439
10. Ibid. p.81
11. N.S. Vol.I, p.522
12. Ibid. p.570
13. Nmṛ Vol.II p.632
14. T.R. P.17
15. Pr.V. P.70
16. V.T.N.

ABBREVIATIONS

Advaita

V.P.—Vedānta Paribhāṣā

Viśiṣṭādvaita

B.S.B.	*Bramasūtra Bhāṣya*
N.P.	*Nyāya Pariśuddhi*
N.D.	*Nyāya Dyumaṇi*
S.S.	*Sarvārtha Siddhi*
T.M.K.	*Tattvamuktā Kalāpa*

Dvaita

N.S.	*NyāyaSudhā*
Nmṛ	*Nyāyāmṛta*
P.P.	*Pramāṇapaddhati*
T.T.	*Tarkatāṇḍava*
V.T.N.	*Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya*

Pūrvamīmāṁsā

M.M.	*Mānameyodaya*
Pr.P.	*Prakaraṇa Pañcika*
Pr.V.	*Prabhakara Vijaya*
S.D.	*Śāstradīpikā*
T.R.	*Tantra Rahasya*

CHAPTER 16

Śrī Śaṅkara and Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

Both *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and Vedānta derive their tenets from Vedas. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* derives its tenets mostly from Brāhmaṇa portions while Vedānta derives them the from Upaniṣads. Therefore, both are interested in the interpretation of the Vedas. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* has evolved certain guidelines for the interpretation of the Vedas. These are mostly accepted by Vedānta. However, their central doctrine and the goal are different. *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* is concerned with *Dharma,* i.e. ritual programmes, while Vedānta is concerned with *Brahman.* Therefore, they differ in respect of their goal and the means to achieve it.

Śaṅkara refers to *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* by the name *Prathamatantra, Pūrvakāṇḍa, Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa,* etc. He refers to Śabarasvāmin and Upavarṣa. He utilizes the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* guidelines of interpretation such as *Upakrama, Upasaṁhāra,* etc., and also *śruti, liṅga,* etc. He quotes *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* Nyāyas. Brahmasūtrakāra himself refers to Jaimini. Many *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* terms and the names of sacrifices like *Agnihotra, Dvādaśāha* etc., are referred to in Brahmasūtra. But in respect of the central doctrine and the goal, Vedānta differs from *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.* Some of their differences are fundamental in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Śaṅkara discusses these in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and *Upaniṣad-bhāṣyas.* It is not possible to collect the entire material in this respect in one paper and analyse the same. Therefore, some crucial points that deserve special attention are deliberated on in this paper.

In the very introduction to his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,* i.e. *Adhyāsabhāṣya,* Śrī Śaṅkara raises the question as to what is the scope of the authority of Vedic injunctions, prohibitions, etc., that constitute the source of authority for the *Dharma* of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*[1] He clearly states that these are authoritative within the field of *Avidyā* as in the case of perception, inference and other *pramāṇas.* The knowledge of *Dharma,* i.e. ritual programmes, given by Vedic injunctions, prohibitions, etc., is not helpful to achieve *Brahmajñāna;* on the contrary it is opposed to *Brahmajñāna* as it involves the differentiation of agent, object, results, etc. The ritual programme of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* falls within the field of *Avidyā* and, therefore, that portion of the Veda that conveys this has authority only within that field.

The question of the difference in the scope and the objective of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and Vedānta is again raised under the first *Sūtra* while discussing the import of *atha.*[2]

Atha means after. This raises the point after what? Śrī Śaṅkara clearly states that it cannot be taken as 'after *karmajñāna* or *dharmajñāna.*' In support of this stand, he gives three reasons:

(1) The object of inquiry of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and Vedānta are different and unrelated. *Dharma* and *Brahman*[3] constitute the object of enquiry of these two respectively. These are not related as main and subordinate so as to warrant a consideration of one after the other. No such sequence is warranted on any other ground also. One can undertake the inquiry into *Brahman* before *Dharmajñāna* or after it, or even without it, since *Dharmajñāna* is irrelevant for *Brahmajñāna*. In fact, it is opposed to it.

(2) The goals of the two are different. *Dharma* is meant for the prosperity within the field of *avidyā* while *Brahmajñāna* is intended to cross over *avidyā*.

(3) The nature of *Dharma* is such that it has to be performed while that of *Brahman* is to be realized. Further, *Dharma* has to be accomplished in future while *Brahman* is ever present. Therefore, the two are totally different and unrelated. Thus Śrī Śaṅkara clearly demarcates the areas of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and Vedānta.

Under *Janmādhikaraṇa* (I.1-2) another interesting point is mentioned in respect of *Dharma* and *Brahmajñāna*. *Śruti* is the source and it communicates *Dharma*. Whatever *śruti* informs us as *Dharma*, that has to be taken as *Dharma* and is to be performed. But in case of *Brahman*, the *śruti* has to lead to the experience.[4] It is the experience or the realization of *Brahmanhood* that is important. As *Dharma* is communicated through verbal means, the classification of communicated matter as injunction, prohibition, etc., is possible and meaningful. The arrangement as general, exceptional, and alternate is also possible and meaningful. But in case of *Brahmajñāna*, the process of communication does not end by mere verbal communication. It has to lead to the experience and realization.[5] Therefore, *Brahmajñāna* is definitive. Further, *Dharmajñāna* is of the nature of *Parokṣajñāna* (mediate knowledge) while *Brahmajñāna* is *aparokṣajñāna* (immediate knowledge).

Here an important epistemological point is made. According to Advaita Vedānta, even verbal communication can lead to direct perception. The example that is generally quoted to bring home this point is "*daśamaḥ tvam asi*," "Thou art the tenth" The *Śruti* passage "*tat tvam asi*" leads to such direct perception. Thus the *śruti* helps to obtain the experience or realization of *Brahman*. As soon as the *śruti* leads one to such an experience, its purpose is over. This is how the *śruti*, that belongs to the field of *avidyā*, enables one to cross over *avidyā*.

It is in the *Samanvaya-adhikaraṇa* (I.1-4) that an issue, on which *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and Vedānta fundamentally differ, is discussed.

The Mīmāṁsā holds that the Vedas communicate only in terms of injunction. No passage that does not communicate an injunction or something that is connected with it, can be considered authoritative. Therefore, *Brahman*, as such, cannot be communicated by the Vedas. However, if the passages that refer to *Brahman* are construed as injunctions of meditation, then, *Brahman* can be treated as communicated as an object of an injunction. Another way of getting *Brahman* communicated through Vedic passages is to treat these passages as conveying a deity connected with the rituals. In any case, *Brahman* alone cannot be communicated without relating it with an injunction.[6] No Vedic passage is meaningful or authoritative unless it conveys an injunction.

This position of Mīmāṁsā is not acceptable to Vedānta. Śrī Śaṅkara refers to a number of *śruti* passages that refer to *Brahman* but do not contain any injunction. From this it is clear that *Brahman* as such can be communicated without injunction.[7]

Śrī Śaṅkara also rejects the plea that *Brahman* can at least be treated as an object of the injunction to know it. The contention of those who somehow want to bring the communication of *Brahman* within the scope of an injunction is that the Vedic communication should lead to either *Pravṛtti* or *Nivṛtti*, that is to say, either prompting to undertake something or to withdraw from something. This can be managed only by injunctions and prohibitions. Descriptive passages do not prompt either undertaking or withdrawing. Therefore, the passages that describe *Brahman* have to be treated as injunctions to know *Brahman*.[8] In some of the passages that deal with *Brahman*, injunctive verbs and potential participles are employed.

This contention is not acceptable to Vedānta. It is not necessary that every passage should lead to *Pravṛtti* or *Nivṛtti*. Nor is it necessary that either *upādeya* or *heya* be communicated. *Brahman* is neither *upādeya* nor *heya*. Brahmahood is ever present. It neither needs obtaining nor rejecting. It has to be only realized. Therefore, mere communication of it so as to enable one to realize it is sufficient.[9] No injunction to know it is necessary. Knowledge is not an activity.[10] For instance, the knowledge of fire as fire is not an activity. Therefore, it cannot be enjoined. It can only arise. The verbs in potential mood, and potential participles in some of the Vedic passages that communicate *Brahman* are intended to communicate the withdrawal from other objects rather than enjoining to know *Brahman*.[11] It is the cessation of all activity that is a precondition of *Brahmajñāna*. As regards the statement of Jaimini to the effect that no Vedic passage that does not communicate an injunction is meaningful or authoritative, it applies only to such passages that do not communicate *Brahman*. In conclusion Śrī Śaṅkara remarks that if *Brahman* were also to be communicated through *codanā* or an injunction, it would have been a sub-topic of *Dharma* and no separate treatment of inquiry into *Brahman* would have been necessary.

The above discussion makes it clear that Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta fundamentally differ on the issue of the mode of verbal communication. Their respective stands are very vital to their respective doctrinal positions. This issue of the mode of verbal communication has been a major issue in Indian epistemology. These two theories of verbal communication are known as *kāryavyutpatti* and *siddhavyutpatti*. Apart from Advaita Vedānta, a few other systems also go by the *siddhavyutpatti* theory. But the special point of Advaita in verbal communication is that it can lead to direct experience or immediate experience. The passages like '*tat tvam asi*' lead to immediate experience or realization of *Brahman*, according to Advaita.

The problem of the relative position of *Karma* and *Jñāna* in achieving human goal has been a matter of controversy between Mīmāṁsakas and Vedāntins. Mīmāṁsakas are reluctant to give an independent position to *jñāna* in this respect while Vedāntins consider *karma* only a *sahakārin* for *jñāna* but not a direct means for achieving final goal. This point is raised under many *adhikaraṇas* of *Brahmasūtras* and Vedāntin's position is made clear by Śrī Śaṅkara.

Under *Kartradhikaraṇa* and *Takṣādhikaraṇa* (II.3.33-40 and II.3.40), the very basic question whether *Jīva* is Agent or not, and if he is an Agent, whether his Agency is real or superimposed, is raised. Śrī Śaṅkara agrees that *Jīva* is an Agent but he states that this agency is not real but superimposed.[12] *Jīva* is an Agent within the field of *avidyā*. When he crosses the bound of *avidyā*, he has no separate identity and, therefore, there is no question of any Agency.

The Vedas issue injunctions and prohibitions. These will be meaningful only when there is an Agent to translate them into action. Therefore, *Jīva* has got to be an Agent. At the same time, his true nature is that he is *nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāva*. Therefore, there cannot be any real Agency on the part of *Jīva*. These two positions can be reconciled only by envisaging superimposed agency on the part of *Jīva*. This stand of Vedānta naturally relegates the entire sacrificial activity of Mīmāṁsakas to the area of avidyā.

That the Vedic injuctions are meant for the *avidvān*, while the Vedic teachings of *Brahman* or *Ātmaikya* are meant for the *vidvān*, is another way of putting the same thing.

Śrī Śaṅkara points out that the Vedic injunctions do not cause the real Agency but only enjoin certain duties with reference to the Agency that is there.[13] It is irrelevant for this purpose whether such an Agency is real or superimposed.

Under *Puruṣārthādhikaraṇa* (III.4-1-17), the question whether *jñāna* is an independent and direct means of *puruṣārtha* or subordinate to *karma* is specifically raised. Mīmāṁsakas naturally take the view that it is subordinate to *karma*. *Ātman* is the agent to perform *karmas*. Therefore, he is connected with *karma*. Hence, *Ātmajñāna* is also connected with *karma*. Therefore, whatever it achieves that is achieved through *karma* only.[14] It has no independent goal. The results of *Ātmajñāna*, such as freedom from sorrow, etc. that are mentioned over and above the results of *karma*, are only of *Arthavāda* nature. That is why it is found that even *brahmajñānins*, like Janaka, took to *karma*. It is specifically stated in *śruti* passages like "*yadeva vidyayā karoti tadeva vīryavattaraṁ bhavati.*" This clearly shows only the supporting role of *jñāna*. Passages like "*kurvanneveha karmāṇi*" make the performance of *karma* obligatory. Therefore, the Mīmāṁsakas argue that *jñāna* is not independent means of *Puruṣartha*.

This contention of the Mīmāṁsakas is opposed in *Puruṣārthādhi-karaṇa*. By *Ātman* the Mīmāṁsakas have understood *saṁsāri Ātman* here. He is, no doubt, connected with *karma* as an Agent. But when *śruti* talks of *Ātmajñāna*, it is *Paramātman* as bereft of Agency etc., who is meant. He is neither connected with *karma* not subordinate to it. Therefore, *Ātmajñāna*, in the sense of *Brahmajñāna*, is nor subordinate to *karma*. It is an independent means of *Puruṣārtha*.[15]

Here, by *Puruṣārtha* the Mīmāṁsakas understand *svarga*, etc., while Vedāntins take it in the sense of liberation. Therefore, for the Mīmāṁsaka *karma* is the means for *svarga*, etc., while *jñāna* may support *karma* to some extent. For Vedāntin, it is *jñāna* that is the real means for liberation. *Karma*, that involves the Agent, the object like *bheda-prapañca*, is actually opposed to liberation.

However, Vedāntins do accept *Karma* as *sahakārin* to *jñāna*. This question is raised in *Sarvāpekṣādhikaraṇa*.[16] It is true that *jñāna* is an independent and direct means to liberation. *Karma* does not directly contribute to this end but assists in obtaining knowledge through

cittaśuddhi. Performance of *Āśramakarmas* and *Nityakarmas* does help to obtain *cittaśuddhi* and knowledge. This point is also discussed under *Āśramakarmādhikaraṇa*[17] particularly under the *Sūtra* '*sahakāritvena ca*' (III.4.33). Even *kāmyakarma*, when performed bereft of *kāma*, does assist *jñāna*. *Agnihotra* and other *nityakarmas* are stated to be *Āradupakāraka* to liberation under the *Sūtra*.[18]

Vedāntins do not reject the utility of *karma* within the field of *avidyā*. In fact, they defend sacrifice within this field. Under the *sūtra* "*aśuddhamiti cet na śabdāt*" performance of sacrifice and offering *paśu* in a sacrifice is defended.[19] The results to be obtained by sacrifice are accepted as valid within the field of *avidyā*. But *karmas* cannot lead to liberation. These also cannot prevent liberation once the knowledge is obtained. The knowledge will nullify the effects of the *karmas*. This point is discussed under *Tadadhigamādhikaraṇa* and *Itarāsaṁśleṣādhikaraṇa* (IV.1.13-14). The point raised here is: How can *karmas* remain without producing their result simply because one has obtained *jñāna*? *Karmas* have the potency to produce their results and, therefore, they must lead to the respective results, irrespective of one obtaining *Ātmajñāna*. This line of argument is not acceptable to the Vedāntins. According to them, *Ātmajñāna* cuts the very roots of *karma*. The notions of *Kartṛtva* and *Bhoktṛtva* are the basis of *karma*. *Ātmajñāna* cancels these notions and hence the effects of *karma* are nullified by *jñāna*.

Finally, the Vedāntins do not accept the Mīmāṁsaka's contention that *karma* leads to its results through *Apūrva*. The concept of *Apūrva* is not acceptable to Vedāntins.

This question is raised under *Phalādhikaraṇa* (III.2.38-41). Here, the question whether *karma* leads to its results or Īśvara bestows the results of *karma*, is raised. The Mīmāṁsakas take the view that *karma* produces *Apūrva* which ultimately leads to the results. This view is rejected here. *Apūrva*, being *jaḍa* (non-intelligent), cannot lead to the results by itself. The concept of *Apūrva* in between *karma* and its results is not warranted since Īśvara bestows the result taking into account the *karmas* of *jīvas*.[20] This is probably the biggest blow to the Mīmāṁsakas. Though early Mīmāṁsakas are silent about Īśvara, later Mīmāṁsakas, like Kumārila, do accept Īśvara. Therefore, they cannot argue that since there is no Īśvara, *Apūrva* is necessary.

Under Devatādhikaraṇa (I.3.26-33) an interesting point, on which Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā differ, is raised. Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that deities have no *vigraha* or form. The Mīmāṁsakas do not accept *vigraha* or form to the deities for two reasons:

(1) Many persons will be performing the same sacrifice at different places at the same time. It would be difficult for Indra and other deities to be present at all places if they have *vigraha* or form.

(2) The forms of the deities, if any, will be perishable. The deities are mentioned in Vedas. The Vedic words and their meanings are eternally interconnected. However, if one of them, say, the meaning is perishable, then the very relation between the Vedic word and its meaning will be perishable. This will ultimately affect the very doctrine of *Vedanityatva*.

This line of argument is not acceptable to Śrī Śaṅkara. One and the same deity can assume many forms and be present at all the sacrifices wherever he is invoked at the same time. Further, it is not their physical presence that is necessary. The offerings are meant for them wherever they are.[21]

As regards the second reason, Śrī Śaṅkara makes it clear that the meaning of words is not *vyakti* but *ākṛti*.[22] *Ākṛti* is *nitya*. Therefore, even if in *dravyaākṛti* is perishable *Ākṛti* is not perishable. Hence, neither the *nityatva* of the relation between word and meaning is affected nor *Vedanityatva* is affected.

Incidentally, Śrī Śaṅkara discusses two other important questions here:

(1) Whether there is any need to accept the doctrine of *sphoṭa* or *varṇas* constituting a word.

(2) What is exactly meant when it is stated that the whole world arises from *Śabda*? He rejects the concept of *sphoṭa* and subscribes to the Mīmāṁsā view that *varṇas* constitute word. In this connection, he quotes the views of *Upavarṣa* who had commented on both Mīmāṁsāsūtras and *Vedāntasūtras*. As regards the second point, Śrī Śaṅkara points out that when it is stated that the world arises from '*śabda*,' it is not intended to convey their *upādāna upādeya-bhāva* (relation) as in the case of *Brahman* and the world but it only means that words connote the objects. The problems of *Vedanityatva* and *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* are also discussed under this *Adhikaraṇa*. Vedānta supports *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* on these two issues.

The *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* guidelines to determine the purport of a *śruti* passage, viz., *Upakrama, Upasaṁhāra*, etc., *tātparyaliṅgas* are fully utilized by Śrī Śaṅkara all along in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and *Upaniṣadbhāṣyas*. The Sūtrakāra himself mentions these in his *sūtras*. In many cases, the agreement between *Upakrama* and *Upasaṁhāra* is utilized to determine the purport of a passage. *Abhyāsa* and *Apūrvatā* are shown to determine the purport in a few cases.

Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya, etc., the guidelines for determining the meaning, are also utilized. The *Jaimini-Sūtra* that states the relative priority of these is quoted in *Liṅgabhūyastvādhikaraṇa* (III.3.44). But there is one important difference in the application of these between Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. In Mīmāṁsā these are *aṅgatvanirṇāyaka* while in Vedānta these are *arthanirṇāyaka*.

Mīmāṁsā guidelines of *karmabheda* are utilized to decide *saguṇopāsanā vidyābheda*. The *Jaimini-Sūtra* that lays down these guidelines is quoted in *Śabdādibhedādhikaraṇa* (III.3.58). The guidelines for determining some *vidyās* that are mentioned in more than one *śākhā* as one *Vidyā*, and sifting the material from one *śākhā* to another in the case of such *vidyās* are also utilized. It is stated that just as *Dravya* and *Devatā* constitute the central point of a sacrifice, the object to be meditated on constitutes the central point of a *saguṇopāsanā vidyā*. The passages that describe *upāsanās*, like *Udgīthopāsanā*, are treated as injunctions. Even the distinctions like *Yajamānakarma* and *Ṛtvikkarma* are introduced in the case of some *saguṇopāsanās*. Thus, the Mīmāṁsā technique and terminology are considerably utilized in Vedānta. So far as the field of *Avidyā* is concerned, the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* programme is a respectable field of activity. But when it comes to the stage of *Brahmajñāna* and realization of *Ātmaikya*, the ritual programme stands rejected.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Adhyāsa bhāṣya
2. SB.I.1.1
3. SB.I.1.1
4. SB.I.1.1
5. SB.I.1.2
6. SB.I.1.4
7. SB.I.1.4
8. SB.I.1.4
9. SB.I.1.4
10. SB.I.1.4
11. SB.I.1.4
12. SB.II.3.40
13. SB.II.3.40
14. SB.III.4.2
15. SB.III.4.8
16. SB.III.4.27
17. SB.III.4.26
18. SB.IV.1.10
19. SB.III.1.25
20. SB.III.2.38
21. SB.I.3.27
22. SB.I.3.28

ABBREVIATION

S.B.-Śāṅkarabhāṣya

CHAPTER 17

Review of Pūrvamīmāṁsā Doctrines by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

S. Revathy

I

INTRODUCTION

All systematic, rational and advanced philosophical speculation in ancient India took place under an impetus received from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The writers of the Nyāya works were concerned chiefly with problems of logic and secondarily with those of metaphysics and the like. The Mīmāṁsakas who were originally performing Vedic rituals also developed a similar kind of interest with regard to problems of logic and metaphysics. During this same medieval period the Buddhist thinkers severely criticized Gautama, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara of the Nyāya school. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who flourished during the beginning of the tenth century A.D., made a remarkable venture in refuting the arguments of the Buddhists and the Mīmāṁsakas and presented a synthetic view of the Nyāya tenets and brought out a comprehensive picture of the Indian theory of knowledge in his work *Nyāyamañjarī*. This work is an illuminating running commentary on select *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama. Although the work is, in a sense, a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras*, by far the largest portion of the text treats Nyāya topics under the rubric of *pramāṇa* and, in the remaining, the objects of valid knowledge (*prameyas*) are explained. It is a work of great authority for its exhaustive treatment of the Nyāya logic and ontology and incisive criticism of the rival schools like Buddhism and the Mīmāṁsā. Jayanta's knowledge of the Mīmāṁsā is very comprehensive. He is thoroughly acquainted with the two broad divisions of Mīmāṁsā school, viz., the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools. N.J. Shah in his book observes: "one finds the triangular context among the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Buddhists. Its study gives us a clear idea of the problems of Indian philosophy and their solutions offered by three main branches of Indian philosophy."[1]

The work is divided into twelve *āhnikas*, of which the first *āhnika* is a commentary on the single aphorism in *Nyāyasūtra* which refers to the four *pramāṇas*,[2] perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. Jayanta in this *āhnika* accomplishes his task in the following four ways: (1) formulating his own definition of *pramāṇa* and criticizing the rival definitions of Buddhists, Mīmāṁsakas and Sāṁkhyas; (2) criticizing the Buddhist position that there are only two *pramāṇas*, viz., perception and inference; (3) criticizing the Mīmāṁsā, position that *arthāpatti* or presumption is a distinct *pramāṇa*; (4) criticizing the Kumārila position that *anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension is another *pramāṇa*. The second *āhnika* is devoted to

the discussion of perception, inference and analogy and third to verbal testimony, validity of cognition extrinsic or intrinsic, theories of error, existence of God and nature of the word.

Jayanta gives a faithful presentation of the views of Mīmāṁsakas. He takes into consideration Kumārila's exposition as the *prima facie* view of the Mīmāṁsā system. The focus of this monograph is to set forth the criticism of Mīmāṁsā views by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa with regard to some of these major issues of epistemology.

Prior to discussing the nature of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), its definition, etc., in the Nyāya school and its criticism of the Mīmāṁsā view, there are some preliminary considerations. As an initial step, one must understand the nature of knowledge in the systems of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā.

II

JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF PRAMAṆA IN GENERAL

Knowledge may be described as the basis of all life's activities.[3] The followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school hold that knowledge is a specific quality of the self, which arises through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) when there is sense-contact with a respective object. It follows from this that the self by being the substratum of quality (*guṇāśraya*) is a substance. The self is not itself consciousness but stands in need of an appropriate aid to become aware of things. Thus, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the self is essentially a substance and knowledge or cognition is one of its adventitious qualities which occurs occasionally without affecting its essential nature.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṁsā school considers the self to be a substance. But it is dynamic and not static. According to this view, knowledge is a process in the self. It is effected due to the revelation of the object presented. These two are respectively designated *Jñāna* and *Saṁvedana*. In other words, *Jñāna*, which means knowledge, according to this view, is a means to the awareness of the object known as *Saṁvedana*.[4] Thus, knowledge is to be understood both as a process and as a result. Now the question arises as to what precisely is the nature of cognition. Is it a substance or a quality, a relation or an action or something different from these?

The followers of the Bhāṭṭa school consider cognition as an act of the self and not as a quality for the following reasons: A quality is a permanent property of an object while in activity we find transition from one to another. Further, qualities exist in objects without referring to anything beyond themselves, whereas cognitions refer to something beyond. Hence, cognition cannot be a quality but an act of the self and it implies another object which is cognized. The Bhāṭṭas maintain cognition of an object as acquisition (*prāpti*) of the object. This acquisition or *prāpti* cannot be explained otherwise than by referring to some activity on the part of the cognizing self. The sense-organs or their activity alone cannot account for it, because in the state of sleep even in the presence of sense-organs, there is no awareness of objects and in the state of absent-mindedness there is no

knowledge even while the senses are active. The mind-soul contact which is the cause of knowledge in general also cannot explain the knowledge of objects. By the process of elimination, the ideal acquisition of an object could be explained only through some activity and it is known as cognition.[5] This action, which inheres in the self, is implied in expressions such as 'I know' and is known as cognition wherein an object is made the accusative of apprehension.[6] Thus, in the act of cognition, an object is apprehended by the self. Nārāyaṇa in his *Mānameyodaya* states that cognition is one of the specific qualities of the self. Although Pārthasārathimiśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* admits that cognition is an act of the soul, yet, in a later section he states that cognition is a *dharma* of the soul. Kumārila also in the *Nirālambhanavāda* section of his *Ślokavārttika* mentions that cognition is a *dharma* or property of the soul.[7] While the Naiyāyikas call it a quality (*guṇa*), the Mīmāṁsakās refer to it as a *dharma* which may mean either a quality or action. However, it may be noted that cognition cannot be treated on a par with the properties like pleasure, pain, etc., which characterize the soul. Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika* adds:

> We do not hold motion to be the only form of action as held by the Vaiśeṣika; all that is expressed by a verbal root is an action.[8]

Further he states that the self is the agent of action by virtue of its power of determination. It may be added here that in the act of knowing, a subject and an object come to be related together. This relation does not constitute knowledge; it is only the result of the cognitive act. A relation is originated when one thing acts upon another thing. There is no relation which is not based upon action belonging to an agent. This agent-action relationship underlies all relations.[9] From the above, it follows that subject-object relation also, like all other relations, presupposes some action of the agent of knowing and the known object. This is called cognition. This is referred to as the act-theory of knowledge of the Mīmāṁsakās. It is against this background, that one must understand Jayanta's exposition of the Mīmāṁsā theory of *pramāṇas* in his *Nyāyamañjari*. According to the Mīmāṁsakās, consciousness itself is a *pramāṇa*, but the result achieved from *pramāṇa* is distinct from pramāṇa viz., cognizedness belonging to the object of consciousness. This cognizedness (*Jñātatā*) is the mark (*liṅga*) by means of which we infer consciousness. Consciousness is an act-process. All acts are inferred from their results.[10] How is consciousness known as an act? It is thus: a knower cannot achieve a result if he does not accomplish an act. The causes themselves get united to generate an imperceptible act. Otherwise, (if action is not postulated) why do they unite without a purpose? Unless the *kārakās* (causes) unite, they cannot produce any result. A cause bears that significant name only when it is connected with the action. A thing, which is supposed to be a cause, will remain with its old designation, and will not acquire the name cause unless and until it is related to an act. This would only result in cessation of activity on the part of the people, because one who desires a particular result, will not actually go in search of something which would not produce any result. He adds that as the already existent *kārakās* such as rice, water, fire, pot etc., become united with a view to performing the act of cooking (*sādhya*) which is the meaning of the root (*pac*) and then produce the action (*vyāpāra*) so also the soul, sense-organs, mind and the independent object when become united, then the

action called *jñāna* is produced. This act of consciousness is not directly known, but it may be indirectly known by means of its result, viz., the cognizedness (*jñātatā*) belonging to the object.[11] Śabara in his *bhāṣya* states:

> When an object remains unknown, nobody cares to know whether a preceding act of consciousness exists. But, when an object is known, the preceding act of consciousness is inferred.[12]

Even the author of the *Vārttika* endorses this viewpoint thus:

> No object is cognized if the act of consciousness does not precede it. Cognizedness, belonging to an object, cannot be explained if the preceding act of consciousness is not presumed. To solve the apparent contradiction afterwards, the proof is presumed.[13]

It emerges from the above account that this action of the knower which is inferred from the result (*jñātatā*) and which is termed *jñāna*, is the means of valid knowledge. Since the sense-organs serve as an aid in effecting knowledge, the functioning of the sense-organ is figuratively spoken of as knowledge.[14] Thus the proof, viz., inference brings about a result, viz., cognizedness belonging to an object.

Having thus faithfully presented the views of the Mīmāṁsakās, Jayanta proceeds to analyse their innate inconsistencies. His criticism primarily centers around the mediacy of knowledge at all times. Jayanta observes in the first place that knowledge cannot be mediate in nature always, for, we have direct experience and corresponding expression of the form 'the object is known'. The perceptual cognition and the corresponding expression 'The cloth is white' presuppose direct apprehension of the white colour as its antecedent condition. Likewise, the perceptual judgment 'The object is known' should also presuppose the direct awareness of the object as its antecedent condition.[15] Jayanta adds that if the Mīmāṁsakas hold the view that the perception of an external object reveals only the object and that perception is not self-conscious, then they could direct this question against the Buddhists only and defeat them.[16]

It might be said by the Mīmāṁsakas that being of the nature of action (*Jñānarūpavyāpāra*), knowledge becomes mediate. Jayanta emphatically denies it, for, knowledge is not of the nature of action. On the other hand, it is an effect partaking of the nature of a result.[17] An act belonging to a perceptible substance alone is directly perceived. According to the Bhāṭṭas, the soul is directly perceived but the action belonging to the soul is not directly introspected. Jayanta sardonically puts it that such is the offence made by the act of knowledge that it transcends introspection.[18] The Mīmāṁsakas might say that a suprasensuous act which is different from physical movement, etc., belongs to the perceptible causes. Jayanta denies it and questions whether this action is eternal like a universal or non-eternal property like colour, etc., of a substance. If it is eternal like a universal, then its result should be always present, since an act always inheres in the substance.[19] If, however, it is a non-eternal property, then we have to admit that this act is accomplished by means of a cause. And when this cause brings about the act in question, another act should be admitted to inhere in the cause and so on *ad infinitum*.[20] If, on the

other hand, it is held that an act is generated by a cause even without an act, then it comes to this that the so-called result of an act could come into existence even from causes where there is no act. This means that act has no role to play at all.[21]

It might be contended by the Mīmāṁsakas that the word "*Kāraka*" is derived as "that which produces" (*Karotīti*) because a *kāraka* would not be referred to as *kāraka* unless it is associated with an action. Hence it is not possible to dispense with *kriyā* or activity.[22]

Jayanta accepts the derivation of the word *kāraka* as explained above but with a minor difference that *kāraka* produces only the result and not the action. In response to this argument, the Mīmāṁsakas argue that in order to produce an act, *kārakas* in need of other conditions too. In the sentence 'Caitra weaves a mat' (*caitraḥ kaṭam karoti*), the sense of the agent expressed by the word Caitra and the object conveyed by the word *kaṭa* cannot be set aside. Likewise, the meaning of the verb *kṛñ* (i.e., action) also cannot be denied because it is only in relationship to it that the words Caitra, *kaṭam*, etc., become *kārakas*. This question may be answered by saying that the state of being a *kāraka* is not caused by the association with an action which is supra-sensible. it is because, action being supra-sensible (*atīndriya*), the nature of *kāraka* produced by the association with such an action (*atīndriyavyāpāra*) cannot be known and as such there will arise the contingency of the cessation of all worldly activities. It is because without knowing the nature of a *kāraka* caused by the association of action, nobody desirous of result goes to collect that *kāraka*.[23]

Jayanta Bhāṭṭa hastens to add that, in his view, however, the nature of a *kāraka* is not something that is supra-sensible. He defines *kārakatva* (the state of being a *kāraka*) as the association of something as it is with all essential conditions that would produce the result. Those who are desirous of a result, after ascertaining the availability of all conditions, get hold of the favourable condition and derive the intended result.[24] The Mīmāṁsakas argue that if a factor does not possess an act, then no purpose would be served by auxiliaries. If consciousness is not an act but only a result, the auxiliaries would serve no purpose. The *Naiyāyikas* counter-argue saying that if a factor possesses an act, even then the auxiliaries would prove futile.[25] What Jayanta wants to emphasize is that the Mīmāṁsakas are extremely partial in saying that it is only the action that is produced by all the auxiliaries put together and not the result.

Next, Jayanta proceeds to analyse the meaning of the verb '*karoti*'. Here the meaning of the root *kṛñ*, is only the movement which is of the nature of action perceived in worldly objects. Never indeed do we deny the action which is seen and which is of the nature of movement (*parispanda*), because we do notice various kinds of action such as burning, etc., in each *kāraka*. Jayanta only wants to say that there is no action which is suprasensible.[26]

The Mīmāṁsakas further argue that the verb '*pac*', 'to cook', has a meaning which is different from the act of burning, etc., since without assuming it, the final result, viz., boiling, cannot be attained. If we do not admit such a condition (final result), then there is no use of the combination of the cases. This contention, according to Jayanta, is not proper. He adds that by this the Mīmāṁsakas only convey that the cases produce the act. Now, Jayanta raises two objections:

(i) Whether the cases jointly generate the act? or
(ii) Whether a single case produces it?[27]

If the first alternative is held, then it means that each case (*kāraka*) does not singly generate the act. Now, if each case cannot singly produce it, how will such cases bring about the act even when they combine? If the second alternative is admitted, then any one of the cases may produce it even without combining with the other cases. The result of this argument is that the act, the meaning of the verb '*pac*', does not constitute the result for the realization of which the cases are admitted to combine.[28]

Granting the combination of cases, Jayanta further questions as to the relative priority of the act and the combination of cases. Only two options are possible for those who admit that the cases (*kārakas*) combine with each other aiming at the supra-sensible action. (i) the *kārakas*, which already possess the action, unite with each other or (ii) after getting united, they produce the action. If the first alternative is maintained, then there is no use of getting united. Thus, the *kārakas* may even produce the result separately. If, however, the second alternative is consdiered, then there would arise the contingency of each *kāraka* being devoid of action. The pieces of wood will not burn till they come into contact with the cooking pot.[29]

The Mīmāṁsakas might reply saying that the pieces of wood simply burn but do not cook. What they mean is that when the cases combine, they produce an act which is other than motion. But Jayanta points out that this contention is untenable because the pieces of wood burn alike whether they are associated with the cooking pot or not. The point that is of relevance here is that the cases combine together not in order to bring about a distinct act but a result. Now, a question arises as to the exact nature of this result. If this result, viz., (the action of cooking) is independent of our will, it cannot be made, unmade or made otherwise and hence it is called *siddha*. Thus, if the action of cooking is established, the nature of *kārakas* also is established and hence there cannot be any combination of the *kārakas*. If, on the other hand, the result is produced by our will which means that it can be made, unmade or made otherwise, then it is called *sādhya*. Thus, if the result is admitted as a *sādhya*, then such an action is only different from the visible action. And the Naiyāyikas too admit the result to be a *sādhya*. But Jayanta differs in saying that, that *sādhya* is not an action. He adds that, in the present case, 'cooked rice' which is the result, is not an action. Jayanta prefers to maintain silence on this issue further.[30]

The Mīmāṁsakas further question the Naiyāyikas about the exact meaning of the word *pāka* (*kriyā*). If it does not convey the sense of an act, then the verb will have no meaning to convey.

Jayanta answers this as follows:

Pāka (cooking) consists in the movement of all the *kārakās* such as Devadatta, the agent, etc., together for producing a specific result such as *viklitti*, this alone being the meaning of the root "*pac*". In the example given, each *kāraka* has a distinct act, the fuel burns, the pot holds the content, etc. It is also noticed that these acts are distinct from one another. But when these actions combine together to bring forth the common result, viz., the act of cooking, we overlook their individual character and consider the group of verbs as a single verb. This is the verb 'to cook'. We have verbal usages such as 'Devadatta cooks' (*Devadattaḥ pacati*), 'the pieces of wood cook' (*kāṣṭhāni pacanti*) and 'the pot cooks' (*sthāli pacati*).[31] The Mīmāṁsakas add to this conclusion of the Naiyāyikas by saying that

even in the visible action of Devadatta such as stirring by ladle, etc., there is the precedence of the action of the soul and, therefore, we may have to admit supra-sensible activity (*atīndriya vyāpāra*) in Devadatta. If movement is the only act, the final source of activity being the soul, the verbal usage 'the soul cooks' also must be admitted. Jayanta replies that there is no activity in the soul. Instead, it only has the qualities of knowledge, desire and aversion. They in turn give rise to volitional effort which is also a quality. It is only the volition that causes activity in the material object.[32] According to the Naiyāyikas, action is that which is accomplished (*sādhyasvarūpa*); knowledge, etc., are existent entities like pot, etc. Hence effort also is not an act but a quality.[33]

Jayanta then proceeds to point out that knowledge is not an act. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that since all roots express action, '*jñā*' being a root, also should express only action. This is the action of a man which is of the nature of knowledge.[34]

Jayanta replies that there is no hard and fast rule that a root expresses only action, because in the *dhātupāṭha* we find '*gaḍivadanaikadeśe*' where the root *gaḍi* refers to a portion of a face but does not convey the sense of action. Moreover, if we analyse the verbal cognition "*ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmi*" (I know the pot) 'I' refers to the soul, pot is the object and 'know' (*jānāmi*) conveys the sense of knowledge which exists in the self. Here '*jñā*' does not convey action as conceived by the Mīmāṁsakas, because it is imperceptible according to them. On this ground, knowledge is not an act.[35] If it had been so, Śabara in his *bhāṣya* would not have mentioned knowledge as distinct from action. He points out 'knowledge and action are also recognized, so they also should be eternal'. Therefore, knowledge is different from action and the view that upholds knowledge as imperceptible because it is of the nature of action, does not stand to reason. Further, if knowledge as action is considered imperceptible, then it cannot even be inferred for want of a positive instance.[36]

This adds glory to the Mīmāṁsakas that inference could operate in cases where invariable relation is possible and where it is not possible, *arthāpatti* or presumption could function. By this they postulate action, viz., knowledge in the soul, because without this knowledge the result, viz., cognizedness cannot be known.[37] The Mīmāṁsakas try to point out a similar instance in the Nyāya school where they prove the existence of the self even without citing a positive instance (*sapakṣa*). Jayanta retorts by saying that this argument is untenable. He says that positive instance is indispensable only where an induction is based on similarity. If it is based on other grounds such as a universal, etc., then a positive example is not necessary.[38] In a subsequent section, Jayanta mentions this syllogistic argument.

We shall now consider the Mīmāṁsā view of perceptibility of object (*arthasya dṛṣṭatā*). Jayanta suggests two alternatives to this point. It means being the object of knowledge (action) or being of the nature of illumination. Since all knowledge is mediate, being the object of knowledge cannot constitute perceptibility. Unless the qualification is known the qualified, viz., perceptibility, cannot be produced. If, however, perceptibility means being of the nature of illumination, it becomes common to all and everyone would know everything and become omniscient.[39] However, it is not the case.

The Mīmāṁsakas might say that there would certainly not arise the contingency of everyone becoming omniscient because perceptibility is produced in an object only for a person whose sense-organs come into contact with that object.[40]

The Naiyāyikas do not favour this argument. Jayanta argues that it is not correct to maintain that it is only for one who has knowledge of objects like lamp, etc., the perceptibility is produced in that object.[41]

As to the doubt of the Mīmāṁsakas regarding the cognition of number two, the Naiyāyikas say that in the case of one who has the enumerating cognition alone, number two is produced and he alone can have its cognition. But in the case of objects like lamp etc., there need not be any specific relation between the object and the knower.[42]

Jayanta then directs his objection to those Mīmāṁsakas who maintain that *saṁvedana* is the result and knowledge is the action with regard to that result, and question as to the exact nature of *saṁvedana*. If it belongs to the knower, then there is no need of another knowledge in the form of action. Jayanta considers *jñāna* as a synonym of *saṁvedana*. If the latter is said to be present in the object, then there is the contingency of everyone being omniscient. It cannot also be said that *saṁvedana* is present both in the soul as well as in the object. Further, there arises a doubt as to how *saṁvedana* is known. If another *saṁvedana* is admitted for this purpose, then to know the latter we may have to admit another and so on *ad infinitum*. *Saṁvedana* cannot also be admitted as self-illumined.

In the case of the erroneous cognition of shell-silver which is a combination of perception and recollection wherein this element is perceived and silver element is recollected, error lies in the fact that there is the non-apprehension of this difference in the cognition. If *saṁvedana*, which is the result of the knowledge process, is self-luminous, then the result of the apprehension would be known as it is and that of memory also would be known as it is. This means that there will not arise the non-apprehension of difference. As such, there would not arise any illusory cognition either. Hence *saṁvedana* cannot be treated as self-illumined. However, it cannot be known as formless too.[43]

The Mīmāṁsakas might argue that *saṁvedana* is nothing but the form of the object. In that case, *saṁvitti* and *saṁvedana* would become identical. However, we know them as different. The Mīmāṁsakas might argue that when there is association with the form of an object, *saṁvit* reveals itself. Jayanta hastens to add that this is exactly the view of the Buddhists who deny outside objects. On these grounds, it is not correct to say that knowledge in the form of action is postulated on the basis of the result.[44] Further, if consciousness, according to the Mīmāṁsakas is self-luminous, then they cannot subscribe to the view that *saṁvedana* is the result of the knowledge-process.

Jayanta concludes by saying that knowledge, which is inferred by means of its result (cognized-ness) as a mark (*liṅga*), is not a means of valid knowledge.

Jayanta then proceeds to analyse the definition of *pramā* according to the Mīmāṁsakas that *pramā* or valid knowledge is a knowledge whose content is *unknown hitherto* (*anadhigata*).[45] Hence, *pramāṇa* is that which gives us the knowledge of objects of which we have not had any knowledge in the past. If the objects were already known in the past, there would arise no necessity of their knowledge. Thus, for the Mīmāṁsakas, the means of valid knowledge must be related to an object which we have not known earlier. It follows from

this that *smṛti* or recollection cannot be *pramā* or valid knowledge insofar as it is not a new experience but only a recollection of an earlier experience. Its content is not new. The Mīmāṁsakas are of the firm view that a *pramāṇa* could serve no purpose in giving rise to the knowledge of an object known already. Jayanta derisively remarks that in that case, even with an unknown object the function of a *pramāṇa* is futile.

It might be said by the Mīmāṁsakas that although a *pramāṇa* for the first time generates a true knowledge, in the second and subsequent moments it gives rise to the real knowledge of a known object and there is no harm in it. A *pramāṇa* need not operate with a purpose. It is because the knowledge of an already known object is not purposeless; for, even when an object is seen again and again as, for example, thorns, snake, wolf, crocodile etc., one tries to avoid seeing them due to fear. Likewise, on seeing things which would afford pleasure, such as, sandalwood, fragrance, camphor, etc., one attains pleasure.[46] This view even has the sanction and support of Kumārilā's *Ślokavārttika*:

> Where the knowledge (of an object) is produced, again by the *pramāṇas* like (perception etc.) which operate for the second time, the previous knowledge of the same object is not the same as the one that occurs subsequently.[47]

From this we may conclude that for the Mīmāṁsakas, a *pramāṇa* gives rise to the knowledge of only an unknown thing. For them, a *pramāṇa* ceases to operate the moment it gives rise to valid knowledge, whereas for the Naiyāyikas, it stops functioning the moment it comes into contact with another object or when there is absence of any auxiliary factor of knowledge.

Now Jayanta directs his question in a different direction and shows that the definition of *pramāṇa* as framed by the Mīmāṁsakas, would not include *pratyabhijñā* under its fold. By *pratyabhijñā* or recognition is meant, the knowledge of an object as what was known earlier. In it, the object that is now perceived, is directly felt as the same thing perceived earlier. For example, we have the expression 'This is that man whom I saw yesterday'. The element 'this' of the present perception is identified with 'that' of the past perception. Therefore, recognition cannot be a knowledge of what was unknown earlier. Yet all schools of philosophy, including the Bhāṭṭas, consider it as a form of *pramā* or true knowledge. It emerges from the above that we must either give up the idea of unknown-ness as a characteristic of *pramā* or say that recognition is not true knowledge. No knowledge is made true or false simply because it is original or otherwise. Never does the truth of knowledge depend on the newness of its object.[48]

Further, in the case of a continuous stream of cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*) also, the definition of *pramā* framed by the Bhāṭṭa school is not applicable. In this cognition, the same thing is known and in the cognitions that are subsequent to that which is the first member of the series are merely a repetition and as such they would cease to be valid[49] and so the Prābhākaras argue that *anubhūti* is *pramāṇa* and this constitutes the definition of *pramāṇa*.[50]

In fact, the Bhāṭṭas contend that the continuous cognition refers to new objects in all its parts. The series of cognitions occur in different instants of time. The object, which is thus connected with different times, though apparently the same, becomes really different

object in a continuous stream of cognition. The successive cognitions are valid insofar as each apprehends the object as qualified by a different time and hence as a new object.[51] It may be added that the Mīmāṁsakas hold that the time-quality is directly perceived, as, otherwise, the present-ness (*vartamānatva*) in 'I see a pot now' cannot be explained.

The Naiyāyikas object to this by saying that the instants of time (*kṣaṇa*) cannot be perceived by us, because an object to be perceived must possess gross size (*mahattva*) and manifest form (*udbhūtatva*). Hence time, like atoms, cannot be perceived as it is devoid of both these qualities. The different instants entering into the stream of cognition, being unperceived, cannot be admitted as constituting different objects in the series of the stream of cognition. If only these temporal differences are apprehended and included into the stream of cognition, then its continuity would be broken and it would also cease to be a stream of cognition. Since it is not the case, we must admit that the stream of cognition is a single state of cognition that endures for some time. Yet objectively it is a series of cognition. Jayanta adds that in the series of cognition those that succeed the first are admitted by all to be valid like the first. But it cannot be said that they manifest new aspects of the object. He concludes this account by stating that 'The palm of the hand seen a thousand times adds no new content to our previous knowledge of it.'[52] What Jayanta wants to emphasize is that the validity of knowledge does not lie in any character of novelty. We shall discuss a little later in this monograph the problems related to validity and invalidity of knowledge according to the Mīmāṁsakas and the way Jayanta subjects them to serious criticism in the third *āhnika* of *Nyāyamañjari*.

III

THE REFUTATION OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION OF THE MĪMĀṀSAKAS

Having thus analysed the *pramaṇas* in general Jayanta proceeds to assess the merit of the classification of the different *pramaṇas* admitted by the different schools of Indian philosophy. Both the nature and the number of *pramaṇas* vary in these schools. While the Cārvāka-materialists admit *pratyakṣa* as the only *pramaṇa*, the Paurāṇikas admit eight. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā and following them the Advaita Vedāntins recognize six *pramāṇas*, viz., *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *śabda* (verbal testimony), *upamāna* (comparison), *arthāpatti* (presumption) and *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension). Of these *pramāṇas*, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikās recognize only the first two. The Sāṁkhyas and Bhāsarvajña, the author of *Nyāyasāra*, recognize the first three. Udayana and the other Naiyāyikas admit the first four. The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā accepts all except non-apprehension. The Paurāṇikas add two more, viz., *saṁbhava* (probability) and *aitiḥya* (tradition).[53]

Prior to Jayanta's refutation of the definition of *pratyakṣa* framed by some Mīmāṁsakas, it is imperative to know the Mīmāṁsā view. Kumārila's theory of perception is based on the aphorism of Jaimini which states:

> That cognition by a person, which appears when there is sense-contact (with objects) is perception and it is not a means (of knowing *dharma*) as it comprehends only things existing at the present time.[54]

The preceding aphorism examines the means through which *dharma* can be known and the following aphorism states that *śabda* or scriptural testimony is such a means. The present aphorism is intended to reject perception as a means of knowing *dharma* obviously on the ground that perception can comprehend only objects related to the present time. Śabara, the principal commentator on Jaimini's *sūtras*, holds the view that the aphorism as a whole is intended only for rejecting perception as a means of comprehending *dharma.* Commentators such as Bhavadāsa and others are of the view that this definition comprises two parts. The first part, viz., perception is that cognition, etc., constitutes the definition and the second part indicates that such a perception can reveal only present objects and not *dharma* as the latter belongs to the past and the future also. Upavarṣa also, known as Vṛttikāra, however, maintains that the aphorism is chiefly designed to define perception only. But in order to have a definition devoid of ambiguity, we must read the aphorism interchanging the words *sat* and *tat.*

Kumārila agrees with the viewpoint of Śabara and totally disagrees with Bhavadāsa. Had Jaimini, the author of the *sūtras* intended to define perception, he would have in the same breath defined inference and other *pramāṇas* too. However, following Vṛttikāra, Kumārila accepts it as the definition of perception.[55]

The followers of the Prābhākara school define *pratyakṣa* as direct apprehension. This involves cognition of three factors, viz., (1) the apprehended object (*meya*), (2) the apprehending subject (*mātṛ*), and, (3) the act of apprehension (*māna*). This theory of *pratyakṣa* is known as *tripuṭīpratyakṣavāda.* Pārthasārathi seems to have accepted Vṛttikāra's definition of perception.[56] Elsewhere in his *Śāstradīpikā* he states, "A direct knowledge of pleasure, etc., leads to inference of some sense-organ as its cause, because in the case of colour, etc., direct knowledge is always known to depend on a sense-organ."[57] Commenting on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttikā*[58] Pārthasārathi says:

> The immediate knowledge that results from sense contact and not from any other source is perception and it is commonly known as such without any regard to how philosophers define perception.

Kumārila, however, defines perception in terms of sense-object contact. It is thus clear that perception is sometimes defined in terms of immediacy and other times in terms of sense contact. So far the Mīmāṁsā view.

Introducing the Mīmāṁsā theory of perception Jayanta clearly observes that the followers of Jaimini may either interpret the aphorism to indicate *dharma* and say that it has no direct bearing upon the definition of perception or it embodies the definition of perception. In either of the views there are difficulties. If the former alternative is held, then there is no use in discussing the aphorism in terms of the definition of perception. If the second alternative is maintained, then there would arise the defect of overpervasion (*ativyāpti*) in the case of doubt and illusion as they are also based on the sense-object-contact (*satsamprayoga*) Jayanta draws attention to the fact that even within the school of

Jaimini, the commentators draw different interpretations of the phrase '*sat samprayoga*' based on the splitting of the compound in different ways such as (i) *satāṁ samprayoge,* (ii) *sati samprayoga* and (iii) *tat samprayoge sat pratyakṣam* by interchanging the words '*tat*' and '*sat*' in the original aphorism.

Jayanta objects to these kinds of interpretations of the Mīmāṁsā school and rejects all these on the following grounds: If the phrase '*satsamprayoga*' is interpreted as '*satām samprayoga*' which means 'contact of the sense-organ with the existent real object' only those hallucinations that are not conditioned by the real existent objects will be excluded from the purview of perception but doubt and illusions which do refer to real objects will not be excluded.[59]

Jayanta sets aside the second alternative interpretation '*sati samprayoge*' (*sati, sam-samyakprayoge*) by quoting a verse from Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*:

> The term '*sat*' is a participle; the indeclinable '*sam*' signifies properness and the compound '*samprayoga*' is qualified by the participle '*sat*', and the sense of the aphorism is that when there arises proper sense-contact with the respective object there arises valid sense perception. Since doubt and illusion involve defective sense-object-contact, they are excluded from the domain of perception.[60]

Jayanta emphatically denies that the properness of the sense-object contact (*prayoga samyaktva*) is supra-sensuous (*atīndriya*) and hence it is not perceived. It cannot be said that 'properness' is inferred from the effect, because the effect, viz., apprehension is not directly qualified by the adjective 'proper'. Further, there is neither a single word nor a letter nor even a slightest indication found in the *sūtra* to qualify the resulting consciuosness. The object of the compound word that signifies the contact of the sense-organ with the real object has been brought in so as to exclude hallucination from the purview of perception.[61]

As regards the third interpretation provided by Upavarṣa, the Vṛttikāra, Jayanta adds that this definition is applicable in doubt as well. The Mīmāṁsakas might say that one's sense-organ does not come into contact with either of the two distinct objects presented in doubt. If that is so, adds Jayanta, that the objects are alternatively referred to, the sense-organ and hence the definition applies to doubt as well.[62]

The Mīmāṁsakas might further argue that in case of a doubt, two distinct objects are manifested but one's sense-organ does not come into contact with both of them in order to generate a doubt. Jayanta adds that just as we have the knowledge of two different trees of two different species, *dhava* and *khadira* independently, a doubt does not refer definitely to two different objects. A doubt is after all a knowledge in which the mind oscillates between two alternatives as for example 'Is it a lamp-post or a man?'[63] When the sense-organ comes into contact with one of the two objects, the two objects are alternatively referred to by it. Thus the definition of true perception would apply to doubt too.

In order to overcome this difficulty, the Mīmāṁsakas might offer a different interpretation which is as follows: the purpose of the aphorism is not to define perception but to highlight the impossibility of perception to apprehend *dharma*. Jayanta quotes from the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila:

> The very essence of perception consists in its being produced by the real sense-object contact and that the remaining conclusioins follow from it.[64]

Or it may be stated that the very definition of perception determines the essential character, viz., the essence of perception. This is how Kumārila establishes the utility of the *sūtra* on perception.

Kumārila also suggests an alternative interpretation and states that perception is not a source of apprehending *dharma.* In that case, Kumārila is forced to face the question whether he has deliberately offered this interpretation so as to exclude the transcendental perception of *dharma* by the sages. If the answer is in the negative, then Kumārila seems to contradict himself. It is because transcendental perception is only a fiction according to the Mīmāṁsakas. Adhering to the standpoint of the opponent's, if the Mīmāṁsakas consider the existence of transcendental perception, then they should accept it as real like the opponents. If, however, it is not sound, then it has no solid ground to stand on in all the systems. The opponents admit that *dharma* is revealed through transcendental perception. Thus, if the Mīmāṁsakas agree in its fullness with the opponent's position and also in the same breath proclaim that transcendental perception does not reveal *dharma,* it is an apparent contradiction.[65]

The Mīmāṁsakas may contend that it is an admitted method of destructive criticism, viz., *reductio ad absurdum.* It consists in assuming the conclusion of the opponent in examining and drawing an absurd conclusion from it. The opponent (Naiyāyikas) considers that an existent object is comprehended by perception which arises from the sense-object contact. Since *dharma* cannot become an object of sense-contact, perception is not a proof of *dharma.*

Jayanta boldly asserts that this method adopted by the Mīmāṁsakas is not really one of *reductio ad absurdum.* On the other hand, Jayanta remarks, that it appears to be a futile effort to draw a picture without a canvas, or to discuss whether sky-flower is fragrant or not.[66] Using the same method as a defensive measure, Jayanta in his usual way states:

> We do not arrive at the generalization that no perception is a proof of *dharma.* Who knows that nobody's perception reveals *dharma*?
>
> You cannot know that I do not perceive *dharma.* I cannot know that you do not perceive *dharma.* Both you and I cannot know that he does not perceive *dharma* like us.[67]

Jayanta then engages in a lengthy discussion with the Mīmāṁsakas to prove the transcendental perception of the Yogins. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school believes in the capacity of yogins to perceive things which ordinary people cannot. They hold that the yogins in the state of ecstasy, perceive through their minds which acquire extraordinary excellence resulting from the performance of yoga, the essential forms of their own as well as other selves, ether, space, time, atoms, etc., and also other qualities inhering in them. With this power they are able to perceive subtle, remote, past and future objects.

The Mīmāṁsakas argue against the above view saying that although perception can reach the climax of perfection yet it cannot violate the law which governs the nature of its

objects. *Dharma* is not at all a perceptible object and hence cannot become the object of transcendental perception;

Jayanta refutes this view and states that *dharma* is transcendental to the sight of normal beings but it is sensed by the sages. As to the objection that if a sage perceives a transcendental object then he should also perceive odour, taste, etc., with his eyes, Jayanta points out that it is not only vision but all the senses of the sages which are endowed with supernormal powers.[68]

To sum up this part: (i) Jayanta is of the firm view that the *sūtra* of Jaimini does not serve the purpose of the definition of perception;

(ii) it is not meant for the refutation of transcendental perception even as considered by Kumārila;

(iii) the superhuman way of perceiving all past, present and future things by the yogins through meditation is admitted by the Nyāya system but not by the Mīmāṁsakas;

(iv) *dharma* is not perceptible according to the Mīmāṁsakas but it is perceived by the yogins through the power of meditation for the Naiyāyikas. That is, it is *yogajapratyakṣaviṣaya.*

IV

ON UPAMĀNA PRAMĀṆA—JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF PŪRVAMĪMĀṀSĀ

We shall now pass on to the next *pramāṇa*, viz., *upamāna*, the nature of which differs vastly in the systems of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā. Before exactly explaining Jayanta's penetrating criticisms of the Mīmāṁsā views on *upamāna*, we shall very briefly point out its nature in the school of Nyāya as that would facilitate our understanding of Jayanta's review of Mīmāṁsakas theory of *upamāna.*

The expression '*upamāna*' is derived from the words *upa* meaning *sādṛśya* or similarity and *māna* meaning cognition. This *upamāna* conveys the sense of knowledge of similarity (*sādṛśyajñāna*) between two things. *Upamāna* as a *pramāṇa* is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its sense (*saṁjñāsaṁjñisambandhajñāna*).[69] Thus *upamāna* is generally defined as the ground of our knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing well known earlier.[70] In other words, *upamāna* is the process of reasoning by which we know that a word denotes a certain class of objects on the basis of some authoritative statements. Thus, a man, who does not know which objects are conveyed by the word '*gavaya*', may have it from some authority that the word '*gavaya*' conveys the sense of an animal resembling the cow. When he happens to find such an animal later, he finds its striking similarities to the cow. Then he remembers the authoritative statement that animals that resemble the cow are *gavayas*. From this he comes to the conclusion that the word '*gavaya*' denotes this class of animals. Thus, it may be known that the chief purpose of *upamāna pramāṇa* in the Nyāya school is to serve as the means to comprehend the power present in a word (*śabdaśakti*). And the resultant cognition, *upamiti*, is of the form "The word '*gavaya*' is significative of the sense of the animal *gavaya*."

According to the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins, *upamāna* is accepted as an independent source of knowledge. The sense in which the Mīmāṁsakas accept *upamāna,* however, is quite different from that of the Naiyāyikas. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, it is the source of the knowledge of reciprocal similarity. Prābhākara holds this similarity as a distinct category but Kumārila considers it as a quality of two objects.[71]

Śabara in his *bhāṣya* states that *upamāna* is resemblance which brings about the cognition of an object that has not been in sense contact. Thus, Śabara seems to maintain that the perception of a *gavaya* qualified by its similarity to cow is the means (*upamāna*) and the remembrance of a cow is the result (*upamiti*). Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika* questions this interpretation of Śabara, viz., that the cognition of a thing observed in the past, due to the perception of a similar thing in the present, is nothing but remembrance and such a remembrance cannot be admitted as a *pramāṇa.*[72] In the same breath, he refutes the Nyāya view and states that it does not appear sound to say that when the object (*gavaya*) has been ascertained to resemble the cow, the relation of the animal (wild cow) with the word *gavaya* is known with the help of the statement of the forester. He further adds that in that case it would be a case of verbal testimony and not *upamāna.*[73] Hence for Kumārila, *upamiti* is the cognition of a remembered thing qualified by its similarity to a perceived thing, i.e. the *gavaya,* as similar to a cow, is a judgment of perception as it arises immediately after perceiving the *gavaya* and the cognition 'the remembered cow is similar to *gavaya*' is the result of *upamāna.*

Pārthasārthi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* defines it thus:

> The knowledge of the similarity between the present object and the recollected object of past perception is *upamāna.*[74]

Sucaritamiśra in his commentary *Kāśikā*[75] on the *Ślokavārttika* states that what is perceived in *upamāna* is that the *gavaya* is similar to the cow and this leads to the cognition that the cow is similar to the *gavaya.* This cognition is not recollection. It is because recollection presupposes experience and the similarity of the cow to the *gavaya* could not be experienced prior to the perception of the *gavaya.* Although we admit that an object is similar to another if they possess in common many elements, yet an object is known to be similar to another when the other correlative term is presented to our consciousness.

This judgment (the remembered cow is similar to *gavaya*) cannot be admitted as a result of inference for it occurs in our mind independently of an induction or deduction. Neither the resemblance belonging to a *gavaya* nor a cow can constitute the ground as they do not belong to the subject of inference. Expressed in a nutshell, *upamiti* is as follows:

> The judgment that a *gavaya,* which is not perceived, is similar to a group occurring in the mind of a knower who resides at the time of the judgment in a forest, is *Upamiti.* It is a class by itself and is distinct from the other kinds of knowledge such as perception etc.[76]

Jayanta in the second *āhnika* of his *Nyāyamañjari* endeavours to critically examine the Mīmāṁsā views and finally reject them.

At the very outset Jayanta rejects the Mīmāṁsā theory of *Upamāna* on the ground that the concept of *Upamiti*, that is, a cow is like a *gavaya* propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is not based upon experience. What we experience is that a *gavaya* is like a cow but not the converse judgment, i.e., a cow is similar to a *gavaya.*[77] So it cannot be a class by itself. And no distinct instruction is needed to produce it. Thus, *upamāna* is not a distinct proof. Even assuming that there arises such a judgment, it will only be a case of memory. The Mīmāṁsakas might say that even if the cow had been experienced earlier, the similarity existing in the cow is experienced for the first time. However, Jayanta affirms that similarity subsisting in the cow also is perceived earlier. For, similarity as belonging to a cow could be experienced even without knowing the similarity belonging to a *gavaya.* When a person happens to see *gavaya* in a forest, he does not recollect a horse or a camel or an elephant but only an individual of a distinct class. The recollection of this distinct object is not revived without valid ground. On this ground, Jayanta contends that the individual thing perceived as similar to the *gavaya* by a person is recalled only in his memory whenever a *gavaya* is perceived but not by anyone. Certainly it is not possible for a villager to conclude on the basis of his experience that a cow is like a *gavaya* if he has not seen *gavaya* earlier. Hence, it is but necessary to hold that similarity to *gavaya* is earlier experienced when a *gavaya* is not cognized distinctly. Therefore, the contention of the Naiyāyikas holds good.[78]

The Mīmāṁsakas counter argue that a villager cannot know that a cow is similar to a *gavaya* if he has no definite knowledge of a *gavaya,* the other correlate of the relation of similarity[79] (*sādṛśyapratiyogi*).

Jayanta argues that by posing this question the Mīmāṁsakas contradict their earlier statement. They hold that similarity, like a Universal, exists pervasively in each of its *loci* and so even when the other correlate of the relation is not cognized, similarity can be cognized. Further, the Mīmāṁsakas have defined similarity in two different ways. (i) Similarity is the common possession of various limbs by two similar objects, and (ii) it is the unique source of the awareness of resemblance. Jayanta points out that the finest definition is rather vague. These limbs could be perceived even by a villager if he has never seen a *gavaya.* Further, it is too narrow to be applied to the picture of a cow and too wide as it applies to an animal which is dissimilar to a *gavaya.* It should also be made clear as to the exact meaning of the word "many" by the Mīmāṁsakas. If they hold that the number of common limbs should be such that they produce the ideas of similarity, then it culminates in the second definition of similarity, and thus the awareness of similarity is possible even when the *gavaya* has not been perceived. Further, the statement that 'a cow is like a *gavaya*' is dependent only on memory.[80]

The Mīmāṁsakas try to justify their position by saying that according to the Naiyāyikas when the forester instructs a person that a *gavaya* is similar to a cow, the significative relation of the word *gavaya* to its sense, viz., the animal *gavaya* is not known, but with the perception of the similarity of a cow belonging to a *gavaya* it is rightly and distinctly grasped. In the same way, the similarity of a *gavaya* is vaguely experienced at the initial stage when '*gavaya*' the correlate remains unknown. But when the similarity of a cow belonging to *gavaya* is perceived, it becomes clear and distinct.[81]

In response to this argument the Naiyāyikas say that *upamāna* (comparison) cannot exclusively claim an object which has not been comprehended by any other *pramāṇa*. This object is supplied by perception.[82]

As to the question how the perception of a person who stays in the forest contributes towards the knowledge that a cow in a village is like a *gavaya*, it is answered that it is a fact and hence cannot be questioned.[83]

The Mīmāṁsakas put forth another argument to prove that *upamāna* is a distinct *pramāṇa*. It is as follows: perception gives rise to the knowledge of a nearer object while the statement 'a cow is like a *gavaya*' is not perceptual as the cow that resembles *gavaya* is beyond the range of perception.

The Naiyāyikas meet this argument by saying that the judgment that a cow is a like a *gavaya* merely acts as a memento as it bears the stamp of likeness. If this knowledge is treated as recollection, then it cannot be a piece of valid knowledge for, the Mīmāṁsakas consider novelty as the criterion of valid knowledge. This being the case, it cannot be treated as a separate *pramāṇa*.

Assuming for the sake of argument that it is different from recollection, even then Jayanta reduces Bhāṭṭa *upamāna* to *anumāna*. The syllogistic argument is as follows:

> Whatever has some points in common with something is similar to that thing; the remembered cow has some points in common with the perceived *gavaya*; therefore, the remembered cow is similar to the perceived *gavaya*.

Jayanta states that an inexperienced lad, a resident of the coconut island (where cows and *gavayas* are not to be found) does not have the judgment that the cow, seen in a village is like this *gavaya* which is being seen in the forest. On the strength of the absence of such an experience, it is to be admitted that the judgment that 'a cow is like a *gavaya*' is deduced only from a major premise arrived at by induction. Hence, this judgment is not produced by *upamāna* but is only inferential or recollection.[84]

Next, Jayanta enters into the criticism of the practical utility of *upamāna* mentioned by Kumārila. Kumārila says that in the '*Saurya*' sacrifice where the details of performance are not given, *upamāna* supplies the required details. The '*Saurya*' sacrifice is similar to the *Āgneya* sacrifice in the sense that both have a common deity. The details of the performance of the latter are known and on the basis of similarity they are transferred to the former. Again when, '*vrīhi*', that is preserved for oblation is spoilt, '*nīvāra*' can be used as its substitute as their results would be similar. Kumārila adds that '*nīvāra*' becomes a substitute by virtue of its similarity to *vrīhi*.[85]

Criticizing the above view of Kumārila, Jayanta says that there is absolutely no argument between the Bhāṭṭa definition of *upamāna* and the above mentioned utility.[86] He adds that in the case of *upamāna*, we judge that an object is similar to another object on the ground that the latter is similar to the former. In the case of *Āgneya* sacrifice, we know through *upamāna* that it is similar to the '*Saurya*' sacrifice. And this does not in any way justify in treating *Āgneya* as a substitute of the '*Saurya*' sacrifice. Jayanta concludes that these are only instances of analogy and not *upamāna*, because in them similarity in some unknown respect is inferred from similarity in some known respect.

To sum up this part: (i) according to the Nyāya school, *upamāna* is the means of knowing the significative relation of a word to its sense;

(ii) according to the Mīmāṁsakas, *upamāna* gives rise to the cognition of a remembered thing qualified by its similarity to a perceived thing;

(iii) Jayanta reduces the Bhāṭṭa theory of *upamāna* to memory or *anumāna*.

V

ARTHĀPATTI AS A DISTINCT SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE IN MĪMĀṀSĀ–JAYANTA'S REVIEW

Arthāpatti as a source of knowledge, is accepted by both the schools of Mīmāṁsā, with minor differences. We get a short account of *arthāpatti* as a way of knowing from the *Śābarabhāṣya* on the aphorisms of Jaimini. According to Śabara, *arthāpatti* is the presumption of an unperceived object on the ground that a fact already seen (*dṛṣṭaḥ*) or heard (*śrutaḥ*) cannot be explained without that presumption. For instance, if it is found that Devadatta, who is alive, is not in the house, the presumption would be that he is present somewhere outside, as otherwise the fact of his being alive and not in the hosue could not be explained.[87] Kumārila interprets the definition of *arthāpatti* without making any change in the sequence of words in it. He considers the words *dṛṣṭaḥ śrutaḥ*, in the *bhāṣya* as referring to two kinds of *arthāpatti*, viz., *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti*. However, Prabhākara interprets the words as meaning the same thing. Pārthasārathi in his *Śāstradīpikā* defines it as follows: Perceiving that what is an indubitable fact (i.e., not merely perceived but logically known to be a fact) cannot be explained except by another fact we postulate something to account for it and that postulation is *arthāpatti*.[88]

Jayanta offers a faithful presentation of the Mīmāṁsā views on *arthāpatti*. As could be seen throughout his work, most of his criticisms are directed only against the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā. As mentioned earlier, Kumārila, taking the stand of Śabara's words as referring to two main forms of *arthāpatti*, viz., *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti*, again subdivides the former into five forms and thus we have six forms of *arthāpatti* in all. The example of Devadatta's non-existence in the house is ascertained from non-apprehension and this is a fact that remains unintelligble without the presumption of Devadatta's presence outside. Here the unintelligibility lies in a fact given by non-apprehension. Hence, it is known as *abhāva-pūrvikā arthāpatti*. This is not always the case, because unintelligibility may even arise due to the fact given by perception or any other *pramāṇa*. Thus, *arthāpatti* is of six forms, viz., based on perception, on inference, on comparison, on verbal testimony, on another presumption and on non-apprehension.[89]

The first type of *arthāpatti*, viz., *pratyakṣa pūrvikā arthāpatti* is illustrated in the presumption of burning power in fire. Here the unintelligibility lies in a perceived fact. We do perceive that fire burns objects. This fact remains unintelligible without the presumption of burning power in fire. In *arthāpatii* based on inference the unintelligibility lies in an inferred fact and it is explained in the presumption of moving power in the sun. The sun

moves inspite of not possessing the means of motion. This conflict is resolved by presuming moving power in the sun. *Arhhāpatti* that is based on *upamāna* is illustrated as follows: That a cow is similar to *gavaya* is known through *upamāna*. There is some unintelligibility in the cognition of similarity. The similarity of the cow to the *gavaya* consists in the presence in the former of the universals of the limbs of the latter and these universals were present in the cow even when it was perceived for the first time. Why then the cognition of the cow's similarity did not arise, but only arose on the perception of the *gavaya*. This unintelligibility is resolved by the presumption of some power in the cow which is manifested only by the perception of the counter-correlative (*pratiyogi*) and gives rise to the cognition of its similarity to the *gavaya*.

Arthāpatti based on *arthāpatti* is illustrated in the presumption of the eternity of words. When a word is heard, there arises the cognition of the object denoted by it. From this it is concluded that the word is the cause of the cognition of the corresponding object. Unless there is some action, there can be no causality. Thus, some action inhering in the word is inferred and this action is referred to as *abhidhā* or denotation. This denotative power of word cannot be possible without the eternity of the word. Thus, this impossibility leads to the presumption of eternity of words. The last variety, viz., *abhāvapūrvikā arthāpatti*,[90] we have explained already.

Jayanta then explains the Mīmāṁsā view that *arthāpatti* is different from *anumāna*. It is contended that just as in *anumāna*, here too perception of something proves an unperceived object, so it is only *anumāna*. Kumārila does not admit this and answers this by adhering to the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas. The latter holds *pakṣadharmatājñāna*, etc., as constituting the causal apparatus generating *anumāna*. Since that is not present here, *arthāpatti* cannot be treated as *anumāna*. Let us consider the example of Caitra's presence outside and see if it could be explained as a case of *anumāna*. The fact given in this example is Caitra's absence in the house. That which is to be known from this fact can be stated in two forms, viz., 'Caitra is present in outside space' and 'outside space is one where Caitra is present'. One has to think which could be the ground of inference here. Is it the house qualified by the absence of Caitra or Caitra qualified by the absence of house or else the absence of Caitra in the house or the non-perception of Caitra in the house. None of these exist in the subject of inference, viz., Caitra. Neither the house, nor Caitra, nor his absence nor the non-apprehension of him exist in Caitra. Since there can be no *pakṣadharmatājñāna*, one of the essential causes of *anumāna*, it is not a case of *anumāna*. So what is known through *arthāpatti* cannot be known through *anumāna*.[91]

Jayanta records another argument of the Mīmāṁsakas for the non-inclusion of *arthāpatti* in *anumāna*. Those who want to reduce *arthāpatti* to *anumāna*, cannot in the first place make Caitra's non-existence in the house as the *hetu* because it is non-conclusive by itself. When a man is not present in the hosue, we cannot say that he is present outside, because he may be even dead. Hence, non-existence in the house devoid of Caitra's being alive is not a proof of Caitra's existence outside. Therefore, the opponent should say that Caitra's non-existence in the house along with the fact that he is alive is the *hetu* and this proves the *sādhya*, viz., Caitra's existence outside. This, however, cannot be done. The togetherness of the fact of Caitra's non-existence in the house and his being alive cannot

be known without the knowledge of his existence outside. In an inferential cognition, the knowledge of the *sādhya* arises from the knowledge of the *hetu* and the knowledge of the latter is independent of the former. Smoke is known independently of fire. In the present case, we cannot have the cognition of the *hetu* independently of the cognition of the *sādhya.* It is because soon after we come to know the togetherness of Caitra's non-existence in the house and his being alive, we also come to know Caitra's existence outside. Without referring to the difference of place, Caitra's existence (being alive) and non-existence (in the house) cannot be put together. In other words, there is no compatibility between existence and non-existence. Thus, here the knowledge of Caitra's existence in general and his non-existence in the house itself result in the knowledge of his existence outside the house. Hence, there remains nothing to be known after knowing the *hetu.*[92]

Further, *arthāpatti* does not stand in need of the knowledge of invariable relation (*vyāpti*) whereas *anumāna* cannot proceed without it. It is true, no doubt, that there exists *vyāpti* between non-existence inside the house and existence outside but this is not known prior to the presumption of Caitra's presence outside. Moreover, even one who does not have the knowledge of invariable relation of this kind presumes that a person who is not inside exists outside. In fact, this knowledge itself is nothing but *arthāpatti.* It is how the Mīmāṁsakas establish the distinctness of *arthāpatti* from *anumāna.*[93]

The Naiyāyikas and others might say that the knowledge given by *arthāpatti* does follow from certain universal propositions and hence it can be treated as inference. That Devadatta eats at night follows from the universal proposition "A man who does not eat at night while fasting by day is not fat." Likewise, the fact that "Devadatta is present outside" follows from the proposition 'A living man is either at home or present outside'. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that these propositions are not cases of real *vyāpti* or induction. They are not generalizations from the particular facts of experience. For example, the universal proposition 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' is derived from the particular instances of their agreement in absence. But, in the present case, we have no such previous experience of the agreement in absence between 'eating at night' and fatness. In fact, it is the result of an attempt to correlate his fatness with the absence of eating by day, and it is a process of reasoning which is different from that involved in inference. Similarly, the proposition 'Devadatta lives outside' follows in the wake of any attempt to reconcile the facts that 'Devadatta lives but he is not in the house'. On these grounds, *arthāpatti* is not a form of inference but a separate source of knowledge.

Now a question may arise that Caitra's absence may certainly be known by means of non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). The Mīmāṁsakas proclaim an emphatic 'No'. It is because when absence is known by means of non-apprehension, we know it as located upon a particular well-defined substratum. Absence of Caitra belongs to all places excepting his house. Hence it cannot be known by non-apprehension. The Naiyāyikas might argue that by travelling all the places the absence of Caitra is ascertained by non-perception. This contention is not tenable. Although one travels to all the places, one cannot exactly know the locus of the absence of Caitra. After having left Kauśambī, he may even return to it. For a common man with limited knowledge, it is impossible to know the absence of Caitra in all the places, except his house, by means of non-apprehension except for presumption.

The Naiyāyikas may still argue that the object in question may be inferred. The inferential argument is as follows:

> All the other places contain the absence of Caitra; because those places are other than the place occupied by Caitra;
>
> Like the place in the vicinity of his house.
>
> The Mīmāṁsakas set aside this by a counter-inference which is as follows:
>
> Other places are not devoid of Caitra, because those places are different from the place adjacent to the place of Caitra, like the place where Caitra exists.

The small body of a man seen only at a particular place, and if his absence had not been present in the other places, then his small size would not hold good. That is why it is presumed that his absence exists in all places not occupied by him. Thus the absence of Caitra under discussion is only known through presumption.[94]

VI

ŚRUTĀRTHĀPATTI

As mentioned earlier, Kumārila interprets Śabara's statement *dṛṣṭa* and *śruta* as implying two different kinds of presumption, viz., *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti*. On hearing the statement 'Devadatta who is fat, does not take his meal during the day', we arrive at the conclusion of Devadatta eating at night. Kumārila considers this to be a distinct type of knowledge and designates it '*Śrutārthāpatti*'. Kumārila who is fully aware of its being included under the other sources of knowledge by the opponents, hastens to show that it cannot be included under the other sources of knowledge. *Arthāpatti*, as has been mentioned earlier, gives us a knowledge of facts which cannot otherwise be explained. It cannot be explained by perception, because the fact known through *arthāpatti* is not perceived by us. 'That the fat Devadatta eats at night' is not a matter of perception for us. Nor can we explain this knowledge by inference because the above knowledge comes to the mind of one who is ignorant of the law of invariable relation. We cannot even entertain a supposition that it is due to comparison. It is because there is no similarity either between the sentence which is heard, i.e. 'does not eat during the day' and that which is not heard, i.e. eats at night' or between the meaning of these sentences. On these grounds, it may be concluded that the 'knowledge of taking meals at night' is only verbal. But in the usual verbal testimony, words which are heard have the competence to convey the complete sense whereas it is not the case with presumption based upon verbal testimony. In the given example that which is heard conveys the negative meaning of Devadatta not taking food during the day and not the positive meaning of eating at night. Hence, the knowledge that he takes his food at night is based only on a part of the sentence, which is presumed by us.[95]

Now, how is this sentence presumed? The assumption of such a supplementary sentence with reference to the context, etc., has been admitted by the Mīmāṁsakas. We cannot assert that the inconsistency inherent in the sentence 'Devadatta who is fasting during day is fat' kindles our imagination to supplement it by the assumption of the sentence that he takes food at night in order to make it a consistent one. Thus, the given sentence implies, as a grammatical necessity, the presumption of the portion of the sentence. If that is not done so, the above incomplete sentence will not be able to convey its meaning. This is how the Mīmāṁsakas establish *śrutārthāpatti*.[96]

The Mīmāṁsakas add that a sentence which expresses a complete meaning is a source of valid knowledge. Therefore, whenever a portion of a sentence is heard, we should fill up the gap supplying the understood portion by our imagination. If the understood portion is not supplied, we cannot get the complete and consistent meaning of the sentence. In many cases, the Vedic injunctions are incomplete. By means of presumption based on testimony they are made complete. Sometimes a complete Vedic injunction is also presumed on the basis of an incomplete injunction. For example, the Vedic injunction that 'one should perform *Viśvajit* sacrifice' is an incomplete one. It is because it does not convey the enjoyer of the fruit of the action. This means that the injunction is incomplete as it has not conveyed its intended sense. The very purpose of an injunction is to induce a man to perform the rite it prescribes. But in the absence of the knowledge of the fruit, nobody would have inclination to perform the rite. It is with this in view that the Mīmāṁsakas prescribe the supplementation of the word "*svargakāmaḥ*", one who is desirous of heaven. The injunction in its full form thus means 'One who is desirous of heaven should perform *Viśvajit* sacrifice'. Similarly, the injunction 'One who is desirous of lustre arising from the holy study should offer *Caru* (rice boiled in milk) in honour of the Sun god' is also incomplete as the meaning of the word *Caru* is ambiguous. It may either mean the pot containing rice to be boiled in milk or simply rice boiled in milk. Hence, another injunction which throws light on the deity to be worshipped and the substance to be offered should be presumed to supplement it. Similarly, in the case of subsidiary rites, such as *Aindrāgnya*, etc., a general hint has been provided by the basic injunction as regards their performance. In order to know the details of the rites, we have to assume some injunctions which proclaim that subsidiary rites bear a close resemblance to the principal rites which they belong to.[97]

To sum up this part: Jayanta concludes his review of the Mīmāṁsā position that presumption based upon six sources of valid knowledge must be admitted as a distinct source of valid knowledge.

VII

JAYANTA'S CRITICISM OF MĪMĀṀSĀ VIEWS ON ARTHĀPATTI

Jayanta's exposition of the problems related to *arthāpatti* is quite exhaustive. He holds the view that *śrutārthāpatti*, as formulated by Kumārila, can be reduced to inference. He

reproduces the Prābhākara views on *arthāpatti* in a precise and clear manner. At the very beginning of the criticism of the Mīmāṁsā views, Jayanta asserts that presumption is identical with inference. He states that if two things are not inseparably connected by a relation, then one of them cannot manifest the other. No one can know one object on the basis of the knowledge of another object. In the absence of the knowledge of invariable relation between two objects, knowledge of one object does not guarantee the knowledge of the other. In the case of presumption, although a general kind of relation exists between two objects, it is not possible to know the specific relation in all cases. Since the Mīmāṁsakas hold that in cases of presumption the proof cannot be established without the assumed object, it is a kind of negative concomitance. This negative concomitance (*vyatireka vyāpti*) being known, one can lead to positive concomitance too. These two kinds of concomitance are the property of the *hetu.*[98] Hence presumption is not distinct from inference. Jayanta adds that the so-called instances of presumption which are based upon perception and other forms of valid knowledge and have been explained to prove the existence of the supra-sensuous power of an object, are really pointless.[99] It is because these powers cannot be known through any other *pramāṇa.* As regards the *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* variety of presumption based upon perception and also the Mīmāṁsā thesis that perception is totally different from perception, and the presumption based upon non-apprehension, explained by Kumārila, Jayanta remarks that it is really a matter of wonder that the simple cognition of fire is perception, but the cognition of the burning power in fire is the result of presumption. Likewise having accepted initially six kinds of presumption, it is not fair on the part of the Mīmāṁsakas to later desert presumption based on non-perception like a doe in a forest. He says poetically:

> If you (Mīmāṁsakas) desert this young lady (in the form of your earlier illustration or presumption) who absolutely depends upon you for her protection, then how will the other ladies (other forms of presumption) count upon your protection with confidence.[100]

Jayanta then directs his effort to the rejection of *śrutārthāpatti* as a source of knowledge. *Śrutārthāpatti,* as has been mentioned earlier, is the presumption of an unheard clause with a given sentence when the sentence becomes unintelligible without the presumption of such a clause. Not only is it different from other sources of knowledge but from other types of presumption too. Most of the cases of *śrutārthāpatti* centre around structural and hermeneutical dimensions of the sentence. The Bhāṭṭas do not agree to reduce this type of *arthāpatti* to inference. But Jayanta holds it to be not different from inference. The following are the arguments advanced by Jayanta to refute the Bhāṭṭa viewpoint.

The example of the so-called presumption based upon verbal testimony is not different from inference. It really sounds absurd to presume the part of a sentence since the meaning of the absent part can also be inferred from its effect which serves the purpose of a genuine ground. Just as fire is inferred from smoke, so also one can infer the taking of meal at night by Devadatta as a ground for Devadatta being fat. That 'fatness' is caused by taking heavy meal is well known. In some cases, it is known perceptually and in other cases, it may be known verbally. As there is not much difference between these two types

of grounds, there is no difference between *śrutārthāpatti* and inference.[101]

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas have put forth that an incomplete sentence cannot convey its full meaning. No doubt they admit that the sentence 'Devadatta who is fat does not eat during day' conveys that he is fat but what they want to say is that it should be complemented by the clause 'he takes food at night' which is not known through the original sentence. Hence what precisely is called *śrutārthāpatti* is nothing but the complementary portion of the sentence. Jayanta at this juncture objects as to which component of the given sentence requires a complement; whether it is a word or its meaning or knowledge If the Bhāṭṭas say that a word requires a complement, then it may be said that no inarticulate sound would require a complement. If it is said that the meaning requires a complement, it can be admitted as a complementary meaning, but for that purpose a portion of the sentence need not be assumed. If, however, knowledge expressed by a part of the sentence requires a complement, even then the additional objects themselves could serve this purpose. Thus, in any case, presumption of a part of the given sentence becomes unnecessary.[102]

Jayanta anticipates many objections to this from the Mīmāṁsakas, but rejects all of them. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that the presumption of the object and not of meanings themselves would render the Vedic sentence non-Vedic. Jayanta affirms that if the sentence is presumed, the meaning would become non-Vedic and thus the presumed sentence also would become non-Vedic. Thus a Vedic injunction becoming non-Vedic is not a welcome position. Further, if the directly stated sentence and the subsequently assumed sentence would constitute a Vedic text according to the Mīmāṁsakas, then in the same breath they can even say that the expressed and suggested meaning may also be treated as Vedic. On the basis of these facts, the arguments relating to fatness being perceptual and 'taking food at night' as not perceptual, etc., stand discredited. What Jayanta wants to convey is that when one portion of a sentence is known, the other part could be inferred.[103]

From the above it follows that Jayanta does not consider *śrutārthāpatti* as a distinct means of knowledge. The arguments put forth by the Bhāṭṭas are not based on sound logic.

To sum up this part: Mīmāṁsakas use *arthāpatti* very frequently to explain Vedic texts by presuming missing words and meaning without which the Vedic texts cannot be explained. Jayanta is of the firm view that the role played by *arthāpatti* can be had through inference itself. Kumārila, however, considers it as a distinct source of knowledge.

VIII

ON ANUPALABDHI—JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF MĪMĀṀSĀ

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and following them, the Advaita Vedāntins consider that *abhāva* or non-existence of an object in a specific substratum and its ascertainment needs an independent means of knowledge called *anupalabdhi* or non-apprehension. The Prābhākaras although do not admit *abhāva* as an objective reality, yet consider it to be cognized through perception. The Naiyāyikas maintain that non-existence is comprehended

by the sense-organs through the relations of *samyuktaviśeṣaṇatā* or *samyuktaviśesyatā*.[104] Hence *anupalabdhi* is a distinct *pramāṇa*, according to them. Kumārila is of the view that perception, inference, etc., are the means of knowing the positive aspect of things. The means of knowing negative facts cannot be perception or inference which are positive means.

Kumārila's analysis of the metaphysical and epistemological aspects is largely responsible for formulating the theory of negation as a distinct way of knowing.[105] The Bhāṭṭas believe that every object has two forms—one of existence and the other of non-existence. They say that a proof which does not reveal a positive object, reveals a negative object and is called the privation of proof (*pramāṇābhāva*). If we analyse the judgment that 'there is no jar here' then we find that a proof which comprehends only a positive object reveals a jar and that a negative judgment arises from privation of all proofs. To be explicit: the non-appearance of the knowing process of the knower directed to a jar is the proof which is called the non-perception of a perceptible object and the resulting consciousness assumes the form that a jar does not exist. [Or else] The knowing process of a knower which reveals a negative fact, such as the negation of a jar, is due to the absence of a positive proof. The judgment that 'there is no jar' is the proof. The result of such a proof is that the negation of a jar is to be avoided or obtained.[106] Kumārila states in his *Ślokavārttika*:

> The first hypothesis of Kumārila is that the proof which is called the privation of proof is really the negative mode of a soul—the negative mode which is the absence of all positive states such as perceptual consciousness, etc. These positive states of the soul reveal only positive objects. The negative state, on the other hand, is the source of a negative judgment such as 'there is no jar'.[107]

Kumārila states that the judgment 'There is no jar' is not perceptual because there is no sense-contact to comprehend it. Sense-contact is of two types: (i) conjunction and (ii) inherence. The contacts such as *saṁyukta viśeṣaṇatā*, etc., admitted by the Nyāya school are not accepted by them. If sense of sight can comprehend the absence of jar through the above relation, then the Mīmāṁsakas contend that it can comprehend whatever is present in substances which is conjoined with the sense of sight. This means taste, etc., can be comprehended by the latter. The Naiyāyikas may say that taste, etc., are not comprehended by the sense of sight, as they do not have the fitness to come within the range of sense of sight. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that if perceptibility or imperceptibility determines its perception or non-perception, then why should the sense-object contact with its sixfold division be assumed as one of the conditions of perception. Hence, the fitness to be perceived should alone determine perception. Therefore, the awareness of the absence of jar is not perceptual.[108]

The Naiyāyikas counter argue that when there is perception of absence of jar, there is also the perception of its locus, viz., bare floor. There is certainly a marked difference in the cognition of these two and this can be accounted for only by establishing two different types of contacts to comprehend them. However, the Mīmāṁsakas argue that it is precisely on this ground that a separate *pramāṇa* called non-apprehension is admitted to

comprehend absence of 'jar' as there is no sense-contact with it. So it has been stated in the *Ślokavārttika*:

> The knower at the outset perceives the locus of negation. Then he recollects the object negated. Afterwards his inner organ in cooperation with the non-perception of the perceptible object produces the knowledge of negation without receiving direct help from the external sense-organs.[109]

That the sense-organs play no role in giving rise to the negative judgment is explained by the Mīmāṁsakas thus: a man who has totally seen all the objects of Gauramūlaka, a village, goes out of the village to a distant place. When he is asked by some one, whether Garga lives at Gauramūlaka or not, he immediately recollects and knows that such a person is not present at Gauramūlaka. Here the awareness of the absence of Garga is not perceptual. It is not a case of inference even. It is not proper for us to entertain a hypothesis that the negative judgment that there is no jar on this spot is either due to verbal testimony or comparison or presumption. Therefore, it stands to reason that the knowledge of a negative fact is due to a proof which is itself negative in its character. Jayanta concludes the Mīmāṁsā account of *anupalabdhi* thus:

A proof, which is negative in its character, cannot reveal a positive object. Similarly, a negative fact cannot be established by a proof which is positive in character. A proof, which throws light only on a negative fact, cannot be gainsaid. Therefore, a proof, which is negative in character, should be admitted in order to enlighten a negative fact.[110]

IX

JAYANTA'S REFUTATION OF NON-APPREHENSION AS A DISTINCT SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

Jayanta strikes at the root saying that when the Mīmāṁsakas have admitted absence as an objectively real entity, they should as well admit that it is revealed by perception but should not go in search of a distinct proof for its manifestation. When an absence lies within the range of perception, it can certainly be perceived. Only when it is beyond the scope of perception, it is to be comprehended by some other proof. In the case of the cognition of the absence of jar, the sense of sight comprehends the floor as associated with absence of jar. The Mīmāṁsakas make it complicated by saying that the substratum of absence is comprehended by the sense of sight. The absence of pot there is known through *anupalabdhi pramāṇa.* Jayanta questions as to how a distinction in the nature of the so-called cognition of the two objects can be drawn. In the mediate knowledge of fire on a mountain after the perception of smoke therein, there arises the knowledge of invariable relation of smoke to fire. Then there arises the mediate knowledge of fire. Thus, there is an interval between the cognition of smoke and fire and so we can speak of difference in their awareness. But, in the present case, just as we see the bare floor, at the very same moment absence of pot also is cognized. Thus, the awareness of the substratum of pot and the awareness of the

absence of pot immediately and invariably follows sense-object contact, viz., the functioning of the sense of sight. The Mīmāṁsakas may say that fire on the mountain is beyond the range of vision; but the absence of a perceptible object, say, pot, is present before us and the perception of absence is causally connected with the senses on the basis of the method of agreement and difference. Further, the Mīmāṁsakas have pointed out that the colour pertaining to fire is seen but its heat is inferred and hence the latter is not causally connected with the sense-stimulus. In the same way, the awareness of absence is not causally connected with the sense-organ. So absence cannot be visually perceived. Jayanta feels that this analogy does not hold good. This conclusion arrived at by the Mīmāṁsakas is not applicable to the perception of negation.[111]

Further, Bhāṭṭas maintain that there must be similarity between the means of knowledge and the knowable object. Positive objects are comprehended by positive means of knowledge and negative objects by negative means. But Jayanta objects to this and asserts that negative facts are also included in the causal apparatus that produces positive knowledge. Sometimes a negative fact becomes the ground leading to the inferential knowledge of a positive *sādhya*. The absence of rainfall leads to the inferential knowledge of the blowing away of the clouds by a storm. Hence it is not correct to maintain that a negative fact is known only by means of negative proof. When a semi-divine being, Yakṣa, is worshipped, the articles of worship do not change in conformity to the object of worship.[112]

Jayanta agrees with Kumārila in saying that negation within the range of vision has no need to be inferred. However, negation that lies outside the range of sense of sight is a case of inference or knowledge through verbal testimony.

Jayanta convinces the Bhāṭṭas to either accept absence as unreal as it has no characteristics or accept it as being perceptual.[113]

To sum up this part:

(i) *abhāva* or absence is a distinct type of knowable object, and it is known through a distinct *pramāṇa* called *anupalabdhi* in the Mīmāṁsā system;

(ii) *abhāva* is simply capable of being cognized through the method of perception and so there is no need of accepting *anupalabdhi* as a distinct way of knowing.

X

ON VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE—JAYANTA'S REVIEW OF MĪMĀṀSĀ

While discussing the nature of verbal testimony, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa states that a sentence is true when uttered by an authoritative person and false otherwise. The Mīmāṁsakas add by saying that a sentence is true not only when uttered by a trustworthy person but also when it happens to be a sentence which is uttered by none. This follows from his belief that Vedas do not have any author. That is, they are *apauruṣeya* or impersonal. Again, this view is a corollary to the basic acceptance by the Mīmāṁsaka that all cognitions are intrinsically valid. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa identifies the true spirit of the Mīmāṁsakas and says that in the context of discussing verbal testimony as a *pramāṇa*, the Mīmāṁsakas have raised the

question, whether the validity of a cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic. This question becomes meaningful by throwing light on the former question.

Jayanta devotes much attention and treats it as an independent topic in the third *āhnika*.

Since knowledge depends upon certain specific conditions for its rise, we have to explain its truth or falsehood. In other words, there arise the questions how the validity or invalidity of knowledge are constituted and how they are known to us. The first question relates to the conditions of origin (*utpatti*) and the second to the condition of ascertainment (*jñapti*) of validity and invalidity. There are two possible answers to these questions. (1) Knowledge is both made and ascertained to be valid or invalid by the same conditions which originate the knowledge (*jñānasāmagrī*); (2) or it may be said that validity or invalidity of knowledge is both constituted and known by external conditions. On this basis, we draw four alternative solutions to this problem. Each of these has been accepted and supported by one or the other system of Indian philosophy. The Sāṁkhyas maintain that both validity and invalidity are inherent in the cognition itself. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, hold that both are proved by certain extraneous causes, such as inference, etc. The Buddhists are of the opinion that invalidity inheres in all cognitions but validity is established by something else. The Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins believe that validity is self-evident and invalidity is determined by extraneous causes.[114]

According to the Nyāya school, knowledge is only the manifestation of objects. No knowledge is valid or invalid on its own account, or simply because it is produced by certain specific causes (*jñānasāmagrī*). Validity and invalidity of knowledge depend upon its conformity and non-conformity to objects or facts. If it corresponds to the real nature and relations of its object, knowledge is valid; otherwise it becomes invalid. Thus the validity and invalidity of a cognition depend upon extraneous features.[115] We shall see how Jayanta formulates his own theory refuting the arguments of the opponents.

Jayanta critically examines the view of the Sāṁkhyas and the Buddhists and finally rejects them. Next, he takes up for critical examination the view of the Mīmāṁsakas. Before providing Jayanta's account of the Mīmāṁsā position we shall briefly point out the theory of validity according to the three followers of the Mīmāṁsā school.

The systems of Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsā, Prābhākaramīmāṁsā, the Mīmāṁsā of Murārimiśra and Advaita Vedānta maintain that the factor that comprehends a primary cognition comprehends its validity also. Thus, these systems uphold the view that validity of knowledge is known intrinsically.

According to the Bhāṭṭa school, cognition transcends the sense-organ. Hence the cognition of a pot which arises from the contact of the sense of sight does not become the object of another cognition. The cognition of the pot gives rise to a peculiar quality called 'known-ness' (*jñātatā*) in the object. This quality is immediately apprehended. On the basis of this imemdiate apprehension of known-ness, the existence of the cognition of pot is inferred. It is this inferential knowledge that cognizes the primary cognition as also its validity.

According to the Prābhākara school, owing to the contact of sense-organs, there arises in the first instance itself the cognition in the form 'I know the pot'. In this cognition, the three factors of pot, cognition and the soul are manifested. Cognition is self-luminous

in the sense that it is the content of itself. Thus cognition which comprehends itself comprehends its validity too.

According to Murarīmiśra, first there arises the cognition in the form 'this is a pot'. Subsequently, there arises an after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) in the form 'I know the pot'. In other words, the after-cognition takes the form 'I have the cognition whose predicate is potness and the substantive is pot'. Thus according to Murārimiśra's view, it is the after-cognition that comprehends the primary cognition. And it is the same after-cognition that comprehends the validity of the primary cognition too.[116]

We shall now summarise Jayanta's review of the Mīmāṁsā position.

The very nature of knowledge is to reveal its object. In other words, no knowledge exists without revealing some object. It follows from this that knowledge does not require any condition other than itself in order to reveal its object. Thus, we see that knowledge by its very nature must be valid, i.e., the conditions which condition knowledge must also condition its validity. It may be said that knowledge is neutral and validity and invalidity are its adventitious characters. But there is no cognition which is neutral or characterless. Every cognition is either valid or invalid. There is no scope for a third alternative at all. Doubt which comprehends two opposing features also is a form of invalid knowledge. Further says the Mīmāṁsakas that if knowledge is not valid intrinsically, then it can never be made so by any extraneous condition. It is because the cognition that validates the first cognition, must itself be validated by other conditions and this must again be validated by another and so on *ad infinitum*. The result of this position is that the validity of knowledge cannot be finally established. The validity of knowledge, thus, must be conditioned by the condition of knowledge itself. In other words, it must be intrinsic to knowledge. The only extraneous feature accounting for validity is the absence of defects (*doṣābhāva*). And this again does not mean that validity is known externally. It is because absence of defect is not a positive factor and cannot contribute to the validity of knowledge. At best it can account for the absence of invalidity but not validity. There is no proof for the presence of any positive external condition like specific efficacy of the conditions of knowledge (*kārakātiriktatadgataguṇa*). On these grounds, we have to admit that the validity of knowledge is due to the conditions of knowledge itself (*svarūpasthitahetuja*). That is, it is intrinsic to knowledge.[117]

In the same way, the validity of knowledge must be known from the conditions of knowledge itself. A true knowledge is known to be true by itself. It does not require any another factor to ascertain its truth. It cannot be known from any special efficacy in the conditions of knowledge (*kāraṇaguṇa*) as there is no such thing. Even if such a one exists, it must pertain only to the sense organs which are the instruments of knowledge. But, since the sense-organs are supra-sensible, they cannot be known. It might be said that validity is known from the experience of non-sublation (*bādhakābhāvajñāna*). Non-sublation cannot be a test of the validity of knowledge. It is because non-sublation would mean either of the two things, viz., that there is no sublation for the present or there cannot be sublation at any point of time. To know that there is non-sublation for the present would not guarantee for the validity of knowledge. For, a knowledge which is not sublated now, may be sublated in the future. The second alternative that there cannot be sublation at any point of time, would mean that we would never know anything unless we become omniscient.[118]

Non-sublation thus cannot serve as a test of validity. Validity of knowledge can neither be known from its co-existence with another knowledge (*saṁvāda*). Now how do we know that there is co-existence of two cognitions? How do we know that the second knowledge which co-exists with the first and validates it, is itself valid? In order to validate the second we must admit a third knowledge and so on *ad infinitum*. If we put an end at a particular knowledge and say that as a whole the system of knowledge has self-validity, there is no reason why can the first knowledge itself not be admitted to have self-validity? It may be said that the experience of the desired results accounts for the co-existence of cognition. But the mere experience of desired objects cannot be a proof of the validity of knowledge. In dream, we do perceive many desired objects. But this does not make the dream-knowledge a valid one. Thus, it may be seen that none of these, viz., correspondence, co-existence, non-sublation can serve as an extraneous factor to prove the validity of knowledge. It comes to this that knowledge must certify its own validity or that the validity of knowledge is self-evident.[119]

As regards invalidity, the Mīmāṁsakas hold the view that it is extrinsic to knowledge. That is, the invalidity of knowledge is due to some defects in the conditions of knowledge (*kāraṇadoṣa*). When certain defects vitiate its natural conditions, then that knowledge fails in its purpose of attainment of truth. Hence, invalidity is conditioned by conditions other than knowledge itself. Knowledge by itself is valid. If, in any case, it is rejected as false, it is because it fails to give the expected result (*viparītavyavahāraja*) and not due to its failure to reveal the object. Knowledge is called invalid either because it is sublated by some other knowledge or it has arisen from certain defects. Thus, it may be seen that invalidity of knowledge is both constituted and known by external conditions other than the conditions of knowledge itself.[120]

When one knowledge is sublated by another, sometimes we may have some doubt regarding the second knowledge and may resort to a third one to resolve the doubt. But here we would not face the defect of *infinite regress* and be forced to give up the view of intrinsic validity of knowledge. If the third knowledge is consistent with the first, then the intrinsic validity of the first remains established. This is done by the third knowledge by dispelling the false doubt caused by the second sublating knowledge. If, however, the second knowledge is consistent with the first, it confirms the sense of sublation and thus the first is known to be invalid. Thus, we may see that the invalidity of the first knowledge is known through something other than itself. The consistency of the third with the second, however, does not mean that it validates the second but it only means that the doubt with regard to the second is removed by its co-existence with the third. It follows from the above account that every knowledge validates itself through itself and is invalidated by some other knowledge.[121]

To sum up this part: Validity is intrinsic to all knowledge while invalidity is extrinsic and accidental.

Jayanta has so far set forth the Mīmāṁsā view of *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*. Now, he rejects the first part of the Mīmāṁsā theory, viz., that knowledge is both made valid and known to be valid intrinsically. In the first place, says Jayanta, that the validity of knowledge cannot be due to the condition of knowledge as such. In that case, there would not arise any invalid

knowledge because invalid knowledge also arises from the condition of knowledge. Jayanta states that just as invalid cognition is due to some positive factors that vitiate the general conditions of knowledge, in the same way, it must be accepted that valid cognition also is due to special features of the general conditions of the knowledge. Mere absence of vitiating factors cannot guarantee the positive character of validity. It follows from the above that validity of perception is not merely due to the absence of vitiating factors such as the defective sense-organ but due to positive factors such as the efficacious sense-organ. Likewise, in all cases the validity of knowledge is due to some special conditions in the specific causes of knowledge (*kāraṇaguṇa*). These special conditions may not always be perceived but they may be known through inference and verbal testimony. This special efficacy of the sense-organ may be known from the medical sciences.[122]

Moreover, if the validity of knowledge is simply due to the absence of vitiating conditions, its invalidity may also be said to be due to absence of efficacious conditions. What Jayanta emphasizes is that invalidity need not be admitted as known through external conditions.

Furthermore, since according to the Mīmāṁsakas all knowledge is intrinsically valid, the distinction between validity and invalidity is rendered insignificant. No knowledge can be treated as invalid. On the contrary, we do have erroneous cognitions, hallucinations, etc. Hence it must be admitted that both validity and invalidity are externally conditioned.[123]

Similarly, no knowledge can by itself be known to be valid. For example, the cognition of blue does not cognize its validity at the same time when it cognizes the blue colour. It does not even cognize itself immediately as a cognition of blue, far less as a valid cognition of blue. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, a cognition is not immediately cognized, but is known mediately by inference. In that case, validity of knowledge cannot be known immediately by itself. Nor can we say that with every cognition there follows immediately another cognition which cognizes the validity of the first. While perceiving the blue colour, for instance, we do not find another cognition that immediately follows it cognizing its validity or invalidity. Also there is no introspective evidence of the presence of the secondary cognition of validity appearing immediately after the primary cognition of an object. Even admitting that, validity of knowledge would not be intrinsic but evinced by another knowledge.

Further, if the invalidity of knowledge be known from its sublation, we have to admit that validity is known from the absence of sublation. If, on the other hand, we accept the Prābhākara view that knowledge is self-manifest and guarantees its own validity without reference to anything else, then we cannot satisfactorily account for doubt and error. Since validity is inherent, every knowledge would carry with it an assurance of its truth and there would be no doubt. Moreover, since all knowledge is valid, there cannot be any disappointment in empirical life. On the other hand, doubts and disappointments are very common in our life. The third cognition may not constitute the validity of the first by being co-existing with it, but at least may condition our knowledge of its validity. So validity of one knowledge is known by another knowledge. Hence the Naiyāyikas conclude that validity of knowledge must be known from external conditions.[124]

From the above it would appear that the Naiyāyikas do not favour the theory of intrinsic validity of the Mīmāṁsakas.

CONCLUSION

A close and careful study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* would prove that it will not be a proper appreciation of Jayanta if we merely take his work to be a running commentary but as one providing glimpses of the history of many centuries. Being a traditional Naiyāyika, he supports the Nyāya tenets very strongly, and at the same time he is perfectly judicious in presenting the views of his opponents including the Sāṁkhyas, Buddhists and Mīmāṁsakas. Perhaps he was the first and last logician to have given serious thought to the problems related to acquiring and testing knowledge and assess the merit of classification of the means of knowledge. He reproduces the views of the Mīmāṁsakas with clarity and seems to have had Kumārila as his main target of attack mostly. Thus Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* may be rightly acknowledged as a landmark in the formulation and growth of Indian epistemology.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See Nagin J. Shah, *A study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī' A Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic*, Introduction p. 3.
2. *pratyakṣānumāmōpamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni. Nyāyasūtra.* 1. 1. 3.
3. *sarvavyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam, Tarka Saṅgraha* (hereafter *TS*) Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri. A Primer of Indian Logic, Chennai: Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, 1998, p. 12.
4. See M. Hiriyanna *Indian conception of Values*, Mysore: Kavyālaya Publishers, 1975, p. 29.
5. Govardhan P. Bhatt *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* (hereafter *EBP*) The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies Vol. XVII. Varanasi, p. 18.
6. Kāśikā C.on *Ślokavārttika*, part II, p. 123. *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (hereafter *ŚV*).
7. *Nirālambanavāda* section. 47.
8. Ibid., *Ātmavāda* 74-75.
9. Ibid., *Śabda* section-69.
10. *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (hereafter *NM*) with Tippaṇī *Nyāyasaurabha*, K.S. Varadachārya. Oriental Research Institute Series No. 416, p. 43.
11. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 45.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 46.
20. Ibid., See also *Nyāyasaurabha* Ṭippaṇī on *NM*, p. 46.
21. Ibid.
23. Ibid.,
24. Ibid., p. 47.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 48.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 49.
30. Ibid., p. 50.
31. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
32. Ibid., p. 51.

33. Ibid., p. 52.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. See FN. 1. p. 45, *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Āhnika-I. V.N. Jha (trans. in English). Sri Satguru Publications, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 190. 1995.
37. *NM*, p. 53.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 54.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
44. Ibid.
45. Jaimini in fact has employed three essential elements in a valid piece of knowledge and they are (1) *aupapattikatva* (2) *abādhitārthakatva* (3) *anadhigatārthatva.*
46. *NM*, p. 57.
47. *ŚV*, 1.1.2. Verse 74.
48. *NM*, pp. 58-59.
49. In a continuous stream of cognition we have, fixing our attention on the object, different intellections of the same object, e.g. 'This is pot' 'This is pot' and so on where each apprehension is valid though it would be not, according to the Bhāṭṭa definition of *pramāṇa.*
50. *Anubhūti* or *anubhava* is direct apprehension.
51. *Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra (hereafter *ŚD*) Tarkapāda D. Venkataramaiah (trans. in English), Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. LXXXIX, p. 52. Oriental Institute, 1940.
52. *NM*, pp. 57-58.
53. *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa, p. 8. Adyar Library Publications. (i) *Saṁbhava* or probability is that by which one knows that a smaller number is included in the greater one. For example, fifty is included in hundred. (ii) *Aittihya* or tradition is that by which one comes to know some idea believed through centuries as for example the presence of a ghost on the tree.
54. *Pūrva Mīmāṁsāsūtra* 1.1.4.
55. *ŚV*, *Pratyakṣa* Section pp. 38-39.
56. *ŚD*, pp. 49-50.
57. Ibid., p. 36.
58. *ŚV*, 4. 254.
59. *NM* p. 261.
60. *ŚV*, 1. 1. 4.-39 Q in *NM*, p. 261.
61. *NM*, pp. 261-262.
62. Ibid., p. 262.
63. *TS*, p. 32.
64. *ŚV*, 1. 1.-21. Q. in *NM*, p. 264.
65. *NM*, p. 264.
66. *taddhi kuḍyam viṇā tatra citrakarmaēva lakṣyate na hi nabhaḥ kusumasya saurabhāsaurabha vicāro yuktaḥ, ibid.*, p. 266.
67. Ibid., p. 267.
68. Ibid., pp. 269-271.
69. *TS*, p. 28.
70. *NM*, p. 374.
71. Kumārila defines similarity as the presence in one class of objects of the universals inhering in a number of parts of the individuals belonging to a different class. For details See *EBP*, p. 308.
72. *ŚV*, Upamāna Section. Verse. 4.
73. Ibid., 13.
74. *ŚD*, p. 99.
75. See Indian Theory of knowledge basd upon Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, by C.D. Bijalwan Heritage Publishers, Delhi. 1977. p. 192.
76. See Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* The compendium of Indian Speculative Logic Translated into English by Janaki Vallabha Bhattacarya, Vol. 1. Motilal Banarsidass. 1978, p. 304.

77. *NM*, p. 386.
78. Ibid., p. 388.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p. 389.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 390.
84. Ibid., pp. 390-391.
85. Ibid., pp. 392-393. See also *ŚV*, Upāmana Section 52-53.
86. *NM*, p. 393.
87. *Śabarabhāṣya* on *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtra* 1. 1. 5.
88. *ŚD*, p. 100.
89. *ŚV*, Arthāpatti Section. 2. Also See *NM*, p. 95.
90. *NM*, pp. 95-96.
91. Ibid., p. 97.
92. Ibid., pp. 97-99.
93. Ibid., p. 99.
94. Ibid., p. 100.
95. Ibid., p. 101. See also *ŚV*, Arthāpatti Section 33-45.
96. *NM.* p. 101.
97. Ibid., pp. 104-106.
98. Ibid., 106-107.
99. Ibid., p. 107.
100. Ibid., p. 120.
101. Ibid., p. 121.
102. Ibid., pp. 121-122.
103. Ibid., p. 123.
104. *TS.* p. 16.
105. *ŚV*, Abhāva Section
106. *NM.* p. 131. See also Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, Translated into English by Janaki Vallabha Bhattacarya Vol. I. Motilal Banarsidass. 1978, p. 102.
107. *ŚV*, Q. in *NM*, p. 131.
108. *NM*, p. 132.
109. *ŚV*, Q. in *NM*, p. 133.
110. *NM*, Verses, 154, 155. p. 136.
111. Ibid., pp. 136-137.
112. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
113. Ibid., pp. 139-140.
114. Ibid., pp. 420-421.
115. Ibid., p. 440. See also Satish Chandra Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* (hereafter *NTK*) University of Calcutta, 1978, p. 77.
116. See for details Dr. S. Revathy, "Validity of knowledge Intrinsic or Extrinsic" Brahmavidyā, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. 63. pp. 23-37.
117. See *NTK*, pp. 92-93.
118. *NM*, pp. 425-426.
119. Ibid., pp. 426-430.
120. Ibid., pp. 430-431.
121. Ibid., pp. 431-432.
122. Ibid., pp. 435-436.
123. Ibid., p. 450.
124. Ibid., pp. 448-449.

CHAPTER 18

A Review of the Akhyāti Theory of Prābhākara School of Mīmāṁsā in Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya

D. Prahlada Char

Among the several epistemological issues on which the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya school hold extrememly divergent views, the nature of error is also one. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, elaborately presents the arguments of the Prābhākaras regarding the nature of an error and rejects the same after a thorough analysis.

BACKGROUND

The Prābhākaras, who hold the Vedas in high esteem, in their anxiety to uphold the validity of them, deny the very existence of erroneous cognition. They contend that if a cognition could be erroneous, then no cognition will be trusted and ultimately the cognition produced by the Vedas also will be doubted of its validity. Therefore, the Prābhākaras maintain that no cognition is invalid. To establish the validity of the cognitions which the other schools consider as invalid, they adopt an ingenious method. They claim that the cognition 'this is silver' which arises on seeing a conch-shell, is not a single cognition, as considered by the others. Instead, it is a combination of two cognitions. One is the perceptual cognition of the conch-shell that has arisen due to the contact between the eyes and the conch-shell. However, because of the defect in the sense-organ, the conch-shell is not grasped as conch-shell, but is grasped as just 'this'. The other cognition is the recollection of the silver. The impression of silver seen elsewhere is aroused here on seeing the resemblance of silver in the conch-shell, and the aroused impression leads to the recollection of the silver. The Prābhākaras contend that the person, whose sense-organ is defective, is unable to see the difference between the conch-shell and the silver and also the difference between the perceptual cognition and the recollection. Thus, as per the Prābhākaras, an 'erroneous cognition', instead of misapprehension, is actually a case of non-apprehension.

As against this view, the Nyāya school holds that a cognition may be erroneous. It defines a true cognition as an experience (*anubhava*) grasping a substantive possess of an attribute which is a qualifier in the experience.[1] The Prābhākara, who considers both recollection and indeterminate cognition as *apramā*, agrees that a cognition to be regarded as *pramā* should have a feature and also be an experience, i.e. a cognition other than

recollection. However, he maintains that the remaining part in the Naiyāyika's definition of *pramā*, viz., it should be grasping a substantive possessed of the attribute, has no use as all the cognitions are true and hence there is nothing to be excluded by this adjunctive.[2] It is true that recollection and indeterminate cognition are regarded as '*apramā*' by the Prābhākaras. But, they are '*apramā*' just in the technical sense, as the recollection and indeterminate cognition are not experiences. They are not '*apramā*' in the sense in which the term is used by the Naiyāyika and others, as they, according to him, do not grasp a qualifier (*prakāra*) which does not exist in the qualificandum.

The following are some of the inferences which the Naiyāyika would put forward to establish the existence of erroneous cognition:

Being an object of the efforts put forth by a person desirous to have silver is concomitant to being a content of the experience in which *rajatatva* figures as a qualifier, for 'being an object of the efforts of a person desirous to have silver' is an attribute that exists only in such objects which are just the objects of the efforts put forth by a person who is desirous of having silver.[3] The inference may be explained as follows.

Any attribute, for instance, *rajatatva* which exists only is *rajata*, in such that it exists only in such things which are the objects of the efforts of a *rajatārthī* (one who is desirous of *rajata*). At the same time, the attributes such as *rajatatva* are invariably present in the objects which are the contents of the experience having *rajatatva* as the qualifier. Similarly, 'being an object of the efforts of a person desirous of *rajata*' is an attribute that exists only in *rajata*. Hence, wherever this attribute, namely, being the object of the efforts of *rajatārthī* exists, all of them should be the contents of an experience in which *rajatatva* is the qualifier. As we know, sometimes the things such as conch-shell, etc., also are the objects of the efforts of a *rajatārthī*. Hence, conch-shell, etc., also must be the contents of such experiences in which *rajatatva* is a qualifier. In other words, we have to accept the presence of such experiences in which conch-shell as qualificand is the content of the experience and *rajatatva* is its qualifier. Such an experience is none other than the erroneous cognition, the existence of which is vouchsafed by the Naiyāyika.

The Prābhākara rejects this inference pointing out that the inference is defective as it has a vicious condition (*upādhi*). The *upādhi* suggested here is, 'existence in silver only'. The point being made by the Prābhākara is that an attribute, in order to be invariably concomitant with 'being a content of an experience in which *rajatatva* is the qualifier', will have to be existent in *rajata* only. The attribute '*rajatatva*' itself can be taken as an example here. It is obvious that *rajata*, where *rajatatva* is present, is a content of the experience in which *rajatatva* is the qualifier and hence *rajatatva* can be said as the invariable concomitant to 'being a content of the experience in which *rajatatva* is the qualifier'. But, the attribute 'being an object of the efforts put forth by the person desirous of *rajata*' is not the one that exists only in *rajata*. As we know, even the conch-shell is 'the object of the efforts of the *rajatārthī*'. Therefore, the Prābhākara maintains that the object of the efforts of the *rajatārthī*, in the present case, the conch-shell, need not necessarily be the content of the experience having *rajatatva* as its qualifier. This amounts to say that there is no cognition wherein the conch-shell is the qualificand and *rajatatva* is the qualifier. Thus, the Prābhākara's argument culminates in the rejection of erroneous cognition which as per the Naiyāyika grasps the qualifier that does not exist in the qualificand.

The Prābhākara alludes to another inference of the Naiyāyika, in support of the existence of erroneous cognition, as follows:

The conch-shell is found to be the object of the efforts put forth by a person desirous of having *rajata.* Therefore, the Naiyayika argues that the conch-shell must have been a content of the cognition of *rajata.* For, as we know, *rajata,* which is the object of the efforts of a *rajatārthī,* is found to be the object of the cognition.

Again, the Prābhākara rejects this reasoning on the ground that the inference is defective with the vicious condition (*upādhi*)-*rajatatva.*[5] As we find, *rajata,* which is the content of the cognition of *rajata,* has *rajatatva.* Thus the *upādhi* pervades the *sādhya.* But, the *upādhi-rajatatva,* not being present in the conch-shell, which is the object of the efforts of the *rajārthī,* does not pervade the *hetu.* The sum and substance of this rebuttal by the Prābhākara is that a thing, in order to become an object of the cognition of *rajata,* should have the attribute-*rajatatva.* Since conch-shell does not possess the same, it cannot be claimed as an object of the cognition of *rajata.* Thus the Prābhākara rejects the above and similar inferences put forward by the Naiyāyika to prove the existence of erroneous cognition.

SOME FRESH ARGUMENTS OF THE NAIYĀYIKA

Keeping in view the Prābhākara's explanation about the cognitions, termed as erroneous by the Naiyāyika, that such cognitions are, in fact, combinations of two cognitions, the Naiyāyika puts forth some fresh arguments.

He points out the fact that any effort, for instance, the effort on the part of the person desirous to get a conch-shell, is found to have been produced by a cognition grasping a qualified thing which is also the object of the effort directed towards the thing desired. Therefore, the Naiyāyika argues that the effort directed towards the conch-shell due to desire for *rajata* also should have been caused by a cognition grasping a qualified thing, as does the effort with regard to the desired thing.[6] When thus it is to be admitted that the cognition leading to the effort to have the conch-shell, which is not known as conch-shell, but with the desire to have *rajata,* is caused by a cognition having a qualified content, then the cognition must have the conch-shell as its qualificand and the *rajatatva* as its qualifier. Such cognitions are the ones which the Naiyāyika considers as erroneous cognitions that have a qualifier which does not exist in the qualificand.

The Prābhākara may again contend here that the inference is defective having a vicious condition,[7] viz., being an effort with regard to a desired thing. The point being made by the Prābhākara is that only such efforts directed towards the desired thing are produced by the cognitions that grasp the desired thing as qualified with the attribute. Whereas the efforts having things such as the conch-shell, that are not desired as their objects, are not produced by the cognitions grasping the things as qualified with the attributes.

Responding to this argument, the Naiyāyika draws our attention to the fact that the *upādhi* suggested by the Prābhākara is actually such that the *hetu* in the inference of the Naiyāyika is made a part of it.[8] The *hetu* in the Naiyāyika's inference is 'being an effort'.

The *upādhi* suggested by the Prābhākara is—'being an effort that has the desired thing as its object'. It is obvious here that the *upādhi* contains in it the *hetu*. When thus a *hetu* is a part of the *upādhi*, it cannot be pervasive of the *sādhya*. For, the Naiyāyika is confident that the *hetu* is concomitant with the *sādhya*. If the *upādhi* is thus inclusive of the *hetu*, then it cannot be pervasive of the *sādhya*, for it does not pervade the *hetu* which is concomitant to the *sādhya*. Thus, the so called *upādhi*, in the present case, 'being an effort that has the desired thing as its object', ceases to be an *upādhi*.[9]

When the Naiyāyika tries to establish the existence of erroneous cognition on the ground that the efforts put forth to procure the conch-shell by a person who is desirous of getting silver is the product of a cognition that has a qualified thing as its content, the Prābhākara raises a pertinent objection. He points out that the cognition may be termed by the Naiyāyika as 'a cognition of the qualified thing', as it, according to him, actually grasps the relation of *rajatatva* in the conch-shell. But, from the point of view of the Prābhākara school, that cognition is not a single cognition and hence cannot be termed as a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*.

The Naiyāyika replies that, even according to him, the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* cannot be considered as the cognition grasping the relation between the qualificand and the qualifier. For, where the relation is inherence, it is not an object of perceptual cognition as inherence is considered as a super-sensible relation. Therefore, what the Naiyāyika wants to establish is that the cognition leading to the efforts to procure conch-shell is a cognition comprehending both the qualifier and the qualificand. It is also admitted by both the schools as not grasping the absence of relation between the qualificand and the qualifier. As a matter of fact, even the Naiyāyika does not hold the view that a cognition can comprehend something which is totally non-existent. In other words, even according to the Naiyāyika, whatever appears in the erroneous cognition is real only. Even then he differs from the Prābhākara by holding that the erroneous cognition is a single cognition grasping both the qualificand and the qualifier. What makes the cognition as erroneous is the fact that the qualifier being grasped in the qualificand does not exist there. Thus the cognition is erroneous in the sense that it is *vyadhikaraṇaprakāraka*—grasping a qualifier that does not exist in the qualificand. The Prābhākara, on the other hand, completely differs from the Naiyāyika by holding that the so called erroneous cognition is not a single cognition grasping both the qualificand and the qualifier. Instead, they are two different cognitions. In short, whether the Prābhākara agrees to a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* or not, the Naiyāyika maintains that he will succeed in his attempt of establishing erroneous cognition by proving that the efforts put forth by a *rajatārthī* to procure conch-shell are produced by a single cognition grasping both the *dharma* and the *dharmin*—the qualifier and the qualificand.[10]

The Naiyāyika has Another Argument to Establish Anyathākhyāti

Both the Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara have agreed that the cognition having *rajatatva* as its feature, in certain instances, leads to the efforts to get the conch-shell when there is desire to have *rajata*. The Naiyāyika contends that this particular cognition is similar to the

cognition that leads to the efforts to have the conch-shell with the desire to have it, inasmuch as both of them lead to the efforts towards conch-shell. Therefore, the Naiyāyika maintains that just as the cognition that generates the effort towards a conch-shell in the person who actually desires to have it, the cognition having *rajatatva* as its feature, but leading to the efforts towards the conch-shell in the person who desires to have *rajata*, also should have conch-shell as its qualificandum. In other words, the cognition is such that it has the conch-shell as its qualificandum while the qualifier is *rajatatva*. Since such a cognition cannot be considered as true, *anyathākhyāti* becomes established.[11]

Finding fault in this argument, the Prābhākara raises the question about the specific nature of the cognition which the Naiyāyika wants to establish as *anyathākhyāti*. His contention is that the cognition which is to be established as erroneous by the Naiyāyika, according to him, is a single cognition grasping the object as qualified with the attribute that is not there in the object, or it should be, following the Prābhākara school, two cognitions, one being comprehension and the other being recollection. In either way the inference is defective, for, if the inference has as its subject the single cognition as admitted by the Naiyāyikā, then from the point of view of the Prābhākara to whom the inference is directed, the inference is *āśrayāsiddha*, for, such a cognition does not exist as far as the Prābhākara is concerned. On the other hand, if the subject of the inference is maintained as two cognitions, for which the Prābhākara has no objection, then the inference will suffer from the fallacy of *bādha*, for, as is obvious, though one cognition, namely, the recollection of the silver has *rajatatva* as the qualifier, the other cognition, namely, the perceptual comprehension of the conch-shell as 'this', does not have *rajatatva* as its qualifier.[12]

The Naiyāyika dismisses the objection as ridiculous, pointing out that if such objections are taken seriously, then any inference can be rejected as fallacious. For, one may, with regard to any inference, put the question as to whether the subject is that which has the *sādhya* or that which has the absence of the *sādhya*. It is obvious that any answer to this question would be rejected on the ground that it either leads to the fallacy of *bādha* or *āśrayāsiddhi*. Therefore, the Naiyāyika suggests that it is obligatory on the part of any debater to employ such inferences in which the subject is acceptable to both the parties. In the present case, the Naiyāyika suggests that the 'cognition that leads to the efforts to procure the conch-shell' may be considered as the subject of the inference. Since both the Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara, in spite of the difference of opinion about the nature of such a cognition, have agreed that it leads to the efforts to procure the object which, in fact, is conch-shell, there will not be any problem in employing an inference of the above kind.[13]

From the above arguments of the Naiyāyika and the attempts made by the Prābhākara to reject them, it becomes clear that the crux of the problem here is whether the efforts of a person to get something desired is caused by the cognition that grasps the thing as qualified with the attribute, or as maintained by the Prābhākaras, such efforts are produced by two cognitions between the contents of which difference is not grasped. The Prābhākara insists that by the application of the principle of parsimony, it can be decided that an effort is produced by the non-apprehension of the difference from the object desired only and never by a single cognition which, as per the Naiyāyika, is comprehending the qualificand as qualified with an attribute.

The arguments of the Prābhākara may be summed up as follows:

The efforts to procure *rajata* desired by a person is found in two circumstances, namely, where actually *rajata* is present and also where *rajata* is not present. It is true that where *rajata* is present, the person who puts forth his efforts to procure it has the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*—the cognition of the *rajata* as qualified with the attribute *rajatatva*. However, such a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* should not be considered as the cause of the efforts on the part of the person, as it leads to the fallacy of undue assumption—*kalpanā-gaurava*. For, in the instances where the *rajata* does not exist, but the *pravṛtti* to have the *rajata* takes place, the Naiyāyika will have to presume the presence of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, which from the point of view of the Prābhākara, does not exist. So far as the Prābhākara is concerned, in all the instances where *rajata* may or may not exist, the *pravṛtti* is caused by the cognition of the desired thing associated with the non-apprehension of the difference from the desired object. The presence of such a cognition, in all the instances where *rajata* may or may not exist, is admitted even by the Naiyāyika. For, as is obvious, where *rajata* exists, the Naiyāyika also agrees that the person has the cognition of the *rajata* which is desired, and he does not see the difference of *rajata* in the object present before him. Even in the instance where *rajata* does not exist, the Naiyāyika has to agree that the person has the cognition of the *rajata* and does not find the difference of it in the conch-shell. Otherwise, the superimposition of the *rajata* itself would not occur. Thus the Prābhākara claims that the Naiyāyika's view that the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is the cause of *pravṛtti*, is faulty because it entails the fallacy of *kalpanā-gaurava*, as the presence of such a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* will have to be assumed in the instances where *rajata* does not exist. Whereas, the Prābhākara's view, that it is the cognition of the desired object associated with the non-apprehension of difference from the desired objects that is the cause of the *pravṛtti*, does not attract any such *gaurava*, for, the Naiyāyika also has to accept its presence in all the cases of the *pravṛtti* to have *rajata*, irrespective of the fact whether *rajata* exists or not.[14]

The above view of the Prābhākara that the efforts to get a thing need not be considered as produced by the cognition of the identity with the desired object, is challenged by the Naiyāyika. He argues that, generally any *vyavahāra*—use of words—is preceded by the cognition of what the words indicate. For this rule, the use of the words indicating identity is not an exception. Therefore, the words 'this is silver' used in respect of the conch-shell imply that the use of them is preceded by the cognition grasping the identity of the silver with the conch-shell. Similarly, the desire about a thing also is caused by the cognition that grasps the identity with the desired object. Therefore, the desire with regard to the conch-shell in the form 'let me have it' should be considered as produced by the cognition grasping the identity of the silver with the conch-shell. Thus, the existence of an erroneous cognition, the Naiyāyika maintains, has to be accepted.[15]

The Prābhākara concedes the point that sometimes we make use of the words indicating the identity of the silver in the conch-shell. As a matter of fact, according to him, the cognitions that lead to the use of words of that kind are regarded as erroneous just because they lead to the use of such sentences. However, he maintains that the use of the sentence 'this is identical with silver' is not produced by the cognition grasping the identity of the silver with the conch-shell. He contends that in this case also, there are two

cognitions. One is the cognition of the conch-shell being grasped as just 'this' and the other is the cognition of the identity of the silver. But, here there is no cognition that comprehends the relation of the identity of the silver with the conch-shell. Instead, here is the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of identity with the silver which leads to the use of such sentences. The desire also, in the above case, is just about the thing which is before and known. The object of the desire is never about the thing identical with the silver. Thus, at no point, is there a necessity to admit the existence of erroneous cognition.[16]

Thus, by the above arguments of the Prābhākara and the Naiyāyika, we can see that in the context of an erroneous cognition, the controversy between them centres around the existence of the cognition that grasps the identity of something desired with a thing which is different from it. The Naiyāyika has another instance to show that such a cognition should be admitted even by the Prābhākara.

The person who is affected by jaundice has the cognition of difference in the form that the conch is yellow and not white. But, when he has the desire to get the white conch he would put his efforts to have the conch, as he has the inferential cognition of the presence of the whiteness there. This shows, the Naiyāyika claims, that in all the cases of erroneous cognition, it is the cognition of the identity with the desired object that causes the effort.

Rejecting this contention, the Prābhākara points out that this very instance is an evidence to show that the cognition of the identity with the desired object is not the cause of the *pravṛtti*. Had it been so, he argues, the person who is desirous of having a yellow conch should put forth his efforts to have the yellow conch, as he has, due to jaundice, the cognition of its identity with the yellow. But, as we know, no such *pravṛtti* happens to take place, for he has the inferential cognition of the difference in the form 'this is not yellow, as it is a conch'. Thus, in the above case it has to be admitted that it is the cognition of difference that obstructed the *pravṛtti*, which means that the absence of the cognition of difference is the cause of *pravṛtti*. It may be argued that the cognition of the identity with the yellow could not, in the above case, produce the *pravṛtti*, as the cognition is known as erroneous. If so, the Prābhākara maintains that the cognition of the difference from the white also could not prevent the *pravṛtti*, as it was known as erroneous cognition. Therefore, he points out that the Naiyāyika's contention that the cognition of identity is the cause of the *pravṛtti*, is not tenable.

When, thus, the Prābhākara rejects a single cognition in the instances of erroneous cognition and maintains that the *pravṛtti* can be managed with two cognitions, the pertinent question that naturally arises is, then where is the necessity to admit a single cognition grasping the qualified object in the instances of true cognition of silver that leads to *pravṛtti* in the person who is desirous to get the silver. The contention that the experience that follows the cognition of the silver in the form—'I know this as silver' is the evidence of the existence of a single cognition which has the silver as the qualificandum and the silverness as the qualifier, is also not tenable. For, while the conch-shell was actually seen, but the cognition of the silver has arisen, we have the same kind of experience—'I know this as silver'. If such an experience, in the instances of true cognition, could establish the existence of a single cognition, then it should establish the same kind of cognition in the instances of erroneous cognition also.

The Prābhākara may argue here that the cognition 'I know this as silver' that arises following the cognition of the silver where actually silver exists and also following the cognition of the silver where actually silver does not exist, may appear to be the same. But, as a matter of fact, they are not so. In the case of the cognition of the silver where the silver exists, there is no sublation and hence the experience 'I know this as silver' can be considered as a single cognition having 'the cognition of the silver' as the qualificandum and 'having silverness as its content' as the qualifier. It can also be considered as the experience that vouchsafes that the cognition 'this is silver' is a single one. However, the same cannot be said with regard to the cognition 'I know this as silver' which arises following the cognition of silver, where silver does not exist. For, since the cognition of silver, in this instance, is sublated later, the cognition 'I know this as silver' cannot be considered as a single cognition grasping '*rajatatva-viṣayakatva*'—'having *rajatatva* as its content' in the cognition of the silver. Instead, the Prābhākara school holds it as an instance of two cognitions, viz., the cognition of silver and the cognition of *rajatatva-viṣayakatva.* It also holds that it is a case of non-apprehension of difference between the two cognitions and, therefore, it cannot establish the cognition of the silver that has arisen on seeing conch-shell as a single cognition grasping a qualified thing.

The above argument of the Prābhākara is based on the view that the cognition of silver where the conch-shell is present is sublatable and hence the cognition of silver cannot be considered as a single cognition of the qualified object. On the other hand, the cognition of silver, with regard to the silver, is unsublatable and, therefore, can be regarded as a single cognition. This argument, the Naiyāyika points out, can hold good if the cognition of silver where there is conch-shell, can be ascertained as sublated. But, if the line of argument of the Prābhākara is extended, the sublation also can be considered as an instance of two cognitions—one being the cognition of the conch-shell present before us and the other the cognition of the absence of silverness. Thus, it may be contended here that between the two cognitions and the contents of them, the existent difference is not cognized and hence, truly speaking, it is not a sublation, it being a cognition of the qualified object. Consequently, in the case of the cognition of silver in respect of the conch-shell, the *anu-vyavasāya* in the form 'I know this as silver', not being associated with any sublation, can establish the cognition 'this is silver' as a single cognition grasping the qualified object.[17] The sum and substance of the Naiyāyika's argument here is that, either the Prābhākara has to concede that all the cognitions, including the erroneous cognitions, will have to be admitted as single cognitions grasping the objects as qualified with some property or that he cannot succeed to establish any cognition as a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna.*

The Prābhākara has the following reply to this argument.

The first-ever cognition of silver in the life of a person has to be accepted as an experience of the silver as qualified with silverness. This cognition cannot be held as a recollection, for the person in his present life never had any experience of silver and hence does not have the *saṁskāra* needed for the recollection. Thus, this cognition of silver which has arisen due to the contact between the object which is perceptible and the sense-organ has to be considered as a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna,* grasping both the *dharmin,* the substantive and the *dharma,* the property *rajatatva* in the present case. This cognition cannot be the cognition

of merely the silver. Nor can it merely be the perceptual cognition of the property, viz., *rajatatva*. Instead, as already stated, as the totality of the causes required for the generation of a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is present, the occurrence of a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* will have to be admitted.[18]

Thus, though the first-ever cognition of silver can be claimed as a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, the same cannot be said regarding the cognition of silver that arises on seeing the conch-shell. For, since *rajatatva* is not before us and hence is not in contact with the sense-organ, which is required to make it a content of the cognition of the conch-shell that has occurred, it cannot be held as a content of the cognition. In other words, there is no other way except considering the cognition of *rajatatva* as a cognition different from that of the cognition of the conch-shell which is grasped sans its property, *śuktitva*.

The Naiyāyika who holds the view that the attribute *rajatatva* is a content of the cognition of the conch-shell may contend that while the conch-shell is presented to the cognition by the sense-organ, the attribute *rajatatva* is presented by the *saṁskāra*, i.e. the impression of it obtained by an earlier experience of the same. In the case of recognition, sense-organ and impressions are known to be the presenters of contents. However, the Prābhākara rejects this contention drawing our attention to the subtle but significant difference that exists between a recognition and the cognition maintained as erroneous by the Naiyāyika. While in a recognition, impression and the sense-organ operate with regard to the same object, in case of the erroneous cognition they do not do so. For instance, in the erroneous cognition of silver, while the substantive, viz., the conch-shell is presented to the cognition by the sense-organ, the attribute *rajatatva* is presented by the *saṁskāra*. The point is that different contents may be presented to the same cognition if the presenter is the same. But, if the contents are different and the presenters also are different, the cognition to which the contents are presented cannot be the same. In the case of *pratyabhijñā*, though the presenters, viz., the sense-organ and the impression are different, the content is the same and it can be presented to a single cognition. But, in the case of an erroneous cognition, not only the contents, viz., the substantive and the qualifier are different, but also their presenters, as already shown, are different. Hence, those two cannot be the contents of the same cognition.[19]

Yet another pertinent question raised by the Naiyāyika is that if the very existence of erroneous cognition is rejected, how to distinguish between the cognition considered as doubt and the cognition designated as erroneous. In the case of a doubt, for instance, the cognition 'whether this is a man or post', the Naiyāyika claims that he can give a satisfactory explanation regarding the nature of such cognitions, which is totally distinct from an erroneous cognition like 'this is a post' which has arisen on seeing a man. The former cognition, according to him, is a doubt, for it grasps more than one mutually contradictory alternatives in one substantive. The latter cognition, he holds as *viparyaya*, an erroneous cognition, as it grasps, in a substantive, an attribute that does not exist there. The Prābhākara, obviously, cannot accept this explanation as he does not subscribe to the view that such cognitions also are *viśiṣṭa-jñānas*. His explanation of an erroneous cognition, viz., that it is a case of non-comprehension of the difference that actually exists between

the two cognitions, that of the qualificand and the qualifier and also between those two contents, cannot distinguish it from a doubt, for such non-comprehension of difference, according to the Prābhākara, does exist in the cognitions considered as doubts.

Conceding the point that the non-apprehension of distinction is common to both *saṁśaya* and *viparyaya*, the Prābhākara maintains that they are distinguishable from a different angle. While the so-called *viparyaya* is just the case of non-apprehension of difference between the two contents of two different cognitions, doubt is an instance of non-apprehension of difference between a substantive and many objects which are contradictory to each other and also independently but simultaneously presented.[20] In the instance of the doubt, 'is it a post or a person', the difference between the substantive—the tall object seen before and the two contradictory objects, namely, the post and the person which are simultaneously presented, the difference is not comprehended. It is true that in the erroneous cognition,, 'this is not silver, it is a conch-shell', which has arisen on seeing a silver piece, silver and its difference, which are contradictories, are presented. However, in this cognition, the silver is presented as the counter-entity of the difference and not as an independent qualifier. Hence, such an erroneous cognition does not fall in the category of doubt.[21] The doubt is also distinct from the two erroneous cognitions that come into existence one after the other, immediately. For, on such occasions, there will be the non-comprehension of difference with those two that are presented to the mind one after the other. But, in the case of a doubt, the two contents with which the difference is not comprehended in the substantive, are presented simultaneously.[22]

If, thus, the non-apprehension of the difference with the two that are presented to our mind simultaneously is the factor that determines the nature of a cognition as doubt, then there will be the possibility of considering an erroneous cognition also a doubt. For instance, when with regard to a post, a doubt has occurred in the form 'is it a post or a person' and with regard to the same post, due to erroneously cognizing the characteristics of a person, the erroneous cognition 'this is a person' has arisen, it will have to be considered as a doubt. For, here there is the non-apprehension of the difference of both the person and the post. If it is contended that there is the non-apprehension of the difference of only the person and not that of both, then it means that there is the apprehension of the difference of the post. If, thus, the difference of post is apprehended in the post, the Prābhākara will have to be considered as *Anyathākhyātivādin*. To avoid a situation of this kind, the Prābhākara holds that a cognition will be considered as a doubt only when there is the non-apprehension of the difference of two independently presented objects. In the present case, the cognition is in the form 'this is a person and not a post'. It is obvious here that 'the post' is presented only as a qualifier of the absence and not independently. Therefore, although, here there is the non-apprehension of the difference of the person who is independently presented, there is no such non-apprehension of the difference of the post independently presented. Hence, it is not an instance of doubt. Nor is it an instance of *anyathākhyāti*, for, as per the Prābhākara, here, in the post which is the substantive, the relation of the difference of the post is not grasped. Instead, according to him, it is only a case of non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of the difference of the post.[23]

The Naiyāyika mentions another instance wherein, according to him, *anyathākhyāti* has to be admitted by the Prābhākara also.

It is found that having entertained the doubt 'whether the hill is fiery or not', persons desirous of getting fire put their efforts to get the fire on the hill. It is also found that such efforts are undertaken by more persons only when they have the cognition of the presence of the smoke on the hill. Now, the point to be considered is as to how the erroneous cognition of smoke could produce the efforts on the part of the persons desirous of fire. It is clear that the cognition of the smoke cannot produce the efforts for fire, directly. The view that through the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of the fire on the hill, the efforts to procure fire were produced, is also not tenable. For, such a non-apprehension was already there during the doubt 'whether the hill has fire or not'. Had that non-apprehension produced the efforts, they should have been produced when the doubt still remained. Therefore, it has to be accepted that erroneous cognition of the smoke first generates the inferential cognition of the fire on the hill and then through that it generates the efforts to procure the fire. This inferential cognition of fire on the hill has to be accepted as an erroneous cognition and thus the existence of *anyathākhyāti* will have to be admitted by the Prābhākara.[24]

In reply to this contention, the Prābhākara argues that it is not necessary here to accept the occurrence of the inferential cognition of fire. He holds that since smoke and fire are mutually related objects, the cognition of smoke will lead to the recollection of fire, independently. The recollection of fire thus produced and the perceptual cognition of the hill, together will produce the efforts for fire, as there is the apprehension of the difference between the two. It cannot be contended that the absence of fire also may be recollected and the efforts to procure the fire would not take place. For, there is no possibility of the occurrence of the recollection of the absence of fire, as the cognition of smoke prevents the occurrence of such a recollection. Thus, after the cognition of smoke, there will not be either the doubt of fire or the erroneous cognition of fire, but only the recollection of it, which is sufficient to produce the efforts.

It may be contended that in the given circumstances such as the above, if two cognitions, namely, the perceptual cognition of the hill and the recollection of the fire take place and the difference between the two is not grasped, then such cognitions can be claimed as very much similar to the perceptual cognition of the fire on the hill. Therefore, it is but natural, if we a have the experience 'I perceive fire on the hill'. On the other hand, in the circumstances such as the above, we have the experience 'I infer fire on the hill'. This shows that we do not, as claimed by the Prābhākara, have two cognitions the difference between which is not grasped, but we have the inferential cognition of fire, which is *anyathākhyāti.*

The Prābhākara partially agrees with the above contention of the Naiyāyika. He agrees that in the circumstances such as the above wherein the efforts to get the fire follow the erroneous cognition of the smoke, we have many a time the experience 'I infer fire on the hill'. But, he points out that sometimes we may also have the experience 'I perceive fire on the hill'. In such circumstances, he maintains that we will have the experience 'I infer fire on the hill' if we are aware that the cognition of the fire has followed the cognition of

the *hetu*—the smoke. In case, we do not have such an awareness, the ensuing experience would be in the form 'I perceive the fire'. Anyway, as per the Prābhākara, the cognition of the fire and the cognition of the hill are not the same as maintained by the Anyathākhyātivādins, instead, as already explained, they are two different cognitions and hence *anyathākhyāti* is not admitted by the Prābhākara even in the above instances.[25]

If the absence of the apprehension of the difference with the desired object is the cause of the efforts (*pravṛtti*), then the Naiyāyika raises a pertinent question as to what should be the cause of the withdrawal (*nivṛtti*) from it. What he wants to point out is that since the *pravṛtti* with regard to the conch-shell is due to the non-apprehension of the difference of the silver, it is but natural to accept that the non-apprehension of the differences of the conch-shell is the cause of the *nivṛtti* from it. While we have, with regard to the conch-shell the cognition 'this is silver, not the conch-shell', the Prābhākara cannot say that we have the apprehension of the difference with the conch-shell. For, such an apprehension will have to be considered as *anyathākhyāti* by the Prābhākara. Therefore, while we have the cognition 'this is silver, not a conch-shell' the Prābhākara has to agree that we have the non-apprehension of the difference with the conch-shell. As a result, one will have to have *nivṛtti* also during such cognitions.[26]

In his reply, the Prābhākara agrees that during the cognition with regard to the conch-shell 'this is silver, not the conch-shell' we have the non-apprehension of the difference with the conch-shell. Yet, he holds that the *nivṛtti* does not occur, as the *nivṛtti* is caused by the non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object which is independently presented to our mind. While we have, with regard to the conch-shell, the cognition 'this is silver, not conch-shell', of course, the undesired object—the conch-shell is presented to our mind and the difference with it is also not apprehended in the conch-shell. Still, the *nivṛtti* is not caused, for here, the conch-shell is not independently presented, but, as is obvious, as the counter-positive of the difference of it. Hence, in such instances, *nivṛtti* will not take place.[27] With regard to the conch-shell, the negation 'this is not conch-shell', the Prābhākara further holds, is not the difference of the conch-shell. Instead, it indicates the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of the absence of the conch-shell—*śuktyabhāvāsaṁsargāgraha.* hence, according to him, there is no *anyathākhyāti* here.[28]

On the ground that *anyathākhyāti* will have to be admitted, the Prābhākara also rejects the contention that the apprehension of the identity with the undesired object is the cause of *nivṛtti.* Therefore, while with regard to the silver one has the cognition 'this is conch-shell', according to him, it is just the case of the non-apprehension of the absence of the identity of the conch-shell that causes the *nivṛtti.* If the apprehension of the identity with the undesired object is considered as the cause of *nivṛtti,* he further points out that one should not withdraw when one has, with regard to the silver, the cognition 'this is not silver'. For, there is no apprehension of identity with the undesired object here.[29]

If, thus, the non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object, that is independently presented, is considered as the cause of *nivṛtti* and the non-apprehension of the difference with desired object as the cause of *pravṛtti,* the Naiyāyika points out that the Prābhākara will have to face a peculiar situation in which *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* should happen simultaneously. While, with regard to *rajata* (silver) and *raṅga* (glass piece) one has the

cognition that 'these are *raṅga* and *rajata*' respectively, then one will have to have *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* simultaneously. For, as is obvious, the causes of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*, namely, the non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object—*raṅga* in *rajata* and the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object—*rajata* in *raṅga* are simultaneously present here.

But, the Prābhākara rejects the contention holding that there is no evidence for the existence of such an erroneous cognition. The point that is being made by him is that the existence of such an erroneous cognition could be admitted had there been the *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* simultaneously. But, since they do not happen simultaneously, it can be assumed that such cognitions do not exist. As a matter of fact, the cognition of *rajata* and the cognition of *raṅga* are quite distinct and are taking place one after the other. It means, the causes of the *pravṛtti* and the *nivṛtti* also come to existence one after the other only. Therefore, they cause the *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* in a sequence. Of course, there may be a feeling that it is one cognition. But, such a feeling is only due to the non-apprehension of the difference between these two cognitions that come into existence in a sequence. In fact, the Prābhākara claims that the Naiyāyika also has to accept this explanation; otherwise, he too cannot explain the non-occurrence of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* simultaneously.[30] Thus, the Prābhākara is of the view that *pravṛtti* or *nivṛtti*, as claimed by the Naiyāyika, does not demand the existence of *anyathākhyāti*.

Against the theory of *akhyāti* and in support of the *anyathākhyāti* theory the Naiyāyika has yet another argument. The Naiyāyika contends that the concept of *bādha*—sublation, cannot be properly explained if *akhyāti* theory is admitted. For, *bādha* is of the nature of negation of what is *prasakta*, i.e. presented, since, what is presented is meant to be negated. Presentation in this context could be by error only,[31] for something which is presented by a true cognition, can never be negated. Thus, it is obvous that the *akhyāti* theory of the Prābhākara which rejects the very idea of error, cannot explain the concept of *bādha*,[32] unless it accepts the concept of error.

Ridiculing the argument, the Prābhākara points out that contrary to the contention, it is the Anyathākhyātivādin who finds it difficult to explain the concept of sublation. As per the Anyathākhyātivādin, the relation of sublation and sublated holds good between two cognitions. For instance, in the case of the erroneous cognition of *śukti-rajata*, the cognition of the *rajata* is the sublated, while the cognition 'this is not *rajata*' is considered as the sublation. The moot question here is as to why only the cognition of the *rajata* should be considered as sublated. The Naiyāyika may put forward two points which he considers as the criteria to hold the cognition 'this is not *rajata*' as the sublation. One is that it contradicts the cognition 'this is *rajata*'. Another is that it succeeds the cognition 'this is *rajata*', the cognition 'this is *rajata*' also contradicts the cognition 'this is not *rajata*'. But, just as the cognition 'this is not *rajata*' contradicts the cognition 'this is *rajata*', the cognition 'this is *rajata*' also contradicts the cognition 'this is not *rajata*'. For, contradiction is always mutual. The second point also cannot be favourable to the Naiyāyika, for, just like the succeeding contradictory cognitions, sometimes preceeding contradictory cognition also are found to be sublating. For instance, the cognition produced by the statement of a trustworthy person 'what he will say, is false' sublates the cognition that would be succeeding.

Therefore, instead of considering one cognition as sublated by the other, the Prābhākara claims, it would be more appropriate if the dealings caused by the non-apprehension of the difference between the two cognitions are considered as sublated by the apprehension of the difference between them. For instance, due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the cognition of the *śukti* as 'this' and the recollection of the *rajata*, whatever dealings were going to take place, all of them are obstructed by realizing the difference between the two cognitions. Hence, the dealings are considered as obstructed or sublated. In case of *upekṣā-bhrama*, i.e. the erroneous cognition with regard to the objects about which we are indifferent, it is true that no dealings would take place and hence *vyavahāra* in such contexts cannot be considered as sublated. However, in such cases, the use of the words—*śabda-prayoga*, itself can be considered as sublated. For, in the cases such as *upekṣā-bhrama*, when the person realizes his mistake, he would be prevented to make use of the words about the thing, even mentally.[33]

Having thus defended his position that the so-called erroneous cognitions are only instances of non-apprehension of difference between two cognitions and all the cognitions are true, the Prābhākara points out certain serious defects in the *anyathākhyāti* theory of the Naiyāyika.

The first and foremost objection raised by the Prābhākara is that it is absolutely contradictory to hold that the cognition of something has something else as its content. Having something as its content is the nature of the cognition of that something. Hence, to hold that the cognition of *śukti* has *rajata* as its content is to hold that the cognition of *rajata* is the cognition of non-*rajata*. Thus the theory of *anyathākhyāti*, if admitted, would bring in contradiction in the very nature of the cognition. To avoid the contradiction, if it is held that the cognition in question is of both the *rajata* and the *śukti* and hence the cognition of *śukti* can have *rajata* as its content, then the cognition will have to be considered as a *samūhālambana* cognition, which permits it to have both of them as its contents. In short, the view that something appears as something else is opposed to the very nature of cognition. For, when something is being apprehended, something different is not at all grasped.[34]

Another serious allegation made by the Prābhākara against the Anyathākhyātivādin is that the theory of *anyathākhyāti* is tantamount to the Buddhists' *sākāravāda*. The Buddhists hold the view that the *rajata* cognized where it does not externally exist is nothing but the form of the cognition itself. The Anyathākhyātivādin also will have to subscribe to the same view. For, though the Naiyāyika maintains that the *rajata* being grasped where it does not exist is that which exists somewhere else, it is not tenable, for, the sense-organ cannot have any contact with the *rajata* existing in a yonder place. Hence, as there is no other explanation possible, the Naiyāyika has to accept the Buddhist view that the *rajata* grasped by the erroneous cognition is the very form of the cognition.[35]

Yet another pertinent question that the Prābhākara poses to the Anyathākhyātivādin is, if a cognition could be false, as there is the possibility of all the cognitions being doubted as false, none can ever have an unwavering effort which, following a cognition, is normally found. It may be contended that the cognition, if not produced by any defect, will be trusted and such efforts will follow. But, again the question is whether simply by not

being a product of defect a cognition will have the trust required for unwavering efforts or only after being known as not being a product of defect, it will be trusted. If a cognition can be trusted only by not being a product of defect, then no erroneous cognition can be trusted as it is produced by defects. Consequently, even while it is not known that it is a product of defect, it should not lead to unwavering efforts. Therefore, in order to lead to unwavering effort, it is not sufficient it is just not a product of defects, but it should also be known as such. But the problem is that, that cognition also will not be trusted like any other erroneous cognition. Therefore, in order to avoid mistrust in a cognition, it is necessary to hold that all cognitions are invariably true.[36]

Further, the Prābhākara argues that the contents of an erroneous cognition cannot be totally non-existent, for a totally non-existent entity cannot be cognized. Therefore, all the contents of erroneous cognitions must be accepted as existents only, which means there cannot be any erroneous cognition at all.[37]

Again, there cannot be an erroneous cognition for the simple reason that there is no cause which can produce it. As is obvious, no sentence which is used by a trustworthy person or no defectless reason could produce an erroneous cognition. The Naiyāyika may only hold that the defective sentence and reason are the causes of the erroneous cognition. But a verbal cognition or inferential cognition can occur only when the sentence is known as having consistency, expectency, etc., and the reason as existing in the subject. The cognition of the sentence and the reason as possessing the above requisites, cannot, again, be an erroneous cognition for the same reason, namely, the absence of the cause. So, while the sentence or the reason does not actually have the required properties, the cognition of them, as already explained, has to be considered as the instance of two cognitions between which the difference is not cognized. Anyway, in the absence of the causes, no verbal or inferential cognition can be regarded as erroneous.

Similarly, as already explained, no perceptual cognition can be erroneous. For, the sense-organs can generate a cognition only when they are in contact with the objects. In the absence of the object, they cannot produce any cognition. There is a view that though the sense-organs generally produce a cognition only when they have contact with the objects, exceptionally, due to the presence of the auxiliary causes such as defects, the same sense-organs, even in the absence of the contact with the objects, can produce a different kind of cognition, namely, erroneous cognition. But, the Prābhākara maintains that the view is not tenable, for, the defects considered as auxiliary causes are no causes at all as they cannot produce anything. If the defects have any such capacity, defective seeds should be able to generate different kind of plants. Those who claim that defects also can produce an effect, mention the defect in the stomach called *Bhasmaka* with which enormously consumed food is rapidly digested, as an example. But, the Prābhākara holds that *Bhasmaka* is misunderstood as a defect. As a matter of fact, he asserts that *Bhasmaka* is the manifestation of a specific digesting capacity. Because of this peculiar capacity the entire food is digested including the nutritious part of the food. Hence, in spite of the food consumption in a larger quantity, the body will not get any nourishment. In short, *Bhasmaka* cannot be mentioned as an instance of a defect producing an effect. Another example where defect in considered by some as the auxiliary cause is the seed of bamboo burnt in

the wild fire. It is believed that because of the auxiliary cause, namely, the wild fire, the bamboo seed can produce a banana plant.

But, the Prābhākara maintains that the bamboo seed cannot be the cause of the banana plant as it is completely burnt in the wild fire. Instead, its ashes may be the cause of the plant. Anyway, nowhere is defect found to be the cause. Hence, in the present case, the defect in the sense-organ cannot be held as the cause of the erroneous cognition.[38]

The above explanation for the cognitions commonly known as erroneous by the Prābhākara may appear very strange. But, the Prābhākara claims that his explanation is not that strange as it appears, for, there are certain cognitions to which his explanation is admitted as suitable by all the schools. The cognition 'this is hot water' is one such. Even the Naiyāyika knows that hotness is not a property of water and it belongs to fire. He has to agree that the cognition of hotness, which arises from the touch of the fire particles, is different from the cognition of water. Thus the cognition is a case of the combination of two cognitions between which the difference is not apprehended. The cognition is also not considered as erroneous, for it has the support of *saṁvāda*-corroborative cognition. So a cognition, though truly speaking not a true cognition, may be considered as a true cognition provided it is supported by the corroborative cognition. In the absence of such a *saṁvāda*, a cognition is considered as erroneous, but it does not necessarily mean that the cognition as claimed by the Naiyāyika is erroneous. In the case of *upekṣā-jñāna* the cognition about the content of which we are indifferent, it is true that we will not have any corroborative cognition or evidence. Yet, if it is worthy of having a corroborative evidence, it is regarded as *yathārtha* and if it is not worthy of having such a *saṁvāda*, it is regarded as *ayathārtha*. Thus the Prābhākara maintains that the theory of *akhyāti* expounded by his school, though considers all cognitions are invariably true, does not violate any principle set either by the *śāstra* or *loka*.

GAṄGEŚA'S CRITICISM OF THE AKHYĀTI THEORY

The above exposition of the *akhyāti* theory makes it clear that the akhyātivādin differs from the Anyathākhyātivādin by holding that the cognitions such as 'this is silver' which arise on seeing conch-shell, etc., are actually a combination of two cognitions and they do not grasp the relation-*vaiśiṣṭya* of the qualifier with the qualificandum. Hence, there is nothing in the cognition which would make it a false cognition, *apramā*. The Anyathākhyātivādin, on the other hand, strongly holds that the cognition 'this is *rajata*' is not a combination of two cognitions. Instead, it is a single cognition grasping the relation of *rajatatva*, which actually does not exist in the conch-shell, the qualificandum, and makes the cognition *apramā*. Now, employing the law of parsimony, Gaṅgeśa establishes the existence of *apramā*.

In the instances where the desired object, for example, the *rajata* exists, it is to be admitted that the cognition of the desired object present before us is the cause of efforts. When thus the causality is fixed in the cognition of the desired object present before, Gaṅgeśa holds that there is parsimony if, as the content, the *vaiśiṣṭya*–the relation of the desired object, in the object present before, is accepted as the determinant of the causality.

When thus the *vaiśiṣṭya* is admitted as the determinant of the causality of our efforts, wherever the causality is present, the *vaiśiṣṭya* also must be admitted as present, as a content. In short, since the erroneous cognitions also generate the efforts, they too have the causality and the determinant of it, the *vaiśiṣṭya* must be present as a content of it. Thus the cognition, for instance, of *rajata* arising on seeing the conch-shell should be accepted as grasping the *vaiśiṣṭya* of the *rajata* which actually does not exist in the conch-shell and has to be characterized as *anyathākhyāti.*

The above explanation of the Naiyāyika regarding the causality of efforts and its determinant makes now the respective stands of the Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara very clear. While the Prābhākara maintains that the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object, presented independently, is the cause of the *pravṛtti* and being that non-apprehension is the determinant of the causality, the Naiyāyika holds that the cognition of the object as related with a qualifier is the cause of the *pravṛtti* and that relation or *vaiśiṣṭya* is the determinant of the causality.

Here, the Naiyāyika draws our attention towards the parsimony that his view involves. When actually the *rajata* is present, it is agreed by all that the cognition of the desired object present before is the cause of the *pravṛtti* and the *vaiśiṣṭya* being a content of the cognition is the determinant of the causality. Here the parsimony is due to the fact that the *vaiśiṣṭya,* which is a content of the cognition 'this is rajata', is grasped by the *jñāna-vṛtti*— the knowledge of the cognition. While the knowledge apprehends the cognition as the cause of the *pravṛtti,* as the *vaiśiṣṭya* is one of the contents of the cognition, it is also grasped. Thus the *vaiśiṣṭya* is rapidly presented to our mind and there is no problem in accepting it as the determinant of the causality.[39]

On the other hand, the Prābhākara view that the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object, which is independently presented, cannot be regarded as the cause of the *pravṛtti* and also being the non-apprehension of such a difference as the determinant of the causality, for as is obvious, it involves *gaurava,* heaviness. The striking difference between the *vaiśiṣṭya* and being the non-apprehension of the difference, which are accepted as the determinants, is that, as already stated, the *vaiśiṣṭya* is immediately grasped along with the cognition. On the other hand, while the cognition 'this is *rajata*' is grasped and while the causality with respect to the *pravṛtti* also is grasped in that cognition, the said determinant, namely, 'being the non-apprehension of such difference' is not known to be grasped. In fact, we may have to just assume of its being present.[40]

Regarding the view of the Naiyāyika that the *vaiśiṣṭya*—the relation of the qualifier in the qualificandum, which is a content of the cognition, is also cognized by the knowledge of the cognition and hence it is to be accepted as the determinant of the causality, there is a possibility of one pertinent objection being raised. The objection is that this view is not justifiable either from the stand-point of the Naiyāyika or from that of the Prābhākara. For, the Naiyāyika holds that the validity of a cognition is *prataḥ,* which means that it is grasped by the means which are different from the means that grasp the cognition. In other words, since the validity of a cognition boils down to the relation of the qualifier in the qualificandum, if it is also grasped by the knowledge of the cognition, it amounts to the acceptance of the theory of *prāmāṇya-svatastva,* for, the *vaiśiṣṭya* the validity of the cognition

is grasped by the knowledge of the cognition. Neither the view that the *vaiśiṣṭya* is grasped by the knowledge of the cognition can be ascribed to the Prābhākara, for the *vaiśiṣṭya* in the case of the cognition 'this is *rajata*' in inherence of *rajatatva* and it cannot be grasped by the knowledge of the cognition as it is agreed by the Prābhākara as super-sensible. Therefore, the Naiyāyika's view that the *vaiśiṣṭya* is grasped by the knowledge of the cognition seems to be not at all tenable.[41]

However, the deeper analysis of the Nyāya theory of validity will show that the *vaiśiṣṭya* also is grasped by the knowledge of the cognition. For, when the cognition is presented to its knowledge, it is in the fitness of things that all the contents of the cognition also are presented to the knowledge, of course, through the cognition. As a matter of fact, the Naiyāyika accepts that the knowledge grasps the cognition as having the *prakāratā*, qualifierness in the qualifier. When thus the *prakāratā* is grasped by the knowledge, it means that the *vaiśiṣṭya* also is grasped by the knowledge. For, *prakāratā* is nothing but being a corelate of the relation that is being grasped, *bhāsamāna-vaiśiṣṭya-pratiyogitvam.*[42]

Now, the question as to how the Naiyāyika would consider himself as *prāmāṇya-paratastvavādin* may arise. However, the Nyāya school holds that the validity of cognition is considered as grasped only when the *vaiśiṣṭya* is independently grasped. While the *vaiśiṣṭya* is independently grasped, the knowledge can be said as asserting the existence of the qualifier in the qualificandum. Thus, the knowledge can be regarded as apprehending the validity which includes the existence of the qualifier in the qualificandum. But, in the present case, the knowledge of the cognition is grasping the *vaiśiṣṭya* only through the cognition and not independently. Hence, though the knowledge is apprehending the cognition, it cannot be said that it is also apprehending the validity.[43]

So far as the Prābhākara is considered, since he is known as *prāmāṇya-svatastvavādin*, it is obligatory for him to hold that the knowledge of the cognition is also grasping the *vaiśiṣṭya*. Otherwise, he would cease to be a *svatastvavādin*. It is true that the Prābhākara is of the view that the relation of *samavāya* is super-sensible. But, in order to protect his theory of *prāmāṇya-svatastva*, he has to hold that the *vaiśiṣṭya* is somewhat different from the *samavāya.*[44]

With regard to the Nyāya contention that in the instances of real silver, the cause of the *pravṛtti* is the cognition of the qualified object, i.e. the cognition of the object before which is grasped as identical with the desired thing and the determinant of the causality is the *vaiśiṣṭya*, the Prābhākara would argue that though the presence of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is agreed to in the instances of real silver, the cause of the *pravṛtti* has to be the non-apprehension of the difference. For, even the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, in order to exist, needs the non-apprehension of the difference as its cause. In the absence of the non-apprehension of the difference, the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* cannot exist. To be clear, when we are aware that there is, in the object before us, the difference of *rajata*, or the cognition of 'this' and the cognition of the '*rajata*' are different from each other, it is needless to say that the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* 'this is silver' cannot occur. Therefore, when thus the presence of the non-apprehension of the difference is ensured in all the instances of *pravṛtti* in the cases of real silver, there is parsimony in accepting the non-apprehension of the difference as the cause of the *pravṛtti*. For, its presence is universally admitted. Consequently, the Prābhākara insists that there

again is parsimony in accepting 'being the non-apprehension of such a difference' as the determinant of the causality.[45]

The Naiyāyika rejects this argument maintaing that while the causality of the *pravṛtti* is being ascertained, it is not possible to hold that 'being the non-apprehension of the difference' also is being presented to us. The point that he is making is this that in the instances of real *rajata* when the cognition 'this is *rajata*' occurs following the observation that the *pravṛtti* also is invariably taking place, one will assert that the cognition is the cause of the *pravṛtti*. At this juncture, the non-apprehension of the difference does never come to our mind. Only when we also come to know that the cognition 'this is silver' is a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, then the 'non-apprehension of the difference' also comes to our notice as we then think that the cognition 'this is silver' cannot be a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, unless there is the non-apprehension of the difference. In other words, the assumption of the presence of the awareness of the non-apprehension of the difference follows the assumption of the cognition as a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*. Therefore, the contention of the Prābhākara that the non-apprehension of the difference has to be regarded as the determinant of the causality of the *pravṛtti* is not tenable, as the claim of the Prābhākara, as shown now, is not correct.[46]

In retaliation to the *gaurava* suggested by the Naiyāyika in the *akhyāti* theory, the Prābhākara would say that the *anyathākhyāti* theory also has *gaurava*. He would contend that while he could manage without assuming the existence of a cognition called erroneous cognition, the Naiyāyika has to assume the existence of such a cognition and this leads to the defect of *gaurava* for the Naiyāyika. However, the Naiyāyika holds that though he has to assume the existence of such a cognition, the assumption cannot be considered as a defect. While in order to establish the existence of something, we are seeking a clinching evidence and such an evidence is in the vicinity, the assumptions made during such circumstances are considered as result-oriented and can never be treated as a defect. In the present context, the moot question is whether the cognition leading to the efforts that will be futile is a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* or not. When with the evidences put forward by the Naiyāyika, the existence of a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is established, the defect, *gaurava*, will not be effective, for it cannot disprove the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* based on the establishment of which the *gaurava* could be suggested. In case it is argued that the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is not at all established with any evidence and that it is unknown, even then the *gaurava*, defect, cannot be levelled against the Naiyāyika, for in that case there will not be any assumption of it. As a matter of fact, when the evidences are advanced in support of the existence of a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, which has to be considered as an erroneous cognition, it will be in the fitness of things if its existence is accepted.[47]

By the above arguments of the Naiyāyika, the evidence which he wants to put forward in support of the existence of erroneous cognition is now clear to us. First, on the basis of the principle of parsimony, he establishes the cause and effect relation between an effort and the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, keeping in mind the successful efforts that follow a true cognition. Then, he further argues that unsuccessful efforts also, just as in the case of successful efforts, are caused by a cognition grasping the object as qualified with the qualifier. It is not justifiable to hold that the unsuccessful efforts are produced by a different kind of cause. For, no effect will occur unless that which is already established as the cause of a similar

effect is present.[48] The *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* which is now established as the cause of unsuccessful efforts, also cannot occur unless that which is known as the cause of the similar effect, i.e. the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* in the instance of successful effort, is present. Thus the sense-organs which are already established as the cause of *viśiṣṭa-jñāna,* in different situations, have to be admitted as the cause of unsuccessful efforts also. However, the same sense-organ could produce a different kind of effort, as it is associated with the defect. The Naiyāyika maintains that all these assumptions hold good as there is no other way to explain. The impossibility of any other explanation itself, he claims, is the strongest evidence.[49]

The Naiyāyika further points out that the Akhyātivadin's explanation of the unsuccessful efforts as due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the cognition and their contents is also not tenable. If that explanation is agreed to, then he contends that in the instance of *viparīta-catuṣka,* the cognition which wrongly grasps the foursome, effort and withdrawal should take place simultaneously. Such a cognition grasps *rajata* (1) as *raṅga* and also (2) as having the difference of *rajata* and *raṅga* (3) as *rajata* and also (4) as having the difference of *raṅga.* Hence, if the Prābhākara's contention that the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object is the cause of *pravṛtti* and non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object is the cause of *nivṛtti* is accepted, then obviously both the causes are simultaneously present here and the *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* should simultaneously take place.[50]

The Prābhākara may argue that such a cognition does not exist. But, when actually *rajata* and *raṅga* are present and the necessary contact with the sense-organ is there, we experience the true cognition of *rajata* and *raṅga,* grasping them as *rajata* and *raṅga* respectively. Similarly, when the causes that can produce the erroneous cognition grasping *rajata* as *raṅga,* and *raṅga* as *rajata* simultaneously exist, it is but natural to have a *samūhālambana,* erroneous cognition. Such an erroneous cognition is also experienced by all. In spite of the experience, if the Prābhākara rejects the *samūhālambana* cognition of this kind, then the numbers such as duality (*dvitva*) can never be perceived. For, such numbers which reside only in two or more objects can be grasped only by a perceptual *samūhālambana* cognition that grasps two or more things simultaneously. Anyway, the Prābhākara cannot altogether deny the existence of such cognitions. For, nobody can prevent such an erroneous cognition occurring by the fallacious sentence 'these are *rajata* and *raṅga*', wrongly used in respect of *raṅga* and *rajata.*[51]

Further, as per the Anyathākhyātivādin, when with regard to *rajata* and *raṅga* the erroneous cognition occurs, grasping them as *raṅga* and *rajata* respectively, due to defect *rajata* is grasped as different from *rajata* and *raṅga* is grasped as different from *raṅga.* For the same reason, according to him, in respect of each of them, the doubt 'whether it is *rajata* or *raṅga*' cannot arise. But, as per the Akhyātivādin, the apprehension of the difference from *rajata* and *raṅga* in them is not possible as he does not accept *anyathākhyāti.* In other words, while with regard to *rajata* and *raṅga,* the cognition 'these are *raṅga* and *rajata*' takes place, from the Akhyātivādin's point of view, we have, with regard to *rajata,* the non-apprehension of the difference with both *rajata* and *raṅga.* The same is the case with regard to *raṅga* also. Thus, since we have all the causes needed for the doubt, in respect of each of them, we should have the doubt whether it is '*rajata* or *raṅga*'.[52]

Thus the Naiyāyika makes a very strong point against the Akhyātivādin. According to the Naiyāyika, as already stated, it is the cognition of the identity with the desired object in the object that is before us that causes the *pravṛtti*. Similarly, the *nivṛtti* is caused by the cognition of the difference with the desired object. Such cognitions of identity and difference, according to him, are *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* only. Therefore, when the erroneous cognition 'these are *rajata* and *raṅga*' occurs in respect of *raṅga* and *rajata*, the person having the cognition will have, *pravṛtti*, only in respect of *raṅga* as he has the apprehension of the identity with *rajata*, the desired object. With regard to *rajata*, he will have only *nivṛtti* as he has the apprehension of the difference with *rajata*, the undesired object. But, in the above context, the Prābhākara cannot escape from the problem of having both *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* with regard to *rajata* and *raṅga*, for he has the causes of both *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*, namely, the non-apprehension of the desired object as well as the non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object.

The Prābhākara may again argue that in the instances of erroneous cognition, *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, which according to the Naiyāyika, is the cause of the *pravṛtti*, cannot be there if there is no defect. If thus the presence of defect is inevitable, then instead of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, the defect itself can be considered as the cause of the *pravṛtti* also. But, as the Naiyāyika rightly points out, the defect is present only in the instances of erroneous cognitions. But the *pravṛttis* do take place where true cognitions are produced without any defect. Therefore, the defect which is not present in all the instances of *pravṛtti*, cannot be considered as the cause of *pravṛtti*. The contention that though the defect cannot be considered as the cause of *pravṛtti* in the instances of a true cognition where the *pravṛtti* is successful, the *pravṛttis* that are unsuccessful can be accepted as the products of defects which are invariably present, is also not tenable. For, the defects in the instruments of cognitions, such as sense-organs, reasons and sentences, are quite different in nature and hence cannot be, in a general manner, held as the cause of unsuccessful *pravṛttis*. In fact, the cognitions produced by these defects are quite different in their nature. The view that the *pravṛttis* produced by these defects possess a different kind of generic attribute and therefore the cause and effect relation can be accepted between the defects and the different kinds of *pravṛttis* also is not acceptable to the Naiyāyika. For, there is no evidence to hold that the *pravṛttis* produced by the different kind of defects have different generalities. Hence, the Naiyāyika maintains that, defects or no defects, sense-organ, etc., the instruments of different types of cognitions, produce a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* which in its turn leads to *pravṛttis* successful or unsuccessful, depending upon the nature of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*. If the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is true, the *pravṛtti* produced by it will be successful, otherwise, it will be unsuccessful.[53]

So far, we have seen as to how the Naiyāyika rejects the contention of the Prābhākara that the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object which is independently presented to our mind is the cause of the *pravṛtti* of all kinds, successful or unsuccessful. Now, the Prābhākara in his endeavour of denying the *anyathākhyāti* modifies his argument and puts forward, as follows:

This much we observe that certain *pravṛttis* are quite distinct from other *pravṛttis*. While some *pravṛttis* are successful, some other *pravṛttis* are not successful. This distinction that we observe in them, obviously is due to some cause that is exclusive to it. Such a cause, according to the Naiyāyika, is the validity of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* if the *pravṛtti* is a

successful one and the invalidity of the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* if the *pravṛtti* is not successful. But, the causality in the invalid *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is something which is not admitted by the Prābhākara and has to be assumed by the Naiyāyika. Thus, it involves *kalpanā-gaurava* on the part of the Naiyāyika. However, the *akhyāti* theory does not involve any such wild assumptions. For, it holds that the successful *pravṛtti* is produced, as agreed to by the Naiyāyika, by the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* that precedes it.

On the other hand, the unsuccessful *pravṛtti*, it maintains, is due to the non-apprehension of the difference, for instance, between the *śukti* and the *rajata* and also between the cognitions of them. This non-apprehension of the difference is present even according to the Naiyāyika, for, in its absence, the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, 'this is silver', cannot take place. Thus, the Akhyātivādin's stand with regard to the causes of the different kinds of *pravṛttis* does not involve any *gaurava*.[54]

It may appear that though Akhyātivādin has been able to avoid the *gaurava*, he has not been able to formulate, with regard to the *pravṛttis*, a uniform cause and effect relation, as he holds that different types of the causes produce different types of *pravṛttis*. But the Prābhākara maintains that he can also formulate a uniform cause and effect relation. Accordingly, the cognition of the object which is not apprehended as different from the desired object is the cause of *pravṛtti* in general. In the instances of the successful *pravṛttis*, where the valid *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is held as the cause, we have the above case, namely, the cognition of the object before us, which is not apprehended as different from the desired object. In the instances of so-called erroneous cognitions also, the Prābhākara points out that the above cause is present, for we have the cognition of the object before us, which, however, is not apprehended as different from the desired object. Though, thus, we can explain the cause of *pravṛtti* in common terms, it is the non-apprehension of the difference and not the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* that causes the unsuccessful *pravṛtti*, whereas it is the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* that causes the successful *pravṛtti*.[55]

Thus, though the Prābhākara seems to be successful in suggesting the cause of *pravṛtti* in general terms, the pertinent question will arise as to why the *pravṛtti*, while actually the *rajata* is present, is not unsuccessful. For, as stated above, the non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object, namely, the *raṅga*, which according to the Prābhākara, is the cause of unsuccessful *pravṛtti*, is very much there. It may be said that while the *rajata* is actually present, the *pravṛtti* can never be unsuccessful. But, if that is the case, the non-apprehension of the difference with the undesired object cannot be said as the cause of such a *pravṛtti*, for it has failed to produce the same in spite of its presence.

Responding to this objection the Akhyātivādin clarifies his point of view as follows:

As stated earlier, the cause of the successful *pravṛtti* is *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* only. The *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* will occur only when the object is there. On the other hand, when the object is not present, the *pravṛtti* is caused not by the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, as it will not take place there. Instead, it is the non-apprehension of the difference that causes the *pravṛtti* which is known as *visaṁvādi*. Here *visaṁvāda* means 'having an object which is not desired' as its content. when the conch-shell is present before us and the cognition 'this is *rajata*' occurs, the content of the cognition, namely, the conch-shell which is before us, is undesired. Hence, the *pravṛtti* having the conch-shell as its content is considered as *visaṁvāda*. Since in the

instances of erroneous cognition *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* will not occur due to the non-apprehension of the difference, there could be only the *pravṛtti* which in the sense mentioned above is *visaṁvādi*. However, there cannot be both *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* simultaneously, as the causes required for them cannot be there simultaneously.[56]

In rejection of the above modified arguments of Akhyātivādin and in support of his *anyāthākhyāti* theory, the Naiyāyika has to say the following:

It is observed and also agreed by all, that in the case of first-ever effort and in the instances of the efforts that are successful, the cognition has produced the effort with regard to its content. On the basis of such instances, we may hold that a cognition can produce *pravṛtti* with regard to its contents only. This view is also supported by two reasons, one is parsimony and the other is the absence of any opposition.[57]

It may be argued that it is not invariably true that a cognition produces efforts with regard to its contents only. The *phala-jñāna*, cognition of the result, has the result as its content. But, it will produce the efforts not with regard to its content, namely, the result. Instead, it produces the effort with regard to the means by which the result can be obtained. The contention here is that the cognition of the result will only produce the desire to get it and thus it is superfluous with regard to the effort to have the means. But, the desire to have the result which intervenes between the cognition of the result and the effort towards the means can only be considered as the intermediary cause and does not make the cognition of the result superfluous.

However, it may be noted that the actual cause of the *pravṛtti* the cognition of the result ultimately leads to, is the cognition of the object being instrumental to obtain the desired object, i.e. *iṣṭa-sādhanatā-jñāna*. Therefore, the cognition of the result cannot be considered as the cause of the *pravṛtti*.[58]

Now, when, thus, it is to be admitted that a cognition can produce *pravṛtti* only with regard to its content, the cognition of the silver that causes the *pravṛtti* with regard to the conch-shell also has to be accepted as having the conch-shell as its content. For, as already stated, the cognition of the *rajata* is causing the dealings with regard to the conch-shell and if the conch-shell is not its content, it cannot cause any such dealings with regard to it.[59] When, thus, it is imperative to accept the conch-shell as the content of the cognition of the *rajata*, the cognition cannot be anything else but *anyathākhyāti*.

The Prābhākara admits the fact that it is agreed to by all that in the instances of the first-ever efforts and also corroborated efforts, cognitions produce efforts only with regard to their contents. Yet, he is of the view that since the unsuccessful *pravṛtti* can be explained as due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the two cognitions, we may assume that sometimes cognitions would produce efforts even with regard to those which are not contents of the cognition. He also holds that though the notion that cognitions cause efforts with regard to only their contents was gathered first, it will have to be shelved later, as we have to assume the presence of *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* in all the instances of erroneous cognition, leading to the defect of *gaurava*.

However, the Naiyāyika feels that the evidences that are obtained are stronger and based on them we should assume the presence of a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* in all the cases of *pravṛtti*. If some concept or notion formed through so many sources is to be shelved, it can be done

only if there are some stronger contrary evidences. Only in such circumstances alternative explanations also can be contemplated. In the present context, since no such contrary evidences are found, the assumption of *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* in all the instances of *pravṛtti* will not attract the defect of *gaurava*. As a matter of fact, the Prābhākara also has enunciated certain doctrines on the basis of the evidences obtained in the initial stages of life. For example, he holds that the denotative function of a word lies with the objects that are connected with certain acts. He strongly upholds this doctrine, although at later stages we come across the use of words in respect of the objects that are accomplished and not connected with any act. The Naiyāyika argues that if the notion that cognition causes *pravṛtti* with regard to its content only obtained at the initial stages, is abandoned following the later examinations, then the Prābhākara will have to shelve his theory of denotative function formulated on the ground of the use of the words observed in one's childhood. If the *gaurava*, leading to a result, is not a defect for the Prābhākara, the Naiyāyika contents that the same is true for him also.[60]

Now, once again the Prābhākara makes an attempt to defend his theory of *akhyāti*, drawing our attention to the point what he thinks as the essensce of his argument.

He agrees now with the contention of the Naiyāyika that a cognition can generate the effort only with regard to its content. But, he makes a distinction between the cognition that produces successful effort and also the cognition that leads to unsuccessful effort. Though in both the cases, the cognition produces efforts only with regard to its content, in the case of the unsuccessful effort, for instance, with regard to the *pravṛtti* towards the conch-shell, he maintains that it is the cognition of 'this' that produces the *pravṛtti*. The cognition of 'this' has the conch-shell as its content and the *pravṛtti* also is with regard to the conch-shell. Of course, there is also the cognition of the desired object, i.e. *rajata*. But, that is not the cause of the *pravṛtti*. As a matter of fact, just as the cognition 'this' is the cause of the *pravṛtti*, the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object, of which we are aware, is also the cause of the *pravṛtti* towards the object before us. Now, as we can see, the cognition of the desired object is not the cause of the *pravṛtti*. Instead it is the determinant of the causality that exists in the non-apprehension fo the difference. Thus, just as 'staffness' being the determinant of the causality residing in a staff is superflous, with regard to a jar the cognition of the desired object is superfluous.

However, in the case of a successful *pravṛtti*, for instance, the *pravṛtti* with regard to the *rajata* that actually exists, there are no two cognitions that precede the *pravṛtti*. The cognition 'this', is actually the cognition of the desired object here. Hence, the cognition of the desired object is the cause of the *pravṛtti* here and not the determinant of the cause. In short, the Prābhākara claims that though he agrees with the view that a cognition can produce *pravṛtti* only with regard to its content, he can also defend his theory of *akhyāti*.[61]

Countering the Prābhākara's argument, the Naiyāyika rejects his contention that in the instance of an unsuccessful *pravṛtti* the cognition of the desired object is not the cause of the *pravṛtti* but, it is just the determinant of the causality. He points to the fact that the causality of thing is decided on the basis of *svatantra-anvya-vyatireka*, independent agreement and difference that it has with regard to the effect. As we know, while we have

the cognition of the desired thing, we will have the *pravṛtti* with regard to it and in the absence of that cognition the *pravṛtti* will not be there. This agreement and difference that the cognition of the desired thing has with regard to the *pravṛtti* is absolutely independent. It is neither the determinant of the causality as in the case of 'staffness' nor is bound with the cause, as in the case of 'the colour of the staff'. Hence, the cognition of the desired thing must be accepted as one of the causes of *pravṛtti*. Otherwise, we may also argue that the cause of the *pravṛtti* is the cognition of the desired thing with which the difference is not apprehended in the object present before us, thus making the non-apprehension of difference the determinant of the causality. If it is insisted that the non-apprehension of the difference has independent agreement and difference with the *pravṛtti* and hence has to be considered as the cause of the *pravṛtti*, then since the same argument holds good with regard to cognition of the desired object also, that too has to be admitted as the cause of the *pravṛtti*. Thus, it will be in the fitness of things, if both, the cognition of the desired thing and the non-apprehension of the difference with the desired object, are accepted as the causes of the *pravṛtti*. Now, when the cognition of the *rajata*, the desired object, is agreed to as the cause of the *pravṛtti* towards the conch-shell and the principle that a cognition can produce *pravṛtti* with regard to its content only is also agreed to, it means the cognition of the *rajata* has conch-shell as its content, making the cognition of the *rajata* as *anyathākhyāti*.[62]

Further, as already stated when the *pravṛtti* is with regard to the desired object, then it is found that the cognition of the desired object is the cause of it. So, when thus the cognition of the desired object is established as the cause of *pravṛtti* in certain instances, it is in the fitness of things that it is held as the cause of the unsuccessful *pravṛtti* also. Here, the Prābhākara may argue that to bring uniformity he would hold that in the cases of successful *pravṛtti* also it is the cognition 'this' that generates the *pravṛtti*. 'Having the desired object as its content' may be there, but it is just accidental. Thus, he will not consider the cognition of the desired object even in the instances of successful *pravṛtti* and thereby would bring uniformity in the causal relation between the *pravṛtti* and the cognition. But, it is obvious that this view is not tenable, for in that case, just the cognition of 'this' should have produced the *pravṛtti*. Hence, in the instances of successful *pravṛtti*, it is imperative that we should accept the cognition of the desired object as the cause of the *pravṛtti*. Similarly, in the instances of unsuccessful *pravṛtti* also, we have to hold the same kind of cognition, viz., the cognition of the desired object as the cause of the *pravṛtti* and that cognition is *anyathākhyāti*.[63]

Having thus established the theory of *anyathākhyāti* on the basis of several inferences, the Naiyāyika maintains that the existence of *anyathākhyāti* is based on the evidence of perceptual cognition also. He argues that the main issue under dispute between the Akhyātivādin and the Anyathākhyātivādin is whether something else can be the content of the cognition of something else. The Anyathākhyātivādin holds that it can be so. The *rajata*, according to him, is the content of the cognition of the *śukti* and hence it is an erroneous cognition. In fact, it is the *anu-vyavasāya*, the perception of the perception, which is considered as the evidence in the contentness of an object. It is our experience that following the cognition 'this is *rajata*' that arises on seeing the conch-shell, we will have the *anu-vyavasāya* 'this I cognize as *rajata*'. It is obvious here that this *anu-vyavasāya* grasps the

rajata as a content of the cognition of 'this'. Thus, it is through the perceptual cognition that the *anu-vyavasāya* establishes the *rajata* as a content of the cognition of the *śukti*.[64]

It may be argued that though, actually, the *rajata* is not a content of the cognition of the *śukti*, it is so cognized by the *anu-vyavasāya* wrongly. In other words, the *anu-vyavasāya* 'this I cognize as *rajata*' is wrongly grasping the cognition 'this is *rajata*' as having *rajata* as the content, though actually it is not so. But, the Naiyāyika, bringing out the hollowness of this argument, points to the fact that an *anu-vyavasāya*, without any exception, is a true cognition. Therefore, the *anu-vyavasāya*, 'I cognize this as *rajata*' also must be a true cognition to the core. If *anu-vyavasāya* also could be a false cognition, then sometimes, when one is actually having the cognition of the jar, the false *anu-vyavasāya* 'this I cognize as cloth' should also be possible. Therefore, it may be asserted that the said *anu-vyavasāya* confirms the *rajata* as a content of the cognition of the *śukti* and thereby convincingly establishes the existence of *anyathākhyāti*.[65]

The indomitable Prābhākara may further argue that though he too accepts that the *anu-vyavasāya* is a true cognition, it is just a case of *rajata-jñāna-viṣayatva-asaṁsarga-agraha*, i.e. the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of the contentness with regard to the cognition of *rajata*. What he means here is that whenever there is the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of *rajatatva* in the *śukti*, following that there will also be the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of contentness related with the cognition of the *rajata*. Due to that non-apprehension, we will have the *anu-vyavasāya*, 'this I know as *rajata*'. Thus, the *anu-vyavasāya* cannot be claimed as an evidence in the *rajata* being a content of the cognition of the *śukti*.

However, this argument, the Naiyāyika contends, is not tenable, for, even while we realize the difference that the *śukti* has with the *rajata*, we will have the *anu-vyavasāya* 'I cognized the *śukti* as *rajata*' or 'I had the cognition of *rajata* with regard to *śukti*'. Had the *anu-vyavasāya* been an instance of the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of *rajata-jñāna-viṣayatva* due to the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of *rajatatva*, when we have the apprehension of the absence of the relation of *rajatatva* in *śukti*, the *anu-vyavasāya* should not have arisen. Therefore, the *anu-vyavasāya* has to be explained as a cognition grasping the contentness in the *rajata*.[66]

Again it may be argued that it is true that even while there is the apprehension of the absence of the relation of *rajatatva* in the *śukti*, we continue to have the *anu-vyavasāya* 'I cognized *śukti* as *rajata*' and thereby continue to have the absence of the apprehension of the relation of *rajatatva* in the *śukti*. For, only that apprehension of the absence of relation, caused by the proper examination of the object, can sublate the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation. So, when there is no such proper examination, naturally the apprehension of the absence of the relation will not obstruct the said non-apprehension and hence the *anu-vyavasāya* also may continue, in spite of the apprehension of the absence. But, the actual problem for the Prābhākara is that, he can never think of non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of the said cognition, viz., the cognition of the *śukti* where *rajatatva* is the qualifier. As per the Prābhākara who does not accept *anyathākhyāti*, such a cognition is absolutely non-existent and therefore, he cannot even imagine of the non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of such cognition.[67]

The Akhayātivādin, while rejecting the theory of *anyathākhyāti*, had pointed out certain defects in it. One of them is *saṁvad-virodha*, contradiction with experience. According to him, it is contradictory to the nature of a cognition of something to have something else as its content. Therefore, the cognition of *rajata* can never be that of something which is non-*rajata*. If two things, which do not have the relation of attribute and substantive, are the contents of a cognition, then the cognition can only be a *samūhālambana-jñāna*, a cognition of the things grasped as a group.[68]

But now, when the erroneous cognition is established as a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, the Anyathākhyātivādin contends that it is the nature of a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* to grasp its contents as being in the relation of substantive and attribute. The erroneous cognition also, being a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, is not an exception to this rule.[69]

Another argument of the Prābhākara was that the theory of *anyathākhyāti*, which holds that even in the absence of the content, cognition of that object having it as a content would arise, is tantamount to the *sākāravāda* of the Buddhists. Here, the Naiyāyika clarifies his position. He points out that as per the Buddhist, the silverness that appears in an erroneous cognition, actually belongs to the cognition. It has no external existence whatsoever. But, from the Nyāya point of view, the silverness has an external existence. The only thing is that it does not exist in the proximity. Even then, due to defect, it is grasped in the object lying before the perceiver as an attribute of the same. The only similarity is that both schools admit that it is not present in the object before us. If this trivial similarity makes them one and the same, then since some such similarity can be found in all the schools of philosophy, all the schools will have to be admitted as mutually contaminating each other.[70]

Regarding the other argument of the Prābhākara that if a cognition can be false, then since the two cognitions, viz., the erroneous cognition and the cognition that arises later and is considered as the sublation, are mutually contradictory, it will not be possible to hold only the first as the sublated and only the second as the sublation.

Rejecting the argument, the Naiyayika asserts that in spite of the mutuality of contradiction, it is quite possible to decide as to which of them is the sublation. For, between the two, that one, the validity of which is never doubted, will be considered as the sublation while the other one, whose validity is doubtful, is regarded as the sublated.[71]

Further clarifying the point, the Naiyāyika explains that when there are two independent cognitions between which the first one is actually caused by a defective sense-organ and the following one is a produce of the sense-organ without any defect, the first one cannot sublate the succeeding one for the simple reason that the second one has not come into existence while the first one is already there. On the other hand, the second cognition, which takes place due to its causes, has a contradictory cognition that has already occurred. Here, since the succeeding cognition cannot come into existence unless it sublates the former, while it comes into existence, it comes so as the sublation of the former. Otherwise, as already stated, the second cognition can never come into existence, if the first cognition itself is the sublation.

On the other hand, between the two cognitions, if the second one depends on the first one, for its origination is yet to take place, it will not originate, being contradicted by the cognition on which it depends. When thus it does not come into existence, it is obvious that

it cannot sublate the first one as it has no existence. An instance is the inferential cognition which for its origination needs the perceptual cognition and also has contradiction with it. To illustrate, the inferential cognition of the absence of heat in fire is dependent on the perceptual cognition of fire. Since it is contradicted by the perceptual cognition on which it is dependent, it will never take place. When thus it has not originated at all, the question of it sublating the preceding perceptual cognition will not arise. In short, between the two contradictory cognitions of independent origin, the succeeding one will sublate the preceding cognition. On the other hand, if the two cognitions are supposed to be of contradictory nature and the succeeding one is dependent upon the preceding one, then, as a matter of fact, the cognition supposed to succeed will never take place. Thus, it is an instance where the preceding cognition sublates the succeeding one, by never allowing it to take place. In the case of an erroneous cognition, the succeeding contradictory cognition is independent of the preceding one and therefore it sublates the preceding erroneous cognition. Thus, there is no room for confusion about *bādhya-bādhakabhāva-vyavasthā*.[72]

Now, the pertinent question may arise here as to what is meant by 'being sublated' in regard to an erroneous cognition. We cannot say that its very nature is sublated. For, unlike absolutely non-existent entities, it has existence. We cannot either hold that its 'having conch-shell as its content' or 'having silverness as its qualifier' is sublated. For, they can never be de-linked with the cognition. When the cognition took place, it had the conch-shell as its content and silverness as its qualifier. And it will remain so till it lasts. Neither we can say that the dealings due to the cognition are sublated. For, if the *pravṛtti* is taken as the *vyavahāra*, since following the cognition it also took place, although without any success, it cannot be considered as sublated. So, finally, we may explain the *bādha* as obstructing the capacity of the cognition to produce *pravṛtti* in future. But, such *pravṛttis* will not take place as they do not have the necessary causes such as the cognition of the object and there is no need to envisage the obstruction of its capacity. Thus, the Prābhākara feels that it is not possible to explain the concept of sublation which is an essential part of the theory of *anyathākhyāti*.[73]

However, the Naiyāyika maintains that there is no difficulty in explaining the concept of sublation. According to him, 'sublatedness' means the realization of 'erroneousness', i.e. *bhramatva* of the cognition. When we come to know that the object before us is not silver, but is conch-shell, we realize that the earlier cognition that 'this is silver' was erroneous. Therefore, the Prābhākara cannot deny the very existence of erroneous cognition on the pretext that '*bādhya-bādhakabhāva*' cannot be explained.[74]

Yet another argument of the Prābhākara to reject the theory of *anyathākhyāti* was that if a cognition could be false, we might lose trust in all the cognitions, as there is a possibility of these also being false. The Naiyāyika sets aside the argument point out to the fact that the validity of a cognition can be ascertained on the basis of its having a corroborative evidence or its leading to a successful effort. In fact, the Naiyāyika contends that the problem is equally true with the *akhyāti* theory also. For, the cognitions held by the Naiyāyika as erroneous, as per the *akhyāti* theory, are true and are the instances of two cognitions between which and their contents, the absence of the relation, though existent, is not grasped. So it is quite possible to have the doubt with regard to the other cognitions

also whether they are, likewise, the instances of two cognitions between which and their contents the absence of a relation, though existent, is not grasped. As a consequence, we may equally lose trust in all those cognitions.[75]

The Akhyātivādin may argue here that we will trust cognitions because we are aware that their contents are real. It is true that we may think of them as the cases of non-apprehension of the absence of the relation among the contents. But, it will dawn upon us, rather lately that instead it is their *sadviṣayatva*, i.e., having a real content, as the characteristic of cognition that occurs to our mind rather quickly. Sometimes we may doubt the truthfulness of a cognition. However, the corroborative knowledge will remove the doubt and we will trust even such a cognition.[76]

In that case, the Anyathākhyātivādin contends that the possibility of having mistrust with regard to all cognitions would not be there for him also as he holds that validity is a general phenomenon of cognitions and only in exceptional cases it is disturbed. Further, he points out that for the Akhyātivādin, the trust in a cognition is due to another cognition that all cognitions have only real contents. But, the mistrust would arise even with regard to that cognition. Thus it is infinite regress.[77]

Another pertinent question raised against the theory of *anyathākhyāti* is as to how can a cognition be regarded as false. In the instance of the erroneous cognition 'this is silver', even according to the Naiyāyika, both 'this' and 'silver' are real only. It may be argued that though both are real, the identity between the two is non-existent and hence the cognition grasping it is considered as false. But, even the identity of the silver is existent in the silver. If it is held that the identity of the silver 'in this' is non-existent and the cognition grasping the same is false, then the Naiyāyika will be considered as *Asatkhyātivādin*, one who holds the theory that non-existent also can be cognized.

The Naiyāyika dismisses the question by formulationg a definition of invalidity of a cognition, which is applicable even though all the contents of an erroneous cognitions are real only. Accordingly, invalidity of a cognition is having that as the substantive which does not possess the attribute, which is the qualifier in the cognition. Or invalidity of a cognition is 'having a substantiveness which does not co-exist with the attribute, the qualifier'.

The Pracīna-Naiyāyika holds a slightly different view in this regard. He maintains that whether it is the identity of the silver or the relation of silverness grasped in the conch-shell, it is absolutely non-existent only. Yet, the theory of *khyāti*, being advocated by him, is not *asatkhyāti*, for, there is a significant difference with regard to the cognition of a non-existent entity agreed to by the Buddhist and the Naiyāyika. While the Buddhist holds that in an erroneous cognition, all the contents are non-existent only, the non-existent is grasped totally unrelated to any existent, the Naiyāyika maintains that all the contents are not non-existent and even the identity of the relation of the qualifier, which is accepted as totally non-existent, cannot be grasped independently. Further, it is grasped as related with an existent thing. While it is established that an erroneous cognition also is a *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, he maintains that it is inevitable to accept *asatkhyāti* as explained by him. Vācaspati has succinctly stated this as below:

tasmād yad anyathā santam anyathā pratipadyate.
tannirālambanaṁ jñānam asadālambanaṁ matam.

"That knowledge is, therefore, considered as baseless which lies in the understanding of something contrary to what actually it is and hence has nothing to sustain it."

* The book referred for writing this article is *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya with the commentaries Prakāśa of Rucidatta Miśra and Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi on Prakāśa of Rāmakṛṣṇādhvarin, critically edited by N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, Volume-I (Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa), published by Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, 1973.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *tadvati tatprakārakānubhavo vā. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 436.
2. *nanu sarvajñānānāṁ yathārthatvāt pramāṇālakṣaṇe (viśeṣaṇasya) vyāvartyāprasiddherviśeṣaṇavaiyarthyam, anyathākhyātau mānābhāvāt.* Ibid. p. 463.
   tatprakārakānubhavatvavyāvartyanirvikalpakasmṛtyoḥ prasiddhatvādāha-tadvatīti. Nyāyaśikhāmaṇiḥ. Ibid.
3. *rajatārthipravṛttiviṣayatvaṁ rajatatvaprakārakānubhavaviṣayatvavyāpyaṁ rajatārthipravṛttiviṣayamātravṛttidharmatvāt rajatamātravṛttidharmavat. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 464.
4. *śuktī rajatajñānaviṣayatāśrayaḥ rajatārthipravṛttiviṣayatvāt rajatavat.* Ibid. p. 472.
5. *rajatatvamupādhiḥ.* Ibid.
6. *rajatārthitājanyā śuktau pravṛttiriṣṭapravṛttiviṣayaviśiṣṭajñānasādhyā pravṛttitvāt śuktau śuktyarthipravṛttivat.* Ibid. p. 473.
7. *na ceṣṭaviṣayapravṛttitvamupādhiḥ.* Ibid. p. 476.
8. *sādhanaviśeṣitatvāt.* Ibid. 476.
9. *tathā ca sādhanena vyāpyena ghaṭitatvānnāyamupādhiḥ. sādhyavyāpyāvyāpakatvena sādhyāvyāpakatvādiyarthaḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 477.
10. *na ca grahaṇasmaraṇayorviśiṣṭasya jñānasya vā pakṣatve bādha āśrayāsiddhirvā. ubhayasiddhena śuktiniṣṭhapravṛttihetutvena pakṣatvāt. anyathā sādhyatadabhāvavataḥ pakṣatvenānumānocchedaḥ. samavāyātīndriyatvavādinaṁ prati agṛhītāsaṁsargakadharmadharmi-viṣayakamekaṁ jñānameva viśiṣṭajñānaṁ sidhyati. na caivamubhayakhyātiḥ, nānyathākhyātiriti vācyam. vyadhikaraṇaprakārakajñānasya tattvāt. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 479-482.
11. *yadvā rajatecchājanyaśuktiviṣayapravṛttijanakarajatatvaprakārakaṁ jñānaṁ śuktiviśeṣyakaṁ śuktipravṛttiprayojakajñānatvāt śuktau śuktyarthi-pravṛttijanakajñānavat.* Ibid. p. 477.
12. *na ca grahaṇasmaraṇayorviśiṣṭasya jñānasya vā pakṣatve bādha āśrayāsiddhirvā.* Ibid. p. 479.
13. *ubhayasiddhena śuktiniṣṭhapravṛtti hetutvena pakṣatvāt. anyathāsādhyatadabhāvavataḥ pakṣatvenānumānocchedaḥ.* Ibid.
14. *svatantropasthiteṣṭabhedāgrahādeva pravṛttyupapatteḥ kiṁ viśiṣṭajñānena. pareṇāpyāropaṇiyamārthaṁ tadabhyupagamāt. na ca rajate pravṛttiṁ prati viśiṣṭajñānasya hetutvāt ihāpi tatsiddhiḥ. pravṛttimātre bhedāgrahe satīṣṭapurovartijñānasya lāghavena hetutvāt, na tu sadapi viśiṣṭajñānaṁ tantraṁ, gauravāt.* Ibid. p. 484.
15. *na cābhedavyavahāro vyavahartavyadhīsādhyo na tu tadabhāvāgrahāt.* Ibid. p. 491.
16. *yadyapi rajatābhedaviśiṣṭaśuktivyavahāraḥ sarvasiddhaḥ. anyathā ayathārthavyavahārajanakatvanibandhano jñānāyathārthatvavyapadeśa iti parasiddhāntavyākopaprasaṅgāt. tathā ca nāśrayāsiddhiḥ. tathāpi jñātābhedāsaṁ sargāgrāhādabhedaviśiṣṭecchādivyavaharopapatterna viśiṣṭajñānāpekṣetyaprayojakatve tātparyam.* Nyāyaśikhāmaṇiḥ. p. 491.
    icchādīnāṁ jñātapurovartimātraviṣayativāt. abhedābhilapo'pi jñātābhedasyāsaṁsargāgrahāditi nājñāte vyavahāraḥ. Tattvacintāmaṇi. p. 492.
17. *bādhaśūnyānuvyavasāyabalena yadi viśiṣṭadhiḥ syāttadā śuktāvapi syāt. ato na sa tasyāṁ pramāṇamiti bhāvaḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 495.
18. *tatra hi rajatasya na smṛtiḥ prāgananubhavāt. grahaṇaṁ ca tasya dharmi-viṣayakaṁ yogyadharmiyogena rajatatvajātigrahādityarthasiddhaṁ dharmadharmiviṣayakamekaṁ jñānam. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 495-496.
19. *na ca rajatatvasya śuktyanubhavaviṣayatve heturasti. na ca pratyabhijñānavat saṁskārendriye hetū. tayoratra bhinnaviṣayakatvāt.* Ibid. p. 496.
20. *ekadā svatantropasthitaviruddhānekabhedāgrahe saṁśayaḥ.* Ibid.
21. *evamapi rajata eva nedaṁ rajataṁ kiṁ tu śuktiriti bhrame saṁśayatvāpattiḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 496-497.
22. *na ca krameṇopasthitānekabhedāgraho yena sa kramikaviparyayadvayarūpaḥ syāt. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 497.

23. *na ca saṁśayānantaraṁ viparyayadaśāyamubhayabhedāgrahe saṁśayaḥ, ekabhedāgrahe anyathākhyātiḥ, doṣamahimnā hyekasya na svātantryeṇopasthitiḥ kiṁ tvabhāvaviśeṣaṇatayeti tadbhedāgraho' pyakiñcitkaraḥ. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 497-498.
24. *na ca saṁśayānantaraṁ dhūmabhramādasti kvacidvahnyarthipravṛttirna tu tena vinā. na ca tasya svatantropasthitavahnyasaṁsargāgrahodvāram, saṁśayānurodhena tasya prāgapi sattvādvahnyanumitirdvāramiti vācyam.* Ibid. p. 498.
25. *na ca parvatasya pratyakṣatve vahneśca smaraṇe pratyakṣabhramānna viśeṣa iti sākṣātkaromīti syāt na tvanuminomīti vācyam. liṅgajñānānantarabhāvitva-pratisandhānāpratisandhānābhyāmubhayasambhavāt. Ibid.* p. 498-499.
26. *nanu śuktau rajatabhedāgrahāt yathā pravṛttiḥ tathā śuktibhedāgrahānnivṛttiḥ syāt. tadgrahe'nyathākhyātyāpatteḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 499.
27. *evaṁ svatantropasthitāniṣṭabhedāgraho'pi nivartakaḥ. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 499.
28. *śuktyabhāvāsaṁsargāgrahaśca nakārasyārtha iti nānyathākhyātiḥ.* Ibid. p. 500.
29. *aniṣṭābhedagrahasya nivartakatve ca rajata eva nedaṁ rajatamiti kṛtvā na nivarteta, anyathā anyathākhyātyāpatteḥ.* Ibid. p. 501.
30. *nanu rajataraṅgayorime raṅgarajate ityatra pratyekamubhayabhedāgrahe yugapatpravṛttinivṛttī syātāmiti cet—na. evaṁvidhabhrame mānābhāvāt. kāryonneyadharmāṇāṁ yathākāryamunnayanāt. kramotpanna-jñānayorbhedāgrahādekatvābhimānaḥ.* Ibid. p. 501-502.
31. *prasaktasyaiva pratiṣedhāt prasaṅgasya cāroparūpatvādityarthaḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 502.
32. *prasaktapratiṣedhātmā bādho'khyātau na yujyate. sādhayatyanyathākhyātiṁ bādha eva hi naḥ sphuṭam. Tattvacintāmaṇi* p. 502.
33. *tasmādabhedāgrahāt prasajjito vyavahāro bhedagrahāt bādhyata iti yuktam. upekṣābhrame ca śabdaprayogo bādhyaḥ.* Ibid. p. 503.
34. *tadīyatāmātrasvabhāvatvāt tadviṣayatvasya. kathaṁ rajatīyamātrajñāna-marajatīyaṁ svabhāvavyāghātat. na cobhayīyam, samūhālambhanāppatteḥ.*
    'anyasya hyanyathābhānaṁ pratītyaiva parāhatam.
    parasmin bhāsamāne tu na paraṁ bhāsate yataḥ.' iti. Ibid.
35. *viṣayaṁ vinaiva tadākāraṁ jñānamīti sākāravādaḥ.* Ibid. p. 504.
    purovartini rajatatvābhāvat jñānākārasyaiva rajatatvasya tatra bhānābhyupagamādityarthaḥ. asannikṛṣṭarajatasya bhānābhyupagame vā samūhālambanatvāpatteriti bhāvaḥ. Prakāśaḥ. p. 504-505.
    deśāntarasthasya sannikarṣābhāvena bhānāyogāt pariśeṣāt jñānākārarajatamaṅgīkṛtya tadbahiravabhāsata ityakāmenāpyavaśya-mabhyupagamanīyamityāha—purovartinīti. Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi. p. 505.
36. *jñānāyathārthatve ca jñānamātrasya tacchaṅkayā na niṣkampa pravṛttiḥ. na ca doṣājanyatvādinā viśvāsaḥ. bhramādaviśvāse pravṛttyabhāvāpatteḥ. nāpi tajjñānāt. jñānatvena tatrāpyaviśvāsāt. taducyate—*
    'aho bata mahāneṣa pramādo dhīmatāmapi.
    jñānasya vyabhicāratve viśvāsaḥ kiṁ nibandhanaḥ.' iti.
    Tattvacintāmaṇi. p. 504-505.
37. *bramasya ca sanmātraviṣayakatvenāyathārthatā. asadviṣayakatve'satkhyātiḥ.* Ibid. p. 505.
38. *'sākāravādādasato na bhānāt*
    saṁvidvirodhādatha hetvabhāvāt.
    dhiyāmanāśvāsabhayācca neṣṭā
    yato'nyathākhyātirato yathārtha.' Ibid. p. 506.
39. *siddhāntastu—satyasthale pravṛttimātraṁ pratīṣṭapurovartijñāne hetutayā vyavasthite'tiprasaṅgavāraṇārthaṁ viṣayatayā vaiśiṣṭyameva kāraṇatāvacchedakaṁ kalpyate lāghavāt. kāraṇatāgrahasamaye jñānavittivedyatayā śīghropasthitikatvāt bādhakābhāvācca.* Ibid. p. 510.
40. *satyasthale pravṛttimātraṁ pratīṣṭapurovartijñāne hetutayā vyavasthite'tiprasaṅgavāraṇārthaṁ viṣayatayā vaiśiṣṭyameva kāraṇa-tāvacchedakaṁ kalpyate lāghvāt. kāraṇatāgrahasamaye jñānavittivedyatayā śīghropasthitikatvāt bādhakābhāvācca. nanu svatantropasthiteṣṭabhedāgraḥ kāraṇaṁ, tādṛśabhedāgrahatvaṁ ca kāraṇatāvacchedakaṁ, gauravāt kalpanīyopasthitikatvācca.* Ibid. p. 510-514.
41. *nanvasminnyāyanaye prāmaṇyasya svatogrāhyatvāpattyā vyavasāyaviṣayo'pi vaiśiṣṭyaṁ nānuvyavasāyaviṣyaḥ. paramate tadatīndriyameva. tatkathametat.* Prakāśa. p. 510.
42. *vastuto vyavasāyopanītatvāt viśeṣaṇavaiśiṣṭyamanuvyavasāyaviṣaya eva. anyathā ghaṭatvaprakārakatvamapi tatra na bhāseta, bhāsamānavaiśiṣṭyapratiyogitvasyaiva prakāratvāt.* Ibid. p. 511.
43. *na caivaṁ svatastvāpattiḥ jñānaviṣayatāmātreṇa tadgrahasvīkāre'pi svātantryeṇa tadsvīkārāt. tenaiva ca rūpeṇa tadgrāhakasya tadvattāniścayarupatvena tadghaṭitaprāmāṇyaniścayarūpatvādityuktam.* Ibid.
44. *paramate ca samvāyātīndriyatve'pi tadbhinnaṁ vaiśiṣṭyaṁ pratyakṣameva. anyathā prāmāṇye svatastvaṁ na syāt.* Ibid.

45. *viśiṣṭajñāne'pi hetutvenāvaśyakatvāt bhedāgraha eva hetuḥ. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 514.
46. *viśiṣṭajñāne taddhetutvasya tatkalpanottarakalpyatvena pravṛttikārāraṇatāgrahasamaye tadanupasthiteḥ.* Ibid. p. 515.
47. *na caivaṁ mithyājñānakalpane gauravam. pramāṇapravṛttisamaye siddhyasiddhiparāhatatvena phalamukhagauravasyādoṣatvāt. pramāṇavatastasya nyayyatvāt.* Ibid.
48. *kḷptakāraṇaṁ vinānupapatteḥ.* Ibid. p. 517.
49. *sarvato balavatī hyanyathānupapattiḥ.* Ibid.
50. *viparītacatuṣke yugapat pravṛttinivṛttyāpatteḥ.* Ibid.
51. *na ca tatra mānābhāvaḥ. ime raṅgarajate iti satyajñānavat rajataraṅgayoḥ pratyekabhramasāmagryorekadā sattvena tādṛśabhramotpatte-rānubhavikatvāt. anyathā samūhālambanocchede dvitvādyapratyakṣatāpatteḥ. ime raṅgarajate iti śabdābhāsādevaṁvidhabhramasambhavācca.* Ibid. p. 518.
52. *mama doṣamahimnā rajataraṅgayo rajataraṅgabhedagrahānna saṁśayaḥ. tava caikatra svatantrobhayabhedāgrahāt pratyekaṁ raṅgaṁ veti saṁśayaḥ syāt.* Ibid. p. 519.
53. *na caivamāvaśyakadoṣādeva pravṛttinivṛttī, satyasthale tadabhāvāt. na ca visaṁvādinī doṣāt, indriyaliṅgaśabdādidoṣāṇāmananugatatvāt. tajjanyajñāne ca jātibhedāt.* Ibid. p. 521.
tatpravṛttau vaijātyakalpane mānābhāvāt pravṛttimātre viśiṣṭajñānahetutvakalpanāditi bhāvaḥ. Prakāśaḥ. p. 521-522.
54. *syādetat. saṁvādivisaṁvādipravṛttyorvaicitrye viśiṣṭajñānabhedāgrahau hetū kḷptatvāt, na tu viśiṣṭajñānasatyatvāsatyatve gauravāt. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 524.
55. *pravṛttinivṛttimātre ceṣṭāniṣṭapurovartijñānaṁ heturiti nānanugamaḥ. na tu viśiṣṭajñānaṁ gauravāt.* Ibid. p. 526.
56. *atha rajataraṅgayoḥ rajataraṅgabhedāgrahāt visaṁvādinyau balāt syātaṁ, tatsāmagrīsattvāt. visaṁvādinī tatra satyarajate na sambhavatīti cet—ata eva bhedāgraho na tadhetuḥ, tatsattve'pi tadabhavāt..... maivam. pravṛtteraniṣṭaviṣayatvaṁ nivṛtteriṣṭaviṣayatvaṁ visaṁvādaḥ. tathā cāniṣṭaviṣayapravṛttāviṣṭaviṣayanivṛttau ca bhedāgraho heturiti kathaṁ tata iṣṭāniṣṭaviṣayapravṛttinivṛttī syātāṁ, tatra tasyāsāmarthyāditi.* Ibid. p. 527.
57. *atra brūmaḥ-jñānaṁ svaviṣaye pravartakamityādyapravṛttau saṁvādipravṛttau ca sarvairavadhāritaṁ, lāghavādbādhakābhāvācca.* Ibid. p. 528.
58. *nanu phalajñāne vyabhicāraḥ. tasya svaviṣayībhūtopāye pravartakatvāt. na ca phalecchayaiva tadanyathāsiddhamiti vācyam. tasyāstadvyāpāratvāt... vayaṁ tu brūmaḥ. phalecchāyaā iṣṭasādhanatājñānopakṣīṇatvenānyathāsiddhatvāt phalajñānaṁ pravṛttau sutarāmanyathāsiddham.* Prakāśaḥ. Ibid.
59. *tata iṣṭajñānaṁ śuktau pravartakaṁ tadviṣayakaṁ tadvyavahārahetutvāt svāviṣaye tasyāsāmarthyāt. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* Ibid.
60. *anyathā prathamaṁ sarvairgṛhītāpi kāryānvite śaktiḥ siddhārthadarśanādgauravācca parityajyeteti sādhusamarthitaṁ gurumatam. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 530.
61. *nanu svaviṣaye jñānaṁ pravartakamiti satyam. kiṁ the visaṁvādipravṛttāvidaṁ jñānameva pravartakaṁ na tviṣṭajñamapi. taddhi jñāyamāneṣṭabhedāgrahe kāraṇatāvacchedakaṁ lāghavāditi daṇḍatvavadanyathāsiddham..... saṁvādipravṛttau ceṣṭajñānaṁ pravartakaṁ, tasya viśiṣṭajñānatvāt abhedenāvacchedakatvābhāvāditi mama siddhāntasāraḥ.* Ibid.
62. *ucyate. svatantrānvayavyatirekādiṣṭajñānahetureva na tvitarahetutāvacchedakamanyathāsiddhaṁ vā. na hīṣṭajñānamādāyaiva iṣṭabhedāgrahasyānvayavyatirekau yena daṇḍatvavattadavacchedakam. nāpīṣṭajñānasya bhedāgrahagarbhatvenānvayavyatirekau, yena daṇḍarūravattadanyathāsiddham. anyathā agṛhītabhedeṣṭajñānaṁ heturavacchedako bhedāgraha ityeva kiṁ na syāt. tasmāt svatantrānvayavyatirekādubhayorapi hetutvam.* Ibid. p. 531.
63. *atha tatrāpīdaṁ jñānaṁ pravartakaṁ, daivādhīnaṁ tasyeṣṭaviṣayatvamapīti cet—tarhīṣṭe idamiti jñānādeva pravṛttiḥ syāt.* Ibid. p. 532.
64. *evaṁ pratyakṣamapyanyathākhyātau mānaṁ kāraṇamānābhāvāt. tathā hi—idaṁ rajatatayā jānāmītyanuvyavasāyasākṣikamevānyasyānyathā bhānam. na hi viṣayatve' nuvyavasāyādanyat pramāṇam.* Ibid. p. 550.
65. *na hyatadviṣayastajjñānaviṣayatvena na vā tadaviṣayakaṁ tadviṣayakatvenānuvyavasīyate. anuvyavasāyasya pramātvaniyamāt. anyathā ghaṭajñāne'pi kadācitpaṭaṁ jānāmīti syāt.* Ibid. p. 550-551.
66. *na ca bhedāgrahadaśāyaṁ rajatajñānaviṣayatvāsaṁsargāgrahaḥ. śuktau bhedagrahe'pi śuktī rajatatvena mayā jñātā śuktau rajatajñānaṁ me vṛttamityanuvyavasāyāt.* Ibid. p. 552.
67. *atha vicārasādhyāsaṁsargagrahabādhyo'yamasaṁsargāgrahaḥ, tena vicāraṁ vinā bhedagrahe'pyavatiṣṭhata iti cet-na. idaṁ rajatatayā jānāmītyatra śukti-karmakarajatatvaprakārakajñānāsaṁsargāgrahasyātmanyasambhavāt tādṛsajñānāprasiddheḥ.* Ibid. p. 552.

68. *dharmadharmibhāvānāpannobhayajñānasya samūhālambanatva-niyamādityarthaḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 503.
69. *viśiṣṭajñānaṁ ca sarvatra viśeṣaṇaviśesyīyamityanyathābhānamapi tathā. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* p. 553.
70. *saugatamate jñānīyameva rajatatvaṁ jñānaviṣayo na tu bāhyam, atra tu na tatheti bhāvaḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. Ibid.
71. *ananyathāsiddhāyā dhiyo bādhakatvāt. Tattvacintāmaṇi.* Ibid.
72. *'pūrvātparabalīyastvaṁ tatra nāma pratīyate.*
anyonyanitrapeṣāṇāṁ yatra janma dhiyaṁ bhavet.' iti.
yatra pūrvāpekṣamuttaraṁ jñānamutpattumunmukhaṁ tatropajīvyapūrvavirodhenottaraṁ notpadyate. ato'jātaṁ satpūrvaṁ kathaṁ bādhatām. Ibid. p. 554.
73. *nanu bramasya kiṁ bādhyate. na svarūpaṁ tasya sattvāt. nāpi rajatatvaprakārakatvaṁ śuktiviṣayakatvaṁ vā, tayorapanetumaśakyatvāt. jātaṁ hi tadrajatatvena śuktiṁ viṣayīkṛtya. nāpi vyavahāraḥ, pravṛttyāderv̥ṛttatvāt. nāpyanāgatavyahārajanakatvaṁ, tasya kāraṇābhāvādevāsambhavāt.* Ibid. p. 555.
74. *bādhakena bramasya bramatvabuddhireva bādhaḥ.* Ibid. p. 556.
75. *satyatvaniyame'pi sadasaṁsargāgrahasyāgṛhītāsaṁsargasya jñānadvayasya ca bahuṣu darśanātkathamāśvāsaḥ.* Ibid.
76. *atha sadasaṁsargāgrahasya pratsandhānaṁ vilambitam. sadviṣayatvaṁ ca śīghropasthitamityautsargikasadviṣayatvajñānādviśvāsaḥ.* Ibid.
77. *tava tu jñāne pravṛtte tatrautsargikasadviṣayatvajñānādviśvāsa ityabhyupagamena sadviṣayatvajñāne tatra tādṛsajñānāntarsaṁ vināna viśvāsa iti tatrāpi tadapekṣāyamana vasthāpattiḥ.* Prakāśaḥ. p. 556-557.

CHAPTER 19

Criticism of Buddhism by Pūrvamīmāṁsā

S. Revathy

1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The word *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* is applied to the system originally propounded by the sage Jaimini. It was directly concerned with sacrificial and ritual matters. Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtras* may be assigned to about A.D. 200. There are some rudimentary principles of epistemology in the *sūtras* of Jaimini, but they have no direct reference to the Buddhistic doctrine or philosophy. The earliest extant commentary on the twelve *adhyāyas* of Jaimini is the *bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmin. Although the earlier writers held *Vedārthavicāra* or the investigation into the contents of the Vedas as the object of Mīmāṁsā, Śabarasvāmin seems to have deviated from the path of those earlier thinkers. The reasons for such a deviation of Śabarasvāmin and his introduction of some popular reforms in the system of Mīmāṁsā are not far to seek. The period in which Śabara flourished was such when Buddhistic philosophers came forward vehemently attacking the six orthodox systems of philosophy with their own tenets and doctrines of *Kṣaṇikavāda, Śūnyavāda, Nirālambanavāda, Nairātmyavāda* and *Vijñānavāda.* The Buddhists criticized and called into question the authority of the Vedas on *dharma.* These powerful attacks on the Vedic religion, *dharma* and philosophy shook faith of the people in the Vedas and Vedic sacrifices. Under such threatening circumstances, it fell upon the exponents of the Vedic religion and the six systems of philosophy to review and re-establish their systems well based on more rational arguments and on absolutely sure grounds to repudiate the attacks of non-Vedic thinkers.

The *Tarkapāda* of the first *adhyāya* is the most essential part of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* and it is chiefly due to this *pāda* that the system of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* has been raised to the status of an independent system of philosophy. Śabarasvāmin has, for the first time introduced the subject of epistemology in this system in detail, rejected for the first time *Nirālambana* and *Śūnyavāda* of Buddhists and re-established the theory that each *dharma,* that is performed, produces the desired results and proved the existence of soul as the enjoyer of those results either in this birth or in the next.

After the period of Śabara, Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti—three great Buddhist logicians who flourished, were chiefly concerned with criticizing the doctrines of the realistic schools, namely, the Nyāya system of Gautama and Vātsyāyana and the Mīmāṁsā system of Jaimini and Śabara. Taking their stand on the *Śūnya* and *Vijñānavāda*

schools of Buddhism, these logicians vehemently criticized these two systems. During this period, the Buddhistic philosophy and logic enjoyed much popularity through the voluminous writings of these three authors. Further, the period extending from the fifth to eleventh century is a remarkable period in the history of Indian philosophy. A galaxy of great thinkers of the Buddhist camp such as Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and Śāntarakṣita and Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Prābhākara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Udayana and Śrīdhara of the orthodox realists flourished during this period. On the one side the orthodox schools having as their basis the Upaniṣads advocated the soul-theory (*ātma-vāda*) and on the other side the Buddhist schools, based on their scriptures, proclaimed the no-soul theory (*anātmavāda*). These two groups have, thus, been acting and reacting upon each other giving rise to richness of philosophical thought.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, on the one hand, and the Mīmāṁsā school, on the other, were the champions of a most radical realism in India. The realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school did not at all show any concession to the assailing Buddhists. Instead, it was very adamant to its realistic position and did not yield even a bit to Buddhistic influence. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara who flourished during this period respectively, wrote a commentary and a sub-commentary on the fundamental aphorisms of Gautama, were the doughty champions of the Nyāya system. Uddyotakara in his *Vārttika* has defended Vātsyāyana against the criticisms of Buddhists. Praśastapāda who commented on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda is thoroughly realistic in his ontology but in his logic there is much of Buddhistic influence.

During the ninth century A.D., the Nyāya school produced the most distinguished philosopher—Vācaspatimiśra who wrote his *Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparya-Tīkā* and *Nyāya-kaṇikā* which are entirely devoted to the exposition and refutation of Buddhist theories. His commentator Udayana was also chiefly occupied in writing treatises in refutation of Buddhism, the noteworthy being the *Ātma-tattva-viveka*. The period of the struggle between the Nyāya and the Buddhist schools came to an end during the tenth century A.D.

In contrast with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṁsā realists adopted a realistic logic but did not strictly accept the realistic principles as did the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Mīmāṁsā school got split into two distinct schools, namely, the Bhāṭṭa school and the Prabhākara school. The names of these schools signify that they are founded by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara. The latter provided an important place to the Buddhist points of view.

It may be added here that while reacting to the Buddhist opposition, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopted a rigid attitude; Kumārila adopted a more rational attitude and formulated his epistemological theories in such a way that his school could meet the Buddhist criticism. But Prabhākara borrowed freely from Buddhist ideology.

Kumārila Bhāṭṭa who flourished in the seventh century is the author of the well-known work—*Mīmāṁsā-Ślokavārttika*. He is the father of the Bhāṭṭa school of the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* system. As the *Vārttikakāra* of this *Śāstra*, his position is unique. Kumārila is accepted as more authoritative than even Śabara, the *bhāṣyakāra*. His great work constitutes an extensive commentary on the *Śābarabhāṣya*. The various parts of this commentary are known as (i) the *Ślokavārttika;* (ii) the *Tantravārttika*, and (iii) the *tupṭīkā*.

The *Ślokavārttika* is verse mostly in the *anuṣṭup* metre, consisting about 3,300 *kārikās* is an elaborate commentary on the *Tarkapāda* or the first *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* of the *bhāṣya.* The topics of controversy in the Vedic philosophy introduced by Śabara have given much scope to Kumārila for establishing the Mīmāṁsā system of philosophy on an absolutely sound basis and for refuting the arguments of the Buddhists.

Kumārila had the unique fortune to have a dedicated band of distinguished disciples some of whom produced epoch-making works. Among them are Prabhākara, familiarly known as *guru,* Maṇḍanamiśra and Umveka Bhaṭṭa. Prābhākara was more an original thinker than Kumārila, and he introduced a peculiar theory of knowledge known as *Tripuṭīpratyakṣavāda* or the theory of triple perception and a theory of error known as *Vivekākhyātivāda.* He wrote a commentary named *Bṛhatī* on Śabara's *bhāṣya. Bṛhatī* was commented upon by Śālikānātha in his *Ṛjuvimalapañcikā.* Śālikānātha also wrote *Prakaraṇapañcikā* which is an independent treatise on the Prābhākara school.

Pārthasārathi Miśra (A.D. 1050-1120), a reputed Mīmāṁska of the Bhāṭṭa persuasion, wrote the *Śāstradīpikā* which is an independent commentary on the twelve chapters of *Jaiminisūtras.* Though in the main it is an exposition of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā, it is polemical in character and criticizes the doctrines of other schools such as of Prābhākara, Advaita, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bauddha. The *Tarkapāda* section of *Śāstradīpikā* reviews the questions on epistemology, ontology, etc.

II

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

As regards the early schools of systematized Buddhism and their mutual relation, there is not much certainty. But as it is found explained in the Sanskrit works by Hindu and Jaina writers, Buddhism is commonly divided into four schools called Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. Of these the former pair are realistic; and the latter idealistic. All the schools maintain that things are mere aggregates of parts (*saṅghāta*) and even as aggregates they do not endure for more than one moment. So they are all momentary (*kṣaṇika*). The self also, according to these schools, is a momentary complex of five factors of which one represents the physical body and the rest, the states of consciousness like perception and feeling.

(i) *Sautrāntika*—The word '*sautrāntika*' is derived from *sūtrānta,* i.e. the original text. The Sautrāntikas derived inspiration only from the original *sūtras* of Buddha. Yaśomitra, one of the chief exponents of this school, says that those who accept *sūtras* and not *śāstras* as authority are called Sautrāntikas. The distinctive features of this school are (a) everything internal as well as external exists, but it exists only in the present and not in the past or future. (b) all external objects are real but they are only inferable (*anumeya*).[1]

(ii) *Vaibhāṣika*—Since everything internal as well as external exists really, this school along with the Sautrāntikas is referred to as *Sarvāstivāda.* According to this

school, the external world exists and is perceptible (*aparokṣa*). Hence they questioned the verbal usage given by Sautrāntikas in the form 'the external objects are not perceptible'. Thus they are referred to as Vaibhāṣikas. Cognition does not have any form of its own. All the elements internal (*citta* and *caitta*) as well as external (*bhūta* and *bhautika*) exist in all the three divisions of time, past, present and future. Substances, which are *dharmins*, do not exist apart from the *dharmas* or attributes. Similarly, wholes (*avayavin*) do not exist apart from the parts (*avayavas*).[2]

(iii) *Yogācāra* (*Vijñānavāda*)—This school is also called *Vijñānavāda,* as it accepts *Vijñāna* as the ultimate reality. *Vijñāna* is of two kinds, *ālaya* and *pravṛttivijñāna.* It totally denies the existence of the external objects.[3] The external objects are only states and forms of series of momentary cognitions. Every cognition invariably refers to an object and every object is conceived of only as being known. This invariable appearance of knowledge and its objects is called *sahopalaṁbhanīyama.* This *niyama* has led this school to maintain that there is no object apart from the series of momentary cognitions. Cognitions like the knowledge of pot, cloth, etc., have the specific form of pot, cloth, etc., which distinguishes one cognition from another. As knowledge does not point to any external object, all experience is illusory.

(iv) *Mādhyamika* (*Śūnyavāda*)—Nāgārjuna is regarded as the founder of this school. Like the *Yogācāra* school, this school also denies the reality of objects but in addition it also denies the reality of the soul, namely, series of conscious states. This doctrine is known as the doctrine of void (*Śūnyavāda*). *Śūnya* as a principle is not admitted but when this school denies even the momentary consciousness, it results in void.[4]

With the advent of Diṅnāga who developed a powerful logic, Buddhism turned out to be a revolt against the theory of permanent soul of the orthodox systems. Diṅnāga in his magnum opus *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as well as in his other philosophical treatises like *Ālaṁbana-parīkṣā,* bitterly criticizes the naive realism of the orthodox systems, especially the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsā and propounds his own theories on logic and metaphysics.

The crying need of the realists was the defence of realism against the Buddhist school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. With this avowed objective emerged the two great champions of realism, namely, Kumārila and Prābhākara of the Mīmāṁsā school. As defenders of realism, they are second to none in the history of Indian philosophy. The Mīmāṁska is a confirmed realist as regards the things of the world. The external world according to him is real. The structure of realism on the basis of realistic categories built by the Vaiśeṣika school, was adopted by the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and other realist schools with some alterations. For example, both the schools of *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* accept the first four categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, namely, *dravya, guṇa, karma* and *sāmānya.* While Viśeṣa is summarily rejected by both the schools of Mīmāṁsā, *samavāya* is accepted only by Prābhākara. But it is not one as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The last category *abhāva* is accepted by Kumārila but not by Prābhākara.

Although both Kumārila and Prābhākara took upon themselves the task of repudiating the Buddhist tenets yet the real opponent emerged in the person of Kumārila. As mentioned earlier, his *Śloka-Vārttika* presents the criticism of the Buddhist philosophy in relation to major topics of epistemology, logic and metaphysics. The focus of this essay is to put forth the criticism of Buddhistic views from the Mīmāṁsā standpoint no doubt, but it would not be out of place to refer in some places the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika criticisms against the Buddhists, because it would strengthen the Mīmāṁsā arguments. We shall first deal with the problem relating to perception.

Ever since philosophical enquiries were set out, it has been the problem of philosophers as to the nature of perception and how it is related to conditions of knowledge. A philosopher analyses perception insofar as it is essential to the foundation of knowledge especially our knowledge of the external world and of such things as physical objects. To begin with, the philosopher needs an adequate epistemological definition.

Indian philosophers may be divided into two groups, one group defining perception in terms of immediacy and the other in terms of sense-contact. The latter definition, viz., 'perception is knowledge derived from sense-object contact' seems to be older. Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* defines perception as a non-erroneous cognition produced by the interaction of the sense-organs with the objects, which is definite and independent of verbal expression.[5] Praśastapāda defines perception as the cognition that is dependent on sense-organs.[6] Vācaspatimiśra in his *Sāṁnkhyatattvakaumudī* states that, according to the Sāṁkhyas, perception is the cognition dependent on sense-contact.[7] Kumarila also is inclined to define perception in terms of sense-contact. The *sūtra* that serves as the basis of Kumārila's theory of perception is: 'That cognition by a person, which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs, is perception, and it is not a means (of knowing *dharma*) as it apprehends only things existing at the present time.'[8] The Jaina, the Bauddha, the Prābhākara and the Advaitin define perception as the immediate or direct cognition of an object. The Buddhist is known for his celebrated definition of perception as a cognition free from subjective images and error.[9] This definition evoked much discussion regarding the nature and conditions of valid perception and the rôle of language in it. But Dharmottara states that perception is a direct presentation of an object.[10] Freedom from subjective images and non-erroneous nature are added to ensure the validity of perception. Śālikānātha states that perception is direct apprehension.[11]

The idea behind the definitions, mentioned above, is to bring under the fold of perception non-sensuous forms of direct knowledge. The knowledge of past, present and future objects, attributed to mystics and God which is direct and non-sensuous in origin is considered as a form of perception by the philosophers of this group. But since Kumārila neither accepted mystic perception nor the existence of God, the definition in terms of immediacy was not favoured by the Bhāṭṭas, despite the fact that immediacy was accepted as one of the characteristics of perception.

III

INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE PERCEPTION

Two forms or stages of perception have been distinguished in Indian philosophy. These are *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate and *savikalpaka* or determinate perception. Perception that arises immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with its object is *nirvikalpaka,* i.e. devoid of *vikalpas* or determinations. Subsequently, when the sense-object contact still continues to exist, the object is determined as belonging to a particular class or possessing some characteristic, etc., and thus the perception becomes determinate or *savikalpaka.*

While the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception is admitted by almost all schools of Indian philosophy, there is much divergence of opinion among the different systems as regards their nature and validity. Jayanta considers the two phrases *avyapadeśyam* and *vyavasāyātmakam* in the definition of perception framed by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* to mean the two kinds of perception, viz., indeterminate and determinate. In the former the distinction and relation between a substantive element (*viśeṣya*) and an adjectival feature (*viśeṣaṇa; prakāra*) is cognized. For example, being aware of a rose as red is a determinate cognition. Here the rose is the substantive feature, the red colour is the adjectival feature and the latter is cognized as being inherent (*samaveta*) in the former. When a cognition is without any adjectival feature (*niṣprakāraka*), it is indeterminate. Since the relation between the substantive and adjectival features is not cognized in this case, it may be characterized as a mere acquaintance with something with which there is sensory connection. Hence, perception can only be indeterminate. It may be added here that according to the Nyāya school, indeterminate cognition is not perceptual, i.e. we can never introspect it. We can only introspect a determinate cognition.[12] The Advaitins say that determinate perception does not lead to the knowledge of reality; and the Grammarian says that indeterminate perception is impossible. While these are the various views regarding the kinds of perception, the Buddhist emphatically denies determinate perception. We shall now explain the definition of perception given by the Buddhists and Kumārila's arguments against the denial of determinate perception.

In the first place, *nirvikalpaka* is the only type of valid perception according to the Buddhists. Diṅnāga defines *pratyakṣa* as *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham* which when rendered in simple English means 'perception is a (cognition) which is free from conceptual constructions'. The expression *kalpanāpoḍham* excludes from its purview inference which is invariably associated with ideal constructions (*kalpanā*). It also excludes errors and illusions from the category of perception since they are never on par with facts, although they are free from ideal constructions. Dharmakīrti adds another phrase '*abhrānta*' to this definition in order to exclude errors from the category of perception. That is, perception, according to him, is non-erroneous and devoid of determinations. Non-erroneousness is a general condition of all forms of valid knowledge. The word '*kalpanā*' is explained as meaning a cognition capable of being associated with a name.[13] A person who has the knowledge of the relation that exists between a name and the object which it refers to, as

a pot, his cognition gets associated with the word 'pot'. In the case of one who has not yet known the relation between a name and the named, say a child, the cognition is not associated with a name, but still it is capable of being expressed by a name. Both of these cognitions are excluded from perception. It might be asked as to how a cognition which is not actually associated with a name be ascertained to be capable of being so. The Buddhists say that when a cognition is independent of or not conditioned by the object cognized, it is ascertained to be capable of being associated with a name. Perception is that cognition whose content is determined exclusively by an objective fact; but *kalpanā* is purely a subjective idea having no regard for an objective fact. In other words, while perception depends on the immediate presence of the object perceived, *kalpanā* is independent of the presence of its object. In the case of a child, although he does not know the use of words, he is able to identify that what he sees now, is not the object that was perceived in the past. It is so because what was seen in the past, cannot be the object of the present perception. Hence the child's present cognition is associated with an element of *kalpanā* or imagination. Although the child is unaware of the use of names, yet his cognition is *savikalpaka* and hence it is *not perception.*[14] The Buddhists add by saying that perception in the true sense is produced purely by the object perceived and is free from verbal expression and all other subjective contributions. In the case of auditory perception, even when the words are heard, there is not necessarily a recollection so as to signify objects and hence it is free from *kalpanā.*

The fundamental principle of Diṅnāga's system is the differentiation between two kinds of knowable objects (*prameyas*) and consequent differentiation of the two types of means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) that comprehend these two kinds of objects.

Again, objects according to him, are of two kinds, namely, (i) the unique particulars *(sva-lakṣaṇas)* and, (ii) the universals, the generalized objects (*sāmānya lakṣaṇas*) which are merely mental entities. Of these, *Svalakṣaṇa,* which is the real object of perception, is that which makes a difference between cognitions arising out of a close and a remote observation of a thing. When an object is looked at from a distance, the cognition is not distinct. But when it is observed in close proximity, it appears distinct. Thus, an object which is cognized indistinctly and distinctly when viewed from far and near is *svalakṣaṇa* and it is the real, which is free from conceptual impositions or thought determinations. *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* or the form of an object which is common to other objects, say 'cowness', does not really belong to the object but is imposed upon it by the knower and hence it does not make any difference in cognition, whether observed closely or from a distance. Therefore, it is not an object of perception. In other words, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is a mode of thought and not a mode of existence.

It may be added here that for the Buddhists in accordance with the two-fold nature of objects, the means of knowledge are also of two kinds. (i) Perception *(pratyakṣa)* which means pure sensation and comprehends only the particular *(svalakṣaṇa)* and not the generalized form and (ii) inference *(anumāna)* which comprehends only the generalized form *(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)* and not the particular. Each of these *pramāṇas* operates only in its own sphere.[15]

The Buddhist denies determinate perception on the ground that the determination of an object as having a name and a class-character is not conditioned by the object itself but is purely a subjective construct imposed upon it by the cognizer. The real is unique and changes from moment to moment. The real of the previous moment is entirely different from the reals of the present and succeeding moments. Hence, there can be nothing in common to the reals of the different moments. The cognition of the common character is not conditioned by the real object because whether the object is looked at from a distance or vicinity it does not matter much. It is only due to the *svalakṣaṇa* or the unique character of the cow with which the class-character of cowness is associated, that it is distinctly perceived in indeterminate perception. Explaining the indeterminate and determinate cognitions of the Buddhists, S. Chatterjee in his *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* writes:

> It is such a cognition of an object as contains no element of thought or ideation in it (*kalpanāpoḍham*). Ordinarily knowledge involves two elements, namely, the given or the sensed and the meant or the ideated. The Buddhists hold that what is given is a unique individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) that belongs to no class and is not related to anything. We may call it by a name, bring it under a class and think of it as having certain qualities, actions and relations. But its name, class, quality, action and relation are not any part of what is directly given; these are the contributions of our mind (*kalpanā*) to the given experience. Hence *nirvikalpaka* perception is a cognition of the given datum as such, i.e. as not modified by any idea or concept like those of its name, class, etc. As contrasted to this, *savikalpaka* perception is a verbalised experience in which the object is determined by the concepts of name, class, relation, etc... Such a knowledge, however, is false, since it is not due to the given object, but to our conceptual construction of it. Thus the Buddhists reduce *nirvikalpaka* to pure sensation which is valid but blind, and *savikalpaka* to conceptual knowledge which is definite but false.[16]

T.N. Ganapathy[17] in his book writes that the Buddhists' view finds a parallelism in the writings of some of the sense-data philosophers, especially Russell.

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* does not favour the above explanation offered by the Buddhists to deny determinate perception. He says that when a person sees a cow in front of him in the form 'this is a cow', then it is directly cognized. There is no evidence that the distinctness of such a determination is caused by anything except the immediacy of cowness. Class-character, though fit to be expressed in words, is cognized distinctly through sense-organs and indistinctly through inference. The division of cognitions into distinct and indistinct, immediate and mediate does not depend upon the nature of objects, as the Buddhists assume. One and the same object could be apprehended mediately or immediately, distinctly or indistinctly on different occasions. If mediacy or immediacy, distinctness or indistinctness depended on the nature of objects, the cognition of some objects would always be of the same kind and that of others of another kind. For example, the cognition of the universal would always be mediate and indistinct and that of *svalakṣaṇa* always immediate and distinct. However, the cognition of the universal is sometimes

immediate and sometimes mediate. Pārthasārathi makes it explicit thus: when a person perceives a patch of white colour at a distance, he entertains a doubt whether it is related to a cow or a horse. But, after a while, when he hears the neighing sound, he decides that the white colour belongs to a horse. Here horseness is known through inference. When he goes near the horse, he is able to clearly apprehend it as a horse. While observed from a distance there was immediate cognition of a bare particular and horseness was cognized mediately. The same horseness was also immediately cognized when drawn nearer. This is confirmed by the verbal expressions of such a person who has the cognition. He says 'earlier horseness was not perceived but now I directly perceive it'. The difference in the earlier and the subsequent cognitions was not caused by the *svalakṣaṇa* but the class-character, namely, horseness. Thus a class-character also becomes an object of perception and hence determinate cognition also is perceptual in character.[18]

Insofar as the word *kalpanā* in the definition of perception means the attribution of something to an object, which it does not possess, the Buddhist view of perception that it is free from *kalpanā,* is correct. But it does not exclude determinate cognition from perception because the latter does not make any false attribution. In the same way, the universal also is real as the particular but the Buddhists reject it as unreal because of his metaphysical prejudice.

The *Vṛtti* on Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* states that determinate cognition includes five aspects within it. These are name (*nāman*), universal (*jāti*), qualities (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*) and substance (*dravya*). All these are purely mental constructions (*kalpanā*) and are superimpositions of mind upon the pure object. Hence, the Buddhists do not consider the cognition about them as *pratyakṣa* but they have the semblance of *pratyakṣa* (*pratyakṣābhāsa*). Kumārila refers to this view of the Buddhists in his *Ślokavārttika* thus:

"When the universal, etc., (*jātyādi*), being different from the real, are superimposed upon the real object, there arises a determinate cognition. Hence, this cognition is similar to that of a mirage."[19]

What Kumārila wants to convey is that according to the Buddhists the knowledge of name, universal, etc., in the pure object (*svalakṣaṇa*) has a semblance of perception, just as the knowledge of water in the desert is only an illusion.

Following the traditional orthodox view of classification of perception into determinate and indeterminate, Kumārila declares that when there arises contact of a sense-organ with an object, there arises a cognition in the first moment. It is a simple apprehension or a bare awareness of an object and is the basis of the predicative consciousness that arises in the next moment. It resembles the perception of infants, dumb persons and animals and is produced purely by the object, because it is not mixed with anything like particular (*viśeṣa*) or the universal (*sāmānya*). The *nirvikalpaka* perception corresponds to 'simple apprehension' or 'acquaintance' invented by Bertrand Russell. A similar idea of Kumārila's definition of *nirvikalpaka* is expressed by A.J. Iyer:

> I think it improbable that animals, or very young children, have the ability to make judgments, but I should not for that reason deny that they were capable of being acquainted with sense-data. Accordingly, I find it necessary to admit a

sense of acquaintance with, or direct apprehension of, sense-data that does not entail the making of any judgment about them.[20]

Subsequently, that object is determined by its attributes like the universal, etc., (*jātyādi*) and that too is perception.[21] Since Kumārila accepts determinate perception also as a form of perception, he uses the word 'that too' (*so'pī*) as a perception. It is obvious from this that these words have been addressed by Kumārila to his opponent, the Buddhist who does not admit determinate knowledge as a type of perception but accepts it only as *pratyakṣābhāsa*.

To sum up this part:

(i) Perception is defined in terms of immediacy by one group of philosophers and in terms of sense-contact by another group;

(ii) Buddhists define perception in terms of immediacy and Kumārila is inclined to define it in terms of sense-contact;

(iii) Two kinds of perception are generally admitted by Indian philosophers, namely, indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*); and the former precedes the latter.

(iv) For the Buddhists, indeterminate perception alone is valid; the Mīmāṁsakas admit both types of perception as valid and say that only when an object is determined in the form of a different object, it is invalid.

IV

CRITICISM OF THE IDEALISTIC VIEWS *(VIJÑĀNAVĀDA)*

We shall now deal with the criticism of the idealistic views of the Buddhists by the Mīmāṁsakas.

The Mīmāṁska is a confirmed realist as regards the things of the world. He believes in the independent existence of external objects. He maintains that the external objects become the content of consciousness in the process of knowing. In this respect, this view is opposed to the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra Buddhists. Although Kumārila's theory is opposed to Prābhākara and Nyāya realism also, yet the Bhāṭṭa polemic is mostly directed against the idealism of Yogācāra. Kumārila has developed his realism in his arguments with the Yogācāra or the Vijñānavādin.

Before descending into details we shall briefly point out the fundamental position of the four schools of Buddhism. These schools, although differ among themselves as regards epistemological issues, yet have some common metaphysical tenets which are questionable by the orthodox systems. One such tenet is the conception of reality as a perpetual flux. For the Buddhists, causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) is the criterion of reality. The real produces effects and that which produces effects is real. Real is subject to change and what is unchanged is not real. Therefore, everything that is real is momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Thus the doctrine of momentariness is the outcome of the Buddhist criterion of reality. All

real objects which appear to be stable are actually in ceaseless flux. The self is not an eternal unchanging entity but a continuous series of cognitions or ideas. As there is no permanent soul, it is the momentary cognition that cognizes itself (according to the Yogācāra) or an external object (according to the Vaibhāṣika). All the Buddhists uniformly eliminate the distinction between the cognition and the cognizing soul; they identify the cognizer with the cognition. So far the common tenets of the four schools.

As regards the objects of the external world, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas maintain that it is an aggregate of the four *bhūtas* or constituent elements, namely, earth, water, fire and air. Each of these constituent elements is momentary. The soul is a complex of five factors, namely, *rūpaskandha, vijñānaskandha, vedanāskandha, saṁjñāskandha,* and *saṁskāraskandha.* Of these, the *rūpaskandha* is an aggregate of the five constituent elements in the form of physical body and of the sense-organs. The *Vijñānaskandha* is the series of conscious states in the form 'I'. The precedent state of the series is known as *manas* or mind in this doctrine. *Vedanāskandha* constitutes the states of mind such as happiness, misery, etc. *Saṁjñāskandha* is determinate cognition. *Saṁskāraskandha* stands for the latent impression in the subsequent state in the series of conscious states. Both the external world and the soul are momentary and each continues as a series for any length of time. The cognition of identity of one member to be the same at a subsequent period of time is based upon similarity.

The Vaibhāṣika school considers that the objects are directly perceived. The Sautrāntika holds that in order that an object may be directly perceived what is necessary is that the object must be present at the time of perception. This implies the presence of the object at least for two moments. Since nothing lasts for more than a moment, it is admitted that the previous member of the series leaves its impression upon the subsequent in the series of conscious state (*vijñānaskandha*). The subsequent member in the series from the impression, it has, infers the prior existence of the object. Thus, while both the schools agree in the existence of the external reality, they differ from each other in the mode of cognizing the external objects.[22]

The Yogācāra school totally denies the existence of external objects. The external objects are only states and forms of series of momentary cognitions. Mention was made earlier that every cognition invariably refers to an object and every object is conceived of only on being known. This invariable appearance of knowledge and its object is called *sahopalaṁbha niyama.* The acceptance of this led to the idea that there is no object apart from the series of momentary cognitions. Since knowledge does not point to any external object, all experience is illusory.

It follows from the above that the Yogācāra totally dispenses with the knowing self and the world of knowable objects which are the presuppositions of cognition. He does not accept the need of a substratum for his 'cognition'. The formulation of such a theory runs quite contrary to common experience. Hence, Kumārila had to engage himself in the task of raising his voice against the views of Yogācāra. As a prelude to this, he had to primarily establish the independent reality of external objects. Without this, the relation between the cognizer and the cognized cannot be established. Since the Yogācāras reduce everything to cognition, there is no scope for speaking of a relation. Relation always presupposes two

relata. With this in view, Kumārila directed all his efforts towards the refutation of the Yogācāra doctrines. The Mādhyamika school denies the reality of the external world like the Yogācāra but unlike the latter it denies the reality of the soul too which is a series of conscious states. The process of denial of everything culminated in void or *śūnya* but *śūnya* as a principle is not admitted by them.[23]

Śabara in his *bhāṣya* and Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika* in two bulky sections entitled *Nirālaṁbanavāda* and *Śūnyavāda* have refuted the theories of the Idealists. We shall now explain the idealist views as presented by Kumārila and then put forth the latter's arguments against these views.

V

KUMĀRILA'S EXPOSITION OF THE YOGĀCĀRA POSITION

It is a matter of experience that objects are cognized as having a shape. That which is cognized and that which has a shape are not different. It is because there is no consciousness of their differentiating properties. Hence, the two must be treated as one only. Now there arises a question as to the exact nature of the cognized object with a shape. Is it an external object that is cognized or the cognition itself? If it is an external object, then we have to postulate a cognition to prove the existence of the object. It is so because it is only a cognition that serves as the proof for the existence of any object. If it is not so, any object, real or unreal, will come to possess existence. So the idealists (Yogācāra) conclude by saying that the Mīmāṁsakas have to postulate the existence of a cognition for the existence of an external object. He adds that the existence of such a cognition cannot be proved except through cognition. Thus the Mīmāṁsakas are forced to admit that cognition cognizes itself, because apart from the cognition there cannot be a cognizer. But it has been already pointed out that one object alone is cognized with a shape. On these grounds, it must be held that cognition alone is comprehended. And the postulation of an external object is not necessary as there is no proof for its existence. The notions of external and internal operate only in the sphere of duality. When duality has been rejected and cognition alone is accepted as real, the relative notions of external and internal are meaningless.[24]

The Mīmāṁsakas might say that the postulation of external objects is necessary in order to explain the diversity of cognitions. There arise cognitions of different shapes and this could be accounted for only if independent existence of objects is admitted.

The Yogācāras argue that the above contention of the Mīmāṁsakas would involve a number of difficulties viewed in the light of their own position. According to the Yogācāras, cognition in reality is pure, but it comes to appear in various shapes of blue, yellow, etc., due to the diverse impressions with which it is associated. Cognition gives rise to impression and impression in turn gives rise to cognition. The reciprocal causality of cognition and impression is beginningless like that of a seed and a sprout. Thus the Yogācāras assume only the reality of cognition and explain its diversity on the basis of the

assumption of a diversity of impressions. On the other hand, the Mīmāṁsakas have to assume cognition, impression and also an external object. When compared to this, the postulation of a cognition having different forms, is simpler than the postulation of external objects having different forms.

The Yogācāras further argue that by the law of parsimony the assumption of external objects becomes superfluous. It is thus: if the forms of cognition such as 'blue', etc., are not established, the cognition that is naturally pure cannot present particular objects. In the absence of difference in cognition, no difference in the cognized could be established. Again in the absence of such forms of cognition as 'blue', etc., all cognitions would be identical. Thus, in order to establish the objects of different shapes, cognition too must be admitted to have different shapes. The mere existence of cognition cannot ascertain the presence of an object, say, 'blue'. Therefore, 'blue', etc., which are apprehended, are forms of cognition and not of objects. The forms of objects are neither perceived directly nor does there exist any proof of their existence. As explained earlier, diversity of forms could well be explained by postulating impression.

Further the Yogācāras argue that if there is no identity between the cognition and the cognized as maintained by them, then the Mīmāṁsakas cannot satisfactorily explain cognisability. It is because, according to the Buddhists, manifestation is possible only when the form and the cognition are identical. If, however, the relation between the cognizer and the cognition is one of difference, as held by the Mīmāṁsakas, then there can be no cognisability. The Mīmāṁsakas hold the two to be different. And relation of identity is not possible between two different things. If the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that an object could be cognized even in the absence of a relation, then everything would be cognized by every cognition and it would result in omniscience. The Mīmāṁsakas might say that causality also is a relation like that of identity and it is the relation of causality that exists between the cognized object and the corresponding cognition, i.e. the external object is the cause of generating cognition. The Yogācāras answer by saying that causality cannot constitute cognisability, for in that case even the sense of sight, which causes a cognition, could be accepted as cognizable by the Mīmāṁsakas. The Mīmāṁsakas might argue that the sense of sight is not cognizable, because, though it is a cause of visual cognition, it is not capable of transferring its shape on cognition. It comes to this that causality, that is associated with the capacity to impart a form to cognition, alone constitutes cognisability. The Yogācāras are not convinced and so they retort by saying that there is no proof that an external object imparts its form to cognition. If this position is held to explain the variety of cognitions, it is unnecessary as the Mīmāṁsakas have already provided a simpler explanation. On these grounds, the Yogācāra concludes that there is no cognizable object other than cognition; no second cognition of a cognition; and cognition devoid of a cognizer and the cognized object shines forth by itself.[25]

The Yogācāras advance another argument by saying that if the form belongs to an external object and not to cognition, then there would be a difference between the object and the cognition and the latter cannot manifest the former. Since form and cognition are identical, for the Yogācāras manifestation is possible. Even the Mīmāṁsakas must subscribe to the view that the form that is cognized belongs only to cognition and not to

objects. It is because even the Mīmāṁsakas hold cognition as the manifesting factor of external objects which are devoid of self-luminosity. Objects are not self-manifest because they may exist by being unknown. The object, that is to be known, can be known only after the cognition is known. The latter, like a lamp, manifests the object and also manifests itself. An external object cannot be apprehended if the apprehension itself is not apprehended.[26] Therefore, says the Mīmāṁsaka that a cognition must be apprehended as soon as it arises. Being self luminous, it does not stand in need of another cognition to manifest it. If it is said that the first cognition requires another cognition, then the second cognition would depend on a third one and so on *ad infinitum*.

Further, in the cases of the objects that are recollected, only the cognition has a form and not the object, because, object which is not present then, cannot impart its form to the cognition as held by the Mīmāṁsakas. In the case of the present objects, we have the verbal usages 'This object is blue because I have a cognition of that form'. This clearly shows that it is only after the apprehension of cognition that objects are apprehended. When it is thus known that a cognition is apprehended, it ensues as a matter of course that the apprehended form belongs only to the cognition, as the apprehension of a thing devoid of form is not possible. There cannot also be two forms one belonging to cognition and another to the external objects, but one only and that belongs to cognition. On these grounds, the Yogācāras affirm that an external object is not at all cognized and hence it is non-existent. So far the Yogācāra's views.

To sum up the idealistic views:

(i) cognition is both the cognizer and the cognized;
(ii) the variety of forms is consistent with cognition and not with objects;
(iii) cognisability is possible only on the basis of the relation of identity between the cognition and the cognized;
(iv) law of parsimony is against the assumption of external objects (realism) but favours idealism;
(v) external object is not cognized at all and hence it is non-existent.

VI

KUMĀRILA'S REFUTATION OF THE IDEALISTIC VIEWS (*VIJÑĀNAVĀDA*)

In the first place the idealist view of the identity of the cognizer and the cognized is impossible. It is thus: if cognition is identical with the cognizer and the cognized, this identity must refer to action and accusative (or) instrumental and accusative (or) nominative and accusative. It is always found that the nominative, the accusative, the instrumental are all distinct from one another. For instance, the act of cooking does not cook itself or cutting does not cut itself. Since these kinds of identities are not noticed anywhere, the case of cognition, cognizing itself cannot be proved.

If the idealist says that the self-revealing nature of cognition is intended to be conveyed by the identity of the cognizer and the cognized, then also it must refer to a person to whom

it is revealed. Other than the momentary cognition, the Buddhist does not recognize a self. Thus, if the momentary cognition reveals itself to itself, it must take the form as 'I am blue' instead of 'this is blue'. However, cognition is always known to refer to object as 'this' which is other than itself. In other words, the functioning of cognition is directed outwards and not inwards as the idealists hold. Hence the identity of the cognizer and the cognized would not hold good.[27]

The idealist may point to 'fire' as an example in support of his theory. But this is not correct, says Kumārila. Fire, which is of the nature of light, does not require another factor to illumine, no doubt. But illumination and cognition are not equal. The light that illuminates itself does not cognize itself, because it could only be cognized by a person through the functioning of his sense-organ, say, sense of sight which illumines. Similarly, the sense of sight also is cognized by a distinct cognition called presumption (*arthāpatti*). In the same way, cognition also is not revealed directly but through another cognition. We shall explain this a little later. From the above, it would be clear that fire, being a means of manifesting the objects at night, can be referred to as cognizer (in the sense of the instrumental) with reference to the objects, but with reference to the fire, the sense of sight is the cognizer and with reference to a cognition a subsequent cognition is the cognizer. In all these instances, it can be noticed that there is no identity of the cognizer and the cognized. Therefore, the object of cognition, its means and one who cognizes, viz., the self, are all distinct from one another.

The identity of the cognition and the cognized cannot be admitted for another reason. If they are identical, the consciousness of any one of these would bring about the consciousness of two forms which is never seen. When the form of the cognized object is apprehended, the form of the cognition is not apprehended and vice-versa. Sometimes it is seen that the previous cognition is remembered but the object that was cognized is forgotten. Thus, the absence of concomitance of the cognition and the object clearly proves the distinction between the cognition and the cognized.[28]

Even in the case of the self, there is no identity of the nominative with the accusative. The self is its own cognizer and there is no second cognizer no doubt, but this case is not parallel to that of the cognition. The latter, according to the idealist, is indivisible and does not admit of any distinction. The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, admit some difference in the self in the form of a property, namely, cognition, and in the form of a substance. Even maintaining its unitary character, the self still possesses dual forms. When there arises sense-contact with the object, there arises in the self the property of cognition. The latter is different from the self. As possessing this property, the self is the cognizer. In the form of a substance which it shares with other substances like earth, etc., it is the cognized. But the Buddhist does not admit such a form of duality as that of substance and property in cognition. The Buddhists might argue that even the Mīmāṁsakas do not seem to admit absolute difference while denying identity between the cognizer and the cognized. The Mīmāṁsakas answer by saying that it is not possible to have total difference in such cases because even in the case of fire and jar, which are manifester and the manifested, an identity between them in the form of substances is admitted, although they are different. What the Mīmāṁsakas want to emphasise is that some difference is desirable between the

manifester and the manifested, but it is not needed in the case of the self. In other words, difference between the manifester and the manifested here is only a sufficient condition but not necessary condition.

Anticipating an objection from the Buddhists that if the functioning of cognition is always directed outwards, how could the Mīmāṁsakas explain ego-consciousness in the form of 'I', Śabara says that in 'I'-consciousness' the cognition is directed inwards. Here the property of cognition by itself is not the cognizer. It is the self qualified by the property of cognition that is the cognizer and the notion of 'I' does not refer to cognition alone but to the self qualified by cognition. Here though the cognized substance and the cognizing property of the self are different, yet the two are basically one. Since the I-notion points to this basic unity of the nominative and accusative of 'I know' the inward functioning in ego-cognition would not present any difficulty in the Mīmāṁsaka view. In self-consciousness, the 'I' refers to the nominative of cognition and it is explicitly different from object-consciousness in which the object is referred to as 'this'. The Buddhists cannot explain this. In the ego-consciousness, the agent of cognition alone is revealed but not the cognition. In the cognition 'this is blue', the accusative of cognition is revealed but not anything else. Since the Buddhists cannot satisfactorily explain any of these, cognition cannot be considered as self-luminous, as held by them.

The Buddhists might say that the self-luminous nature of cognition is inferred from reflective cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). Subsequent to the cognition of an object, say, pot as 'This is pot', we have the reflective cognition of the form 'I know the pot'. This reflective cognition cannot be had of anything that was not experienced. If the primary cognition is not admitted to be self-manifesting, then the subsequent reflective cognition will only be of the form 'This is pot' and not 'I know the pot'. And any number of reflective cognitions, that would follow it, will all be alike and there would be no difference among such cognitions. Contrarily, we do find a difference in such cognitions, for example, among 'I know the pot', 'I know that I know the pot' and so on. Here in the reflective cognition of the form 'I know that I know the pot', the form of pot, the form of its primary cognition and the form of the first reflective cognition are remembered. Thus the first reflective cognition proves that the primary cognition of the pot revealed itself simultaneously with the pot[29] and the second reflective cognition proves that while recollecting the pot and the primary cognition, the first reflected cognition revealed itself too.

Kumārila criticizes the above view as follows: there is no accumulation of forms in successive reflective cognition. Only one form is revealed in all the so-called reflective cognitions. The subsequent cognitions, as conceived by the Buddhists, are as primary as the cognition of pot in the form 'this is pot'. Their only difference from the latter is that they are appropriated by the self. Moreover, there is no invariable rule that reflective cognitions necessarily succeed object cognitions. Only where there is the desire to know the cause of object-consciousness, there arises a reflective cognition. Wherever there arises the cognition of an object and when this cognizedness of the object is to be conveyed, this corresponding cognition is known through *arthāpattipramāṇa* and thus we have the consciousness as 'I know pot'. It must be noted that this cognition is different from the object—pot, and has no form.

The Buddhists might object that if cognition has no form, then the verbal usages such as 'the object is blue because I have a cognition of that form' would not become intelligible. Sucarita Miśra in his commentary *Kāśikā* on the *Ślokavārttika,* says that such verbal usages do not prove that cognition has some form. It is because 'Blue', 'Yellow', etc., are only forms of objects but the cognition is neither blue nor yellow. Hence cognition has no form. Moreover, if cognition had a form, it then would not be described in terms of the forms of objects.[30] It comes to this that although cognitions are devoid of any form, yet the difference in cognitions is known by the difference in the cognized objects. As such, there is no need for postulating a form for cognition.[31] Whether it has form or not, cognition anyway cannot be self-revealing in nature. If the Buddhists contend that the self-revealing nature of cognition is inferred from the reflective cognition, then he is contradicting his own position. If cognition could cognize (perceive) itself, then recourse to inference is irrational. Furthermore, it is only on the basis of the independent existence of external objects that cognition has been classified into perception and inference. Those which are directly known are perceptual in nature and those that are indirectly known are considered to be inferential. When the Buddhist questions the very existence of external objects, the division of cognition into perception and inference is baseless. Hence, they cannot resort to inference to prove the self-revealing nature of cognition.[32]

The Buddhists might say that there is no need for an external object in the form of that which is apprehended, because cognition itself has two parts, one apprehending the other. This means that while being different as apprehending and the apprehended parts, they are also identical in the form of cognition. Thus, by accepting both identity as well as difference, the Buddhists have given up their own theory of absolute identity and have embraced identity-cum-difference.[33]

Some Buddhists (*Vaibhāṣikas*) deny the existence of an object external to cognition and hence they say that a cognition apprehends another cognition antecedent to it. Hence, in the cognition 'this is blue', this refers to the antecedent cognition and not to an external object. This view is not correct. The apprehender and the apprehended—both these cannot be cognitions, since they do not share the common feature of 'cognition-ness' in them. Cognition-ness is a universal and according to the Buddhists a universal is only the negation of opposites and is called *apoha.* We shall deal with the criticism of this concept by the Mīmāṁsakas later. Since cognition is the only reality, its opposite, namely, non-cognition cannot be real and hence its negation cannot be conceived and the universal 'cognition-ness' also is inconceivable. So cognition-ness can belong not to both, the apprehender and the apprehended, but to only one of them.

Further, an antecedent and a subsequent cognition cannot stand in the relation of apprehender and apprehended because, according to the Buddhists, cognitions are momentary and when the subsequent cognition appears the antecedent one would have been destroyed, so that it cannot be the object of the subsequent cognition. Thus, when a past cognition cannot be the object of a present one, it must be an external entity which is the object of the present cognition. If, however, the two cognitions are simultaneous, then also their relation cannot be explained because the cognized object is supposed to be the cause of cognition and causality implies sequence and dependence whereas these cognitions are simultaneous and independent.[34]

If the Mīmāṁsakas have to explain the causal relation between the cognitive act and the cognized objects, then Pārthasārathi Miśra says that for the Mīmāṁsakas the apprehending cognition is the cause and the apprehended object is the effect.

The Buddhists might offer a convincing explanation that the antecedent cognition will be the object of a subsequent one by imparting its impression or *vāsanā* to the latter so that the latter would become its effect. This is also not favoured by the Mīmāṁsakas because an antecedent cognition gets destroyed as soon as it arises and as such it cannot leave any impression (*niranvayavināśa*) so as to be passed on to its succeeding cognition. If the antecedent cognition gets destroyed along with the impression, the object then will be one that is related to the past as in the case of recollection and it cannot be treated as perceptual. Further, *vāsanā* or impression cannot be satisfactorily explained by the Buddhists who hold cognition as the only reality and as momentary. As such, *vāsanā* cannot have cognition as its substratum because the past and future cognitions do not exist now and the present also would be destroyed soon after its origination. The Buddhists might say that even the past objects may appear as present ones, in perception as in dream. The Mīmāṁsakas reply to this by saying that in dream, the past objects do appear as present no doubt, but the dream objects are sublated when one wakes up, and hence treated as illusory whereas the objects of waking are not treated to be so. On these grounds, an object of the past is not considered to be the object of the present perception.

Secondly, the Buddhists have propounded the view that variety of forms cannot belong to a single object and hence the cognized form necessarily belongs to the cognition. This contention is wrong. The Buddhists have cited the woman who possesses three forms, viz., that of a corpse, of a beautiful maid and a lump of flesh. But these forms are recognized by three different persons in three different ways. That is, an ascetic recognizes her in the first form as he has transcended all forms of enjoyment, the man of lust identifies her in the second aspect and an animal that eats flesh looks at her as a lump of flesh. Thus, it may be seen that one and the same object possesses various forms but all of them are not cognized by everyone at once. In accordance with one's modes of thought and interests the form that is perceived is determined. However lustful a person may be, he would not see a jar as a beautiful maid. However hungry may a dog be, it would not perceive a stone as a lump of flesh. Hence, it may be known that there is no incompatibility of multiple forms with that of the unity of object.

In the same way, the length and shortness in one and the same object at the same time can also be explained in relation with other objects. There would arise contradiction only if one and the same object could be conceived as possessing two different forms at the same time without any relation to any object. Experience allows us to admit one or more forms in a single object and there is no rule that an object must possess only one form. A jar may be known as a substance made of clay at one time and at other times it may be recollected as being a pot—a specific name given to it. All these go to prove beyond doubt that the cognized form belongs only to the external object and not to cognition.[35]

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* makes the following criticisms against the above view of the Buddhists. While apprehending absence of cognition (*ajñāna*), absence is cognized. Here absence of cognition cannot be a form of cognition, as they are mutually

exclusive. Likewise, in the cases of recognitions such as 'this is the same object' there is reference to an enduring entity whereas cognition is momentary. A cognition, which is momentary, cannot be of the form of an enduring entity. In the same way, if the form belongs to cognition, a group cognition, wherein more than one form is cognized in different objects, cannot be had. It is so because cognition cannot have more than one form. On these bases, it must be concluded that these are not forms of cognition but of something else different from cognition. Further, the Buddhists deny external objects on the ground that the cognizer and the cognized are identical while external objects are illusory. But the very fact that some one makes such an assertion about the non-existence of external object, stands as a proof for the external object. It is so because negation always precedes the knowledge of what is negated. Thus, the knowledge of external objects remains in one's mind before they are negated. Hence, prior to negation, there is the knowledge of the external object. And what is primarily known cannot be negated by any *pramāṇa*.[36]

Thirdly, the Buddhist claims validity for his views on the basis of the law of simplicity. He is of the view that since his theory is against the existence of external reality that is needlessly presumed by the Mīmāṁsakas, it is simple. The Mīmāṁsakas answer this by saying that the external object is not presumed as understood by the Buddhists, on the other hand, it is directly experienced. For the Buddhists since cognition and the object are simultaneously apprehended, there is no need for an external world. But the Mīmāṁsakas do not favour this and they say that there is no simultaneity of cognition and the cognized. While the object is directly apprehended cognition is not at all apprehended. But its existence is presumed subsequently through presumption (*arthāpatti*). A cognition appears first but it is not apprehended first. Hence the law of simultaneous apprehension would not operate here. Further, in order that the object may be apprehended, it is not necessary that the means must be apprehended first, because the latter may not be apprehended due to the absence of a *pramāṇa* to apprehend it. In the case of sense of sight which is a means to see the external objects, we notice that the sense of sight remains unknown by any other means. Cognition reveals an external object but cannot manifest itself.

The Buddhists might say that if cognition is not cognized along with the object, then the reflective cognition of the form 'I know the pot' cannot be explained. The Mīmāṁsakas consistently give the answer that in a reflective cognition what is known is the object and not the cognition. The cognition, however, is known only through *arthāpatti pramāṇa*. The verbal cognition of the form 'The object is blue because my cognition appears in that form' does not prove that prior to the object the cognition is known. In this case, one who cognizes a blue object but is doubtful about it, ascertains himself on the basis of the cognition he had.[37]

Fourthly, the Buddhists have said that cognizability consists in the identity between the cognizer and the cognized. Kumārila says that there cannot be identity between the two but it is the relation of *viṣayatā* that exists between them. The commentaries *Kāśikā* and *Nyāyaratnākara* on the *Ślokavārttika* explain this relation as *viṣayaviṣayibhāva*. *Viṣayatā* is severally interpreted as the object bearing the result of the cognitive act, as a unique type of causal relation, or a unique type of relation (*svarūpasaṁbandha*). Cognition has a cause, namely, sense object contact. The object, when in contact with a sense-organ, becomes the

cause of the manifestedness of the object. Thus an object produces a cognition and the cognition in turn produces cognizedness in the object. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas are obliged to hold this view of a unique relation of reciprocal causality between the cognition and the object, because the criticism of Yogācāras against the causal theory of the Sautrāntikas which fails to explain the presented character of the object of perception is an indirect attack on Śabara too. He recognizes a causal relation between an external object (say) cloth and the corresponding cognition. It was to save Śabara from the criticism of Buddhism that Kumārila explained this kind of relation. According to this view, the cognition is produced by an external object. The object appears to belong to the present time because cognizedness, which is produced by cognition in it, belongs to the present time. Although the object is the cause of cognition, yet in the process of cognizing, this relationship is inverted and the cognition becomes the cause of producing the state of cognizedness in the object.

Now a question may be asked that if 'cognizedness' is produced, just as 'cookedness' is produced in rice by the act of cooking, then just as 'cookedness' is perceived by others, cognizedness also must be visible to others. It is answered by the author of the commentary on *Ślokavārttika* that just as a person who engages himself in activity alone reaches another place and not others, in the same way, cognizedness is known only to that person in whom cognition is produced and not to others.[38]

As to the question how cognizedness could be produced in a past or future object by the present act of cognition, Pārthasārathi Miśra says that just as there is comprehension of the numerical quality of 'tenness' referring to the days that have elapsed, in the same way, on the strength of experience, manifestedness is admitted to arise in objects that either existed in the past or would exist in future.[39]

The Buddhists have stated that external object is not at all cognized and hence it is non-existent. In the context of criticizing the validity of sense perception formulated by Śabara in his *bhāṣya,* the Buddhists say that cognition is without a substratum in the external world. Just as the dream cognitions are without any real objective substratum, similarly waking cognitions in the form of a pillar, a wall, etc., also must be without a real substratum.[40] The implication of this is that if there is no real object in the external world, there can be no contact of the sense-organs with an object of perception and hence no perception could fulfil the essential condition laid down in the definition of sense perception. The result of this argument is that cognitions in their very nature are wrong or mere illusions and an analysis of the means of cognition is unnecessary.

It might be objected that the cognition of the pillar that one has during the dream state is determinate in nature and hence it cannot be wrong. The Mīmāṁsakas maintain that falsity of cognition rests purely upon the nature of its instruments. That is, when there is a defective instrument, then cognition becomes false. The Yogācāras, however, argue that it is chiefly because cognitions are devoid of a real external object, there can be no real contact between the sense-organ and the object. And this results in the absence of any valid perception which is defined by the Mīmāṁsakas as being brought by sense-object contact. Pārthasārathi Miśra puts it in the form of an inferential argument which is as follows:

> All waking cognitions are devoid of external objects, because they are cognitions like the cognitions in a dream.[41]

Kumārila points out several logical fallacies in this inferential argument in the *Nirālaṁbanavāda* section of the *Vārttika* and puts forward a counter-argument as follows:

> The cognition of external objects in the waking state is valid, because it is not contradicted by the subsequent experience like the cognition of falsehood in dreams.[42]

It comes to this that the Buddhists assert that cognitions are to be considered as false not only because they are brought about by means of defective instruments but mainly they are devoid of a real external object.

The Mīmāṁsakas are of the view that the dream analogy is plainly a false one. Dreams are quite unlike the waking and sensory experience. What exactly is the difference between the two? Śabara in his *bhāṣya* states that it is the sublatability and non-sublatability of dreams and sensory experience respectively. Dreams are sublated on waking up. The objects and events of the dream are known to be false on awakening. But the objects and events of our waking experience are never known to be contradicted.

The Buddhists might argue that sublation would follow in the case of the waking cognition also as in the dream cognitions. Śabara argues that this contention of the Buddhists would hold good only if the falsity of the dream cognition were due to the fact that it cognizes, i.e. apprehends, then since waking cognition also is a cognition in the same sense it would also be treated false. However, the falsity of the dream cognition is inferred from other reasons such as the fact of its being sublated by a contrary cognition. For instance, dream appears only when one is sleepy (has *nidrā*) and when the mind is not quite alert, just before the deep sleep state. When one wakes up from sleep and when the mind is quite alert, there is no reason why the cognition during this state should be false. When there is some defect in the cognitive process and organs, cognition tends to be false even in the waking state; but when there is such a defect, it becomes detected sooner or later and the cognition is declared to be false.

It follows from the above that the Buddhist cannot deny the truth of the above mentioned counter-argument put forward by Kumārila against the Buddhist's argument to prove the non-reality of external objects. If he does so, then he might have to admit the validity of dream-cognition. In this process, he will contradict his own view that all cognitions are false. Thus Kumārila concludes that inference cannot prove the non-existence of external objects. And in the process of giving a counter-argument to his opponent, the Buddhist admits the existence of the realist whom he cognizes as external to him. This is against the Buddhist's view that all cognitions apprehend themselves and not any external object.[43] Kumārila adds that even scriptural authority proves the reality of external objects. Religious instruction is impossible without a teacher and a pupil who are independently real. If the external objects are non-real, no one would strive after liberation. Neither *upamāna* nor *arthāpatti* could prove the non-reality of external objects. *Anupalabdhi* proves only the reality of the external world by negating subjective idealism. The idealist

view that even if there is an external object it is only an aggregate of atoms and hence cannot be perceived, is wrong. Kumārila thus shows that none of the means of cognition could prove the non-reality of external objects. We shall explain the views of Buddhists as regards the constitution of an object and its criticism later.

There are some more arguments advanced by the Mīmāṁsakas against the Buddhistic contention of the non-reality of external objects. These are as follows:

The Buddhists have said that cognition and the object are identical in form. Śabara states that even if they were identical in form, the object, which is actually perceived, cannot be denied its existence but it is only the cognition whose separate existence can be denied. In reality, cognition and object are not identical in form because when the cognition is inferred from the fact of the object being cognized *(pratyayatvāt),* Śabara says that we infer it without a form, whereas when the object is directly perceived it is perceived with a form.[44]

It emerges from the above that cognition has its substratum in the object and thus the existence of external objects is proved. Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* endorses this viewpoint by saying:

"Is *vijñāna* an object of perception or inference? If regarded as an object of perception, supposing that no perceptual cognition of a formless thing is possible and that only one form is cognized (by *jñāna*), it comes to this that the perceived form is *jñāna* only. Hence, the object not being given in perception, will be non-existent only (i.e., the object perceived is illusory). If, on the other hand, vijñāna is an object of inference, as in the Bhāṭṭa school, seeing that inference is impossible without an external object being posited (i.e., a liṅga), the reality of the existence of external objects is proved (beyond doubt).[45]

Since the Mīmāṁsakas have criticized the Buddhistic view that there is no simultaneity between the cognition of the object and the cognition of cognition itself, it now remains to be explained how the object and the cognition are known according to the Mīmāṁsakas.

The Mīmāṁsakas maintain that the factor that comprehends the primary cognition, comprehends its validity also. According to the Bhāṭṭa school, cognition transcends the sense-organs. Hence the cognition of a pot, which arises from the contact of sense of sight, does not become the object of another cognition. The cognition of the pot gives rise to a peculiar quality called knownness (*jñātatā*) in the object. This quality is immediately apprehended. On the basis of this immediate apprehension of knownness, the existence of the cognition of pot is inferred. It is this inferential knowledge that cognizes the primary cognition and also the validity of it.[46]

To sum up Kumārila's refutation of Yogācāra's Idealism:

(i) cognition cannot be both the cognizer and the cognized;

(ii) the variety of forms is quite consistent with the unity of an object and not with cognition;

(iii) cognizability consists in the relation between the cognition and the cognized and the relation is one of *viṣayaviṣayibhāva;*

(iv) the law of parsimony and the law of simultaneous apprehension do not favour idealism;

(v) a cognition cannot apprehend either a part of itself or another cognition antecedent to or simultaneous with it;
(vi) there is no means to prove the non-real nature of the external objects.

VII

MĪMĀṀSAKA THEORY OF AVAYAVIN

While discussing about the two kinds of perception we mentioned that as against the Buddhist's view Kumārila accepts determinate perception as that which apprehends objects as qualified by attributes, relations etc., in the forms such as 'this is blue' 'this is a red pot', etc. What does the word 'this' convey in such cognitions? Kumārila says that the word 'this', which is manifested as possessing some attribute like colour, etc., is called a substance. Nārāyaṇa in his *Mānameyodaya* defines a substance as the substratum of measure.[47] Kumārila, however, is of the view that generic and specific properties are also attributed to a substance. The conception of substance is one of the basic tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also. The two realistic schools, viz., the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accept the difference between substance and its properties, but the Buddhists deny it by saying that only *dharmas* which are momentary point-instants, are real. The existence of a permanent substratum is opposed to the Buddhist theory of *kṣaṇabhaṅga.*

The Buddhist holds that a substance does not exist as separate from qualities which alone are presented to us by our senses. A substance, according to him, is nothing but an aggregate of colour, taste, touch, etc., just as a forest is nothing but an aggregate of trees. Almost all the important works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, including *Nyāya-Vārttika, Nyāya-Vārttikatātparyaṭīkā, Nyāyakandalī, Nyāyamañjarī*[48] discuss this topic. Kumārila and Pārthasārathi maintain that a substance is apprehended through the sense of sight and touch, prior to the apprehension of attributes. Closely allied to this topic is the discussion regarding the doctrine of *avayavin* (whole) emerging as an effect from its cause (parts).

According to the Mīmāṁsakas a substance is a whole (*avayavin*) composed of parts (*avayava*). It is a spatial unity of parts which are many. Now there are some important questions as to how the parts are unified into one whole. What exactly is the relation between the whole and its parts? Is the whole different from its parts or identical with them?

The Buddhist says that a whole does not really exist. It is only the aggregate of atoms that is illusorily perceived as a whole and there does not exist any whole apart from the parts. A forest is wrongly seen as a whole, while there exists a number of trees actually.

Kumārila points out that the analogy of forest does not hold good, because due to defect in the sense-organ or distance there arises contradicting notion, but the perception of each tree as a whole cannot be treated as erroneous. While refuting the theory of wholes and parts in the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist puts forth an argument that a substance, (say) pot, is not a whole originated over and above the potsherds through the relation of *samavāya* but is only an aggregate of atoms. As for the Naiyāyika's question that

since the atoms are imperceptible, pot, which is an aggregate of atoms, also would be imperceptible, the Buddhist answers by saying that although one single hair is not perceptible from a distance, yet a mass of hair becomes perceptible. Likewise, says the Buddhist, although one atom is imperceptible, yet a collection of atoms would be perceptible.[49] Thus pot, which is an aggregate of atoms also would be perceptible. However, the Naiyāyikas do not accept this view.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is absolute difference between the whole and parts and they are related through the relation known as inherence (*samavāya*). A whole inheres in its parts and the qualities of parts are the cause of the qualities in the whole. The Bhāṭṭa school maintains the relation of identity-cum-difference between the parts and the whole. Cloth is a whole existing in threads. Cloth is not apprehended as distinct from threads. At the same time difference between cloth and threads also is manifested insofar as parts, such as threads, are seen as belonging to a whole. Thus, experience reveals identity as well as difference between the parts and the whole.[50]

It comes to this that, according to the Buddhists, substance has no separate existence, different from the attributes of a thing. And a substance is not a whole which resides in its parts. But it is only an aggregate of atoms. Mīmāṁsakas consider a substance as different from qualities, and it is a whole composed of parts.

We shall now pass on to the concept of *kṣaṇabhaṅga* of the Buddhists and its criticism by the Mīmāṁsakas.

VIII

KṢAṆABHAṄGAVĀDA—(DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS)

The theory of flux or *kṣaṇabhaṅga* is the key concept of the Buddhist philosophy. The Buddhist supposes that what is given in perception is the instantaneous present.[51] Buddha himself seems to have taught only the impermanence of things excepting perhaps mind, but soon through the force of its inherent logic this doctrine came to be treated as one of the momentary disintegration of all things. The schools of Buddhism, despite holding different views on issues related to epistemology and metaphysics, have a common doctrine, viz., 'all things are momentary' (*sarvaṁ kṣaṇikam* or *sarvam anityam*). But, due to certain logical absurdities, it could not win followers outside the Buddhist school. The schools of realism, viz., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* advocate a diagonally opposite view of permanence or the non-transitory nature of things. Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Pārthasārathi Miśra and Śālikanātha have critically examined and finally rejected this doctrine. We shall now explain this doctrine and also summarize the arguments put forth by the Mīmāṁsakas in opposition.

According to Vasubandhu, a moment consists in the nature of an entity which gets destroyed soon after its existence. The entity which is of such a nature is said to be *kṣaṇika* or momentary.[52] Kumārila in his *Ślokavārttika*, while reviewing this doctrine, refers to this definition and also uses the expression *utpanna vinaṣṭatvāt* to refer to an object that is momentary.[53]

Now, there arises a doubt regarding the proof to maintain that all existents are momentary. Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā*[54] and Śālikanātha in the *Jīvarakṣā*[55] section of his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, raise this objection and discuss this topic at length. They say that the scope of perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) lies in revealing the existence of an object during its own time and does not negate its existence at another time. Hence perception cannot prove the momentary nature of objects. However, the Buddhists cite inference as a *pramāṇa* which has *svabhāva* as its *hetu*. It may be fully expressed as *svabhāvahetukavyāptiyuktaliṅgakam*. This serves as a ground to prove momentariness in all objects. Momentariness is one which always co-exists with *sattā* or existence. Thus we have the invariable rule 'whatever exists is momentary' (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*).[56]

It remains now to define the term 'existence' according to the Buddhists, as it serves as the inferential mark (*hetu*) for proving momentariness. We shall explain this in some detail.

Before explaining the exact nature of an existent or real thing, according to the Buddhists, we may refer to a few things related to this topic. The Buddhists advance several arguments to prove the momentary nature of reality, the foremost one being based on the law of contradiction. According to it, one and the same entity cannot be the substratum of contradicting features at the same time. For example, an entity cannot be hot and cold at once. Whenever there are two contradictory features, there would exist two different objects to which the two features belong. When an object exists at one point of space at the same time it cannot exist at another point of space. Therefore, it is known that existence at two points of space belong only to two different things. In the same way, with regard to time also existence at one moment implies non-existence at any other moment. For instance, if an entity exists at a moment (A) it cannot also exist at the moment (B). All reality, therefore, is momentary by its very nature. However, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsakas, there is no contradiction if an entity existing at one moment continues to exist at a subsequent moment also. This difference between the Buddhists and the realists is based upon the conception of reality by them. To a realist, reality means to be endowed with the universal called existence (*sattā*). To the Buddhist, an existent or real entity is that which is capable of efficient action.[57] Thus, causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) is the criterion of reality for the Buddhists. For them, being and doing are identical. In other words, the existence of an entity is identical with its causality. This follows from the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness or the latter is based upon its conception of existence as identical with causality.

Thus, according to the Buddhist, an enduring entity cannot be existent because it cannot produce anything. He further explains that efficient action, which characterizes an existent entity, can be produced only in two ways, either in succession or simultaneously. Both these alternatives are not possible if the reality or existence is admitted to have a permanent or enduring nature. If an enduring object is capable of producing an action, it must produce it at once but not in succession. It is because a capable cause cannot brook any delay. If, however, it is incapable of producing the effect, it would not do so even in future as inefficacy would exist in it at all time. From the above, it emerges that an enduring cause cannot also produce an effect in successive stages.[58]

The Mīmāṁsakas might argue that a cause, although permanent, does not produce its effect at once as it stands in need of certain auxiliaries (*sahakāri*). The auxiliaries would appear only in successive stages. For instance, a seed does not produce a sprout at once but waits for the auxiliaries such as soil, water, light, etc. These are provided to the seed only in successive stages. The result of this argument is that even permanent entities do have causal efficiency but they produce effects in successive stages.[59]

The Buddhist objects by asking that whether the auxiliaries impart any excellence (*atiśaya*) in the cause or not. If the effect is produced due to this excellence added to the cause which is a permanent entity, then the latter would cease to be a cause as it is different from the element of excellence added to it. If, however, the excellence produced by the auxiliaries is identical with the cause, then it means that the cause remains the same as before and it could have produced the effect at the very first moment of its existence. It might be said that the cause devoid of any excellence disappears and due to the presence of auxiliaries a cause possessing the excellence has come in its place. This means that the previous object is destroyed and a new one has taken its place. The Buddhists assert that this is precisely the doctrine of momentariness. It would have become clear from the above that an enduring entity cannot be existent (*sattā*) but only what is momentary co-exists with *sattā* or existence.[60]

Another reason for momentary existence of objects is the inevitable nature (*dhruvabhāvitva*) of destruction. All material objects are effect substances; they have been produced from their causes and hence they are all subject to destruction. This destruction does not stand in need of any extraneous cause just as heat, which is natural to fire, does not require any extraneous cause for its being hot. Similarly, since destruction is natural, it does not stand in need of any extraneous cause. Now there arises a question whether the objects of the world arise as associated with destructible nature or indestructible nature. If the latter is maintained, they will never be destroyed and thus they will be eternal. But, this is opposed to experience and hence they are admitted to arise as associated with destructible nature. Destruction, being their nature, must take place as soon as they are born. Hence they do not require any extraneous factor for its accomplishment. This argument of the Buddhists is summarized by Jayanta thus:

> If an existent object is of destructible nature, it does not require any cause for its destruction. If, on the other hand, it is of indestructible nature, even then it does not require any cause for its destruction.[61]

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā*[62] and Śālikanātha in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*[63] explain the position of Buddhists in a similar manner. It follows from the above that as soon as an object is produced it is also destroyed and hence the momentary nature of things is established.

The Buddhists further add by saying that destruction, which takes place at every moment, is not apprehended due to its subtlety. Pot, for example, undergoes destruction every moment. The object 'pot' of the previous moment is totally different from the pot of the succeeding moment. Yet, this difference is not noticed by us due to the similarity which the pot of the succeeding moment possesses with that of the pot of the previous moment.

As a result of this, there arises the mistaken notion of identity in the pot as associated with different moments till it is destroyed into pieces. While in reality pot gets destroyed every moment, people wrongly think that it is destroyed only when given a blow. Since there can be no cause for destruction, blow cannot be considered as the cause. Blow here only is the cause of a new series called potsherd (*kapālasantāna*) as the pot-series (*ghaṭasantāna*) has come to an end by the blow. But when people actually perceive a distinct series of potsherd after the pot is broken with the stick they attribute the causality of destruction to the stick. In fact, nothing serves as a cause of destruction. Destruction, which owes its origin to a different cause, cannot be identical with the object as there is difference in their causes. And if it were different from the object, then even if destruction occurs, the object would be perceptible as before like when a cloth is produced a pot which is different from it is apprehended as before. On these grounds, it is conclusively proved by the Buddhists that destruction is inherent in the nature of things and is not caused. Experience also favours this view of the Buddhists. It is commonly experienced that objects like pot, etc., although preserved with care, get destroyed after a point of time even without a blow given by a stick. This destruction cannot certainly be well accounted for, unless we admit a gradual decay of the objects ever since they were produced. That is why we also have the usages such as 'this object is old'. From the foregoing account it is evident that an object of a particular moment is totally different from the objects of other moments and no object endures for more than a moment. How then are we to account for the recognition of identity? The Buddhists answer that this is only false as that of the identity in the flame of a lamp. Although the light changes every moment, it appears to be the same due to similarity.[64]

To sum up the whole discussion: according to the Buddhists all apparently enduring things are only momentary.

IX

REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS BY THE MĪMĀṀSAKAS

So far we have summarized the views of the Buddhists with regard to the doctrine of momentariness. We have stated that perception is not capable of standing as a proof to establish their doctrine of momentariness. As a next option, they have shown inference as a proof. The Mīmāṁsakas point out that the premises on the basis of which the Buddhist bases his conclusions are all fallacious.

In the first place, their assertion that existence is identical with causal efficiency does not stand to reason. The latter is only a property of existence. That is, an object that exists possesses causal efficiency. Moreover, every existent object need not be causally operative. It may exist even without producing anything. That is, being is not identical with doing. Further, all existent entities need not be the causes of their respective cognitions too. Even admitting so, only objects which are immediately present could possess causality. In a mediate knowledge, like inference, etc., the object of knowledge does not become the

cause of knowledge. If, however, the Buddhists attribute causality to all existing objects with regard to their knowledge, then the causal efficiency would get exhausted by this process, and the entire universe would become a void in the next moment. It is because the Buddhists do not accept successive production of effects.[65]

An object cannot produce its effects in successive stages is the second premise given by the Buddhists. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that it is indeed true that an object should have auxiliaries to produce the effect and it would wait till it gets associated with them, to produce the effect. Seed, for example, although produces the sprout, could do so only in association with fertile soil, water, light, etc. These auxiliaries make some modifications in the seed and helps the seed to produce the sprout. If the auxiliaries are not admitted to form part of the causal aggregate, then even a seed from the granary may be admitted to give rise to a sprout. This, however, is not the case. Thus, a cause would give rise to its effect only as associated with auxiliaries. This leads us to admit that causal efficiency of enduring entities becomes manifest only successively when they get associated with auxiliaries.[66]

The Buddhists might counter argue by saying that a seed which is in association with the auxiliaries acquires the potency or efficacy to produce a sprout whereas a seed in the granary is not able to do so due to the absence of auxiliaries. The difference between the two lies in this that while the former has reached its final moment that is sufficient to give rise to the sprout, the seed in the granary has not reached that stage. It comes to this that the final moment gives rise to the sprout without the aid of auxiliaries. If it is asked whether the same seed that has reached its final moment of producing the sprout, could do so if it is brought to the granary, then the criticism by the Mīmāṁsakas is that there is no use then of the careful husbandry on the part of the farmer. In the same way, no effort is needed on the part of the people to get instruction from the teacher in order to obtain the final release. When they reach the final moment, independent of their effort, they would attain release. Therefore, concludes the Mīmāṁsakas that the support of the auxiliaries is highly essential and it results from this that the effects could arise only in successive stages from a causally efficient entity. This again goes to prove the permanent nature of things and not momentariness, as the Buddhists think.[67]

Further, the Buddhists have proved that destruction is not caused by any extraneous factor but is inherent in the nature of objects. Now it is asked whether destruction is identical with a thing or different from it. If destruction is identical with a thing then the latter would not be perceived like destruction. If, however, destruction is different from the thing, then even after the destruction the thing must be perceived. To get over this difficulty, if it is said that destruction is neither different nor non-different but an absence (*abhāva*), then it would exist permanently. This is against the spirit of the Buddhist who accepts everything as momentary. Thus, the Buddhists are left with no other option except to admit that destruction is different from the thing and it makes the thing disappear. The objection of the Buddhists that if destruction is distinct from the object then its counter-correlate (*pratiyogin*) would continue to exist, is waived on the ground of universal experience.[68] It follows from this that destruction is only extraneous and not natural.

Pārthasārathi Miśra states that in an object there is change of states every moment, but that does not force us to admit that the object wherein these states exist, gets destroyed every moment. The unitary character of an object and the manifoldness could still be maintained. There would arise contradiction only if different states belong to a thing simultaneously. A particular thing arises at a given point of time, exists for some time, decays and finally is destroyed. All these states are caused by extraneous factors. Just as origination of the object depends upon certain causes so also its destruction. People try to seek a cause in respect of the origination or destruction of an object but not with regard to its existence. If it is left undisturbed, it would exist for ever without getting destroyed. Only when there is an external force, it gets destroyed. Thus, it may be known that destruction is not natural but permanence alone is natural to things.[69]

We have stated earlier that according to the Buddhists, recognition of an object as the same thing could well be accounted for by accepting similarity and hence objects are only momentary. The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, consider that recognition is the strongest proof of the enduring nature of things. It is so because similarity between two things consists in one object among them being different from the other, and possessing some attributes belonging to the other. For the Buddhists, who admit destruction (*niranvayavināśa*), similarity is a total impossibility. The object of the past moment gets destroyed totally without leaving a trace behind and the object of the present moment is totally a new product. If, however, similarity between the preceding and the succeeding moments is admitted, then an object is admitted to exist for more than a moment and thus the doctrine of momentariness stands refuted.[70]

The instance of lamp-flame shown by the Buddhists to prove recognition as false and that identity is due to similarity is reviewed by Kumārila in the *Śabdanityatva* section of *Ślokavārttika.* He states that there is no destruction of the lamp-flame every moment. The flame of the lamp is recognized as the same because of the sameness of arrangement, although fresh particles of light flow in removing the previous one. Similarly, because of the arrangement of its parts, a body also is recognized as the same, despite the various changes of states such as youth, old age, etc., that may occur in it. As body is not identical with these states, even if one of these states comes to an end and another begins, the body would not get destroyed. Thus it may be seen that changes do not alter the enduring nature of an object.[71]

Further, the doctrine of momentariness wherein there is a total destruction of an entity, cannot satisfactorily account for the existence of the entity in the next moment. It is really a matter of surprise how for the Buddhists when a pot of the present moment gets destroyed, a pot similar to it arises the next moment without a material cause or even an efficient cause (say) potter. It ensues from this that production takes place even without a cause, as that of destruction. It might be said that pot of the present moment becomes a cause of another pot in the subsequent moment due to its antecedence in time. But since the subsequent moment is absolutely non-existent in the present moment, the latter cannot function towards producing the pot of the subsequent momentary form. If, for reasons desired by the Buddhists, this rule must be favoured, then the Mīmāṁsakas would only retort by saying that in that case a pot of one particular moment can also be looked upon

as a cause of another (say) cloth-moment. But it cannot be the cause of a cloth-moment because it precedes the cloth merely in time and cannot function towards the production of cloth. As it does not possess any activity in the prior moment, it cannot produce a similar kind of effect too. It is generally observed that an entity may be a cause only when it is possessed of the necessary activity to bring forth the effect.

To sum up this part of the discussion:

(i) the Buddhists hold causal efficiency as the criterion of reality; whatever is real is momentary; and an enduring entity cannot be real or existent;

(ii) the momentary nature of objects is proved on the basis of inference;

(iii) the Mīmāṁsakas point out that the premises on the basis of which the Buddhist bases his conclusion are all fallacious;

(iv) causal efficiency does not constitute existence;

(v) the Mīmāṁsakas prove that permanence alone is natural to things and not destruction.

X

APOHAVĀDA—THE BUDDHIST NOMINALISM

The counterpart of the theory of universal of the realists, is the Buddhists' theory of *Apoha* or nominalism. According to the former, universals are entities different from particulars, independent and related to the particulars in some way. The Buddhists, on the other hand, hold the view that the only universals are words and they are made universal by being used for a number of different particulars. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas admit universals as an independent category of reality. They inhere in individuals or particulars by virtue of which the latter are known. They provide the basis for general conceptions and designation of objects. Further, they are eternal and different from the particulars in which they inhere. The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā accepts the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universals without any modification. But the Bhāṭṭa school makes a pertinent change by negating absolute difference between the particular and the universal. In that place, Kumārila accepts the relation of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*).

Almost all systems of Indian philosophy are uniform in rejecting the theory of universals. But a penetrating criticism is advanced by the Buddhists against all forms of realism. The Buddhists hold that words cannot signify reality. Reality, according to them, is only the thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*); it is momentary; comes and vanishes away the same time and hence is beyond the scope of word. Defining the nominalism of Buddhists R.R. Dravid writes:

> Reality, according to him, is constituted of momentary particulars which are absolutely discreet and disparate. There is no identity or similarity in reality. All notions of identity and similarity, therefore, are fancies of imagination. All class-concepts are constructions of thought (*apohas*); they are mere names, having no objective foundation whatsoever. This is pure and simple nominalism.[72]

According to the Buddhists there are two orders of reality. They are: (i) the ultimate (*paramārtha*), and (ii) the empirical (*saṁvṛti*). To the former belong the world of unique point instants (*svalakṣaṇas*) which are given in pure sensation and the world of universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇas*) which are given by the understanding belongs to the latter. These two have been referred to earlier. In order to comprehend the flowing reality, the world of universals is created by the understanding. But the real, which by nature is non-relative or non-conceptual, is beyond the comprehension of languages and thought. Conceptual knowledge, however, has practical value but is illusory.

It now remains to be discussed as to what exactly is the nature of conceptual knowledge according to the Buddhists. How are the thought constructions (universals) and the ultimate real particulars related to each other if at all there is any relation? These questions are answered by the Buddhists on the basis of their theory of *apoha* (nominalism). According to this theory, concepts and words do not have direct relation to reality; their objective reference is an illusion. The objects of conceptual cognition are universals which are pure thought constructions. Although false, the conceptual knowledge is valid phenomenally as it has an indirect causal relation to reality.[73]

Now, there arises an objection that if words do not signify any real object, then what is their significance? Words certainly do have a meaning and also an objective external reference. This fact cannot be accounted for, if words signify only a subjective idea existing internally within the mind. However, the Buddhists reply by saying that neither a subjective idea nor an objective reality is signified by a word, but something fictitious and unreal. That is, the connotation of words is but a subjective idea mistaken for an objective reality existing in its own right independent of the thought process. This mental image has a distinctive character of its own which distinguishes it from other such mental representations and thus to contain a negative implication. We characterize it by a negative expression, viz., negation of another (*anyāpoha*). Thus, it may be known that a word basically conveys a subjective notion and a mental image which is positive. But, since it has exclusive reference by implication and as the latter gives the word its distinguishing character, its real significance, etc., the connotation of a word, is taken to be one of fundamental negation. To be precise, since all concepts become intelligible in contrast with their opposites, words express their meanings only in contrast with their opposite meanings. Thus, according to Diṅnāga, the import of words is negative. He states that words appear to signify a positive meaning but they only deny the contrary meaning. In other words, while sense contact affirms positive aspects, judgments, which are products of thought, only negate. For example, the word 'cow' neither conveys the meaning of individual cows as they are innumerable, nor does it convey the sense of the universal 'cowness' as it is non-existent. But what it conveys is only the exclusion of non-cows. It is called *atad-vyāvṛtti* which means the exclusion of what a thing is not. Buddhists give it the name *apoha*. To be explicit: the cows in this world do not have anything in common excepting that they have similar causes of their birth. They are also different from one another and also different from the non-cows. It is the difference from non-cows, viz., horses, etc., that constitutes what is known as negative commonness in them. Thus the

universal-cowness is not an external reality, says the Buddhist, but is only a negation in the form of exclusion of non-cows.[74]

Vācaspati Miśra, while reviewing this concept in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*, assigns three reasons as to why *apoha* is considered by the Buddhists as of the nature of exclusion of others. *(anyavyāvṛttirūpa)* They are: (i) this *(anyavyāvṛttirūpa)* is normally applicable to both existence and non-existence, (ii) it brings about similarity between extremely dissimilar entities, and (iii) it is experienced so (as of the nature of exclusion of others).[75] He further explains each one of these reasons:

(i) In the case of determinate perception of a cow, for instance, we make assertions such as 'the cow exists' and 'the cow does not exist.' These assertions refer to both the existence as well as non-existence of cow. If the object 'cow' were of positive nature like the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which always is of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, then it cannot be related to non-existence because of contradiction. An object cannot be both existent as well as non-existent at once. Nor even can it be related to existence as that would be a mere repetition.[76]

(ii) Similarity between absolutely dissimilar entities can exist only due to the exclusion of others. For instance, the similarity existing between a cow, a buffalo, a horse and an elephant is due to their common differentiation from a lion. Although these animals are different from one another, yet they are said to be similar in this that they all differ from a lion. In the same way, there is similarity of an external unique particular, which is of an affirmative nature and is an ultimate reality with the unreal that is totally dissimilar to it. This logical reason is called *svabhāva-hetu*.[77]

(iii) Above all, the object of determinate perception, the empirical cow, for example, is in fact experienced only in the form of differentiation or exclusion (from others). If exclusion from other objects is not admitted to be known at the time of the determinate perception, then a person who has been asked to fasten a cow to a pillar may fasten a horse instead. It is so because cow is not comprehended as distinguished from a horse. Thus, if we admit that it has been comprehended as distinguished from a horse, then there is no reason to reject that it is of the nature of exclusion from non-cows. On these grounds, a class-name and a determinate perception associated with it are to be admitted as of the nature of exclusion of other things.[78] Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on the *Pramāṇa samuccaya* of Diṅnāga, presents an illuminating account on the negative meaning of *apoha*.[79]

It follows from the above that Diṅnāga, for the first time in Indian philosophy, draws a distinction between two types of our knowledge: (i) the particular which is external reality, and (ii) the general which is only ideal and objectively unreal. By his theory of *apoha* Diṅnāga drew yet another line of demarcation between two sources of knowledge viz., sense and intellect. The former is affirmative while the latter is negative. So far the Buddhist view of *Apoha*.

XI

REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF APOHA BY THE MĪMĀṀSAKAS

Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, who by their *Apoha* theory denied objectivity to concepts and words, were vehemently criticized by the principal advocates of realism (Mīmāṁsaka and Naiyāyika) like Kumārila, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta and Śrīdhara. The refutation given by Kumārila is the longest and perhaps the most intricate. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, words are eternal and they are eternally related to the universal which forms its meaning. However, for the Naiyāyikas although the word is not eternal yet its meaning is determined either by Divine or by human desire.[80] And it conveys a positive real possessing a class character. However, for the Buddhist, there are only positive facts and negation are mere non-entities. The former is beyond the scope of thought and language, and hence words and concepts are concerned with the latter alone. Thus, the basic differences that emerged between the viewpoints of the realists and the Buddhists paved a way for the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas to discuss the topic of objectivity of verbal and conceptual knowledge at length. Kumārila devotes a separate section to discuss the implications of this concept and then reject it.

In the first place, Kumārila argues that the import of positive words is never known to be negative; it is always positive. If it is a simple negation, as the Buddhists think, then it cannot be admitted as the object of verbal cognition, because negation of such a nature would not figure in it. The Buddhists, however, consider *apoha* as a non-entity, a pure nothing *(śūnya)*. It is an absurdity to posit it as the meaning of words. Instead, we could very well say that words have no meaning at all. Even assuming that the meanings of words are devoid of externality, its positive character cannot be set aside. Kumārila firmly believes that words invariably relate to and stand for positive entities. He does not deny the fact that the meaning of a word excludes the opposite meaning but adds by saying that, that exclusion is not known in the verbal cognition. Therefore, concludes Kumārila that the Buddhist's theory of negative meaning is opposed to all experience.[81] In his *Vārttika* on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Uddyotakāra adds to the above view by saying that the exclusion of an opposite meaning can be understood only if the positive meaning of a word is initially known. If there is no positive meaning at all for the words, much less could their import be the exclusion of the contrary meaning. Further, he points out that since negative cannot be the object of a command or comprehension, the import of words cannot be negative. What does not serve as the content of a cognition, cannot be considered as its object.[82]

Satkāri Mookerjee in the chapter on "The Doctrine of Apoha" in his book *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* writes:

> ...When Diṅnāga declared that word imports a negation and neither an objective universal nor a particular, he only emphasized this negative implication of verbal import. He did not mean that negation was the primary and apparent connotation. But Uddyotakara and Kumārila misunderstood the real significance of Diṅnāga's doctrine and raised objections which were uncalled for and irrelevant. All their

> objections and criticism proceed from the assumption that Diṅnāga regarded pure negation as the connotation of words and when they say that pure negation without a positive basis is unintelligible nonsense, this does not affect the central position of the master and only fights with a shadow of their own creation. The connotation of a word is a positive concept and when Diṅnāga characterized it as a negation he only emphasized its essential negative implication which makes the verbal import significant and meaningful.[83]

Mookerjee records some more arguments of Uddyotakara and concludes by saying that the argument of Uddyotakara, apart from its sophistry, is based upon a misconception.

Kumārila further adds that in the absence of a positive character, 'cowness,' the meaning of the word 'cow' cannot be ascertained and again 'cowness' cannot be ascertained by the particulars excluded by the word 'cow'. Non-pot, for example, has a negative connotation, no doubt, but it is known easily because what is negated (*apohya*), viz., pot, primarily connotates an object possessing a positive character, viz., potness in common. In the case of the word 'cow', the *apohyas,* i.e. non-cows are infinite in number, and hence one cannot even conceive them. Elephant, buffalo, horse, etc., which are the *apohyas* of the word 'cow', are themselves universals like cow according to the Buddhists and thus they are also negative entities like the universal cow. Now to determine the connotation of the word 'cow', we have to first ascertain the meaning of the word 'horse' and again for the latter we have to depend on the meaning of the word 'elephant' which is one of the *apohyas* of the word 'horse'. Thus, we would arrive at the fallacy of *infinite regress.* As a result, we cannot definitely arrive at the meaning of any word. Further, if cow is only a negation of non-cows, viz., horse, buffalo, elephant, etc., then we may have to admit an infinite number of meanings, as the *apohyas* are too many in number.[84]

Kumārila further points out that the contention of the Buddhists that the import of the words, although negative, is comprehended as positive is not sound. It is because in the first place negation is impossible without affirmation. There can be no positive comprehension of what is negative or a non-entity. On the other hand, a negative conception of what is positive is possible but not *vice versa.* A cow, for instance, can be referred to as not something else but a non-entity which cannot give rise to a positive conception.[85]

The assertion further made by Kumārila is that experience stands as a strong proof to admit the positive nature shared by all individual cows. Never, indeed, does one start thinking about an object in negative terms. When a cow is perceived, for instance, nobody is ever reminded of non-cows such as horse, etc. When the Buddhist, however, says that a cow is only exclusion or negation of non-cows (*ago apohya*), he only asserts indirectly that it is a cow for the simple reason that a denial of a denial would always result in affirmation. Thus, it proves to be a *tautology* to determine the positive common nature.[86] Not only this, negation of mere negations (non-entities) is inconceivable. Admitting so, it would only be positive and a universal.[87]

Kumārila proceeds to point out specific instances where the *Apoha* theory of the Buddhists stands discredited. He considers the words 'knowable' and 'nameable' for this purpose. Being co-existent with reality, these two cannot exclude anything from their

connotation. The meaning of knowable cannot be admitted as the negation of the unknowable, as it is a self-discrepant notion. What is not known, cannot at all be negated. Exactly similar consideration is applicable to the word 'nameable' too.[88] Uddyotakara gives an even more interesting word "all" which would not exclude anything. The Buddhist might say that "all" excludes the numbers such as 'one' 'two', etc. It cannot be said so, because these are the constituents of 'all' and not opposites. Thus, if a word could exclude its own constituents from its meaning, then there would remain nothing for it to convey.[89] The result of this argument is that, according to the *Apoha* theory, words like 'knowable' 'nameable' and 'all', which are 'all-inclusive' and 'non-exclusive' of anything, would become meaningless.

While refuting the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, we mentioned Kumārila's view that cognitions do not have any form and the latter is only a property of external objects. Kumārila recalls it in this section.[90] For the Buddhist, since external objects are indeterminate, cognitions cannot be distinguished if they do not possess any form. For the Mīmāṁsakas, however, it is not so, as the cognitions could be made distinct on the basis of objects. Thus, if cognitions do not possess any form, as maintained by Kumārila, the meanings of words in this theory would be indistinguishable from one another.[91]

Diṅnāga emphatically points out that the realists' conception of the universal, viz., eternality, oneness, subsistence in many individuals, would exactly be applicable to the *apoha* formulated by the Buddhists. In addition, it also satisfactorily explains conceptual knowledge. Hence the *Apoha* theory of the import of words reigns supreme.[92]

When we carefully analyze the writings of different Buddhist thinkers, we arrive at the fact that their theory of the import of words is presented by them in three different forms. Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti emphasize the negative aspect of the meaning of words. Some others distinguish between the direct and indirect meanings of words. Later thinkers maintained that a word signifies both the positive and the negative meanings simultaneously. All these three views maintain that words and concepts correspond to nothing in reality.

As rightly pointed out by R.R. Dravid,[93] Kumārila is of the view that Diṅnāga's attempt to characterize *apoha* is like trying to weave cloth without yarns. We may sum up the whole discussion by pointing out that while the Buddhists hold that the comprehension of the meaning of a word is not possible unless it includes the negation of the opposite meaning, the realists maintain that the negation of the opposite meaning cannot logically be the part of the meaning of a word as the former presupposes the latter. This is as it should be. For, without a positive meaning, the negation of the opposite meaning is inconceivable.

XII

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the above discussion that the controversy between the realists and the Buddhists is one of two radically opposed metaphysical standpoints. The disputes over

logical and epistemological issues among them could be traced back to their respective metaphysical presuppositions. When the entire philosophical world was overwhelmed by the anti-realist arguments of the Idealists, Kumārila came forward to the rescue of realism with his equally sound anti-idealist arguments. Although there were several thinkers before him to accomplish this task, yet the real thinker to defend realism and expose the weaknesses of idealism emerged in the person of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. He knocked out the idealist from the philosophical arena, by putting forward his unique views such as the theory of cognizedness and others. Indeed Kumārila's greatness lies in his grasping the root idea from which idealism grew and then criticize it.

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CHAPTER 20

The Concept of Mokṣa in Pūrvamīmāṁsā

K.T. Pandurangi

I

The study of the concept of *Mokṣa* (liberation) has to cover three areas, viz., (i) The nature of the liberated state; (ii) The means of liberation; (iii) The result of the liberation.

The nature of liberated state is envisaged in three ways: (i) A state of supreme bliss, (ii) A state of complete absence of sorrow, (iii) A state of the absence of both bliss and sorrow.

The Vedānta schools adopt the first view. Nyāya adopts the second view while Sāṁkhya adopts the third view. The third state is known as *Kaivalya* state.

There is no difficulty in considering the first view of *Mokṣa* as *Puruṣārtha,* i.e. the goal of life. All living beings like to be happy. These will strive to achieve happiness. The second view also claims that its concept of *Mokṣa* is *Puruṣārtha.* They argue that no amount of happiness or bliss will satisfy man. He will go on seeking more and more. As there is no end to it, he will be unhappy. Therefore, blissfulness or happiness cannot be a satisfying goal of life for man. On the other hand, freedom from sorrow can be a better goal of life.

The third view of *Mokṣa,* viz., the absence of both happiness and sorrow also claims that its concept of *Mokṣa* can be *Puruṣārtha,* i.e. the goal of life. To undergo the pain and pleasure is a routine matter. These experiences cannot be avoided so long as one is involved in worldly activities. Therefore, man longs for the freedom from both these. The experiences of pleasure and pain is *bhoga* while freedom from these is *apavarga.*

These three views give psychological dimension to the concept of *Mokṣa. Mokṣa* has mystical, spiritual, ethical and even aesthetic dimensions.

II

The Mīmāṁsā concept of *Mokṣa* comes under the third category. Pārthasārathi describes the state of *Mokṣa* as '*svastha*', i.e. the state of remaining unto himself. The original nature of *Ātman* consists of the potency of cognition and existence as a substance. At this stage, not only the pleasure and pain are eliminated but all other qualities such as desire, initiative, religious merit, etc., are also eliminated.

The Vaiśeṣikas also describe the liberated state in the same way.

Pārthasārathi argues that there cannot be any experience of bliss during the liberated

state as there is no *manas* at that state. The bliss is not *svaprakāśa* so as to provide its experience without the help of *manas.* Further, if the bliss that is supposed to be experienced at the liberated state is same as that of the state *saṁsāra,* then, it means *saṁsāra* has continued. If it is different and generated at the liberated state, then, this will not be permanent and enduring. This makes the very liberation a temporary state.

Further, mere presence of bliss will not make it a *puruṣārtha.* The *ātman,* who is supposed to posses it, should cognize it. However, there will not be any cognition during the liberated state.

Kumārila also argues that if the enjoyment of bliss in the liberated is envisaged, then it will be the same as *svarga* and hence temporary.

III

Now, let us examine the means of liberation. In this respect, there are three main views, viz., (i) *Jñāna* is the means of liberation; (ii) Both *Jñāna* and *Karma* are the means of liberation; (iii) *Karma nivṛtti,* i.e. withdrawal from *Karma* is the means of liberation.

The nature of *jñāna* required for liberation differs from school to school. The Vedānta schools go by *Brahmajñāna.* Sāṁkhyas go by *Prakṛti-Puruṣa viveka jñāna.* The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas go by *padārtha tattva jñāna. Bhakti* and *Vairāgya* are considered as supporting means in Vedānta. *Vairāgya,* i.e. non-attachment to the worldly affairs is considered as a first step to seek freedom from worldly involvement by all.

Pūrvamīmāṁsā goes by the third view, viz., withdrawal from the *kāmya* sacrificial activity and the prohibited ones. However, it is not total withdrawal from *Karma. Nitya* and *Naimittika Karmas* have to be performed.

Pārthasārathi explains the means of liberation as follows:

(i) Elimination of pleasure and pain is achieved by the elimination of *dharma* and *adharma.*

(ii) The *dharma* and *adharma* already accrued to the credit of a person have to be eliminated by the experience of the consequences of the same.

(iii) By withdrawing from the performance of *kāmyakarmas,* the generation of *dharma* from these has to be stopped.

(iv) By performing *Nitya* and *Naimittika Karmas* and by avoiding the prohibitted acts, the generation of *adharma* has to prevented.

(iv) When *dharma* and *adharma* will be eliminated, there will be no ground for assuming further births. When present body is left, the *ātman* attains *svastha* state.

Mīmāṁsakas describe *prapañca sambandha* as *bandha* and *prapañcasambandhavilaya* as *mokṣa.* The body, senses and objects constitute the *prapañca.*

Getting rid of the contact with these three is liberation. Suffering from the pleasure and pain by the contact with these three is bondage.

Mīmāṁsakas do not introduce the concept of *ajñāna* or *avidyā* as the basis of bondage, nor do they seek the help of *jñāna* to get rid of it. They do not seek *paramātmajñāna* for liberation. However, they do mention *ātmajñāna.* The role of *ātmajñāna* is stated in the

Mīmāṁsā terminology as *kratvartha.* The knowledge of *ātman* as distinct from the body enables a person to undertake sacrifices which yield results in the other world and after this birth. In this way, *ātmajñāna* is helpful to the sacrifice. Therefore, *ātmajñāna* is *kratvartha.* Beyond this role, the *ātmajñāna* does not contribute to his liberation in any other way.

Ślokavārttika makes it clear.

The *ātmajñāna* referred to here is not *Paramātmajñāna.* It is the knowledge of the true nature of oneself. In *Tantravārttika* on *arthavādādhikaraṇam,* Kumārila makes it clear that the *ātmajñāna* deliberated on in Upaniṣads is *kratvartha. Etena kratvarthakartṛpratipādanadvāreṇa upaniṣadāṁ nairākāṅkṣyaṁ vyākhyātam.*

This *ātmajñāna* is not *paramātmajñāna* but *svanityajñāna, dehādavyatiriktvajñāna.*

The *paramātmajñāna* is not introduced by Kumārila as a requirement for the liberation in the *sambandhākṣepa* section of *Ślokavārttika.*

IV

There is a controversy whether Mīmāṁsakas accept *Īśvara* or not. In any case, the role normally assigned to *Īśvara* is not assigned to him by the Mīmāṁsakas. The roles assigned to *Īśvara* are:

(i) He is creator and destroyer of the world.
(ii) He is the author of the Veda.
(iii) He is the bestower of the results of good and bad deeds.

For the Mīmāṁsakas, *Īśvara* is not required for these purposes. In the context of *Mokṣa* also neither *Īśvara,* nor has *Īśvarajñāna* any role to play.

V

However, certain remarks of Kumārila in *Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* give a different picture. In *Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* a question is raised whether employing correct words is sufficient while using Vedic language to perform *dharma* or the knowledge of the correctness of these words through *Vyākaraṇa* is a necessary requirement. It is concluded that Vedic words have to be used with the knowledge of their correctness through *vyākaraṇa.* Incidentally, another question is raised whether the knowledge of the correctness itself is sufficient or the actual use of the words with the knowledge of their correctness is necessary. In this context, Kumārila remarks that the correctness of the knowledge of words is merely a matter of *saṁskāra.* Therefore, it cannot lead to any result, viz., *dharma.*

Stating this position of *Jñāna,* Kumārila makes an exception in the case of *ātmajñāna.*

He further states that *ātmajñāna* is both *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha.* We have already noticed that it is *kratvartha.* But the idea that it is also *puruṣārtha* is introduced here. Kumārila quotes Upaniṣadic passages like '*ya ātmā apahata pāpmā*' '*satyakāmaḥ satyasaṅkalpaḥ*' '*sa anveṣṭavyaḥ sa jigñāsitavyaḥ*' '*ātmā- namupāsīta*', etc., and says *jigñāsāmananasahitātmajñāna* is enjoined here. Therefore, the *abhyudaya* stated in the *śruti*

passages '*sa sarvān lokānāpnoti, sarvān kāmān āpnoti*' has to be brought here as a result of *ātmajñāna*. Similarly, *niḥśreyasa* stated in the passages like '*na sa punarāvartate*' indicating *paramātmaprāpti* has also to be brought here as a result of *ātmajñāna*. This *ātmajñāna* naturally is *paramātmajñāna*. This makes *ātmajñāna* a *puruṣārtha*. One and the same *ātmajñāna* can be both *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* as per the *saṁyogapṛthaktvanyāya*.

In this context, Kumārila raises another question whether considering *ātmajñāna*, as a means for liberation, comes in the way of *Karma* being the means of liberation. He answers that the purpose served by the two are different as also are different their approaches. Therefore, both are required to attain the liberation. One of them does not supercede the other. These two cannot be considered as alternate means, nor as main and subbordinate. Hence, these are the means of liberation without prejudice to each other.

In this account of the concept of liberation, Kumārila makes two important additions, viz., (i) He introduces the concept that *ātmajñāna* as a means of *puruṣārtha* widens the scope of it to include *paramātmajñāna*. (ii) *Jñāna* is also a means of liberation.

From this it is clear that Kumārila's concept of liberation has become positive here and it is closer to the Vedāntic concept.

The earlier account of Kumārila's concept of liberation given in *sambandhākṣepa* section of *Ślokavārttika* has been negative and closer to the Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika concepts of liberation. It is difficult to reconcile these two views.

The basic differences between these two positions are as under:

(i) In the first account, Kumārila declares that in the liberated state the *ātman* remains in the *svastha* state, the attributes like *dharma* and *adharma*, are eliminated and he is without pain and pleasure. In the second account he states that *ātman* attains *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*. All his desires will be fulfilled. Kumārila quotes the Upaniṣadic passage *sarvān kāmān avāpnoti*. This reveals that the nature of liberated state is quite different in the two accounts.

(ii) In the first account he declares that withdrawal from *Kāmya karmas* and *Niṣiddha karmas* is the means of liberation. He does not mention *jñāna* as the means of liberation. In the second account, he adds *jñāna* also as a means of liberation. This reveals that the means of liberation are quite different also in the two accounts.

(iii) The concept of *puruṣārtha* is not introduced in the first account while in the second account it is given a prominent place.

It may be noted that the first account is in a proper context while the second one is merely an appendage in *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa*.

Pārthasārathi gives a full exposition of the first account and merely mentions the conclusion of the second account in *Śāstradīpikā*.

In *Nyāyaratnākara*, he explains the expression *ātmajñānam* as *dvividhaṁ hi ātmajñānaṁ dehād vivekajñānam. Upāsanātmakaṁ jñānam.* He says the latter cannot be taken as *kratvartha*. It has to be treated as *puruṣārtha*. He draws our attention to Kumārila's observations in *Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa*.

He is aware of the two accounts and makes room for the second account by this explanation of the term *Ātmajñāna*. However, the conflict between the two accounts is not resolved.

VI

The first account seems to be true to the general thinking of the Mīmāṁsā school. Strictly speaking, Mīmāṁsā is not interested in liberation. Performing *karmas* faithfully is a way of life as well as the goal of life for the Mīmāṁsakas. The performance of *kāmyakarmas* is voluntary and performance of *nityanaimittikakarmas* is obligatory. A man should find fulfillment of his life in discharging these duties.

An active life is a way of life as well as a goal of life for the Mīmāṁsakas. Probably, they did not envisage the idea of liberation on their own. However, due to the impact of other systems of Indian philosophy and a general trend for the concept of liberation in Indian culture, they formulated the concept of liberation. They worked out its means in such a way that *nityanaimittikakarmans* are not given up till last and are not considered as a hindrance to the liberation. They did not see any charm in the liberation. They saw life as active and liberation as idle. The *svastha* state, described as the liberated state, is in a way an idle state. It is envisaged as an opposite of active life. That is why it is not stated as *puruṣārtha* in the first account. The *svastha* state may be claimed as a *puruṣārtha* in the sense that it provides freedom from the routine life of pain and pleasure. As stated by Kumārila himself, introducing the concept of fulfillment of desire, i.e. *abhyudaya* in liberation amounts to designating *Svarga* itself as *Mokṣa*. Therefore, the Mīmāṁsaka's made it a state of freedom from the pain and pleasure of the routine life. They do not envisage any transcendental bliss in it as has been done in Vedānta. Therefore, they envisaged the state of liberation as a state of complete rest which they characterized as the *svastha* state. Therefore, we may conclude that the first account of the concept of liberation given by Kumārila fits better in the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā* scheme. The second is probably given to be in tune with the Vedāntic thought.

V
Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation

CHAPTER 21

The Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation

M. Rama Jois

Interpretation of law is an important branch of jurisprudence. The principles of interpretation help in understanding the correct meaning of a provision of law. A few important questions which arise for consideration while implementing or enforcing a provision of law are posed here.

(1) What is the real meaning that should be given to a particular word used in a particular law, *when it is not defined in the law* and *when it has a general meaning as well as a technical meaning?*

(2) If *a sentence used in law is ambiguous, how should its meaning* be ascertained?

(3) *If two provisions in a law are seemingly contradictory,* what is the course required to be adopted?

(4) If a provision is not well worded or the *construction of a sentence* is *defective,* how should the real meaning be ascertained?

(5) Whether a particular law which stipulates a certain act being performed in a particular manner is *mandatory* or *directory?*

These problems are of everyday occurrence in courts when the parties opposing each other contend placing two differing interpretations on the same provision. The power and duty of the court is to implement the law, and for this purpose it is obliged to ascertain the real meaning of the law and apply it accordingly. The courts have no power to change the law. That power belongs to the Legislature. It is not open to the courts to usurp the function of Legislature by giving an un-warranted interpretation to any law.[1] Therefore, they have to follow certain well recognized norms or rules to interpret the law in order to resolve the various problems regarding interpretation arising before them. Under the modern legal systems, a large number of well settled and accepted principles governing interpretation of law has been developed.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MĪMĀṀSĀ (INTERPRETATION)

In the ancient Indian society, the *rules of Dharma incorporated in the Vedas, Smṛtis and Dharmaśāstras covered every aspect of human activity.* The Vedas, the primordial source of *Dharma,* mostly prescribed rules and procedure for religious rituals and sacrifices. The source of the Vedas was believed to be divine and therefore the ritualistic rules contained in them were considered inviolable and unalterable by the society. But the provisions in the Vedas were in a cryptic and difficult language. Therefore, the possibility of divergent

interpretations was always there. In order to resolve this difficulty and for the purpose of understanding their correct import, *Mīmāṁsā* (rules of interpretation) came to be written by those who were eminent Vedic scholars and logicians and who were well versed both in language (*Bhāṣā*) and grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*). Mīmāṁsā became an important branch of study of the *Dharmaśāstras*. Mahrṣi Jaimini is the oldest renowned author of the monumental work under the title *Mīmāṁsā*. He laid down the principles of interpretation of the Vedic provisions regulating religious sacrifices and rituals. Though the principles so laid down were for the purpose of interpreting the Vedic provisions, many of those principles were so fundamental that they could be applied for interpreting the *vyāvahāra* portions of the *Smṛtis* which contained civil and criminal laws. Leading Smṛtikāras and commentators of the Smṛtis fully utilized the fundamental rules of Mīmāṁsā laid down by Jaimini for clarifying and expounding the several complicated provisions of law. Therefore, Mīmāṁsā, though originating in interpreting the rules governing performance of religious acts, came to occupy an important position in the ancient legal system of this country.

Mr. Colebrooke, who recognized the importance of Mīmāṁsā in the interpretation of Hindu law, observed:

> A case is proposed either specified in Jaimini's text or supplied by his scholiasts. Upon this a doubt or question is raised, and a solution of it is suggested, which is refuted, and a right conclusion established in its stead. The disquisitions of the *Mīmāṁsā* bear, therefore, a certain resemblance to judicial questions; and in fact, the Hindu law being blended with the religion of the people, the same modes of reasoning are applicable, and are applied to the one as to the other. *The logic of the Mīmāṁsā is the logic of the law—the rule of interpretation of civil and religious ordinances.* Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided, the principles may be collected. *A well ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of the law,* and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the *Mīmāṁsā*.[2]

Sir John Edge stressed the importance of Mīmāṁsā (rules of interpretation) in the interpretation of the Hindu law as follows:

> The question is, 'How is the text of Vaśiṣṭha to be construed? It must clearly be construed according to the rules for the construction of the texts of the sacred books of the Hindu law, if authoritative rules on the subject exist. *That rules for the construction of the sacred texts and laws of the Hindus do exist cannot be disputed,* although those rules have been frequently overlooked or not referred to by Judges or English text writers probably because they are in Sanskrit and have, so far as I am aware, not yet been translated. That they are rules of the highest authority is obvious from the manner in which they have been referred to by Mr. Colebrooke.[3]

The above observations by eminent scholars and judges and the prescription of the *knowledge of Mīmāṁsā as one of the qualifications for judges*[4] indicate the importance of Mīmāṁsā as also its relevance to the interpretation of the provisions of positive law. At this stage, it should be mentioned that Mīmāṁsā is a vast and independent subject and

therefore in the nature of things it constitutes an independent subject for study.[5] However, as indicated above, in view of its importance to the branch of law, *legal history would be incomplete without any reference to the rules of Mīmāṁsā.* Hence, the fundamental rules of Mīmāṁsā, which are relevant to the interpretation of *forensic* law alone, are set out hereinafter and that too only to a very limited extent. As stated earlier, the *Sūtras* which are relevant for interpretation of law originated with reference to interpretation of rules regulating performance of religious ceremonies or sacrifices. Therefore, while setting out the relevant *Sūtras*, the reference to their origin is left out as unnecessary in many cases as it would serve no useful purpose, but only the principles laid down and their relevancy in the context of interpretation of law are given.

Dr. Thibaut, in his introduction to the translation of *Artha Saṅgraha.* observes:

> The *Mīmāṁsā* certainly deserves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed one of the attractions which the other *Darṣanas* derive from the speculative character of their content; its scope is limited and the nature of the investigations in which it is engaged leaves no room for high flights of imagination. But it possesses counterbalancing advantages. Its subject mattter is of a positive nature, its method is sound and its reasoning in most cases convincing.[6]

Ganganatha Jha in his introduction to the third volume of his English translation of *Śabara Bhāṣya* which is an elaborate and authoritative commentary on Jaimini states:

> Unfortunately, for modern Hindus, the examples that Jaimini chose for illustrating his rules of interpretation were all from sacrificial rituals. Naturally, during his time, every Brāhmaṇa was familiar with these rituals, and hence they were regarded as providing most suitable illustrative examples. Latterly, however, sacrificial ritual has gradually all but disappeared from the life of the Hindus; and this has led to the neglect of the study of the *Mīmāṁsā śāstra.* Even so, it continues to be recognized that the *rules that Jaimini evolved are still found useful in the interpretation of law texts*; and *they have been so widely* used that there is no important legal digest which does not draw upon the Nyāyas of Jaimini.

Mīmāṁsā was declared to be essential for acquiring the knowledge of the *śruti* and the *Smṛtis*, vide Yājñavalkya-1-3 and consequently considered as one of the qualifications to be possessed by a person for being appointed as a Judge. The prescription of Mīmāṁsā as a qualification for judges spells out its importance in the interpretation of civil and criminal laws.

Procedure for Interpretation

The procedure adopted by Mīmāṁsakas to settle the meaning of a provision of the Vedic or Smṛti text has been to take up each issue and consider arguments both for and against, and to arrive at a final decision. All these aspects put together was called *Adhikaraṇa* [a complete theme]. Kumārila explains the method as follows:

Viṣayo viśayaś caiva pūrvapakṣastathottaram.
Nirṇayaścheti pañcāṅgaṁ śāstre'dhikaraṇaṁ smṛtam.

"The text under consideration, the doubt concerning it, the first side, the other side or answer, and the conclusion, all these constitute an *Adhikaraṇa.*"[7]

The same was the method adopted by Śabara.[8]

(i) The subject matter which requires interpretation is set out first.
(ii) The doubt which has arisen in the matter of such interpretation is explained.
(iii) *Pūrvapakṣa* (prima facie argument) is set out.
(iv) *Siddhānta* (the answer), i.e. the final view taken in the matter together with reasons indicating the pertinence or relevancy of such an interpretation along with the rules of interpretation applied is set out, which forms the concluding part of an *Adhikaraṇa.*

The principles laid down as above indicate the systematic way in which the Mīmāṁsakas proceeded to interpret any provision.

Rules of Three Debts—Key to Interpretation

Jaimini declared that there are three fundamental principles which serve as the key to the interpretation of the *Smṛtis.* They are that every Hindu is under a duty to discharge the following three kinds of debts:

(1) *Devaṛṇa* — Debt due to God by performing religious sacrifices.
(2) *Ṛṣiṛṇa* — Debt due to saints by the acquisition of and imparting knowledge.
(3) *Pitṛṛṇa* — Debt due to parents by becoming a householder and maintaining the continuity of the family institution and tradition by begetting children.

Śabara Swāmi interprets this maxim and holds that this 'rule of three debts' is binding of all the Aryans.[9]

K.L. Sarkar, on the importance of the three-debt formula, states: "Therefore, in interpreting texts relating to the duties and rights of the Hndus, these principles must always be kept in view, and it should be presumed that all texts are more or less intended to promote these three classes of duties."

The three presumptions arising from the above maxim are in favour of (1) securing spiritual welfare, (2) encouraging learning and skill and (3) maintaining the family institution and traditions.

Jīmūtavāhana, in treating the principles of succession, discriminates between the *Śruti* texts, many of which are conflicting with one another, mainly relying on the presumption in favour of spiritual welfare. This theory of spiritual benefit is identical with the principle of *Swarga kāmo yajeta.*[10]

It was the firm belief that the ultimate goal of all the provisions of the Vedas and Dharmaśāstras was to ensure the discharging of three debts by every individual and this was possible only by following the path of *Dharma* in all walks of life as prescribed, and therefore, every provision was to be interpreted so as to be in conformity with the rule of the three debts.

The above principle was also adopted in the interpretation of the *Smṛitis* which constituted the basic legal texts governing Hindu society. This principle of interpreting the law in the light of the philosophy or object which inspired its making is comparable to the modern principles, namely, (i) that the preamble to any law including constitutional law which sets out the basic objectives of the law or the Constitution, as the case might be, as the key for interpretation of the provisions incorporated therein;[11] and (ii) that whenever two constructions of a provision of law are possible, one which conforms to the constitutional law and another inconsistent with it, the former should be accepted and the latter rejected.[12]

The Hindu jurists accepted the view of Jaimini that the provisions contained in the *Smṛtis* should be interpreted so as to promote and fulfil the object of satisfying the three debts. To illustrate, the law of inheritance, the doctrine of pious obligation, the recognition of adoption, and the law on that topic, orginated from the principle of *Pitṛṛṇa.* The making of gifts during religious sacrifices and the law governing gifts, owed its origin to the principle of *Devaṛṇa.* The great stress laid on acquisition of knowledge and its dissemination and the law on the question of the gains of learning, emanated from the principle of *Ṛṣiṛṇa.* Further, as pointed out in the law relating to debts, the fourth debt, viz., debt towards society (*Samājaṛṇa*), was recognized in the great epic *Mahābhārata* and this principle also influenced considerably the interpretation of law for public good as well as the character of the people, and is evidenced by the historic records relating to gifts recognized and made for public purposes and selfless sacrifice made by innumerable persons, known and unknown, in rendering service to the nation or society in all walks of life.

RULES TO RESOLVE CONFLICITS BETWEEN DIFFERENT SOURCES OF LAW

The source of law consisted of the *Śruti,* the *Smṛitis* composed by several authors and the *Purāṇas* as also *Sadācāra* (usage and custom). Naturally, the provision in one source, in some cases, could be contrary to a corresponding provision in another source. Rules to resolve such conflicts were laid down.

(1) *Vyasa* : 1, *V.* 4:

Śrutismṛti purāṇānāṁ virodho yatra dṛśyate.
Tatra śrautaṁ pramāṇaṁ tu tayor dvaidhe smṛtiv varā.

When there is a conflict between the Vedas, the *Smṛtis* and the Purāṇas, the Vedas should prevail, and as between the *Smṛtis* and the Purāṇas, the *Smṛtis* are superior.[13]

The above rule indicated the comparative efficacy or superiority of the provisions in the various sources of *Dharma.* They were placed in the following order:

(i) the Vedas, (ii) the *Smṛtis* and (iii) the Purāṇas

(1) *Why Smṛtis should be regarded as authority?*

An argument that only the Vedas (*Śruti*) should be considered as authoirty and not the *Smṛtis,* was considered and answered by Jaimini.

Jaimini 1-3-1:

Dharmasya śabdamūlatvād śabdam anapekṣaṁ syāt.[14]

Pūrvapakṣa or prima facie view: In as much as *Dharma* is based upon the Vedas, what is not in the Vedas should be disregarded.

The above statement indicates that the paramount authority of the Vedas was accepted. Therefore, if a provision in the *Smṛtis* was found to be in conformity with a known Vedic text, there was no dispute about its validity. The question, however, raised was why a *Smṛti* rule should be regarded as binding unless a Vedic text from which it emanated was known. It was argued for the Pūrvapakṣin, in support of his case, that giving credence to such a *Smṛti* (reminiscence) text would be meaningless on the following analogy:

Yā hi vandhya smaredidaṁ me dauhitrakṛtam iti, na me duhita'stiti
matva na jātucidasau pratiyāt samyagetaj jñanami ti.[15]

Remembrance under the circumstances would be just like the remembrance that a barren woman might have to the effect that 'such and such act was done by my daughter's son'; if she ever had such a remembrance, then, knowing as she does that she had no daughter, she could never believe that remembrance of the son's act to be correct.

Tasya kutaḥ. Jātyandhāntarāt. Evaṁ jātyandhaparamparāyām api satyāṁ
naiva jātucit saṁ pratīyur vidvāṁsaḥ samyog darśanam etad iti.
Ato nādartavyam evaṁjātīyakam anapekṣaṁ syād iti.[16]

This case would resemble the case where a person born blind says, 'I remember this particular colour',—and being asked, 'How could you have had any cognition of colour?', he points to another person blind from birth; it being asked from where this latter derived his cognition, another person blind from birth is pointed out; so that even though there is an unbroken line of tradition of persons born blind, no sensible people can even regard this remembrance as right cognition.

Siddhanta J 1.3.2 *and* 3:

Api vā kartṛsāmāmyāt pramāṇamanumānaṁ syāt.
Virodhe tvanapekṣaṁ syād asāti hyanumānam.[17]

(i) The *Smṛti* (Remembrance) is *Pramāṇa* (trustworthy), as there would be an inference (presumption) of its having a basis in the Vedas. (AIR 1958. SC. 5 72)

(ii) Provided where there is conflict (between the Vedas and a *Smṛti* rule) the *Smṛti* rule should be disregarded, because the presumption holds good only when there is no conflict.

In support of the above view the reasoning is given by Śabara:

Nanu noplabhanta evaṁjātiyakaṁ grantham Anupalabhamānā
vismaraṇama pyupapadyata it. Tad upapannatvāt pūrvavijñānasya.
Traivarnikānāṁ smaratām vismaranasya ca upapannatvād granthānumānam
upapadyata it pramāṇaṁ smṛtiḥ.[18]

"Says the Opponent—'But people do not find any such Vedic text as you would infer as the basis for the *Smṛtis.*

Even if they do not actually find it, they would infer it. It is quite possible also that the text upon which the *Smṛti* is based was actually known to the *Smṛti* writer, but has since been forgotten.

Thus, in the case of the 'remembrance' of men of the three higher castes, the necessary 'previous cognition' being traceable,—and it being possible that the texts from which that cognition proceeded have been forgotten—the inference of the text becomes justifiable; consequently, the *Smṛti* text is trustworty."

In the concluding portion, the validity of the *Smṛti* rules *inter alia* that (1) the *Aṣṭak* rite, namely, 'the worship of the divinity of night should be performed', (ii) 'the student should follow the teacher', (iii) 'tanks should be dug' and (iv) 'drinking water booths should be set up', were upheld. The conclusions read:

Aṣṭakāliṅgaśca mantrā vededṛśyante, 'yāṃ janāḥ prātindanti' ityevamādayaḥ.
Tathā pratyupasthitaniyamānāmācārānāṁ dṛṣtārthatoādeva prāmāṇyam.[19]

"*Aṣṭaka* is spoken of as the divinity of night eulogised as the 'consort of the year'; here we have a Vedic text speaking of *Aṣṭaka* as an object of adoration; and this is taken as indicative of the desirability of performing the rites of *Aṣṭaka.*"[20]

Guroranugamātprīto gururadhyāpayiṣyati,
grantha-granthi-bhedinaśca nyāyān parituṣto vakṣyatiti.
Tathā ca darśayāti, tasmāchreyāṁsaṁ pūrvaṁ yantaṁ pāpīyān
paścād anveṣyatīti. Prapāstaḍāgāni ca paropakārāya, na dharmāyetyevāvagamynte.[21]

"As regards the other instances of the *Smṛti* rules of conduct quoted above (relating to the 'following of the teacher', 'the digging of tanks', 'establishing drinking water booths', and so forth), *their authoirty (reliability, trustworthiness) rests in the fact of the apparently useful purposes served by them;* for instance, (a) if one follows his teacher, the teacher becomes pleased and teaches him with care, and also, being satisfied with the pupil, explains to him the reasoning that go to solve the various difficulties that present themselves in the course of the study of the texts—'Therefore the inferior always walks behind the superior walking ahead' (hence, indicates the propriety of the superior persons being followed by the inferior), and (b) Drinking water booths and tanks are *philanthropic works* conducive to the benefit of the people."

Tena ye dṛṣtarthāstetata eva pramāṇam.
Ye tu adṛṣtārthās teṣu vaidika-śabdāmumnam iti.[22]

"Thus then, those rules (of the *Smṛtis*) that serve apparently useful purposes are trustworthy on that account, and in the case of those that pertain to transcendental purposes, we shall infer the Vedic texts as their basis (and on this basis will rest their trustworthy character)."

Thus the answer furnished to the question or the point raised by the Pūrvapakṣin was that when there was no conflict between a *Smṛti* rule and the known *Śruti* texts, the former

should be presumed to be valid on the assumption that the *Smṛti* (memory) must have emanated from a Vedic text which had been forgotten on account of human failings.

Smṛti Rule Invalid for Improper Motive

Though the validity of the *Smṛti* provisions, in the absence of conflict with a known *Śruti* provision, was to be presumed, it was not an irrebuttable presumption. If it was shown that it came to be incorporated for collateral considerations, such a provision was held not binding and had to be disregarded.

Applying these principles, Śabara declared a few of these rules invalid. Though such invalidated rules were with reference to religious ceremonies, the reasoning behind their invalidation is forthright and forceful, and even now useful.

Example:

(i) Rule of the *Smṛti*: The whole of an *Audumbara* post (piece of wood from the *audumbara* tree used in a religious ceremony) should be covered by cloth.

(ii) Rule of the *Śruti* with which it conflicits: One should sing a *Saman* touching the *Audumbara* post.

After a thorough argument the conclusion recorded was that the *Smṛti* rule was invalid on the ground of its conflict with the *Śruti* (because touching of the post as directed by the *Śruti* would be impossible if the whole of it was covered by cloth) and also on the ground that the *Smṛti* rule had proceeded from a selfish motive.

Pramāṇāyāṁ smṛtau sparśanaṁ vyāmohaḥ.
Sparśane pramāṇe smṛtir vyāmohaḥ.

"If the *Smṛti* rule [regarding covering up the whole post] is right, then the touching [laid down in the *Śruti*] is wrong, and if the touching is right, then the *Smṛti* is wrong".[23]

Tasmād uktam śrutiviruddhā smṛtirapramāṇamiti.
Ataśeca sarvaveṣṭanādi nādaraṇīyaṁ.

"Consequently, what has been said in the *Smṛti* regarding the covering of the whole post, has to be disregarded."[24]

Lobhādvāsa āditsamānā audumbarīṁ kṛtsnām veṣṭitavantaḥ kecit. Tat smṛterbījam.[25]

"Some greedy priests being desirous of having a large piece of cloth, covered up the whole of the post at a certain performance; this was what gave rise to the *Smṛti* rule [that the whole post should be covered up."[26]

The principle holds good even now. Any administrative action which is malafide or based on collateral consideraton is regarded as invalid.[27] Even a presidential proclamation under Article 356 dismissing a State Government and dissolving an elected legislature could be declared invalid, if found malafide.[28] Similarly, an ordinance promulgated if malafide is liable to be declared invalid.[29]

Provisions of Manu Smṛti Held Invalid on the Ground of Conflict

Vijñāneśwara declared Manu—IX 106 as also Manu—IX 112, which provided for unequal distribution of shares as among sons by providing a higher share for the eldest son, invalid on two grounds:

(i) giving of an unequal share to the eldest son was invalid as it was opposed to a citation in the *Śruti* which supports equal distribution.[30]

(ii) that it was disapproved by the people.[31]

Validity of Sadācāra [Custom and Usage]

Naturally the *Śruti* and the *Smṛtis* could not have covered all problems and situations for all time. Therefore, custom or usage, which was agreeable to the conscience of the people [without bad motive] was also accepted as the source of law. On this question Śabara considered the validity of a few *Smṛti* rules and opined as follows:

> *Apica śaucaṁ dakṣiṇācāratā yajñopavītatvaṁ caivaṁjātīyakā arthā vyavadhātaro na bhavanti. Sarvapadārthānāṁ śeṣabhūtatvāt. Tasmādācamanādīnāṁ prāmāṇyam.*[32]

"The *smṛti* rules dwelt upon here are such as (a) An act should be done after rinsing the mouth, (b) An act should be done by one wearing the *Yajñopavita,* (c) One should perform the acts with the right hand and such others, with what then these acts be in conflict (...there is nothing against the authority of the *Smṛti* rule in question)."[33]

On the above reasoning, it is concluded:

"...Further, 'performing with the right hand', and 'wearing the sacrificial thread—constitute purity (or cleanliness), and such things are not regarded as interruptions at all; because, purity or cleanliness is a necessary adjunct to all actions." "From all this it follows that the *Smṛti* rules, relating to all these acts—rinsing, using the right hand, wearing the sacrificial thread and the like, are authoritative, i.e. valid and trustworthy."[34]

The above discussion indicated the reason for treating the *Smṛti* and also *Sadācāra* as sources of law in addition to the *Śruti* but subject to the condition that there was no conflict between the former and the latter. In fact, the *Smṛti* themselves laid down the rule that if there was conflict between the *Smṛtis* and the *Śruti,* the latter would prevail.

Test for Deciding Validity of Usage

Manu laid down that conscious satisfaction (*Ātmatusti*) of those who are well informed in the Vedas was the test to decide the validity of usage.[35] The test of *Ātmatusti* was subjected to critical examination by Kumārila. He did not agree that *Ātmatusti* (self-satisfaction) as the sole test for determining the validity of a custom or usage but held that it should satisfy a rational test also. In this behalf Kumārila observed:

Ke śiṣṭāḥ? ye sadācārāḥ

Who are well informed?
Those whose actions are sound.

Sadācārāśca tatkṛtāḥ.

Then whose actions are sound?
Of those who are well informed.

Itaretarādhīna-nirṇayatvādanirṇayaḥ.

This leaves us where we were.[36]

Therefore, he proceeded to state that *Ātmatusti* alone was not a sure test. After a thorough discussion, he said:

Tathācarātmatuṣṭyādi-dharmyaṁ dharmamayātmanām.
Vedoktam iti niścitya grāhyaṁ dharmabubhutsubhiḥ.

"In order that a usage be valid it must be such that not only there must be absence of improper motives but also the desire for heavenly bliss should be its basis and a true believer in the Vedas is likely to observe it as a matter of duty."[37]

Sharp intellect, absence of blind belief in or acceptance of the *Smṛti* rules, forceful ratiocination, all are at once patent in the above ruling given by Kumārlia.

Colebrooke on the validity of usage states:

> Usage generally prevalent among good men and practised by them as understanding it to be enjoined and therefore incumbent on them, is mediately, but not directly, evidence of duty; but it is not valid, if it be contrary to an express text.
> ...any usage which is inconsistent with a recorded recollection is not to be practised, so long as no express text of scripture is to support it.[38]

The discussion so far made, illustration given and the conclusion reached disclose the following aspects:

(1) The Vedas were regarded as the first and inviolable source of *Dharma.*

(2) As the Vedas were handed down from generation to generation (orally), the possibility of some of the Vedic injuctions having been missed or gone out of memory was accepted.

(3) The *Smṛti* writers were expected to incorporate in writing (obviously after the practice of writing came into existence) only such of the principles laid down in the Vedas and *Sadācāra* which were not in conflict with the Vedas, though the actual text could not be traced or remembered. There was a presumption in favour of honesty and truthfulness of the *Smṛti* writers.

In this behalf Kumārlia states:

"In the case of a *Smṛti,* corroborative text is assumed directly from the fact of its being compiled by people learned in the Vedas."[39]

(4) Therefore, if the *Smṛti* writers recorded any rule, the presumption was that it was in conformity with a Vedic rule even if it be that rule was not known, i.e. was forgotten.

(5) If, however, a *Smṛti* rule contravened a known provision of the Vedas, that was to be treated as invalid, as the *Smṛti* writer could not incorporate any such rule into a *Smṛti,*

as that would amount to remembering what did not exist, just like a born blind man cannot remember any colour. Therefore, any such rule, even if incorporated into the *Smṛti*, was invalid.

(6) (i) Even if a *Smṛti* rule did not conflict with any known provision of the Vedas, if any personal or selfish motive of anyone could be seen behind such a rule, want of *Dharma* would be apparent from such a rule and therefore, could not be deemed to have been sanctioned by the Vedas. In other words, the normal presumption in favour of a *Smṛti* rule, that it was in conformity with a provision of the Vedas which had gone out of memory, stands rebutted by the existence of a selfish motive.

(ii) In such a case the view rejecting the validity of a motivated rule is more reasonable than the view assuming support of a Vedic text in favour of such a rule.

(7) However, if on the other hand, the rule only promotes public good or helps better implementation of a Vedic injunction, the presumption which favours its validity being more reasonable than its rejection, such a rule should be treated as valid.

The above tests were no doubt laid down to prove the validity of a *Smṛti* rule vis-a-vis the *Śruti* or the Vedas. But, in principle, we find a striking similarity to the following well accepted principles of interpretation in modern jurisprudence.

(i) Constitutional provisions are supreme.
(ii) There is always a presumption that legislators enact laws in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution or, in other words, that the legislative enactments are constitutionally valid.
(iii) However, if conflict is established, legislative enactment would be invalid.
(iv) Any order made under the law, by any authority on whom the power is conferred, is also presumed to be valid, but if it is found to contravene statutory provision, or made with motive, it is invalid.

Though the *Smṛtis* were regarded as of high authority and binding, the validity of any of their provisions was liable to be challenged. Actually, as shown above, Śabara, as also Vijñāneśwara, declared that some rules of the *Smṛtis* were invalid as having proceeded from bad motive or as being contrary to the *Śruti.*

RULES OF INTERPRETATION

Having laid down the procedure to be followed in resolving conflicts, as also regarding the rule of preference in case of conflict between different sources of law, Jaimini expounded the rules of interpretation which are to be adopted to find out the real meaning of the provisions, including the clauses or words incorporated therein, having due regard to the object and purpose of the provision, whenever it became necessary.

Elementary Principles

The elementary and important principles of interprettion laid down by Jaimini are as follows:

I. The *Sārthakya* axiom: Every word and sentence must have some meaning and purpose.
II. The *Lāghava* axiom: Where one rule or proposition would suffice, more must not be assumed.
III. The *Arthaikatva* axiom: To a word or a sentence occurring at one and the same place double meaning should not be given.
IV. The *Guṇapradhāna* axiom: If a word or a sentence which, on the face of it, purports to express a subordinate idea which clashes with the principal idea, the former must be adjusted to the latter or altogether disregarded.
V. The *Sāmañjasya* axiom: Contradiction between words and sentences is not to be presumed where it is possible to reconcile them.
VI. The *Vikalpa* axiom: Where there is a real contradiction, one of the contradictory matters may be adopted at one's option.[40]

I. ***The Sārthakya principle:***

Śabdādhikyāt arthādhikyam.

'More words, more meanings'.[41]

Jaimini applies this principle and states that commendatory words used in a *Vidhi* have a meaning and purpose, as they make explicit what is implicit in the rule and therefore, cannot be ignored. The fault of an interpretation rendering a part of the provision otiose was termed '*anārthakyadoṣā*'.

The above principle is also the primary or literal rule of construction in modern jurisprudence.

Maxwell:

"A construction which would leave without effecting any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected."[42]

III. ***The Arthaikatva principle:***

This principle meant that there should be consistency in the meaning given to the same word in different contexts.

Sakṛduccaritaḥ śabdaḥ sakṛdevārthaṁ gamayati.

The same word used at different places should be given the same meaning.[43]

This principle means that, unless there are special reasons to do so, i.e. unless the context otherwise requires, a word must be given the same meaning at all places in a text wherever it is used.[44] The above principle is also found to be a good rule of interpretation in modern jurisprudence.

Maxwell:

"It is at all events reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of the Act."[45]

This rule was applied by Jīmūtavāhana in interpreting the word 'mother' used in a rule laid down on the law of inheritance. The rule of the *Smṛti* reads:

Samāṁśahāriṇī mātā.

Mother shall be an equal sharer.[46]

The above rule was laid down to specify the share of the mother at a partition between sons.

The question for consideration was whether the expression 'mother' included 'step-mother' (childless). Jīmūtavāhana applied the *Arthaikatva* rule and held:

Samāṁśahārinī mateti vacanāt mātrpadasya jananiparativāt na sapatnīparatvam api. sakṛt śrutasya mukhyagauṇatvānupapatteḥ.

"Since the word 'mother' intends natural parent, it cannot also mean a step-mother, for, a word once employed cannot bear literal and metaphorical senses at the same time."[47]

Mit. on Yaj. II-123 is silent on the meaning of the word 'mother' as used in the rule, but Devannabhaṭṭa gave a liberal interpretation to it:

Jananigrahanaṁ tatsapatnyāderupalakṣaṇārtham.

The word 'mother' used here includes her co-wives.

The view of Devannabhaṭṭa is in conformity with Viṣṇu (p. 73-74) which states, "Mothers shall receive shares proportionate to their sons' shares." The use of the plural is indicative of the inclusion of all the wives of the father, all of whom stand in the position of 'mother'.[49] Nandapaṇḍita also had taken a similar view of Viṣṇu (pp. 73-74). Though no reason is given by them for the above interpretation, it appears to be a reaosnable construction of the rule. The interpretors belonging to *Mitākṣarā* school preferred to construe the rule as providing a share for all the wives of the deceased father, i.e. that the word 'mother' used in the rule was not intended to include only such of the wife or wives (in cases where the father had more than one wife) who had male children, for purposes of getting a share in the property of their husband's so as to deny the other wife or wives (who had no male issues) without any share, rendering them destitutes.

The above method of understanding the meaning of the word in the context in which it was used was also authorized by the rules of *Mīmāṁsā*.[50]

Adopting such a rule of construction, i.e. when a word, having regard to the context, is found to have been used in a different sense in a statute, such meaning could be given to it, is also one of the recognized principles in the modern rule of interpretation.

Maxwell:

"The same word may be used in different sense in the same statute and even in the same section."[51]

Therefore, while normally the same word used in the same statute at different places should be given the same meaning, for good reasons different meanings could also be given. That is why, even when an Act defines the words used in that Act, the definition section always takes care to say 'unless the context otherwise requires'.

It is unnecessary to go into the correctness of the rule of construction adopted by Jīmūthavāhana and Devannabhaṭṭa (Sm. Ch.). What is of importance is, they indicate a fairly well developed stage of the art of interpretation. The view of the former became the law in Bengal and Assam and that of the latter, being a commentary on *Mitākṣarā*, became the law in the rest of the country.[52]

There was nothing unusual in the two learned authors taking divergent views. This is similar to what happens when different High Courts take divergent views on the

interpretation of one and the same law, which continues to be the law in force in the respective area until superseded by a decision of the Supreme Court.

IV. ***Guṇapradhāna principle:***

The principle of this rule is that if a word or a sentence in a provision used to express a subordinate idea is in conflict with the principal idea of the rule, the former should be reconciled with the latter or it should be discarded.

Jaimini lays down this rule tersely and precisely.

Jai. III (iii) 9:

Guṇamukhyavyatikrame tadarthatvat mukhyena vedasaṁyogah.

When a *Guṇaśruti* (subsidiary clause) is in conflict with a *Mukhyaśruti* (principal clause) the principal clause prevails.[53]

V. ***Sāmañjasya or Harmony principle:***

It means that contradiction should not be too easily assumed.[54]

The rule means that, as far as possible, all the clauses of a *Śruti* should be construed harmoniously. All the clauses, other than the clause which lays down the principle, should be understood as having been used to give full effect to the principal idea. In other words, it means that only when *Sāmañjasya* (harmonious construction) is impossible, having regard to the plain meaning of the words in the subsidiary clause, the rule of *Guṇapradhāna* should be applied and the subsidiary clause should be discarded, unless it be in the nature of a proviso (*Paryudasa*), in which event it should be given effect to in respect of matters covered by the proviso.[55]

This rule was applied to the following *Smṛti* texts which apparently appear to conflict with each other.

Gautama p. 303-29 (*Dharmakośa*, p. 1562):

Vibhaktajaḥ pitryameva

A son begotten after partition takes exclusively the wealth of his father. (Also Manu IX. 216)

Viṣṇu p. 17-3 (*Dharmakośa*, p. 1562):

Pitṛvibhakta vibhāgān antarotpannasya bhāgaṁ dadyuḥ

Sons with whom the father has made partition should give a share to the son born after the distribution.

On a plain reading of the two provisions, the following questions arise for consideration:

1. If a son born after partition was to take the property of the father, why should the brothers give him a share?

2. How and why should a partition made before his birth be reopened?

3. Whether the right of such son extends to the self-acquired property of the father and/or to ancestral property?

Jīmūtavāhana applied the rule of *Sāmañjasya* with great clarity and held as follows:

Idaṁ ca pitrupāttadhanamātravisye yadi tu paitamaha dhanamapi bhūmyādikaṁ vibhaktaṁ tadā taddhanavibhāgaṁ bhrātṛbhya eva gṛhṇīyāt mātuḥ nivṛtte rajasi tadvilbhāgavidhānāt. Tadāha viṣṇuḥ.[56]

"This is applicable only to the case of wealth acquired by the father. But if property inherited from the grandfather, as land or the like, had been divided, he may take a share of such property from his brothers; for partition of it is authroized (only) when the mother becomes incapable of bearing more children. (Consequently, since the partition is illegal, having been made in other circumstances, it ought to be annulled.)

That is declared by *Viṣṇu:* "Sons, with whom the father has made a partition, should give a share to the son born after the distribution."[57]

VI. ***Vikalpa principle:***

It means that in cases where it is impossible to reconcile the two conflicting provision, any one of them may be given effect to.

This rule naturally applied to a case where the *Sāmañjasys* rule failed.

Jaimini X-VIII 6:

Nātirātre gṛhṇāti ṣodaśinam ityādi niṣedhasya vikalparūpatādhikarṇam,
Śiṣṭa tu pratiṣedhaḥ syāt.

Prohibition, which follows an injunction amount to making one of them optional (*Vikalpa*).[58]

The above principle of *Vikalpa* was laid down in the context of two contradictory Vedic texts, one directing the doing of a particular religious rite and another prohibiting it. After discussing the whole matter, the conclusion recorded by Śabara was as follows:

Vacanaprāmāṇyāt pratiṣedho vidhiṁ badhitvā bhaviṣyati vidhirapi pratiṣedham.
Nānyā gātirastīti pakṣe mithyāpratyayaḥ kalpiṣyate. Tadā vidhiḥ
yadā na pratiṣedhaḥ. Tadā pratiṣedho yadā na vidhiriti.

In such a case one of the two, either the prohibition or the injunction, should be regarded as wrong (disregarded). In that case, it should be either injunction in all cases or prohibition in all cases.[59] (A.I.R. 1976 S. C. 133).

Both the rules, i.e. *Sāmañjasys* (harmonious construction) and *Vikalpa* (alternative), are well accepted rules of modern interpretation.[60]

Maxwell points out to several means of avoiding conflicts:

(1) Not to presume conflict and try to place a harmonious construction on the two apparently conflicting provision (similar to the *Sāmañyasya* principle).

(2) To treat one of the confliciting provisions as an exception or a proviso (similar to *Paryudasa* which is explained later).

(3) Treating them as distinct and separate situations or separate *Vidhis.*

When it is impossible to adopt any one of the aforesaid courses, the principle laid down is as follows:

"If two sections of the same statute are repugnant, the known rule is that the last must prevail."[61]

The reason for accepting the last rule is that the Legislature has set aside the earlier rule by the later rule and therefore, the later intention must prevail over the earlier. The *Vikalpa* principle, laid down in Mīmāṁsā, was also to cover a similar situation. However, the difference between the two is that, according to *Vikalpa* principle, there is option to follow the earlier or the later rule, while according to Maxwell, the later rule must prevail.

RULE OF CONSTRUCTION FOR ASCERTAINING THE MEANING OF A PROVISION

Six general rules of construction for understanding the real meaning of a provision were laid down. They are: *Śruti* (direct assertion), *Liṅga* (indicative power), *Vākya* (syntactical connection), *Prakaraṇa* (context), *Sthāna* (place or order) and *Samākhya* (name).[62]

The elucidation of the first four principles which are of importance are as follows:

(1) *Śruti* or direct assertion:

Śruti: When a sentence is complete and explicit in sense and grammar, no attempt should be made to strain or twist its meaning.

Yadarthasyābhidhānaṁ śabdasya śravaṇamātrādevāvagamyāte
sa śrutyāvagamyāte, śravaṇaṁ śrutiḥ.

Śruti refers to that meaning which is understood on the mere hearing of the statement. (*Śruti* means 'hearing')[63]

This principle means that when the meaning of a sentence is understood on mere hearing of it, it is not open to any interpretation. That meaning must be given effect to. This was the first fundamental rule of construction propounded by *Mīmāṁsā* and it is also the elementary rule of construction in modern jurisprudence.

Maxwell explains the rule of literal construction thus:

> Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise.
> Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced, however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be.[64]

This principle is another facet of the *Sārthakya* axiom. While the *Sārthakya* principle lays down that no word or words should be rendered superfluous, the *Śruti* principle requires not to attempt an interpretation when it is not called for. This is called the 'golden rule' in modern jurisprudence.

Maxwell:

> The so called 'golden rule' is really a modification of the literal rule. It was stated in this way by Parke B: 'It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, which could be collected from the statute itself, or when it leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further.'[65]

According to the *Śruti* principle, if the provision is clear and unambiguous, it is considered binding unless there are any syntactical defects.

Application of the 'Śruti' principle by Jīmūtavāhana: The Dāyabhaga law of inheritance was the direct result of the application of the *Śruti* principle to the relevant provisions in Manu, by Jīmūtavāhana.

Manu IX 104:

Ūrdhvaṁ pituśca mātuśca sametya bhrātarassamam.
Bhajeran paitṛkaṁ rikthamanīśāste hi jivatoḥ.

After the death of father and mother, the brothers may divide among themselves in equal shares the paternal estate *for they have not got power over it while their parents are alive.*

Jīmūtavāhana was of the view that the above rule was in the nature of direct assertion (*Śruti*) and therefore sons acquired no right in ancestral property till the death of their father. To the question that sons acquire right to ancestral property by birth, Jīmūtavāhana gives his answer thus:

Naitat manvādivirodhāt. yathāha Manuḥ:
Ūrdhvaṁ pituśca mātuśca sametya bhrātaṛas samam.
Bhajeran patṛkaṁ rikthamanīśāste hi jīvatoḥ.
Jīvatorapi pitroḥ putrāṇām kuto na vibhaga
ityāśaṅkāyāmidamuttaraṁ tadānīm asvāmitvad iti.

"That is not correct for it contradicts Manu and the rest: 'After the death of the father and the mother, the brethren, being assembled, must divide equally the paternal estate: for they have no power over it while their parents live'.

This text is an answer to the question as to why partition among sons is not authorized while their parents are living, namely, 'because they have no ownership at that time.'

Ato jīvatoḥ pitrordhane putrāṇāṁ svāmyaṁ nāsti, kintu uparatayoriti
jñāpanarthaṁ manvadivacanam ekaḥ śābdo'paraśca ārthaḥ.

Hence, the texts of Manu and the rest (such as Devala 18) must be taken as showing that sons have no right of ownership in the wealth of the living parents, but in the estate of both when deceased. One position is conveyed by the terms of the text, the other by its import.[66]

However, a contrary view was taken by Vijñāneśwara. Obviously, he followed the rule of *Sāmañjasya.* After an elaborate discussion and considering various objections, and referring to several other texts including the one attributed to Gautama, existence of which is disputed by the propounders of *Dāyabhāga,*[67] he held that right to property by birth was recognized and the aforesaid rule (Manu IX 104) only spoke of want of independence of sons during the lifetime of their father but not want of right. After considering all the texts, he answered as follows:

Loke ca putrādīnām janmanaiva svatvaṁ prasiddhataraṁ nāpahnavamarhati.

"It has been shown that property is a matter of popular recognition and the right of sons and the rest, by birth, is most familiar to the world and so it cannot be denied."[68]

It is true that the text of Gautama (published *vide* S.B.E. Vol. II, Part I) also does not contain the *Sūtra* which recognized the right of sons by birth on which Vijñāneśwara relied. However, it is difficult to impute to a jurist of such eminence an act of impropriety of relying on a non-existent text. Such a possibility is also inconsistent with the wide acceptance which his interpretation received. Further, the said text of Gautama as quoted

in Mit. is also cited in all the important commentaries compiled thereafter.[69] It was (and is) the law in force in all areas where *Mitākṣarā* law prevails, subject to legislative modifications. Therefore, it is appropriate to presume that there must have been in existence the said rule of Gautama. For raising this presumption there is intrinsic support in the published text of Gautama in which there is a rule which provides for partition during the lifetime of the father, of course with his consent.

Gautama 299-1-2; *Dharmakośa*, pp. 1144-45:

Ūrdhvaṁ pituḥ putrā rikthaṁ vibhajeran nivṛtte rajasi mātur jīvati cecchati.

"After the father's death let the sons divide his estate or, during his lifetime, when *the mother is past child-bearing, if he* (*the father*) *desires it.*"

One significant condition in the provisions is that during the lifetime of the father, even if he desires to effect partition, the mother should be past child-bearing age. If sons had no right by birth there was no necessity to incorporate that condition as in that case the question of protecting the right or interest of a child that might be born subsequently would not arise.

Whatever doubt is created by the above provision is cleared by Br. pp. 369-370, 1-2, *vide Dharmakośa* pp. 1155-1221-22.

Pitrorabhāve bhrtrṇāṁ vibhāgaḥ sampradarśitaḥ.
Mātur nivṛtte rajasi jīvator api śasyate.
Paitāmahaṁ hṛtaṁ pitrā svaśaktyā yadupārjitam.
Vidya śauryādinā prāptaṁ tatra svāmyaṁ pituḥ smṛtam.
Pradānaṁ sveechaiyā kuryād bhogaṁ caiva tato dhanāt.
Tadabhāve tu tanayāḥ samāṁśāḥ parikīrtitāḥ.

After the death of both the parents, division of the property among brothers has been ordained (to take place). It may take place even in their lifetime, if the mother be past child-bearing.

Houses and landed property inherited from an ancestor shall be shared equally by the father and sons; but the sons cannot claim a share of their father's own property without the consent of the father.

The rule of Bṛhaspati is clear and specific. The effect of the rule is:

(1) Partition can take place during the lifetime of the father. Sons could claim equal share in ancestral property and the consent of the father was necessary only to claim share in his self-acquired property. If there was no right by birth, this could not be provided for.

(2) Again, at the time of partition, the mother must be past child-bearing age. This condition was imposed obviously for the reason that partition should not affect the right (by birth) of any children born thereafter.

Vyavahāra Mayukha cites the above rules of Bṛhaspati as also the rule of Vyāsa that even if the property is self-acquired, the father cannot sell or gift away immoveable property without the consent of the sons, which was also relied on in *Mitākṣarā*.

Further even Manu IX 106 (for text, see next para) appears to support the view of Vijñāneśwara. After declaring the merit of begetting the son, the said rule proceeds to

state that the first son so born is entitled to the whole paternal estate and does not qualify it by saying that he would get it after the death of the father, which would have also meant that if the father preserved it till his death. Thus it appears that a harmonious reading of all the relevant texts (*Sāmañjasya* rule) has influenced the view of Vijñāneśwara. Usage and custom, i.e. recognition by the people of the right of a son by birth, was also taken into account by him in interpreting Manu IX 104.

Jīmūtavāhana, however, would not allow the literal meaning or direct assertion of Manu IX 104 to be whittled down.

Notwithstanding the divergence in their views, and irrespective of the correctness of one view or the other, there can be no doubt that both were eminent jurists and were held in high esteem by the society. Interpretation of Jīmūtavāhana was accepted in Bengal and Assam and that of Vijñāneśwara in the rest of the country and continued to be the law for several centuries and it is so even now by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution, except to the extent modified by recent legislations.

It is, however, interesting to note that while interpreting Manu IX 106, both the commentators resorted to the *Sāmañjasyā* rule of construction.

Manu IX 106:

Jyeṣṭhena jātamātreṇa pūtrī bhavati mānavaḥ.
Pitṛṇāmanṛṇaścaiva sa tasmāt sarvamarhāti.

Immediately on the birth of his first son, a man is called *Putravanta* (possessor of a son) and is freed from the debt to the manes; *that son, therefore, is entitled to receive the whole ancestral estate.*

If the *Śruti* rule was applied, only the eldest son would have been entitled to the entire ancestral property. But Jīmūtavāhana refers to the other provision of Manu relating to the eligibility of younger sons for the share on partition, as also to the text of Nāraḍa and the provision for a younger son to be *kartā* in certain cases and holds that all sons are entitled to a share.[70]

Vijñāneśwara also took a similar view consistent with the view that all the sons acquire right to ancestral property by birth.[71] He also declared Manu IX 112, which provided an additional share for the eldest son, as invalid on the ground of conflict with the *Śruti.*[72]

These instances indicate the prominent part played by *Mīmāṁsā* in moulding the ancient legal system.

(2) *Liṅga or indicative power: Liṅga*: when a word or expression used in a provision has more than one meaning, its correct meaning has to be determined by the context in which that word has been used.

Śabara on Jaimini III (iii) 14:

Tadabhidhīyate, yat tāvat śabdasya arthamabhidhātuṁ sāmarthyam tallingam.

Indicative power is the power or capacity of a word to denote a certain thing.[73]

This rule of construction means that when the meaning of a particular sentence is not understood on merely hearing it, it could be ascertained by any significant word or expression used in that provision, i.e. where the meaning which is implicit in a provision is made explicit by some particular word in the sentence.[74]

The corresponding principle set out by Maxwell is:

> Individual words are not considered in isolation but may have their meaning determined by other words in the section in which they occur.
> It has been said that one of the safest guides to the construction of sweeping general words which are hard to apply in their full literal sense is to examine other words of like import in the same instrument.[75]

Words in a statue often take their meaning from the context in which they are used.[76] In other words, not only the text but also the context should be the guide for ascertaining the real meaning of a provision of law.

(3) *Syntactical connection: Vākya* or syntactical connection means that, where words and sentences are not connected in an explict or clear manner, they (the words) should be joined grammatically so as to make a sensible proposition.

(a) *Principle of syntactical unit (Ekavākya) and syntactical split (Arthaikatva)*

Jaimini II 1-46; *Mimamsadarshana I, pp.* 142-143 (S):

Arthaikatvādekaṁ vākyaṁ sākāṅkṣaṁ cedvibhāgo syāt.

So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which on being separated are found to be wanting, they must be treated as one sentence.

All the words, phrases and clauses (which when put together serve a single purpose) should be read conjointly as forming a single sentence i.e. taken as a single provision.[77]

Pārthasarāthi Miśra

"All the words, phrases and clauses that have a single purpose, of indicating details connected with an Act, for instance, are to be treated as one sentence".[78]

Prābhākara

"*Artha* must mean *Prayojana* (purpose), as purpose is the most important factor; all the words in the sentence must be related to that important factor.[79]

A well recognized modern rule of construction also supports that it should be purpose oriented.[80]

(b) *Principle of syntactical split:*

Jaimini II 1-47:

Sameṣu vākyābhedaḥ syāt.

When a sentence is independent, it should be treated as syntactically distinct. Śabara refers to a *mantra* which contained different and distinct ideas together and interprets as follows:

Mīmāṁsādarśana p. 145:

Evaṁ tu sarve keptiviśluṣavacanāḥ, tacca dṛṣṭaṁ prayojanam.
Tasmād anekārthatvāt tatrāpi vākyabhedah iti.

As each set of words would be serving a distinct purpose, and various distinct purposes would be served by the group, each set should be regarded as a separate sentence syntactically.

This is the converse of the preceding rule. According to this rule, if a provision consists of several sets of words or clauses, and each of them indicates a specific object to be achieved, then each clause should be read disjunctively and not conjointly, so that all the objects are achieved which otherwise would defeat some of the objects sought to be achieved by the provision.

This is a well known exception to the general rule of literal construction according to Maxwell also.

> Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: "the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution."[81]

The dominant object of the above principle, according to both Śabara and Maxwell, is the same, i.e. the defective grammar or composition of a sentence should not be allowed to defeat the purpose (*Prayojana* or *Artha*) of the provision.

(4) *Context: Prakaraṇa* or context means that when a sentence or clause makes no complete sense by itself, however clear its meaning and grammatical composition may be, the meaning of such a sentence or clause should be ascertained by reading it with some other passage with which it coalesces, having due regard to the context in which such a clause or sentence is used.

Śabara on Jaimini 3-3-14 *at* p. 322 (*S*):

> *Kiṁ punaḥ prakaraṇaṁ nāma? Kartavyasya itikartavyatākāṅkṣasya vacanaṁ prakaraṇam.*

What is meant by *Prakaraṇa* (context)? *Prakaraṇa* is the declaration of what is to be accomplished and which stands in need of a procedure (which is required to be supplemented).

The difference between syntactical connection (*Vākya*) and context (*Prakaraṇa*), is explained thus:

Śabara p. 322 (S):

> *Tatra pratyakṣaḥ ekavākyabhāvaḥ. Prakaraṇe tu apratyakṣaḥ. Katham? Itikartavyatākāṅ-kṣasya samīpe upanipatitaṁ purṇam iti.*

Syntactical connection is directly perceived... In the case of context, what happens is that when some detail is found mentioned in close proximity to an Act which stands in need of the mention of the details or procedure, then the latter becomes complete by being supplemented by the former.[82]

This is similar to the modern rule of reading a provision, which is deficient in some respects, in the context of another provision which would clarify the rule.

Maxwell:

> The meaning of a section may be controlled by other individual sections in the same Act. So too, the apparently general language of a schedule may be restricted by the more specific provision of one of the sections of the statute.
> If one section of an Act, for instance, required that 'notice' should be 'given', a verbal notice would generally be sufficient; but if another section provided that it should be 'served' on a person, or 'left' with him, or in a particular manner or place, it would obviously show that a written notice was intended.[83] (AIR 1984 SC 1595)

ORDER OF PREFERENCE REGARDING APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

Jaimini 3-3-14:

> *Śruti-liṅga-vākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānām samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakarṣāt.*

Among the rules, *Śruti* (direct assertion), *Liṅga* (indicative power), *Vākya* (syntactical connection), *Prakaraṇa* (context), *Sthāna* (place) and *Samākhya* (name), that which follows is weaker than that which precedes, because it is more remote than the real object.

After an elaborate discussion of the principles and reasons governing the order of preference in the matter of application of the rules of construction, Śabara concludes:[84]

Mīmāṁsādarśana p. 326:

> *Tadeteṣāṁ śruti-liṅga-vākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānāṁ pūrvaṁ pūrvaṁ yat kāraṇaṁ tat paraṁ paraṁ prati balīyo bhavati.*
> *Na etasya utpannasya vimṛṣyamāṇasya bādhakaṁ vijñāntaramasti.*
> *Tasmāt teṣāṁ samavāye (virodhe) paradaurbalyaṁ artha viprakarṣāiti.*

Among the several means of ascertaining the true meaning of a provision namely, *Śruti* (assertion), *Linga* (indicative power), *Vākya* (syntactical unit or, split), *Prakāraṇa* (context), *Sthāna* (order) and *Samākhya* (name), the one that precedes is more authoritative than the one that follows.[85]

In view of this order of preference, where the meaning of a provision is plain and unambiguous, the *Śruti* rule of construction should be applied, irrespective of the consequences of such a meaning. It is not open to an interpreter to change its meaning by relying on the suggestive power of some words or on any other principle of interpretation.[86]

If the *Śruti* rule of contruction is not helpful, i.e. if the meaning of a given provision is ambiguous, then the interpreter should have recourse to the rule of *Liṅga* (indicative power) or *Lakṣaṇārtha.* If the meaning of a provision cannot be ascertained from the first two methods then only *Vākya* principle should be resorted to i.e. rearranging the sentence to give effect to the real purpose of the rule, without which it would be unworkable. *Prakaraṇa* should be followed only as a last resort.[87]

RULE FOR ASCERTAINING THE MEANING OF THE WORDS

Jaimini 1-3-9:

Śāstrasthā vā tannimittatvāt.

If the meaning of a word used in a text is indicated by the scriptures, then that meaning alone should be given.[88]

This rule means that if a particular meaning is assigned by the Vedas, to a particular word used therein, then it is not open to the interpreter to assign any other meaning even if the word carries a different meaning in common parlance.

Maxwell:

> Sometimes it is provided that a word shall 'mean' what the definition section says it shall mean. In this case, the word is restricted to the scope indicated in the definition section.[89]

Exception

Jaimini 1-III-30:

> *Prayoga-codanābhāvāt arthaikatvam avibhāgāt.*
> *Ya eva laukikāḥ śabdāḥ.*

The words used in the Vedas must be given the same meaning as the one given to them in common parlance.

This is an exception to the aforesaid rule and applies to a case where the scriptures have not assigned any meaning to a word. After a thorough discussion of this rule and after considering the argument that words used in the Vedas are '*Vaidika*' and those used in common paralance are '*Laukika*', and therefore the meaning of the former are different from those in common parlance, Śabara states the *Siddhānta* as follows:

Mīmāṁsādarśana p. 85(s):

> *Ta eva vaidikāḥ. Ta eva eṣāmartha iti. Kutaḥ? Prayoga-codanābhāvāt*
> *Prayoga-codanā sambhavati, yadi ta eva śabdāḥ ta eva arthāḥ*
> *evaṁ itaratha śabdānyatveartho na pratryeta. Tasmodekaśbdatvaṁ iti.*

"The words in the Vedas are the same as those in common parlance, and the things expressed by them are also the same. Why? Because thus alone are injunctions of actions possible; it is possible to have an injunction of action only when the words are the same and

the things denoted by them are also the same. If the two sets of words were different, then their meaning could not be understood (by ordinary men). Hence, the two sets of words must be the same."[90]

Illustration

There is a text which reads:

Nirmanthyena iṣṭakāḥ pacanti.

'Bricks are baked in *Nirmanthya* (fire)'.

The word *Nirmanthya* has got two meanings: one is, consecrated fire and the other is, ordinary fire. In this context, it is reasonable to understand the word as denoting ordinary fire, as no one bakes bricks in consecrated fire.[91] (AIR 1987 SC 222)

This is a very familiar rule of construction followed in the interpretation of the words used to indicate articles to be subjected to sales-tax under the Sales-Tax Laws i.e. when a word has various meanings, but the word is understood as in common parlance, by the sellers and buyers, so as to indicate a particular type of goods only, then the word must be given the latter meaning having due regard to the context, namely, the tax on sale of goods.[92]

Meaning of Doubtful Expressions

Jaimini 1-4-29:

Sandigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt.

Doubts regarding meaning of words should be decided by relying on the rest of the sentence.[93]

According to this rule, if any doubt arises as to what should be the correct meaning which should be assigned to a word used in a provision, it is permissible to look into the rest of the provision and decide its meaning having regard to the context in which it is used.

This rule is the application of *Prakaraṇa* principle to the understanding of a word. It is adopted in the interpretation of statutes. It means that a special meaning may be given to a word because of the group of words in which it figures.[94]

CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIMARY RULES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE

Jaimini 12-2-27:

Aṅgaguṇavirodhe ca tādarthyāt.

When there is conflict among the details of subsidiaries and primaries, the details of the former are to be regarded as superior in authority to the latter.

This principle was laid down in the particular context where the details of procedure prescribed for performing a religious rite were found to be in conflict with the primary rule prescribing the conditions for performing the same right.

The view expressed by Śabara on the above *Sutra* reads:
Mīmāṁsādarśana Part II p. 877:

Aṅgaguṇena pradhānguṇasya virodhe etasmin aṅgaguṇo bādhyeta. Kutaḥ? Tādarthyāt. Aṅgaguṇavat kriyate pradhānaṁ saguṇaṁ syāditi. tacced aṅge guṇavati kriyamāṇe viguṇamāpadyate ko'rtho'ṅgena guṇavatā kṛtena?

"In a case where there is conflict between the details of the subsidiary and the details of the primary, it is the details of the subsidiary that should be excluded. Why? Because it is for that purpose; as a matter of fact, the performance of the subsidiary is made complete in its details only with a view to making the performance of the primary perfectly complete in all its details; if then, it so happens in any case that the adoption of the details of the subsidiary makes the primary defective, what would be the use of making the subsidiary complete in its details?"[95]

The rule prescribed is similar to the rule in modern jurisprudence that whenever a provision of the law prescribing the procedure for the doing of an act is found to be in conflict with the provision of the substantive law for the implementation of which the procedure is prescribed, the substantive provision prevails.[96]

Several Details to Achieve One Purpose are Optional

Jaimini 12-3-10:

Ekārthāstu vikalpyeran. Smuccaye hyāvṛthiḥ syat pradhanasya

When several details (procedures) serving the same purpose are prescribed there should be option (to do one and not all).

Śabara explains this *Sūtra:*

Kiṁ kāraṇam? Pradhānaṁ hi phlāya vā kriyate phalavadupakārāya vā. Nāṅgāya. Sakṛt kṛtena ca kṛtaṁ kāryam. tasya nirarthikā āvṛthiḥ.

Why? The main act is done either for the purpose of obtaining a desirable result or (when repeated) for helping the result, and it is never done merely for the sake of a detail; and when the purpose is seved by a single performance of the act, its repetition would be entirely useless.[97]

Different Details Meant to Achieve Different Purposes are all Mandatory

Śabara furnishes the reason:

ye ekasmin karmani gunāḥ bahavaḥ śisyante tesāṁ sarveṣāṁ kriyā syāt saṃu evaṁccayaḥ. sarvesāṁ ś:asanam arthavad bhaviṣyati.

When several accessory details are laid down in connection with the same sacrifice, there should be performance of all; i.e. there should be a combination; as it is only thus that the injuction of them all serves a useful purpose.[98]

The rationale of the two *Sūtras* are self evident. The dominant aspect to be considered is the purpose. If for achieving a single purpose more than one procedure or method is prescribed, then all are not compulsory and any one of them is sufficient, as by one such method itself the object gets fulfilled. If, on the other hand, for achieving a single purpose more than one act or procedure are necessary, the performance of all of which are to achieve the desired purpose, then the performance of all of them is obligatory. For instance, if a rule prescribes two methods of service of notice on the opposite party to a case, one personally through an officer of the court and another by registered post, adoption of both is unnecessary as one method would be sufficient, as it serves the purpose. However, if a rule prescribes that a public notice shall be given by publication in the official gazette and also by local publication so as to notify the interested persons, observance of both is mandatory as the object of giving notice to all is achieved only by observing both the methods.[99]

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROVISIONS

Jaimini classified the Vedic texts as follows on the basis of the binding nature of the provisions.

(i) *Obligatory or mandatory rules:*
- (a) *Vidhis*—positive commands, *viz.*, a direction to do a particular act.
- (b) *Niṣedhas*—negative commands, *viz.*, a direction not to do a particular act.

(ii) *Non-obligatory:*
- (a) *Arthavādas*—non-obligatory rules connected with *Vidhis.*
- (b) *Nāmadheyas*—non-obligatory rules which are not connected with any *Vidhis.*

What Rule should be Considered Obligatory or Non-obligatory

(I) (a) *Vidhi:* The expression *Vidhi* has not been separately defined by Jaimini. But he has indicated its meaning while defining *Dharma* (Jaimini 1-1-2):

Codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ.

An expession having the character of a command is *Dharma.*

Mīmāṁsakas have given another definition—

Aprāptaprāpako vidhiḥ.

Vidhi is a rule which places you in a position to which you would not get into (but for the *Vidhi*).[100]

If a rule contained a direction which a man would comply with even without it, it is no *Vidhi.* But if it contains a direction which commands a man to do a particular act, which he is unlikely to do unless under the force of a command, it is a *Vidhi.*

(i) A rule that says, "Eat when you are hungry, drink water when you are thirsty, or you shall collect your salary when it is due," is no *Vidhi,* as there is no necessity to compel a man to do so; by nature he would do so without such a rule.

(ii) A rule which says, "Give one-sixth of your income as tax to the king," is a *Vidhi.* because, except under a compelling rule, no person would pay tax voluntarily.

(iii) *Nīṣedha*: The meaning of *Niṣedha* presupposes a command, and it is similar to *Vidhi,* but is in the negative form. The *Niṣedha* rule is against *rāga prāpta.* In other words, the rule which commands a person not to do an act which by impulse he is most likely to do unless prevented by a command is called *niṣeda.*[101]

Illustrations:

(i) A rule like, "Do not touch fire" is no *Niṣeda,* as no one by impulse is going to do that even in the absence of a command not to do so.

(ii) A rule like, "Do not pluck fruits or flowers from the public gardens or roadside trees," is a *Niṣedha,* as without such command a person is likely to do so.

Manu X-63 incorporates five commands:

Ahiṁsā satyamasteyaṁ śaucam indriya-nigrahaḥ.
Etaṁ sāmāsikaṁ, dharmaṁ cāturvarṇye'bravīn manuḥ.

(1) Observe non-violence.
(2) Tell the truth.
(3) Do not covet the property of others.
(4) Observe cleanliness (in mind, word and deed).
(5) Control your senses.

These are applicatble to all the four *Varṇas* as common *Dharma.*

Out of these, the first, second, fourth and fifth are positive commands (*Vidhis*) and the third is a negative command (*Niṣedha*).

To put it in a nutshell, all the provisions which are in the nature of a primary command (*Pradhāna codanā*) to ensure ideal conduct of human beings, as also to achieve heavenly bliss, were considered as *Vidhis* or *Niṣedhas* as the case might be. (A.I.R. 1972 S. C. 2563).

(II) (a) *Arthavāda:*

Arthavādānāṁ hi siddharūpo'rtho na hi tadarthasya kartavyatā pratīyate.

Arthavāda is a statement connected with a *Vidhi,* without adding to it or detracting from it. Thus, an *Arthavāda* is a subsidiary provision which may explain the reason of a *Vidhi* or it may illustrate it or expatiate the benefit of it, but it is neither a rule by itself nor an exception to or modification of the main rule.

To put it differently, *Arthavāda* consists of words or expressions used along with a *Vidhi* to make the rule more attractive and more understandable though, even without the use of those words the *Vidhi* would be complete and intelligible.[102]

Illustrations:

(i) The expression 'one attains all desires' added to a rule 'that final oblations should be offered in a religious ceremony or sacrifice' is only eulogizing the rule and therefore amounts to *Arthavāda.*[103]

(ii) The Vedas which contain injunctions not to commit theft as also not to tell untruth, further use expressions such as 'mind is a theif' and 'speech is a liar', which are only figurative to indicate that, just as mind remains hidden, thieves are also concealed, and

that many people habitually speak untruth. Such figurative expressions are also called *Arthavāda.*

There is another type of *Arthavāda* which appears in the form of an injunction, but in reality it is only commendatory, being only a statement of reasons in support of a *Vidhi* or in praise of it.[104]

The *Vidhis* are equivalent to what is termed as 'mandatory' in modern jurisprudence. *Arthavādas,* however, are not equivalent to 'directory provisions'. They are meant only to explain or praise a *Vidhi,* but do not add to or subtract from a *Vidhi,* and therefore, the question of their binding nature or otherwise does not arise.

There is, however, an exception when an *Arthavāda* becomes a *Vidhi.*

Jaimini 1-II-25:

Vidhau ca vākyabhedaḥsyāt.

If an *Arthavāda* amounts to an addition to a *Vidhi* then it becomes a separate *Vidhi.*

This exception means that though a sentence is part of a *Vidhi* but appears like *Arthavāda,* if in reality it incorporates an injunctive rule by way of addition to the *Vidhi,* should be regarded as a *Vidhi* and not as *Arthavāda.*[105] This is equivalent to the modern rule of interpretation that even if the wording of a provision appears to be directory, if the intention of the provision is ascertained and it is found to be compulsive, it should be held to be mandatory.[106]

(II) (b) *Nāmadheya:*

A word or expression which forms part of a law text but not part of a *Vidhi,* and which indicates the meaning of the word, i.e., what it means or what it excludes, is termed *Nāmadheya.*[107]

The difference between these provisions has been explained by K.L. Sarkar:

> There is no difference between a *Vidhi* and a *Niṣedha* in principle, the one being a positive command and the other negative. Now, the distinction between a *Vidhi* and an *Arthavāda* is this. A *Vidhi* contains a command imposing an obligation. An *Arthavāda* is a statement connected with a *Vidhi* without adding to it or detracting from it. It may explain the reason of a *Vidhi,* it may illustrate it, it may expatiate on the benefit of it, or it may present its effect in a tempting form to those who may not catch the spiritual value of it. Roughly, an *Arthavāda* may be called an explanatory or illustrative text, or a text in the nature of a recital or preamble. According to our modern legal ideas, an explanation or illustration can never be allowed to control the words of an obligatory rule. Jaimini also emphasizes that principle. He maintains that if you take an *Arthavāda* as adding to a *Vidhi,* then it becomes a separate additional *Vidhi* itself. And also if you understand it as detracting from a *Vidhi,* then it becomes a separate conflicting *Pratiṣedha Vidhi* (negative command), the one neutralizing the other. He would not allow this so long as the text was capable of being construed as an *Arthavāda.* But an *Arthavāda,* though it cannot be allowed to interfere with the force of a *Vidhi,* is yet useful, as Jaimini explains, to facilitate the understanding of a *Vidhi* and its application, and is thus its concomitant.[108]

As regards the class of text called *Nāmadheyas*, literally, they are description of names; practically they correspond to what in our modern legislation form definitions and general clauses originating in the *Apūrva* sanction but not containing a command in itself.[109]

PARYUDASA (PROVISO OR EXCEPTION)

Jaimini X-VIII-I:

Pratisedhaḥ pradeśe'nārabhyavidhāne ca prāpta-pratiṣiddhatvāt vikalpaḥ syāt.

Where the leading clause of a passage contains a general direction for the performance of a certain act and there is a prohibition of it under certain circumstances, the prohibition is to be taken as a legitimate exception or proviso (*Paryudasa*).

Śabara discusses this principle and holds that if one provision conflicts with another in all respects, then there would be the option to accept one or the other (*Vikalpa*), but if a provision only accepts a particular situation out of a general rule, i.e. permits contravention of the rule in a given situation, such a provision must be treated as a *Paryudasa*, applicable to the situation specified therein.

Paryudasa means a proviso or an exception incorporated into a rule in modern statutes. A case falling under the proviso cannot come under the main clause and vice versa.[110] This was also the view of Śabara. (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 12)

VIDHIVAIṢAMYA (INCONSISTENCY)

Vidhivaiṣamya means inconsistent arguments placed on different provisions of a statute. According to Mīmāṁsakas, such arguments should not be permitted.[111] A construction placed on two provisions of a statute, one of which cannot stand if the other were to be accepted, constituted the vice of *Vidhivaiṣamya.* Such a construction is also not permitted under the present rules of interpretaton.

NYĀYA (MAXIM)

The expression *Nyāya*, used in Mīmāṁsā, corresponds to the word 'Maxim'.

This is one of the devices by which an experience secured from or a conclusion reached in a particular case can be used to explain a similar situation in a brief and telling manner. A *Nyāya* may be used either for interpretation of the provisions or to explain the situation in a given case forcefully. *Nyāyas* are of immense use in the same way in which the Latin maxims have been used in jurisprudence. A modern treatise on the *Nyāyas* was written by Raghunātha of Rajasthan under the title *Laukikanyāyasaṅgraha.* Col. C.A. Jacob of Bombay has published as many as 430 *Nyāyas* with appropriate notes under the title *Laukikanyāyañjali* in three parts brought out in 1900, 1909 and 1911, respectively. Professor Ranganatha Sharma of Bangalore has published in 1959 as many as 212 *Nyāyas* in Kannaḍa, with a brief explanation for each one of them.

It is convenient to classify the maxims propounded by Mīmāṁsakas into two categories:

I. Maxims governing interpretation;

II. Maxims of general experience.

Some of the important maxims falling under these two categories are set out below and are explained with reference to the principles of interpretation and also maxims which are current in modern jurisprudence.

Maxims Governing Interpretation

Pāṭhakramanyāyaha: According to this, the order of sequence of various acts required to be performed in a given case are to be performed in the same order in which they are mentioned in the verbal text.

The principle is that if the provision of law gives sufficient indication as to the various steps to be performed to fulfil a designed purpose, then the sequence cannot be altered as it would defeat the very purpose of those steps. Śabara explains this principle thus:

> At any one sacrifice, the acts should be performed in a definite 'Order of Sequence'. Why? Because such is the very nature of actions; things are generally found to have the character of being done in a definite order; for instance, in the case of the sentence—'one should bathe, rub sandal-paste, breakfast', it is understood that the acts are to be performed in this definite order of sequence. From all this it follows that in all such cases the order of sequence is the one that is indicated by the order of the verbal texts concerned.[112]

An illustration would bring forth the force of this principle. If the law requires that before the imposition of municipal tax in a local area, or declaring an area as coming under local authority, there should be a publication of the proposal inviting objections, consideration of representations or objections received, consultation with the specified interests and thereafter a final decision should be taken; in order that the decision be valid, the same sequence has to be followed. If the decision is taken first, and the procedure for consultation, etc., is followed next, it would be illegal. However, this principle is applicable only to cases where the sequence is implicit in the rule and disobedience of it would defeat the very purpose of the law, as in the case of the aforementioned illustration. This is an accepted principle under the present rules of interpretation also.

Satranyāyaha:

Jaimini 6-3-22:

Bahūnāṁ tu pravṛtte'nyamāgamayedavaiguṇyāt.

At a *Satra,* if there is some disqualification in one of the masters, there may be a substitute for him.

This principle has been discussed with reference to a sacrifice for which the minimum number of 'masters' prescribed was seventeen.[113] The view taken was, if one of the masters became disqualified, the vacancy had to be filled up by a qualified person, as the

performance of the function by any number less than the prescribed number [seventeen] was invalid.

This is a very important principle. In modern jurisprudence also, if a statute requires that a prescribed number of persons should perform a statutory function, if one of them dies, resigns or becomes disqualified or otherwise ceases to be a member, another has to be brought in, and an act performed by a lesser number of members would be invalid. [*u.c. Bank vs. Their Workman* [A.I.R. 1951 SC 230 at 235]

Dvayo-Pranayantinyāyaha: This was one of the most popular *Nyāyas* which emphatically declared the inpermissibility of an inconsistent stand being taken by a party.

Jaimini VII-iii 19:

Prāyanaṁ tu saumikamavācyaṁ hi itart.

One and the same text should not be taken as a case of *Paryudasa* [mere exception] and again as a case of *Pratiṣedha* [prohibition][114]

K.L. Sarkar says: "Great importance is attached to it by the Hindu jurists. It lays down, however, a very elementary principle that one should not blow hot and cold at the same time."

The principle holds good even now. This means, a party cannot approbate or reprobate in that when a landlord files a case for eviction of his tenant from the rented premises, the tenant takes the stand that the Rent Control Court has no jurisdiction as there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and accepting that plea the petition is dismissed. Thereafter, when the landlord files the suit for possession, the tenant takes the stand that he was a tenant and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, which plea cannot be permitted.[115]

Kalañjanyāyaha: This maxim flows from *Niṣedha*—'*Na kalañjam Bakshyayet*', which means, Do not eat fermented food'. *Kalanjañyāya* is used to indicate a prohibitory act or *Niṣedha Vidhi*.[116] A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 1107.

Illustration:

To say that the *Kalañja* maxim applies to the interpretation of a provision of any law, means that the said rule, being couched in a negative language, is prohibitory in nature and therefore, such a rule must not be allowed to be violated directly or circumvented indirectly. This corresponds to the modern rule of interpretation that negative expressions are rarely directory, i.e., generally they should be considered mandatory.[117]

Madhyadīpikānyāyaha: Literally this means, 'Lamp in the centre'. This principle is useful in the interpretation of statutes. According to this, a word can be shown to throw light on the preceding as well as the succeeding clause, just as a light placed on a half partition wall throws light over both the apartments.[118]

Maṇḍukaplutinyāyaha: This maxim may be likened to a 'frog's leap', according to which the clause lying between two clauses is skipped over in order to make a resonable interpretation of the statute.[119]

Gobalīvardanyāyaha: This means 'cattle and bull' maxim. According to this, when two adjoining words having almost similar meaning are used in a provision out of which one is general and the other is more specific, the latter word qualifies the former.[120]

Kullūka has used this *Nyāya* to interpret Manu VIII 28 which reads:

Vaśāputrāsu caivaṁ syādrakṣaṇṁ niṣkulāsu ca.
Pativrātāsu ca strīṣu vidhavāsvāturāsu ca.

The king should take care of women who are barren, who have no sons, who have no family, wives who are faithful to their respective husbands, widows who are afflicted and have none to look after them.

Kullūka holds that in view of the last specification, the rule means that the duty of the king is to protect all women who had none to look after them. In other words, he holds that the women of whatever category, who are required to be protected by the king, are those who are destitutes.

The *Nyāya* is somewhat similar to the modern rule of construction indicated by the rule of *ejusdem generis* which requires that a general word which follows a specific word of the same category takes the restricted meaning of the preceding specific word. But in order to attract this rule there must be a genus or category.

Ghaṭa-paṭanyāyaha: This is the converse of the rule of *ejusdem generis.* The meaning is, if two words, like *ghaṭa* (pot) and *paṭa* (portrait), appear one after another in a provision, one of the words cannot be understood as qualifying the other. Therefore, in such a case, the *ejusdem generis* rule is not applicable, as the words do not belong to the same genera. Analogous to *Ghaṭa-paṭanyāya*[123] is the principle laid down by the Supreme Court that the rule of *ejusdem generis* is not applicable for interpreting the words 'local' or 'other authority', used in Article 12 of the Constitution after the word 'State'.

(i) *Sāmānyaviśeṣanyāyaha:* This is a maxim of the general and the special.
(ii) *Apavādaiḥi utsarga bodhyante:* According to this maxim, general rules are set aside by special ones.

The purport of these two *Nyāyas* is the same, namely, where there are two *Vidhis* applicable to a given cse, one of them being general and the other special, the latter should prevail.

This is a well accepted rule of construction in the present legal system incorporated in the maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant,* i.e. the speical provision excludes the general provision.[122]

Rūdhiryogamapaharatihi: According to this maxim, popular usage overpowers etymological meaning.

It is a very useful maxim, and of immense use, frequently applied in the interpretation of the laws. Whenever a word used in a statute has an etymological meaning and also a popular meaning which is different from the former it is the popular meaning which prevails over the etymological meaning unless there is an indication to the contrary.[123]

This maxim points out that whenever a doubt is created in respect of any question that arises for consideration, the same should be resolved by the application of reasoning.[124]

Sandhigdasya vākyaśeṣānnirnayaha: According to this maxim, whenever it becomes necessary, in that when a word is capable of being understood in two ways, the correct meaning of an expression has to be ascertained from the context in which it is used in any given provision.

For instance, this principle applies to the following verse of *Manu Smṛti:*

Pitā rakṣati kaumāre bhartā rakṣati yauwane.
Rakṣanti sthavire putrā na strī svātantryaṁ arhati.

"The father protects the girl in her childhood, the husband protects her after marriage and her sons protect her in old age. At no stage should a woman be left free."

Thus, the words "*na strī swātantrayam arhati*" used in the last part of the verse has become controversial because of wrong interpretation. These words have to be understood in the context in which they are used. At three places earlier the words used are "*rakṣati*" [protects]. Therefore, in the context, the words "*na strī swātantryamarhati*" only means that at no point of time a women should be left free in that, she should not be allowed to remain unprotected.

In fact, it must be said to the credit of Kerry Brown, a British author, who has in her celebrated work, *The Essential Teachings of Hinduism* at p. 186 gives the real meaning of the verse as follows:

> In Hinduism a woman is looked after not because she is inferior or incapable but, on the contrary, because she is treasured. She is the pride and power of the society. *Just as the crown jewels should not be left unguarded, neither should a woman be left unprotected.*

The other verses in *Manu Smṛti* in which it is said that "*Yatra Naryastu Pūjyante ramaṇte tatra devatāḥ*" and many other verses also indicated that the above meaning is the correct one.

Therefore, to interpret the verse to the effect that a woman must be treated as a slave by her father during her childhood, and by her husband after her marriage and by her sons in old age, and that she should be deprived of freedom throughout her life is wholly erroneous and perverse.

This is also a well known principle of construction in modern rules of interpretation. This rule means that whenever the legislature uses an ambiguous expression in enacting a provision, the real meaning of the provision should be ascertained by looking into the whole scheme of the legislation and the purpose for which the provision is incorporated. In other words, the context of the provision would help to clear the ambiguity or doubt and to arrive at the correct conclusion.[125]

Śundopaśundanyāyaha: This is a maxim of 'two monsters'. It is derived from a mythological story, according to which two monsters, Śunda and Upaśunda, fought with each other for acquiring Tilottama, a heavenly damsel, but destroyed themselves in that process.[126]

It has its counterpart in the latin maxim *Allegans contraria monest andicendus*, i.e. 'He is not to be heard who makes mutually destructive allegations'.

This maxim can be used to describe the mutually destructive pleas put forward by a party to a litigation who ultimately loses both the pleas.

Arkamadhunyāyaha: This maxim states—Go not far if you can find it close at hand.

Arke cenmadhu vindet akimartham parvataṁ vrajet.

If you can find honey in the *Arka* plant which grows in yard the back of your house, why go to the mountains in quest of a bee-hive?[127]

The meaning is that when an object can be achieved by following a straight path, why should one resort to a circuitous procedure.[128]

The maxim applies to cases where parties raise several contentions and try to advance long arguments at the expense of much public time though the case can be got decided in one's favour by a short and clinching argument.

For instance, when a petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground for want of *locus standi*, or when a petition presented by a person who has *locus standi* has to be dismissed on the ground of limitation or when a petition has to be allowed as the act complained of cannot be sustained in view of the same being made without jurisdiction, i.e. by an incompetent authority, it is unnecessary to spend time in addressing or hearing arguments on the other points raised, as even after considering those points, the petition has to be dismissed for want of *locus standi* or on the ground of limitation, or the petition has to be allowed on the ground that the order impugned was bad for want of jurisdiction, as the case might be, irrespective of any decision on other points.

'Ekamanusandhitsatoparaṁ pracyavate' iti nyāyaha: This maxim relates to an incongruous situation when one relies on an argument which gives rise to an equally strong objection.[129] It is like 'joining a stick at one end while breaking it at the other end' as the *Nyāya* is styled.

For instance, in a case where the petitioner relies on a statutory rule and the respondent relies on an executive order (which is made in contravention of the rule), the respondent by doing so invites the objection that the executive had no jurisdiction to issue the order in conravention of the rule. In such a case, therefore, it is no use relying on such an order.

'Śiroveṣtanena nāsikasparṣa' iti nyāyaha: This maxim applies to a case of resorting to a circuitous and time consuming argument to bring home a point though a straight and short argument is possible.[130] It is like 'moving the hand round the neck to show the nose' as the *Nyāya* implies.

Upajivyavirodhanyāyaha: This maxim means that one should not take up an argument which would cut at the root of one's own case.[131]

It is like a person seeking benefit under the provisions of law also raising an argument that the very law is unconstitutional, because if his latter argument succeeds, the very basis of his right falls to the ground. This maxim is similar to the proverb—'Sitting on the branch of a tree and cutting its trunk'.

It is unfortunate that though we got rid of political slavery in 1947, even after five decades we have not got rid of mental slavery. The Education System introduced by Macaulay, which brought about self forgetfulness [*Ātma Vismṛti*] still has eclipsed us. In this regard Justice S.S. Dhavan of Allahabad High Court had said this as early as in 1968 thus:

> Why study Indian jurispurdence at all? It may be asked: In these days when there is so much to learn, why should the student, the lawyer, and the judge be burdened with an extra subject dealing with the past? Some of you may be inclined to inquire whether the demand for the study of Indian jurisprudence is not another form of revivalism or nostalgia, and it would not be better to bury the dead past and plan for the future. These are fair questions and I feel bound to answer them, because I consider that the teaching of Indian jurisprudence in our law faculties is essential for the healthy development of our judicial process. I am also of the opinion that the comparative weakness of the judicial process in India is due to the fact that it lacks social roots and theoretical nourishment.
>
> Today, a law student in India is virtually ignorant of Indian jurisprudence. He does not know that the Indian judicial system and the Indian judiciary have the oldest pedigree of any existing judicial system in the world, that the "*Dharmasthiyam*" part of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* is, in the words of the Chief Justice of India, "one of the earliest secular codes of law in the world, and the high level at which legal and juridical principles are discussed, and precision with which statements are made, and the absolutely secular atmosphere which it breathes throughout, give it a place of pride in the history of legal literature." Nor does the Indian student know that Indian jurisprudence had a rich secular content: that it originated the evolutionary concept of law which geared law to changing social conditions; the concept of sovereignty; the earliest theory of a state based on a social contract; the republican form of government; kingship limited by law and subject to the right of the subjects to revolt against tyranny; the concept of the welfare state; correlation of duties and rights under which duties are primary and rights corollaries of duties; the law of contract, partnership, and of negotiable instruments, a code of maritime and riparian navigation; a law of evidence including the principle that a man could not be punished until his guilt was proved by witnesses; the principle that the accused must have the benefit of doubt *sandeha* and a code of procedure which was similar to our modern codes in essential respects and, according to Dr. J.W. Spellman, superior in some respect.
>
> One great disservice which the British Government did to the study of social science including jurisprudence was the acceptance of Macaulay's Minute on Education in which all Indian thought in all ages was dismissed as "dotages of Brahmanical Superstition" and there was a complete switch over to the exclusive study of Western thought. The opposing view that the people of India must not be cut off altogther from their cultural roots was rejected. As a result for a whole century Indians were taught their ancient heritage with contempt. The system of education was designed to create, in the words of Macaulay, "a class of persons

Indian in blood and colour but English in tastes, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect." It did not succeed in making Indian Englishmen but completely succeeded in persuading Indians that they were an uncivilized people redeemed by the British. "This was the first time that the Indian mind was thrown off its balance." We talk of brain-washing behind the iron curtain without realizing that the greatest brain-washing operation took place in our own country then we accepted the myth that the rule of the law were Britain's gift to India. One of the results was the virtual burial of Indian jurisprudence which has been developed by our jurists and political philosophers for nearly three thousand years.

There is no harm in imbibing great ideas from other nations. No civilization can claim to be so superior or perfect as to reject exchange of ideas. A civilization which turns its back on the world and turns inwards cannot progress. We must borrow great ideas from wherever they come, as they are the common heritage of all humanity.

But there is a difference between borrowing and imitation. Only a people conscious of its own heritage and proud of its tradition is capable of borrowing ideas from other nations and adapting them to its own social conditions. A nation which is ignorant of its own intellectual heritage or has been taught to despise it becomes incapable of intelligent borrowing or assimilating great ideas. It can imitate; it cannot borrow.

This is precisely what has happened to the Indians in the field of jurisprudence and law. We are ignorant of our great heritage; we have been taught to despise it. Consequently, we have degenerated into a race of imitators.

Mahatma Gandhiji, had said thus:

It seems to me that before we can appreciate *Swaraj*, we should have not only love but passion for *swadeshi*. Every one of our acts should bear *swadeshi* stamp. *Swaraj* can only be built upon the assumption that most of what is National is on the whole sound. [My Picture of Free India, P. 74]

But Swadeshi which was uppermost in our mind during struggle for freedom was disregarded when struggle for political power succeeded it. Gandhi and his ideals were totally disregarded in every field such as social, political, cultural and education. If our country should regain its past glory, there can be no alternative than to resurrect our ancient knowledge and ideals subject to such alternations and modifications necessary in the modern scientific age.

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4. See Qualification of Judges, Part VII, Ch. I. of L & C. H.
5. See *Śabara Bhāṣya*—Translated into English by Ganganatha Jha in 3 Vols, 2429 pages.

6. Tagore Law Lectures 1905, p. 10.
7. Kumārila Q.T.L.L. [1905] p. 62
8. See *Śabara Bhāṣya* Vol. I, II, III, English verison by Sri Ganganatha Jha.
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10. *Swarga kāmo yajeta* is a Vedic hymn which means those desirous of securing *Swarga* (heaven) should perform *yajña.* Though initially the word *yajña* appears to have been used to indicate religious rites, in course of time the word acquired a very wide meaning, in that, performance of all the legitimate duties of an individual with utmost devotion, dedication and selflessness also came to be regarded as *yajña.* Thus the five fundamental duties of the king towards the kingdom were regarded as five *yajñas* to be performed by him. See *Rājādharma*—Duties of Kings, vide Part VIII, Chapter III, *Legal and Constitutional History of India,* Vol. I, by M. Rama Jois for further elucidation.
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CHAPTER 22

The Mīmāṁsā Principles of Interpretation

Markandey Katju

The Mīmāṁsā system was created in connection with the *yagya* (*yajña*). It is thus ritualistic and deals with the *Karmakāṇḍa.*

The Hindu religion today is very different from the Hindu religion of ancient times. Today the Hindu religion consists in going to temples and praying before the idols of Lord Rāma, Kṛṣhṇa, Hanumān, etc. But in ancient India there were no temples, no idols, no Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Hanumān, etc. The ancient Hindu religion consisted of performing the *yagya* before the sacrificial fire, and the Gods were Indra, Agni, Surya, etc. There is no mention of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Hanumān, etc. in the Ṛgveda. Since the ancient Hindu religion has almost ceased to exist (*yagya* are rarely performed nowadays), and since the Mīmāṁsā system was based on the *yagya,* it has hence today largely lost its relevance and significance.[1] Hence, among the six classical systems of Indian philosophy Pūrva Mīmāṁsā has now become perhaps the least important.

The two Mīmāṁsā systems—Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Uttara Mīmāṁsā rely on the authority of the Veda, the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā laying emphasis on the Brāhmaṇa part of the *Śruti*[2], while the Uttar a Mīmāṁsā lays emphasis on the Upaniṣad part of the *Śrūti.*

The Veda (or *Śrūti*) consists of 4 parts: (1) Saṁhitā (or *Mantra*) (2) Brāhmaṇas (3) Āraṇyakas, and (4) Upaniṣad. The Saṁhitā consists of the *Ṛgveda,* the *Sāmaveda,* the *Yajurveda,* and the *Atharvaveda.* Of these, the most important Saṁhitā is the *Ṛgveda.* The *Sāmaveda* is simply *Ṛgveda* set to music (though there are a few *ṛcas* which are different). Two-thirds of the *Yajurveda* consists of *ṛcas* from the *Ṛgveda* (the rest are texts relating to certain rituals). The *Atharvaveda* was at one time not even regarded as Veda, and Veda was then called '*Trayī Vidyā*' consisting of *Ṛg, Sāma* and *Yajur Vedas.* Later on, however, the *Atharvaveda* was also accepted as Veda.

Attached to these Saṁhitās are certain books in prose called the Brāhmaṇas (the *Ṛgveda* in verse form is called *ṛcas*). Thus, attached to the *Ṛgveda* are the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kauśiteki Brāhmaṇa,* attached to the *Kṛṣṇa* (black) *Yajurveda* are the *Taitareya Brāhmaṇa* and some other Brāhmaṇas, attached to the *Śukla* (white) *Yajurveda* are the *Śatapatha* Brāhmaṇa and some other Brāhmaṇas, attached to the *Sāmaveda* are the *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa* and some other Brāhmaṇas. The *Atharvaveda* has only one Brāhmaṇa, the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa,* attached to it.

While the Saṁhitās are hymns to various gods (mostly personification of natural forces like rain, fire, sun, etc.) the Brāhmaṇas prescribe the rules for performance of the rituals (the *yagyas*).

Since the Mīmāṁsakas believed that the *yagya* was the most important part of religion, they regarded the Brāhmaṇas as the most important part of the Vedas. On the other hand, since the Vedāntins regarded knowledge of Brahma as the most important part of religion, they regarded the Upaniṣads as the most important part of the Vedas. This does not mean that the Vedāntins did not perform *yagyas.* But the *yagya* was regarded by the Vedāntins as of far lesser importance than spiritual knowledge. On the other hand, the Mīmāṁsakas regarded that part of the Veda which lays down injunctions (*vidhis* or *niṣedha*) for the ritual as the most important part of the Veda, and these are contained in the Brāhmaṇas. As regards the Upaniṣads (and even the Saṁhitās), the Mīmāṁsakas regarded them as '*arthavāda*' and hence of much lesser importance than the Brāhmaṇas.

Having briefly mentioned about the Vedas and the systems of Indian philosophy I may now come to the question as to why principles of interpretation were created by the Mīmāṁsakas.

When the Aryans came to India around 1500 to 2000 B.C.[3] they spoke a language which may be called Ṛgvedic Sanskrit. Now Sanskrit is not just one language, in fact, there are several Sanskrits. What we understand by Sanskrit today, and what is taught in schools, colleges and universities, is really Pāṇini's Sanskrit, (also called *laukik* Sanskrit or classical Sanskrit). But knowledge of Pāṇini's Sanskrit will not enable one to understand the *Ṛgveda,* as the *Ṛgveda* is in ancient Sanskrit.

Language changes with passage of time. Thus, for example, one cannot understand Shakespeare's dramas without a good commentary, as many of the words and expressions in the English language which were prevalent in Shakespeare's times (the sixteenth century) are no longer in vogue today.

Similarly, the Sanskrit language kept changing from about 1500 to 2000 B.C. when the *Ṛgveda* was written to about 500 B.C.[4] when Pāṇini wrote his *Aṣtadhyayi,* which is perhaps the greatest book on grammar the world has ever seen. Pāṇini fixed the rules of Sanskrit, and thereafter no further changes in Sanskrit were permitted, except slight changes made by Kātyāyan (who lived about 200 years after Pāṇini) and Patañjali (who lived about 200 years after Kātyāyan, and wrote his great work, the *Mahābhāṣya,* which is a commentary on the *Aṣtadhyayi*). Thus, the Sanskrit with which we are familiar today is really Pāṇini's Sanskrit.

The language and grammar of the non-*śruti* part of Sanskrit literature was altered and made in accordance with Pāṇini's grammar, and hence is easily comprehensible. Thus the language and grammar even of that part of the *Mahābhārata* which was written prior to Pāṇini was altered and made in accordance with Pāṇini's grammar.[5] The same can be said about the *Rāmāyaṇa,*[6] and our other non-*śruti* Sanskrit literature.

But this alteration was not permitted regarding the *śruti* literature. One did not have the liberty to change the language and grammar of the *Ṛgveda* and make it in accordance with Pāṇini's grammar. Pāṇini or no Pāṇini, one could not touch the *Ṛgveda,* because it was held to be so sacred, in fact, it was not even written and was transmitted by oral tradition. Since the Brahmaṇas, too, form part of the Veda, their language, too, could not be altered and made in accordance with Panini's grammar.

The difficulty was that with the passage of time the Sanskrit language had changed since the times when the Brāhmaṇas were written, and hence many of the texts of the Brāhmaṇas later became incomprehensible.

The *yagya* had to be performed exactly as prescribed.[7] But the rules for performing it were mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa texts, many of which had become incomprehensible with the passage of time. It is for this reason that principles of interpretation had to be created to explain them.

Another reason why such principles of interpretation had to be created was that the texts of the Brāhmaṇas were often unsystematic, incoherent and rambling, with many ambiguities, conflicts, vagueness, etc.

The Mīmāṁsā principles of interpretation were first laid down by Jaimini in his sūtras[8] about 500 B.C. That they are very ancient is proved by the fact that they are referred to in many Smṛtis, which themselves are very old. Thus, the *Āpastamba sūtras* copiously refers to Jaimini's principles. Since Jaimini's sūtras are in very terse and concise form it became necessary to explain them. Many commentaries were written on them, e.g. of Uparvarṣa, Śabar, etc. but all these are lost except the *Śabarbhāṣya*. Śabar's work was, in turn, commented on by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Prābhākar, etc. These in turn were commented upon by Pārthasarthy Miśra, Śalignāth, etc. There are in fact, scores of books on the topic (all in Sanskrit), e.g. the commentaries of Sree Bhaṭṭ Śaṅkar, Apadeva, Laugakṣi Bhāskar, etc., and our interpreters have gone much deeper into the topic than Maxwell. While the Westerners have been doing interpretation only for about 200 years (Maxwell's book was written in 1875) we have been doing interpretation for at least 2,500 years or so.

The Mīmāṁsa principles of interpretation were created for religious purposes, that is, to enable correct performance of the *yagya*. However, since these principles were extremely rational and logical they began to be subsequently used in other branches of Sanskrit literature, e.g. in philosophy, law, grammar, etc., that is to say, they became of universal application. Thus, Śaṅkarācārya has used the Mīmāṁsā *adhikaraṇas* in his *bhāṣya* on the Vedānta sūtras.

The Hindu law originated in the Smṛtis[9], e.g. *Manusmṛti, Yājñavalkya Smṛti*, the smṛtis of Viṣṇu, Nārad, Parāśar, Āpastamba, Vaśiṣṭha, etc. There were conflicting texts, ambiguities, apparent absurdities in these, and hence the Mīmāṁsā principles, which were originally meant only for religious purposes, began to be used in the field of law also. Our great jurists like Vijñāneśwar (author of the *Mitākṣarā*), Jīmūtvāhan (author of the *Dāyabhāga*), Nanda Pandit (author of *Dattak Mīmāṁsā*), etc., regularly used the Mīmāṁsā principles in their commentaries whenever faced with any difficulty in interpreting the Smṛti texts.[10]

The Mīmāṁsā principles distinguish between obligatory rules and non-obligatory statements. The main obligatory rule is called a *vidhi* (or a *niṣedha*, if it is in negative form). *Vidhis* are of 4 types: (1) *Utpatti Vidhi*, or a substantive injunction (e.g., 'perform the *agnihotra*') (2) *Viniyoga vidhi*, or applicatory rules (e.g. 'with curdled milk perform the *agnihotra*'), (3) *Prayoga vidhi*, or rules of procedure, and (4) *Adhikāra vidhis* (rules regarding rights and personal competence). Apart from these *vidhis* there are certain quasi-*vidhis* called *niyamas* and *parisaṅkhyās*, but it is not necessary to go into detail about them here.

A non-obligatory statement is known as an *arthavāda*. Thus most of the texts in the Saṁhitās and Upaniṣads are regarded as *arthavādas* by the Mīmāṁsakas (since most of the Vedic hymns are in praise of some God, and do not lay down any injunction) whereas most of the *vidhis* are in the Brāhmaṇas. An *arthavāda* is a statement of praise or explanation and it is like the preamble or statement of objects in a statute. An *arthavāda* has no legal force by itself, but it is not entirely useless, since like a statement of objects or preamble it can help to clarify an ambiguous *vidhi*, or give the reason for it. Often a *vidhi* is couched in the form of an *arthavāda*, or vice-versa, and the mīmāṁsakas have dealt with these situations also.

In his book on the *Mīmāṁsā Principles*, K.L. Sarkar mentions 6 axioms of interpretation. These are:

(1) The *sārthakatva* axiom, which means that every word and sentence must have some meaning.

(2) The *lāghava* axiom (*Gauravah doṣah*), which states that the construction which makes the meaning simpler and shorter is to be preferred.

(3) The *arthaikatva* axiom, which states that a double meaning should not be attached to a word or sentence occurring at one and the same place. Such a double meaning is known as a *Vākyabheda*, and is a fault (*doṣa*).

(4) The *guṇapradhān* axiom, which states that if a word or a sentence purporting to express a subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea the former must be adjusted to the latter, or must be disregarded altogether.

(5) The *Sāmañjasya* axiom[11] which states that all attempts should be made at reconciliation of apparently conflicting texts. *Jīmūtvāhana* has utilized this principle for reconciling conflicting texts of Manu and Yājñavalkya on the right of succession (see K.L. Sarkar's *Mīmāṁsā Principles*, Second Lecture).

(6) The *Vikalpa* axiom, which states that if there is a real and irreconcilable contradiction between two legal rules having equal force, the rule more in accordance with equity and usage can be adopted as one's option (It must be clarified here that where one of the rules is a higher legal norm as compared to the other, e.g. a śruti is a higher norm than a smṛti, then by the *Badha* principle[12] the former will prevail).

It may be mentioned here that the mīmāṁsakas were great reconcilers. They made every effort to reconcile conflicts, and held that *vikalpa* was to be resorted to only if all other means of reconciliation failed, for *vikalpa* had 8 faults (*doṣa*).

Apart from the abovementioned axioms of interpretation there are the 4 well known general principles of interpretation in mīmāṁsā, viz:

(1) The Śruti principle, or the literal rule. This is illustrated by the well known *Gārhapatya* maxim. There is the Vedic verse '*Aindra gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate*' (with the Indra verse one should worship *Gārhapatya*). Now this *vidhi* can have several meanings, e.g., (1) one should worship *Gārhpatya*, the household fire, with a verse addressed to Indra, (2) one should worship both Indra as well as *Gārhapatya*, (3) One should worship either of the two. The correct interpretation, according to the śruti principle, is the first interpretation since the word '*Gārhapatya*' is in the objective case.

(2) The *Liṅga* principle (also called *Lakṣaṇa artha*) or the suggestive power of words or expressions. This principle can be illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in *UP Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore*, AIR 1988 SC 2239, where the words 'landless persons' were held to refer to landless peasants only and not to landless businessmen. In the Mīmāṁsā, it is illustrated by the 'barhi nyāya' (for details see K.L. Sarkar's book).

(3) The *Vākya* principle, or syntactical arrangement. Mīmāṁsakas illustrate it by the *Āruni nyāya* (see K.L. Sarkar's book).

(4) *Prakāraṇa*, which permits construction by referring to some other text in order to make the meaning clear.

The above are only some of the broad principles of interpretation created by the Mīmāṁsakas, and I am not going into details (which may be seen in K.L. Sarkar's book). The question arises, why did they fall into disuse, particularly when they are so rational and logical? The only answer can be is that when the British came to India they wanted to demoralize the Indians and paint them as a race of savages and fools, with no intellectual achievements to their credit. Hence they introduced Maxwell's principles of interpretation (given in his book *Interpretation of Statutes*) in our law courts, and these are still being followed today. There is nothing wrong in using Maxwell's principles where they are appropriate to the context, but why the allergy to the Mīmāṁsā Principles? In certain contexts Maxwell's principles may not resolve the difficulty and here Mīmāṁsā principles may be of help. Hence, we should use both Maxwell's and Mīmāṁsā principles in our law courts, and this is what I have been propagating.

I may now mention some of my decisions in which I have used the Mīmāṁsā principles, and in which the controversy involved could probably not have been resolved by using Maxwell's principles.

(1) In *Sardar Mohd. Ansar Khan v. State of UP* 1993(1) ALR 89 the controversy was that if two clerks in an intermediate college in UP were appointed on the same day who would be senior? Whoever was senior had the right to be promoted as head clerk.

Now on this point the law was silent. There is nothing in the UP Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations made thereunder which says anything about this. However, chapter II Regulation III of the Regulations says that if two teachers are appointed on the same day the senior in age will be senior. I used the *atidesha* principle of Mīmāṁsā, and held that the same principle which applies for teachers should also be applied to clerks, and hence the senior in age would be senior.

What is this *atidesha* principle? To explain this it may be mentioned that the rules for performing certain *yagyas* are given in the Brāhmaṇa texts. Such *yagyas* are known as *Prakṛti yagyas*. Thus, the *darṣapaurnamāsa*[13] is a *prakṛti yagya*, because the rules for its performance are given in the first chapter of the *Śatapath a Brāhmaṇa*. Similarly, the *agnihotra*[14] is also a *prakṛti yagya*, because its rules of performance are given in the second chapter of the *Śatapath Brāhmaṇa*.

However, there were certain other *yagyas* whose rules of performance are not given anywhere, e.g. the *Saurya yagya*. Such *yagyas* are called *Vikṛt yagyas*. How was a vikrit *yagya* to be performed? For resolving this difficulty (in fact, all the Mīmāṁsā principles were

created for resolving the practical difficulties in performing the *yagya*) the *atidesha* principle was created. *Atidesha* really means going from the known to the unknown. Hence it was held that a *Vikṛt yagya* should be performed in accordance with the same rules as the *Prakṛti yagya* of the same category. For instance, the *Saurya yagya*, which is a *Vikṛt yagya* belongs to the category of the *Darṣapaurṇamāsa*, which is a *Prakṛti yagya*. Hence, the *Saurya yagya* has to be performed in accordance with the rules of the *Darṣapaurṇamāsa*.

Now we may consider how the *atidesha* principle, which was created for religious purpose, began to be used in the field of law. A son which a man has through his legally wedded wife is called an *aurasa putra*.[15] His rights and duties are given in the smṛtis. But as regards a *dattak putra* (adopted son) his rights and duties are not given anywhere. Hence the *atidesha* principle was used and it was said that legally a *dattak putra* stands on the same footing as an aurasa putra[16], and hence he has the same rights and duties. In other words, the aurasa putra is treated as a *prakṛti yagya*, while the dattak putra is treated as a *vikṛt yagya*.

The *atidesha* principle will have even greater utility in modern times. Since society in the modern age is fast changing often cases will come up before the Court where the law is silent (because the legislature cannot contemplate all the situations which will arise in the future).

(2) In *Udai Shankar Singh v. Branch Manager, LIC*, writ petition no. 3807 of 1993 decided on 9.4.1998 the facts were that the petitioner was going on a scooter and met with an accident with a truck. As a result, his right leg had to be amputated, and his right hand was totally paralyzed. He had taken an LIC policy, and he claimed compensation. The LIC policy mentioned that compensation was payable on death or permanent disability. Permanent disability was defined in the policy as (a) loss of both the eyes, or (b) amputation of both legs, or (c) amputation of both the hands, or (d) amputation of one hand and one leg.

The LIC rejected the claim, saying that the right hand was only paralyzed, and not amputated.

Now if we follow the literal rule of interpretation (the *śruti* or *abhida* principle) the LIC was correct.

However, I allowed the petition holding that here the literal rule should not to be followed, and instead the *liṅga* or *lakṣana* principle has to be followed. After all, paralysis of the hand was as bad as amputation of the hand, because both lead to loss of use of the hand. The word 'amputation' has hence to be regarded as only illustrative and not exhaustive. We have to see the intent, and that was that compensation should be paid for loss of use of the hand. In fact, the modern method of interpretation, as Lord Denning has pointed out in his book, *The Discipline of Law* is to see the intent, and not go by the literal rule. The Mīmāṁsakas were great intention seekers. For instance, there is a text "*Kākebhyo dadhi rakṣitām*" (i.e. protect the curd from crows). Here the word 'crow' is only illustrative, because the intention was that the curd should be protected from all dangers, and not that it should be protected only from crows but may be allowed to be eaten by dogs, cats, etc. Similarly, the word 'amputation', too, should only be treated as illustrative.

In this connection it may be mentioned that Article 1 Section 8 of the US Constitution states that Congress can raise armies and navies. There is no mention there of an air force and the reason for that was that the US Constitution was enacted in 1791 when there were no aircraft. But the reality of today is that an army ordinarily cannot fight without air cover. Hence a literal interpretation of the provision has to be avoided, and it has to be held that the words 'armies and navies' are only illustrative, and they connote all armed forces necessary for the security of the nation.

(3) Under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), it is provided that a man arrested under the Act can apply for bail to the designated Judge. Designated Judge was defined in Section 9 to mean the Judge nominated by the State Government after consulting the Chief Justice. In UP the State Government, after consulting the Chief Justice, nominated all District Judges to be the Designated Judge in his district.

The difficulty was that in many districts there was no District Judge (since the High Court had not made selections) and hence persons arrested under TADA could not even apply for bail and could not be released even if they had a good case for obtaining bail, and some were languishing in jail for 8 or 10 months. In such cases, the *jateṣti nyāya* (rule of substitution) can be applied for solving this difficulty.

The rule of substitution, like other rules in the Mīmāṁsā system, arose out of practical difficulties in performance of the *yagya*. If often happened that the material (*sāmagri*) prescribed for use in the *yagya* was not available in the area. In ancient days there were no aeroplanes, trains or cars for bringing such materials from other areas. What was one to do in such a situation? The *nitya yagyas*, in particular, had to be performed as they were compulsory. The rule of substitution resolved this difficulty. This rule stated that if the material prescribed was not available in the area then the material nearest to it which was available in the area could be used. Thus, if the *soma* plant was not available the *putika* plant could be used.

Using this rule of substitution one could hold that where there was no District Judge the senior most Additional District Judge could grant bail (since he was nearest to the District Judge).

(4) In *Mahabir Prasad Dwivedi v. State of UP* writ petition no. 6318 of 1992, decided on 27.7.1992 the *anusaṅga* principle of Mīmāṁsā was used.

Section 7-A of the UP Town Areas Act provided that the District Magistrate could remove the Chairman of the Town Area for certain misconducts. There were two provisos to Section 7-A. The first proviso said that before removing the Chairman the District Magistrate had to give him an opportunity of hearing. The second proviso said: "Provided secondly that no order for removal shall take effect unless it has been confirmed by the State Government."

The question was whether the State Government also has to give an opportunity of hearing.

At first glance it seemed that it was not necessary for the State Government to give an opportunity of hearing before confirming the order of the District Magistrate. There was no such requirement expressly mentioned in the second proviso. Moreover, the second proviso was in close proximity to the first proviso where this requirement was expressly

mentioned, and hence it was urged by the respondents that the Legislature never intended that the State Government must give opportunity of hearing, otherwise it would expressly have mentioned it in the second proviso (as it had in the first).

However, using the *anusaṅga* principle I held that the State Government must also give opportunity of hearing.

The *anusaṅga* principle (or elliptical extension) states that an expression occurring in one clause is often also meant for a neighbouring clause, and it is only for economy that it is not mentioned in the latter.

The view I took makes the statute more fair and democratic. After all, the Chairman of a Town Area is an elected functionary, and hence he should not be easily removeable, particularly by a non-elected official who may be under local pressure.

(5) In *Tribhuwan Nath Misra v. DIOS* writ petition no. 17554 of 1990 decided on 30.3.1992 the *sāmanjasya* principle (principle of harmonious construction) was used. The question in the case was who can officiate as Principal of an intermediate college on retirement of the permanent Principal (till a regular selection). There were two apparently conflicting division bench decisions on this point. The division bench presided over by R.M. Sahai, J. had held that the seniormost teacher shall officiate as Principal, while the division bench presided over by V.N. Khare, J. had held that in such a situation it is the discretion of the management of the college to appoint anyone.

Using the *sāmanjasya* principle I held that ordinarily the seniormost teacher can officiate, but in exceptional circumstances (e.g. if there are serious charges against him) the next in seniority can officiate, but in such a case reasons and a brief opportunity of hearing should be given to the seniormost teacher. In this way the above two division bench decisions were reconciled, without the necessity of referring the matter to a Full Bench.

An illustration of use of the *sāmanjasya* principle by *Jīmūtvāhan* has been given earlier. One of the illustrations of the *sāmanjasya* principle is the maxim of lost horses and burnt chariot (*Naṣtasvadagdha Ratha Nyāya*)[17], which was used in Tribhuwan Nath Misra's case (Supra). This is based on the story of two men travelling in their respective chariots and one of them losing his horses and the other having his chariot burnt through outbreak of fire in the village in which they were putting up for the night. The horses that were left were harnessed to the remaining chariot and the two men pursued their journey together. Its teaching is union for mutual advantage, which has been quoted in the sixteenth Vartikā to Pāṇini, and is explained by Patañjali. It is referred to in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Tantra Vartikā.*

Mīmāṁsā principles sometimes lead to different results. For example, there is a text of Vaśiṣtha which says "a woman should not give or take a son in adoption except with the assent of her husband". This has been interpreted in 4 different ways by our commentators: (1) the *Dattak Mīmāṁsā* holds that no widow can adopt a son because the assent required is assent at the time of adoption, and since the husband is dead no assent of his can be had at the time of adoption. Vācaspati Miśra, of the Mithilā School of Mitākṣarā, is of the same opinion, but for a different reason. According to him, adoption can only be done after performing the *homa,* and since a woman alone cannot perform the *homa* a widow cannot adopt. (2) The Dāyabhāga view is that the husband's assent is not required at the time of actual adoption, and hence if the husband had given assent in his lifetime his widow can

adopt after his death. (3) The view of the Dravida School of Mitakṣara is that the word 'husband' in the expression 'except with the assent of the husband' is only illustrative, and hence if the husband is dead the assent of his father or other senior male member of the family is sufficient. (4) The *Vyavahārmayukha* and *Nirṇayasindhu* hold that assent is required only for the woman whose husband is living, and hence a widow can freely adopt unless she had been expressly forbidden by her late husband.

To give another example, the Hindu law diverged into two schools, the Mitākṣarā and Dāyabhāga because of two different interpretations given to one word, '*sapiṇḍa*'. Manu has written that when a man dies his property will go to the nearest *sapiṇḍa*. What does the word '*sapiṇḍa*' mean? That depends on the meaning of the word '*piṇḍa*'. According to the Dāyabhaga, '*piṇḍa*' means the rice balls offered at the *śrāddha* ceremony to one's deceased ancestors, and hence *sapiṇḍa* means the person who has the right to offer the *piṇḍa* (rice balls) in the *śrāddha* ceremony, and hence such person will inherit the property. On the other hand, the *Mitākṣarā* interprets the word '*piṇḍa*' to mean particles of the body, and not rice balls, and hence *sapiṇḍa* means one having the same particles as the deceased (i.e., nearer in blood). Thus *Dāyabhāga* is a more religious system, while *Mitākṣarā* is more secular.

The fact, however, that Mīmāṁsā principles sometimes lead to different results does not detract from their utility. Maxwell's principles can also lead to different results. This only shows that principles of interpretation should be applied appropriately, and not out of context or in a bookish way. They are, after all, not rules of law but a methodology or tool for resolving certain difficulties. Principles of interpretation, it is said, are good servants but bad masters.

It is also necessary to mention that the Mīmāṁsā principles were basically meant for interpreting the religious texts pertaining to the *yagyas*, and hence not all of them may be relevant for interpreting legal texts.

Our culture is very rich. However, it must be also pointed out that part of our old culture and our Sanskrit literature is outmoded, irrational and rubbish, though of course there is also a part which is rational and very great. We must therefore use our discrimination and reject the outmoded, irrational and superstitious part, while encouraging and promoting the useful and rational part. The Mīmāṁsā system contains both. The belief that on performing the *putrakāmeṣti yagya* one will have a child is, in my opinion, superstition and nonsense. A couple without a child should go to a doctor. Similarly, the belief that the various *yagyas* give various benefits is all superstition, and hence has to be rejected in this age of science. However, the Mīmāṁsā system also contains principles of interpretation, which are very rational and logical, and this part should be promoted and used in our law courts.

This is not to suggest that we should not use the sound and useful ideas of western jurists like Maxwell. Marxwell was a great scholar, and we would be petty and foolish to discard the good ideas of Western jurists. It has never been the Indian tradition to reject foreign ideas, merely because they are foreign. There are many good things we have to learn from the West, e.g. scientific knowledge. But at the same time, we should not blindly ape the West and discard our own traditional ideas if they are still useful and relevant. There should not be 'reverse discrimination' in the intellectual field. After all, we too have

produced great thinkers, and we can utilize their sound ideas wherever appropriate after making suitable adaptations to fit them to the prevailing conditions.

This is a practical age. We must make our Sanskrit literature (or at least that part of it which is rational and logical) connected with practical life, otherwise it will remain sterile. One way to do this is to start using Mīmāṁsā principles in our law courts.

I suggest that a body of experts from the fields of Sanskrit, Philosophy and Law should be set up by the Indian Law Institute, the National Law School, and/or other organizations for this purpose.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. In this connection I may narrate an incident. I had been invited by the Benaras Sanskrit University (The Sampurna Nand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya) to deliver a lecture on the Mīmāṁsā principles. I was told by the then Vice Chancellor Dr. Mandan Mishra that the University has a Mīmāṁsā Department but the department has no teacher. I was shocked. What kind of a department is it that has no teachers? He told me that people with knowledge of Mīmāṁsā are just not available. This shows the plight of Mīmāṁsa today.
2. Veda is also called Śruti.
3. There is a controversy whether Aryans came from outside India or not. It is not necessary to enter into this controversy here, though the writer believes that they came from outside as there appears to be overwhelming evidence in support of this view.
4. These are rough, not accurate, dates.
5. The *Mahābhārata* is 10 times longer than Homer's epics *Iliad* and *Odyssey* put together. Hence it could not possibly have been written by one man. It is said that Veda Vyās wrote it. But '*Vyās*' merely means 'a writer', and hence it is not the name of a particular man. In all probability someone initially wrote one small portion of it, someone in the next generation added another portion, someone in the third generation added some more, etc. Thus it seems that the *Mahābhārata*, as it exists today, was written over several centuries, and was written by dozens of persons. Some portion of it was certainly written before Pāṇini because Pāṇini has referred to the *Mahābhārata* in his *sūtras*.
6. Though the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* are highly respected by Hindus they are not as sacred as the Vedas as they are not Śruti.
7. There are two kinds of Vedic *yagya*, the *nitya yagya*, and the *kāmya yagya*. *Nitya yagya*, e.g. *agnihotra*, *darṣapaurnamas*, etc. were for religious benefit, and were compulsory, while the *kāmya yagyas* were for various wordly benefits, and were optional. Certain minor deviations from the prescribed rules were permitted in the case of the *nitya yagyas*, but no deviations at all were permitted for *kamya yagyas*. On the correct performance of the *yagya* it was believed that a force called '*apūrva*' was created which resulted in giving the fruits of that *yagya* e.g. wealth, cattle, rain, child, victory in war, etc.
8. In fact, the Mīmāṁsā rules of interpretation existed even before Jaimini, since Jaimini himself has referred to 8 Acāryas on the topic in his '*pūrvapakṣa*'.
9. It is taught in our law colleges and law departments that Hindu law originated from the Vedas. This is a fiction. There is no law in the Vedas.
10. The Mīmāṁsa principles of interpretation have been narrated fairly exhaustively in K.L. Sarkar's book *The Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation* which is the best book in English on the topic. (This book published in 1909 is a collection of 13 lectures delivered in 1905 by K.L. Sarkar in the Tagore Law Lectures series. The writer has edited a second edition of the book, published by Modern Law Publications, 8 Hastings Rd., Allahabad)
11. *Sāmañjasya* Principle: This is laid down in Book I, Chapter II, Sūtra 9 of Jaimini's Sūtras as follows: "The inconsistencies asserted are not actually found. The conflict consists of difference of application. The real injunction is not affected by application. Hence there is consistency." This principle is illustrated in the Dāyabhāga. Jīmūtvāhana found that there are inconsistent texts regarding the right of a son born after partition. Thus, Manu says, "A son, born after division, shall alone take the paternal wealth", and this is also the view of Nārada and Gautam. However, Viṣṇu says "Sons, with whom the father has made

a partition, should give a share to the son born after the distribution" and this is also the view of Yājñavalkya. Jimutvāhana reconciles these texts by holding that the former text applies to the self acquired property of the father, while the latter applies to property which is descended from the grandfather.

12. *Badha* Principle, or exclusion by repugnancy, e.g., a special law prevails over a general law, a higher law prevails over a lower law, a clear law prevails over an unclear law, a law which serves a purpose immediately prevails over that which is of remote service, a manifest sense prevails over a sense by context, etc. More examples are given in Śree Bhaṭṭ Śaṅkar's *'Mīmāṁsā Valaprakaś'* (which have been referred to in K.L. Sarkar's Mīmāṁsā Principles'). Jaimini has described this principle in the Tenth Chapter of his work.
13. '*Darṣa*' means *amāvasya* or moonless night, and *paurṇamāsa* means full moon. Hence this *yagya* had to be performed every fortnight, on moonless and full moon days. It was a *nitya yagya* (i.e. a *yagya* for religious benefit) and hence was compulsory, as contrasted to *Kamya yagyas* (for some worldly benefit) which were optional.
14. This is also a *nitya yagya*, and had to be performed daily.
15. These are 11 other varieties of sons, e.g. *kṣetraja putra* (a son through some other man's wife, i.e. through *niyoga*), but it is not necessary here to go into these details.
16. There is only one small difference. For a *dattak putra* the prohibited degrees of relationship for marriage are on both sides, i.e. on the side of the natural family as well as the adoptive family.
17. Nyāyas or Maxims are often used by the Mīmāṁsakas to illustrate a principle of interpretation. There are a large number of nyāyas e.g. *holikā nyāya, Āruni nyāya, ṣoḍaśi nyāya, sphadi nyāya, Kapijjala nyāya, Matsya nyāya,* etc.

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